# Stiegler

### Fwk

Weight the aff

### 2AC perm – reformism

Perm do both.

* Reforming out of current economic systems is vital. We can’t start from an imagined future or wish away existing institutions. That’s Barry.
* Reforming growth is better than trying to wish it away. Provides resources necessary for adaptation and broad social change is impossible.

Aff reduces consumption - cutting

#### Reformist strategy has broad legitimacy that is key to success.

John BARRY Reader in Politics @ Belfast ‘7 “Towards a model of green political economy: from ecological modernisation to economic security” Int. J. Green Economics, Vol. 1, Nos. 3/4, 2007 p. 460 [acroynym clarified-Turner]

Viewed by itself, EM [ecological modernisation] is a reformist and limited strategy for achieving a more sustainable economy and society, and indeed, questions could be legitimately asked as to whether the development of a recognisably ‘green’ political economy for sustainable development can be based on it, I nevertheless contend that there are strategic advantages in seeking to build upon and radicalise EM. While there are various reasons one can give for this, in this conclusion I will focus on two – one normative/principled, the other strategic. From a strategic point of view, it is clear that, as Dryzek *et al.* (2003) have shown, if green and sustainability goals, aims and objectives are to be integrated within state policy, these need to attach themselves to one of the core state imperatives – accumulation/economic growth or legitimacy (Barry, 2003b). It is clear that the discourse on EM allows (some) green objectives to be integrated/translated into a policy language and framework which complements and does not undermine the state’s core imperative of pursuing orthodox economic growth. Therefore, in the absence of a Green Party forming a government or being part of a ruling coalition (or even more unlikely, of one of the main traditional parties initiating policies consistent with a radical understanding of sustainable development), the best that can be hoped for under current political conditions is the ‘greening of growth and capitalism’ *i.e.*, EM. On a more principled note, the adoption of EM as a starting point for the development of a model/theory of green political economy does carry with it the not inconsiderable benefit of removing the ‘anti-growth’ and ‘limits to growth’ legacy, which has (in my view) held back the theoretical development of a positive, attractive, modern conceptualisation of green political economy and radical conceptualisations of sustainable development. Here, the technological innovation, the role of regulation driving innovation and efficiency, the promise that the transition to a more sustainable economy and society do not necessarily mean completely abandoning currently lifestyles and aspirations – strategically important in generating democratic support for sustainable development, and as indicated above, important if the vision of a green sustainable economy is one that promotes diversity and tolerance in lifestyles and does not demand everyone conform to a putative ‘green’ lifestyle. Equally, this approach does not completely reject the positive role/s of a regulated market within sustainable development. However, it does demand a clear shift towards making the promotion of economic security (and quality of life) central to economic policy. Only when this happens can we say that we have begun the transition to implementing the principles of sustainable development rather than fruitlessly seeking for some ‘greenprint’ of an abstract and utopian vision of the ‘sustainable society’.

### Reform

#### Specific progress within existing economic and political institutions builds hope. Rejection and alternatives to economic opportunity lock the left into pessimism and social isolation.

Daniel **INNERARITY** Social and Political Philosophy @ Basque Country University **’12** *The Future and its Enemies* p. 114-123

Escaping Pessimism One of the characters from Goethe's Torquato Tasso has given us a maxim that is probably the paradigm of all excuses: whatever one is/other people are to blame. This conviction does not clarify anything, but it provides a good deal of relief; its purpose is to reconfirm us as opposed to them. It explains in simple terms the tension between the global and the local, and it provides the basic outline for the relationship between right and left-wing forces. We can be certain that this approach encourages continued political confrontation when our entire view is filled with rhetoric designed to show that other people are worse than we are. This approach reveals very little confidence in our own project, ideas, and convictions. This is, with few exceptions, how the current antagonism between the right and the left functions. That is why the many outstanding analyses about the problems of the New Right fail to mention the weaknesses of the left. What if we inverted the maxim spouted by Goethe's character and considered the ways in which the left is to blame for the right's successes? This type of analysis tends to be more productive because it would not have to buy into the prejudicial assumption that if our competitors are bad, then our ideas must necessarily be right. I believe that one of the main difficulties faced by the left in many countries of the world is that it limits itself to being the anti-right, which-although it may seem otherwise has nothing to do with offering a true alternative. It has been said that the left has trouble mobilizing its electorate, and some believe that success would flow, not by reviving collective hope, but by fanning the flames of concern so that voters would be forced to support the left, however reluctantly, as the lesser evil. To summarize, the right nowadays is optimistic and the left pessimistic. It may be the case that political enmity is currently articulated more as an emotional disposition than an ideological position. The truth of the matter is that emotions and ideas are more closely related than we tend to assume. If we look at things this way, we will perceive the ideological displacement that is taking place. Traditionally, the difference between progressives and conservatives corresponded with pessimism and optimism, both anthropologically and socially. While progressivism formed a part of a historic movement toward betterment, conservatism, as Ernst Bloch suggested, has always been prepared to accept the inevitability of a certain amount of injustice or suffering. But to a large extent, this is no longer the case. The general mood of the right, whose best representative is Nico\_ las Sarkozy, is the complete opposite of resignation: decisive and activ complex-free, trusting in the future, and firmly resolved not to let anyonee, else take control of the vanguard. This attitude is making things difficult for a left that, even when it has good reasons to object, cannot seem to rally when the time comes for proposing something better. Whether defending the causes of marginalized peoples or becoming the advocate of pluralism , the left does not do so in order to construct an alternative conception of power; this is evidenced by the guilty conscience of those who realize they are merely preaching to the choir. The left is, fundamentally, melancholic and critical. It sees the contemporary world as a machine that needs to be stopped, not as a source of opportunities and instruments susceptible to being placed at the service of its own values: justice and equality**. Socialism is now perceived as the means to redress the inequalities of a liberal society. Its sole legitimacy stems from its goal of fixing things that were destroyed by the right or protecting things from the right's threats. It attempts to preserve that which is at risk of being destroyed but does not offer any alternative structure. Its** restorative mentality is constructed at the expense of innovative and predictive thought. **For this reason,** it does not offer a coherent interpretation of the world that awaits us because that world is seen only as a potential threat. This suspicion of the future is basically the end result of perceiving the market and globalization as the principal agents of economic chaos and social inequalities and failing to note the possibilities that they encompass and that could be exploited. It is not enough to simply marshal good feelings and continuously invoke ethical values; it is also important to understand social change and recognize the ways in which the values one holds can be achieved under new circumstances. The left's primary difficulty in positioning itself as a promising alternative comes from its "heroism in the face of the market" (Grunberg and Laldi 2007, 9) that prevents it from understanding the market's true nature and causes it to view the marketplace as nothing more than a fomenter of inequality, an antisocial reality. For much of the left, economic reasoning is a type of social conspiracy. They believe that social benefits are always in conflict with economic considerations. The ritual condemnation of neoliberalism and global commercialization stems from an intellectual tradition that sets social interests against economic interests and tends to privilege determinism and existing structures over the opportunities offered by social change. From this starting point, it is difficult to comprehend that competition, rather than public or private monopolies, is one of the left's (rue values, especially when government monopolies have stopped guaranteeing the provision of a common good in economically efficient and socially advantageous terms. Indeed, some government monopolies falsity the rules of the game. At this point, we are perfectly aware that both the marketplace and the government produce certain inequalities, but government inequalities are met with extraordinary indulgence by many. There are times, for example, when we must balance the value of guaranteeing employment at any cost with the price this protection represents for the people who are thus prevented from entering the workforce. This creates a new inequality. Masked as a defense of social progress, critiques of contemporary society can in fact be conservative and inequitable, which explains why the left is currently closely identified with maintaining the status quo. This conservative attitude could be redefined in terms of political innovation, modifying procedures in order to achieve the same objectives: it is a question of putting the marketplace at the service of the public good and the fight against inequalities. Nostalgia paralyzes and does not help us understand the new terms under which an old battle is being waged. It is not accurate that an era of solidarity has been supplanted by a burst of individualism, yet we must learn to express solidarity more formally. If we want to address social problems more effectively, we must replace the mechanical tendency to automatically intensity state interventions with more flexible forms of collaboration between the government and the marketplace, making use of indirect forms of government and promoting a culture that encourages the evaluation of public policies. The other reason the left currently projects a pessimistic attitude is its wholly negative assessment of globalization. This worldview prevents it from understanding the positive effects globalization can have on the redistribution of wealth, the emergence of new actors, or the change in the rules of the game in power relationships. When it insists on deregulations related to globalization, the left runs the risk of appearing to protect the privileged few while rejecting everyone else's possibilities for development. It is true that the forces at work in the world have never been so powerful but also so promising for so many people. Or are we meant to believe that there is not a hopeful correspondence between the process of globalization and the emergence of a multipolar world? For that reason, the left of the twenty-first century must be careful to distinguish itself from alter-globalization. This does not mean that there are no serious problems in need of solution or that the left should abandon its critical stance. But it must not yield to the litany of protests over OUr loss ofinBuence on the general course of the world. Instead of proclaiming that "another world is possible," it would better serve the left to imagine other ways of conceiving of and acting in this world. The idea that nothing can be done in the face of globalization is an excuse for political laziness. What the left cannot do is choose to act as if nothing had changed. The left will not be free from the grip of pessimism until it makes an effort to take advantage of the possibilities generated by globalization and tries to guide social change in a more just and egalitarian direction. The Political Configuration of the Future Politics is the attempt to civilize the future (Willke 2002, 208), to reject the colonization of the future by a determinant past, to impede its ideological monopoly or its abandonment to simple administrative inertia. The goal of politics is to shape a common backdrop of meaning in which individual expectations are linked with collective progress. For some time now, politics has been hard-pressed to configure that future, as its resolve to constitute, renew, and transform the social order has Bagged. Three factors, in my opinion, contribute to the political system's loss of relevance: the privatization of personal fulfillment; the barriers st

