# 001

#### “Financial incentive” is a distinct category that requires a cash transfer – excludes tax incentives.

Christiansen & Böhmer 5 (Hans, Senior Economist in the OECD Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, & Alexander, co-ordinator of the MENA-OECD Investment Programme in the OECD’s Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Investment Division, “Incentives and Free Zones In The MENA Region: A Preliminary Stocktaking,” MENA-OECD Investment Programme, OECD, Working Group 2, p. 4-5, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/22/36086747.pdf)

I. Toward a common definition of incentives and FEZs¶ a) Investment incentives¶ 3. There is a grey area between, on the one hand, investment promotion and facilitation, and investment incentives on the other. Investment promoters may make information about their host location, relevant laws and administrative procedures available as a public good, but as soon as they offer facilitation and matchmaking tailored to the needs of individual investors then they are effectively subsidising these investors. The monetary value to investors of such assistance may in some cases exceed the value of outright investment incentives. Conversely, actual investment incentives are normally considered as falling into three categories, namely “regulatory”, “fiscal” and “financial” incentives1:¶ • Regulatory incentives are policies of attracting investment projects by offering derogations from national or sub-national rules and regulation. Where such derogations are offered on an economy-wide basis they tend to focus on the environmental, social and labour-market related requirements placed on investors. In the context of FEZs, they often consist in the relaxation of direct investment regulations (e.g. nationality requirements; screening and authorisation procedures) in place elsewhere in the host economy.¶ • Fiscal incentives consist of an easing of the tax burden on the investing companies or their employees. Unlike many other incentives they are most commonly rules-based as changes in taxation in most cases require legislative action. General fiscal incentives normally take the form of reduced corporate tax rates or tax holidays; encouragement of capital formation (e.g. investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation allowances); and preferential treatment of foreign operators (e.g. lower tax on remittances; reduced personal income tax rates on expatriates). In FEZs fiscal incentives, virtually by definition, also include lower import and export taxes and tariffs.¶ • Financial incentives consist of out of hand public spending to attract companies or induce them to invest. They are often formally justified by a need to compensate investors for the perceived disadvantages of a particular location (“site equalisation outlays”), or may take the form of tailoring the infrastructure of a prospective location to the needs of investors. Other financial incentives include subsidising the actual costs of relocating corporate units (e.g. job training cost; expatriation support; and temporary wage subsidies).

Vote negative-

a. explodes limits- allows any different financial mechanisms that we can’t be prepared for

b. ground- we lose core disads to up front government spending

# 010

#### Will pass – capital key – issues will be worked out

CT POST 3 – 28 – 13 Connecticut Post <http://www.ctpost.com/local/article/Immigration-reform-gaining-support-in-Congress-4393187.php>

A Republican Party in desperate search for relevance to Latino voters. An expanded Democratic advantage in the Senate. A second-term President with his legacy on the line.

Does all that add up to enough to break decades of impasse and produce comprehensive immigration reform? As expectations -- and tensions -- rise, the answer won't be long in coming.

A bipartisan bill could be filed in the Senate as early as next week, followed in relatively short order by a House bill, also crafted by a bipartisan group, aiming at a compromise on the key issue of citizenship.

The efforts are being applauded by President Barack Obama, who is using every ounce of his political clout to try to get comprehensive reform.

Obama said the time has come "to work up the political courage to do what's required to be done."

"I expect a bill to be put forward. I expect a debate to begin next month. I want to sign that bill into law as soon as possible," Obama said at a White House naturalization ceremony.

In addition to the issue of eventual citizenship for 11 million undocumented immigrants, Congress is expected to address the need for temporary or guest worker programs.

Congress last passed comprehensive bipartisan reform legislation in 1986, when President Ronald Reagan signed a law that granted citizenship to several million undocumented immigrants and created a guest worker program.

Up until now, Republicans have opposed citizenship programs as an "amnesty" for lawbreakers who entered the country illegally, and labor has chafed at guest worker programs.

But Republican losses in the 2012 elections and increased public support for reform have many in the GOP talking compromise.

"If there is one issue that the two parties could produce something meaningful on in this Congress, it would be immigration," said Stephen Hess, a political expert at The Brookings Institution.

Hess said an eventual bill "will have lots of provisos, and it will go back and forth, but it would be hard not to produce something given the general feeling that something has to be produced."

More and more Republicans are moving toward immigration-reform measures as the party seeks to reach out to Latinos, the nation's largest -- and growing -- minority voting bloc.

Public opinion is behind them.

A recent poll showed 63 percent of Americans supported a path to citizenship for undocumented workers provided they meet certain requirements, according to a survey by the Public Religion Research Institute.

Notable Republicans who have recently spoken in favor of compromise on citizenship proposals include Sen. Rand Paul, R-Ky.; former Mississippi Gov. Haley Barbour; and Rep. Paul Ryan, R-Wis.

And a March report by the National Republican Committee, considered a "post mortem" on the 2012 elections, recommended the GOP embrace comprehensive immigration reform to shore up its shaky standing with minorities -- Latinos, in particular.

Roy Beck, executive director of Numbers USA, which advocates lower numerical numbers on immigration, predicted a majority of Republican senators would oppose citizenship.

Groups like Numbers USA are working to hold GOP senators in line. They sent 13,000 emails to Kentucky voters that claimed Paul's position was "more radical and pro-immigration than anything proposed by President Obama."

The group has targeted Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., one of the "Gang of Eight" senators writing the Senate bipartisan bill, as a lawmaker who favors foreign workers over unemployed South Carolinians.

Democrats from conservative-leaning states could also feel political heat.

Beck said if five to 10 Democrats in the Senate oppose a bill, proponents would need 10 to 15 Republicans to reach the 60 votes needed to cut off debate and vote on legislation.

"You do the math," Beck said.

In 2007, an effort to cut off debate on a Senate immigration reform bill died on a 46-53 vote.

But immigrant reform proponents, such as America's Voice, say there is a "tectonic shift" in the GOP, and the Democrats also have expanded their Senate majority to 53-45, plus two independents who caucus with them. They predict the Senate will muster the votes necessary to pass a reform bill.

Still, it won't be easy.

"We will have not only a few potholes, but a few near-death experiences along the way," said Frank Sharry, America's Voice executive director.

#### Plan costs MASSIVE CAPITAL

COHEN 3 – 18 – 13 Executive Director, Columbia University's Earth Institute [Steven Cohen, Hiding Renewables Inside the 'All of the Above' Energy Strategy Won't Work, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steven-cohen/hiding-renewables-inside_b_2899833.html>]

Even worse, no sooner had the president announced his meager plan, than the usual suspects responded with their automatic, reflex-like rejection. As Phillip Rucker reported last week in the Washington Post:

"After details of Obama's plan emerged Friday morning, a spokesman for House Speaker John A. Boehner (R-Ohio) voiced skepticism about it and suggested that the administration ought to do more to grow domestic oil and gas production."

It is clear that no great national renewable energy project is possible with an anti-government Republican Party in charge of the U.S. House of Representatives. The basic research on alternative energy so vital to America's future will not take place until we elect a Congress willing to spend more money on science and technology research. It is useful for the president to use his executive authority to do whatever he can to fund this research and to raise to cost of global warming pollution through EPA's command and control style regulation. But this "small ball" strategy is not enough, and no one should be fooled into thinking it is.

As I wrote last week, the strategy of "all of the above" is not a real energy policy, but a political slogan designed to reduce political heat and in this case, squeeze a little renewable energy research through under the broad cloak of a policy that continues to promote fossil fuels.

If we promote every form of energy, why would anyone oppose throwing a few crumbs at alternative energy? You can almost hear the Administration pleading to industry lobbyists: "We're not some soft-minded advocates of renewable energy, we're not against fossil fuels; we're in favor of every form of energy." This may sound like pragmatic, hard-headed politics inside the beltway, but from out here it seems weak, confused and self-defeating. We're not going to transition off fossil fuels by continuing to promote their extraction and use. We need strong, direct, presidential leadership. We need a president willing to expend real political capital and take this issue on directly.

The world doesn't need America to lead an "all of the above" approach to energy. The intense demand for energy in the developing world is already following that strategy. China is spending money on solar. But the real money is going to fossil fuels. Coal fired power plants are being built and planned at a ferocious rate. According to the World Resources Institute:

"... 1,199 new coal-fired plants, with a total installed capacity of 1,401,278 megawatts (MW), are being proposed globally. These projects are spread across 59 countries. China and India together account for 76 percent of the proposed new coal power capacities."

There is no question that demand for energy will continue to increase, and that inadequate energy supplies would be economically devastating and politically destabilizing. It is easy to see why national leaders, like our own president, gravitate to the "all of the above" energy strategy. My point is that we do not need governments to advocate or pursue "all of the above". The free market will take care of that on its own. The only way to intervene in that market is to fund the basic research that will generate a transformative energy technology. The only way to reduce the use of fossil fuels is to develop an energy source that is cheaper and hopefully safer and cleaner than fossil fuels. Until government funds the basic research needed to develop renewable alternatives, we will have no choice but to burn fossil fuels.

It's certainly true that an extra $200 million a year for energy research can't hurt. Perhaps the president will find a few other billion in the military and NSF budgets to add to the fund. A little extra cash can go a long way in the hands of capable scientists. But something this important needs more attention, more rhetoric and much more money.

There is no single issue more important to the development of a sustainable economy than the transition to renewable energy. We have a president who seems to understand this in his brain, but his awareness has not made the journey to his gut. In contrast to President Obama's understanding of the issue and his sense that it requires government action, we see Republicans in Congress denying climate science and delegitimizing any role for government in addressing our energy needs. While one would think that our nation's economic well-being might stimulate some consensus on this issue, we see either a cynical denial of scientific fact or a level of scientific illiteracy that is truly terrifying.

The approach followed by some political leaders, such as President Obama and Governor Andrew Cuomo is to give climate deniers a pass: "Even if you don't think we have a climate problem we should certainly... (fill in the blank):\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ protect our infrastructure from flooding; pursue all energy sources we can find; invest in energy efficiency, and so on. They and their advisors will argue that we need to be politically realistic, and build consensus. Most of the time I agree with that approach; but the private market forces behind fossil fuels are strong and growing. The demand for energy in the developing world, and our own deep dependence on energy here in America ensures a growing demand for energy. Americans can get more efficient and stop wasting energy; but no one around here is going to go off the grid and power down. The climate problem will only get worse if we do not transition off of fossil fuels.

The political power of energy companies is an intense and central part of the environment of policy decision-making in Washington. It may well be that the Obama team has decided to invest its political capital elsewhere, where the probability of success seems greater. It would take unusual courage and skill to pursue government energy policy that resists this economic and political force. It may be too much to expect President Obama to push back against this force, but without strong and constant presidential leadership, rapid change is unlikely.

#### Will include high skilled visas

IMASSERA 3 – 26 – 13 <http://www.imassera.com/obama-urges-congress-to-restart-immigration-talks/2420307/>

President Obama got the new week off to a fast start by prodding congressional negotiators, from both parties, to get to work at once in order to reach a plan that would finally overhaul the nation’s immigration laws.

The Commander-in-Chief essentially demanded that a new immigration bill emerge soon from the halls of Congress so that its merits can be debated publicly in the Senate.

According to President Obama, now is the time to fix the system which he claimed has been broken for years.

The President and members of Congress have stated that they expect a new bill to be introduced in early April right after members return from their two week Easter vacations.

The new bill, when introduced, is likely to include a thirteen year road to full citizenship for the country’s millions of illegal aliens.

It is also supposed to include visas for high tech workers that allow them to stay in the United States for a longer period of time. There will also be a section in the bill that eliminates visas for extended families.

The legislation is expected to receive strong bipartisan support.

#### Turns china relations and key to India relations

Los Angeles Times, 11/9/2012 (Other countries eagerly await U.S. immigration reform, p. <http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/11/us-immigration-reform-eagerly-awaited-by-source-countries.html>)

"Comprehensive immigration reform will see expansion of skilled labor visas," predicted B. Lindsay Lowell, director of policy studies for the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University. A former research chief for the congressionally appointed Commission on Immigration Reform, Lowell said he expects to see at least a fivefold increase in the number of highly skilled labor visas that would provide "a significant shot in the arm for India and China." There is widespread consensus among economists and academics that skilled migration fosters new trade and business relationships between countries and enhances links to the global economy, Lowell said. "Countries like India and China weigh the opportunities of business abroad from their expats with the possibility of brain drain, and I think they still see the immigration opportunity as a bigger plus than not," he said.

#### Nuclear war

**Schaffer**, Spring **2002** (Teresita – Director of the South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Security, Washington Quarterly, p. Lexis)

Washington's increased interest in India since the late 1990s reflects India's economic expansion and position as Asia's newest rising power. New Delhi, for its part, is adjusting to the end of the Cold War. As a result, both giant democracies see that they can benefit by closer cooperation. For Washington, the advantages include a wider network of friends in Asia at a time when the region is changing rapidly, as well as a stronger position from which to help calm possible future nuclear tensions in the region. Enhanced trade and investment benefit both countries and are a prerequisite for improved U.S. relations with India. For India, the country's ambition to assume a stronger leadership role in the world and to maintain an economy that lifts its people out of poverty depends critically on good relations with the United States.

# 011

#### Wind kills bats

CRYAN 11 Research Biologist, United States Geological Survey, Fort Collins Science Center [Paul M. Cryan, Wind Turbines as Landscape Impediments to the migratory connectivity of Bats, Environmental Law 41: 355-370]

Several species of insectivorous bats migrate hundreds to thousands of kilometers each spring and autumn, crossing a wide variety of landscape features and ecosystems on their journey.1 These long-distance nocturnal flights, combined with the cryptic diurnal habits of migratory bats, have made it extremely difficult to uncover the details of their seasonal whereabouts, movements, and migration behaviors. Beginning around the turn of the millennium, a scatter of reports came to light regarding the surprising numbers of migratory bats found dead beneath wind turbines during autumn across both North America and Europe.2 Since the release of these studies, mortality of migratory bats at wind turbines during latesummer and autumn has become a major conservation issue.3 Whereas there were no known energy-related imminent threats to populations of migratory bats prior to about the year 2000, observed fatality rates of certain species at turbines now indicate the distinct possibility of population declines. At some sites, the estimated number of bats killed range from hundreds to over one thousand in a single autumn migration season, with cumulative estimates for North America ranging into the hundreds of thousands per year, eclipsing any previously observed mortality of these mysterious migrants.4 Over the past decade it has become apparent that wind turbines have the potential to seriously impede and disrupt the migration—and therefore long-term persistence—of several species of bats at a continental scale. Importantly, none of the migratory bats most affected by wind turbines are protected by national conservation laws or international treaties,5 so legal mandates for researching and finding practical solutions to the problem are lacking.

#### Keystone species

BEST 07 Board on Environmental Studies and Toxicology [Environmental Impacts of Wind-Energy Projects (2007), p. 71]

We can make three general predictions about the large-scale and longterm impacts of individual fatalities. First, life-history theory predicts that characteristics of populations of affected species determine the consequences of increased mortality: organisms whose populations are characterized by low birth rate, long life span, naturally low mortality rates, a high trophic level, and small geographic ranges are likely to be most susceptible to cumulative, long-term impacts on population size, genetic diversity, and ultimately, population viability (e.g., McKinney 1997; Purvis et al. 2000). Bats are unusual among mammals with respect to their life-histories, because they typically have small body sizes but long life spans (Barclay and Harder 2003), and the probability of extinction in bats has been linked to several of these characteristics (Jones et al. 2003). Second, the effects of a decline in one species on entire biotic communities is determined by the role of the species in the larger context: losses of keystone species, organisms that have a disproportionately high impact on ecosystem functioning (Power et al. 1996), and those that provide important ecosystem services (Daily et al. 1997) are of most concern. Species that are important predators and perform critical top-down control over communities, and species that are important prey sources can be keystone species in both natural and human-altered ecosystems (Cleveland et al. 2006). Notably, many raptors and insectivorous bats fill these roles. Finally, we do not know how the migration patterns of affected species will influence regional-scale mortality; we also do not understand the consequences of deaths of individuals of these migrating species to the local populations they originate from. Unfortunately this type of information is nearly impossible to obtain.

#### Extinction

Tutchton 11 General Counsel at WildEarth Guardians, House Natural Resources Committee Hearing [Jay; "The Endangered Species Act: How Litigation is Costing Jobs and Impeding True Recovery Efforts,” 12-6, LexisNexis]

The vast variety of species with which humans share this planet are of incalculable value to us. As stated by Representative Evans on the House floor in 1982: [I]t is important to understand that the contribution of wild species to the welfare of mankind in agriculture**,** medicine, industry, and science have been of incalculable value. These contributions will continue only if we protect our storehouse of biological diversity ... [O]ur wild plants and animals are not only uplifting to the human spirit, but they are absolutely essential - as a practical matter - to our continued healthy existence. 128 Cong. Rec. 26,189 (1982) (Statement of Rep. Evans of Delaware). As Americans, we have celebrated the comeback of the bald eagle, the very symbol of our country, from a low of 487 nesting pairs in the continental United States to more than 9,000 nesting pairs. In large part, the Endangered Species Act is responsible for the eagle's recovery. Similarly, we now enjoy the company of approximately 3 million American alligators, a species we almost lost before it was protected under the Act and quickly recovered. The whooping crane, a symbol of wisdom, fidelity, and long life in many cultures, has also benefited from protection under the Endangered Species Act, rebounding from a low of 16 individuals to approximately 400. However, though the Act has prevented the extinction of this species, the Whooper is not yet ready to graduate from the Act's protection. Such charismatic creatures the Act has pulled back from the brink of extinction are frequently invoked in hearings on the Endangered Species Act. The law, however, does not deny its protective shield to creatures whose pictures may never grace a wildlife calendar. While some have criticized the Endangered Species Act for protecting "bugs and weeds," these invertebrates and plants are frequently of the most utilitarian value to humans. As expressed by Harvard professor E. O. Wilson, if we do not protect the little things that run the world: New sources of scientific information will be lost. Vast potential biological wealth will be destroyed. Still undeveloped medicines, crops, pharmaceuticals, timber, fibers, pulp, soil-restoring vegetation, petroleum substitutes, and other products and amenities will never come to light ... it is also easy to overlook the services that ecosystems provide humanity. They enrich the soil and create the very air we breathe. Without these amenities, the remaining tenure of the human race would be nasty and brief. The life-sustaining matrix is built of green plants with legions of microorganisms and mostly small, obscure animals - in other words, weeds and bugs. The Diversity of Life at 346-47. On a global scale, 25 to 40 percent of pharmaceutical products come from wild plants and animals. Kellert, Stephen R., The Value of Life: Biological Diversity and Human Society (1996). A full 70 percent of pharmaceutical products are modeled on a native species, despite only 0.1% of plant species having been examined for their medicinal value. Dobson, Andrew P. Conservation and Biodiversity, Scientific American Library (1996). Invertebrate pollinators are also of high value to humanity. A variety of pollinators, such as some butterflies and bats, are currently protected by the Endangered Species Act, although others are not. The loss of pollinators threatens ecological and economic systems across the country. Committee of the Status of Pollinators in North America, National Research Council, Status of Pollinators in North America, National Academies Press (2006). One of the Endangered Species Act's explicit purposes is "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved." 16 U.S.C. [Sec.] 1532(b). This vision of ecosystem protection appears frequently throughout the Act's legislative history. Rosmarino, Nicole J., Endangered Species Act Under Fire: Controversies, Science, Values and the Law, University of Colorado (2002) The economic benefits healthy ecosystems provide humanity dwarf even our national debt. Economists estimate the global value of "ecosystem services" at $33 trillion annually and in the U.S. alone at $300 billion annually. Pimentel, David, et al., Economic and Environmental Benefits of Biodiversity, BioScience 47(11) (1997) at 747-57; Costanza, R. et al., The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, Nature 387 (1997) at 253-260. Even these dramatic estimates are conservative, as the value of ecosystems ultimately equates to the value of everything - as without ecosystems humans could not survive. Leakey, Richard et al., The Sixth Extinction: Patterns of Life and the Future of Humankind (1995). Moreover, most of the services, currently provided to us for free by ecosystems, are so intricate and provided on such a massive scale that it would not be feasible to replicate them at any cost even if scientists possessed the knowledge to do so. The tremendous value of ecosystems is placed at risk by the continued erosion of the biodiversity. Ehrlich, Paul R. and Wilson, E.O., Biodiversity Studies: Science and Policy, Science 253 (1991) at 758-62. Additionally, endangered species are of great aesthetic, symbolic, and recreational value. Animals and nature are ubiquitous in our children's fairly tales and stories, which inform social codes of conduct. Continued destructiveness towards nature may consequently impact human cognition and social relations. "The more we know of other forms of life, the more we enjoy and respect ourselves. Humanity is exalted not because we are so far above other living creatures, but because knowing them well elevates the very concept of life." Wilson, Edward O. Biophilia: The Human Bond with Other Species, Harvard University Press (1984) at 115. The recreational value of wildlife is also very significant. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has determined that approximately 87 million adult Americans, or 38 percent of the adult population, spend more than $120 billion in the course of wildlife-related recreation annually. These expenditures support hundreds of thousands of jobs. U.S. Department of the Interior, 2006 National Survey of Fish, Hunting, and Wildlife-Associated Recreation. These jobs are every bit as valuable to those who hold them as are the jobs the Committee perceives at risk from enforcement of the Endangered Species Act. In short, the protection of biodiversity appears well worth the effort. Just as a nation should not squander its fiscal resources, it should not squander its natural ones. The Endangered Species Act is central to our national effort to conserve our irreplaceable natural resources. B. The Present Rate of the Loss of Species Is Alarming The current rate of species' extinction worldwide is estimated at 1,000 times the natural rate of extinction and is increasing. The impact of seven billion humans on species diversity is comparable to that of the asteroid that wiped out most life on Earth 65 million years ago. Like geologists do today, future intelligent beings, should there be any, will be able to mark the current human-caused extinction epoch by observing the number and diversity of fossils preserved in future rock layers. Unless these trends are reversed, by the year 2020 up to 20 percent of all extant species will no longer exist. Wilson, Edward O., The Diversity of Life at 346. According to the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, one in every four mammals is facing a high risk of extinction in the near future. Almost half of all tortoises and freshwater turtles are threatened. More than one-fifth of the world's birds face extinction according to Birdlife International. One third of the world's amphibians are also vanishing. Stokstad, E., Global Survey Documents Puzzling Decline of Amphibians, Science 306: 391 (2004). At least two out of every five species on earth will go extinct due to human-caused climate change if greenhouse gas emissions are not promptly curtailed. Flannery, Tim, The Weather Makers, Atlantic Monthly Press (2005) at 183. Moreover, there is a trickle-down effect from species' extinction as the loss of one species leads to the loss of other dependent species. For example, researchers recently calculated that the extinction of nearly 6,300 plants listed as threatened or endangered by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature would also result in the loss of nearly 4,700 species of beetles and 136 types of butterflies. Lian Pin Koh, et al., Species Coextinctions and the Biodiversity Crisis, Science 305 (2004) at 1632-34. In sum, there should be no legitimate debate over whether or not our planet's biodiversity is rapidly diminishing. There should also be little debate that this loss is attributable to human activities and dramatic human population increases: Human demographic success has brought the world to this crisis of biodiversity. Human beings - mammals of the 50-kilogram weight class and members of a group, the primates, otherwise noted for scarcity - have become a hundred times more numerous than any other land animal of comparable size in the history of life. By every conceivable measure, humanity is ecologically abnormal. Our species appropriates between 20 and 40 percent of the solar energy captured in organic material by land plants. There is no way that we can draw upon the resources of the planet to such a degree without drastically reducing the state of most other species. Wilson, Edward O., The Diversity of Life at 272. Over ninety-nine percent of scientists agree that a serious, world-wide loss of biodiversity is likely, very likely, or virtually certain. Rudd, Murray A., Scientists' Opinions on the Global Status and Management of Biological Diversity, Conservation Biology 25(6) (2011) at 1165-1175. There is also strong scientific consensus that humans are responsible for this extinction crisis. Id. Indeed, last year the United Nations marked the first ever International Year of Biodiversity to call attention and spur action to address this problem. The United States Endangered Species Act serves as a model for many other nations and exhibits our national commitment to the international effort to save the diversity of life on Earth.

# 100

#### Nuclear power demand increasing now and will buoy uranium prices, but gains could be reversed if other energy sources undercut nuclear.

Brett Arends, 1/18/2013. “Uranium: Mining a Contrarian Play With Big Potential,” Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323783704578245791855437054.html.

Investors looking for a bold contrarian bet should consider the stocks of companies exposed to uranium, the fuel used in nuclear reactors. Uranium prices have been in a slump since the reactor meltdown in Fukushima, Japan, in March 2011—yet there are reasons to believe the slump may be temporary.

"World demand is growing, and supplies aren't growing fast enough," says Adam Schatzker, an analyst at RBC Capital Markets in Toronto. Today's low prices aren't sustainable, he says, and are likely to recover in the next few years. "It's just a matter of when," he says.

The world-wide nuclear-power industry was thrown into turmoil by Fukushima. Japan, the world's third-largest nuclear-power producer at the time, mothballed its other reactors. Other countries have closed plants and put plans for expansion under review. Some might exit nuclear power altogether.

Yet while the reaction to Fukushima might slow the growth of nuclear power, it won't reverse it. Many countries, particularly emerging-market nations such as China, India, Russia and South Korea, are bringing many more reactors online to meet their rising energy needs. Currently 62 new reactors are being built around the world, and many more are planned.

The International Atomic Energy Agency predicts nuclear-power production will rise between 35% and 100% over the next 20 years. The World Nuclear Association, a trade group, estimates total demand for uranium will rise by about 60% over that time.

China, which faces growing pollution problems from fossil fuels, recently resumed permitting new reactors, ending a hiatus that followed Fukushima. It already has approved four new reactors in a matter of months, on top of the 28 that were already under construction, notes Jonathan Hinze, an analyst at uranium-research firm Ux Consulting. The new reactors will use a more modern and safer design, developed after the 40-year-old Fukushima plant was built.

In Japan, which has few domestic sources of energy, new Prime Minister [Shinzo Abe](http://topics.wsj.com/person/s/shinzo%20abe/7120) has publicly reversed his predecessor's antinuclear stance. Mr. Abe says he wants to bring many of the country's reactors back online and recently talked about building new, safer reactors. Japan has few domestic sources of energy and is heavily dependent on oil imports.

Meanwhile, a 20-year agreement to decommission old Soviet warheads and convert the uranium for use in reactors is due to expire this year. Analysts don't expect it to be renewed. This could put upward pressure on prices, because the agreement currently supplies one-eighth of world uranium needs.

The World Nuclear Association warns that world-wide uranium demand might exceed supply next year.

Meanwhile, this past week, a Russian state-controlled entity struck a $2.6 billion deal to secure future supplies by taking control of global mining company [Uranium One](http://online.wsj.com/public/quotes/main.html?type=djn&symbol=SXRZF) [SXRZF -0.63%](http://online.wsj.com/public/quotes/main.html?type=djn&symbol=SXRZF?mod=inlineTicker) .

All this spells a bullish case for uranium. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, less than half the world's uranium reserves can be mined profitably at current levels. Mining costs are rising quickly. Mr. Schatzker at RBC says the industry needs prices at $75 or $80 a pound for future mine production to be profitable; it currently trades at $42.25.

Just before Fukushima the price was about $70. Mr. Schatzker thinks prices might get back there within three years. In 2008, just before the financial crisis, uranium hit $135.

There are risks to investing in uranium, of course. Another disaster might spell doom for the industry. Nuclear programs remain subject to political pressure. The world's energy needs might grow more slowly than forecast, reducing the need for nuclear power. Other energy supplies, such as natural gas or solar power, might prove cheaper or more abundant than expected.

#### renewable energy makes flexibility more important than energy output – causes gas to out-compete nuclear.

John Bartlett, 9/20/2012. M.S. with honors in environmental science and policy, with a focus on environmental economics, from the University of Chicago, senior research analyst at the Milken Institute specializing in economic and technology research for the Institute's Center for Accelerating Energy Solutions. Before joining the Institute, he worked as an energy analyst and a SunShot Fellow with the U.S. Department of Energy. “Can nuclear power compete as the electric grid requires greater flexibility?” Milken Institute, http://www.milkeninstitute.org/newsroom/newsroom.taf?function=currencyOfIdeas&blogID=575.

When electric utilities and grid operators consider new generation, they look at three resource components: energy, capacity and flexibility. Energy is simply the average amount of electricity that a power plant would be expected to produce over a period of time, measured in kilowatt-hours or megawatt-hours. Power plants well suited to providing energy are those with low variable costs, like nuclear. Capacity, or sometimes referred to as firm capacity, is the amount of electricity that can be reliably produced at a particular moment, measured in kilowatts or megawatts. Natural gas and coal-fired power plants provide excellent capacity because they can be relied upon to generate electricity at almost any time. Flexibility accounts for how quickly and by what amount a power plant can increase or decrease its output in response to changing electricity supplies and demands on the grid. Natural gas plants, which have the lowest fixed costs, are optimal for delivering flexibility.

For nuclear, its greatest value lies in its energy contribution. Of all traditional forms of electricity generation, nuclear has the lowest variable costs. Nuclear power also usually provides reliable capacity, but reactors can need to be taken offline for extended periods of time for repairs (as with San Onofre in Southern California) or when heat waves force shutdowns of plants reliant on rivers for cooling (as happened in France in 2003 and 2009).

Nuclear has **little to no value with respect to flexibility**, for economic as well as technical and regulatory reasons. Economically, nuclear, with very high fixed costs and very low variable costs, is ill-suited to running at much less than full capacity. Technically, most nuclear plants are not designed to ramp up and down quickly, and in the U.S. the Nuclear Regulatory Commission does not currently allow nuclear plants to operate in this manner.

Today, emerging trends in the generation mix and in demands on the grid are **changing the relative values of energy, capacity and flexibility**. On the supply side, with growing additions of wind and solar power plants (wind has accounted for roughly 35% of power plant additions since 2006), nuclear is no longer the cheapest source of energy to be dispatched, as wind and solar have essentially zero variable costs of production. In addition, **with increasing amounts of wind and solar, which are intermittent and variable, the values of capacity and, to an even greater extent, flexibility are rising**. This **adds to the appeal of natural gas power plants to the detriment of nuclear**. On the demand side, the long-term trend towards vehicle electrification (both plug-in hybrid vehicles and electric vehicles) may further increase the need for grid flexibility.

Although these supply and demand developments will occur gradually, it is important to understand that the timescale in planning nuclear power is on the order of 40-60 years, so utilities must consider the mix of electricity generation as well as electricity demands stretching far into the future.

#### That destroys Kazakh economic modernization.

Gregory Gleason, 12/14/2011. Professor at the University of New Mexico and the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. “KAZATOMPROM LOOKS EAST,” Central Asia Caucasus Institute Analyst, http://cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5683/print.

BACKGROUND: Kazakhstan’s uranium industry is a key part of the country’s diversification and modernization strategy. Kazakhstan played an important role in the Soviet nuclear industry with major mining, processing, fabricating and industrial facilities. Kazakhstan was the home of the Soviet Union’s major experimenting and testing facilities. The end of the Soviet Union brought the Soviet-era nuclear complex to a standstill. The first decree signed by Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan’s first president, was to immediately close the Soviet nuclear weapons test range. Kazakhstan’s government moved quickly to eliminate the Soviet-era nuclear weapons and weapons facilities, and the country signed on to the basic principles of the Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty by rejecting nuclear armaments while endorsing peaceful use of the atom. Due to Kazakhstan’s large uranium mineral reserves, the development of the uranium industry for peaceful uses became one of Kazakhstan’s economic policy priorities. Kazakhstan’s industrial privatization program in the mid-1990s gave rise to numerous industrial enterprises but the uranium industry, because of its dual role as a commercial as well as a strategic resource, was retained under government control. In 1997, the Kazakhstani government formed Kazatomprom, a state-run mineral and industrial complex with direct responsibility for the uranium industry as well as for some other specialized industrial metals such as beryllium and tantalum. In a very short period of time Kazatomprom brilliantly succeeded in cobbling together Kazakhstan’s remnants of the Soviet-era uranium complex to build an industrial juggernaut in the uranium business. Kazatomprom surpassed its competitors in 2009 by emerging as the world’s largest producer of uranium ore. Kazatomprom’s success was achieved through a business model which linked Kazakhstan’s upstream mineral extraction with the downstream industrial facilities located elsewhere. Kazatomprom turned first to the Russian uranium industry, drawing on long-standing relations with Russia’s state-run nuclear complex under the control of Rosatom and with Russia’s related nuclear industry commercial firms. Later Kazatomprom moved outside the connections of the former Soviet space to forge business connections with foreign partners, forming joint ventures with leading technological partners such as France’s Areva and Canada’s Cameco. But Russia’s nuclear industry remained the locomotive driving Kazakhstan’s nuclear sector as it moved from the role of primary commodity supplier to the role of an integrated transnational industrial enterprise. Working in parallel, driven by state-financed enterprises and focused on jointly gaining a position to capture the expanding nuclear services market, Russia’s Rosatom and Kazakhstan’s Kazatomprom made major investments in a coordinated effort to corner the future nuclear reactor fuel supply market in Asia, focusing on China, India, Japan and Korea.

#### Kazakh economic development is a key model for Central Asia—instability would spread and trigger Central Asian conflict.

Margarita Assenova et al, 2008. Director of Institute for New Democracies @ CSIS; with Natalie Zajicova, Program Officer (IND); Janusz Bugajski, CSIS NEDP Director; Ilona Teleki, Deputy Director and Fellow (CSIS); Besian Bocka, Program Coordinator and Research Assistant (CSIS). “Kazakhstan’s Strategic Significance,” CSIS Institute for New Democracies, http://eurodialogue.org/Kazakhstan-Strategic-Significance.

The decision by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to award Kazakhstan the chairmanship of the organization for 2010 underscores a growing recognition of the country’s regional and continental importance. Kazakhstan is a strategic linchpin in the vast Central Asian-Caspian Basin zone, a region rich in energy resources and a potential gateway for commerce and communications between Europe and Asia.

However, it is also an area that faces an assortment of troubling security challenges. Ensuring a stable and secure Central Asia is important for the international interests of the United States and its European allies for several prescient reasons:

• Asian Security: Because of its proximity to Russia, China, Iran, and the South Asian sub-continent, Kazakhstan’s security and stability is an increasingly vital interest to all major powers. Kazakhstan’s tenure as chair of the OSCE will become an opportunity for greater multilateral cooperation in achieving this objective while strengthening the role and prestige of the OSCE throughout Central Asia.

• Afghanistan: Central Asia is a key staging area for U.S. and NATO military operations in Afghanistan against Taliban insurgents and Al Qaeda militants. Central Asia is a crucial conduit for U.S. and NATO troops and supplies into Afghanistan. U.S. offi cials recently reached new agreements with Russia, Kazakhstan, and other Central Asian countries to allow Afghanbound non-military supplies through their territories.

• Trans-National Terrorism: The Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan stimulates cross-border terrorism that may endanger the stability of several Central Asian neighbors and undermine Western interests. Central Asian states have been the victims of Afghanistan-based transnational terrorism. These states, including Kazakhstan, can support international efforts to counter regional terrorist networks.

• Organized Crime and Drug Traffi cking: Central Asia is an important transit region for narcotics traffi cking between Afghanistan and the countries of Europe and Asia. Joint initiatives that will enable the Kazakh government to control and monitor borders more effectively, intercept smuggling operations, and eradicate criminal networks will buttress international security and curtail funding to cross-border terrorist groups.

• Energy Security: Central Asia has the potential to be a vital energy source for Europe. The region contains a vast storehouse of oil and natural gas, which Europe urgently needs in order to lessen its reliance on Russian and Middle Eastern energy supplies. Disputes between Russia and several energy transit states, such as Ukraine, have increased Europe’s interest in developing direct supply lines between Europe and the Caspian countries.  
Challenges to International Interests

Despite the strategic significance of Central Asia and the Caspian Basin, in recent years Western countries have not paid sufficient attention to the region. This is due to a combination of factors, including the absence of a shared strategic framework for helping to stabilize and develop the heartland of Asia; insufficient focus on consolidating close political ties with key countries in the region through ustained high-level engagement; and opposition on the part of other major powers competing for influence in Central Asia.

Many Western experts conclude that Russia’s leaders have sought to use multi-national organizations, Moscow’s political connections and its economic leverage to assert greater control over ex-Soviet neighbors. There are reports that the Central Asian governments were pressured to curtail Western security interests, including limiting its military presence in the region by, for example, urging Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to evict the U.S. military from bases on their territory.

Kazakh leaders are supportive of a more effective American and European role in Central Asia to help promote the region’s security and development, but without undermining Astana’s cordial relations with Russia. Kazakhstan’s independent foreign policy helps provide Western access to the region and enhances its position as a vital transport corridor. Kazakhstan is also a stabilizing factor in the geopolitical competition of the regional powers for access and influence across Central Asia. With its reinvigorated commitment to securing Afghanistan and stabilizing the wider region, the Obama administration has an ideal opportunity to reach out to key partners such as Kazakhstan and to enhance Astana’s role as a regional stabilizer.  
Kazakhstan as a Regional Stabilizer

Despite having the largest territory and economy in Central Asia, Kazakhstan is not a source of insecurity or threat to any of its neighbors. It does not employ territorial, ethnic, economic, or energy instruments to target and undermine any government in the region. On the contrary, Astana has sought to establish a system of collective security in Eurasia that would avert the emergence of a single dominant power. Kazakhstan’s “multi-vector” foreign policy, which seeks to pursue cooperative relations with all major powers, leads Astana to resist any hegemonic ambitions by larger countries that would undercut Kazakhstan’s political or economic independence.

While it is a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Kazakhstan has sought to diversify its security relations and keep its freedom to establish and maintain international partnerships. Indeed, Astana has developed productive contacts with NATO by participating in NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and its Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. It was the only Central Asian government to negotiate an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO in January 2006.

NATO’s June 2004 summit affirmed the growing importance of Central Asia by designating the region as an area of “special focus” and stationing a liaison officer in the Kazakh capital of Astana in order to develop NATO assistance programs to modernize national military structures. A NATO Secretary General Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia was also appointed.

Astana has underscored that neither the CSTO nor the SCO should become exclusive military alliances or anti-Western blocs that would challenge NATO’s mission in the wider region. Kazakhstan supports NATO operations in Afghanistan and grants overflight rights to U.S. and other NATO warplanes transporting non-lethal cargo to Afghanistan, as well as emergency landing rights for U.S. military aircraft in the Kazakh city of Almaty. The Kazakh authorities are also developing a Peacekeeping Battalion (KAZBAT), which is slated to become fully operational by 2011 and potentially available for international peace stability missions.

Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian country to have an Action Plan to assist in the reconstruction process in Afghanistan, including granting more than $3 million in the 2007-2008 fiscal year for social and infrastructure projects, humanitarian aid, and training for Afghan law enforcement and border patrol officers. For 2009-2011, Kazakhstan has committed an additional $5 million to improve the water supply and distribution infrastructure for shipments of grain and other commodities.

Kazakhstan also provides funding to support U.S. objectives in the region. Astana is the only regional donor giving significant aid to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan. According to the U.S. State Department’s Background note on Kazakhstan, “in 2006, Kazakhstan became the first country to share directly in the cost of a U.S. Government’s foreign assistance program. Through 2009, the Government of Kazakhstan will contribute over $15 million of a $40 million USAID economic development project aimed at strengthening Kazakhstan’s capacity to achieve its development goals.”

Kazakhstan has initiated and championed the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building in Asia (CICA). Modeled after the OSCE, the CICA process aims to promote peace and security throughout Eurasia through confidence-building measures and other means. The first CICA summit, held in June 2002, was attended by leaders from 16 states who signed the “Almaty Act,” as well as a declaration to eliminate terrorism and promote inter-cultural dialogue. The second CICA summit (hosted by Kazakhstan in June 2006) adopted the Catalogue of Confidence Building Measures (CBM)—a road map for implementing the CBM on a bilateral and multilateral basis. At the last CICA working meeting in India in February 2009, the participating states selected Turkey to chair the conference and host the third CICA summit in 2010. The Turkish chairmanship will expand CICA geographically and move it closer to Europe.  
Multi-National Counter-Terrorism

Kazakhstan has been combating several potential threats to its own stability and that of its neighbors, including terrorism, drug smuggling, and organized crime. Although Kazakhstan is generally not a source of these maladies, it is a transit country for such illicit activities. Kazakh leaders have been especially concerned about possible terrorist strikes against their country’s energy infrastructure that could affect exports to European and other consumers. To counter terrorist threats, the Kazakh government has supported multilateral efforts in key multilateral organizations to make counter-terrorism an essential ingredient of their security focus. Astana has also assigned troops to the Central Asian Rapid Reaction Force (CARRF), which is designed to defend each country against major terrorist threats.  
Regional Non-Proliferation

KazakhstanwasthefirstformerSovietrepublictoabandon its nuclear arsenal. It closed the largest nuclear weapons test site and has spearheaded regional denuclearization. Kazakh leaders have also made major progress in downgrading nearly all of the country’s highly enriched uranium, thus lessening the opportunities for such material to fall into the hands of foreign governments or terrorist groups. Astana’s non-proliferation initiatives have earned it praise from a number of international leaders.

With impetus from Kazakhstan, the Central Asian states have agreed to coordinate their nonproliferation and export control policies, especially to prevent the smuggling of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and related materials from the former Soviet Union. In September 2006 in Semipalatinsk, a former Soviet nuclear testing site in Kazakhstan, representatives of the five Central Asian states signed a treaty to create a Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, which entered into force on March 21, 2009. The signatories pledged not to develop, manufacture, or otherwise acquire nuclear devices or to assist third parties in developing nuclear weapons programs. The treaty further addressed environmental protection as each of the five states share common problems of environmental damage resulting from the production and testing of Soviet nuclear weapons.  
Counter-Narcotics Trafficking

Countering the trafficking of narcotics from Afghanistan through Central Asia is a major security challenge for all countries in the region, as well as an issue of concern for European and Asian states seeking to stabilize Afghanistan. Proceeds from large-scale smuggling finance organized crime and cross-border terrorism. Central Asian states, including Kazakhstan, have been active in joint operations to intercept drug shipments from Afghanistan and are expanding their counter-narcotics agencies to deal more effectively with the threat. The Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC), established in Almaty under UN auspices, serves as the main regional communication center for analysis and exchange of information on transnational crime and the coordination of joint operations. The OSCE, which Kazakhstan will chair in 2010, has established the priority of curbing drug and arms smuggling, strengthening border controls to curtail illegal migration, and countering the financing of terrorist and criminal organizations.  
Energy Security

Kazakhstan is a major producer and exporter of crude oil, projected to export three million barrels of oil per day, or 150 million tons per year, by 2015. Kazakhstan also possesses substantial natural gas reserves and some of the world’s largest reserves of uranium.

The three energy-rich states of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan) understand that their political independence and energy security requires diversifying their energy customers and avoiding reliance on any single power or transit route. Currently, Russia is the main transit route for energy exports from Central Asia. Kazakhstan supports building oil and gas pipelines that would channel its energy resources directly to Europe and China. The Kazakh energy industry favors a direct energy connection with Azerbaijan across the Caspian Sea that would help supply the European market.

Astana is seeking to diversify its economy and avoid over-dependence on natural resources and energy exports. Until recently, oil and gas revenues have been aggressively used to develop a stronger economic foundation for expansion into new markets. Kazakhstan seeks to attract advanced technologies and modern management practices into its priority economic sectors, including high technology, financial services, and agriculture. However, the current global financial crisis poses considerable challenges to this agenda, not least because of the weaknesses it has exposed in Kazakhstan’s banking and financial services sector.  
Economic Development

Sustained economic development is a major determinant of long-term regional stability. Kazakhstan has emerged as a successful model of economic development in Central Asia and the secular Muslim world. It has the largest economy in Central Asia with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) exceeding the combined total of its four Central Asian neighbors. The government is in the process of negotiating its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) and is a leading proponent of deepening economic cooperation in Central Asia and the Caspian region.

Kazakh leaders have focused on developing the Euro-Asian Economic Community (EurAsEC), an organization that also involves Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. More generally, Kazakhstan has strongly supported deeper economic integration among these states. Nonetheless, Astana opposes over-reliance on any single country because this would undermine Kazakhstan’s independence and integration into the global economy.

In positioning Kazakhstan as a potential economic hub and the core of a “Eurasian transport corridor,” President Nursultan Nazarbayev has proposed creating a regional organization, styled as the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), to harness and intensify trans-border cooperation in such areas as water resource management, transportation infrastructure, crisis-response, environmental protection, and region-wide economic development. Such a process, even without the support of all Central Asian countries, could be the first steps toward lowering barriers to trade, harmonizing customs, and building closer economic associations. Kazakh officials contend that closer economic integration would reduce regional tensions, attract greater levels of foreign direct investment, and increase the region’s leverage and competitiveness in the international arena. Integration has also been fostered by tangible investments and capital flows as Kazakhstan has played a major role in exporting capital to its neighbors.

#### Central Asia conflict will escalate to US-Russian nuclear war [network-centric warfare compresses decision-making times and triggers miscalculation.]

McDermott 11—Roger McDermott, Honorary senior fellow, department of politics and international relations, university of Kent at Canterbury and senior fellow in Eurasian military studies, Jamestown Foundation [December 6, 2011, “General Makarov Highlights the “Risk” of Nuclear Conflict,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx\_ttnews%5Btt\_news%5D=38748&tx\_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=27&cHash=dfb6e8da90b34a10f50382157e9bc117]

In the current election season the Russian media has speculated that the Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov may be replaced, possibly by Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s Ambassador to NATO, which masks deeper anxiety about the future direction of the Armed Forces. The latest rumors also partly reflect uncertainty surrounding how the switch in the ruling tandem may reshuffle the pack in the various ministries, as well as concern about managing complex processes in Russian defense planning. On November 17, Russia’s Chief of the General Staff, Army-General Nikolai Makarov, offered widely reported comments on the potential for nuclear conflict erupting close to the country’s borders. His key observation was controversial, based on estimating that thepotential for armed conflict along the entire Russian periphery had grown dramatically over the past twenty years (Profil, December 1; Moskovskiy Komsomolets, November 28; Interfax, November 17). During his speech to the Defense Ministry’s Public Council on the progress and challenges facing the effort to reform and modernize Russia’s conventional Armed Forces, Makarov linked the potential for local or regional conflict to escalate into large-scale warfare “possibly even with nuclear weapons.” Many Russian commentators were bewildered by this seemingly “alarmist” perspective. However, they appear to have misconstrued the general’s intention, since he was actually discussing conflict escalation (Interfax, ITAR-TASS, November 17; Moskovskiy Komsomolets, Krasnaya Zvezda, November 18). Makarov’s remarks, particularly in relation to the possible use of nuclear weapons in war, were quickly misinterpreted. Three specific aspects of the context in which Russia’s most senior military officer addressed the issue of a potential risk of nuclear conflict may serve to necessitate wider dialogue about the dangers of escalation. There is little in his actual assertion about the role of nuclear weapons in Russian security policy that would suggest Moscow has revised this; in fact, Makarov stated that this policy is outlined in the 2010 Military Doctrine, though he understandably made no mention of its classified addendum on nuclear issues (Kommersant, November 18). Russian media coverage was largely dismissive of Makarov’s observations, focusing on the idea that he may have represented the country as being surrounded by enemies. According to Kommersant, claiming to have seen the materials used during his presentation, armed confrontation with the West could occur partly based on the “anti-Russian policy” pursued by the Baltic States and Georgia, which may equally undermine Moscow’s future relations with NATO. Military conflict may erupt in Central Asia, caused by instability in Afghanistan or Pakistan; or western intervention against a nuclear Iran or North Korea; energy competition in the Arctic or foreign inspired “color revolutions” similar to the Arab Spring and the creation of a European Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system that could undermine Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrence also featured in this assessment of the strategic environment (Kommersant, November 18). Since the reform of Russia’s conventional Armed Forces began in late 2008, Makarov has consistently promoted adopting network-centric capabilities to facilitate the transformation of the military and develop modern approaches to warfare. Keen to displace traditional Russian approaches to warfare, and harness military assets in a fully integrated network, Makarov possibly more than any senior Russian officer appreciates that the means and methods of modern warfare have changed and are continuing to change (Zavtra, November 23; Interfax, November 17). The contours of this evolving and unpredictable strategic environment, with the distinctions between war and peace often blurred, interface precisely in the general’s expression of concern about nuclear conflict: highlighting the risk of escalation. However, such potential escalation is linked to the reduced time involved in other actors deciding to intervene in a local crisis as well as the presence of network-centric approaches among western militaries and being developed by China and Russia. From Moscow’s perspective, NATO “out of area operations” from Kosovo to Libya blur the traditional red lines in escalation; further complicated if any power wishes to pursue intervention in complex cases such as Syria. Potential escalation resulting from local conflict, following a series of unpredictable second and third order consequences, makes Makarov’s comments seem more understandable; it is not so much a portrayal of Russia surrounded by “enemies,” as a recognition that, with weak conventional Armed Forces, in certain crises Moscow may have few options at its disposal (Interfax, November 17). There is also the added complication of a possibly messy aftermath of the US and NATO drawdown from Afghanistan and signs that the Russian General Staff takes Central Asian security much more seriously in this regard. The General Staff cannot know whether the threat environment in the region may suddenly change. Makarov knows the rather limited conventional military power Russia currently possesses, which may compel early nuclear first use likely involving sub-strategic weapons, in an effort to “de-escalate” an escalating conflict close to Russia’s borders. Moscow no longer primarily fears a theoretical threat of facing large armies on its western or eastern strategic axes; instead the information-era reality is that smaller-scale intervention in areas vital to its strategic interests may bring the country face-to-face with a network-centric adversary capable of rapidly exploiting its conventional weaknesses. As Russia plays catch-up in this technological and revolutionary shift in modern warfare capabilities, the age-old problem confronts the General Staff: the fastest to act is the victor (See EDM, December 1). Consequently, Makarov once again criticized the domestic defense industry for offering the military inferior quality weapons systems. Yet, as speed and harnessing C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) become increasingly decisive factors in modern warfare, the risks for conflict escalation demand careful attention—especially when the disparate actors possess varied capabilities. Unlike other nuclear powers, Russia has to consider the proximity of several nuclear actors close to its borders. In the coming decade and beyond, Moscow may pursue dialogue with other nuclear actors on the nature of conflict escalation and de-escalation. However, with a multitude of variables at play ranging from BMD, US Global Strike capabilities, uncertainty surrounding the “reset” and the emergence of an expanded nuclear club, and several potential sources of instability and conflict, any dialogue must consider escalation in its widest possible context. Makarov’s message during his presentation, as far as the nuclear issue is concerned, was therefore a much tougher bone than the old dogs of the Cold War would wish to chew on.

# 110

#### Text: The 50 state governments and relevant subnational governments should establish a renewable energy payment program that creates long-term purchase contracts for new qualifying facilities in the United States that use solar power for energy production to ensure a reasonable rate of return and establish renewable portfolio standards.

#### States can apply renewable energy credits in their RPS programs to meet the pricing requirements of Feed-in Tariffs – prevents pre-emption and solves the Aff.

M. Ryan **Hurley 11**, partner in the Rose Law Group. November, http://www.roselawgroup.com/\_includes/documents/GAS28\_04proof2Hurley.pdf

FeRC OR FICTION? The reverse auction mechanism also proved to be a temptingly easy way for regulators to deal with the jurisdiction issues of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Unlike in Germany, **US energy markets are subject to both state and federal jurisdictions.** **Without a national renewable energy policy, states have been left to determine their own policies, largely resulting in a patchwork of RPS programs**. These programs generally pose no problems of FERC jurisdiction, as they simply provide renewable energy targets for intrastate activities. However, **one area that FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over is** that of **wholesale electricity rates**. In other words, **the purchase price between a utility and an independent generator is governed solely by federal law and must be approved by FERC** under the Federal Power Act (FPA). Thus, theoretically, **any above-market purchase price mandated by a state FIT program is preempted** by the FPA and therefore illegal and invalid. Accordingly, the only valid price that a state could legally mandate was the purchase of energy from qualified facilities at the utility’s avoided cost under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA). The avoided cost is generally the levelized long-term cost for baseload electricity generated by a new natural gas combined-cycle plant. This is often described as the Market Price Referent (MPR). As such, the avoided cost under PURPA is well below the price necessary to incent the development of renewable energy. Although it is possible for a state to redefine and increase the MPR to include external costs such as environmental impacts, this proves to be a politically undesirable way forward. **One way around this limitation is by using the market-based rates exemption under the FPA**. In other words, **if an energy seller has no undue influence over the market, then the seller can enter into a purchase contract that is the result of an arm’s-length**, **market-based transaction. A FIT program with a reverse auction award mechanism meets these criteria and thus avoids FERC scrutiny.** For this reason, **many state regulators are keen to adopt auction-style FITs to avoid creating any questions of jurisdiction or federal preemption.** This was ultimately the case in Arizona where the FIT proceedings occurred against the backdrop of FERC hearings on the matter. The prospects of legal challenges and the difficulties of setting a proper price and program participation guidelines resulted in an auction-style pricing mechanism. 1 ReCS aNd eFFeCTS Unfortunately, many a FIT proceeding in many a state has succumbed to the challenges posed by program participation caps and FERC jurisdiction. Ultimately the result of these challenges is the state’s adopting so-called FIT programs that really resemble nothing of a true FIT. Essentially, these programs end up being mere extensions of modifications of their current RPS programs. For example, the resulting pilot program in Arizona created a standard offer reverse auction for projects up to 20 megawatts. However, in reality, this program was no different than recurring requests for proposal that the utilities issued under the existing RPS programs. Thus, **these** types of **FITs are unlikely to address shortcomings of existing programs and unlikely to result in more effective deployment of renewable energy resources. The central aspect of a true FIT requires a fixed price**. **Without this feature, states would be better served by refining their existing processes and programs instead of adopting another version of their existing policies just with a different name.** Thus, **if states with existing RPS programs truly want to do something innovative and adopt a fixed-price true FIT, they must find a way to design the program to address the concern discussed earlier. Fortunately, the concept of** renewable energy credits **(RECs),** which generally already exist in RPS states, **provides an avenue to adopt a true FIT that avoids legal pitfalls and addresses practical participation issues. Essentially a REC represents the “green” or “renewable” attributes of a megawatt-hour of energy**. **Thus,** for every **megawatt-hour of energy generated by a solar system**, **two commodities are created, the underlying energy and the green attributes that are embodied in the REC**. In other words, **a generator can sell a utility not only the energy from the system, but also the REC associated with that energy**. **RECs are a creation of state law and are primarily used as a measure of compliance with a state RPS program** (i.e., the utility may purchase and retire RECs to demonstrate compliance with renewable energy mandates). Thus, **the value of a REC can be thought of in one way as the utility’s cost of compliance with the RPS**. All of this is a roundabout way of saying that **the price of a REC is separate from the price of energy and is therefore a matter of state law and not FERC jurisdiction.** 2 Thus, **states that wish to adopt a fixed-price FIT may do so using a combination of the avoided cost for energy and the necessary above-market cost for RECs.** See Exhibit 1 that depicts the components of such a proposal in California for a fixed-price solar PV FIT. Furthermore, the price of RECs can be set and differentiated to address the problem of program participation as well. It is simply not political reality yet in the United States to advocate for an unlimited FIT program as in Germany. Thus, any FIT proposal with fixed pricing must provide a way to deal with a capped program. First come, first served is generally not desirable, as this leads to overnight lines and programs that stop and start abruptly. Rather, **a more useful way to determine program participation is to give an advantage to more desirable projects. This can be done by offering different prices for RECs.** For example, **if a state is examining a FIT because community solar projects are not being built, it could offer a higher REC price to those types of projects**. Another example would be to incent projects that fit well with existing transmission and load constraints. CONCLuSION In conclusion, a true fixed-price FIT can be adopted within the confines of a state RPS program. However, the program design must be well-planned in advance and defensible to regulators who are prone to capitulate to the status quo under the specter of FERC and a voting public. Nonetheless, **without this a FIT truly is not a FIT, and efforts to adopt one would be much better spent revising existing RPS programs**.

# 111

#### The United States Department of Defense should engage private contractors to construct and continually deploy at least 1,500 satellite-guided sailing ships with spinning silicon wafers capable of spraying eight gallons of .8 micron water droplets per second deployed evenly across the ocean through split contracts of less than $50 million dollars each.

#### The United States federal government should establish a nitrogen fertilizer tax of 16 cents per pound of nitrogen, and use the revenue from that tax to provide loan guarantees for farmers to procure biocharcoal technology.

#### The United States Federal Government should end arms sales and the approval of arms sales to Taiwan.

The United States Federal government should ask Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to immediately pay a goodwill visit to China.

#### CP solves warming - geoengineering

**Kunzig ‘8** (Robert, winner of the Walter Sullivan Award for Excellence in Science Journalism, Scientific American, “Geoengineering: How to Cool Earth—At a Price”, 10-20, https://sslaccess.elkresources.net/files/OTHER-MISC/Geoengineering\_How%20to%20Cool%20Earth-At%20a%20Price.pdf)

Stephen Salter, an emeritus engineering professor at the University of Edinburgh, has come up with a scheme that, on paper at least, looks ingenious. “It’s basically a watering can,” Latham says—but the nozzle would be a silicon wafer etched with billions of holes less than a micron across, and it would be mounted on an unmanned, satellite-guided sailing ship. More specifically, the vessel would be a Flettner ship, which has tall, spinning cylinders that resemble smokestacks but act as sails, generating lift because one side is moving with the wind and the other side against it. In Salter’s concept, turbines spun by water moving past the ship would generate the electricity to keep the cylinders spinning and also to spray seawater out the stacks in 0.8-micron droplets. Salter and Latham estimate that 1,500 ships, each spraying eight gallons a second—and each costing $2 million, for a total of $3 billion**— could offset the global warming caused by a doubling of CO 2** . Half the job could be done, according to modeling results from the Met Office Hadley Center for Climate Prediction and Research in Exeter, England**, by deploying ships over just 4 percent of the ocean.**

#### And, sequestration

Technology Review, 4/26/2007. “The Case for Burying Charcoal,” published by MIT, http://www.technologyreview.com/news/407754/the-case-for-burying-charcoal/.

Several states in this country and a number of Scandinavian countries are trying to supplant some coal-burning by burning biomass such as wood pellets and agricultural residue. Unlike coal, biomass is carbon-neutral, releasing only the carbon dioxide that the plants had absorbed in the first place. But a new research [paper](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biombioe.2007.01.012) published online in the journal Biomass and Bioenergy argues that the battle against global warming may be better served by instead heating the biomass in an oxygen-starved process called pyrolysis, extracting methane, hydrogen, and other byproducts for combustion, and burying the resulting carbon-rich char. Even if this approach would mean burning more coal--which emits more carbon dioxide than other fossil-fuel sources--it would yield a net reduction in carbon emissions, according to the analysis by [Malcolm Fowles](http://technology.open.ac.uk/tm/mf.htm), a professor of technology management at the Open University, in the United Kingdom. Burning one ton of wood pellets emits 357 kilograms less carbon than burning coal with the same energy content. But turning those wood pellets into char would save 372 kilograms of carbon emissions. That is because 300 kilograms of carbon could be buried as char, and the burning of byproducts would produce 72 kilograms less carbon emissions than burning an equivalent amount of coal. ¶ Such an approach could carry an extra benefit. Burying char--known as black-carbon sequestration--enhances soils, helping future crops and trees grow even faster, thus absorbing more carbon dioxide in the future. Researchers believe that the char, an inert and highly porous material, plays a key role in helping soil retain water and nutrients, and in sustaining microorganisms that maintain soil fertility. ¶ Johannes Lehmann, an associate professor of crops and soil sciences at Cornell University and an expert on char sequestration, agrees in principle with Fowles's analysis but believes that much more research in this relatively new area of study is needed. "It heads in the right direction," he says.¶ Interest in the approach is gathering momentum. On April 29, more than 100 corporate and academic researchers will gather in New South Wales, Australia, to attend the first international conference on black-carbon sequestration and the role pyrolysis can play to offset greenhouse-gas emissions. Lehmann estimates that as much as 9.5 billion tons of carbon--more than currently emitted globally through the burning of fossil fuels--could be sequestered annually by the end of this century through the sequestration of char. "Bioenergy through pyrolysis in combination with biochar sequestration is a technology to obtain energy and improve the environment in multiple ways at the same time," writes Lehmann in a research paper to be published soon in [Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment](http://www.frontiersinecology.org/). Fowles says that there would be an incentive for farmers, logging communities, and small towns to convert their own dedicated crops, agricultural and forest residues, and municipal biowaste into char if a high enough price emerged for the sale of carbon offsets. "Every community at any scale could pyrolyse its biowaste ... motivated by doing their bit against global warming," he says. Fowles believes that storing black carbon in soil carries less risk, would be quicker to implement, and could be done at much lower cost than burying carbon dioxide in old oil fields or aquifers. And he says the secondary benefits to agriculture could be substantial: "Biochar reduces the soil's requirement for irrigation and fertilizer, both of which emit carbon." Fowles adds that it has also been shown to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases from decay processes in soil. This would include nitrous oxide, a potent greenhouse gas. "Biochar has been observed to reduce nitrous-oxide emissions from cultivated soil by 40 percent."

#### Endign arms sales solves relations

**Zhang, 12 – 23 -10** (Jiakun, Junion in Pol. Sci. – Duke U., Duke East Asia Nexus (An Online Journal covering East Asian Affairs, “Disentanglement: A Case to End U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan”http://www.dukenexus.org/?p=215)

The Taiwan Strait is one of the few places in the world where the United States may be drawn into an armed conflict with an existing nuclear power. Though it is in the U.S national interest to reduce the probability of armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait, U.S. policy of arms sales to Taiwan endanger long term stability of the region. Since the abrogation of the of the formal defense treaty between the United States and Taiwan, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan under the guidance of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) have served as a de facto defense treaty.[1] U.S. arm sales to Taiwan play a defining role in this post-1979 defense agreement. Section 2 of the TRA requires that the United States provide Taiwan with the necessary defense assistance to maintain Taiwan’s self-defense capability.[2] The People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s dissatisfaction with the terms of the TRA spurred the Reagan administration to issue the 1982 Joint Communiqué which reassured that, The United States Government states that it will not seek to carry out a long term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution.[3] Despite the reassurances of the Joint Communiqué, U.S. presidents George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush have greatly elevated, rather than reduced U.S. arm sales to Taiwan. McClaran reflects, “The contradictions between the TRA and the Joint Communiqué have thus been revealed as a major source of PRC ire toward the U.S…[placing] the U.S. squarely in the middle of what the PRC leadership believes is an unsettled issue of civil war.”[4] With the growing cooperation and exchange between Taiwan and mainland China currently underway, the time is ripe for the United States to reverse its problematic policy of arms sales to Taiwan. The U.S. policy of arm sales to Taiwan escalates an arms race with China, entraps the United States in Taiwan’s defense, and creates the incentive for Taiwan to shirk its responsibilities in defense. Reversing the policy of arm sales would ameliorate many of these negative consequences while not compromising U.S. strategic aims in East Asia. II. U.S. Aims and the Policy of Arm Sales The United States has adopted the policy of arms sales to Taiwan, as part of its China strategy, to achieve three major strategic objectives in the Taiwan Strait. First, the U.S. seeks to deter China from attempting to reunify Taiwan by military force. Guided by deterrence theory, the U.S. has maintained a steady resolve over the past fifty years that it will not tolerate the violent reunification of Taiwan. By providing Taiwan with modern weapons, the U.S. effectively increases the cost of military intervention for China and decreases the likelihood of success of such an action. In other words, the U.S. hopes to pursue deterrence by denial through its policy of arms sales to Taiwan. Second, the United States wishes to protect the democratic institutions and the free market economy of Taiwan. Taiwan is one of the “Asian Tigers” and is the eighth largest trading partner of the United States.[5] Since the late 1980s, Taiwan has also repealed martial law and democratized. Therefore, it is in U.S. interest to maintain both Taiwan’s economic and political structure. Third, the United States seeks to prevent China from becoming a hostile rival in the Pacific. This complicates its other aims in the Taiwan Strait. Arming Taiwan to deter China elevates tensions with China. The policy of U.S. arm sales to Taiwan therefore represents a classic case of the security dilemma. On one hand the U.S. wishes to provide Taiwan with weapons to deter Chinese aggression; on the other hand, these efforts are perceived as U.S. attempt to divide China and result in greater arms build up in China. The consequence is an even more unstable Taiwan Strait with a greater accumulation of weapons on both sides. The U.S. aim of deterrence through arm sales therefore produces severe consequences and security challenges. III. China’s Aims and Response to Arm Sales The People’s Republic of China (PRC) views the U.S. policy of arm sales to Taiwan as a threat to its national sovereignty and prestige. The PRC perceives U.S. efforts to arm Taiwan as an attempt to undermine China’s sovereignty. From Beijing’s perspective, “Taiwan is the last unresolved territorial issue (after Hong Kong and Macao) dating back to the pre-communist period of China’s national weakness and territorial dismemberment.”[6] As such, the Taiwan issue has become a rallying point for Chinese nationalism. Thus, “anything that occurs on Taiwan that suggests permanent separation from China and any U.S. policy that could be construed as aimed at this outcome, in essence, becomes a severe security threat to Beijing and what remains of the compact between the regime and its citizens.”[7] Given the domestic consensus on the Taiwan question, the cost of capitulation for the PRC in the event of Taiwanese independence would be very high. This shifts the balance of resolve away from the United States towards China. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s asymmetrical military modernization program signals of its resolve to risk war with the U.S. over Taiwan. The PLA has invested in submarines, Sovremenny-class destroyers, as well as medium and short range ballistic missiles that are area denial weapons designed to destroy the power of U.S. aircraft carriers. [8] These weapons would effectively raise the costs of deploying a carrier group in the Taiwan Strait and act as area denial deterrence. Additionally, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan represent a challenge to China’s sense of national prestige. According to a report to Congress, “Many of Taiwan’s traditional arms suppliers have stopped out of respect for China’s position and the prospects for more lucrative commercial trade with the mainland.” The report continues, “This has effectively isolated the U.S. as a major threat to China’s national prestige and sovereignty, and hence made it the de facto focus of the PLA’s strategic and military modernization effort.”[9] China’s resolve to achieve its aims in the Taiwan Strait outweigh the resolve of the United States; while Taiwan is a peripheral concern of U.S. foreign policy, it lies at the center of Chinese foreign policy. China has demonstrated its strategic resolve in the Taiwan Strait through its investments in asymmetrical warfare. Thus, in the collapse of the “One China” consensus, the policy of arms sales places Washington uncomfortably in the middle of Beijing and Taipei and may draw the U.S. into an unwanted war with China. The U.S. policy of arms sales creates a Chinese security paradox paralleling the U.S. security paradox. “The PRC’s motivation to push Taiwan onto a path toward unification increases in direct proportion to the degree to which Beijing perceived Taipei to be drifting away. To deter that drift’s reaching the point of independence, the PRC increased its military projection…this, of course, induced Washington to enhance its own deterrence”[10] by pushing Taiwan to accept more U.S. weapons. IV. Consequences of Policy of Arm Sales Both China and the United States are plagued by this shared security dilemma. Both sides contribute to the security dilemma by attempting to shift the balance of arms in the Taiwan Strait in order to achieve its own strategic aims. The U.S. policy of arms sales to Taiwan as outlined in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) lies at the crux of its own security dilemma. The policy of arms sales produces three major consequences for the U.S. First, it creates a destabilizing arms race with China. Second, it emboldens the Taiwanese to be more aggressive in their foreign policy and may lead to entrapment. Third, it creates incentive for Taiwan to shirk its defensive duties. The Arms Race Problem The U.S. policy of arm sales to Taiwan empowers PLA hardliners and creates a destabilizing arms race across the Taiwan Strait. “U.S. arm sales to Taiwan significantly reduce Beijing’s options in dealing with Taipei and greatly increases the prospects of military confrontation. The net effect is that these arms sales have become the single biggest obstacle to establishing fully normal relations between the U.S. and China and narrow the options for both sides to either conflict or cooperate.”[11] The policy of U.S. arm sales reinforce Beijing’s suspicion that separation is Washington’s scarcely concealed agenda.[12]This is because U.S. weapons in Taiwan undermine the credibility of China’s threat to use military force in response to Taiwanese independence. Thus, it induces China to modernize its military to continue to make credible its threat of military force. This security dilemma gives the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strong political influence over the PRC’s Taiwan Policy, allowing hardliners more sway within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). [13] These hardliners have pushed for Chinese military modernization in order to challenge the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait. Chinese modernization in term provokes the U.S. to approve of even larger arm sales to Taiwan. According to the spiral model of arms races this will increase tensions across the Strait as the build up in arms increases mutual hostility and fear. This nascent arms race, if continued, could lead to greater instability in the Taiwan Strait and lead to war between the U.S. and China. The Entrapment Problem While U.S. arm sales to Taiwan may deter the use of military force by China in the short run, it also makes the U.S. vulnerable to entrapment in the long run. McClaran writes, “With the Taiwan Relations Act, Congress came within a micron of committing the U.S. to Taiwan’s defense.”[14] The role of arm sales in U.S. commitment to Taiwan were outlined when the TRA ensures that the U.S. will provide Taiwan with weapons it deems necessary for “defense”. However, since 1979, a number of Taiwan’s procurements have been more closely allied with U.S. foreign trade prerogatives and lacked credible links to its real military needs.[15] A major portion of U.S. arms received by Taiwan since 1979 were primarily made to satisfy the influential advocates and beneficiaries of the U.S. domestic industry and for political gains. [16] From Taiwan’s perspective, this indicated an increased level of U.S. support for its de facto independence.[17] This perceived deepening of U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s defense compromises U.S. strategic aims in the Taiwan Strait by creating the problem of entrapment. Arm sales that go beyond Taiwan’s real defense needs may encourage Taiwan to pursue an aggressive foreign policy objective such as independence. In this event, China will be forced to retaliate with military force as it has committed itself to do, and the United States would be drawn into the war due to its defensive commitment to Taiwan. The U.S. came dangerously close to being entrapped by Taiwan when China made known its outrage over Chen Shui-bian’s campaign for diplomatic and U.N. recognition of Taiwan. Chen deviated from his campaigned platform of 2000, in which he pledged the Five Nos[18], because he perceived strong U.S. support in 2001 when President Bush approved the largest Taiwan arms sale since 1992.[19] The strong support of Taiwan by the Bush administration was capitalized upon by the Taiwanese president to adopt otherwise overly ambitious foreign policy objectives with impunity. The Shirking Problem The Bush administration entered office with a more pro-Taiwan Policy than any of his predecessors. He sought to reverse the policy of strategic ambiguity in regards to Taiwan and was in favor of “declar[ing] unambiguously that [the U.S.] would come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of an attack or a blockade against Taiwan.”[20] The logic was that this would clarify America’s commitment to protect Taiwan, decrease the potential for miscalculation by Beijing, and reduce Chinese interest in military conflict over Taiwan. President Bush significantly reduced U.S. strategic ambiguity by stating that the U.S. will “do whatever it takes” to protect Taiwan.[21] In 2001, the Bush administration coupled its rhetoric by approving the largest Taiwan arms sale since 1992 a package which included 8 diesel-electric submarines, 12 ASW aircraft, and 4 Kidd class destroyers (weapon systems designed to offset the Chinese superiority in submarines). Though this may have heavy-handedly achieved its intended goal of reducing Chinese miscalculation, it also created room for Taiwanese politicians to shirk in their own defense. In 2001, Taiwan’s defense budget would suffer a reduction from $12.9 billion to $8.0 billion and continue to be reduced to $7.5 billion in 2003. Taking advantage of the guarantee of American support provided by the Bush administration, the Taiwanese legislature sought to shirk defense spending, to the great frustration of U.S. policy makers. In 2004, Richard Lawless, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, made it clear to Chen Chao-min, Taiwan’s vice Defense Minister, that Taiwan “should not view America’s resolute commitment to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait as a substitute for investing the necessary resources in its own defense.”[22] The Bush administration recognized the problem of shirking produced by their arm sales. The fear was that Taiwan will be unwilling to adequately provide to its own defense and thus shift the burden of deterring Chinese aggressing to the United States. In 2004, the rhetoric of the Bush administration reversed almost completely. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly clarified U.S. policy by making it clear that the U.S. “does not support” Taiwanese independence, that it would be “irresponsible” to treat the PRC’s statements as “empty threats” and that U.S. efforts to deter the PRC “might fail” if Beijing is convinced that Taiwan is embarking on a course of independence and concludes that Taiwan must be stopped.[23] President Bush had seemingly put a freeze on Taiwan’s arms requests in 2006 and delayed notifying Congress of eight pending arm sales.[24] V. Alternative Policy The policy of U.S. arm sales to Taiwan generates instability in the long run: sparking an arms race across the Taiwan Strait, while at the same time enabling Taiwan’s shirking of its own defensive responsibilities and making the United States vulnerable to entrapment where Taiwan’s aggressive diplomacy may provoke a Chinese response and draw the United States into a war that it wishes to avoid. Ceasing annual arms sales with Taiwan would eliminate the consequences of the policy without necessarily endangering U.S. aims. It would actually create a new opportunity that may enable the United States to achieve more of its aims in East Asia such as the disarmament of North Korea. Ceasing regular arms sales does not mean eliminating U.S. deterrence against a Chinese attempt to unify Taiwan by force. The conventional strength of the U.S. navy serves as a powerful deterrent for China not to invade Taiwan. In fact, the ceasing of arms sales should be coupled with a reiteration of U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan if China seeks a military solution. Additionally, China and Taiwan are making great diplomatic progress through the Three Links, which make Taiwan and China even more interconnected and decrease the risk of armed conflict in the Strait. In other words, China would have no incentive to change the status quo even if the U.S. ceased arm sales to Taiwan because it can more effectively entice Taiwan towards reunification economically. In fact, a reiteration of the 1983 Joint Communiqué would be a gesture of good that can enlist Chinese cooperation on tough issues in which it also has a stake, such as North Korea. Along the same lines, the U.S. aim to preserve the democratic government of Taiwan and its free market would not be jeopardized by ending arm sales. Taiwan is now the biggest investor in China, trade across the strait have grown and will continue to grow with the Three Links.[25] The PRC has stated that it is more than willing to allow Taiwan to maintain its own way of governance as a democracy if it was to become reunified with China.[26] It has also made clear that Taiwan would be allowed to keep its own defense force in the event of unification. Chinese conduct in Hong Kong makes it promise credible. The return of Hong Kong to China has not resulted in the collapse of Hong Kong’s democratic government and economy. Most importantly, the U.S. objective to avoid the rise of a hostile power in the Pacific will be realized if arm sales to Taiwan ends. China’s economic growth and consequent power cannot be wished or ignored away; they are realities that the United States will continue to live with. The key for U.S. foreign policy therefore should be to prevent China from becoming a hostile power. Additionally, if the U.S. ends arm sales on the condition that China toughens up its policy towards North Korea, regional allies will be placated. South Korea and Japan’s concern over North Korean nuclear program dwarfs their concern over the security of Taiwan. The overture to end arm sales can be part of a tit-for-tat bargaining strategy with China to enlist its help with the otherwise unsolvable problem of North Korea. If China fails to cooperate, then the U.S. would still have the freedom to resume arm sales in Taiwan. In the spirit of the 1982 communiqué, a halt of U.S. arm sales to Taiwan would allow all three U.S. objectives in the Taiwan Strait to be achieved without any of the consequences. Some would see ceasing arm sales to Taiwan as a form of appeasement for China that will result in Chinese “salami slicing”. These fears are largely unfounded; the relaxing of tension over the Taiwan would deny hardliners in the CCP their favorite diversion from festering internal problems. Additionally, a military unification of Taiwan is highly unlikely in the short run, given the success of China’s diplomatic and economic overtures to Taiwan. It is equally, if not more, unlikely in the long run as cross-strait interdependence grows. The major obstacle facing arms sale reduction is US domestic politics. The TRA places the issue of arm sales to Taiwan in the jurisdiction of Congress. The Taiwan lobby is a powerful force in Washington and among its advocates are large U.S. weapons contractors who may be forced to cut production even further in this state of the economy. In fact it has been clear since the 1980s that “Taiwan does not need more arms for the U.S…. the U.S. must shift its policy from providing arms overtly to a discreet strategy of advice and assistance designed to improve and rationalize Taiwan’s force structure with its military objectives.”[27] Nevertheless the policy of arm sales continued because contractors such as Lockheed Martin and Raytheon make massive profits from this unique form of trade with Taiwan. Even though the policy of stopping U.S. arm sales to Taiwan on the condition of Chinese cooperation on North Korea is a sound foreign policy, it will face significant opposition in Washington. VI. Conclusion A policy to end U.S. arm sales to Taiwan while reiterating U.S. opposition to the use of force in the Taiwan Strait would be consistent with American aims in the region. Arm sales simply are not a sustainable long term policy; impetus for change should come sooner rather than later. The current climate of cooperation between the PRC and Taiwan reduces Chinese reliance of military coercion and offers the Obama administration the unique opportunity to end U.S. arm sales at the lowest possible cost internationally. Taiwan’s sagging economy means that the Taiwanese military budget is under pressure domestically and demand for U.S. arms is low. Additionally, the belligerence shown by North Korean’s ballistic missile testing means that South Korea and Japan are more eager acquiesce to a deal where ending arm sales to Taiwan would increase Chinese pressure on North Korea. This policy reversal sacrifices none of the major U.S. goals in the Taiwan Strait and eliminates all the unpleasant consequences. The U.S. could avoid escalating the arms race with China and at the same time protect itself from Taiwanese entrapment and shirking. The U.S. will be much freer to maneuver diplomatically in East Asia as a result and even have the potentially opportunity enlist China’s cooperation in other major objectives such as counter-proliferation in North Korea and Iran.