### Asdf

#### Structual transformation is compatible with policy fixes. The case is a pre-requisite for discursive shifts on energy use and environmental harm.

Paul WAPNER Director of the Global Environmental Politics Program in the School of International Service at American University ‘8 “The Importance of Critical Environmental Studies in the New Environmentalism” *Global Environmental Politics* 8.1 p. MUSE 6-13

We are all familiar with the litany of environmental woes. Scientists tell us, for example, that we are now in the midst of the sixth great extinction since life [End Page 9] formed on the planet close to a billion years ago. If things don't change, we will drive one-third to one-half of all species to extinction over the next 50 years.4 Despite this, there are no policy proposals being advanced at the national or international levels that come even close to addressing the magnitude of biodiversity loss.5 Likewise, we know that the build-up of greenhouse gases is radically changing the climate, with catastrophic dangers beginning to express themselves and greater ones waiting in the wings. The international community has embarked on significant efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions but no policies are being debated that come even close to promising climate stabilization—including commitments to reduce the amount of carbon emissions per unit of GDP, as advanced by the US government, and to reduce GHG emissions globally by 5 percent below 1990 levels, as specified by the Kyoto Protocol. Scientists tell us that, to really make a difference, we need reductions on the order of 70–80 percent below 1990 levels.6 Such disconnects between high-level policy discussions and the state of the environment are legion. Whether one looks at data on ocean fisheries, fresh water scarcity or any other major environmental dilemma, the news is certainly bad as our most aggressive policies fall short of the minimum required. What is our role as scholars in the face of such a predicament? Many of us can and should focus on problem-solving theory. We need to figure out, for example, the mechanisms of cap and trade, the tightening of rules against trafficking in endangered species and the ratcheting up of regulations surrounding issues such as water distribution. We should, in other words, keep our noses to the grindstone and work out incremental routes forward. This is important not simply because we desperately need policy-level insight and want our work to be taken seriously but also because it speaks to those who are tone-deaf to more radical orientations. Most of the public in the developed world apparently doesn't like to reflect on the deep structures of environmental affairs and certainly doesn't like thought that recommends dramatically changing our lifestyles. Nonetheless, given the straits that we are in, a different appreciation for relevance and radical thought is due—especially one that takes seriously the normative bedrock of our discipline. Critical theory self-consciously eschews value-neutrality and, in doing so, is able to ask critical questions about the direction of current policies and orientations. If there ever were a need for critical environmental theory, it is now—when a thaw in political stubbornness is seemingly upon us and the stakes of avoiding dramatic action are so grave. The challenge is to fashion a more strategic and meaningful type of critical theory. We need to find ways of speaking that re-shift the boundary between reformist and radical ideas or, put differently, render radical insights in a language that makes clear what they really are, namely, the most realistic orientations these days. [End Page 10] Realism in International Relations has always enjoyed a step-up from other schools of thought insofar as it proclaims itself immune from starry-eyed utopianism. By claiming to be realistic rather than idealistic, it has enjoyed a permanent seat at the table (indeed, it usually sits at the head). By analogy, problem-solving theory in Environmental Studies has likewise won legitimacy and appears particularly attractive as a new environmental day is, arguably, beginning to dawn. It has claimed itself to be the most reasonable and policy-relevant. But, we must ask ourselves, how realistic is problem-solving theory when the numbers of people currently suffering from environmental degradation—either as mortal victims or environmental refugees—are rising and the gathering evidence that global-scale environmental conditions are being tested as never before is becoming increasingly obvious. We must ask ourselves how realistic problem-solving theory is when most of our actions to date pursue only thin elements of environmental protection with little attention to the wider, deeper and longer-term dimensions. In this context, it becomes clear that our notions of realism must shift. And, the obligation to commence such a shift sits squarely on the shoulders of Environmental Studies scholars. That is, communicating the realistic relevance of environmental critical theory is our disciplinary responsibility. For too long, environmental critical theory has prided itself on its arcane language. As theoreticians, we have scaled the heights of abstraction as we have been enamored with the intricacies of sophisticated theory-building and philosophical reflection. In so doing, we have often adopted a discourse of high theory and somehow felt obligated to speak in tongues, as it were. Part of this is simply the difficulty of addressing complex issues in ordinary language. But another part has to do with feeling the scholarly obligation to pay our dues to various thinkers, philosophical orientations and so forth. Indeed, some of it comes down to the impulse to sound unqualifiedly scholarly—as if saying something important demands an intellectual artifice that only the best and brightest can understand. Such practice does little to shift the boundary between problem-solving and critical theory, as it renders critical theory incommunicative to all but the narrowest of audiences. In some ways, the key insights of environmentalism are now in place. We recognize the basic dynamic of trying to live ecologically responsible lives. We know, for example, that Homo sapiens cannot populate the earth indefinitely; we understand that our insatiable appetite for resources cannot be given full reign; we know that the earth has a limit to how much waste it can absorb and neutralize. We also understand that our economic, social and political systems are ill-fitted to respect this knowledge and thus, as social thinkers, we must research and prescribe ways of altering the contemporary world order. While we, as environmental scholars, take these truths to be essentially self-evident, it is clear that many do not. As default critical theorists, we thus need to make our job one of meaningful communicators. We need to find metaphors, [End Page 11] analogies, poetic expressions and a host of other discursive techniques for communicating the very real and present dangers of environmental degradation. We need to do this especially in these challenging and shadowy times. Resuscitating and refining critical Environmental Studies is not simply a matter of cleaning up our language. It is also about rendering a meaningful relationship between transformational, structural analysis and reformist, policy prescription. Yes, a realistic environmental agenda must understand itself as one step removed from the day-to-day incrementalism of problem-solving theory. It must retain its ability to step back from contemporary events and analyze the structures of power at work. It must, in other words, preserve its critical edge. Nonetheless, it also must take some responsibility for fashioning a bridge to contemporary policy initiatives. It must analyze how to embed practical, contemporary policy proposals (associated with, for example, a cap-and-trade system) into transformative, political scenarios. Contemporary policies, while inadequate themselves to engage the magnitude of environmental challenges, can nevertheless be guided in a range of various directions. Critical Environmental Studies can play a "critical" role by interpreting such policies in ways that render them consonant with longer-range transformative practices or at least explain how such policies can be reformulated to address the root causes of environmental harm. This entails radicalizing incrementalism—specifying the relationship between superstructural policy reforms and structural political transformation.