Abe Visit solves war—Aff impact author

Klare, Three days ago [The Aff’s Author, Peace and World Security Studies professor at Hampshire, Three Days Ago, 1-23-13  
(Michael, “The Next War,” 1-23-13, <http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2013/01/23/the_next_war_100500.html>, accessed 1-24-13]

Can such a crisis be averted? Yes, if the leaders of China, Japan, and the United States, the key countries involved, take steps to defuse the belligerent and ultra-nationalistic pronouncements now holding sway and begin talking with one another about practical steps to resolve the disputes. Similarly, an emotional and unexpected gesture -- Prime Minister Abe, for instance, pulling a Nixon and paying a surprise goodwill visit to China -- might carry the day and change the atmosphere. Should these minor disputes in the Pacific get out of hand, however, not just those directly involved but the whole planet will look with sadness and horror on the failure of everyone involved.

# China

#### US-Sino relations high – North Korea

**Schell 3-7** [Orville, Arthur Ross Director of the Center on U.S.-China Relations at the Asia Society in New York. He is a former professor and Dean at the University of California, Berkeley’s Graduate School of Journalism, Can the North Korea Challenge Bring China and the U.S. Together? http://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/03/can-the-north-korea-challenge-bring-china-and-the-us-together/273777/]

What may end up being most significant about the new draft resolution in the UN Security Council to impose stricter sanctions on North Korea, which China seems willing to sign, may not be what it amounts to in terms of denuclearizing the DPRK, but what it portends for U.S.-China relations. Although it is still too early to be certain, this may represent a bold new step forward by Party General Secretary Xi Jinping and China's new leadership in signaling the U.S. that China is now interested in finding new areas of convergence. To date, China has been rather reluctant to support multilateral action toward so-called rogue regimes: China opposed NATO's military campaign in Libya and, last July, China and Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution, that would have threatened sanctions against Syria's leadership.¶ But now not only have China's leaders agreed to strict new sanctions on a foreign power, but on a country that is both a neighbor and a traditional ally.¶ This is a particularly tantalizing moment because it comes just as the new leaders in Beijing are beginning to define their new foreign policy perspective while at the same time Barrack Obama is reorganizing his team for his second term. It may well represent the most significant gesture China has made toward Washington in recent years of wanting to reset the bilateral relationship.¶ When he visited Washington last year, Xi called for a "new type of great power relationship." And at the 18th Party Congress last November, Xi's predecessor Hu Jintao's report to the Party spoke of a "new type of relations among major powers" characterized by "mutual respect, mutual benefits and a win-win partnership."

#### Relations resilient, anything else is a speed bump

**Lamb 3-21** [Gregory M., Christian Science Monitor, Good Reads: US-China relations, 'Lean In,' ballet's whodunit, Ireland's Downton, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/2013/0321/Good-Reads-US-China-relations-Lean-In-ballet-s-whodunit-Ireland-s-Downton]

Competition between the US and China is inevitable, but conflict is not, Mr. Lee argues in an excerpt from his new book in The Atlantic.¶ “This is not the Cold War. The Soviet Union was contesting with the United States for global supremacy. China is acting purely in its own national interests. It is not interested in changing the world.”¶ The complex Chinese-US relationship is underpinned by an essential truth: Each side needs the other.¶ “Chinese leaders know that U.S. military superiority is overwhelming and will remain so for the next few decades,” he writes. “[T]he Chinese do not want to clash with anyone – at least not for the next 15 to 20 years.”

#### The Ralls decision specifically stifles cooperation with China – perceived as particular scrutiny toward China that deters investment.

Baker Botts LLP, 10-1-12

[“President Obama Blocks Chinese-Owned Wind-Farm Development” <http://www.bakerbotts.com/file_upload/Update201210IntlTrade-PresidentObamaBlocksChinese-OwnedWind-FarmDevelopment2.htm>, accessed 10-29-12, TAP]

On Friday, September 28, 2012, the President issued an order to block the Ralls Corporation (“Ralls”), a Chinese-owned wind-farm developer, from proceeding with the development of four wind farm projects in Oregon.1 The President’s order requires Ralls not only to divest itself of all ownership in the project companies, but also requires the removal of all equipment on the sites, bars access to the sites by employees of the companies, and bars any non-U.S. citizens from carrying on the dismantling of installed equipment. It is exceedingly rare for the President to make such a decision as most foreign investors will abandon their transactions when it appears likely that such an order will be issued.¶ ¶ The matter began earlier this year when Ralls bought four small Oregon companies with assets consisting of wind-farm development rights, land rights, power purchase agreements, and government permits. The projects reportedly had received other federal regulatory approvals, including a determination by the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) that the turbine towers presented no hazard to aviation, in particular to nearby airspace used by the U.S. Navy. After learning of the transaction through press accounts and later through a voluntary notice filed by Ralls, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”) reviewed the transaction and issued two orders, pending approval of the President, to stop the construction and operation of all of Ralls' four wind farms on the grounds of national security, while also requesting that the company remove all its equipment from the site within five days and prohibiting Ralls from divesting any of the assets. The President was given until September 28 to make a determination as to whether to approve CFIUS’ order or allow the project to proceed.¶ ¶ In an unprecedented move, the Chinese owners then pursued a legal challenge through U.S. courts by seeking a temporary restraining order to prevent CFIUS from imposing these restrictions on the projects.2 The President’s decision and the developments revealed by Ralls’ legal challenge are noteworthy for several implications specific to ongoing or future acquisitions of U.S. businesses by Chinese companies or nationals.3¶ ¶ Chinese Investors Face Special Scrutiny¶ ¶ The U.S. Government maintains that the CFIUS process does not single out Chinese companies for special attention and that the U.S. remains open to Chinese investment.4 While this assertion may be true with respect to economic sectors that have no apparent national security implications, the Ralls matter seems to confirm an apparent emerging trend that CFIUS will subject transactions by Chinese investors to heightened scrutiny.¶ ¶ CFIUS’ response also highlights the U.S. Government’s concern that allowing Chinese companies proximity to certain military installations may pose an espionage threat, regardless of the underlying type of business involved. This is evidenced by the fact that CFIUS’ main concern with the Ralls acquisition pertained to the proximity of the project properties to airspace used by the Defense Department—mirroring similar CFIUS reactions to two prior Chinese company efforts to acquire mining operations near a U.S. Navy base in Nevada. The Government’s orders do not appear to implicate any of the general concerns that usually arise in the CFIUS context, such as impact on critical infrastructure, access to energy supplies, and technology transfers — all of which are largely moot in the context of this transaction. Chinese investors in particular therefore appear to face the difficult challenge of anticipating a broad range of U.S. national security concerns specific to them, many of which are challenging to assess because they may be classified or otherwise difficult for an outsider to discern.¶ ¶ Taken together with the ongoing controversy over the CNOOC-Nexen transaction that is also pending CFIUS review, and with allegations of espionage by several Chinese telecommunications companies, the political climate of sensitivity around Chinese investment in the United States is at an all-time high. This overall trend will likely continue as it is fueled by bipartisan concerns over cyber-threats, economic espionage, and the trade imbalance. Therefore, any significant Chinese investment in the United States that could implicate the acquisition of control by a foreign person over a U.S. business must be carefully assessed against the FINSA requirements and national security concerns, as well as political dynamics at the state and local level.¶ ¶ CFIUS Casts a Wide Net...¶ According to CFIUS’ filings in the Ralls litigation, the acquisition came to the Government’s attention through a report in a wind power trade publication. This statement confirms the practice of CFIUS agencies aggressively monitoring media in the United States to flag deals that have not been voluntarily presented to the Committee. Chinese companies seeking to acquire a company or business in the United States must therefore anticipate that their transactions, regardless of value, are likely to come to CFIUS’ attention.¶ ¶ ...But Internal Coordination Can Pose a Challenge¶ ¶ The Ralls litigation also has surfaced the unfortunate reality that the U.S. Government does not always coordinate its own activities in areas of interest to CFIUS — in this matter, Ralls reportedly engaged in a long process to secure FAA permits, which included close consultations with the Defense Department to mitigate the impact on U.S. Navy flight operations. Ralls may have assumed that such approvals lessened any need to consult CFIUS. The record suggests instead that neither CFIUS nor the DOD representative on the Committee were made aware of these discussions or the final FAA approval at the time. Further, it does not appear that these approvals carried much weight with CFIUS or even with the Defense Department, as it was a different component of the Defense Department that requested that CFIUS contact Ralls to suggest it initiate a voluntary filing, after the FAA process was completed, and apparently only after being tipped off by the aforementioned press report. This underscores that vetting a transaction with other agencies of the U.S. Government is not a substitute for direct discussions with CFIUS. The parties to a transaction need to assume the burden of ensuring that all of the necessary touch-points with the U.S. Government are covered, including with CFIUS directly.¶ ¶ CFIUS Broadens the Definition of a U.S. Business¶ ¶ On a more general point, CFIUS has moved to adopt a much more expansive view of what constitutes a U.S. business under FINSA in the Ralls case, and this arguably extends beyond CFIUS’ own guidance issued in 2008. As described in the filings with the court, Ralls acquired the rights to develop several wind-farm installations (permits and some contracts, primarily). The acquisition as described by Ralls does not appear to involve the bundle of tangible assets that would normally constitute a business, such as employees or buildings. This suggests that where a Chinese investor is involved, CFIUS is likely to view its jurisdiction as broad enough to cover almost any investment short of a complete greenfield project.¶ ¶ The Only Defense is Effective Advance Notice¶ ¶ As the Ralls case illustrates and our experience confirms, when considering transactions that involve nationals from certain countries or that may implicate some element of national security, broadly defined, the best approach is to engage CFIUS early and often. By not undertaking such an approach, Ralls lost some of the advantage of timing and control over the CFIUS process that engaging in a voluntary filing or an early pre-filing notice typically provides. Recent developments also suggest that the Committee will treat a non-disclosed acquisition much more skeptically, particularly when a Chinese investor is involved.

#### Multiple factors check escalation --- counterbalancing forces, US, economics, moderate leaders

**Sari 12** [Angguntari, reporter for the Jakarta Post, "Three possible scenarios in South China Sea," 12-31, http://www2.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/12/31/three-possible-scenarios-south-china-sea.html]

In the status-quo scenario, which is the most likely scenario for the next 10 years, the claimants adopt half-hearted attitudes to resolving the territorial claims and maintaining stability. The current information suggests that a major conflict will not take place. Military analysts at IHS Jane’s say that Southeast Asian countries, including the claimants, together increased defense spending by 13.5 percent last year, to US$24.5 billion. The figure is projected to rise to $40 billion by 2016. This will prevent China from forcefully pressuring other claimants or occupying the territory that it claims. The other stabilizing factor is the US. The US pivot to Asia Pacific since 2009 includes the commitment to keep all claimants in check since this area has a high strategic and economic value. Nearly a third of the world’s maritime shipping traverse this area. An encouraging sign has come from China’s next leader Xi Jinping. In his address to the annual meeting with ASEAN members, held in the southern Chinese city of Nanning recently, Xi said China was committed to “common development and a peaceful regional solution to the dispute”.

#### Won't escalate

#### Wing 12 [Terry, reporter for VOA News, "Will South China Sea Disputes Lead to War?," 9-4, http://www.voanews.com/content/south-china-sea-war-unlikely/1501780.html]

But that doesn’t mean a war. Storey said an escalation into full-blown conflict is unlikely. “It is in no country’s interests to spill blood or treasure over this issue – the costs far outweigh the benefits,” Storey said. Other experts agree. James Holmes of the U.S. Naval War College says admires how China has been able to get its way in spreading it claims of sovereignty without becoming a bully. “[China] gradually consolidated the nation's maritime claims while staying well under the threshold for triggering outside -most likely American -intervention,” said Holmes. “Is war about to break out over bare rocks? I don't think so.” writes Robert D. Kaplan, Chief Political Strategist for the geopolitical analysis group Stratfor. Kaplan, however, doesn’t give much hope for negotiations. “The issues involved are too complex, and the power imbalance between China and its individual neighbors is too great,” he said. For that reason, Kaplan says China holds all the cards. Kaplan doesn’t look for Chinese military aggression against other claimants. That, he says, would be counterproductive for its goals in the region. “It would completely undermine its carefully crafted ‘peaceful rise’ thesis and push Southeast Asian countries into closer strategic alignment with the US,” said Kaplan.

#### No impact to the economy

Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

**No Asia wars -- international organizations and stability.**

**Desker, ‘8**

[Barry, Dean of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, At the IISS-JIIA Conference 2-4 June 2008, “Why War is Unlikely in Asia: Facing the Challenge from China”, <http://www.iiss.org/conferences/asias-strategic-challenges-in-search-of-a-common-agenda/conference-papers/why-war-in-asia-remains-unlikely-barry-desker/>]

War in Asia is thinkable but it is unlikely. The Asia-Pacific region can, paradoxically, be regarded as a zone both of relative insecurity and of relative strategic stability**.** On the one hand, the region contains some of the world’s most significant flashpoints – the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the Siachen glacier – where **tensions** between nations could escalateto the point of resulting in a major war. The region is replete with border issues, the site of acts of terrorism (the Bali bombings, Manila superferry bombing, Kashmir, etc.), and it is an area of overlapping maritime claims (the Spratly Islands, Diaoyutai islands, etc). Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area of strategic significance, sitting astride key sea lines of communication (SLOCS) and important chokepoints. Nevertheless, the Asia-Pacific region ismore stablethan one might believe. Separatism remains a challenge but the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism is a nuisance but its impact is contained. The North Korean nuclear issue, while not fully resolved, is at least moving toward a conclusionwith the likely denuclearization of the peninsula. Tensions between China and Taiwan, while always just beneath the surface, seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict (especially after the KMT victories in Taiwan). The region also possesses significant multilateral structures such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the nascent Six Party Talks forum and, in particular, ASEAN, and institutions such as the EAs, ASEAN + 3, ARF which ASEAN has conceived. Although the United States has been the hegemon in the Asia-Pacific since the end of World War II, it will probably not remain the dominant presence in the region over the next 25 years. A rising China will pose the critical foreign policy challenge, probably more difficult than the challenge posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This development will lead to the most profound change in the strategic environment of the Asia-Pacific. On the other hand, the rise of China does not automatically mean that conflict is more likely. First, the emergence of a more assertive China does not mean a more aggressive China. Beijing appears content to press its claims peacefully (if forcefully), through existing avenues and institutions of international relations. Second, when we look more closely at the Chinese military buildup, we find that there may be less than some might have us believe, and thatthe Chinese war machine is not quite as threatening – as some might argue. Instead of Washington perspectives shaping Asia-Pacific affairs, the rise of China is likely to see a new paradigm in international affairs – the “Beijing Consensus” – founded on the leadership role of the authoritarian party state, a technocratic approach to governance, the significance of social rights and obligations, a reassertion of the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference, coupled with support for freer markets and stronger regional and international institutions. The emphasis is on good governance. Japan fits easily in this paradigm. Just as Western dominance in the past century led to Western ideas shaping international institutions and global values, Asian leaders and Asian thinkers will increasingly participate in and shape the global discourse, whether it is on the role of international institutions, the rules governing international trade or the doctrines which under-gird responses to humanitarian crises. An emerging Beijing Consensus is not premised on the rise of the ‘East’ and decline of the ‘West’, as sometimes seemed to be the sub-text of the earlier Asian values debate. I do not share the triumphalism of my friends Kishore Mahbubani and Tommy Koh. However, like the Asian values debate, this new debate reflects alternative philosophical traditions. The issue is the appropriate balance between the rights of the individual and those of the state. This debate will highlight the shared identity and shared values between China and the states in the region. I do not agree with those in the US who argue that Sino-US competition will result in “intense security competition with considerable potential for war” in which most of China’s neighbours “will join with the United States to contain China’s power.”[1] These shared values are likely to reduce the risk of conflict and result in regional pressure for an accommodation with China and the adoption of policies of engagement with China, rather than confrontation with an emerging China. China is increasingly economically inter-dependent, part of a network of over-lapping cooperative regional institutions. In Asia, the focus is on economic growth and facilitating China’s integration into regional and global affairs. An interesting feature is that in China’s interactions with states in the region, China is beginning to be interested in issues of proper governance, the development of domestic institutions and the strengthening of regional institutional mechanisms. Chinese policy is not unchanging, even on the issue of sovereignty. For example, there has been an evolution in Chinese thinking on the question of freedom of passage through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. While China supported the claims of the littoral states to sovereign control over the Straits when the Law of the Sea Convention was concluded in 1982, China’s increasing dependence on imported oil shipped through the Straits has led to a shift in favour of burden-sharing, the recognition of the rights of user states and the need for cooperation between littoral states and user states. Engagement as part of global and regional institutions has resulted in revisions to China’s earlier advocacy of strict non-intervention and non-interference. Recent Chinese support for global initiatives in peace-keeping, disaster relief, counter-terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation and anti-drug trafficking, its lack of resort to the use of its veto as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and its active role within the World Trade Organisation participation in global institutions can be influential in shaping perceptions of a rising China. Beijing has greatly lowered the tone and rhetoric of its strategic competition with the United States**,** actions which have gone a long way toward reassuring the countries of Southeast Asia of China’s sincerity in pursuing a non-confrontational foreign and security strategy. Beijing’s approach is significant as most Southeast Asian states prefer not to have to choose between alignment with the US and alignment with China and have adopted ‘hedging’ strategies in their relationships with the two powers. Beijing now adopts a more subtle approach towards the United States: not directly challenging US leadership in Asia, partnering with Washington where the two countries have shared interests, and, above all, promoting multilateral security processes that, in turn, constrain US power, influence and hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is certainly in the midst of perhaps the most ambitious upgrading of its combat capabilities since the early 1960s, and it is adding both quantitatively and qualitatively to its arsenal of military equipment. Its current national defence doctrine is centered on the ability to fight “Limited Local Wars”. PLA operations emphasize preemption, surprise, and shock value, given that the earliest stages of conflict may be crucial to the outcome of a war. The PLA has increasingly pursued the acquisition of weapons for asymmetric warfare. The PLA mimics the United States in terms of the ambition and scope of its transformational efforts – and therefore challenges the U.S. military at its own game. Nevertheless, we should note that China, despite **a “deliberate and focused course** of military modernization,” is still at least two decades behind the United States in terms of defence capabilities and technology. There is very little evidence that the Chinese military is engaged in an RMA-like overhaul of its organizational or institutional structures. While the Chinese military is certainly acquiring new and better equipment, its RMA-related activities are embryonic and equipment upgrades by themselves do not constitute an RMA. China’s current military buildup is still more indicative of a process of evolutionary, steady-state, and sustaining – rather than disruptive or revolutionary – innovation and change. In conclusion, war in the Asia-Pacific is unlikely but the emergence of East Asia, especially China, will require adjustments by the West, just as Asian societies have had to adjust to Western norms and values during the American century. The challenge for liberal democracies like the United States will be to embark on a course of self-restraint.

# Warming

### Solvnecy

#### No one will follow—they can’t solve the legitimacy or capacity deficit

Buzan 10—Professor of International Relations @ London School of Economics [Barry Buzan (Senior Fellow @ IDEAS, Honorary professor @ Universities of Copenhagen and Fellow of the British Academy), “The End of Leadership?—Constraints on the World Role of Obama’s America,” IDEAS reports—special reports, 2010

INTRODUCTION

It is appealing to think of the Obama administration as a return to normalcy after the deviance, unilateralist arrogance and damaging mistakes of the Bush years. In this view, we should expect a¶ return to business as usual, with the US picking up the signature themes of multilateralism and the¶ market that have underpinned its world role since the end of the Second World War. Although by no means universally loved, the US was an effective leader through the Cold War and beyond not only¶ because it promoted liberal economic and political values that were attractive to many others, but also¶ because it was prepared to bind its own power in multilateral rules and institutions sufficiently that¶ its followers could contain their fear of its overwhelming power. Does Obama’s liberal stance mean that we should expect a return to the leadership role that the US has exercised for more than half a¶ century? I argue that this is unlikely to happen because there are now three powerful constraints that¶ will largely block a return to US leadership. The first is that the US has lost much of its followership. The second is that the capacity of the US to lead is now much weakened even if it still retains the will¶ to do so. The third is that there is a general turn within international society against hegemony and¶ therefore against the global leadership role itself.

LOST FOLLOWERSHIP

If the US remains willing to lead, will anyone follow? There are two issues here: the growing range of policy disagreements on specific issues between the US and others; and the decline of shared values and visions between the US and its former followers. A good symbol of the weakening relationship¶ between the US and its followers is the replacement of talk about ‘friends and allies’ or ‘the free¶ world’ with a much harsher and still basically unchanged, line about ‘coalitions of the willing’. There¶ is some hope that under Obama differences over policy might improve in specific areas, particularly¶ the environment, but even on that issue Obama will be lucky just to get the US seen as not part of¶ the problem. Domestic constraints on carbon pricing and accepting binding international standards¶ will make it difficult for the US to lead. Many other areas of disagreement remain, some deep. The US has failed to make the war on terrorism into¶ anything like the binding cause that underpinned¶ its leadership during the Cold War, and its policies¶ continue to erode its liberal credentials. By its use¶ of torture, and even moreso the public advocacy¶ of such interrogation techniques by senior Bush administration figures, and by its rejection of the¶ Geneva Conventions on prisoners or war, it exposed¶ itself to ridicule and contempt as an advocate for¶ human rights. That China is still plausibly able to criticise the US on human rights and environment¶ issues is a marker of how far Washington’s reputation has fallen. US policy in the Middle East, particularly¶ on Israel, has few followers, and the repercussions of¶ the disastrous interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan¶ continue to rattle on. Unless China turns quite nasty, the inclination of many in the US to see China¶ as a challenger to its unipolar position is unlikely¶ to attract much sympathy. The financial chaos of 2008-9 has undermined Washington’s credibility as¶ an economic leader.

Anti-Americanism, though obviously not newbecame exceptionally strong under Bush, and is now more culturally based, and more corrosive of shared identities. It questions whether the ‘American way of life’ is an appropriate model for the rest of the world, and whether the US economic model is either sustainable or desirable. It looks at health; at a seeming US inclination to use force as the first choice policy instrument, with its domestic parallel of gun culture; at the influence of religion and special interest lobbies in US domestic politics; at a US government which was openly comfortable with the use of torture and was re-elected; and at a federal environmental policy until recently in denial about global warming; and asks not just whether the US is a questionable model, but whether it has become a serious part of the problem. While some of this was specific to the Bush administration, and is being turned around by Obama, some of the deeper issues are more structural. The US is much more culturally conservative, religious, individualistic, and anti-state than most other parts of the West. America’s religion and cultural conservatism and anti-statism set it apart from most of Europe, where disappointment with Obama is already palpable. America’s individualism and anti-statism set it apart from Asia, where China is anyway disinclined to be a follower. This kind of anti-Americanism rests on very real differences, and raises the possibility that the idea of ‘the West’ was just a passing epiphenomenon of the Cold War. The Bush administration asset-stripped half-a-century of respect for, goodwill towards and trust in US leadership, and it reflected, and helped to consolidate, a shift in the centre of gravity of US politics. The Obama administration cannot just go back to the late 1990s and pick up from where Clinton left off.

LOST CAPACITY

In addition to having less common ground with its¶ followers the US also has less capacity, both material and ideological, to play the role of leader. The rise¶ of China, and also India, Brazil and others, means¶ that the US now operates in a world in which the¶ distribution of power is becoming more diffuse, and in which several centres of power are not closely linked to it, and some are opposed. In this context, the Bush legacy of a crashed economy and an enormous debt severely constrain the leadership¶ options of the Obama administration. The economic¶ crisis of 2008-9 not only hamstrung the US in terms of material capability, but also stripped away the Washington consensus as the ideological legitimizer for US leadership. The collapse of neoliberal ideology¶ might yet be seen as an ideational event on the same¶ scale as the collapse of communism in 1989.

Since the late 1990s, and very sharply since 2003,¶ the US has in many ways become the enemy of its own 20th century project and thus of its own¶ capacity to lead. Not surprisingly this has deepened¶ a longstanding disjuncture between how the US¶ perceives itself and how the rest of the world sees it. The deeply established tendency of the US to see itself as an intrinsic force for good because it stands for a right set of universal values, makes it unable easily, or possibly at all, to address the disjuncture between its self-perception and how others see it. Self-righteous unilateralism does not acquire legitimacy¶ abroad. To the extent that celebrations of US power as a good in itself (because the US is good) dominate¶ American domestic politics, this does not inspire the US to seek grounds for legitimating its position abroad. A contributing factor here is the US tendency to demand nearly absolute security for itself. The problem for the US of transcending its own self-image is hardly new, but it has become both more difficult and more important in managing its position in the more complex world in which the US is neither so clearly on the right side of a great struggle, nor so dominant in material terms. It is unclear at this point whether Obama will be able to transcend this aspect of American politics, though it is clear that the nature of American¶ politics makes it difficult for any president to do so.

THE TURN AGAINST HEGEMONY

The third constraint stems not from any particular characteristic of the US, but from the fact of unipolarity itself. Since decolonisation global international society has developed a growing disjuncture between a¶ defining principle of legitimacy based on sovereign equality, and a practice that is substantially rooted in¶ the hegemony of great powers. The problem is the absence of a consensual principle of hegemony with¶ which international society might bridge this gap between its principles and its practices. A concentration¶ of power in one actor disrupts the ideas of balance and equilibrium which are the traditional sources and¶ conditions for legitimacy in international society. This problem would arise for any unipolar power, but it¶ connects back to the more US-specific aspects of the legitimacy deficit. Under the Bush administration, the US lost sight of what Adam Watson calls raison de systeme (‘the belief that it pays to make the system¶ work’), and this exacerbated the illegitimacy of hegemony in itself. Since the US looks unlikely to abandon its attachment to its own hegemony, this problem is not going to go away.

If hegemony itself is illegitimate, and the US now lacks both the capabilities and attractiveness to overcome this, what lies on the near horizon is a world with no global leader. Such a world would still have several great powers influential within and beyond their regions: the EU, Russia, China, Japan, the US, possibly¶ India and Brazil. It would also have many substantial regional powers such as South Africa, Turkey and Iran. Whether one sees a move towards a more polycentric, pluralist, and probably regionalised, world political order as desirable or worrying is a matter of choice. In such a world, global hegemony by any one power or culture will be unacceptable. Obama may hasten or delay the US exit from leadership. But the waning of the Western tide, and the re-emergence of a more multi-centred (in terms of power and wealth) and more multicultural (albeit with substantial elements of Westernization) world, mean that hegemonic global leadership whether by a single power or the West collectively is no longer going to be acceptable. The question is whether such a new world order can find the foundations for collective great power management,¶ and whether the US can learn to live in a more pluralist international society where it is no longer the sole¶ superpower but merely the first among equals. Pg. 4-6

**Can’t solve – eliminating every coal plant would only be a POINT 2 degree change**

RAPIER 12 Chief Technology Officer at Merica International – a Renewable Energy Company, Master’s in Chemical Engineering from Texas A&M University [Robert Rapier, Study: Eliminating Coal-Fired Power is Worth 0.2 Degrees in 100 Years, <http://www.consumerenergyreport.com/2012/03/05/study-eliminating-coal-fired-power-is-worth-0-2-degrees-in-100-years/>]

Who could have dreamed solving climate change would be so easy? A new paper in Environmental Research Letters called “Greenhouse gases, climate change and the transition from coal to low-carbon electricity” concludes that replacement of all of the world’s currently operating coal-fired power plants — which produce about 40% of the world’s electricity — and replacing them with renewable energy would have an impact of 0.2 degrees Celsius 100 years from now. Cherry-Picking Conclusions According to One’s Viewpoint However, a number of climate change websites took away a very different message than I took away from the paper. Here is Joe Romm’s view: Bombshell: You Can’t Slow Projected Warming With Gas, You Need ‘Rapid and Massive Deployment’ of Zero-Carbon Power I seem to recall another “bombshell” that he recently reported upon on the same theme: Natural Gas Bombshell: Switching From Coal to Gas Increases Warming for Decades, Has Minimal Benefit Even in 2100. I debunked that by showing that in that particular study, every possible alternative — including wind power, solar power, and even simply shutting down all of the coal plants — was projected to increase global warming in the short term: BOMBSHELL: Solar and Wind Power Would Speed Up, Not Reduce, Global Warming. But Joe is back with the hyperbolic titles and exaggerations (which I get into below), and he missed the biggest story in the paper. Coal and Sunlight-Reflecting Pollutants The subject of Romm’s earlier “natural gas bombshell” was a paper written by Tom Wigley that concluded that shutting down coal-fired power plants would cause the global temperature to increase in the short term because of the loss of sunlight-reflecting pollutants. In that particular paper, Dr. Wigley modeled what would happen if coal-fired power was replaced with natural gas. He did indeed project short-term warming in that scenario, yet it was a result of the air becoming cleaner and allowing sunlight through as the coal was phased out. Thus, the media really got that story wrong, which was not about a deficiency of natural gas, but rather about the peculiarity of burning coal — that the particulate emissions reflect sunlight. Those who fixated on natural gas as the culprit could have written the same story about solar power — which the study’s author confirmed for me. Hence, I made that my “Bombshell” to illustrate the point. However, that particular study didn’t actually model the temperature impact of shutting down coal plants and replacing them with anything other than natural gas. So, I posed the following question to Dr. Wigley: What does the graph look like in 2100 if all coal-fired plants were replaced with zero emission sources (as the idealized study)? I am just wondering what the potential actually is. Are we talking about 1 or 2 degrees lower? I just have no idea of the relative context. We had several email exchanges over his paper, and he said that my questions were intriguing and he would look into them. I never heard back from him on that, but this new paper answers the question. Shuttering All the World’s Coal Plants Wouldn’t Do Much The authors of this newest study modeled the replacement of coal-fired power plants with either natural gas, coal with carbon capture and storage, hydropower, solar PV, solar thermal, wind power, or nuclear power. You can see from Joe Romm’s headline how the story is being spun, but let’s break it down in a more objective fashion. The following graphic from the paper tells the story. Pay particular attention to the temperature scale. The graphic indicates — as Tom Wigley’s previous paper indicated but which was only reported relative to natural gas — that in every single case, it doesn’t matter what coal-fired power plants are replaced with, the temperature is projected to increase for almost the next 40 years. This is true even in the baseline “Conservation” case, which involves merely idling the coal-fired plants and not replacing them with anything. The paper projects that if coal-fired power plants continue to operate, the expected temperature rise relative to the baseline (i.e., relative to the expected temperature increase from other sources) in 50 years is 0.15 degrees C, and in 100 years is about 0.33 degrees C. If coal is phased out and replaced with natural gas, the relative 50 and 100 year temperature rise is projected to be 0.14 degrees C and 0.24 degrees C, respectively. So the paper shows slightly less warming when natural gas is used, which Climate Progress Tweeted as “Switch from coal to natural gas would have zero effect on global temperatures by 2100” and included a link to Joe’s “bombshell.” That is obviously an exaggeration, as the graphic clearly shows that the effect is not zero. If it was, the natural gas line would overlay the coal line. Shocking Implications One shocking implication from the paper was the projection that hydropower would be worse than coal for the next 60 years. The study’s authors cited methane emissions from organic matter buried under water as the reason for this apparent anomaly. But that’s not the really shocking thing about the study for me. The most shocking conclusion was the magnitude of the numbers we are talking about. Even if you could in theory shut down all of the coal-fired power plants in the world and replace them with wind, solar, and hydropower — in 50 years the projected temperature is only one-twentieth of a degree C cooler than the base case of continuing to use coal. In 100 years, if I could replace all global coal-fired power plants with firm, renewable power — the temperature is only projected to be about 0.2 degrees cooler than under the coal base case. And the way this is being spun is that the 0.09 degree reduction from switching to natural gas is equivalent to an effect of “zero”, but the 0.2 degree reduction in hypothetically replacing everything with wind and solar power 100 years from now is significant. About the natural gas case, Romm literally said the 0.09 degree lower temperature in switching to natural gas means that “natural gas is a bridge fuel to nowhere”, but the 0.2 degree lower temperature in switching to renewables is “the world’s only plausible hope to avert catastrophic temperature rise.” Nuclear & Natural Gas to the Rescue — But Most Environmentalists Hate Them A big irony here is that there are only two power sources that are today capable of achieving the study’s conclusion that we must rapidly replace coal-fired power plants: Nuclear power and natural gas. If people really believe that we must urgently address this issue — and they don’t believe that the change from going to natural gas is enough — that leaves nuclear power as the only option capable of achieving a rapid replacement. Bear in mind that this is for a global replacement of coal — most of which is used in Asia. Good luck trying to sell China and India on a 0.2 degree temperature difference in 100 years if they quickly abandon their coal-fired power plants and replace them with wind power. Conclusion: Study is a Major Downer for Activists Battling Climate Change To be honest, if I was devoting my life to fighting against the threat of climate change, this would be one of the most depressing papers I have ever read. If we could convince everyone in the world to shut down their coal-fired power plants — which we can’t — and replace them with renewable power — which isn’t available in quantities sufficient to replace coal-fired power — then by the end of my life there would still be no statistically significant temperature change to even be able to tell if my life’s work was successful. But let’s be realistic, shall we? The people who are concerned about global warming have dug in their heels over natural gas, and they are generally opposed to nuclear power. Because of the sheer impossibility that we will rapidly replace coal with wind and solar power (especially since “we” is the world), then we will in all likelihood be left with the status quo. As I have said before, emissions are much higher in Asia Pacific than they are in the U.S. and Europe combined, and they are rising rapidly. Unless we can figure out a way to convince them to develop without fossil fuels — something no country has done — then global carbon emissions will continue to rise. This is why — even though I accept the science behind climate change — it isn’ t my focus. I just don’t see how the West can possibly do anything about it.

#### Alt cause – their CFR says a cap and trade system is necessary to modelling

#### Warming is irreversible – consensus of most qualified scientists

Romm 3-18 [Joe, PhD in Physics from MIT, Senior Fellow at American Progress, editor of Climate Progress, former acting assistant secretary of energy for energy efficiency and renewable energy in 1997, “The Dangerous Myth that Climate Change is Reversible,” http://theenergycollective.com/josephromm/199981/dangerous-myth-climate-change-reversible]

The CMO (Chief Misinformation Officer) of the climate ignorati, Joe Nocera, has a new piece, “A Real Carbon Solution.” The biggest of its many errors comes in this line:¶ A reduction of carbon emissions from Chinese power plants would do far more to help reverse climate change than — dare I say it? — blocking the Keystone XL oil pipeline.¶ Memo to Nocera: As a NOAA-led paper explained 4 years ago, climate change is “largely irreversible for 1000 years,” with permanent Dust Bowls in Southwest and around the globe (if we don’t slash emissions ASAP).¶ This notion that we can reverse climate change by cutting emissions is one of the most commonly held myths — and one of the most dangerous, as explained in this 2007 MIT study, “Understanding Public Complacency About Climate Change: Adults’ mental models of climate change violate conservation of matter.”¶ The fact is that, as RealClimate has explained, we would need “an immediate cut of around 60 to 70% globally and continued further cuts over time” merely to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of CO2 – and that would still leave us with a radiative imbalance that would lead to “an additional 0.3 to 0.8ºC warming over the 21st Century.” And that assumes no major carbon cycle feedbacks kick in, which seems highly unlikely.¶ We’d have to drop total global emissions to zero now and for the rest of the century just to lower concentrations enough to stop temperatures from rising. Again, even in this implausible scenario, we still aren’t talking about reversing climate change, just stopping it — or, more technically, stopping the temperature rise. The great ice sheets might well continue to disintegrate, albeit slowly.¶ This doesn’t mean climate change is unstoppable — only that we are stuck with whatever climate change we cause before we get desperate and go all WWII on emissions. That’s why delay is so dangerous and immoral. I’ll discuss this further below the jump.¶ First, though, Nocera’s piece has many other pieces of misinformation. He leaves people with the impression that coal with carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a practical, affordable means of reducing emissions from existing power plants that will be available soon. In fact, most demonstration projects around the world have been shut down, the technology Nocera focuses on would not work on the vast majority of existing coal plants, and CCS is going to be incredibly expensive compared to other low-carbon technologies — see Harvard stunner: “Realistic” first-generation CCS costs a whopping $150 per ton of CO2 (20 cents per kWh)! And that’s in the unlikely event it proves to be practical, permanent, and verifiable (see “Feasibility, Permanence and Safety Issues Remain Unresolved”).¶ Heck, guy who debated me on The Economist‘s website conceded things are going so slowly, writing “The idea is that CCS then becomes a commercial reality and begins to make deep cuts in emissions during the 2030s.” And he’s a CCS advocate!!¶ Of course, we simply don’t have until the 2030s to wait for deep cuts in emissions. No wonder people who misunderstand the irreversible nature of climate change, like Nocera, tend to be far more complacent about emissions reductions than those who understand climate science.¶ The point of Nocera’s piece seems to be to mock Bill McKibben for opposing the idea of using captured carbon for enhanced oil recovery (EOR): “his answer suggests that his crusade has blinded him to the real problem.”¶ It is Nocera who has been blinded. He explains in the piece:¶ Using carbon emissions to recover previously ungettable oil has the potential to unlock vast untapped American reserves. Last year, ExxonMobil reportedthat enhanced oil recovery would allow it to extend the life of a single oil field in West Texas by 20 years.¶ McKibben’s effort to stop the Keystone XL pipeline is based on the fact that we have believe the vast majority of carbon in the ground. Sure, it wouldn’t matter if you built one coal CCS plant and used that for EOR. But we need a staggering amount of CCS, as Vaclav Smil explained in “Energy at the Crossroads“:¶ “Sequestering a mere 1/10 of today’s global CO2 emissions (less than 3 Gt CO2) would thus call for putting in place an industry that would have to force underground every year the volume of compressed gas larger than or (with higher compression) equal to the volume of crude oil extracted globally by [the] petroleum industry whose infrastructures and capacities have been put in place over a century of development. Needless to say, such a technical feat could not be accomplished within a single generation.”¶ D’oh! What precisely would be the point of “sequestering” all that CO2 to extract previously “ungettable oil” whose emissions, when burned, would just about equal the CO2 that you supposedly sequestered?¶ Remember, we have to get total global emissions of CO2 to near zero just to stop temperatures from continuing their inexorable march toward humanity’s self-destruction. And yes, this ain’t easy. But it is impossible if we don’t start slashing emissions soon and stop opening up vast new sources of carbon.¶ For those who are confused on this point, I recommend reading the entire MIT study, whose lead author is John Sterman. Here is the abstract:¶ ¶ Public attitudes about climate change reveal a contradiction. Surveys show most Americans believe climate change poses serious risks but also that reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions sufficient to stabilize atmospheric GHG concentrations or net radiative forcing can be deferred until there is greater evidence that climate change is harmful. US policymakers likewise argue it is prudent to wait and see whether climate change will cause substantial economic harm before undertaking policies to reduce emissions. Such wait-and-see policies erroneously presume climate change can be reversed quickly should harm become evident, underestimating substantial delays in the climate’s response to anthropogenic forcing. We report experiments with highly educated adults–graduate students at MIT–showing widespread misunderstanding of the fundamental stock and flow relationships, including mass balance principles, that lead to long response delays. GHG emissions are now about twice the rate of GHG removal from the atmosphere. GHG concentrations will therefore continue to rise even if emissions fall, stabilizing only when emissions equal removal. In contrast, results show most subjects believe atmospheric GHG concentrations can be stabilized while emissions into the atmosphere continuously exceed the removal of GHGs from it. These beliefs-analogous to arguing a bathtub filled faster than it drains will never overflow-support wait-and-see policies but violate conservation of matter. Low public support for mitigation policies may be based more on misconceptions of climate dynamics than high discount rates or uncertainty about the risks of harmful climate change.

Alt causes to coral – inter press lists overfishing, trawling, tourism, disease

### 1NC CO2 Good

#### CO2 boosts plant performance and prevents mass starvation—we control uniqueness

Singer, PhD physics – Princeton University and professor of environmental science – UVA, consultant – NASA, GAO, DOE, NASA, Carter, PhD paleontology – University of Cambridge, adjunct research professor – Marine Geophysical Laboratory @ James Cook University, and Idso, PhD Geography – ASU, ‘11

Regarding the first of these requirements, Tilman et al. note that in many parts of the world the historical rate of increase in crop yields is declining, as the genetic ceiling for maximal yield potential is being approached. This observation, in their words, ―highlights the need for efforts to steadily increase the yield potential ceiling.‖ With respect to the second requirement, they indicate, ―without the use of synthetic fertilizers, world food production could not have increased at the rate it did [in the past] and more natural ecosystems would have been converted to agriculture.‖ Hence, they state the solution ―will require significant increases in nutrient use efficiency, that is, in cereal production per unit of added nitrogen, phosphorus,‖ and so forth. Finally, as to the third requirement, Tilman et al. remind us ―water is regionally scarce,‖ and ―many countries in a band from China through India and Pakistan, and the Middle East to North Africa either currently or will soon fail to have adequate water to maintain per capita food production from irrigated land.‖ Increasing crop water use efficiency, therefore, is also a must. Although the impending biological crisis and several important elements of its potential solution are thus well defined, Tilman et al. (2001) noted ―even the best available technologies, fully deployed, cannot prevent many of the forecasted problems.‖ This was also the conclusion of Idso and Idso (2000), who stated that although ―expected advances in agricultural technology and expertise will significantly increase the food production potential of many countries and regions,‖ these advances ―will not increase production fast enough to meet the demands of the even faster-growing human population of the planet.‖ Fortunately, we have a powerful ally in the ongoing rise in the air‘s CO2 content that can provide what we can‘t. Since atmospheric CO2 is the basic ―food of essentially all plants, the more of it there is in the air, the bigger and better they grow. For a nominal doubling of the air‘s CO2 concentration, for example, the productivity of Earth‘s herbaceous plants rises by 30 to 50 percent (Kimball, 1983; Idso and Idso, 1994), and the productivity of its woody plants rises by 50 to 80 percent or more (Saxe et al. 1998; Idso and Kimball, 2001). Hence, as the air‘s CO2 content continues to rise, the land use efficiency of the planet will rise right along with it. In addition, atmospheric CO2 enrichment typically increases plant nutrient use efficiency and plant water use efficiency. Thus, with respect to all three of the major needs identified by Tilman et al. (2002), increases in the air‘s CO2 content pay huge dividends, helping to increase agricultural output without the taking of new land and water from nature. Many other researchers have broached this subject. In a paper recently published in the Annual Review of Plant Biology, three scientists associated with the Institute of Genomic Biology at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (USA) write that meeting the global increase in agricultural demand during this century ―is predicted to require a doubling of global production,‖ but ―the world has limited capacity to sustainably expand cropland,‖ and this capacity is actually ―shrinking in many developed countries.‖ Thus, Zhu et al. (2010) state, ―meeting future increases in demand will have to come from a near doubling of productivity on a land area basis,‖ and they conclude ―a large contribution will have to come from improved photosynthetic conversion efficiency,‖ estimating ―at least a 50% improvement will be required to double global production.‖ The researchers‘ reason for focusing on photosynthetic conversion efficiency derives from the experimentally observed facts that increases in the atmosphere‘s CO2 concentration increase the photosynthetic rates of nearly all plants, and those rate increases generally lead to equivalent—or only slightly smaller—increases in plant productivity on a land area basis. That provides a solid foundation for their enthusiasm in this regard. In their review of the matter, however, they examine the prospects for boosting photosynthetic conversion efficiency in an entirely different way: genetically, without increasing the air‘s CO2 content. ―Improving photosynthetic conversion efficiency will require,‖ the three scientists state, ―a full suite of tools including breeding, gene transfer, and synthetic biology in bringing about the designed alteration to photosynthesis.‖ For some of these ―near-term‖ endeavors, they indicate ―implementation is limited by technical issues that can be overcome by sufficient investment,‖ meaning they can ―be bought.‖ But several ―mid-term‖ goals could take 20 years or more to achieve; and they state ―even when these improvements are achieved, it may take an additional 10–20 years to bring such innovations to farms in commercial cultivars at adequate scale.‖ And if that is not bad enough, they say of still longer-term goals that ―too little of the science has been undertaken to identify what needs to be altered to effect an increase in yield,‖ while in some cases they acknowledge that what they envision may not even be possible, as in developing a form of RuBisCO that exhibits a significant decrease in oxygenation activity, or in designing C3 crops to utilize the C4 form of photosynthetic metabolism. Clearly, we do not have the time to gamble on our ability to accomplish what needs to be done in order to forestall massive human starvation of global dimensions within the current century. Therefore—in addition to trying what Zhu et al. suggest—we must rely on the ―tested and true: the CO2-induced stimulation of plant photosynthesis and crop yield production. And all we need to do in this regard is to refrain from interfering with the natural evolution of the Industrial Revolution, which is destined to be carried for some time yet on the backs of fossil-fuel-driven enterprises that can provide the atmosphere with the extra carbon dioxide that will be needed to provide the extra increase in crop growth that may mean the difference between global food sufficiency and human starvation on a massive scale a mere few decades from now. Another take on the matter has been provided by Hanjra and Qureshi (2010). They begin their treatment of the subject by quoting Benjamin Franklin‘s well-known homily, ―When the well is dry, we know the worth of water,‖ and they write we ―must not lose sight of surging water scarcity.‖ Noting ―population and income growth will increase the demand for food and water,‖ they contend ―irrigation will be the first sector to lose water, as water competition by non-agricultural uses increases and water scarcity intensifies.‖ As ―increasing water scarcity will have implications for food security, hunger, poverty, and ecosystem health and services,‖ they report ―feeding the 2050 population will require some 12,400 km3 of water, up from 6800 km3 used today.‖ This huge increase, they continue, ―will leave a water gap of about 3300 km3 even after improving efficiency in irrigated agriculture, improving water management, and upgrading of rainfed agriculture,‖ as per the findings of de Fraiture et al. (2007), Molden (2007), and Molden et al. (2010). This water deficiency, according to Hanjra and Qureshi, ―will lead to a food gap unless concerted actions are taken today.‖ Some of the measures they propose are to conserve water and energy resources, develop and adopt climate-resilient crop varieties, modernize irrigation, shore up domestic food supplies, reengage in agriculture for further development, and reform the global food and trade markets. To achieve these goals, they write, ―unprecedented global cooperation is required,‖ which by the looks of today‘s world is an exceedingly remote possibility. What, then, can we do to defuse the ticking time-bomb of this looming food and water crisis? One option is to do nothing: don‘t mess with the normal, unforced evolution of civilization‘s means of acquiring energy. This is because on top of everything else we may try to do to conserve both land and freshwater resources, we will still fall short of what is needed to be achieved unless the air‘s CO2 content rises significantly and thereby boosts the water use efficiency of Earth‘s crop plants and that of the plants that provide food and habitat for what could be called ―wild nature,‖ enabling both sets of plants to produce more biomass per unit of water used. To ensure this happens, we will need all of the CO2 that will be produced by the burning of fossil fuels, until other forms of energy truly become more cost-efficient than coal, gas, and oil. In fact, these other energy sources will have to become much more cost-efficient before fossil fuels are phased out, because the positive externality of the CO2-induced increase in plant water use efficiency provided by the steady rise in the atmosphere‘s CO2 concentration due to the burning of fossil fuels will be providing a most important service in helping us feed and sustain our own species without totally decimating what yet remains of wild nature. In yet another paper to address this important issue—this one published in the Journal of Proteome Research—Sarkar et al. (2010) write, ―increasing population and unsustainable exploitation of nature and natural resources have made ‗food security‘ a burning issue in the 21st century,‖ echoing the sentiments expressed by Farrell (2009), who noted ―the alarming increase in biofuel production, the projected demand for livestock products, and the estimated food to feed the additional 700 million people who will arrive here by 2016, will have unprecedented consequences,‖ among which are likely to be that ―arable land, the environment, water supply and sustainability of the agricultural system will all be affected,‖ and not in a positive way. Furthermore, when the human population of the globe reaches 8.7–11.3 billion by the year 2050 (Bengtsson et al., 2006), the situation will become truly intolerable, unless something is done, far in advance of that date, to mitigate the situation dramatically. Thus, as Sarkar et al. suggest, ―a normal approach for any nation/region is to strengthen its agricultural production for meeting future demands and provide food security.‖ But a major difficulty, which could spoil mankind‘s ability to do so, is the ongoing rise in the atmosphere‘s ozone concentration. This is the subject of Sarkar et al.‘s new paper. In a study designed to elucidate the many ways in which ozone (O3) is harmful to plants, the eight researchers grew two high-yielding cultivars (Sonalika and HUW 510) of wheat (Triticum aestivum L.) outdoors at the Agriculture Research Farm of India‘s Banaras Hindu University. This was done within open-top chambers maintained at the ambient O3 concentration and at elevated O3 concentrations of 25 percent and 50 percent above ambient during the peak O3 period of the day (10:00 to 15:00 hours local time) for a total of 50 days, during which time they measured numerous responses of the plants to the two levels of ozone enrichment. Sarkar et al. determined, among several other things, that the moderate increases in the air‘s O3 concentration resulted in higher foliar injury, a reduction in photosynthetic efficiency, induced inhibition in photochemical efficacy of photosystem II, lowered concentrations of photosynthetic pigments and proteins, and what they describe as ―drastic reductions‖ in RuBisCO large and small subunits, while noting major leaf photosynthetic proteins and important energy metabolism proteins were also ―drastically reduced.‖ Discussing the results, the scientists from India, Japan, and Nepal remark that anthropogenic activities have made ozone a ―major environmental pollutant of our time,‖ while noting some are predicting it to be an even ―greater problem for the future.‖ Adding this dilemma to the problem of feeding the world over the next few decades and beyond makes humanity‘s future look incredibly bleak. Thus, Sarkar et al. suggest we focus on ―engineering crops for future high O3,‖ concentrating on maintaining ―effective stomatal conductance of plants which can avoid O3 entry but not hamper their productivity.‖ We agree. But not knowing to what extent we will be successful in this endeavor, we also need to do something we know will work: allowing the air‘s CO2 content to rise, unimpeded by the misguided efforts of those who would curtail anthropogenic CO2 emissions in the guise of fighting what they claim is anthropogenic-induced global warming. This contention is largely theoretical and wholly unproven, but we know, as a result of literally hundreds, if not thousands, of real-world experiments, that atmospheric CO2 enrichment increases both the productivity and water-use efficiency of nearly all plants, and that it often more than compensates for the negative effects of O3 pollution. Introducing another review of food security studies pertinent to the challenge of feeding 9 billion people just four decades from now, Godfray et al. (2010) note ―more than one in seven people today still do not have access to sufficient protein and energy from their diet and even more suffer some form of micronutrient malnourishment,‖ citing the FAO (2009). Although ―increases in production will have an important part to play‖ in correcting this problem and keeping it from worsening in the future, mankind ―will be constrained by the finite resources provided by the earth‘s lands, oceans and atmosphere,‖ This set of difficulties they describe at the end of their review as constituting a ―perfect storm.‖ In considering ways to mitigate these problems, the first question they ask is: ―How can more food be produced sustainably?‖ They state the primary solution to food shortages of the past was ―to bring more land into agriculture and to exploit new fish stocks,‖ but they note there is precious little remaining of either of these pristine resources. Thus, they conclude ―the most likely scenario is that more food will need to be produced from the same or less land.‖ As they suggest, ―we must avoid the temptation to sacrifice further the earth‘s already hugely depleted biodiversity for easy gains in food production, not only because biodiversity provides many of the public goods upon which mankind relies, but also because we do not have the right to deprive future generations of its economic and cultural benefits.‖ And, we might add, because we should be enlightened enough to realize we have a moral responsibility to drive no more species to extinction than we already have sent to that sorry state. So how can these diverse requirements all be met simultaneously? A clue comes from Godfray et al.‘s statement that ―greater water and nutrient use efficiency, as well as tolerance of abiotic stress, are likely to become of increasing importance.‖ And what is there that can bring about these changes in mankind‘s crops? You guessed it: carbon dioxide. Rising concentrations of atmospheric CO2 increase the photosynthetic prowess of essentially all of the Earth‘s plants, while generally reducing the rate at which they transfer water from the soil to the air. In addition, more CO2 in the air tends to enhance the efficiency with which plants utilize nutrients in constructing their tissues and producing the edible portions that we and all of Earth‘s animals depend upon for our very existence. Focusing on the water scarcity aspect of the food shortage problem, Kummu et al. (2010) write, ―due to the rapidly increasing population and water use per capita in many areas of the world, around one third of the world‘s population currently lives under physical water scarcity (e.g. Vorosmarty et al., 2000; Alcamo et al., 2003; Oki and Kanae, 2006).‖ But despite the large number of water scarcity studies conducted over the years, ―no global assessment is available of how this trend has evolved over the past several centuries to millennia.‖ Thus they conducted a study covering AD 0 to 2005. This analysis was carried out for ten different time slices, defined as those times at which the human population of the globe was approximately double the population of the previous time slice. Global population data for these analyses were derived from the 5‘ latitude x 5‘ longitude-resolution global HYDE dataset of Klein Goldewijk (2005) and Klein Goldewijk et al. (2010), while evaluation of water resources availability over the same period was based on monthly temperature and precipitation output from the climate model ECBilt-CLIO-VECODE, as calculated by Renssen et al. (2005). After completing these assessments, the four researchers found ―moderate water shortage first appeared around 1800, but it commenced in earnest from about 1900, when 9% of the world population experienced water shortage, of which 2% was under chronic water shortage (<1000 m3/capita/year).‖ Thereafter, from 1960 onwards, they write, ―water shortage increased extremely rapidly, with the proportion of global population living under chronic water shortage increasing from 9% (280 million people) in 1960 to 35% (2300 million) in 2005.‖ And currently, they continue, ―the most widespread water shortage is in South Asia, where 91% of the population experiences some form of water shortage,‖ while ―the most severe shortage is in North Africa and the Middle East, where 77% and 52% of the total population lives under extreme water shortage (<500 m3/capita/year), respectively.‖ To alleviate these freshwater shortages, Kummu et al. state measures generally have been taken to increase water availability, such as building dams and extracting groundwater. But they note ―there are already several regions in which such measures are no longer sufficient, as there is simply not enough water available in some regions.‖ In addition, they observe, ―this problem is expected to increase in the future due to increasing population pressure (e.g. United Nations, 2009), higher welfare (e.g. Grubler et al., 2007) [and] production of water intensive biofuels (e.g. Varis, 2007, Berndes, 2008).‖ Hence, they conclude there will be an increasing need for many nonstructural measures, the first and foremost of which they indicate to be ―increasing the efficiency of water use.‖ This characteristic of nearly all of Earth‘s plants is almost universally promoted by atmospheric CO2 enrichment.

#### CO2 is critical to sustaining forest growth

Robinson and Robinson in ‘00

(Arthur and Noah, Chemists @ Oregon Institute of Science and Medicine, The American Spectator, “Some Like It Hot: The global warming business could bankrupt our Earth”, April, L/N)

What will temperatures be during the coming century and beyond? No one knows. Astronomers cannot yet predict future solar activity. If recent trends continue, however, our environment will be much improved. Already, plant growth and diversity-from the forests and fields of North America to the rain forests of South America-have shown a marked increase. This is the result of carbon dioxide fertilization. Mankind is moving carbon from below-ground deposits of coal, oil, and natural gas into the atmosphere, where it is then used to make more plants and animals. Studies indicate that North American forests are growing so fast that they are storing all of the human-released carbon from North America. According to the U.S. Forest Service and the Department of Agriculture, the total amount of large-tree standing timber in the United States alone has increased by 30 percent since 1950. Because they use plants for food, animals have also increased. When this biological miracle stabilizes within one or two centuries, the plant and animal population of the Earth may have doubled. Farm production is already increasing from carbon dioxide fertilization. Wheat crops in dry areas are growing 10 percent faster as a result of atmospheric carbon dioxide increases during the twentieth century (from 280 parts per million in 1900 to 360 in 2000). Trees are more strongly affected. Young orange trees and pine trees are growing more than 25 percent faster. Measurements of South American rain forests show similar accelerations.

#### Forest preservation solves extinction

Bouman in ‘96

(O. Thomas, PhD in Forestry @ U. Gottingen and Member of Canada’s Model Forest Program, “Sustainable Forests: Global Challenges and Local Solutions”, p. xv, Google Print)

The most widespread interpretation of sustainable development is probably that of inter-generational equality. In terms of forestry this means that primary forests should no longer be liquidated merely to spur economic growth for a few generations. Instead the forests created by nature and the processes that regenerate them must be conserved so that the unknown and therefore unique ecological complexity and functionality can contribute to ensuring long-term survival for humanity. Such a precautionary notion of forest sustainability places an unprecedented responsibility on foresters and nations with primary forests that will also be a very ambiguous one. Although humanity is becoming increasingly aware of the absolute scarcity of primary forests, foresters and forestry nations are only economically rewarded when they efficiently supply forest products to solve problems of relative scarcity in a neoclassical sense.

#### They don’t solve disease – keating says agriculture, globalization and bioterror cause it

CO2 isn’t key

Watts, 25-year climate reporter, works with weather technology, weather stations, and weather data processing systems in the private sector, 7/25/’12

(Anthony, <http://wattsupwiththat.com/2012/07/25/lindzen-at-sandia-national-labs-climate-models-are-flawed/>)

ALBUQUERQUE, N.M. — Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Richard Lindzen, a global warming skeptic, told about 70 Sandia researchers in June that too much is being made of climate change by researchers seeking government funding. He said their data and their methods did not support their claims.

“Despite concerns over the last decades with the greenhouse process, they oversimplify the effect,” he said. “Simply cranking up CO2 [carbon dioxide] (as the culprit) is not the answer” to what causes climate change.

Lindzen, the ninth speaker in Sandia’s Climate Change and National Security Speaker Series, is Alfred P. Sloan professor of meteorology in MIT’s department of earth, atmospheric and planetary sciences. He has published more than 200 scientific papers and is the lead author of Chapter 7 (“Physical Climate Processes and Feedbacks”) of the International Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Third Assessment Report. He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences and a fellow of the American Geophysical Union and the American Meteorological Society.

For 30 years, climate scientists have been “locked into a simple-minded identification of climate with greenhouse-gas level. … That climate should be the function of a single parameter (like CO2) has always seemed implausible. Yet an obsessive focus on such an obvious oversimplification has likely set back progress by decades,” Lindzen said.

For major climates of the past, other factors were more important than carbon dioxide. Orbital variations have been shown to quantitatively account for the cycles of glaciations of the past 700,000 years, he said, and the elimination of the arctic inversion, when the polar caps were ice-free, “is likely to have been more important than CO2 for the warm episode during the Eocene 50 million years ago.”

There is little evidence that changes in climate are producing extreme weather events, he said. “Even the IPCC says there is little if any evidence of this. In fact, there are important physical reasons for doubting such anticipations.”

Lindzen’s views run counter to those of almost all major professional societies. For example, the American Physical Society statement of Nov. 18, 2007, read, “The evidence is incontrovertible: Global warming is occurring.” But he doesn’t feel they are necessarily right. “Why did the American Physical Society take a position?” he asked his audience. “Why did they find it compelling? They never answered.”

Speaking methodically with flashes of humor — “I always feel that when the conversation turns to weather, people are bored.” — he said a basic problem with current computer climate models that show disastrous increases in temperature is that relatively small increases in atmospheric gases lead to large changes in temperatures in the models.

But, he said, “predictions based on high (climate) sensitivity ran well ahead of observations.”

Real-world observations do not support IPCC models, he said: “We’ve already seen almost the equivalent of a doubling of CO2 (in radiative forcing) and that has produced very little warming.”

He disparaged proving the worth of models by applying their criteria to the prediction of past climatic events, saying, “The models are no more valuable than answering a test when you have the questions in advance.”

Modelers, he said, merely have used aerosols as a kind of fudge factor to make their models come out right. (Aerosols are tiny particles that reflect sunlight. They are put in the air by industrial or volcanic processes and are considered a possible cause of temperature change at Earth’s surface.)

Then there is the practical question of what can be done about temperature increases even if they are occurring, he said. “China, India, Korea are not going to go along with IPCC recommendations, so … the only countries punished will be those who go along with the recommendations.”

He discounted mainstream opinion that climate change could hurt national security, saying that “historically there is little evidence of natural disasters leading to war, but economic conditions have proven much more serious. Almost all proposed mitigation policies lead to reduced energy availability and higher energy costs. All studies of human benefit and national security perspectives show that increased energy is important.”

He showed a graph that demonstrated that more energy consumption leads to higher literacy rate, lower infant mortality and a lower number of children per woman.

Given that proposed policies are unlikely to significantly influence climate and that lower energy availability could be considered a significant threat to national security, to continue with a mitigation policy that reduces available energy “would, at the least, appear to be irresponsible,” he argued.

Responding to audience questions about rising temperatures, he said a 0.8 of a degree C change in temperature in 150 years is a small change. Questioned about five-, seven-, and 17-year averages that seem to show that Earth’s surface temperature is rising, he said temperatures are always fluctuating by tenths of a degree.

#### Negative feedbacks solve

Singer et al. 11 [S Fred, PhD, a distinguished atmospheric physicist and first director of the U.S. Weather Satellite Service, Craig Idso, editor of the online magazine CO2 Science and author of several books and scholarly articles on the effects of carbon dioxide on plant and animal life, Robert M Carter, marine geologist and research professor at James Cook University in Queensland, Australia Climate Change Reconsidered: 2011 Interim Report]

In the 2009 NIPCC report, Idso and Singer (2009) discussed the plausibility of a multistage negative feedback process whereby warming-induced increases in the emission of dimethyl sulfide (DMS) from the world‘s oceans tend to counteract any initial impetus for warming. The basic tenet of this hypothesis is that the global radiation balance is significantly influenced by the albedo of marine stratus clouds (the greater the cloud albedo, the less the input of solar radiation to the Earth‘s surface). The albedo of these clouds, in turn, is known to be a function of cloud droplet concentration (the more and smaller the cloud droplets, the greater the cloud albedo and the reflection of solar radiation), which is dependent upon the availability of cloud condensation nuclei on which the droplets form (the more cloud condensation nuclei, the more and smaller the cloud droplets). And in completing the negative feedback loop, the cloud condensation nuclei concentration often depends upon the flux of biologically produced DMS from the world‘s oceans (the higher the sea surface temperature, the greater the sea-to-air flux of DMS).

Since the publication of the 2009 NIPCC report, additional empirical evidence has been found to support the several tenets of the DMS feedback process. Qu and Gabric (2010), for example, introduce their contribution to the subject by stating, ―dimethylsulfide (DMS) is the main volatile sulfur [species] released during the formation and decay of microbial ocean biota and ―aerosols formed from the atmospheric conversion of DMS to sulfate and methanesulfonic acid can exert a climate cooling effect directly by scattering and absorbing solar radiation and indirectly by promoting the formation of cloud condensation nuclei and increasing the albedo of clouds, thus reflecting more solar radiation back into space.

Working with climate and DMS production data from the region of the Barents Sea (70–80°N, 30– 35°E) obtained over the period 1998 to 2002, Qu and Gabric employed a genetic algorithm to calibrate chlorophyll-a measurements (obtained from SeaWiFS satellite data) for use in a regional DMS production model. Then, using GCM temperature outputs for the periods 1960–1970 (pre-industry CO2 level) and 2078–2086 (triple the pre-industry CO2 level), they calculated the warming-induced enhancement of the DMS flux from the Barents Sea region. The two researchers report, ―significantly decreasing ice coverage, increasing sea surface temperature and decreasing mixed-layer depth could lead to annual DMS flux increases of more than 100% by the time of equivalent CO2 tripling (the year 2080). In commenting on their findings, they state, ―such a large change would have a great impact on the Arctic energy budget and may offset the effects of anthropogenic warming that are amplified at polar latitudes. What is more, they write, ―many of these physical changes will also promote similar perturbations for other biogenic species (Leck et al., 2004), some of which are now thought to be equally influential to the aerosol climate of the Arctic Ocean. Thus it can be appreciated that DMS production in a warming world—especially when augmented by analogous biogenic phenomena—may provide a large moderating influence on the primary impetus for warming that is produced by mankind‘s emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases.

Kim et al. (2010) write that DMS ―represents 95% of the natural marine flux of sulfur gases to the atmosphere (Bates et al., 1992; Liss et al., 1997), and they say it ―may be oxidized to form non sea-salt sulfate aerosols, which are known to act as cloud condensation nuclei and thereby exert a cooling effect by absorbing or scattering solar radiation. They cite Charlson et al. (1987), who first described the intriguing and important chain of events. They also note ―DMS is generated by intracellular or extracellular enzymatic cleavage of DMSP [dimethylsulfoniopropionate] by DMSP-lyase, which is synthesized by algae and bacteria, following DMSP secretion from producer cells or release following autolysis or viral attack, while noting that ―grazing activity can also result in DMSP conversion to DMS if DMSP and DMSP-lyase are physically mixed following grazing, citing Stefels et al., 2007, and Wolfe and Steinke, 1996.

Working in the coastal waters of Korea from 21 November to 11 December 2008, the 14 Korean scientists utilized 2,400-liter mesocosm enclosures to simulate, in triplicate, three sets of environmental conditions—an ambient control (~400 ppm CO2 and ambient temperature), an acidification treatment (~900 ppm CO2 and ambient temperature), and a greenhouse treatment (~900 ppm CO2 and ~3°C warmer-than-ambient temperature)—and within these mesocosms they initiated phytoplankton blooms by adding equal quantities of nutrients to each mesocosm on day 0. For 20 days thereafter they measured numerous pertinent parameters within each mesocosm. This work revealed, as they describe it, that ―total accumulated DMS concentrations (integrated over the experimental period) in the acidification and greenhouse mesocosms were approximately 80% and 60% higher than the values measured in the control mesocosms, respectively, which they attribute to the fact that, in their experiment, ―autotrophic nanoflagellates (which are known to be significant DMSP producers) showed increased growth in response to elevated CO2 and ―grazing rates [of microzooplankton] were significantly higher in the treatment mesocosms than in the control mesocosms. In the concluding paragraph of their paper, they write, ―the key implication of our results is that DMS production resulting from CO2-induced grazing activity may increase under future high CO2 conditions, concluding that ―DMS production in the ocean may act to counter the effects of global warming in the future.

### Disease

**Coral is incredibly resilient. If it survived 300 million years of badness it can survive anything we throw at it.**

**Ridd ‘7** (Peter, Reader in Physics – James Cook U. Specializing in Marine Physics and Scientific Advisor – Australian Environment Foundation, “The Great Great Barrier Reef Swindle”, 7-19, http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=6134)

In biological circles, it is common to compare coral reefs to canaries, i.e. beautiful and delicate organisms that are easily killed. The analogy is pushed further by claiming that, just as canaries were used to detect gas in coal mines, coral reefs are the canaries of the world and their death is a first indication of our apocalyptic greenhouse future. The bleaching events of 1998 and 2002 were our warning. Heed them now or retribution will be visited upon us. **In fact a more appropriate creature with which to compare corals would be cockroaches - at least for their ability to survive. If our future brings us total self-annihilation by nuclear war, pollution or global warming, my bet is that both cockroaches and corals will survive**. Their track-record is impressive. **Corals have survived 300 million years of massively varying climate both much warmer and much cooler than today, far higher CO2 levels than we see today, and enormous sea level changes**. Corals saw the dinosaurs come and go, and cruised through mass extinction events that left so many other organisms as no more than a part of the fossil record. Corals are particularly well adapted to temperature changes and in general, the warmer the better. It seems odd that coral scientists are worrying about global warming because this is one group of organisms that like it hot. Corals are most abundant in the tropics and you certainly do not find fewer corals closer to the equator. Quite the opposite, the further you get away from the heat, the worse the corals. A cooling climate is a far greater threat. The scientific evidence about the effect of rising water temperatures on corals is very encouraging. In the GBR, growth rates of corals have been shown to be increasing over the last 100 years, at a time when water temperatures have risen. This is not surprising as the highest growth rates for corals are found in warmer waters. Further, all the species of corals we have in the GBR are also found in the islands, such as PNG, to our north where the water temperatures are considerably hotter than in the GBR. Despite the bleaching events of 1998 and 2002, most of the corals of the GBR did not bleach and of those that did, most have fully recovered.

#### No disease can cause human extinction—burnout

Posner 5—judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, and senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School [Richard A, Winter, “Catastrophe: the dozen most significant catastrophic risks and what we can do about them,” http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_kmske/is\_3\_11/ai\_n29167514/pg\_2?tag=content;col1]

Yet the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extiinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. The reason is improvements in medical science. But the comfort is a small one. Pandemics can still impose enormous losses and resist prevention and cure: the lesson of the AIDS pandemic. And there is always a lust time.

### Water

#### No water wars—their ev is hype.

Katz 11—Lecturer of Geography and Environmental Studies @ University of Haifa [Dr. David Katz (PhD in Natural Resource Policy & MA in Applied Economics @ University of Michigan), “Hydro-Political Hyperbole: Examining Incentives for Overemphasizing the Risks of Water Wars,” Global Environmental Politics, Volume 11, Number 1, February 2011, pp. 12-35]

Evidence and Perception

In sum, despite some instances of violent conflict over water, there is little systematic evidence of war over water resources. Evidence for a deterministic relationship between water scarcity and the outbreak of armed conflict is particularly weak. Less ambitious claims that water shortages will contribute to insecurity, which can, in turn, lead to violent conflict, have more empirical support. Even here, however, the importance of water as a causal variable is questionable. Several studies have found that variables such as regime type and institutional capacity are much more important indicators of conflict potential, 43 and may have mitigating effects on any water-conflict link.

As a consequence of accumulated research, many scholars have concluded that risks of water wars are low, 44 and others have toned down or qualified their statements about the likelihood of future water wars.45 Some governmental reports have limited their contentions to highlighting that water scarcity can aggravate conflicts and increase insecurity,46 and many studies now emphasize water as a tool for cooperation.47 Warnings and predictions of imminent water wars continue to be commonplace, however. In a review of published academic literature, Gupta and van der Zaag find that articles on water conflict outnumber those on cooperation by nearly three to one, and are five times more likely to be cited.48

This article will now turn to offering possible explanations for the persistence and popularity of such declarations despite the bulk of expert opinion downplaying the risks of water wars.

Incentives to Stress a Water War Scenario

Incentives Presented in Existing Literature

Observers have noted that various actors may have incentives to stress or even exaggerate the risks of water wars. Lonergan notes, for instance, that in “many cases, the comments are little more than media hype; in others, statements have been made for political reasons.”49 Beyond mere acknowledgement of the possibility of such incentives, however, little research has attempted to understand what these incentives are and how they may differ between actors. An understanding of the different motivations of various groups of actors to stress the possibility of imminent water wars can help explain the continued seemingly disproportionate popularity of such messages and help to evaluate such warnings more critically.pg. 17-18 //1nc

#### UN will step in to resolve these water disputes—Their ev ignores its moderating effects

Tir & Stinnett 12—Professor of Poli Sci @ University of Colorado Boulder & Professor of Poli Sci @ University of Georgia [Dr. Jaroslav Tir & Dr. Douglas M. Stinnett [Jaroslav Tir & Dr. Douglas M. Stinnett, “Weathering climate change: Can institutions mitigate international water conflict?,” Journal of Peace Research 49(1) 2012, pg. 211–225]

For both the direct and indirect scenarios, climate change and attendant increases in water scarcity could heighten the risk of conflict. The most pessimistic version of this ‘neo-malthusian’ prediction is that water scarcity will lead to future full-scale ‘water wars’ (Gleick, 1993; Klare, 2001), a prediction criticized on both empirical and theoretical grounds (Lonergan, 1997; Gleditsch, 1998; Wolf, 1998). One important objection is that international cooperation over transboundary water sources has thus far been much more common than conflict (Yoffe,Wolf & Giordano, 2003). Additionally, international agreements can help manage transboundary rivers and thus discourage international conflict. The next section explores this in greater detail.

Transboundary river treaties and international conflict

While this study is motivated by the premise that water scarcity can contribute to militarized international conflict, we echo some of the skepticism regarding the ‘water wars’ scenario. As Salehyan (2008) observes, proponents of the deterministic view that environmental scarcity leads to armed conflict tend to overlook the role of human agency and the moderating effects of institutions. International institutions, in particular, are one important factor that helps explain why international conflicts over water are comparatively rare. Rather than simply being the opposite of conflict, formal international cooperation is one method for managing transboundary water sources and thereby preventing the emergence and escalation of international water disputes. We thus view international institutions as critical explanatory variables that have been largely overlooked in many discussions of international water conflict.5

International treaties have become an increasingly common means of managing transboundary rivers. International organizations, such as the United Nations and World Bank, often advocate the formation of river treaties. In the case of tensions in the Aral Sea basin, for example, the UN Secretary General has recommended a formal international accord to better manage the rivers feeding the Aral Sea (Heintz, 2010). This trend has been reflected in recent academic research investigating the conditions leading to river treaty formation (e.g. Tir & Ackerman, 2009; Stinnett & Tir, 2009; Tir & Stinnett, 2011). River treaties can specify how the river will be shared, set water quality targets, determine acceptable water withdrawal rates, or balance navigation, water level, and water quality needs; this will, in turn, help minimize the stresses placed on the river and make use more effective in the long run. By helping to resolve the underlying problems that occur because of the competing use of rivers—and which are likely to be exacerbated by increased water scarcity—treaties can alleviate political tensions and reduce international conflict (Wolf, Yoffe & Giordano, 2003). Pg. 214-215

#### UN action preserves global governance

Thakur 11—Professor of international relations @ Australian National University [Dr. Ramesh Thakur (Professor in the Institute of Ethics, Governance and Law, Griffith University), “U.N.-centered multilateralism vital,” The Daily Yomiuri, Aug. 1, 2011, pg. http://tinyurl.com/cymnn2g]

The survival and vitality of international organizations depend on two factors: the capacity to change and adapt and the quality of their governance. The world is interdependent in areas as diverse as financial markets, infectious diseases, climate change, terrorism, nuclear peace and safety, product safety, food supply and water tables, fish stocks and ecosystem resources. In addition to their potential for provoking interstate military conflicts, these are all drivers of human insecurity because of the threat they pose to individual lives and welfare.

As the above list shows, the world has changed enormously since the creation of the United Nations in 1945. A growing number of state and nonstate actors have to grapple with an expanding number, range and complexity of issues in an increasingly networked, deeply intertwined but also more fragmented world.

Multilateralism refers to collective, cooperative action by states to deal with common problems. All states benefit from a world in which agreed rules and common norms bind the behaviour of all actors. But to remain viable, international organizations must be reconstituted in line with 21st century principles of governance and legitimacy and be capable of addressing contemporary challenges effectively.

The U.N. record shows a remarkable capacity for policy innovation, institutional adaptation and organizational learning. In the theatre of world politics, the United Nations has played starring or supporting roles in preventing and managing conflicts, regulating armaments, championing human rights and international humanitarian law, liberating the colonized, providing economic and technical aid in the newly liberated countries, organizing elections, empowering women, educating children, feeding the hungry, sheltering the dispossessed and displaced, housing the refugees, tending to the sick, and coordinating disaster relief and assistance: all on a 24/7 basis. Backstage, the United Nations helps to coordinate and manage a myriad of mundane activities whose pervasive influence on our daily lives would startle most people if they paused to think about it.

That said, without continual structural and procedural reforms, the legitimacy and performance deficits will accumulate and there will be an intensifying crisis of confidence in the world's system of organized multilateralism centred on the United Nations. With respect to the use of force for example, the United Nations has failed to protect member states from attack and invasion by powerful countries, as in Iraq in 2003; failed to punish illegal warmakers, as in the same example; and is an uncertain reed for civilians to lean on for protection against atrocities.