### Yes vtl

**Bernstein ‘2** (Richard J., Vera List Prof. Phil. – New School for Social Research, “Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation”, p. 188-192)

This is precisely what Jonas does in The Phenomenon of Life, his rethinking of the meaning of organic life. He tealizes that his philosophical project goes against many of the deeply embedded prejudices and dogmas of contemporary philosophy. He challenges two well-entrenched dogmas: that there is no metaphysical truth, and that there is no path from the "is" to the "ought". To escape from ethical nihilism, we must show that there is a metaphysical ground of ethics, an objective basis for value and purpose in being itself. These are strong claims; and, needless to say, they are extremely controversial. In defense of Jonas, it should be said that he approaches this task with both boldness and intellectual modesty. He frequently acknowledges that he cannot "prove" his claims, but he certainly believes that his "premises" do "more justice to the total phenomenon of man and Being in general" than the prevailing dualist or reductionist alternatives. "But in the last analysis my argument can do no more than give a rational grounding to an option it presents as a choice for a thoughtful person — an option that of course has its own inner power of persuasion. Unfortunately I have nothing better to offer. Perhaps a future metaphysics will be able to do more." 8 To appreciate how Jonas's philosophical project unfolds, we need to examine his philosophical interpretation of life. This is the starting point of his grounding of a new imperative of responsibility. It also provides the context for his speculations concerning evil. In the foreword to The Phenomenon of Life, Jonas gives a succinct statement of his aim. Put at its briefest, this volume offers an "existential" interpretation of biological facts. Contemporary existentialism, obsessed with man alone, is in the habit of claiming as his unique privilege and predicament much of what is rooted in organic existence as such: in so doing, it withholds from the organic world the insights to be learned from the awareness of self. On its part, scientific biology, by its rules confined to the physical, outward facts, must ignore the dimension of inwardness that belongs to life: in so doing, it submerges the distinction of "animate" and "inanimate." A new reading of the biological record may recover the inner dimension — that which we know best -- for the understanding of things organic and so reclaim for psycho-physical unity of life that place in the theoretical scheme which it had lost through the divorce of the material and the mental since Descartes. p. ix) Jonas, in his existential interpretation of bios, pursues "this underlying theme of all of life in its development through the ascending order of organic powers and functions: metabolism, moving and desiring, sensing and perceiving, imagination, art, and mind — a progressive scale of freedom and peril, culminating in man, who may understand his uniqueness anew when he no longer sees himself in metaphysical isolation" (PL, p. ix). The way in which Jonas phrases this theme recalls the Aristotelian approach to bios, and it is clear that Aristotle is a major influence on Jonas. There is an even closer affinity with the philosophy of nature that Schelling sought to elaborate in the nineteenth century. Schelling (like many post- Kantian German thinkers) was troubled by the same fundamental dichotomy that underlies the problem for Jonas. The dichotomy that Kant introduced between the realm of "disenchanted" nature and the realm of freedom leads to untenable antinomies. Jonas differs from both Aristotle and Schelling in taking into account Darwin and contemporary scientific biology. A proper philosophical understanding of biology must always be compatible with the scientific facts. But at the same time, it must also root out misguided materialistic and reductionist interpretations of those biological facts. In this respect, Jonas's naturalism bears a strong affinity with the evolutionary naturalism of Peirce and Dewey. At the same time, Jonas is deeply skeptical of any theory of evolutionary biology that introduces mysterious "vital forces" or neglects the contingencies and perils of evolutionary development.' Jonas seeks to show "that it is in the dark stirrings of primeval organic substance that a principle of freedom shines forth for the first time within the vast necessity of the physical universe" (PL 3). Freedom, in this broad sense, is not identified exclusively with human freedom; it reaches down to the first glimmerings of organic life, and up to the type of freedom manifested by human beings. " 'Freedom' must denote an objectively discernible mode of being, i.e., a manner of executing existence, distinctive of the organic per se and thus shared by all members but by no nonmembers of the class: an ontologically descriptive term which can apply to mere physical evidence at first" (PL 3). This coming into being of freedom is not just a success story. "The privilege of freedom carries the burden of need and means precarious being" (PL 4). It is with biological metabolism that this principle of freedom first arises. Jonas goes "so far as to maintain that metabolism, the basic stratum of all organic existence, already displays freedom — indeed that it is the first form freedom takes." 1 ° With "metabolism — its power and its need — not-being made its appearance in the world as an alternative embodied in being itself; and thereby being itself first assumes an emphatic sense: intrinsically qualified by the threat of its negative it must affirm itself, and existence affirmed is existence as a concern" (PL 4). This broad, ontological understanding of freedom as a characteristic of all organic life serves Jonas as "an Ariadne's thread through the interpretation of Life" (PL 3). The way in which Jonas enlarges our understanding of freedom is indicative of his primary argumentative strategy. He expands and reinterprets categories that are normally applied exclusively to human beings so that we can see that they identify objectively discernible modes of being characteristic of everything animate. Even inwardness, and incipient forms of self; reach down to the simplest forms of organic life. 11 Now it may seem as if Jonas is guilty of anthropomorphism, of projecting what is distinctively human onto the entire domain of living beings. He is acutely aware of this sort of objection, but he argues that even the idea of anthropomorphism must be rethought. 12 We distort Jonas's philosophy of life if we think that he is projecting human characteristics onto the nonhuman animate world. Earlier I quoted the passage in which Jonas speaks of a "third way" — "one by which the dualistic rift can be avoided and yet enough of the dualistic insight saved to uphold the humanity of man" (GEN 234). We avoid the "dualistic rift" by showing that there is genuine continuity of organic life, and that such categories as freedom, inwardness, and selfhood apply to everything that is animate. These categories designate objective modes of being. But we preserve "enough dualistic insight" when we recognize that freedom, inwardness, and selfhood manifest themselves in human beings in a distinctive manner. I do not want to suggest that Jonas is successful in carrying out this ambitious program. He is aware of the tentativeness and fallibility of his claims, but he presents us with an understanding of animate beings such that we can discern both continuity and difference.' 3 It should now be clear that Jonas is not limiting himself to a regional philosophy of the organism or a new "existential" interpretation of biological facts. His goal is nothing less than to provide a new metaphysical understanding of being, a new ontology. And he is quite explicit about this. Our reflections [are] intended to show in what sense the problem of life, and with it that of the body, ought to stand in the center of ontology and, to some extent, also of epistemology. . . The central position of the problem of life means not only that it must be accorded a decisive voice in judging any given ontology but also that any treatment of itself must summon the whole of ontology. (PL 25) The philosophical divide between Levinas and Jonas appears to be enormous. For Levinas, as long as we restrict ourselves to the horizon of Being and to ontology (no matter how broadly these are conceived), there is no place for ethics, and no answer to ethical nihilism. For Jonas, by contrast, unless we can enlarge our understanding of ontology in such a manner as would provide an objective grounding for value and purpose within nature, there is no way to answer the challenge of ethical nihilism. But despite this initial appearance of extreme opposition, there is a way of interpreting Jonas and Levinas that lessens the gap between them. In Levinasian terminology, we can say that Jonas shows that there is a way of understanding ontology and the living body that does justice to the nonreducible alterity of the other (l'autrui). 14 Still, we might ask how Jonas's "existential" interpretation of biological facts and the new ontology he is proposing can provide a metaphysical grounding for a new ethics. Jonas criticizes the philosophical prejudice that there is no place in nature for values, purposes, and ends. Just as he maintains that freedom, inwardness, and selfhood are objective modes of being, so he argues that values and ends are objective modes of being. **There is a basic value inherent in organic being, a basic affirmation, "The Yes' of Life**" (IR 81). 15 "**The self-affirmation of being becomes emphatic in the opposition of life to death. Life is the explicit confrontation of being with not-being**. . . . The 'yes' of all striving is here sharpened by the active `no' to not-being" (IR 81-2). Furthermore — and this is the crucial point for Jonas — **this affirmation of life that is in all organic being has a binding obligatory force upon human beings**. This blindly self-enacting "yes" gains obligating force in the seeing freedom of man, who as the supreme outcome of nature's purposive labor is no longer its automatic executor but, with the power obtained from knowledge, can become its destroyer as well. He must adopt the "yes" into his will and impose the "no" to not-being on his power. But precisely this transition from willing to obligation is the critical point of moral theory at which attempts at laying a foundation for it come so easily to grief. Why does now, in man, that become a duty which hitherto "being" itself took care of through all individual willings? (IR 82). We discover here the transition from is to "ought" — from the self-affirmation of life to the binding obligation of human beings to preserve life not only for the present but also for the future. But why do we need a new ethics? The subtitle of The Imperative of Responsibility — In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age — indicates why we need a new ethics. Modern technology has transformed the nature and consequences of human ac-tion so radically that the underlying premises of traditional ethics are no longer valid. For the first time in history human beings possess the knowledge and the power to destroy life on this planet, including human life. Not only is there the new possibility of total nuclear disaster; there are the even more invidious and threatening possibilities that result from the unconstrained use of technologies that can destroy the environment required for life. The major transformation brought about by modern technology is that the consequences of our actions frequently exceed by far anything we can envision. Jonas was one of the first philosophers to warn us about the unprecedented ethical and political problems that arise with the rapid development of biotechnology. He claimed that this was happening at a time when there was an "ethical vacuum," when there did not seem to be any effective ethical principles to limit ot guide our ethical decisions. In the name of scientific and technological "progress," there is a relentless pressure to adopt a stance where virtually anything is permissible, includ-ing transforming the genetic structure of human beings, as long as it is "freely chosen." We need, Jonas argued, a new categorical imperative that might be formulated as follows: "Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life"; or expressed negatively: "Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such a life"; or simply: "**Do not compromise the conditions for an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth**"; or again turned positive: "In your present choices, include the future wholeness of Man among the objects of your will." (IR 11)