There remains an urgent need for the United Nations to develop structures, procedures and spine for reliability, predictability and consistency in taking timely and decisive collective action to solve the pressing global problems and also anticipate future challenges. To date, the evolution of international organizations to facilitate robust global responses has lagged behind the emergence of collective action problems. These are global in scope and require global solutions, but the policy authority and legal capacity for coercive mobilization of the required resources for tackling them remain vested in states. The distribution of decision- making authority in the U.N. system remains frozen in the power equations of 1945, not 2011, let alone 2020. The growing influence of nonstate actors like markets, corporations and civil society finds little voice and no vote in U.N. bodies.

There is a mutually undermining gap between legitimacy and efficiency. The very feature that gives the United Nations its unique legitimacy--universal membership--makes it an inefficient body for making, implementing and enforcing collective decisions. This is exacerbated by the often bitter divisions between the global North and South. The Copenhagen conference on climate change, for example, was suboptimal in outcome in part because of their colliding worldviews.

The net result of these governance deficits is to disempower, disable and incapacitate joint decision-making for solving collective action problems. As a corollary, the fundamental challenge for the international community is how to restructure and reform the United Nations in order to reposition it at the centre of collective efforts to manage current and anticipated global problems over the coming decades.

Of course, the United Nations is not the only site of global governance. A recent serious contender for the premier forum of global economic governance is the G-20. Although it began with great initial promise in responding forcefully to the global financial crisis, by now it seems to have lost drive and focus and become yet another global photo-op for leaders: a substitute for instead of the engine of collective action.

Thus the real challenge is how to retain the positive attributes of the existing nodes of global governance while shedding their pathologies. One answer is to configure and operate either the G-20 or the United Nations as the hub of networked global governance. Whichever of the two succeeds in the task first will enjoy a considerable advantage in positioning itself at the centre of the new multilateral order.

By virtue of its universal membership, the United Nations has a head start but not an unbeatable one. For example, globalization has underwritten a rising standard of living and material prosperity throughout the world for several decades. But there is also growing divergence in income levels between countries and peoples. This has implications for social and political stability among and within states. No other body can tackle the pathologies of globalization more effectively, with greater legitimacy, lower transaction and compliance costs, and higher comfort levels for most countries as their organization, than the U.N. system.

But the United Nations' comparative advantage will wane steadily without major reforms of structure and procedure. The Security Council is unrepresentative in both permanent and elected membership, unanswerable to the peoples of the world, unaccountable to the General Assembly, not subject to judicial oversight, and has betrayed the high hopes placed in it in 1945. Those resorting to the use of force unilaterally need fear Security Council censure and punishment only rarely, while those who need international military assistance cannot rely on the Security Council for prompt and effective help.

In addition to a better permanent membership that reflects today's power balance, the Security Council must also be more representative of a broader constituency of interests in its elected members.

One of the best ways to empower the United Nation's member states is to empower the General Assembly by capacitating the office of its president. One concrete example of institutional innovation would be to create a new post of science adviser to the president of the General Assembly. The Assembly could also redraft the terms and conditions of the appointment of the Secretary General so as to make him coequally responsive to both the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Multilateral institutions must recognize and involve nonstate actors on the basis of criteria that ensure their legitimacy and effectiveness. By the same token, with influence on decisions come responsibility for the consequences and distributional impacts of the decisions. Similarly, the for-profit private sector too must take a greater interest in issues of international governance and underwrite the institutional providers of global public goods.

Based on human solidarity across borders and transcending national perspectives, the United Nations provides and manages the framework for bringing together the world's leaders to tackle the pressing problems of the day for the survival, development and welfare of all peoples, everywhere. Yet multilateralism is under serious challenge, from arms control to climate change, international criminal justice and the use of military force overseas. Therefore it is critically important to reaffirm the United Nations' role as the principal embodiment of the principle of multilateralism and the main forum for its pursuit. For it remains our best and only hope for unity-in-diversity in addressing problems without passports that require solutions sans visas.

The United Nations is the embodiment of the international community and the custodian of an internationalized human conscience. It represents the idea that virulent nationalism and the raw interplay of power must be mediated and moderated in an international framework of rules and norms. This is what makes the United Nations the centre for harmonizing the ubiquitous national interests to forging the elusive international interest.

#### It’s failure places human survival at risk

Masciulli 11—Professor of Political Science @ St Thomas University [Joseph Masciulli, “The Governance Challenge for Global Political and Technoscientific Leaders in an Era of Globalization and Globalizing Technologies,” Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society February 2011 vol. 31 no. 1 pg. 3-5]

What is most to be feared is enhanced global disorder resulting from the combination of weak global regulations; the unforeseen destructive consequences of converging technologies and economic globalization; military competition among the great powers; and the prevalent biases of short-term thinking held by most leaders and elites. But no practical person would wish that such a disorder scenario come true, given all the weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) available now or which will surely become available in the foreseeable future. As converging technologies united by IT, cognitive science, nanotechnology, and robotics advance synergistically in monitored and unmonitored laboratories, we may be blindsided by these future developments brought about by technoscientists with a variety of good or destructive or mercenary motives. The current laudable but problematic openness about publishing scientific results on the Internet would contribute greatly to such negative outcomes.

To be sure, if the global disorder-emergency scenario occurred because of postmodern terrorism or rogue states using biological, chemical, or nuclear WMDs, or a regional war with nuclear weapons in the Middle East or South Asia, there might well be a positive result for global governance. Such a global emergency might unite the global great and major powers in the conviction that a global concert was necessary for their survival and planetary survival as well. In such a global great power concert, basic rules of economic, security, and legal order would be uncompromisingly enforced both globally and in the particular regions where they held hegemonic status. That concert scenario, however, is flawed by the limited legitimacy of its structure based on the members having the greatest hard and soft power on planet Earth.

At the base of our concerns, I would argue, are human proclivities for narrow, short-term thinking tied to individual self-interest or corporate and national interests in decision making. For globalization, though propelled by technologies of various kinds, “remains an essentially human phenomenon . . . and the main drivers for the establishment and uses of disseminative systems are hardy perennials: profit, convenience, greed, relative advantage, curiosity, demonstrations of prowess, ideological fervor, malign destructiveness.” These human drives and capacities will not disappear. Their “manifestations now extend considerably beyond more familiarly empowered governmental, technoscientific and corporate actors to include even individuals: terrorists, computer hackers and rogue market traders” (Whitman, 2005, p. 104).

In this dangerous world, if people are to have their human dignity recognized and enjoy their human rights, above all, to life, security, a healthy environment, and freedom, we need new forms of comprehensive global regulation and control. Such effective global leadership and governance with robust enforcement powers alone can adequately respond to destructive current global problems, and prevent new ones. However, successful human adaptation and innovation to our current complex environment through the social construction of effective global governance will be a daunting collective task for global political and technoscientific leaders and citizens. For our global society is caught in “the whirlpool of an accelerating process of modernization” that has for the most part “been left to its own devices” (Habermas, 2001, p. 112). We need to progress in human adaptation to and innovation for our complex and problematical global social and natural planetary environments through global governance. I suggest we need to begin by ending the prevalent biases of short-termism in thinking and acting and the false values attached to the narrow self-interest of individuals, corporations, and states.

I agree with Stephen Hawking that the long-term future of the human race must be in space. It will be difficult enough to avoid disaster on planet Earth in the next hundred years, let alone the next thousand, or million. . . . There have been a number of times in the past when its survival has been a question of touch and go. The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 was one of these. The frequency of such occasions is likely to increase in the future. We shall need great care and judgment to negotiate them all successfully. But I’m an optimist. If we can avoid disaster for the next two centuries, our species should be safe, as we spread into space. . . . But we are entering an increasingly dangerous period of our history. Our population and our use of the finite resources of planet Earth, are growing exponentially, along with our technical ability to change the environment for good or ill. But our genetic code still carries the selfish and aggressive instincts that were of survival advantage in the past. . . . Our only chance of long term survival is not to remain inward looking on planet Earth, but to spread out into space. We have made remarkable progress in the last hundred years. But if we want to continue beyond the next hundred years, our future is in space.” (Hawking, 2010)

Nonetheless, to reinvent humanity pluralistically in outer space and beyond will require securing our one and only global society and planet Earth through effective global governance in the foreseeable future. And our dilemma is that the enforcement powers of multilateral institutions are not likely to be strengthened because of the competition for greater (relative, not absolute) hard and soft power by the great and major powers. They seek their national or alliance superiority, or at least, parity, for the sake of their state’s survival and security now. Unless the global disorder-emergency scenario was to occur soon—God forbid—the great powers will most likely, recklessly and tragically, leave global survival and security to their longer term agendas. Pg. 4-5

# 2nc CP

2NC/1NR—Conditionality Good

Our offense ---

1. Logical decision making --- dispo requires the judge to vote for the plan if its better than a straight-turned CP even if the status quo is better --- the terminal impact to debate is to create good decision makers who can determine what is or isn’t a cost and evaluate policies.

2. 2AC strategic thinking --- conditionality forces the 2ac to tailor their straight turns to what the CP can’t solve --- this increases analytic education.

3. Structural aff bias justifies --- the persuasive value of the 2AR outweighs the strategic benefit of the block and they get to pick the focus of the debate --- multiple options are key to overwhelm their specificity bias.

Our defense ---

1. Time skew inevitable --- we could read more DAs or T violations and some teams are just faster.

2. 2nr checks --- collapsing our strategy allows the 2AR to frame the debate in response.

[And --- No argument irresponsibility --- its no different than them choosing not to go for a link turn on politics.]

[And --- No strategy skew --- no solvency deficit or addon against the CP will hurt them against the status quo --- if we revert to the status quo they get back 9 minutes of offense the CP might have captured.]

And --- Theory interpretations are illegitimate --- they allow the affirmative to arbitrarily allow practices that are slightly better for them, creating a race to the bottom that incentivizes going for theory over substance.

And --- Not a voting issue --- worst case you stick us with the CP.

[And --- One CP doesn’t solve—

a. Still links to their offense --- if one conditional advocacy is good, any disad to two or more is arbitrary.

b. Not a rational test of opportunity cost --- if there are multiple costs to any policy you can’t just ignore some of them.]

[And --- Dispo doesn’t solve—

a. It’s functionally conditional --- the neg will just add planks like feed Africa to force permutations.

b. Doesn’t force 2ac economizing --- they don’t have to make tough choices and narrowly focus their offense.]

# 2nc Addon

### Ash CP – 1nc

#### The United States federal government should research develop and deploy hydrogen based technologies produced from ash

#### That solves

**R&D Magazine 3/26**/13 [“Ash from refuse could become hydrogen gas,” Tue, 03/26/2013 - 12:31pm , pg. http://www.rdmag.com/news/2013/03/ash-refuse-could-become-hydrogen-gas

Every year, millions of tons of environmentally harmful ash is produced worldwide, and is mostly dumped in landfill sites or, in some countries, used as construction material. The ash is what is left when rubbish has been burnt in thermal power stations. A researcher from Lund University in Sweden has now developed a technique to use the ash to produce hydrogen gas. The method is presented in a new thesis.

The technique has significant potential: 20 billion litres of hydrogen gas a year, or 56 gigawatt-hours (GWh). Calculated as electricity, the energy is the equivalent of the annual needs of around 11,000 detached houses. Hydrogen gas is valuable and is viewed by many as an increasingly important energy source, for example as a vehicle fuel.

“The ash can be used as a resource through recovery of hydrogen gas instead of being allowed to be released into the air as at present. Our ash deposits are like a goldmine”, said Aamir Ilyas, Doctor of Water Resources Engineering at Lund University and the developer of the technique. Refuse incineration is a widespread practice in Europe.

The technique involves placing the ash in an oxygen-free environment. The ash is dampened with water, whereupon it forms hydrogen gas. The gas is sucked up through pipes and stored in tanks.

It is the heavy, grit-like bottom ash that is used. In combustion, a lighter fly ash is also formed. The bottom ash remains in quarantine, in the open air, at the site for up to six months to prevent leaching of environmentally harmful metals and the risk of hydrogen gas being formed, since accumulation of hydrogen during indoor storage can result in explosion.

“A bonus is that this method removes the risk of hydrogen gas. It also reduces the strain on our landfill sites.”

==2NC CPS==

\*2NC—2NC CPS GOOD

2NC CPs Are Legitimate

[1. Counter-interpretation --- we can only read 2NC CPs if they are a direct response to a 2AC addon --- that’s key to deter aff sandbagging --- they will save their best advantages for addons --- our interpretation is best ---

a. Argument under-development --- addons shift everything backwards one speech --- that forces the 2NR to give a 2NC which undermines depth of analysis.

b. Kills CP ground --- the aff can have 2AC that are artificially immune to CPs --- CPs are key to test unpredictable aff advantages and avoid moral high grounds like rape bad advantages.]

[1. Counter-interpretation --- we can only read 2NC CPs if they are fixing minor errors in the text --- that’s best ---

a. Cross-x solves --- any confusion about text errors can be resolved by asking us what the CP does.

b. Substance tradeoff --- rejecting CPs just because of small text errors allows the aff to avoid in-depth discussions of policy options in favor of grammatical nitpicking.]

2. The 2NC is a constructive --- the aff’s arbitrary distinction between a CP and other arguments is not grounded in any systemic theory of debate.

3. Structural aff bias justifies --- the persuasive value of the 2AR outweighs the strategic benefit of the block and they get to pick the focus of the debate --- specificity bias is magnified if they can pick advantages to avoid CPs.

4. Best policy option --- 2NC CPs are key to test the opportunity cost of the plan and the intrinsicness of new 2AC advantages --- the terminal impact to debate is to create good decision makers who can determine what is or isn’t a cost and rationally evaluate policies.

### \*\*Civil Wars – Module

**We’ll answer Diamond’s thesis. Democracies are no better because their leaders are not more accountable.**

**Rosato ‘3** (Sebastian, PhD Candidate Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, American Political Science Review, “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory”, 97:4, November, Proquest)

Each variant of the institutional logic rests on the claim that democratic institutions make leaders accountable to various groups that may, for one reason or another, oppose the use of force. I do not dispute this claim but, instead, question whether democratic leaders are more accountable than their autocratic counterparts. Since we know that democracies do not fight one another and autocracies do fight one another, democrats must be more accountable than autocrats if accountability is a key mechanism in explaining the separate peace between democracies. On the other hand, if autocrats and democrats are equally accountable or autocrats are more accountable than democrats, then there are good reasons to believe that accountability does not exert the effect that democratic peace theorists have suggested.11 Following Goemans (2000a) I assume that a leader's accountability is determined by the consequences as well as the probability of losing office for adopting an unpopular policy. This being the case, there is no a priori reason to believe that a leader who is likely to lose office for fighting a losing or costly war, but unlikely to be exiled, imprisoned, or killed in the process, should feel more accountable for his policy choices than a leader who is unlikely to lose office but can expect to be punished severely in the unlikely event that he is in fact removed. Therefore, determining whether autocrats or democrats are more accountable and, consequently, more cautious about going to war rests on answering three questions: Are losing democrats or losing autocrats more likely to be removed from power? Are losing democrats or losing autocrats more likely to be punished severely? and Are democrats or autocrats more likely to be removed and/or punished for involvement in costly wars, regardless of the outcome? To answer these questions I have used a modified version of Goemans's (2000b) dataset. Our analyses differ in one fundamental respect: While he counts the removal of leaders by foreign powers as examples of punishment, I do not. This decision is theoretically informed. The purpose of the analysis is to determine whether leaders' decisions for war are affected by their domestic accountability, that is, if there is something about the domestic structure of states that affects their chances of being punished. Punishment by foreign powers offers no evidence for or against the claim that democrats or dictators have a higher or lower expectation of being punished by their citizens for unpopular policies, and these cases are therefore excluded. I have also made two minor changes to the data that do not affect the results: I have added 19 wars that appear in the COW dataset but not in Goemans's dataset and coded 11 regimes that Goemans excludes.12 The results appear in Table 4. Although democratic losers are two times more likely to be removed from power than autocratic losers, this evidence is not strong. This is because there are only four cases of democratic losers in the entire dataset, making it impossible to draw any firm conclusions about the likelihood that losing democrats will be removed. Prime Minister Menzies of Australia, for example, resigned early in the Vietnam War, but his resignation may have had more to do with the fact that he was in his seventies than the expectation of defeat in South East Asia a decade later. If this case is receded, as it probably should be, democratic losers have only been removed from power 50% of the time and the distinction between democrats and autocrats is small. Losing autocrats are more likely to suffer severe punishment than their democratic counterparts. None of the four losing democrats was punished, whereas 29% of autocratic losers were imprisoned, exiled, or killed. Thus, while democratic and autocratic losers have similar chances of being removed from office, autocrats seem to be more likely to suffer severe punishment in addition to removal. The evidence from costly wars, regardless of whether the leader was on the whining or losing side, confirms these findings. Costly wars are defined as wars in which a state suffered one battle fatality per 2,000 population, as the United States did in World War I.13 Historically, autocrats have been more likely both to lose office and to be punished severely if they become involved in a costly war. Autocrats have been removed 35% of the time and punished 27% of the time, while democrats have only been removed 27 % of the time and punished 7% of the time.14 In short, there is little evidence that democratic leaders face greater expected costs from fighting losing or costly wars and are therefore more accountable than their autocratic counterparts. This being the case, there is good reason to doubt each variant of the institutional logic.

**Democracy doesn’t solve war --- it’s multilateral institutions and historical patterns**

**Schwartz and Skinner '01** Thomas and Kiron K (Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, associate professor of history and political science at Carnegie Mellon University); December 22, 2001; “The Myth of Democratic Peace”; JAI Press; ORBIS

Here we show that neither the historical record nor the theoretical arguments advanced for the purpose provide any support for democratic pacifism. It does not matter how high or low one sets the bar of democracy. Set it high enough to avoid major exceptions and you find few, if any, democracies until the Cold War era. Then there were no wars between them, of course. But that fact is better explained by NATO and bipolarity than by any shared form of government. Worse, the peace among the high-bar democracies of that era was part of a larger pacific pattern: peace among all nations of the First and Second Worlds. As for theoretical arguments, those we have seen rest on implausible premises. Why, then, is the belief that democracies are mutually pacific so widespread and fervent? The explanation rests on an old American tendency to slip and slide unawares between two uses of the word "democracy": as an objective description of regimes, and as a term of praise--a label to distinguish friend from foe. Because a democracy (term of praise) can do no wrong--or so the thinking seems to run--at least one side in any war cannot be a democracy (regime description). There lies the source of much potential mischief in foreign policy. The Historical Problem Democratic pacifism combines an empirical generalization with a causal attribution: democracies do not fight each other, and that is because they are democracies. Proponents often present the former as a plain fact. Yet regimes that were comparatively democratic for their times and regions have fought each other comparatively often--bearing in mind, for the purpose of comparison, that most states do not fight most states most of the time. The wars below are either counter-examples to democratic pacifism or borderline cases. Each is listed with the year it started and those combatants that have some claim to the democratic label. American Revolutionary War, 1775 (Great Britain vs. U.S.) Wars of French Revolution (democratic period), esp. 1793, 1795 (France vs. Great Britain) Quasi War, 1798 (U.S. vs. France) War of 1812 (U.S. vs. Great Britain) Texas War of Independence, 1835 (Texas vs. Mexico) Mexican War, 1846 (U.S. vs. Mexico) Roman Republic vs. France, 1849 American Civil War, 1861 (Northern Union vs. Southern Confederacy) Ecuador-Columbia War, 1863 Franco-Prussian War, 1870 War of the Pacific, 1879 (Chile vs. Peru and Bolivia) Indian Wars, much of nineteenth century (U.S. vs. various Indian nations) Spanish-American War, 1898 Boer War, 1899 (Great Britain vs. Transvaal and Orange Free State) World War I, 1914 (Germany vs. Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, and U.S.) Chaco War, 1932 (Chile vs. Argentina) Ecuador-Peru, 1941 Palestine War, 1948 (Israel vs. Lebanon) Dominican Invasion, 1967 (U.S. vs. Dominican Republic) Cyprus Invasion, 1974 (Turkey vs. Cyprus) Ecuador-Peru, 1981 Nagorno-Karabakh, 1989 (Armenia vs. Azerbaijan) Yugoslav Wars, 1991 (Serbia and Bosnian-Serb Republic vs. Croatia and Bosnia; sometimes Croatia vs. Bosnia) Georgia-Ossetia, 1991 (Georgia vs. South Ossetia) Georgia-Abkhazia, 1992 (Georgia vs. Abkhazia and allegedly Russia) Moldova-Dnestr Republic, 1992 (Moldova vs. Dnestr Republic and allegedly Russia) Chechen War of Independence, 1994 (Russia vs. Chechnya) Ecuador-Peru, 1995 NATO-Yugoslavia, 1999 India-Pakistan, 1999

**Internal wars are MORE likely in democracies – controlling for all variables – that turns the aff**

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[James D. Fearon & David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”. American Political Science Review 97, 1 (Feb 2003): pp.75-90 ]

Democracy and Civil Liberties.

Broad social and political grievances should be lower, on average, in political democracies. But contrary to H4 and consistent with H11, civil war onsets are no less frequent in democracies after controlling for income, as shown by the positive and statistically insignificant coefficient for democracy, the (lagged) Polity IV measure. The results are the same if we use Przeworski et al.'s dichotomous measure instead (available for 1950–91) or the lag of Freedom House's measure of observance of civil liberties (available for 1972–99). In the former case the sign is “wrong,” while in the latter the sign is consistent with H4 but the coefficient on civil liberties is thoroughly insignificant.

Some past studies of civil strife found an “inverted-U” relationship with democracy and sought to explain this by the observation that the most autocratic regimes can repress dissent and thus avoid civil violence despite facing the highest levels of popular grievance (Hegre et al. 2001; Muller and Weede 1990). This observation does not explain why the leaders of a partially democratic regime are not able to implement full autocracy or democracy to avoid conflict and opposition. As suggested in H10c, we suspect that the answer is often that “anocracies” are weak regimes, lacking the resources to be successful autocrats or containing an unstable mix of political forces that makes them unable to move to crush nascent rebel groups. Consistent with this hypothesis and with the prior studies, Model 3 (Table 1) shows that a dummy variable marking anocracies takes a positive coefficient. **In substantive terms the estimate suggests that these regimes have about 68% greater odds of civil war outbreak in any given year than would a full autocracy**. This is so despite the fact that we are controlling for recent political instability, which is much more common in anocracies. 30

**Democracies spark wars**

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[Sandeep Baliga, David O. Lucc, Tomas Sjöström, Domestic Political Survival and International Conflict: Is Democracy Good for Peace?, Review of Economic Studies (2011) 78 (2): 458-486]

1. INTRODUCTION

The idea that democracy promotes peace has a long history. Thomas Paine argued that monarchs go to war to enrich themselves, but a more democratic system of government would lead to lasting peace: “What inducement has the farmer, while following the plough, to lay aside his peaceful pursuit, and go to war with the farmer of another country?” (Paine, 1985 p. 169). Immanuel Kant agreed that if “the consent of the subjects is required to determine whether there shall be war or not, nothing is more natural than that they should weigh the matter well, before undertaking such a bad business” (Kant, 1795, 1903, p. 122). More recently, the democratic peace hypothesis has influenced the “neoconservative” view of international relations (Kaplan and Kristol, 2003). U.S. policy makers of different political persuasions have invoked it in support of a policy to “seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture.”1 But some anecdotal observations seem to support a more “realist” viewpoint. For example, after the breakup of Yugoslavia, democratic reforms were followed by war, not peace. When given a chance in the legislative elections of 2006, the Palestinians voted for Hamas, which did not have a particularly peaceful platform. Such anecdotes suggest that democratization does not always promote peace. Even fully democratic countries such as the U.S. sometimes turn aggressive: under perceived threats to the homeland, the democratically elected President George W. Bush declared war on Iraq.

We develop a simple game-theoretic model of conflict based on Baliga and Sjöström (2004). Each leader can behave aggressively or peacefully. A leader's true propensity to be aggressive, his “type”, is his private information. Since actions are strategic complements, the fear that the other leader might be an aggressive type can trigger aggression, creating a fear spiral we call “Schelling's dilemma” (see Schelling, 1960; Jervis, 1976, Jervis, 1978; Kydd, 1997). Unlike Baliga and Sjöström (2004), we assume a leader may be removed from power. Whether a leader can stay in power depends on the preferences of his citizens, the political system, and the outcome of the interaction between the two countries. The political system interacts with Schelling's dilemma to create a non-monotonic relationship between democracy and peace.

Like the leaders, citizens have different types. By hypothesis, the median type prefers to live in peace. This imposes a “dovish bias” on a dyad of two full democracies (whose leaders can be replaced by their median voters). Thus, a dyadic democratic peace is likely to obtain. However, when facing a country that is not fully democratic, the median voter may support aggression out of fear and may replace a leader who is not aggressive enough. (For example, Neville Chamberlain had to resign after appeasing Hitler.) This gives rise to a “hawkish bias”. Thus, in a fully democratic country, a dovish bias is replaced by a hawkish bias when the environment becomes more hostile. In contrast, a dictator is not responsive to the preferences of his citizens, so there is neither a hawkish nor a dovish bias. Accordingly, a dyad of two dictators is less peaceful than a fully democratic dyad, but a dictator responds less aggressively than a democratically elected leader to increased threats from abroad.

In the model, the leader of a limited democracy risks losing power if hawks in his population turn against him. For instance, the German leaders during World War I believed signing a peace agreement would lead to their demise (Asprey, 1991, pp. 486–487, 491). Conversely, the support of the hawkish minority trumps the opposition of more peaceful citizens. **Thus, a limited democracy experiences a hawkish bias similar to a full democracy under threat from abroad but never a dovish bias. On balance, this makes limited democracies more aggressive than any other regime type.** In a full democracy, if the citizens feel safe, they want a dovish leader, but if they feel threatened, they want a hawkish leader. In dictatorships and limited democracies, the citizens are not powerful enough to overthrow a hawkish leader, but the leader of a limited democracy risks losing power by appearing too dovish. This generates a non-monotonic relationship between democracy and peace.

Our empirical analysis reassesses the link between democracy and peace using a flexible semiparametric functional form, where fixed effects account for unobserved heterogeneity across country dyads. We use Polity IV data to classify regimes as dictatorships, limited democracies or full democracies. Following the literature on the democratic peace hypothesis, we define a conflict as a militarized dispute in the Correlates of War data set. The data, which span over the period 1816–2000, contain many military disputes between limited democracies. In the nineteenth century, Britain had a Parliament, but even after the Great Reform Act of 1832, only about 200,000 people were allowed to vote. Those who owned property in multiple constituencies could vote multiple times.2 Hence, Britain is classified as a limited democracy for 58 years and becomes a full democracy only after 1879. France, Italy, Spain, and Germany are also limited democracies at key points in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These countries, together with Russia and the Ottoman Empire, were involved in many militarized disputes in Europe and throughout the world. For much of the nineteenth century, Britain and Russia had many skirmishes and outright wars in the “Great Game” for domination of Central Asia (Hopkirk, 1990). France is also involved in many disputes and is a limited democracy during the Belgian War of Independence and the Franco-Prussian War. Germany is a limited democracy at the start of the First World War.

Over the full sample, the data strongly support a dyadic democratic peace hypothesis: dyads consisting of two full democracies are more peaceful than all other pairs of regime types. This is consistent with previous empirical studies (Babst, 1972, Levy, 1988, , maozrussett, Russett and Oneal, 2001). **Over the same period, limited democracies were the most aggressive regime type**. **In particular, dyads consisting of two limited democracies are more likely to experience militarized disputes than any other dyads, including “mixed” dyads where the two countries have different regime types**. These results are robust to changing the definitions of the three categories (using the Polity scores) and to alternative specifications of our empirical model. **The effects are quantitatively significant**. Parameter estimates of a linear probability model specification, suggest that the likelihood that a dyad engages in a militarized dispute falls roughly 35% if the dyad changes from a pair of limited democracies to a pair of dictatorships. We also find that if some country j faces an opponent which changes from a full democracy to another regime type, the estimated equilibrium probability of conflict increases most dramatically when country j is a full democracy. This suggests that as the environment becomes more hostile, democracies respond more aggressively than other regime types, which is also consistent with our theoretical model.

### A2 peace – other causes

**Democratic peace is flawed – its about stable borders – democracy is a symptom – this answers all their internal links**

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[Doublas M. Gibler, Volume 51, Issue 3, pages 509–532, September 2007, International Studies Quarterly]

The Democratic Peace and the Steps to War

The democratic peace literature centers on the finding that no two democracies have gone to war with one another in the modern era (Small and Singer 1976), and a sizeable body of literature has emerged that verifies the pacifying effects of democracy, especially in dyads (Rummel 1983; Chan 1984; Weede 1984, 1992; Levy 1988; Bremer 1992, 1993; Ray 1993, 1995; Russett 1993; Oneal and Russett 1997, 1999). For all its empirical strength, however, consensus on the causes of the democratic peace remains elusive. While monadic arguments about the general peacefulness of democracies have performed poorly in tests (Ray 1995), the dyadic nature of the democratic peace has enjoyed far greater support and has been the subject of a great deal of inductive theory-building. In this section, I examine the democratic peace in terms of its three dominant theoretical models and several important findings that have emerged from both proponents and critics. I then offer a way to reconceptualize these findings and lay the groundwork for an alternative theory of democratic peace. Theoretical Models Three models dominate the democratic peace literature: normative, structural, and institutional. Each model looks to domestic regime type as the independent variable responsible for peace, though they disagree over the theory necessary to explain it and the specific expectations about state behavior that should constitute the peace. Norms Following Immanuel Kant’s (1991[1795]) assertion that states with republican constitutions should transcend the anarchy and relative gains considerations of the international system and achieve a kind of cooperative peace, the normative model assumes that states externalize the methods of conflict resolution that define their regime types. These democratic norms are externalized when doing so is not a threat to basic security, such as when dealing with fellow democracies or substantially weaker states (Doyle 1986; Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994; Oneal and Russett 1997, 1999). Domestic structures The structural model focuses on the difficulties democracies face in mobilizing for war (Small and Singer 1976; Rummel 1983; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Lake 1992; Fearon 1994). The need in democratic systems to generate broad public support and to win legitimacy from a variety of decentralized sources of authority represent structural constraints that make the process of mobilizing for war more difficult than in autocratic regimes. Only in rare cases, such as clear security emergencies, can democracies win the support of enough competing domestic interests to go to war. The process is slow and transparent, and in cases of joint-democratic disputes, diplomatic solutions can usually be found before either state wins enough domestic support for a war. Less-constrained autocratic regimes should be able to mobilize for war much faster, presenting the kind of immediate threat against which democratic polities are more likely to win support for violent action. Democracies are thus unlikely to fight one another, although they are more likely to aggressively engage less democratic states. Institutions The institutional model derives democratic peace from two factors: the hesitancy of leaders in democratic states to risk unwinnable wars and the fact that democracies, once committed to war, “try harder” than autocracies and tend to win most of their wars, thus becoming unattractive targets for aggression (Reiter and Stam 1998a,b, 2000; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith 1999; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003). Democratic leaders must distribute public goods such as prosperity and security to stay in power, while autocratic leaders are loyal to a smaller winning coalition who can be more easily placated with private goods, such as the spoils of conquest. Autocrats, able to divert the costs of war to a populace to whom they are not accountable, are thus more likely to resort to war but, because defeat is less a threat to regime survival, do not try hard to win. Democracies, in contrast, fight only those wars they can win, and when committed, they fight hard. Findings Several important findings emerge from the democratic peace literature beyond the simple dyadic peace, but as yet they have not been subsumed under a single theory. As noted above, the absence of war between democratic states forms the core of the democratic peace. However, democracies are no less war-prone in general than other states; they simply do not fight each other (Russett 1993). Second, democracies are more likely than other states to submit their disputes to negotiation and arbitration instead of resorting to force (Dixon 1994; Raymond 1994; Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997; Mousseau 1998; Huth and Allee 2002). Both findings suggest that, given the opportunity, democracies will act peacefully and will not resort to unprovoked attack. Studies also suggest that democracies are uniquely able to refrain from escalating territorial disputes to war (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; Mitchell and Prins 1999; Huth and Allee 2002). Gleditsch (2002), who recasts the democratic peace as a regional phenomenon, notes two other critical regularities: democracies rarely if ever fight wars on or near their home territory, and democracies tend to cluster together in space and time, creating regional zones of peace. Alternatives Each of the above findings is consistent with the assertion that democracies have avoided war with one another because of a lack of territorial issues. First, if neighboring states do not have territorial issues they should be highly unlikely to fight a priori. To the extent that states with stable borders fight wars at all, they are unlikely to do so on or near their home territory. Should these states enter into disputes with distant states, they are less likely to involve threats to their territorial integrity; as such, they should be less likely to follow the power politics path to war identified in the steps-to-war model and more likely to seek peaceful negotiation and arbitration. To the extent that democracies experience territorial disputes, they are likely to be distant.1 Second, if states are more likely to become democratic in the absence of territorial issues, then democracies should cluster around stable interstate borders. As a result of settling their borders, neighbors should experience greater chances of both having a peaceful relationship and becoming democratic. In short, if democracies do not fight each other, it is because the borders between them had to be settled before democracy could take root. Precisely because democracies share stable borders, peace between them is likely. This argument also makes sense in light of several important challenges to the democratic peace, notably in Reed’s (2000) finding that joint democracy exerts a pacifying effect only on dispute onset and not on escalation to war. Joint democracies are simply less likely to experience disputes than other dyads; if these joint democracies tend to interact across shared stable borders, then this result is clearly expected. Especially among newly independent or transitioning states, both of whom are likely to experience territorial disputes (Vasquez 1993, 1995), new democratic institutions might actually increase the likelihood of disputes escalating to war (Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Thompson and Tucker 1997; Snyder 2000). Territorial issues might then represent clear obstacles to democratic consolidation in transitioning states. While democratic peace scholars generally account for this by holding that the pacific benefits of democracy work chiefly in “mature” democracies (Maoz and Russett 1993), it is probably more plausible that the incidence of territorial issues, which are most likely during and after transition periods, might be the cause. That the difference between young and old democracies is explained away in this fashion is unsatisfactory, as the distinction underlying it—the propensity for territorial issues—is a key omitted variable. Fearon and Laitin (2003) note that democracies, especially young ones, are no less likely than nondemocracies to experience insurgencies and civil wars, despite expectations that the protection of civil rights and broad participation should pacify rival ethnic groups. Many of the conditions that favor civil war—and, by extension, democratic breakdown—tend to be those that also destabilize borders: recent independence, favorable terrain, foreign support for guerillas, and past colonial legacies. The eruption of civil war poses a threat to the territorial status quo in much the same way that transitions do; neighbors are uncertain whether, first, violence will spread or, second, whether the victors will respect the established division of territory in the region. The result should be a clearly heightened sense of territorial threat. From this perspective, the conditions that favor insurgencies and civil wars also indicate the presence of an unstable or ill-defined border; thus many of the indicators of border instability in the next section are drawn from the insurgency literature. The confluence of these findings suggests that, if stable borders have something to do not only with peace but also with prospects for democracy, there is reason to believe that the relationship between democracy and peace is spurious. The next step in this argument, then, is to establish the connection between stable borders and the development of democracy.

**Democracy doesn’t prevent conflict – other variables that are necessary for democracy do**

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[Doublas M. Gibler, Volume 51, Issue 3, pages 509–532, September 2007, International Studies Quarterly]

The border variables are again consistent with my theoretical expectations. Contiguity, peace years and civil war in at least one state of the dyad all increase the likelihood of MID initiation. Similarly, an international border that divides an ethnic group also has a higher chance of experiencing conflict. The dyadic duration and colonial master variables are not statistically significant in any of the three models, and while the terrain differences measure is significant in only one model (for the post-Cold War years), the sign is in an unexpected direction (negative). But these results do not necessarily refute an empirical connection between these measures and conflict. As terrain differences, same colonial master, and dyadic duration were strong predictors of joint democracy in Table 2, I conducted separate analyses (available from the author) to determine whether democracy was serving as an instrument for the effects of these border measures. As I expected, all three border variables were statistically significant and in the predicted direction for all models of international conflict that did not include the measure of democracy as an independent variable. Thus, the weak link specification of democracy—though statistically superior to the dichotomous, joint democracy variable—still captures a portion of the underlying relationship between borders and regime type, and the estimates for the border variables measure the effects of each indicator not already accounted for by the processes predicting regime type.

Finally, the key variable for these analyses is the democracy indicator, which is, as expected, not statistically significant in any of the models of conflict that include the border controls. Of course, even if level of democracy was significant, the sign demonstrates a positive relationship between level of democracy and conflict in each fully specified model. This finding obviously supports the proposition that democracy has little or no effect on conflict once controls are included for stable borders, especially considering the inclusiveness of these models, each with over 100,000 dyadic cases.

**Variables determine democratic peace – not democracy itself**

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Eric Gartzke, Preferences and the Democratic Peace, International Studies Quarterly, 00208833, Jun2000, Vol. 44, Issue 2

Other research on the democratic peace questions the exogeneity of democracy (Thompson, 1996; Wolfson et al., 1998; James et al., 1999). I do not attempt to address the structural equation problem--whether peace "causes" democracy--in this study. However, democratization research, if not the fact of regime transition itself, appears to offer face validity for claiming that democracy may be a function of variables that commonly appear on the right-hand side of typical econometric models of the democratic peace. The inclusion of such variables in models of the democratic peace also suggests that these variables are plausible candidates as predictors of international conflict. **It may not be democracy per se that reduces the occurrence of militarized disputes** (Mousseau, 1998, 1999). If economic development and other variables serve to predict democracy, then perhaps too they predict dispute behavior through democracy (Midlarsky, 1995, 1998). This claim parallels Oneal and Russett's arguments and method of testing applied to AFFINITY. I also adopt Oneal and Russett's model specification. If the results reported are similar to those of Oneal and Russett, then inferences from the analysis should be equally valid (or invalid) in determining whether the effect of democracy on the democratic peace is actually attributable indirectly to other variables.

### Relations high

#### Relations resilient, anything else is a speed bump

**Lamb 3-21** [Gregory M., Christian Science Monitor, Good Reads: US-China relations, 'Lean In,' ballet's whodunit, Ireland's Downton, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/2013/0321/Good-Reads-US-China-relations-Lean-In-ballet-s-whodunit-Ireland-s-Downton]

Competition between the US and China is inevitable, but conflict is not, Mr. Lee argues in an excerpt from his new book in The Atlantic.¶ “This is not the Cold War. The Soviet Union was contesting with the United States for global supremacy. China is acting purely in its own national interests. It is not interested in changing the world.”¶ The complex Chinese-US relationship is underpinned by an essential truth: Each side needs the other.¶ “Chinese leaders know that U.S. military superiority is overwhelming and will remain so for the next few decades,” he writes. “[T]he Chinese do not want to clash with anyone – at least not for the next 15 to 20 years.”

### 2nc- China Alt cause

#### No solvency --- 1AC Lin evidence says scientific exchanges, joint research ventures, and changing trade policies is key.

Justin Lin, 1/21/2011. World Bank chief economist. “China, the US and clean energy cooperation,” <http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/china-the-us-and-clean-energy-cooperation>.

Second, there are also major long-term global benefits from clean energy cooperation between the U.S. and China.  Costs of clean energy investment would fall throughout the world, making such investment more financially sustainable.  Clean energy is also a crucial part of providing energy access to better meet basic needs, to enhance growth, and to reduce poverty.

Making clean energy more available and more affordable won’t be easy. It entails making new and improved low-carbon technologies more cost-competitive on a global scale, and supporting developing countries as they strive to expand energy availability. Here, the capacities in both China and the U.S. for innovation and increased diffusion of clean energy technology come to the fore.

Achieving the needed cooperation will take work – in organizing scientific exchanges and shared research ventures, as well as in re-examining national investment and trade policies.

China and U.S. have the means, and I hope the continued will, to take necessary leadership roles in this sphere.  The success of China-U.S. clean energy cooperation could mean a win-win for China, the U.S., and the world.

Such joint efforts could also conserve the planet’s resources and safeguard future generations from the damaging effects of climate change.

#### Investment strategies alone fail --- Gross lists numerous other policy priorities that are necessary, and is talking about a broad-scale increase in trade and investment through FTAs, not a single policy to increase wind investment.

Donald Gross, 12/17/2012. CSIS Pacific Forum. “Seizing the opportunity to improve US–China relations,” <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/12/17/seizing-the-opportunity-to-improve-us-china-relations/>.

Through a new policy approach, the United States can ensure China is a future partner and not a threat to the interests of America and its allies. This policy should embrace the following objectives. First, it should significantly reduce China’s current and potential military threat to Taiwan, thus securing Taiwan’s democracy. Second, it should achieve a pull-back of Chinese forces from a defined coastal security zone surrounding Japan and have China submit its maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas to an independent international judicial body. Third, the United States should expand security cooperation with China on both regional and global issues while increasing China’s military transparency, especially in the development of new weapons systems. Fourth, the policy should facilitate new bilateral and regional free trade agreements that will unleash unprecedented levels of international trade and investment, generating hundreds of thousands of new American jobs. Finally, it should greatly strengthen the advocates of human rights and democracy in China by depriving security forces of their [‘most dependable weapon’](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/16/opinion/16iht-edsharansky.html?_r=0), in the view of former Soviet dissident Natan Sharansky: an external security threat from the United States which is now used to legitimise internal political repression.

In his second term, President Obama should seize the opportunity created by the emergence of China’s new leadership to stabilise US–China relations — by pursuing a diplomatic strategy that minimises conflict, emphasises peaceful coexistence, and significantly expands trade and investment between the two countries. The United States should keep in mind [the profound words](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136754/zbigniew-brzezinski/balancing-the-east-upgrading-the-west) of former US national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski:

‘If the United States and China can accommodate each other on a broad range of issues, the prospects for stability in Asia will be greatly increased … [The] United States must recognize that stability in Asia can no longer be imposed by … the direct application of U.S. military power. Indeed, U.S. efforts to buttress Asian stability could prove self-defeating, propelling Washington into a costly repeat of its recent wars, potentially even resulting in a replay of the tragic events of Europe in the twentieth century’.

#### CFIUS reviews are a huge obstacle to Chinese investment in U.S. clean energy. The U.S. must change its overall policy framework for investment to solve.

Melanie Hart, 2/11/2013. Policy Analyst for Chinese Energy and Climate Policy at the Center for American Progress. “Increasing Opportunities for Chinese Direct Investment in U.S. Clean Energy,” Center for American Progress, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/china/report/2013/02/11/52576/increasing-opportunities-for-chinese-direct-investment-in-u-s-clean-energy/.

One of our most promising opportunities for U.S.-China clean energy cooperation is inward Chinese direct investment. Many Chinese companies want to come to the United States, directly invest in this country, and create jobs here. That is exactly what our economy needs, particularly in sectors such as renewable energy generation that generally do not pose national security concerns and will require large amounts of investment capital to develop. The problem is, however, that we do not have a good policy framework in place to encourage these investments.

In President Obama’s first term, the White House signaled general support for increasing Chinese direct investment. During Vice President Joe Biden’s August 2011 China trip, for example, the vice president stated:

President Obama and I, we welcome, encourage and see nothing but positive benefits flowing from direct investment in the United States from Chinese businesses and Chinese entities. It means jobs. It means American jobs.

From the perspective of most potential Chinese investors, however, those general statements of welcome are not enough to make the U.S. market look like a good bet. These investors need to be able to predict how the U.S. government will respond to particular foreign-invested business models—and that requires actual policies. The only policies we have at present are the national security review policies of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, which are designed to block foreign direct investments that could pose national security concerns. National security protections are very important, but we should pair those protections with additional policies designed to encourage foreign investment in the sectors where security is not an issue. In this era of economic difficulty, we should not let those opportunities go by the wayside.

#### Blocking Chinese wind investment creates a chilling effect for ALL Chinese investment in the US economy.

Juliano and McArdle, Environment and Energy Daily, 10-2-12

[Nick and John, “Obama’s blocking of wind farm adds to U.S.-China tension” <http://www.governorswindenergycoalition.org/?p=3480>, accessed 10-29-12, TAP]

President Obama’s decision to block a Chinese-owned firm’s plan to build wind farms demonstrates growing tensions around the international competition to develop clean energy technology and joins a list of disputes between the United States and China that observers say could have lasting implications for the two countries’ relationship.¶ The president last week blocked Ralls Corp., which is owned by two executives of a Chinese energy firm, from developing four wind farms in Oregon. The president cited unspecified “national security” threats in blocking the projects (E&ENews PM, Sept. 28).¶ During an election year in which Obama has faced attacks from Republican candidate Mitt Romney for not being tough enough on China, the president’s decision may heighten worries among Chinese investors that could reduce their future interest in U.S. markets.¶ “The concern is there’s a feeling in Chinese investment circles that they certainly get special scrutiny,” said Josh Zive, a Washington-based lawyer and lobbyist with Bracewell & Giuliani who tracks international trade issues.¶ Obama’s decision on the Oregon project comes amid an ongoing investigation into whether Chinese utility-scale wind tower manufacturers have benefited from illegal trade practices¶ That case also appears to have a national security component, as the coalition of American wind manufacturers that brought the complaint has argued in filings with the Commerce Department that one of the major Chinese tower producers is part of China’s military enterprise.¶ “There are similar national security implications relating to the imports of the towers, not just the operations of the wind farms,” Alan Price, chairman of the trade practice at the Washington, D.C., law firm Wiley Rein, which represents the coalition, said today. “There are a number of national security implications in the Chinese government’s targeting of wind and other green energy projects.”¶ The Obama administration issued a preliminary ruling in that case earlier this summer finding that Chinese and Vietnamese manufacturers of steel towers used in utility-scale wind turbines have been selling their products in the United States at less than fair value. The Commerce Department set tariff rates of 20.85 percent to 72.69 percent to counter dumping practices by Chinese producers, while tariffs on Vietnamese manufactures were set at 52.67 percent to 59.91 percent.¶ For China, the dumping tariff comes on top of tariffs Commerce imposed in late May after the agency found the government had provided improper subsidies to its domestic wind tower manufacturers. That rate ranged from 13.74 percent to 26 percent.¶ That case isn’t scheduled to be finalized by Commerce and the U.S. International Trade Commission until early 2013.¶ The conflict over Chinese and Vietnamese wind towers comes as a group of U.S. solar manufacturers have argued for heavy new import duties on cheap Chinese solar panels. That case is entering its final stages this month and will feature a much-anticipated hearing before the International Trade Commission this week. In response, China has already launched several counterinvestigations into the U.S. solar industry.¶ Obama’s decision to block the Ralls projects came after a review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, which issued an order earlier this summer effectively blocking the project. Ralls had challenged the CFIUS order in court, prompting a need for Obama to take the rare step of making the final decision on the case.¶ Delaware-based Ralls is owned by two executives of the Chinese firm Sany Group, which manufactures turbines that were to be installed in the four wind farms. All four locations are within or in the vicinity of restricted airspace used by the Naval Weapons Systems Training Facility Boardman, according to government court filings.¶ Ralls’ lawyer says the company will challenge Obama’s decision in court and believes it has been unfairly singled out because the area where its projects are planned already has scores of operating turbines.¶ “The selective and arbitrary singling out of Ralls’ project drives our effort to seek redress in U.S. courts,” Ralls counsel Tim Xia said in a statement after the president’s decision.¶ “Ralls Corporation will continue to uphold and protect U.S. national security interests, and confirm its profound faith in the rule of law,” Xia continued. “We are confident that the courts will vindicate Ralls’s rights under the law and the Constitution and we intend to pursue the remedies that the law makes available.”¶ ‘National security considerations’¶ Legal experts say Ralls will face an uphill battle in court, as judges generally defer to the president when it comes to national security concerns.¶ Judge Amy Berman Jackson, who is hearing the challenge to the CFIUS decision in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, said at a hearing last month that she “can’t review the president’s decision if he stops it” because of the deference afforded to presidents on national security decisions, Bloomberg reported at the time¶ Ralls challenged CFIUS’s initial order under the Administrative Procedure Act, arguing that the agency’s decision was arbitrary and capricious in part because it “offers literally no evidence or explanation” for its determination that the wind farms would endanger national security.¶ Obama’s order from Friday and a statement from the Treasury Department, which chairs CFIUS, also do not specify how the projects would endanger national security, aside from their proximity to the naval facility. A Treasury Department spokeswoman, Natalie Wyeth Earnest, said she could not elaborate due to “the obvious sensitivity of national security considerations.”¶ Ralls was aiming to complete the project before the end of this year, in time to claim a $25 million investment tax credit ahead of its expiration, according to court filings. The company also claims it already had agreed to relocate some towers to accommodate concerns that had been raised by the Navy and notes that the Federal Aviation Administration had certified that the wind farms would not be a hazard to air traffic in the area.¶ The Treasury Department said last week that blocking the Oregan project was done to protect national security and doesn’t undercut the United States’ broader support for open investment in U.S. markets.¶ But China’s state news agency blasted the Obama administration in the wake of last week’s announcement for reneging on its stated commitment to maintaining free and open markets and fighting protectionism.¶ “During this election year when the U.S. economy is mired in tepid growth and high unemployment rate, both Democrats and Republicans are using China-bashing tactic to woo some blue-collar voters,” a Xinhua News article posted on China’s Ministry of Commerce website says.¶ The article says Chinese officials will take their objections to the World Trade Organization.¶ “Through consultations within the WTO trade dispute settlement mechanism, the Chinese side hopes the U.S. can correct its wrong-doing and properly deal with concerns from China,” Shen Danyang, spokesman for the Ministry of Commerce, said at a recent press briefing, according to the article.¶ Some U.S.-based observers also worry about a chilling effect from the Ralls and related cases.¶ “The decision … will unfortunately be seen as yet another signal — this time from the highest possible level — that the United States does not really want Chinese investment,” Edward Alden, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote in a blog post. “And for an economy still struggling to create jobs, that’s the wrong signal to send.”

### No Escalation 2NC

#### No escalation in the South China Sea --- defensive posturing by Southeast Asia, US security guarantees, economic interdependence and China wants to find a peaceful solution --- that is Sari

#### Even if there are some disputes now --- plan can't resolve them because they are based on territorial, nationalistic and OIL claims rather than natural gas

#### Limited to small exchanges --- Glaser

#### NBC News 12 ["Much at stake for US as tensions rise in troubled China Seas," 8-24, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/\_news/2012/08/24/13432841-much-at-stake-for-us-as-tensions-rise-in-troubled-china-seas?lite]

Bonnie Glaser, a senior fellow at the Center for International & Strategic Studies and a consultant to the U.S. government on East Asia, said if China decides to seize the Senkakus – currently administered by Japan – it would likely provoke a military confrontation. An article in Foreign Policy magazine on Monday even speculated on who would win the "Sino-Japanese Naval War of 2012," concluding it would end in a stalemate that would see Tokyo emerge with a political victory and potentially reverse China's progress toward world-power status "in an afternoon." But Glaser told NBCNews.com that she doubted war would break out, partly because China is aware that if they did seize the islands, "the U.S. would be there" for its ally Japan. "I think there could be the possibility of some miscalculation – maybe there could be some exchange of fire, but an all-out war? No. I don't think that's on the cards," she said.

#### Tensions won't escalate

#### Wing 12 [Terry, reporter for VOA News, "Will South China Sea Disputes Lead to War?," 9-4, http://www.voanews.com/content/south-china-sea-war-unlikely/1501780.html]

But that doesn’t mean a war. Storey said an escalation into full-blown conflict is unlikely. “It is in no country’s interests to spill blood or treasure over this issue – the costs far outweigh the benefits,” Storey said. Other experts agree. James Holmes of the U.S. Naval War College says admires how China has been able to get its way in spreading it claims of sovereignty without becoming a bully. “[China] gradually consolidated the nation's maritime claims while staying well under the threshold for triggering outside -most likely American -intervention,” said Holmes. “Is war about to break out over bare rocks? I don't think so.” writes Robert D. Kaplan, Chief Political Strategist for the geopolitical analysis group Stratfor. Kaplan, however, doesn’t give much hope for negotiations. “The issues involved are too complex, and the power imbalance between China and its individual neighbors is too great,” he said. For that reason, Kaplan says China holds all the cards. Kaplan doesn’t look for Chinese military aggression against other claimants. That, he says, would be counterproductive for its goals in the region. “It would completely undermine its carefully crafted ‘peaceful rise’ thesis and push Southeast Asian countries into closer strategic alignment with the US,” said Kaplan.

#### No conflict between the US and China --- economics and MAD

#### Nathan and Scobell 12 [Andrew J., Professor of Political Science at Columbia University; Andrew, Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation. "How China Sees America." Foreign Affairs. 16 Aug. 2012, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138009/andrew-j-nathan-and-andrew-scobell/how-china-sees-america?page=show>]

Despite these views, mainstream Chinese strategists do not advise China to challenge the United States in the foreseeable future. They expect the United States to remain the global hegemon for several decades, despite what they perceive as initial signs of decline. For the time being, as described by Wang Jisi, dean of Peking University's School of International Studies, "the superpower is more super, and the many great powers less great." Meanwhile, the two countries are increasingly interdependent economically and have the military capability to cause each other harm. It is this mutual vulnerability that carries the best medium-term hope for cooperation. Fear of each other keeps alive the imperative to work together.

#### Glaser agrees

#### Bennett 12 [John, covers national security and foreign policy for U.S. News & World Report, "U.S. Expected To Remain Neutral In South China Sea Disputes," 7-30, http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/dotmil/2012/07/30/us-expected-to-remain-neutral-in-south-china-sea-disputes]

As it has in several other South China Sea disputes, Glaser told reporters on a Monday conference call that she sees evidence Washington will "seek to preserve peace and stability and not take sides." For instance, American officials so far have declined to state publicly that a security treaty with the Philippines "would cover this," she says. By essentially threatening its neighbors to stay out of certain parts of the sea, experts say Beijing sometimes undermines its own strategic interests. But Glaser sees signs Beijing is coming to understand the potential risks. "I think there will be an effort in Beijing to rethink" its South China Sea aggressiveness "because they don't want to push their neighbors into U.S. arms," Glaser says.

#### China just testing --- no actual war

#### Legaspi 13 [Amita, "Asia risk analyst doubts China will go to war over Spratlys," 1-17, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/290805/news/nation/asia-risk-analyst-doubts-china-will-go-to-war-over-spratlys]

Amid the reported Chinese intrusions in the disputed Spratly Islands in West Philippine Sea, a risk strategist on Thursday said he doubts China will actually to go to war over the territories it claims it owns. What China will do is test the waters and see how far can go intimidating other claimants, Richard Jacobson, operations director of Pacific Strategies and Assessments, told a forum in Makati City organized by the Foreign Correspondents Association of the Philippines. Pacific Strategies is a business risk consultancy focusing on Asia, with offices in Hong Kong, Manila, Shanghai, Beijing, Bangkok, Milwaukee and Sydney. “It appears doubtful that China has any intention to go to war for the South China Sea territorial claims,” the analyst noted. “Nevertheless it can be expected of Beijing to test the waters and in many ways see how far they can intimidate other claimants,” Jacobson added. Apart from China – which claims the whole of South China Sea or West Philippine Sea – and the Philippines, other countries with claiming territorial ownership over the Spratlys are Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei.

### 1NC No China War

#### China will not risk war—economics and diplomacy

Fravel 12—Associate Professor of Political Science and member of the Security Studies Program at MIT. Taylor is a graduate of Middlebury College and Stanford University, where he received his PhD. He has been a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University, a Predoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, a Fellow with the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program and a Visiting Scholar at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences(M. Taylor, “All Quiet in the South China Sea,” March 22nd, 2012, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137346/m-taylor-fravel/all-quiet-in-the-south-china-sea>)

Little noticed, however, has been China's recent adoption of a new -- and much more moderate -- approach. The primary goals of the friendlier policy are to restore China's tarnished image in East Asia and to reduce the rationale for a more active U.S. role there.

Beijing is also unlikely to be more assertive if that sustains Southeast Asian countries' desires to further deepen ties with the United States.

The first sign of China's new approach came last June, when Hanoi dispatched a special envoy to Beijing for talks about the countries' various maritime disputes. The visit paved the way for an agreement in July 2011 between China and the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to finally implement a declaration of a code of conduct they had originally drafted in 2002 after a series of incidents in the South China Sea. In that declaration, they agreed to "exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes."

Since the summer, senior Chinese officials, especially top political leaders such as President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, have repeatedly reaffirmed the late Deng Xiaoping's guidelines for dealing with China's maritime conflicts to focus on economic cooperation while delaying the final resolution of the underlying claims. In August 2011, for example, Hu echoed Deng's approach by stating that "the countries concerned may put aside the disputes and actively explore forms of common development in the relevant sea areas."

Authoritative Chinese-language media, too, has begun to underscore the importance of cooperation. Since August, the international department of People's Daily (under the pen name Zhong Sheng) has published several columns stressing the need to be less confrontational in the South China Sea. In January 2012, for example, Zhong Sheng discussed the importance of "pragmatic cooperation" to achieve "concrete results." Since the People's Daily is the official paper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, such articles should be interpreted as the party's attempts to explain its new policy to domestic readers, especially those working lower down in party and state bureaucracies.

In terms of actually setting aside disputes, China has made progress. In addition to the July consensus with ASEAN, in October China reached an agreement with Vietnam on "basic principles guiding the settlement of maritime issues." The accord stressed following international law, especially the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Since then, China and Vietnam have begun to implement the agreement by establishing a working group to demarcate and develop the southern portion of the Gulf of Tonkin near the disputed Paracel Islands.

China has also initiated or participated in several working-level meetings to address regional concerns about Beijing's assertiveness. Just before the East Asian Summit last November, China announced that it would establish a three billion yuan ($476 million) fund for China-ASEAN maritime cooperation on scientific research, environmental protection, freedom of navigation, search and rescue, and combating transnational crimes at sea. The following month, China convened several workshops on oceanography and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and in January it hosted a meeting with senior ASEAN officials to discuss implementing the 2002 code of conduct declaration. The breadth of proposed cooperative activities indicates that China's new approach is probably more than just a mere stalling tactic.

Beyond China's new efforts to demonstrate that it is ready to pursue a more cooperative approach, the country has also halted many of the more assertive behaviors that had attracted attention between 2009 and 2011. For example, patrol ships from the Bureau of Fisheries Administration have rarely detained and held any Vietnamese fishermen since 2010. (Between 2005 and 2010, China detained 63 fishing boats and their crews, many of which were not released until a hefty fine was paid.) And Vietnamese and Philippine vessels have been able to conduct hydrocarbon exploration without interference from China. (Just last May, Chinese patrol ships cut the towed sonar cable of a Vietnamese ship to prevent it from completing a seismic survey.) More generally, China has not obstructed any recent exploration-related activities, such as Exxon's drilling in October of an exploratory well in waters claimed by both Vietnam and China. Given that China retains the capability to interfere with such activities, its failure to do so suggests a conscious choice to be a friendlier neighbor.

The question, of course, is why did the Chinese shift to a more moderate approach? More than anything, Beijing has come to realize that its assertiveness was harming its broader foreign policy interests. One principle of China's current grand strategy is to maintain good ties with great powers, its immediate neighbors, and the developing world. Through its actions in the South China Sea, China had undermined this principle and tarnished the cordial image in Southeast Asia that it had worked to cultivate in the preceding decade. It had created a shared interest among countries there in countering China -- and an incentive for them to seek support from Washington. In so doing, China's actions provided a strong rationale for greater U.S. involvement in the region and inserted the South China Sea disputes into the U.S.-Chinese relationship.

By last summer, China had simply recognized that it had overreached. Now, Beijing wants to project a more benign image in the region to prevent the formation of a group of Asian states allied against China, reduce Southeast Asian states' desire to further improve ties with the United States, and weaken the rationale for a greater U.S. role in these disputes and in the region.

So far, Beijing's new approach seems to be working, especially with Vietnam. China and Vietnam have deepened their political relationship through frequent high-level exchanges. Visits by the Vietnamese Communist Party general secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong, to Beijing in October 2011 and by the Chinese heir apparent, Xi Jinping, to Hanoi in December 2011 were designed to soothe spirits and protect the broader bilateral relationship from the unresolved disputes over territory in the South China Sea. In October, the two also agreed to a five-year plan to increase their bilateral trade to $60 billion by 2015. And just last month, foreign ministers from both countries agreed to set up working groups on functional issues such as maritime search and rescue and establish a hotline between the two foreign ministries, in addition to starting talks over the demarcation of the Gulf of Tonkin.

Even if it is smooth sailing now, there could be choppy waters ahead. Months of poor weather have held back fishermen and oil companies throughout the South China Sea. But when fishing and hydrocarbon exploration activities resume in the spring, incidents could increase. In addition, China's new approach has raised expectations that it must now meet -- for example, by negotiating a binding code of conduct to replace the 2002 declaration and continuing to refrain from unilateral actions.

Nevertheless, because the new approach reflects a strategic logic, it might endure, signaling a more significant Chinese foreign policy shift. As the 18th Party Congress draws near, Chinese leaders want a stable external environment, lest an international crisis upset the arrangements for this year's leadership turnover. And even after new party heads are selected, they will likely try to avoid international crises while consolidating their power and focusing on China's domestic challenges.

China's more moderate approach in the South China Sea provides further evidence that China will seek to avoid the type of confrontational policies that it had adopted toward the United States in 2010. When coupled with Xi's visit to Washington last month, it also suggests that the United States need not fear Beijing's reaction to its strategic pivot to Asia, which entails enhancing U.S. security relationships throughout the region. Instead, China is more likely to rely on conventional diplomatic and economic tools of statecraft than attempt a direct military response. Beijing is also unlikely to be more assertive if that sustains Southeast Asian countries' desires to further deepen ties with the United States. Whether the new approach sticks in the long run, it at least demonstrates that China, when it wants to, can recalibrate its foreign policy. That is good news for stability in the region.

#### No military aggression

Goldstein 11—Professor and Director of the China Maritime Studies Institute @ US Naval War College [Dr. Lyle J. Goldstein, “Resetting the US–China Security Relationship,” Survival | vol. 53 no. 2 | April–May 2011 | pp. 89–116]

Weighed in the aggregate, China’s rise remains a peaceful process, and the record to date should engender significant confidence. Beijing has not resorted to a significant use of force against another state in more than three decades. Its deployments of troops as UN peacekeepers to hot spots such as Lebanon and the Democratic Republic of the Congo have played a helpful role, as have the counter-piracy operations of its fleet in the Gulf of Aden. When dealing with weak and occasionally unstable states on its borders, such as Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan, Beijing has not resorted to military intervention, nor even flexed its military muscles to gain advantage. Chinese maritime claims, whether in the South or the East China seas, are generally being enforced by unarmed patrol cutters, a clear signal that Beijing does not seek escalation to a major crisis on these matters. Contrary to the perception that China’s senior military officers are all irreconcilable hawks, one influential People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) admiral recently said in an interview, with reference to lessons learned from recent border negotiations on China’s periphery: ‘If there are never any concessions or compromises, there is simply no possibility of reaching a breakthrough in border negotiations.’2 pg. 90

### 2NC No China War

#### No war—China has the most to lose

Ba 11**—**Professor of Political Science and International Relations @ University of Delaware [Dr. Alice D. Ba (PhD in Government and Foreign Affairs from University of Virginia) , “Staking Claims and Making Waves in the South China Sea: How Troubled Are the Waters?,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Volume 33, Number 3, December 2011, pp. 269-291]

Most of all, authors mostly see the prospects for major conflict being mitigated by an unfavourable cost-benefit calculus where the costs of conflict and militarization will be high and the benefits far from clear. Certainly, this is true of Southeast Asia’s weaker states, but it is also true of the major powers — China and the United States. For China, for example, Womack is strongest in seeing militarization of the dispute as contrary to China’s “quarter century of broad and peaceful development” and reformera policies and diplomacy that have served it very well. A South China Sea conflict scenario would also likely have ripple effects along China’s periphery among other neighbouring and lesser states that are most vulnerable to Chinese power. Given the attention and priority that has been given to stabilizing China’s periphery these past two decades, it hardly seems in China’s interest to militarize the South China Sea in such a way that invites more active interventions from others in the seas around it, especially given its own reliance on those waters to get goods in and out. At minimum, militarization would divert resources and attention from both domestic and other global objectives, with active defence of claims requiring “diplomatic and military efforts of the utmost magnitude”.53 Womack is blunt in his argument that the Spratlys, in the larger scheme of Chinese objectives, is insignificant: “[T]here is no threshold of military superiority that would make it beneficial for China to establish its control over all the Spratlys at the cost of strategic hostility with Southeast Asia.” By one argument, China has the most to lose with the militarization of the South China Sea dispute. Pg. 286

#### No US-China war

Zhang & Zheng 12—Professor of American Studies @ Fudan University & Postgraduate student in international politics @ Fudan University. [Dr. Jiadong & Zheng Xin, “The Role of Nontraditional Security in China–US Relations: common ground or contradictory arena?,” Journal of Contemporary China (2012), 21(76), July, pg. 623–636]

Third, China and the US need to be aware that NTS and traditional security can be merged and often intertwined with each other when the circumstances are right. There is no distinct line between NTS and traditional security, even though they have been termed and coined as distinctly different forms of security. It may not be an important problem between allies but it is a substantial obstacle between China and the US. Yet, this phenomenon isn’t an inevitably negative factor between the two countries. There is an axiomatic consensus between China and the US that both countries should try their best to avoid a military conflict. This will make the two countries more selfcontrolled and rational and able to avoid the possibility of disputes in the NTS field spreading into the traditional security field. Pg. 635

#### Economic ties prevent conflict

Raine 11**—**Research Fellow for Chinese Foreign and Security Policy @ International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) [Sarah Raine, “Beijing's South China Sea Debate” Survival, vol. 53 no. 5 | October–November 2011 pg. 69-88

But despite the powerful limitations imposed by the influence of the military, popular nationalism and the impending leadership change, some fealty to Deng Xiaoping’s 30-year old advice to shelve sovereignty disputes remains.31. China’s Foreign Ministry, in particular, is trying to leverage the Ministry of Commerce’s success in building economic ties with Southeast Asia to advance Beijing’s soft power. It repeatedly warns the central leadership of the counter-productive effect that more assertive statements of Chinese rights in the South China Sea may have on Chinese relations with Asia, and by extension the United States.32 By 2009, China had become ASEAN’s largest trading partner, accounting for 11.6% of ASEAN’s total trade of $1.54 trillion.33 In 2010, a China–ASEAN free-trade agreement aimed at creating a unified market of some 1.9 billion people with a trade volume of around $4.5tr came into force.34 And while these trading relations are not without irritations of their own, the economic attractions of close ties with China are a powerful lure to Southeast Asian states. This is a remarkable achievement by China, given the legacy of historical mistrust combined with contemporary concerns over how China might ultimately seek to use its growing economic leverage to promote its national interests, and whether this might be at the cost of Southeast Asian states’ international autonomy. Pg. 82

#### Institutions check escalation

Ba 11**—**Professor of Political Science and International Relations @ University of Delaware [Dr. Alice D. Ba (PhD in Government and Foreign Affairs from University of Virginia) , “Staking Claims and Making Waves in the South China Sea: How Troubled Are the Waters?,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Volume 33, Number 3, December 2011, pp. 269-291]

Thayer’s conclusion also speaks to the fact that China’s relations with Southeast Asia (and also the world in general) are much more extensive compared to, for example, the early-mid 1990s when the South China Sea was last a major issue. Put another way, recent commentary to the contrary, China’s regional engagement cannot be reduced to this one issue, and Chinese diplomacy of the last decade was not all for naught. At minimum, ten years of mutual engagement have put in place a range of mechanisms and interests that serve to buffer and mediate specific tensions, in addition to keeping opportunities on the table. Nevertheless, China’s relations with Southeast Asian states are, as highlighted, challenged by events. The expansiveness of China’s claim, especially with reference to “historic waters” and historic claims, suggest a sense of regional entitlement that sit in tension with the message China has been trying to convey through what has otherwise been China’s successful regional diplomacy. These tensions have to be reconciled and addressed if the South China Sea is not to remain the primary contradiction and “Achilles heel” (to use Kavi Chongkittavorn’s characterization) in China-Southeast Asian relations.37 pg. 279-280

#### Mature asymmetry prevents escalation

Ba 11**—**Professor of Political Science and International Relations @ University of Delaware [Dr. Alice D. Ba (PhD in Government and Foreign Affairs from University of Virginia) , “Staking Claims and Making Waves in the South China Sea: How Troubled Are the Waters?,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Volume 33, Number 3, December 2011, pp. 269-291]

As Thayer highlights, the resultant “souring of relations”, as well as the potential for conflict more serious than what in fact took place in 2009–10, speak to the special difficulties involved in maintaining this particular China-Southeast Asian relationship. The fact that greater conflict did not take place, argues Thayer, is indicative of the “mature asymmetry” that now characterizes the relationship. Defined by, above all, a mutual recognition and mutual appreciation for the other’s needs, mature asymmetry requires obligations from each side — an obligation from Vietnam (the lesser power) to exhibit deference to China (the larger power) and a reciprocating obligation from China to respect the interests and autonomy of Vietnam, its weaker neighbour.33 Further, such relationships of mature asymmetry are critically not imposed, but ones that are carefully and selfconsciously negotiated; they are based also on mutual recognition of one’s own limitations vis-à-vis the other. To quote Womack, the stability of the relationship is contingent on there being a modus vivendi, as opposed to a modus dominandi. 34 Mutual accommodations are thus critical. Maturity in relations will also be undergirded by a recognition of opportunity and benefit (as opposed to simply costs) that also supports expanded and institutionalized exchanges that underlies the ongoing “normalcy” of relations.35 Noting that 2011 has returned relations to relative “normalcy”, Thayer concludes that the China-Vietnam relationship will require work and continued sensitivity on both sides about the other’s concerns but that ultimately, there is also a mix of mechanisms and “methods” in place36 that help guard against a return to a relationship of more “hostile asymmetry”. Pg. 279

### 1NC No SCS War

#### Potential economic destruction deters war

Creehan 12**—**Senior Editor of the SAIS Review of International Affairs [Sean Creehan, “Assessing the Risks of Conflict in the South China Sea,” SAIS Review, Volume 32, Number 1, Winter-Spring 2012, pp. 125-128

Regarding Secretary Clinton’s first requirement, the risk of actual closure of the South China Sea remains remote, as instability in the region would affect the entire global economy, raising the price of various goods and commodities. According to some estimates, for example, as much as 50 percent of global oil tanker shipments pass through the South China Sea— that represents more than three times the tanker traffic through the Suez Canal and over five times the tanker traffic through the Panama Canal.4 It is in no country’s interest to see instability there, least of all China’s, given the central economic importance of Chinese exports originating from the country’s major southern ports and energy imports coming through the South China Sea (annual U.S. trade passing through the Sea amounts to $1.2 trillion).5 Invoking the language of nuclear deterrence theory, disruption in these sea lanes implies mutually assured economic destruction, and that possibility should moderate the behavior of all participants. Furthermore, with the United States continuing to operate from a position of naval strength (or at least managing a broader alliance that collectively balances China’s naval presence in the future), the sea lanes will remain open. While small military disputes within such a balance of power are, of course, possible, the economic risks of extended conflict are so great that significant changes to the status quo are unlikely. Pg. 126

#### US has already drawn a clear line in the South China Seas.

Ba 11**—**Professor of Political Science and International Relations @ University of Delaware [Dr. Alice D. Ba (PhD in

Government and Foreign Affairs from University of Virginia) , “Staking Claims and Making Waves in the South China Sea: How Troubled Are the Waters?,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Volume 33, Number 3, December 2011, pp. 269-291

Unquestionably, US involvement has upped the stakes for China — but with possibly mixed effects for the dispute at hand. By one argument, Washington’s intervention has been very effective. Certainly, this is the general view of those based in the United States. Washington, with support from key regional states, drew a clear line. More importantly, it “called out” China, which has in essence been trying to have it both ways (in its consolidation and continued defense of its vast South China Sea claims without harm to its ASEAN relations). The US intervention also provided new impetus for rejuvenating China and ASEAN’s 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) and the 2011 agreement on guidelines for its implementation. Pg. 283

### 2NC No SCS War

#### No war—not worth it and China won’t be militarily aggressive

Wang 12 [Terry, “Will South China Sea Disputes Lead to War?” 9-4, http://www.voanews.com/content/south-china-sea-war-unlikely/1501780.html]

“A minor military clash in the South China Sea is, rather worryingly, a distinct and growing possibility,” according to Ian Storey from the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore. Storey, an expert on Asia Pacific maritime security, goes even further. He envisions the possibility of differences over fishing rights or energy exploration turning into a military clash. “Caused by miscalculation, misperception or miscommunication, it’s just a question of time before one these skirmishes results in loss of life,” Storey said. A South China Sea War is Unlikely But that doesn’t mean a war. Storey said an escalation into full-blown conflict is unlikely. “It is in no country’s interests to spill blood or treasure over this issue – the costs far outweigh the benefits,” Storey said. Other experts agree. James Holmes of the U.S. Naval War College says admires how China has been able to get its way in spreading it claims of sovereignty without becoming a bully. “[China] gradually consolidated the nation's maritime claims while staying well under the threshold for triggering outside -most likely American -intervention,” said Holmes. “Is war about to break out over bare rocks? I don't think so.” writes Robert D. Kaplan, Chief Political Strategist for the geopolitical analysis group Stratfor. Kaplan, however, doesn’t give much hope for negotiations. “The issues involved are too complex, and the power imbalance between China and its individual neighbors is too great,” he said. For that reason, Kaplan says China holds all the cards. Kaplan doesn’t look for Chinese military aggression against other claimants. That, he says, would be counterproductive for its goals in the region. “It would completely undermine its carefully crafted ‘peaceful rise’ thesis and push Southeast Asian countries into closer strategic alignment with the US,” said Kaplan.

#### No escalation—EP-3 and Impeccable proves.

Womack 11**—**Professor of Foreign Affairs @ University of Virginia [Dr. Brantly Womack (PhD in Poli Sci from University of Chicago), “The Spratlys: From Dangerous Ground to Apple of Discord,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Volume 33, Number 3, December 2011, pp. 370-387

It is difficult to imagine a Spratly scenario in which a crisis would go beyond a specific incident and threaten the current overall pattern of mixed occupation. Accidents happen, so incidents cannot be ruled out, though the sustained confrontation of two or more militaries are increasingly unlikely. Accidental incidents are likely to lead to a blamestorm, but not to prolonged conflict or to escalation. A premeditated fait accompli against other claimants, as argued earlier, would not accomplish much. The victor (let us assume China) would have alienated the entire region and it would have alarmed the rest of its neighbours and international partners. International cooperation in resource development would be unlikely, and the logistics of transportation, supply and defence would be formidable. If China’s overall foreign policy made a radical change towards aggressive regional hegemony perhaps the Spratlys could become a battleground. But the ramp-up in aggressiveness would take time to develop, Spratly controversies would be derivative rather than the leading element, and there would no longer be a need for a synecdoche of anxiety. The currently foreseeable future is based on a quarter century of broad and peaceful development in which the Spratlys have been a grain of sand.

A militarized incident in the South China Sea between China and the United States is more likely, but it is not likely to originate in the Spratlys nor is it likely to escalate. The direct confrontation has been over the definition of innocent passage in the context of freedom of navigation in EEZs, and an incident in the Spratlys is unlikely to generate a restriction of general freedom of navigation since traffic goes around the islands rather than through them. Incidents such as those involving the EP-3 surveillance aircraft incident of April 2001 or the USNS Impeccable hydrographic ship in March 2009 are possible, but these do not relate specifically to the Spratlys and are only indirectly related to Southeast Asia. It would be surprising if Southeast Asian states would be happy with an American solution that would consider intelligence operations (by China as well as by the United States) legitimate up to a twelve mile limit. The reverberations from such incidents are likely to be restricted to tit-for-tat responses rather than general escalation. The days of the War of Jenkins’s Ear are long past.35 pg. 381-383

### AT: Resource Nationalism

#### Resource nationalism will not lead to war—history is on our side.

Hughes 11—Professor of Political Science and International Affairs@ George Washington University Llewelyn Hughes, “Resource Nationalism in the Asia-Pacific: Why Does It Matter?,” Asia’s Rising Energy and Resource Nationalism: Implications for the United States, China, and the Asia-Pacific Region, National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report #31 | September 2011

The biggest concern about resource nationalism is that energy scarcity could lead governments to use military force to ensure access to supplies. History suggests this concern is unfounded. Resource nationalism in the Asia-Pacific in fact replicates the approach taken historically in Europe and Japan to managing risk in oil markets. For decades, these governments sought to increase the share of their domestic markets controlled by national firms and to increase the amount of oil reserves held by these firms internationally. In each case, resource competition did not lead to worst-case outcomes such as a descent into militarized conflict. China and India, in this sense, are following the path previously taken by the governments of other major oil-importing states.

The predominant trend over the last three decades has also been for these early resource nationalists to reduce, rather than increase, support for NOCs. Indeed, the weakening of links between governments and NOCs is the biggest change in patterns of oil ownership since the oil shocks of the 1970s; over the last three decades, Japan, France, Italy, Spain, and other countries have substantially reduced the importance of resource nationalism in their national energy strategies.