### alt

#### Ethic of care generates imperial hierarchy. Their kritik denys users of energy technologies autonomy – this turns the alternative.

Peter **GRATTON** Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of San Diego 8-4-**‘10** “Taking Care of Youth and the Generations,” http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/24441-taking-care-of-youth-and-the-generations/

But I stop short when Stiegler argues we are creating a generation of "I-don't-give-a-damners." Isn't this complaint the same as it ever was? Newspapers, mass paperbacks, radio, television, the Internet, and so on, were all going to turn us into a pack of hedonists incapable of doing anything other than making the next purchase. Stiegler repeats these age-old attacks almost verbatim, seeming to have missed an entire era of media studies since Marcuse and Adorno were last seen shaking their fists at the "culture industry." This is not to suggest that Stiegler is incorrect about the pernicious shaping of human desires -- marketers who aren't creating desires don't last long. But neither the culture industry nor its consumers are as homogeneous as Stiegler suggests. Heidegger's analysis of everydayness takes one only so far. To argue that those going online are becoming passive and pacified, all but unconscious beings, is a claim strange to be found in the work of one who writes about the pharmakon (the poison and cure) of writing and then assumes newer technologies could be doing nothing but poisoning the minds of the young. This brings me to the politics of the book. Since Stiegler is calling for a "reenchanting" of this video-televisual world, just what "enchanted" world is he referencing? On what basis could he begin to presume such masses are not caring, not "giving a damn," about their lives and the lives of others? The "battle for intelligence," which he calls "noopolitics," must be won lest, he says, there be the "liquidation of 'democratic maturity' and 'democratic responsibility,' that is, populism" (53). If the people aren't paying attention, he warns, "a few will always think for themselves," citing Kant approvingly, and these few will be responsible for "spread[ing] the spirit of a rational appreciation for both their own worth and for each person's calling to think for himself" (40). With rampant "technologies of stupidity," there is a threat that "it might become literally impossible to (re)educate those organologically conditioned brains that have become prone to incivility and delinquency" (35). Time, he literally argues, is running out (182-3). What, then, is to be done? Stiegler's answer is unapologetically a return and reinvigoration of the institutions of the third Republic: bourgeois families (one wonders, though he doesn't say, who will be caring for all those children no longer attached to their gaming devices), reading-focused schools, and a republican form of government anchored in a united Europe. The "work of forming attention undertaken by the family, the school, the totality of teaching and cultural institutions, and all the apparatuses of 'spiritual value' (beginning with academic apparatuses)" will in turn be supported by a new political economy outlined in his other works (184). Failing to demarcate republicanism and democratic theory (he claims Kant as a proponent of the latter[6]), Stiegler walks haphazardly into the whole problem of political representation. Depicting the "people" as a mass of attention-deficit addled "immature" non-citizens duped by the mass media, incapable of Kantian-style enlightenment and thus unable to govern themselves, he seems not to have considered what or who is to be given such rights of "taking care." From Plato to Heidegger and beyond, it's time to attend to another image of the people than as in thrall to Sophistic doxa and media imagery. In other words, isn't there something strange about a book that talks about "caring for the youth" that robs those very youth of any autonomy, of any thought, as Stiegler defines those terms? Taking Care is notably silent on just what they/we think of the changes being wrought during their/our lifetime; don't worry, he suggests, they'll take care of you. Finally, it is more than striking that Stiegler has not paused before arguing for a renewed European culture while generously citing Jules Ferry regarding civilizational "maturity" and "social primary identification." Surely this deserves attention. Ferry's legacy was not simply secular public schools, but also an impassioned imperialism guided by his claim that it was the French "duty to civilize the inferior races." This "republican" education system -- praising universal rights, as long as one was "French" -- was itself a "psychotechnology" and "programming industry" transmitting a generational "superego" described well by generations of anti-colonial writers. One can argue for a renewed republicanism set afloat from its colonial history -- arguing, say, Kant's Critique of Practical Reason is not contaminated by his Anthropology -- but privileging "systems of care," a renewed Europe, and a "battle for intelligence" as a "process" of "unification," which, he writes, "in Jules Ferry's time [was] called 'the nation,'" while discussing the masses in the same coded language of nineteenth century racialists ("lazy," non-thinking, immature, etc.) is ominous (61).

#### Ethic of care coopted for eugenics and family values.

Richard **IVESON** PhD from the Centre for Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths, University of London, October 20**12**, “Rewiring the Brain or, Why our Children are not Human,” Parallax, Vol. 18, No. 4 p. 121

According to Stiegler, we are forever engaged in a ‘battle of intelligence for maturity’, a battle ‘concomitant with the history of humanity’ (p.29). Today, however, this battle has been transformed into the life or death struggle of humanity itself. Unless things change rapidly, Stiegler insists, humanity as we know it will be destroyed, displaced bya dystopian,posthuman futurewhose inhabitants would be incapable not only of heeding Stiegler’s warning, but of even reading it. Proclaiming himself thus a prophet of and from potentially the last generation of mature adults, Stiegler seeks to hastily recall us to rational critique before the new media has its way and irretrievably restructures the connections which constitute intelligence so as to render such constitution impossible (p.33). To instaurate critique, however, is no easy matter. It is not simply a question of educational reform, but of a revolution that impacts upon every level of society and beyond, intervening ceaselessly even at the neurological level. Moreover, a revolution by its very nature offers no guarantees. As Stiegler admits, the remedy he prescribes might also turn out to be the worst kind of poison. Indeed, one can all too easily envisage the appropriation of his discourse in the service of a right-wing defence of ‘family values’, and even in a renewed eugenicist discourse which (by way of A Clockwork Orange) deems synaptic rewiring a remedy for ‘delinquency’ within a regime of enforced ‘care’.

#### Reject their framing of human-technological interaction. It’s over-simplified determinism.

Richard **IVESON** PhD from the Centre for Cultural Studies at Goldsmiths, University of London, October 2012, “Rewiring the Brain or, Why our Children are not Human,” Parallax, Vol. 18, No. 4 p. 122-123

Psychotechnologies, in other words, eliminate the very thing that defines the human, that of critical consciousness. As a result, the ‘new’ short-term state of ‘attention without consciousness’ they inaugurate necessarily constitutes an entirely different form of being. Stiegler refers to this as a state of ‘vigilance’, a form of being characteristic of wild animals (p.78). The programming industries, in short, rewire the human, purging it of its exceptional ‘cerebral plasticity’ so as to produce instead an animalistic nervous system ‘forever enclosed within strict neurological limits’ (pp.96– 8). The post-human, therefore, is a (psycho)technologically produced animal, subject only to the short-term satisfaction of drives without desire. This, suggests Stiegler, is the future, and that future is (almost) now, consciousness having being reduced to a ‘grammatized stream’ by the ‘transformation of formalized machinic processes, as well as by devices recording and manipulating the information stream’ (p.147). This ‘rewiring’, moreover, is no simple metaphor. Television and new media, Stiegler insists, irrevocably restructure the synaptogenetic circuits of children subjected to them at an early age. The evidence invoked to back up this claim is, however, very thin. Nevertheless, Stiegler takes it as proven that such rewiring inevitably results in an irreversible inability to attain maturity at the neurological level (pp.74–7). The ‘herd’ that is the next generation, in short, will thus be physiologically unable to heed Stiegler’s warning and to take responsibility. Rather, by the time today’s children grow up, it will already be too late. For Stiegler, signs of this process are everywhere. In place of the social formation of intelligence, we find only ‘the most minimal human “subject”’, which increasingly ‘delegates its attention to automata that then become its captors, meters, gauges, warning signals, alarms, and so on’ (pp.100–1). While, on the one hand, we can no longer recall our own telephone numbers or how to do simple arithmetic, on the other we transfer control of all our financial, military and medical decisions to various software applications. As a result, there can be no singular internalization of the collective and social memories of humanity, and thus no possibility of creating new long circuits of transindividuation. Instead, machines calculate us: ‘attention engines’ take the place of attention itself, and thus substitute for the subject (p.100). There is, however, something of a hysterical edge to Stiegler’s stricture regarding the toxicity of television and new media, which recalls similar apocalyptic warnings that have accompanied the emergence of every new media form, not excluding the printed book. It is an attack moreover, as John Hutnyk points out in a recent article, ‘Proletarianization or Cretinization’, which depends upon a largely undifferentiated concept of the ‘longcircuit’ that takes no account of the specificities of place. Moreover, Stiegler appears not to consider the possibility that, what for him is only ever a delinquency of youth in need of correction, might instead constitute a basis for resistance and struggle against market controls. Thus, writes Hutnyk, whereas Stiegler’s diagnosis tends all too readily to render the masses a passive object of capture, perhaps instead ‘we need more delinquents, civil unrest, a revolutionary call to attention’ in the constitution of a dialectic in which ‘the distraction of attention may actually be a refined and critical inattention’.2 Stupidity too, insists Hutnyk, can be pharmacological. At the same time, in order to justify his distinction between the (good) psychotechnicswhich constitute humanity, and the (bad) psychotechnologies which reduce it to ‘mere’ animal vigilance, Stiegler’s position ultimately depends upon an extremely problematic human-animal dichotomy, one which conflates ‘the human’ with consciousness and ‘the animal’ with blind instinctual drives. As detailed in the first volume of Technics and Time, Stiegler insists upon the absolute exceptionalism of the human by virtue of a co-constitutive technicity (meaning that, according to Stiegler’s thesis, any nonhuman animal who manipulates a tool must therefore be a human). In Taking Care, however, Stiegler seems to suggest that a human can be somehow reduced to, or even returned to, an animal way of being. The question, then, is how can grammatization – the putatively defining property of the human – effect what for Stiegler is an ontologically impossible reduction of the human to the animal? It is in order to circumvent this question that Stiegler attempts to separate human vigilance from its animal counterpart by claiming they constitute two different ‘aspects’. Such a separation, however, cannot be maintained. Psychotechnologies, he suggests, eliminate human attention, whereas animal attention is always already captured (p.102). In other words, the human, defined futurally, must have attention and thus anticipation eliminated in order to then become a captured animal. The difference then, concerns only the process, rather than the resulting form of being, by which ‘the human’ becomes what ‘the animal’ always already is. Stiegler’s vigilant posthuman, in other words, is the regression of the (ontologically distinct) human to an animal he or she never was. Perhaps then, in this dystopian future controlled by autonomous psychotechnological forces, it will be Senegalese chimpanzees who, with their favourite tools for extracting termites and their carefully fashioned spears for hunting lemurs, will find themselves marked out as the ‘proper’ humans amongst all us (other) animals.