This change means there are fewer governments that see control over oil as a useful strategy for managing risk in the international oil market. It also means that, even as the newly industrializing powers of China and India increase their intervention in oil markets though their NOCs, they are less likely to bump up against other state-sponsored NOCs from oil-importing countries. Pg. 9-10 //1nc

#### No zero-sum dynamics—no impact to equity oil investments

Hughes 11—Professor of Political Science and International Affairs@ George Washington University Llewelyn Hughes, “Resource Nationalism in the Asia-Pacific: Why Does It Matter?,” Asia’s Rising Energy and Resource Nationalism: Implications for the United States, China, and the Asia-Pacific Region, National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report #31 | September 2011

Even if we allow that energy policies in the rising Asia-Pacific powers are government-led rather than firm-led, and that they are designed to enhance energy security, we nevertheless need not fear that this leads to zero-sum dynamics. The most common concern about resource nationalism— that NOCs and others are “locking up” supplies of oil—is misguided; history shows that supply shocks are experienced as price phenomena and not as physical scarcity.

Oil supply shocks certainly matter for economies. But their size and severity are not affected by whether governments from oil-importing countries subsidize upstream investments by their NOCs.4 Further, data from the last 30 years suggests that there is still plenty of oil to go around. Proven reserves increased by 500 billion barrels between 1973 and 2003, despite total production of 730 billion barrels over the same period.5 In 2009, there were 49 countries producing in excess of 100,000 barrels per day of crude oil, up from 33 in 1965. When analyzed on a field-byfield basis, the total number of oil fields in excess of 50 million barrels is estimated by the IEA to be at least 798.6

Oil prices have also not followed a steady trajectory upward, as might be expected if oil were running out, but rather have varied over time in response to supply and demand and the exercise of market power by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). If we take into account that multiple firms commonly invest in the same project in return for a share of production, this implies there are ample commercial opportunities available to NOCs from AsiaPacific countries. Though past performance may not be a predictor of future supply scenarios, decades of predictions of oil running out have thus far been mistaken. Pg. 11

#### No impact. China’s response is driven by industrial policy—No resource nationalism

Hughes 11—Professor of Political Science and International Affairs@ George Washington University Llewelyn Hughes, “Resource Nationalism in the Asia-Pacific: Why Does It Matter?,” Asia’s Rising Energy and Resource Nationalism: Implications for the United States, China, and the Asia-Pacific Region, National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report #31 | September 2011

Further, governments that intervene in oil markets tend to be more interventionist across the economy in general. It is no surprise that France and Japan, two countries that were highly interventionist in energy markets, maintained similar strategies in manufacturing, agriculture, and other sectors. Similarly, policymakers in both China and India are willing to intervene broadly across their economies in order to promote growth, employment, social stability, and other public policy goals.

Given this, it may be more appropriate to understand the energy policies pursued by these governments through the lens of industrial policy rather than resource nationalism. Indeed, it would be more surprising if these governments did not support the operations of their NOCs internationally, considering the strategies they have adopted in other sectors of the economy. If this is the case, these policies may have implications for commercial competition but are unlikely to have more serious consequences. Pg. 10

### 2NC Royal

#### Economic collapse doesn’t cause war---that’s Jervis---if the current downturn didn’t cause global war then the factors cited in their evidence aren’t sufficient to cause hot wars

#### Royal cites a few warrants

#### First -- Diversionary theory --- it’s wrong

Boehmer, 07 – political science professor at the University of Texas (Charles, Politics & Policy, 35:4, “The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict”)

This article examines the contemporaneous effect of low economic growth and domestic instability on the threat of regime change and/ or involvement in external militarized conflicts. Many studies of diversionary conflict argue that lower rates of economic growth should heighten the risk of international conflict. Yet we know that militarized interstate conflicts, and especially wars, are generally rare events whereas lower rates of growth are not. Additionally, a growing body of literature shows that regime changes are also associated with lower rates of economic growth. The question then becomes which event, militarized interstate conflict or regime change, is the most likely to occur with domestic discord and lower rates of economic growth? Diversionary theory claims that leaders seek to divert attention away from domestic problems such as a bad economy or political scandals, or to garner increased support prior to elections. Leaders then supposedly externalize discontented domestic sentiments onto other nations, sometimes as scapegoats based on the similar in-group/out-group dynamic found in the research of Coser (1956) and Simmel (1955), where foreign countries are blamed for domestic problems. This process is said to involve a “rally-round-the-flag” effect, where a leader can expect a short-term boost in popularity with the threat or use of force (Blechman, Kaplan, and Hall 1978; Mueller 1973). Scholarship on diversionary conflict has focused most often on the American case1 but recent studies have sought to identify this possible behavior in other countries.2 The Falklands War is often a popular example of diversionary conflict (Levy and Vakili 1992). Argentina was reeling from hyperinflation and rampant unemployment associated with the Latin American debt crisis. It is plausible that a success in the Falklands War may have helped to rally support for the governing Galtieri regime, although Argentina lost the war and the ruling regime lost power. How many other attempts to use diversionary tactics, if they indeed occur, can be seen to generate a similar outcome? The goal of this article is to provide an assessment of the extent to which diversionary strategy is a threat to peace. Is this a colorful theory kept alive by academics that has little bearing upon real events, or is this a real problem that policy makers should be concerned with? If it is a strategy readily available to leaders, then it is important to know what domestic factors trigger this gambit. Moreover, to know that requires an understanding of the context in external conflict, which occurs relative to regime changes. Theories of diversionary conflict usually emphasize the potential benefits of diversionary tactics, although few pay equal attention to the prospective costs associated with such behavior. It is not contentious to claim that leaders typically seek to remain in office. However, whether they can successfully manipulate public opinion regularly during periods of domestic unpopularity through their states’ participation in foreign militarized conflicts—especially outside of the American case—is a question open for debate. Furthermore, there appears to be a logical disconnect between diversionary theories and extant studies of domestic conflict and regime change. Lower rates of economic growth are purported to increase the risk of both militarized interstate conflicts (and internal conflicts) as well as regime changes (Bloomberg and Hess 2002). This implies that if leaders do, in fact, undertake diversionary conflicts, many may still be thrown from the seat of power—especially if the outcome is defeat to a foreign enemy. Diversionary conflict would thus seem to be a risky gambit (Smith 1996). Scholars such as MacFie (1938) and Blainey (1988) have nevertheless questioned the validity of the diversionary thesis. As noted by Levy (1989), this perspective is rarely formulated as a cohesive and comprehensive theory, and there has been little or no knowledge cumulation. Later analyses do not necessarily build on past studies and the discrepancies between inquiries are often difficult to unravel. “Studies have used a variety of research designs, different dependent variables (uses of force, major uses of force, militarized disputes), different estimation techniques, and different data sets covering different time periods and different states” (Bennett and Nordstrom 2000, 39). To these problems, we should add a lack of theoretical precision and incomplete model specification. By a lack of theoretical precision, I am referring to the linkages between economic conditions and domestic strife that remain unclear in some studies (Miller 1995; Russett 1990). Consequently, extant studies are to a degree incommensurate; they offer a step in the right direction but do not provide robust cross-national explanations and tests of economic growth and interstate conflict. Yet a few studies have attempted to provide deductive explanations about when and how diversionary tactics might be employed. Using a Bayesian updating game, Richards and others (1993) theorize that while the use of force would appear to offer leaders a means to boost their popularity, a poorly performing economy acts as a signal to a leader’s constituents about his or her competence. Hence, attempts to use diversion are likely to fail either because incompetent leaders will likewise fail in foreign policy or people will recognize the gambit for what it is. Instead, these two models conclude that diversion is likely to be undertaken particularly by risk-acceptant leaders. This stress on a heightened risk of removal from office is also apparent in the work of Bueno de Mesquita and others (1999), and Downs and Rocke (1994), where leaders may “gamble for resurrection,” although the diversionary scenario in the former study is only a partial extension of their theory on selectorates, winning coalitions, and leader survival. Again, how often do leaders fail in the process or are removed from positions of power before they can even initiate diversionary tactics? A few studies focusing on leader tenure have examined the removal of leaders following war, although almost no study in the diversionary literature has looked at the effects of domestic problems on the relative risks of regime change, interstate conflict, or both events occurring in the same year.3

#### Next is collapse of trade --- but trade doesn’t solve war

May 5**—**Professor Emeritus (Research) in the Stanford University School of Engineering and a senior fellow with the Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. Former co-director of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation. Principal Investigator for the DHS. (Michael, “The U.S.-China Strategic Relationship,” September 2005, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Sep/maySep05.asp)

However important and beneficial this interdependence may be from an economic point of view, it is not likely to be a significant factor for strategic stability. Famously, economists before World War I sounded clear warnings that Europe had become economically interdependent to an extent that war there would ruin Europe. The war was fought nevertheless, Europe was duly ruined, and the ensuing political consequences haunted Europe to the end of World War II. Other cases exist. Modern war has been an economic disaster. Economic realities, including economic interdependence, play little role in whether a country goes to war or not. Economic myths certainly do and they usually affect strategic stability quite negatively. This is another reason why domestic perceptions matter: they determine which myths are believed.

#### And collapse of trade doesn’t cause war

Bremmer 9**—**IR prof, Columbia. Faculty member at Stanford’s Hoover Institution. Senior Fellow, World Policy Institute. PhD in pol sci, Stanford. (Ian, “The Political Risks From Washington,” 24 March 2009, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2009/03/top\_five\_risks\_and\_a\_red\_herri.html)

There is one serious risk I think we can downplay--a global trade war. The past months have brought all sorts of fears of growing US protectionism and the

spiraling international reaction. And a wide array of localized protectionist measures have been taken around the world-indeed, the world bank has counted about 50 trade restrictive actions and only a dozen liberalizing ones since the G20 countries promised to forestall protectionism last November. To list just a few examples--multiple countries have given low cost or no cost cash to their automakers; the United States has restricted stimulus procurement to a subset of countries under a "Buy American" provision; in response to US cancellation of a Mexican trucking program that country has put over $2 billion in tariffs in place on trade with the United States. But thinking about the magnitude rather than the quantity of events uncovers that this is more conventional, rather narrow protectionism than the opening salvos of a trade war. Certainly in the United States, the highest stakes for protectionism are around the automotive sector (after all, the millions of jobs potentially at stake would undo the Obama administration's job preservation goals in one swoop). But there has been no serious suggestion of raising tariffs on foreign autos, and congressional votes and nationwide polls have made clear that there is no public will to keep the industry alive through massive subsidy. If the auto sector-where unionized labor and management could easily point to foreign competition as a cause of its problems-is not enough to merit nuclear protectionism, what is? Nothing, probably. The biggest silver lining to the economic and financial crisis in the United States is that it has very little to do with globalization. To date, there has been no blaming foreigners; rather, the recession has been a story of domestic greed and poor oversight. Certainly, as Americans feel poorer, the risk of redistribution from the have-lots to the have-littles increases. But it's not a backlash against interconnectedness, trade, or global supply chains.

#### Third Terrorism --- no scenario

Mueller 8/2—IR prof at Ohio State. PhD in pol sci from UCLA (2 August 2011, John, The Truth about Al Qaeda, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68012/john-mueller/the-truth-about-al-qaeda?page=show)

As a misguided Turkish proverb holds, "If your enemy be an ant, imagine him to be an elephant." The new information unearthed in Osama bin Laden's hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan, suggests that the United States has been doing so for a full decade. Whatever al Qaeda's threatening rhetoric and occasional nuclear fantasies, its potential as a menace, particularly as an atomic one, has been much inflated.

The public has now endured a decade of dire warnings about the imminence of a terrorist atomic attack. In 2004, the former CIA spook Michael Scheuer proclaimed on television's 60 Minutes that it was "probably a near thing," and in 2007, the physicist Richard Garwin assessed the likelihood of a nuclear explosion in an American or a European city by terrorism or other means in the next ten years to be 87 percent. By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates mused that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is "the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear." Few, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al Qaeda computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group's budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was some $2,000 to $4,000.

In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have more al Qaeda computers, which reportedly contain a wealth of information about the workings of the organization in the intervening decade. A multi-agency task force has completed its assessment, and according to first reports, it has found that al Qaeda members have primarily been engaged in dodging drone strikes and complaining about how cash-strapped they are. Some reports suggest they've also been looking at quite a bit of pornography.

The full story is not out yet, but it seems breathtakingly unlikely that the miserable little group has had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-tech facility to fabricate a bomb. It is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew, all the while attracting no attention from outsiders.

The documents also reveal that after fleeing Afghanistan, bin Laden maintained what one member of the task force calls an "obsession" with attacking the United States again, even though 9/11 was in many ways a disaster for the group. It led to a worldwide loss of support, a major attack on it and on its Taliban hosts, and a decade of furious and dedicated harassment. And indeed, bin Laden did repeatedly and publicly threaten an attack on the United States. He assured Americans in 2002 that "the youth of Islam are preparing things that will fill your hearts with fear"; and in 2006, he declared that his group had been able "to breach your security measures" and that "operations are under preparation, and you will see them on your own ground once they are finished." Al Qaeda's animated spokesman, Adam Gadahn, proclaimed in 2004 that "the streets of America shall run red with blood" and that "the next wave of attacks may come at any moment."

The obsessive desire notwithstanding, such fulminations have clearly lacked substance. Although hundreds of millions of people enter the United States legally every year, and countless others illegally, no true al Qaeda cell has been found in the country since 9/11 and exceedingly few people have been uncovered who even have any sort of "link" to the organization.

The closest effort at an al Qaeda operation within the country was a decidedly nonnuclear one by an Afghan-American, Najibullah Zazi, in 2009. Outraged at the U.S.-led war on his home country, Zazi attempted to join the Taliban but was persuaded by al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan to set off some bombs in the United States instead. Under surveillance from the start, he was soon arrested, and, however "radicalized," he has been talking to investigators ever since, turning traitor to his former colleagues. Whatever training Zazi received was inadequate; he repeatedly and desperately sought further instruction from his overseas instructors by phone. At one point, he purchased bomb material with a stolen credit card, guaranteeing that the purchase would attract attention and that security video recordings would be scrutinized. Apparently, his handlers were so strapped that they could not even advance him a bit of cash to purchase some hydrogen peroxide for making a bomb. For al Qaeda, then, the operation was a failure in every way -- except for the ego boost it got by inspiring the usual dire litany about the group's supposedly existential challenge to the United States, to the civilized world, to the modern state system.

Indeed, no Muslim extremist has succeeded in detonating even a simple bomb in the United States in the last ten years, and except for the attacks on the London Underground in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. It seems wildly unlikely that al Qaeda is remotely ready to go nuclear.

Outside of war zones, the amount of killing carried out by al Qaeda and al Qaeda linkees, maybes, and wannabes throughout the entire world since 9/11 stands at perhaps a few hundred per year. That's a few hundred too many, of course, but it scarcely presents an existential, or elephantine, threat. And the likelihood that an American will be killed by a terrorist of any ilk stands at one in 3.5 million per year, even with 9/11 included.

#### Forth --- Miscalc --- there’s no scenario for miscalculation

Quinlan 9—distinguished frmr British defence strategist and former Permanent Under-Secretary of State. (Michael, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons, 63-9)

Even if initial nuclear use did not quickly end the fighting, the supposition of inexorable momentum in a developing exchange, with each side rushing to overreaction amid confusion and uncertainty, is implausible. It fails to consider what the situation of the decisionmakers would really be. Neither side could want escalation. Both would be appalled at what was going on. Both would be desperately looking for signs that the other was ready to call a halt. Both, given the capacity for evasion or concealment which modern delivery platforms and vehicles can possess, could have in reserve significant forces invulnerable enough not to entail use-or-lose pressures. (It may be more open to question, as noted earlier, whether newer nuclear-weapon possessors can be immediately in that position; but it is within reach of any substantial state with advanced technological capabilities, and attaining it is certain to be a high priority in the development of forces.) As a result, neither side can have any predisposition to suppose, in an ambiguous situation of fearful risk, that the right course when in doubt is to go on copiously launching weapons. And none of this analysis rests on any presumption of highly subtle or pre-concerted rationality. The rationality required is plain. The argument is reinforced if we consider the possible reasoning of an aggressor at a more dispassionate level. Any substantial nuclear armoury can inflict destruction outweighing any possible prize that aggression could hope to seize. A state attacking the possessor of such an armoury must therefore be doing so (once given that it cannot count upon destroying the armoury pre-emptively) on a judgement that the possessor would be found lacking in the will to use it. If the attacked possessor used nuclear weapons, whether first or in response to the aggressor's own first use, this judgement would begin to look dangerously precarious. There must be at least a substantial possibility of the aggressor leaders' concluding that their initial judgement had been mistaken—that the risks were after all greater than whatever prize they had been seeking, and that for their own country's survival they must call off the aggression. Deterrence planning such as that of NATO was directed in the first place to preventing the initial misjudgement and in the second, if it were nevertheless made, to compelling such a reappraisal. The former aim had to have primacy, because it could not be taken for granted that the latter was certain to work. But there was no ground for assuming in advance, for all possible scenarios, that the chance of its working must be negligible. An aggressor state would itself be at huge risk if nuclear war developed, as its leaders would know. It may be argued that a policy which abandons hope of physically defeating the enemy and simply hopes to get him to desist is pure gamble, a matter of who blinks first; and that the political and moral nature of most likely aggressors, almost ex hypothesis, makes them the less likely to blink. One response to this is to ask what is the alternative—it can only be surrender. But a more positive and hopeful answer lies in the fact that the criticism is posed in a political vacuum. Real-life conflict would have a political context. The context which concerned NATO during the cold war, for example, was one of defending vital interests against a postulated aggressor whose own vital interests would not be engaged, or would be less engaged. Certainty is not possible, but a clear asymmetry of vital interest is a legitimate basis for expecting an asymmetry, credible to both sides, of resolve in conflict. That places upon statesmen, as page 23 has noted, the key task in deterrence of building up in advance a clear and shared grasp of where limits lie. That was plainly achieved in cold-war Europe. 11 vital interests have been defined in a way that is clear, and also clearly not overlapping or incompatible with those of the adversary, a credible basis has been laid for the likelihood of greater resolve in resistance. It was also sometimes suggested by critics that whatever might be indicated by theoretical discussion of political will and interests, the military environment of nuclear warfare—particularly difficulties of communication and control—would drive escalation with overwhelming probability to the limit. But it is obscure why matters should be regarded as inevitably so for every possible level and setting of action. Even if the history of war suggested (as it scarcely does) that military decision-makers are mostly apt to work on the principle 'When in doubt, lash out', the nuclear revolution creates an utterly new situation. The pervasive reality, always plain to both sides during the cold war, is 'If this goes on to the end, we are all ruined'. Given that inexorable escalation would mean catastrophe for both, it would be perverse to suppose them permanently incapable of framing arrangements which avoid it. As page 16 has noted, NATO gave its military commanders no widespread delegated authority, in peace or war, to launch nuclear weapons without specific political direction. Many types of weapon moreover had physical safeguards such as PALs incorporated to reinforce organizational ones. There were multiple communication and control systems for passing information, orders, and prohibitions. Such systems could not be totally guaranteed against disruption if at a fairly intense level of strategic exchange—which was only one of many possible levels of conflict— an adversary judged it to be in his interest to weaken political control. It was far from clear why he necessarily should so judge. Even then, however, it remained possible to operate on a general fail-safe presumption: no authorization, no use. That was the basis on which NATO operated. If it is feared that the arrangements which a nuclear-weapon possessor has in place do not meet such standards in some respects, the logical course is to continue to improve them rather than to assume escalation to be certain and uncontrollable, with all the enormous inferences that would have to flow from such an assumption. The likelihood of escalation can never be 100 per cent, and never zero. Where between those two extremes it may lie can never be precisely calculable in advance; and even were it so calculable, it would not be uniquely fixed—it would stand to vary hugely with circumstances. That there should be any risk at all of escalation to widespread nuclear war must be deeply disturbing, and decision-makers would always have to weigh it most anxiously. But a pair of key truths about it need to be recognized. The first is that the risk of escalation to large-scale nuclear war is inescapably present in any significant armed conflict between nuclear-capable powers, whoever may have started the conflict and whoever may first have used any particular category of weapon. The initiator of the conflict will always have physically available to him options for applying more force if he meets effective resistance. If the risk of escalation, whatever its degree of probability, is to be regarded as absolutely unacceptable, the necessary inference is that a state attacked by a substantial nuclear power must forgo military resistance. It must surrender, even if it has a nuclear armoury of its own. But the companion truth is that, as page 47 has noted, the risk of escalation is an inescapable burden also upon the aggressor. The exploitation of that burden is the crucial route, if conflict does break out, for managing it to a tolerable outcome—the only route, indeed, intermediate between surrender and holocaust, and so the necessary basis for deterrence beforehand. The working out of plans to exploit escalation risk most effectively in deterring potential aggression entails further and complex issues. It is for example plainly desirable, wherever geography, politics, and available resources so permit without triggering arms races, to make provisions and dispositions that are likely to place the onus of making the bigger and more evidently dangerous steps in escalation upon the aggressor who wishes to maintain his attack, rather than upon the defender. (The customary shorthand for this desirable posture used to be 'escalation dominance'.) These issues are not further discussed here. But addressing them needs to start from acknowledgement that there are in any event no certainties or absolutes available, no options guaranteed to be risk-free and cost-free. Deterrence is not possible without escalation risk; and its presence can point to no automatic policy conclusion save for those who espouse outright pacifism and accept its consequences. Accident and Miscalculation Ensuring the safety and security of nuclear weapons plainly needs to be taken most seriously. Detailed information is understandably not published, but such direct evidence as there is suggests that it always has been so taken in every possessor state, with the inevitable occasional failures to follow strict procedures dealt with rigorously. Critics have nevertheless from time to time argued that the possibility of accident involving nuclear weapons is so substantial that it must weigh heavily in the entire evaluation of whether war-prevention structures entailing their existence should be tolerated at all. Two sorts of scenario are usually in question. The first is that of a single grave event involving an unintended nuclear explosion—a technical disaster at a storage site, for example, or the accidental or unauthorized launch of a delivery system with a live nuclear warhead. The second is that of some event—perhaps such an explosion or launch, or some other mishap such as malfunction or misinterpretation of radar signals or computer systems—initiating a sequence of response and counter-response that culminated in a nuclear exchange which no one had truly intended. No event that is physically possible can be said to be of absolutely zero probability (just as at an opposite extreme it is absurd to claim, as has been heard from distinguished figures, that nuclear-weapon use can be guaranteed to happen within some finite future span despite not having happened for over sixty years). But human affairs cannot be managed to the standard of either zero or total probability. We have to assess levels between those theoretical limits and weigh their reality and implications against other factors, in security planning as in everyday life. There have certainly been, across the decades since 1945, many known accidents involving nuclear weapons, from transporters skidding off roads to bomber aircraft crashing with or accidentally dropping the weapons they carried (in past days when such carriage was a frequent feature of readiness arrangements—it no longer is). A few of these accidents may have released into the nearby environment highly toxic material. None however has entailed a nuclear detonation. Some commentators suggest that this reflects bizarrely good fortune amid such massive activity and deployment over so many years. A more rational deduction from the facts of this long experience would however be that the probability of any accident triggering a nuclear explosion is extremely low. It might be further noted that the mechanisms needed to set off such an explosion are technically demanding, and that in a large number of ways the past sixty years have seen extensive improvements in safety arrangements for both the design and the handling of weapons. It is undoubtedly possible to see respects in which, after the cold war, some of the factors bearing upon risk may be new or more adverse; but some are now plainly less so. The years which the world has come through entirely without accidental or unauthorized detonation have included early decades in which knowledge was sketchier, precautions were less developed, and weapon designs were less ultra-safe than they later became, as well as substantial periods in which weapon numbers were larger, deployments more widespread and diverse, movements more frequent, and several aspects of doctrine and readiness arrangements more tense. Similar considerations apply to the hypothesis of nuclear war being mistakenly triggered by false alarm. Critics again point to the fact, as it is understood, of numerous occasions when initial steps in alert sequences for US nuclear forces were embarked upon, or at least called for, by indicators mistaken or misconstrued. In none of these instances, it is accepted, did matters get at all near to nuclear launch—extraordinary good fortune again, critics have suggested. But the rival and more logical inference from hundreds of events stretching over sixty years of experience presents itself once more: that the probability of initial misinterpretation leading far towards mistaken launch is remote. Precisely because any nuclear-weapon possessor recognizes the vast gravity of any launch, release sequences have many steps, and human decision is repeatedly interposed as well as capping the sequences. To convey that because a first step was prompted the world somehow came close to accidental nuclear war is wild hyperbole, rather like asserting, when a tennis champion has lost his opening service game, that he was nearly beaten in straight sets. History anyway scarcely offers any ready example of major war started by accident even before the nuclear revolution imposed an order-of-magnitude increase in caution. It was occasionally conjectured that nuclear war might be triggered by the real but accidental or unauthorized launch of a strategic nuclear-weapon delivery system in the direction of a potential adversary. No such launch is known to have occurred in over sixty years. The probability of it is therefore very low. But even if it did happen, the further hypothesis of its initiating a general nuclear exchange is far-fetched. It fails to consider the real situation of decision-makers, as pages 63-4 have brought out. The notion that cosmic holocaust might be mistakenly precipitated in this way belongs to science fiction.

#### Empirics prove no war.

Miller 1—Morris Miller is an adjunct economics professor at the University of Ottawa [Jan.-Mar, 2001, “Poverty: A Cause of War?” *Peace Magazine*, http://peacemagazine.org/archive/v17n1p08.htm]

Economic Crises?

Some scholars have argued that it is not poverty, as such, that contributes to the support for armed conflict, but rather some catalyst, such as an economic crisis. However, a study by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik shows that this hypothesis lacks merit. After studying 93 episodes of economic crisis in 22 countries in Latin American and Asia since World War II, they concluded that much of the conventional thinking about the political impact of economic crisis is wrong:

"The severity of economic crisis—as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth—bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... or (in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence... In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another)."

#### There is no causal relationship between the economy and conflict—the best study proves.

Brandt and Ulfelder 11—\*Patrick T. Brandt, Ph.D. in Political Science from Indiana University, is an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the School of Social Science at the University of Texas at Dallas. \*\*Jay Ulfelder, Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University, is an American political scientist whose research interests include democratization, civil unrest, and violent conflict. [April, 2011, “Economic Growth and Political Instability,” Social Science Research Network]

These statements anticipating political fallout from the global economic crisis of 2008–2010 reflect a widely held view that economic growth has rapid and profound effects on countries’ political stability. When economies grow at a healthy clip, citizens are presumed to be too busy and too content to engage in protest or rebellion, and governments are thought to be flush with revenues they can use to enhance their own stability by producing public goods or rewarding cronies, depending on the type of regime they inhabit. When growth slows, however, citizens and cronies alike are presumed to grow frustrated with their governments, and the leaders at the receiving end of that frustration are thought to lack the financial resources to respond effectively. The expected result is an increase in the risks of social unrest, civil war, coup attempts, and regime breakdown.

Although it is pervasive, the assumption that countries’ economic growth rates strongly affect their political stability has not been subjected to a great deal of careful empirical analysis, and evidence from social science research to date does not unambiguously support it. Theoretical models of civil wars, coups d’etat, and transitions to and from democracy often specify slow economic growth as an important cause or catalyst of those events, but empirical studies on the effects of economic growth on these phenomena have produced mixed results. Meanwhile, the effects of economic growth on the occurrence or incidence of social unrest seem to have hardly been studied in recent years, as empirical analysis of contentious collective action has concentrated on political opportunity structures and dynamics of protest and repression.

This paper helps fill that gap by rigorously re-examining the effects of short-term variations in economic growth on the occurrence of several forms of political instability in countries worldwide over the past few decades. In this paper, we do not seek to develop and test new theories of political instability. Instead, we aim to subject a hypothesis common to many prior theories of political instability to more careful empirical scrutiny. The goal is to provide a detailed empirical characterization of the relationship between economic growth and political instability in a broad sense. In effect, we describe the conventional wisdom as seen in the data. We do so with statistical models that use smoothing splines and multiple lags to allow for nonlinear and dynamic effects from economic growth on political stability. We also do so with an instrumented measure of growth that explicitly accounts for endogeneity in the relationship between political instability and economic growth. To our knowledge, ours is the first statistical study of this relationship to simultaneously address the possibility of nonlinearity and problems of endogeneity. As such, we believe this paper offers what is probably the most rigorous general evaluation of this argument to date.

As the results show, some of our findings are surprising. Consistent with conventional assumptions, we find that social unrest and civil violence are more likely to occur and democratic regimes are more susceptible to coup attempts around periods of slow economic growth. At the same time, our analysis shows no significant relationship between variation in growth and the risk of civil-war onset, and results from our analysis of regime changes contradict the widely accepted claim that economic crises cause transitions from autocracy to democracy. While we would hardly pretend to have the last word on any of these relationships, our findings do suggest that the relationship between economic growth and political stability is neither as uniform nor as strong as the conventional wisdom(s) presume(s). We think these findings also help explain why the global recession of 2008–2010 has failed thus far to produce the wave of coups and regime failures that some observers had anticipated, in spite of the expected and apparent uptick in social unrest associated with the crisis.

# 1nr Overview

#### Conceded turns case argument – CIR creates trade and business ties with China which boost relations – I’m not reading a new card so you should not allow a 1AR response

#### It’s the most likely scenario for nuclear war and causes nuclear winter

**Robock & Toon 10** - Professor of climatology at Rutgers University & Chair of atmospheric and oceanic scienc­es @ University of Colorado-Boulder [Allan Robock (Director of Rutger’s Center for Environmental Prediction) & Owen Brian Toon (Fellow of the Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics University of Colorado-Boulder, “Local Nuclear War,” Scientific American, January 2010 ] language modified

Why discuss this topic now that the cold war has ended? Because as other nations continue to acquire nuclear weapons, smaller, regional nu­clear wars could create a similar global catastro­phe. New analyses reveal that a conflict be­tween India and Pakistan, for example, in which 100 nuclear bombs were dropped on cities and industrial areas—only 0.4 percent of the world’s more than 25,000 warheads—would produce enough smoke to ~~cripple~~ destroy global agriculture. A regional war could cause widespread loss of life even in countries far away from the conflict.

Regional War Threatens the World

By deploying modern computers and modern cli­mate models, the two of us and our colleagues have shown that not only were the ideas of the 1980s correct but the effects would last for at least 10 years, much longer than previously thought. And by doing calculations that assess decades of time, only now possible with fast, current computers, and by including in our cal­culations the oceans and the entire atmosphere— also only now possible—we have found that the smoke from even a regional war would be heat­ed and lofted by the sun and remain suspended in the upper atmosphere for years, continuing to block sunlight and to cool the earth.

India and Pakistan, which together have more than 100 nuclear weapons, may be the most worrisome adversaries capable of a regional nu­clear conflict today. But other countries besides the U.S. and Russia (which have thousands) are well endowed: China, France and the U.K. have [has] hundreds of nuclear warheads; Israel has more than 80, North Korea has about 10 and Iran may well be trying to make its own. In 2004 this situation prompted one of us (Toon) and later Rich Turco of the University of California, Los Angeles, both veterans of the 1980s investiga­tions, to begin evaluating what the global envi­ronmental effects of a regional nuclear war would be and to take as our test case an engage­ment between India and Pakistan.

The latest estimates by David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security and by Robert S. Norris of the Natural Resourc­es Defense Council are that India has 50 to 60 assembled weapons (with enough plutonium for 100) and that Pakistan has 60 weapons. Both countries continue to increase their arsenals. In­dian and Pakistani nuclear weapons tests indi­cate that the yield of the warheads would be sim­ilar to the 15-kiloton explosive yield (equivalent to 15,000 tons of TNT) of the bomb the U.S. used on Hiroshima.

Toon and Turco, along with Charles Bardeen, now at the National Center for Atmospheric Re­search, modeled what would happen if 50 Hiro­shima-size bombs were dropped across the high­est population-density targets in Pakistan and if 50 similar bombs were also dropped across In­dia. Some people maintain that nuclear weapons would be used in only a measured way. But in the wake of chaos, fear and broken communications that would occur once a nuclear war began, we doubt leaders would limit attacks in any rational manner. This likelihood is particularly true for Pakistan, which is small and could be quickly overrun in a conventional conflict. Peter R. La­voy of the Naval Postgraduate School, for exam­ple, has analyzed the ways in which a conflict be­tween India and Pakistan might occur and ar­gues that Pakistan could face a decision to use all its nuclear arsenal quickly before India swamps its military bases with traditional forces. Pg. 74-75

#### Timeframe – the advantage is solvency dependent – we boost India relations in the short term

# 1nr Hirsch

Renewable energy policy is not a win – faces massive unified opposition from the GOP and fossil fuel lobbies – requires an enormous amount of political capital that trades off with other issues

### A2 hirshc

#### 1. Hirsh is an indict of the meme of capital – we have warrants

#### 2. Obama’s working behind the scenes – that’s 1nc link – here’s academic support

BECKMANN & KUMAR 11 Professor of Political Science, UC, Irvine [Matthew N. Beckmann and Vimal Kumar, How presidents push, when presidents win: A model of positive presidential power in US lawmaking, Journal of Theoretical Politics 2011 23: 3

Fortunately for those inside the West Wing, some researchers paint a more optimistic picture regarding presidents’ potential for passing important planks of their legislative agenda. Covington et al. (1995), Barrett and Eshbaugh-Soha (2007), Edwards III and Barrett (2000), Kellerman (1984), Light (1982), Peterson (1990), and Rudalevige (2002) all observe that presidents secure greater support for their ‘priority’ items, and when they exert ‘effort’ pushing them. In addition, Covington (1987) concludes that White House officials can occasionally win greater support among legislators by working behind the scenes, while Canes-Wrone (2001, 2005) shows that presidents can induce support from a recalcitrant Congress by strategically ‘going public’ when advocating popular proposals (see also Kernell (1993)). Sullivan (1987, 1988) finds that presidents can amass winning congressional coalitions by changing members’ positions as a bill moves through the legislative process.

However, even among these relative optimists, the prescription for presidents appears to be an ephemeral combination of luck and effort, not a systematic strategy. In discussing the challenge for a president looking to push legislation on Capitol Hill, Samuel Kernell offers a comparable assessment. He writes, The number and variety of choices place great demands upon [presidents’] strategic calculation, so much so that pluralist leadership must be understood as an art…an ability to sense ‘right choices’. (Kernell, 1993: 36) Furthermore, the seemingly paradoxical findings noted above, that is, a general (if modest) pattern of president-supported legislative success on passage and policy content, but not on ‘key’ roll-call votes, remain unexplained.

This paper aims to demystify the White House’s legislative strategies, both their logic and their effects. Developing a non-cooperative game in which the president allocates scarce ‘political capital’ to induce changes in legislators’ behavior, we deduce two lobbying strategies White House officials may execute and, in turn, investigate their impact on the laws that result. Interestingly, we theorize that presidents’ foremost influence comes from bargaining with congressional leaders over policy alternatives before bills reach the floor, not bargaining with pivotal voters for their support once they do. Precisely because so much of the presidents’ influence comes in the legislative earlygame (rather than the endgame), we theorize that typical roll-call-based tests of presidents’ legislative influence have missed most of it.

#### 3. Prefer our theory cards – from professors – not a Daily Beast Blogger

#### Independently – Delaying the vote risks killing it. Plan doesn’t even have to be unpopular

ABC NEWS 3 – 27 – 13 [<http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/Politics/reasons-immigration-reform-timeline-matters/story?id=18822563#.UVO80By0fzw>]

A group of Democrats and Republicans working on an immigration reform bill in the Senate will almost certainly miss a self-imposed March deadline to produce draft legislation. And yesterday, one of the groups foremost members, Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), cautioned that a bill might not come in early April, either.

Why does the deadline matter? Here are three reasons.

1. Momentum

The November presidential election -- where Obama housed Romney among Latinos, taking 71 percent of the vote -- got people in Washington talking about immigration reform as a way for the Republican party to win Latino voters.

But that was five months ago, and political memory can be short.

"Once the sting of the election starts to wear off a little bit, I think there's less of an impetus to act on this issue," said Marshall Fitz, immigration policy director at the liberal Center for American Progress. "You've got to act when the issue is fresh and everyone is very cognizant of the political implications...The political implications aren't going to change as we go further into this, but the calculus of the members may start to get obscured."

2. Deportations

Lots of interests groups would like to see an immigration deal inked sooner than later, but no one group feels the pressure more than immigrants who are living in the country without authorization.

Even while President Obama stumps for a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, his administration continues to deport record numbers of people, many of them for immigration-related offenses. A recent report in The New York Times found that on any given day, about 300 people in immigration detention are kept in solitary confinement, treatment that could have lasting psychological effects.

"There is a sense that every day of delay is a day in which people continue to be deported who would otherwise be eligible for relief," Fitz said. "It's not like delay is the status quo. The delay is continued active harm on the community and on immigrant families."

3. Primaries

If the so-called Senate "Gang of Eight" working on immigration reform is able to produce a bill in April, the Senate and House could feasibly vote and pass legislation before the August recess in Congress.

But any further significant delay could jeopardize that timeline. If Congress continues to negotiate the bill in the fall, some Republican members of the House facing reelection in 2014 may be less likely to give their support, fearing a primary challenger who will use the issue as a political cudgel.

"I think the House leadership feels like they've got to get this done and behind them by [the August recess] because their guys are going to be unwilling to take a tough vote after that," Fitz said.

#### 4. Hirsh admits the agenda sometimes works that way

HIRSH 12 – 14 – 12 [Michael Hirsh, Obama Gets a Solution to His Susan Rice Problem, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/whitehouse/obama-gets-a-solution-to-his-susan-rice-problem-20121213>]

It was a classic Washington exit: stealthy and swift, with few fingerprints. President Obama didn’t want to be seen as backing down. So Susan Rice — one of his most devoted aides since 2007 — gave him the way out, seemingly all on her own.

“If nominated, I am now convinced that the confirmation process would be lengthy, disruptive, and costly — to you and to our most pressing national and international priorities,” Rice wrote on Thursday in a letter withdrawing her name from consideration as secretary of State.

In a statement in response, Obama said that “while I deeply regret the unfair and misleading attacks on Susan Rice in recent weeks,” he “accepted her decision.” He added that Rice will continue as his U.N. ambassador for the time being.

This was all the part intended for public consumption. The underlying reality is this: The president is almost certainly furious about this turn of events — which represents the first major defeat he’s suffered since his reelection — but he’s a savvy enough politician to know how to back off without seeming to back down. While floating Rice’s name for secretary of State in the media was always something of a trial balloon — she was never formally nominated or even publicly declared by the administration to be the leading candidate to replace Hillary Rodham Clinton — Obama appeared to really want to appoint her, calling her “extraordinary” and excoriating GOP attacks on her with unusual (for him) personal pique.