#### Resiliency empirically checks environmental impacts. Prefer our evidence—it cites the largest data sets.

Kareiva et al. 11—Peter Kareiva is a Breakthrough Institute Senior Fellow and chief scientist and vice president of The Nature Conservancy as well as a member of the National Academy of Sciences. Robert Lalasz is director of science communications for The Nature Conservancy. He is founding editor of the Conservancy's blog, “Cool Green Science.” Michelle Marvier is professor and department chair of Environmental Studies and Sciences at Santa Clara University. [Fall, 2011, “Conservation in the Anthropocene,” *Breakthrough Journal*, No. 2, http://breakthroughjournal.org/content/authors/peter-kareiva-robert-lalasz-an-1/conservation-in-the-anthropoce.shtml]

As conservation became a global enterprise in the 1970s and 1980s, the movement's justification for saving nature shifted from spiritual and aesthetic values to focus on biodiversity. Nature was described as primeval, fragile, and at risk of collapse from too much human use and abuse. And indeed, there are consequences when humans convert landscapes for mining, logging, intensive agriculture, and urban development and when key species or ecosystems are lost.

But ecologists and conservationists have grossly overstated the fragility of nature, frequently arguing that once an ecosystem is altered, it is gone forever. Some ecologists suggest that if a single species is lost, a whole ecosystem will be in danger of collapse, and that if too much biodiversity is lost, spaceship Earth will start to come apart. Everything, from the expansion of agriculture to rainforest destruction to changing waterways, has been painted as a threat to the delicate inner-workings of our planetary ecosystem.

The fragility trope dates back, at least, to Rachel Carson, who wrote plaintively in *Silent Spring* of the delicate web of life and warned that perturbing the intricate balance of nature could have disastrous consequences.22 Al Gore made a similar argument in his 1992 book, Earth in the Balance.23 And the 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment warned darkly that, while the expansion of agriculture and other forms of development have been overwhelmingly positive for the world's poor, ecosystem degradation was simultaneously putting systems in jeopardy of collapse.24

The trouble for conservation is that the data simply do not support the idea of a fragile nature at risk of collapse. Ecologists now know that the disappearance of one species does not necessarily lead to the extinction of any others, much less all others in the same ecosystem. In many circumstances, the demise of formerly abundant species can be inconsequential to ecosystem function. The American chestnut, once a dominant tree in eastern North America, has been extinguished by a foreign disease, yet the forest ecosystem is surprisingly unaffected. The passenger pigeon, once so abundant that its flocks darkened the sky, went extinct, along with countless other species from the Steller's sea cow to the dodo, with no catastrophic or even measurable effects.

These stories of resilience are not isolated examples -- a thorough review of the scientific literature identified 240 studies of ecosystems following major disturbances such as deforestation, mining, oil spills, and other types of pollution. The abundance of plant and animal species as well as other measures of ecosystem function recovered, at least partially, in 173 (72 percent) of these studies.25

### More alt

#### Investment in renewables better than transition through revolution and crisis.

Tim **JACKSON** Sustainable Development @ Surrey (UK) **‘9** *Prosperity without Growth* p.172-178

The economic crisis presents us with a unique opportunity to invest in change. To sweep away the short-term thinking that has plagued society for decades. To replace it with considered policymaking capable of addressing the enormous challenges of tackling climate change, delivering a lasting prosperity. Of course it's one thing to have such a vision, completely another to set about achieving it. But there are basically only two possibilities for change of this order. One is revolution. The other is to engage in the painstaking work of social transformation. There are those for whom revolution appears to be the answer. Or if not the answer, then at least the inevitable consequence of continued social and ecological dysfunction. Let's end capitalism. Let's reject globalization. Let's undermine corporate power and overthrow corrupt governments. Let's dismantle the old institutions and start afresh. But there are risks here too. The spectre of a new barbarism lurks in the wings. A world constrained for resources, threatened with climate change, struggling for economic stability: how long could we maintain civil society in such a world if we have already torn down every institutional structure we can lay our hands on? To reject revolution is not to accept the status quo. Or even to suggest that only incremental change is needed. It should be clear from everything that has been said that the scale of the required transformation is massive. But we also need concrete steps through which to build change. And this is still a task which calls for the engagement of governments and those able to make or influence 1. J.o po iCy. SpecifYing those steps with any degree of precision relies in part on the opening out of a public and policy dialogue on the issues. Clearly it lies beyond the scope of this (or any other) volume. But it would be wrong to leave the question of policy hanging in the air completely. And it is possible already to establish some clear directions of travel. In the following paragraphs, some specific recommendations are made. They follow directly from the analysis in the preceding chapters. Broadly speaking, they fall under three main headings: • Establishing the limits. • Fixing the economic model. • Changing the social logic. Inevitably, there are some overlaps between these categories. Undoubtedly there are things missing. Not all of the suggestions can be achieved immediately. Not all of them can be achieved unilaterally. But none of them is entirely without precedent and there are numerous points of contact with existing initiatives. Taken together they offer some policy foundations from which to initiate meaningful and lasting change. Establishing the limits The material profligacy of consumer society is depleting key natural resources and placing unsustainable burdens on the planet's ecosystems (Chapter 5). Establishing clear resource and environmental limits and integrating these limits into both economic functioning (Chapter 8 and Appendix 2) and social functioning (Chapter 9) is essential. The first three specific proposals relate to that task. Resource and emission caps - and reduction targets A much closer attention to the ecological limits of economic activity is called for. Identifying clear resource and emission caps and establishing reduction targets under those caps is vital for a sustainable economy. To the extent that they have been implemented, the stabilization targets and emission budgets established for carbon provide an exemplar here. 2 The conditions of equity and ecological limits, taken together, suggest a key role for the model known as 'contraction and convergence' in which equal per capita allowances are established under an ecological cap that converges towards a sustainable leveP This approach has been applied, to some extent, for carbon. Similar caps should be established for the extraction of scarce non-renewable resources, for the emission of wastes (particularly toxic and hazardous wastes), for the drawing down of 'fossil' groundwater supplied and for the rate of harvesting of renewable resources. Effective mechanisms for achieving targets under these caps should be set in place. Once established, these limits also need to be integrated into a convincing economic framework (see Recommendation 4 below). Fiscal reform for sustainability The broad principle of internalizing the external costs of economic activities has been accepted for at least two decades.4 Taxing carbon, for example, sends a clear signal to people about the value of the climate and encourages them to shift to less carbon intensive processes, technologies and activities. A related mechanism already established through the Kyoto Protocol's 'flexibility mechanisms' and in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme - would be to allow permits established under a cap (see Recommendation 1 above) to be tradeds A useful elaboration of the argument is the principle of an ecological tax reform - a shift in the burden of taxation from economic goods (for example incomes) to ecological bads (for example pollution). Taxes on carbon (for example) could be designed to be fiscally neutral, to reduce the burden on businesses and people. New taxes on resource use or carbon would be offset through reductions in taxes on labour. This argument has been elaborated over at least a decade and has been implemented in varying degrees across Europe. But progress towards a meaningful ecological tax reform remains painfully slow.6Support for ecological transition in developing countries A key motivation for rethinking prosperity in the advanced economies is to make room for much-needed growth in poorer nations. But as these economies expand there will also be an urgent need to ensure that development is sustainable and remains within ecological limits. Specifically, this calls for robust funding mechanisms to make resources available to developing countries. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change has already established such a mechanism, known as the Global Environment Facility (GEF) .7 Expanding or replicating this kind of resource transfer mechanism is a priority. Investment in renewable energy, energy efficiency, resource efficiency, low-carbon infrastructures and the protection of 'carbon sinks' (forests) and biodiversity will remain vital. There's another difficult issue for developing economies: namely, the impact of reduced consumption in advanced economies on their export markets. Interestingly, there is now some evidence to suggest that, in the longer term, this will turn out to be a less thorny issue than once thought.8 Growth in the industrializing economies is increasingly built on domestic consumption or trade between industrializing nations. But there will remain for some time a need to provide structural support for developing countries in the transition to a sustainable economy.9 Funding both investment and structural needs could take several forms including a carbon levy paid by richer nations on imports from developing countries, 10 or a Tobin tax on international currency transfers (see Recommendation 6 below). Fixing the economic model An economy predicated on the perpetual expansion of debt-driven materialistic consumption is unsustainable ecologically, problematic socially and unstable economically (Chapters 2, 5 and 6). Changing this requires the development of a new macroeconomics for sustainability (Chapters 7 and 8, Appendix 2): an economic engine that doesn't rely for its stability on relentless consumption growth and expanding material throughput. Building that new framework is an urgent priority. Policy can contribute to that task in several ways. Developing an ecological macro-economics A key step is to develop the technical capacity for what we might call an ecological macro-economics. Essentially this would mean being able to understand the behaviour of economies when they are subject to strict emission and resource use limits. And to explore how economies might work under different configurations of consumption, investment, labour employment and productivity growth. A key requirement is to reframe our preconceptions about both labour and capital productivities. The continued pursuit of labour productivity drives economies towards growth simply to maintain full employment. But this trend is unlikely to continue in an economy geared towards (more labour intensive) services (Chapter 8). The impact of falling labour productivities is already an issue in the EU. I I Rather than stimulating a continued search for high productivities, it would be better to engage in structural transition towards low-carbon, labour-intensive activities and sectors. 'Ecological investment' (see Recommendation 5 below) has also emerged as a key requirement in this analysis. The question of productivity is once again crucial. But here the question is about the productivity of capital. Ecological investments will have different rates and periods of return. In conventional terms they are likely to be 'less productive'. Ecological investment will therefore need to address the conditions as well as the targets of investment (Appendix 2). There is also a clear case for a new macro-economics to include some account of the value of natural capital and ecosystem services. 12 Ultimately, these will need to be integrated into accounts of capital stocks and into production functions and consumption flows. How all this might work is an enormous but exciting challenge. There are virtually no real precedents for a coherent macroeconomic framework for sustainability.13 But the new economics of sustainability is not the dismal science of Thomas Malthus. It's a place that ought to attract bright, young economists to elaborate an economic science fit for the future. Investing in jobs, assets and infrastructures Investment in jobs, assets and infrastructures emerges as a key component, not just of economic recovery but as one of the foundations of a new ecological macro-economics. Ecological investment has some clear targets. These include: 14 • retrofitting buildings with energy- and carbon-saving measures; • renewable energy technologies; • redesigning utility networks, in particular the electricity grid; • public transport infrastructures; • public spaces (pedestrianization, green spaces, libraries and so on); • ecosystem maintenance and protection. Investment in jobs and skills will also be vital in maintaining and improving buildings and infrastructures. In fact the creation of jobs should be thought of as a legitimate focus for investment whenever employed labour is protecting or improving public assets. But ecological investment is not just about targeting investment towards specific goals. It also demands a different 'ecology' of investment. In particular, it will need to address the conditions of investment, rates and periods of return, and the structure of capitalmarkets. Ultimately, this will also mean ralSlllg tough questions about the ownership of assets, and control over the surpluses from those assets. The nature and role of property rights lies at the heart of these questions.

### A2 reduce consumption

#### Alternative can’t solve—can’t convince people – and global markets offset low consumption

Blake ALCOTT Ecological Economist Masters from Cambridge in Land Economy ‘8 The sufficiency strategy: Would rich-world frugality lower environmental impact? *Ecological Economics* 64 (4) p. Science Direct

The environmental sufficiency strategy of greater consumer frugality has become popular in ecological economics, its attractiveness increasing along with awareness that not much can be done to stem population growth and that energy-efficiency measures are either not enough or, due to backfire, part of the problem. Concerning the strategy's feasibility, effectiveness, and common rationale, several conclusions can be drawn. • The consequences of the strategy's frugality demand shift – price reduction and the ensuing consumption rebound – are not yet part of mainstream discussion. • Contrary to what is implied by the strategy's advocates, the frugality shift cannot achieve a one-to-one reduction in world aggregate consumption or impact: Poorer marginal consumers increase their consumption. • The size of the sufficiency rebound is an open question. • The concepts of ‘North’ and ‘South’ are not relevant to the consumption discussion. • Even if the voluntary material consumption cuts by the rich would effect some lowering of total world consumption, changing human behaviour through argument and exhortation is exceedingly difficult. • While our moral concern for present others is stronger than that for future others, this intragenerational equity is in no way incompatible with non-sustainable impact. • Since savings effected by any one country or individual can be (more than) compensated by other countries and individuals, the relevant scale of any strategy is the world. • No single strategy to change any given right-side factor in I = f(P,A,T) guarantees any effect on impact whatsoever. • Right-side strategies in combination are conceptually complicated and perhaps more costly than explicitly political left-side strategies directly lowering impact. • Research emphasis should be shifted towards measures to directly lower impact both in terms of depletion and emissions. Lower consumption may have advantages on the individual, community, or regional level. There is for instance some truth in the view of Diogenes that happiness and quantity of consumption do not necessarily rise proportionally. Living lightly can offer not only less stress and more free time but also the personal boon of a better sense of integrity, fulfilling the Kantian criterion that one’s acts should be possible universally (worldwide). Locally it could mean cleaner air, less acid rain, less noise, less garbage, and more free space. And in the form of explicit, guaranteed shifts of purchasing power to poorer people it would enable others to eat better or to buy goods such as petrol and cars. However, given global markets and marginal consumers, one person’s doing without enables another to ‘do with’: In the near run the former consumption of a newly sufficient person can get fully replaced. And given the extent of poverty and the temptations of luxury and prestige consumption, this near run is likely to be longer than the time horizon required for a relevant strategy to stem climate change and the loss of vital species and natural resources.

#### Case is a pre-requisite to changes in the direction of consumption. Without growth and minimizing conflict resources get devoted to competition.

Rasmus **KARLSSON** Poli Sci @ Lund **‘9** “A global Fordian compromise?—And what it would mean

for the transition to sustainability” *Envt’l Science and Policy*  12 p. 190-191

Though these caricatures may still hold true to a certain extent, I would argue that the last years have challenged this impasse. On one hand, the general public has grown increasingly aware of how serious our current predicament has become. On the other hand, a string of promising academic work, both in the sciences (Hoffert et al., 2002) and in green political theory (Nordhaus and Shellenberger, 2007), has finally taken up what otherwise has been a dormant position ever since the 1970s. I am referring to those who accept the gravity of the present environmental crisis yet believe that the solution can never be found in the traditional green mantra of reduction, conservation and self-denial. Instead these authors have attempted to reconcile the politics of scarcity with technological optimism, to tap into the spirit that once made grand projects like the Apollo program possible and, on this basis, move towards a politics of radical engagement. Nowhere does the need for such new politics appear more urgent than on the global level. With parts of the world (mostly in Asia) rapidly industrializing while others remaining trapped in the direst poverty, the planetary perspective goes to the heart of the sustainable transition. Not only does it show the terrible human cost of the present status-quo but also the irreversibility in the move towards modernization. Billions are now impatiently aspiring for the material living standard of the West, and given the limited ecological space of the planet (Andreasson, 2005; Rist, 1997, pp. 44–45), it is hard to see how these needs can be met without radical technological innovation. However, there are reasons to doubt the feasibility of any advanced technological paths to sustainability. Only in a climate of high and sustained economic growth would it be possible for states to set aside the vast resources necessary to bring success to long-term projects on nuclear fusion, nanotechnology and other converging technologies (Malsch, 2008). Such benign economic conditions are, just as the prospects of sustainable development more generally (Blinc et al., 2007), unlikely to come about in times of international tension, unplanned mass-migration and growing resource scarcity. This should warrant a new kind of sobering realism, an acceptance that the future of modernity is now a planetary enterprise and that we are all into this as one common human civilization.