But as the weeks passed, it became clearer that Rice’s biggest political problem was no longer just the klatch of Republican senators, led by John McCain, who were fiercely criticizing her for allegedly misleading statements on the attack at the U.S. consulate that killed U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans in Benghazi, Libya on Sept. 11.

After a series of strikingly unsuccessful meetings on Capitol Hill in which she failed to impress even moderate Republicans such as Susan Collins of Maine, Rice also found herself facing resistance from foreign-policy elites who questioned her temperament and her record. In addition, human-rights critics were up in arms over her behavior toward African dictators, particularly her role in allegedly holding up publication of a U.N. report that concluded the government of Rwandan President Paul Kagame, with whom she has a long and close relationship, was supplying and financing a brutal Congolese rebel force known as the M23 Movement.

That may have been the tipping point, though an official on Rice's team declined to say so. As she put it herself in her letter to Obama, the president had some other “pressing national international priorities.… It is far more important that we devote precious legislative hours and energy to enacting your core goals, including comprehensive immigration reform, balanced deficit reduction, job creation, and maintaining a robust national defense and effective U.S. global leadership.”

In other words, the Obama team was quickly coming to realize that, even though it appeared he had considerable leverage over the Republicans following a more-robust-than-thought reelection victory, a Rice nomination was simply going to cost him too much political capital, especially when it came to a long-term budget deal.

### A2 ww -generic

#### 1. Winners Lose & capital is finite—can’t replenish

Beckmann & Kumar 11—Professor of Political Science, UC, Irvine [Matthew N. Beckmann and Vimal Kumar, How presidents push, when presidents win: A model of positive presidential power in US lawmaking, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 2011 23: 3]

As with all lobbyists, presidents looking to push legislation must do so indirectly by pushing the lawmakers whom they need to pass it. Or, as Richard Nesustadt artfully explained:

The essence of a President’s persuasive task, with congressmen and everybody else, is to induce them to believe that what he wants of them is what their own appraisal of their own responsibilities requires them to do in their interest, not his…Persuasion deals in the coin of self-interest with men who have some freedom to reject what they find counterfeit. (Neustadt, 1990: 40) Fortunately for contemporary presidents, today’s White House affords its occupants an unrivaled supply of persuasive carrots and sticks. Beyond the office’s unique visibility and prestige, among both citizens and their representatives in Congress, presidents may also sway lawmakers by using their discretion in budgeting and/or rulemaking, unique fundraising and campaigning capacity, control over executive and judicial nominations, veto power, or numerous other options under the chief executive’s control. Plainly, when it comes to the arm-twisting, brow-beating, and horse-trading that so often characterizes legislative battles, modern presidents are uniquely well equipped for the fight. In the following we employ the omnibus concept of ‘presidential political capital’ to capture this conception of presidents’ positive power as persuasive bargaining.1 Specifically, we define presidents’ political capital as the class of tactics White House officials employ to induce changes in lawmakers’ behavior.2 Importantly, this conception of presidents’ positive power as persuasive bargaining not only meshes with previous scholarship on lobbying (see, e.g., Austen-Smith and Wright (1994), Groseclose and Snyder (1996), Krehbiel (1998: ch. 7), and Snyder (1991)), but also presidential practice.3 For example, Goodwin recounts how President Lyndon Johnson routinely allocated ‘rewards’ to ‘cooperative’ members:

The rewards themselves (and the withholding of rewards) . . . might be something as unobtrusive as receiving an invitation to join the President in a walk around the White House grounds, knowing that pictures of the event would be sent to hometown newspapers . . . [or something as pointed as] public works projects, military bases, educational research grants, poverty projects, appointments of local men to national commissions, the granting of pardons, and more. (Goodwin, 1991: 237)

Of course, presidential political capital is a scarce commodity with a floating value. Even a favorably situated president enjoys only a finite supply of political capital; he can only promise or pressure so much. What is more, this capital ebbs and flows as realities and/or perceptions change. So, similarly to Edwards (1989), we believe presidents’ bargaining resources cannot fundamentally alter legislators’ predispositions, but rather operate ‘at the margins’ of US lawmaking, however important those margins may be (see also Bond and Fleisher (1990), Peterson (1990), Kingdon (1989), Jones (1994), and Rudalevige (2002)). Indeed, our aim is to explicate those margins and show how presidents may systematically influence them.

#### 2. Health care and climate prove winners don’t win

Lashof 10—director of the National Resource Defense Council's climate center, Ph.D. from the Energy and Resources Group at UC-Berkeley (Dan, “Coulda, Shoulda, Woulda: Lessons from Senate Climate Fail.” NRDC Switchboard Blog, http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/dlashof/coulda\_shoulda\_woulda\_lessons.html)

Lesson 2: Political capital is not necessarily a renewable resource.

Perhaps the most fateful decision the Obama administration made early on was to move healthcare reform before energy and climate legislation. I’m sure this seemed like a good idea at the time. Healthcare reform was popular, was seen as an issue that the public cared about on a personal level, and was expected to unite Democrats from all regions. White House officials and Congressional leaders reassured environmentalists with their theory that success breeds success. A quick victory on healthcare reform would renew Obama’s political capital, some of which had to be spent early on to push the economic stimulus bill through Congress with no Republican help. Healthcare reform was eventually enacted, but only after an exhausting battle that eroded public support, drained political capital and created the Tea Party movement. Public support for healthcare reform is slowly rebounding as some of the early benefits kick in and people realize that the forecasted Armageddon is not happening. But this is occurring too slowly to rebuild Obama’s political capital in time to help push climate legislation across the finish line.

#### 3. Plan isn’t a win—adding issues makes it more likely winners will lose.

Pastor 91—Professor of political science at Emory University & director of the Latin American and Caribbean Program at Emory’s Carter Center [Robert A., “Congress and U.S. Foreign Policy: Comparative Advantage or Disadvantage,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn]

The third dysfunction in interbranch relations is the length of time and the amount of presidential capital needed to gain approval of a major foreign policy law or treaty. When the president makes a compelling case that the national security of the United States demands the approval of a particular bill or treaty, Congress rarely rejects him. This was true for the Panama Canal treaties and the war in the Persian Gulf. But if the policy is unpopular, the president will almost certainly have to devote a much larger proportion of his time and political capital to gaining approval for it, and he will have less time for and influence on other foreign policy issues. Also, if he needs to ask Congress repeatedly to approve an unpopular policy -- such as contra aid -- he will deplete his political capital and is likely eventually to lose the votes, as Reagan did. The increasing complexity of the world and its growing interdependence with the United States means that the agenda will grow, the trade-offs between domestic and international interests will become more delicate, and the role of Congress will increase proportionately. A few difficult issues -- like the canal treaties or contra aid -- can delay consideration of the entire foreign policy agenda for prolonged periods. Given a fixed amount of time and a limited number of decision makers, this systemic delay might be among the most important problems that stem from interbranch politics. The president must be very conscious of his agenda and very selective in his approach. Carter filled his agenda with a host of controversial issues at the beginning of his administration. Although he succeeded in gaining approval of the new Panama Canal treaties and new energy legislation, both issues were costly, and ironically, his victories left him weaker politically. Reagan learned from Carter's experience and selected a smaller, more manageable agenda. His victories -- the tax cut and the defense budget -- came more easily in Congress, and he looked stronger as a result.

# 1nr Cyber

### A2 Cyber Thumps

#### Cyber doesn’t thump CIR and it’s not controversial

Romm, 3/4/13 [“Napolitano: Immigration priority tops cyber”. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/03/napolitano-immigration-priority-tops-cyber-88396.html]

Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano reasserted Monday that cybersecurity reform remains a "high priority" for the administration on Capitol Hill — but she emphasized immigration right now tops the list.

"We were disappointed Congress didn't act last year," Napolitano said of the botched cybersecurity debate in 2012, during a POLITICO Playbook Breakfast event commemorating the 10th anniversary of the agency. Going forward, she said the White House "will support that effort" on Capitol Hill to return to a bill "and do whatever we can to move it forward."

Pressed, however, on where cybersecurity ranks on the White House's legislative wishlist, Napolitano replied, "It's a very high priority, but I would say, frankly, that our No. 1 priority in terms of legislation is immigration. It is high time for immigration reform."

The White House views congressional action on cybersecurity as imperative even though President Barack Obama signed this month an executive order implementing some reform. Those actions still left important policy gaps.

The administration, on its own, can begin shoring up the digital defenses of critical infrastructure while helping the public and private sectors share threat data. Only a new law, however, can grant DHS new, expanded hiring authority, Napolitano said on the panel Monday. Also, Congress — not the White House — can remove all of the barriers to information-sharing, including liability protections sought by business interests, and create incentives to spur cybersecurity improvements at power plants, water systems and other forms of critical infrastructure.

The secretary said she "wouldn't put odds" on whether Congress can solicit the sort of agreement that eluded lawmakers throughout the 112th Congress. Still, she expressed hope for swift action because the administration feels it's "dealing with a Congress now whose basic knowledge is greater" than previous sessions.

#### Cyber doesn’t thump – below immigration

Chabrow, Bank Info Security, 3-12-13 (Eric, “White House's Fixation on Cybersecurity,” 3-12-13, <http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/blogs/white-houses-fixation-on-cybersecurity-p-1438/op-1>]

Talking Cybersecurity on the Hill

While cybersecurity might not get the same attention from the White House as does the federal budget and deficit reduction, immigration reform and reducing gun violence, it's far from being ignored these days. Cybersecurity will be on the agenda when President Obama visits lawmakers in the Capitol this week.

White House Press Secretary Jay Carney, in his daily briefing of the White House press corps on March 11, volunteered that "the need for Congress to take action on cybersecurity" legislation will be raised when the president makes three trips down Pennsylvania Avenue this week to meet with Congress.

# 1nr Obama not push

#### It’s a top priority – he’s using all his clout – it’s a No 1 priorty - above

#### Obama capital starting to work with Repbublicans

WP 3 – 23 – 13 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/white-houses-outreach-is-yielding-modest-benefits-lawmakers-say/2013/03/23/676dad42-924c-11e2-bdea-e32ad90da239_story.html>

Two weeks after launching a high-profile charm offensive targeting Capitol Hill, President Obama and his aides have taken their effort behind the scenes — quietly pushing for cooperation between the White House and congressional Republicans on key disputes.

Before departing for Israel last Tuesday, for example, Obama called Republican Sens. John McCain (Ariz.) and Lindsey O. Graham (S.C.) to discuss immigration reform and other issues. The White House legislative affairs office reached out to Rep. Tom Cole (R-Okla.) last week after he spoke of being ignored. And Obama counselor Pete Rouse worked with Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska) on resolving the impasse over Interior Secretary-designate Sally Jewell’s nomination.

Lawmakers and aides say the effort has begun to yield modest dividends. Last week, Congress managed to pass a continuing resolution averting another potential government shutdown.

“It’s sort of like the two sides are looking across the table and thinking, ‘We really are going to have to live in this house for the next four years. Let’s divide up who does the dishes: I’ll take Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday,’ ” said Cole, who has broken ranks with his party on occasion. “I sort of see the CR as a confidence builder.”

#### **Obama’s working behind the scenes**

Fox News Latino, 3-28-2013.

In an effort to keep Republicans at the negotiation table, Obama has stayed relatively quiet on immigration over the last month. He rolled out his immigration principles during a January rally in Las Vegas and made an impassioned call for overhauling the nation's laws during his early February State of the Union address, then purposely handed off the effort to lawmakers.

The president has, however, privately called members of the Senate working group, and the administration is providing technical support to lawmakers. The Gang of Eight is expected to unveil its draft bill when Congress returns from a two-week recess the week of April 8.

Obama and the Senate group are in agreement on some core principles, including a pathway to citizenship for most of the 11 million illegal immigrants already in the country, revamping the legal immigration system and holding businesses to tougher standards on verifying their workers are in the country legally.

# 1nr U

### 1nr U Wall

#### It will pass soon – political capital is a framing issue – Obama’s focus will smooth over obstacles – shifts in the GOP and public opinion generate momentum – that’s CT Post

#### And, strong bipart support is overcoming opposition – that’s Imassera.

#### Capital will win votes for immigration.

THE HILL 3 – 15 -1 3 [Obama support group off to sluggish start, <http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/288305-obama-support-group-off-to-sluggish-start>]

Obama sees the group as having the potential to reverse a pivotal mistake from his first term, when Obama feels he failed to harness the enthusiasm of his campaign to promote his policy agenda.

There’s some worry the window for OFA’s success might have already begun to close.

With slipping popularity and congressional Republicans retrenching for another round of budget fights, Obama’s once bountiful post-election political capital is being gradually depleted.

But OFA supporters argued that rather than being derailed by the political circumstances, the group was the answer to the problem.

Ben LaBolt, a spokesman for the Obama campaign who led one of the summit’s seminars, noted Thursday that “more than one million Americans have already taken action through OFA to urge members of Congress to support comprehensive immigration reform, gun safety measures, and policies that will strengthen the middle class.”

President Obama told the group that their efforts “may give space here in Washington to do the kind of work — hopefully bipartisan work — that's required.”

"This is what inside Washington doesn't get about outside Washington,” said the former administration official. “They're thinking about this strictly in terms of process. But it's about how you engage these folks. If you went on and knocked on doors because you're into climate change, you're going to do it on an off year.”

A Democratic operative also argued that the group’s nonprofit status – which prevents it from explicitly partisan, electoral activity – would actually aid the group in its mission to forward the president’s agenda.

“Four years ago we tried to construct OFA as an organization with dual missions -- electing Democrats and passing the president’s policies -- and we may have bit off more than we could chew,” he said. “There's ample need for an organization wholly dedicated to passing this ambitious agenda.”

Even donors who acknowledged the group was off to a slow start predicted that just as the campaign heated up, so will OFA.

"When the president really starts to push these issues like immigration, that's when you're going to see this operation going at full speed,” said one top Obama donor. “This is why people elected the president. It wasn't necessarily about him but what he could do."

#### AND – more warrants

#### A. House & Senate obstacles falling – avoiding unforeseen issues key

PBS NEWS 3 – 21 – 13 <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2013/03/progress-on-immigration-reform-leaves-leading-advocate-elated-wary.html>

Rep. Luis Gutierrez, D-Ill., center at the podium, has long advocated for the comprehensive immigration reform. In November 2012, the representative stood with members of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus and announced a declaration of nine principles for comprehensive immigration reform. Photo courtesy of Rep. Luis Gutierrez/Flickr.

This week, the Republican National Committee, Sen. Rand Paul, R-Ky. and Speaker of the House John Boehner all have endorsed bipartisan work in Congress toward comprehensive immigration reform legislation.

But Rep. Luis Gutierrez, D-Ill., still worries.

"I'm not sleeping because I'm thinking about what [more] needs to be done," said the 10-term Democratic congressman from Chicago. "There are other more nefarious forces out there."

Gutierrez has made securing a path to citizenship for the estimated 11 million undocumented residents living in the U.S. -- most of them Hispanic -- a personal mission. Now that he's closer than ever to the goal, he's not letting up on his image as a tireless, vocal firebrand widely considered the preeminent voice for immigration reform in Congress.

He's led rallies against the deportation policies of President Barack Obama and challenged Mr. Obama and Democratic leaders who support immigration reform to push harder and faster for a comprehensive bill.

But Gutierrez now says the November election may have done for the cause what all his years of hectoring the political class could not.

"I said this before the election. Everybody said, what's going to change, Luis? What's going to change if we vote for Barack Obama? All these deportations, people getting arrested," Gutierrez said in an interview with PBS NewsHour. "I remember saying, oh, I'm working for Obama. I'm gonna make sure he gets elected because the victory is going to be so huge he's going to be indebted to Latinos."

Latinos voted overwhelmingly for the president and other Democrats, and that changed the calculus of Republicans as well, Gutierrez said. "That vote was so huge and numerous that Republicans, who had always wanted to either take this [immigration reform] off the table or -- many more -- who were our allies, our partners" could now support comprehensive reform, he said.

Working closely with Republicans, as he did several years ago during the last run at comprehensive immigration reform, Gutierrez is part of a small group in Congress quietly fashioning a bill. It's allowed the liberal former Chicago city council member to forge new bonds despite ideological differences.

"There are a lot of wonderful personal relationships that are being developed across the aisle between people who politically have nothing else in common, who come to this issue, this 'public policy matter,' [they] you would say, so that it would be drained of any emotion, right? - from a different perspective. I see it as a civil rights issue, as a human rights issue," Gutierrez said.

As the economic, political, and practical advantages of immigration reform get voiced by both parties, he believes potential obstacles to passing a final bill continue to fall away. And he says he's less worried than before about one such pitfall -- the demand by some conservatives that undocumented residents not be allowed to become U.S. citizens but only legalized residents. "I start from the premise that never again will we allow America to let there be a permanent second-class anything. We had a civil war over that," Gutierrez said. "We're not going to revisit it now. We're not gonna allow a permanent subclass of Americans."

Predictions are that immigration bills in the House and Senate will be unveiled formally after next week's Spring congressional recess. Legislation could arrive on the president's desk before summer's end.

But some advocates worry something they can't see now, such as the grassroots "anti-amnesty" movement that scuttled public opinion support for a law six years ago, could arise again.

Gutierrez says it's what keeps him from sleeping well.

#### B. despite skepticism and disagreements

IBT 3 – 22 – 13 International Business Tribune [<http://www.ibtimes.com/immigration-reform-bill-suddenly-close-what-made-republicans-change-their-minds-1145763>]

When President Barack Obama called on Congress to send him an immigration bill “in the next few months” during his 2013 State of the Union address in January, many were skeptical that it would actually happen.

By now it’s a tired trope that the obstructionist tactics of Republican legislators have left Washington sclerotic, all but unable to address many of the issues facing America as Obama begins his second term in the White House.

But immigration reform is turning out to be one area of policy where action is happening, and experts on the issue say that a landmark law will likely be on the books by the end of this summer.

“People want to get this done well before the August recess, and people are talking about before July 4,” David Koelsch, an attorney and law professor who runs the Immigration Law Clinic at the University of Detroit Mercy, said. “A signing ceremony on the Fourth of July looks really good, there’s nice optics around that.”

It’s almost shocking at this point to see members of Congress from both sides of the aisle coming together to support a groundbreaking piece of important legislation.

But that’s what’s happening as even Tea Party-backed Republicans like Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky are coming into the fold and endorsing a path to citizenship and other pillars of what is shaping up to be the framework for comprehensive immigration reform.

There are still some differences between even the most centrist members of Congress that must be ironed out, but in most cases they are disagreements of scale and specifics, and a consensus about what to include in the bill is taking shape.

#### C. Republicans are on board

#### Kimball, 3-30-2013.

(“Demographics Force US Immigration Reform,” <http://www.dw.de/demographics-force-us-immigration-reform/a-16699894>)

Once an issue that polarized the US, immigration reform now enjoys growing bipartisan support. Democrats and Republicans are negotiating a path to legalization, and perhaps citizenship, for 11 million illegal immigrants.

With Congress on recess for spring break, US President Barack Obama has pushed the House and Senate to finish the job of drafting comprehensive immigration reform by April, calling on both political parties to capitalize on recent bipartisan progress toward a deal.

"We are making progress. But we've go to finish the job, because this issue is not new," the president said recently during a citizenship ceremony at the White House for 28 new Americans. "Everybody pretty much knows what's broken; everybody knows how to fix it."

After years of polarization over how to deal with America's 11 million unauthorized immigrants, support for a bipartisan deal has gained momentum since President Obama's victory in the November presidential election.

Republican Senator Rand Paul - a key figure in the conservative Tea Party movement - has spoken out in favor of legalization, revealing a potential game-changing shift within the Republican Party in favor of immigration reform.

"Prudence, compassion and thrift all point us toward the same goal: bringing these workers out of the shadows and into becoming and being taxpaying members of society," Paul told the US Hispanic Chamber of Commerce.

He was just the latest member of the Republican Party, which took a hard-line toward illegal immigrants during the presidential campaign, to signal an opening for a bipartisan deal.

Both Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell and Republican House Speaker John Boehner have expressed support for the negotiations of the so-called "Gang of Eight," a bipartisan group of senators hammering out immigration reform legislation. Meanwhile, Democratic Senator Chuck Schumer has said that the group is "very close to agreement."

"Nobody would have ever anticipated the discussion to be starting at a new starting point, that key Republicans are on board for a comprehensive overhaul and for a legalization program," Audrey Singer, an expert on immigration with the Brookings Institute, told DW.

#### D. Obstacles resolvable

AP 3 – 27 – 13 <http://www.startribune.com/politics/200291201.html>

President Barack Obama pressed for swift action on a sweeping immigration bill Wednesday, saying last-minute obstacles are "resolvable" and predicting Congress could pass historic legislation by the end of the summer.

In back-to-back interviews with Spanish-language television networks, Obama repeatedly voiced confidence in a bipartisan Senate group that appears to be on the cusp of unveiling a draft bill. And he said that while he is still prepared to step in with his own bill if talks break down, he doesn't expect that step to be necessary.

"If we have a bill introduced at the beginning of next month as these senators indicate it will be, then I'm confident that we can get it done certainly before the end of the summer," Obama told Telemundo.

While overhauling the nation's patchwork immigration laws is a top second term priority for the president, he has ceded the negotiations almost entirely to Congress. He and his advisers have calculated that a bill crafted by Capitol Hill stands a better chance of winning Republican support than one overtly influenced by the president.

In his interviews Wednesday, Obama tried to stay out of the prickly policy issues that remain unfinished in the Senate talks, though he said a split between business and labor on wages for new low-skilled workers was unlikely to "doom" the legislation.

"This is a resolvable issue," he said.

The president also spoke Wednesday with Univision. His interviews followed a citizenship ceremony conducted Monday at the White House where he pressed Congress to "finish the job" on immigration, an issue that has vexed Washington for years.

The president made little progress in overhauling the nation's fractured immigration laws in his first term, but he redoubled his efforts after winning re-election. The November contest also spurred some Republicans to drop their opposition to immigration reform, given that Hispanics overwhelmingly backed Obama.

In an effort to keep Republicans at the negotiation table, Obama has stayed relatively quiet on immigration over the last month. He rolled out his immigration principles during a January rally in Las Vegas and made an impassioned call for overhauling the nation's laws during his early February State of the Union address, then purposely handed off the effort to lawmakers.

The president has, however, privately called members of the Senate working group, and the administration is providing technical support to the lawmakers. The Gang of Eight is expected to unveil its draft bill when Congress returns from a two-week recess the week of April 8.

# 1nr PTC

#### Was on the sidelines of fiscal cliff talks and only discussed as package – wind action alone triggers the link

Juliano 12/3/2012 [Nick Juliano, E&E reporter, Wind credit backers floating on the tide of fiscal talks, hoping not to sink, E&E Daily, http://www.eenews.net/EEDaily/2012/12/03/archive/1?terms=ptc]

Just as the passengers on the Titanic could do nothing to avoid that iceberg, supporters of a key wind industry tax break have little control at this point over whether their incentive will continue into next year.

Proponents of the wind production tax credit (PTC) believe they have largely won the argument over the merits of extending it at least through next year -- with a deep, bipartisan bench in both chambers of Congress on board in principle with an extension. But there is little appetite in Congress to address the credit in isolation of the broader suite of tax-and-spending issues collectively known as the "fiscal cliff."

The current scenario leaves wind proponents hoping for the best but realizing there is little they can do to affect their prospects at this stage of the game. Ongoing high-level negotiations between President Obama and House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) -- which did not appear to be going well last week -- will determine whether a fiscal cliff deal can be made.

"The PTC is a mere passenger on the ocean liner that's the fiscal cliff debate," said Josh Freed, vice president for clean energy at the centrist Democratic group Third Way. "That passenger is either going to get to its destination because the ship arrives, or it's going to go down with it."

#### Republicans didn’t object ONLY because it was part of the larger package – longer-term wind credits would trigger the link

Juliano 12/14/2012 [Nick, E&E reporter PTC phaseout proposal shakes up tax incentive debate, E&E Daily, http://www.eenews.net/EEDaily/2012/12/14/archive/2?terms=ptc]

The fate of an immediate PTC extension is expected largely to be decided by whether a deal can be reached on the looming "fiscal cliff" of scheduled tax increases and across-the-board spending cuts; negotiations are ongoing, and the package is expected to have the PTC and other so-called tax extenders tacked onto it.

Pompeo said the presence of a PTC extension would not in itself be enough for him or other members to vote against a larger cliff package that achieved broader Republican goals, such as significant entitlement cuts. That means the long-term future of the credit is likely to remain a prominent fixture in tax reform debate.

# 1nr Wind lobby

### Link xt

Trades off

Here’s how you should evaluate the link

#### Their aff card is our example – their on link turn admits the aff would infuriate the fossil fuel lobby and COST billions

Colman, 12-12-12 Zack, “Sen. Coons predicts GOP support for bill to boost renewable-energy investment” <http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/272519-sen-coons-hopeful-renewable-financing-bill-will-pass-next-congress>

Sensitive to Republican calls to reduce the deficit, Coons suggested the cost to government would be “modest.” Though the bill has not received a score from the Congressional Budget Office, he estimated it would cost less than $1 billion.

Coons acknowledged that some lawmakers representing areas heavy in fossil fuels might hesitate to support the bill, as it could help renewables cut into energy markets currently dominated by coal, natural gas and petroleum.

But Rep. Ted Poe (R-Texas), a cosponsor of the House version, said Wednesday that he backs the bill even though, “I represent probably more refineries in Texas than any member of Congress anywhere in the country.”

Coons pointed to Poe as the type of Republican lawmaker who could help bring other GOP legislators behind the bill.

“As they come on and support it, more and more Republicans or people who are from traditional oil-and-gas states and regions will recognize that this is a way that everybody can win,” Coons told The Hill after the press conference.

Poe said he has witnessed how effective the structure has been for investment, and said it would help create jobs if extended to renewables.

Master limited partnerships would decrease uncertainty in the industry, as firms often depend on subsidies that require regular congressional reauthorization, Dan Reicher, an Energy Department official for former President Bill Clinton, said at the press conference.

He said they would help firms grow by establishing some stability for investors.

“A big tent is helpful,” Reicher, who is currently executive director of the Steyer-Taylor Center for Energy Policy and Finance at Stanford University, said of expanding the financing structure.

Coons said he wants the White House to champion the partnerships next Congress. He said he has spoken to several senior Obama administration officials about the bill.

Coons, along with bill co-sponsors in the House and the Senate, sent a letter to President Obama on Wednesday to voice support for master limited partnerships.

They also advocated extending real estate investment trusts, which operate in a similar manner, to renewable energy. They have largely been used for collecting investors for electric power transmission lines.

While Congress would have to pass legislation to include renewables in master limited partnerships, executive action could fold renewables into real estate investment trusts.

“Small tweaks to the tax code could attract billions of dollars in private sector investment to renewable energy deployment, reduce the cost of renewable electricity by up to one third, and dramatically broaden the base of eligible investors,” the bipartisan group of 29 lawmakers said in the letter.

#### Anti Fossil Fuel changes are dead on arrival

MOGULESCU 2 – 6 – 13 Entertainment attorney, writer and political activist [Miles Mogulescu, Can We Solve the Climate Crisis If We Don't Solve the Democracy Crisis?, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/miles-mogulescu/can-we-solve-the-climate-_b_2631033.html>]

ExxonMobil "has invested mainly in a blocking strategy, focusing its PAC donations on Republicans who can try to assure that no damaging laws go through," writes Coll.

So as long as Republicans -- and corporate-friendly Democrats -- control the House, and Republicans in the Senate have enough votes to filibuster effective climate change legislation, changing the laws in any significant ways to slow devastating climate change is effectively dead. Our corrupt political finance system -- which allows the energy industry to buy Congress and block change -- makes it difficult to impossible to take effective legislative action.

Under our campaign laws -- as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Citizens United -- Congress is a wholly owned subsidiary of the energy industry. To say it again, in order to solve the climate crisis, we need to solve the democracy crisis.

#### Obama pushing immigration – ignoring energy key

HARDER 2 – 6 – 13 National Journal Staff [Amy Harder, In Washington, Energy and Climate Issues Get Shoved in the Closet, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/power-play/in-washington-energy-and-climate-issues-get-shoved-in-the-closet-20130206>]

At a news conference where TV cameras in the back were nearly stacked on top of each other, an influential bipartisan group of five senators introduced legislation late last month to overhaul the nation’s immigration system. The room was so crowded that no open seats or standing room could be found.

A week later, one senator, Republican Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, was standing at the podium in the same room to unveil her energy-policy blueprint. There were several open seats and just a few cameras. At least one reporter was there to ask the senator about her position on President Obama’s choice for Defense secretary, former Republican Sen. Chuck Hagel.

“I’m doing energy right now,” Murkowski responded. “I’m focused on that.”

Almost everyone else on Capitol Hill is focused on something else. Aside from the broad fiscal issues, Congress and the president are galvanizing around immigration reform.

Four years ago, the White House prioritized health care reform above comprehensive climate-change legislation. The former will go down in history as one of Obama’s most significant accomplishments. The latter is in the perpetual position of second fiddle. “To everything,” Murkowski interjected fervently when asked by National Journal Daily whether energy and climate policy was second to other policies in Washington’s pecking order.

Murkowski, ranking member of the Senate's Energy and Natural Resources Committee, said she hoped the Super Bowl blackout would help the public understand the importance of energy policy.

“This issue of immigration: Why are we all focused on that? Well, it’s because the Republicans lost the election because in part we did not have the Hispanic community behind us,” Murkowski said this week. “What is it that brings about that motivation? Maybe it could be something like a gap in the Super Bowl causes the focus on energy that we need to have. I can only hope.”

It will take more than hope. Elections have consequences, but so far the only kind of electoral consequence climate and energy policy has instigated is one that helped some lawmakers who supported cap-and-trade legislation to lose their seats in the 2010 midterm elections. For the pendulum to swing the other way—for lawmakers to lose their seats over not acting on climate and energy policy—seems almost unfathomable right now.

Billions of dollars are invested in the fossil-fuel power plants, refineries, and pipelines that the country depends on today. The companies that own this infrastructure have a business interest in keeping things the way they are. Immigration reform doesn’t face such formidable interests invested in the status quo.

“They [businesses] have employees—real, visible people—who they value and who they want to make legal as soon as possible,” said Chris Miller, who until earlier this year was the top energy and environment adviser to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev.

On energy and climate-change policy, Miller added, “You’re probably never going to have anything like the fence in the Southwest or the border-control issue that pushes action and debate on immigration, because climate-change impacts will likely continue to be more abstract in the public's mind until those impacts are so crystal-clear it’s too late for us to do anything.”

Another, tactical reason helps build momentum on immigration and not on other issues. Obama can capitalize on immigration as it becomes more of a wedge issue within the GOP. On energy and climate policy, Obama faces a unified Republican Party.

“The president has cracked the code on how to push his agenda items through. He learned from his victories on the payroll tax and the fiscal cliff that the key is to stake out the political high ground on issues that poll in his favor while exploiting the divisions within the GOP,” said a former Republican leadership aide who would speak only on the condition of anonymity. “With this in mind, the next logical place for him to go is immigration. Unlike issues like energy or tax reform where the GOP is united, he can claim a big win on immigration reform while striking a political blow to Republicans.”

### A2 MLPs = Bipart

#### You should read their link turns with a HIGH degree of skepticism – couple of issues –

A. Most of them are from RENEWABLE ENERGY advocates who say it would be bipartisan. Like COONS who is quoted in their evidence and is their solvency advocate in congress.

B. The warrant is that it’ll be popular since the fossil fuel industry already gets them. That’s just stupid. That’s like saying the CORN industry wouldn’t get pissed just because you gave their subsidy DIRECTLY to their competition.

#### Their link turns are useless—hurting traditional fossil fuels guarantees the link to politics—regional, party dynamics. Even if some are happy with the plan, the majority will be furious across the spectrum of politics

Macneil 12—University of Sydney [Robert Macneil, Alternative climate policy pathways in the US, Climate Policy, Volume No. 10 Sep 2012]

3. US energy production, consumption, and legislation

When assessing the prospects of any type of comprehensive national policy in the US, one ever-present factor is the potential for inter-regional conflict among the country's half-dozen or so distinct regions. As Lee (2001) notes, the history of national policy in the US has been one of heated regional battles over the direction of legislation, and relatively small regions with particular vested interests have often gained control over specific issue areas. While managing such battles has remained a difficult task even for relatively simple issues, the remarkably broad distribution of fossil energy resources across the US mainland has made climate policy a uniquely complicated endeavour. With four states responsible for producing the lion's share of the country's oil and gas supplies (Louisiana, Alaska, Texas, and California7), eight responsible for the majority of natural gas production (Colorado, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Utah, Texas, and Arkansas8), and another 15 responsible for the country's coal

supply (see Table 1), attempts to regulate and reform US energy production have been perceived as tantamount to an assault on the economies and employment bases of more than 20 states. Although consumer states outnumber producer states by a decent ratio, representatives from producer states in Congress are dramatically over-represented in the Senate (the producer states alone have enough senators to seriously inhibit any form of climate regulation) and, historically, have managed to establish themselves on important committees with jurisdiction over energy and natural resource policy (Lee et al., 2001). This regional over-representation has had the effect of pushing Congress to support policies that have been aimed at supporting conventional energy (both to increase demand and bring down energy and gasoline prices in the short term) as well as to remain timid on issues such as climate and long-term energy security (e.g. Tomain, 2010).

The zeal with which producing states have guarded against changes to the country's energy policy has been compounded by the history of US energy consumption. Indeed, there are deeply entrenched structural differences in the US mode of energy use that render the goal of decarbonization comparatively more difficult than in other parts of the Western world. Thus, policies that aim at achieving decarbonization are potentially more onerous to voters. In contrast to Western Europe's project of ‘ecological modernization’, the Anglo-American world has embraced ‘carboniferous capitalism’ (Dalby and Paterson, 2008). Whereas development of the former has typically involved highly dense settlement areas (which started as ‘walking cities’ and have become increasingly dense with the advent of steel-framed architecture), the latter's dominant settlement pattern began with late-19th-century ‘saucer cities’ and, later, post-war suburbanization and excessive land development, all of which have proceeded on the presumption of ever-cheap and ever-abundant fossil fuel resources (see also Nivola, 2010). The result of these divergent development patterns is two rather distinct models of energy use and economic development, and therefore two very different structural starting points for climate regulation. With more than 50% of the US population residing in suburban areas and another 20% in rural areas, a natural or artificial rise in the cost of energy would have considerably greater negative impacts on US industry and lifestyles compared with other parts of the West.9 This obviously has important implications for the perceived legitimacy (or lack thereof) of policy makers who wish to raise the price of fossil energy for a public that is dependent on its cheap availability. This has lent a great deal of credibility to often exaggerated studies by right-wing think tanks, which have highlighted the supposedly harmful economic impacts of climate legislation, particularly on individuals and families.10

In relation to the legislative process itself, it is worth noting that—with the brief exception of the Depression and post-war eras—the legislative process in Washington has historically been uniquely ill-equipped to execute formal comprehensive regulatory packages such as a system-wide climate bill. Indeed, with a federal governmental structure carefully designed to guard against the acquisition of excessive centralized power (complete with a disaggregated executive and legislative branch and a series of prohibitive checks and balances that require either exceptional cooperation or a series of lopsided electoral victories to pass major legislation), the proposition of a comprehensive climate bill implies a legislative gauntlet that has little parallel elsewhere in the West.

The first and most obvious element of passing a bill is successfully moving it through the House and Senate11. However, this is a considerably more complicated process today than it has been at most points in US history. The consolidation of the major parties’ contemporary coalitions over the past 30 years has ushered in an era of partisan gridlock, largely unknown in recent US history, which has proved to be a particular anathema to progressive state-building.12 As Hacker and Pierson (2006) note, while the first 200 years of US legislative politics were (with obvious exceptions) characterized by loose, interchangeable coalitions that generally traversed geography and lacked fixed identities, the modern crystallization of ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ coalitions (based on rigid values and identities) has led to the emergence of highly ideological, ‘lock-step’ party disciplines in Congress. Although these are reminiscent of European-style parliamentary democracies, they lack the historical tendency towards mixed coalition building that lies at the heart of multi-party parliamentary systems.

Climate legislation has predictably evolved along these broad partisan battle lines, but specific changes in the organizational structures of the two major parties over the past three decades have had uniquely prohibitive knock-on implications for environmental policy. Whereas the ‘golden age’13 of American environmentalism saw a tidal wave of regulatory measures passed with relative bipartisan support, the extensive redrawing of the federal electoral map throughout the 1980s served to render environmental policy a particularly intractable wedge issue. Among the most crucial elements of this shift has been the ‘southern realignment’, which began in the 1980s: the Democrats consolidated a more homogeneously liberal base in the Northeast, parts of the Midwest, and the West Coast and began to cede control over their century-old ‘solid south’ base to the ‘Grand Old Party’ (GOP), as the Republican Party engaged in a near-wholesale takeover of the South, Rocky Mountain west, and Farmbelt (Campbell, 2007).

The South's shift towards the GOP during this period has been of particular importance in relation to the climate and the environment for at least two reasons. First, while the Republican Party has shifted towards a broadly antiregulation platform, this broad anti-state philosophy has interacted—in a particularly detrimental way—with the South's specific historical position on environmental issues. As Klyza and Sousa (2008) have noted, although the US public has tended to claim a broad sympathy for environmental issues (despite rarely supporting them electorally; see Guber, 2003), southerners, by and large, have displayed much more antipathy in opinion polls towards such issues.14 Much the same can be said of the citizens of the Rocky Mountain west and Appalachia regions, which, from 1980, have also increasingly embraced the Republican Party. As a result, over the past three decades, while the antiregulation philosophy of the GOP has broadly influenced the South's position on regulation, the South, in turn, has influenced the party's specific position on the environment. With this dynamic in place (and with the party's leadership largely dominated by individuals from these regions), GOP opposition to environmental regulation has become increasingly aggressive over the past 30 years. This has been compounded further and accelerated by the massive purge of the party's moderate wing across much of the country (and its near total disappearance in the Northeast, Midwest, and West Coast), which has led to an extremely narrow internal debate on environmental issues. The issue of climate change, with its potential to incite broad state regulation over massive swaths of the economy and curtail certain personal freedoms, has led to a particularly strong form of reactionary indignation from the Republican Party, effectively constituting an affront to its entire contemporary political–economic philosophy.