#### Reducing consumption worst for billions dependent on high levels of global demand. It’s too complicated to reduce consumption without economic disaster.

Rasmus **KARLSSON** Poli Sci @ Lund **‘9** “A global Fordian compromise?—And what it would mean

for the transition to sustainability” *Envt’l Science and Policy*  12 p. 191

Yet, this does not take away the impression that other environmental problems, and then especially global climate change, are not prone to go away that easily. In fact, climate change may turn out to be the ‘‘perfect moral storm’’ (Gardiner, 2006) as it causes and effects are transboundary, intergenerational and highly varied across time and space. Unlike CFCs that were fairly easy to substitute, the use of carbon based fuels are ubiquitous, even up to the point when it can be considered the very propellant of the modern industrial civilization. This combination of immense collective action problems (Andreou, 2006) and our profound dependence of fossil fuels clearly put limits on traditional green politics. Yet, it also helps explaining why Greens, during the last decade, so unanimously have identified climate change as being the environmental issue. For radical Greens, the transition to a post-carbon society means nothing less than the very dismantlieng of the global consumer society, a return to small self-sufficient communities and with them a life thought to be both more democratic and authentic. For moderate Greens, the same transition is a way of not only avoiding dangerous climate change but also indirectly solving a range of other environmental problems such as acidification and toxification since these often are closely related to the burning of fossil fuels. Both groups offer grim projections of what the future will be like if we fail to take action (Kolbert, 2006; Linden, 2006; Lynas, 2007). The coming catastrophes of climate change are thought to include economic downfall, lethal heat waves and massive loss of human life. What is perplexing is that many, if not all, of these future calamities are already happening today in Africa and other parts of the developing world. Given that most environmental ethicists subscribe to highly universalistic morals this may point towards a kind of cognitive dissonance by which potential human suffering in the future appears more urgent than actual human suffering today. But beyond that dissonance, and the accompanying easy rhetorical point, lies a much darker landscape of hopelessness. Without the prospect of advanced technological paths to sustainability, and here we have to remember that Greens traditionally have been highly sceptical of big science, the sustainable transition would have to imply a dramatic reduction in human consumption and thus in global economic demand. To put it somewhat bluntly, ‘‘the path of reconciliation with the Third World might consist in our becoming Third World ourselves’’ (Bahro, 1996, p. 88). Taking this provocative statement as a starting point, I will now turn my attention to three different problems related to the anatomy of such a possible future reduction. 2.1. Unintended consequences Witnessing how the subprime mortgage fallout has spread around the world over the last year, it is easy to see that not only is the world economic system highly interdependent, its foundations may also be somewhat shakier than commonly understood. The very capitalistic system as we know it (with stock markets, interest rates and government treasury bonds) is built around the single premise of long-term economic growth. Any politically motivated reduction in consumption, especially of the more dramatic kind envisaged by radical Greens, is likely to have numerous and probably even disastrous consequences for the world economy. Unfair as the current terms of trade may be, the livelihood of billions of people depend on that there is a global demand for textiles, food and a whole range of other consumer goods. Only if very carefully orchestrated can that demand be scaled back piece by piece, yet Arne Næss is not alone in arguing, ‘‘the longer we wait the more drastic will be the measures needed’’ (Næss, 1989, p. 31). Most likely, any such urgency would come at a high human toll. Remembering how notoriously difficult it was to plan the economy from above in the communist countries (Ericson, 2006), dismantling global chains of commerce appears to be like a gigantic Mikado game in which we cannot easily tell what should go first. It is not certain that what appears as the luxury of some is not intricately connected to the provision of the daily bread of others.

[Mikado = pick up sticks game]

#### Radical reduction in consumption is *less* sustainable – more vulnerable to resource bottlenecks, pandemics, asteroids.

Rasmus **KARLSSON** Poli Sci @ Lund **‘9** “A global Fordian compromise?—And what it would mean

for the transition to sustainability” *Envt’l Science and Policy*  12 p. 192 [Footnote added]

In the meantime, as the natural environment continues to deteriorate, political pressure for more radical reform is likely to grow. Though deep-green visions may not have a strong appeal on the wider public for the moment they do remain present, if only as anti-theses to the dominant economic paradigm. Most people have no problem identifying things they ought to do in order to save the environment; be it to stop flying, cutting back on consumption or start riding a bicycle. Intrinsically good as such actions may be, they do not however resolve the global tensions of sustainability. In fact, it is unlikely that even a deep-green society, as envisioned in the literature (de Geus, 1999), would be particular sustainable once we start to look deeper into the future.1 1 Deep-green societies would also be increasingly vulnerable to some other existential risks which I will not elaborate on here. These risks include asteroid collisions, leakages from nuclear waste/weapons disposals and pandemics. Unless those societies succeed in moving away from non-renewable resources altogether, sustainability would only be secured for a limited time span. Moreover, trapped in a low-tech economic configuration, deep green societies would be less able to come up with substitutes (and probably have difficulties in using the resources that do exist but are inaccessibly located). Considering that 85% of the world energy production in 2004 was based on fossil fuels (Grillot, 2006), such a historical move away from non-renewables would amount to precisely the kind of utopian engineering discussed earlier on and thus be susceptible to the same line of criticism.

### Impact

Nonfals

#### Military-industrial complex has no influence on foreign policy

**Ripsman, 9** – Norrin M., Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Concordia University (Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign policy, pp 183. Edited by Steven E Lobell, Norrin M Ripsman, Jeffery W Talliaferro (professors of poli sci). )

Aside from a direct electoral payoff, political leaders are also interested in those domestic actors who can provide resources that can be used either to retain power or, in cases of corrupt regimes, to line their pockets. In this regard, we might expect that wealthier groups would have more influence than those with only limited resources. Nonetheless, money and resources should be of only limited utility, since – unlike direct, coherent electoral clout – they tend to be spread across interest groups. Thus, while one group may offer a large material payoff for pursuing its preferred policy option, it is conceivable that one or more actors that oppose the policy will be able to provide a countervailing payoff that, even if smaller, would allow the executive to select its preferred policy without forgoing the bulk of the payoff. For this reason, I do not expect so-called “military-industrial complex” (MIC) or “iron triangle” interest groups to have any significant influence over foreign security policy.36 These groups, particularly firms that produce armaments or otherwise supply the military, and those engaged in defense-related research and development, are supposed to exert – together with the military and their allies in the government – a decisive influence over issues ranging from defense spending and weapons procurement to decisions of war and peace. Yet it is not clear why they must do so. To begin with, on individual procurement decisions, firms compete against each other and can raise countervailing rewards for the executive; therefore, the government should be able to choose its own preferred option independently of MIC interest groups at little cost. Furthermore, on those issues where the MIC interest groups are united (say in favoring higher overall defense spending or encouraging the use of force), firms and interest groups in other sectors of the economy that would lose out as a result can coalesce to offer a countervailing reward. So it seems unreasonable to privilege this one cluster of economic interests over other well-endowed interests.37

# case

### A2 renenwables link

#### Plan is distributed regeneration – turns their offense, our aff’s technology encourage a relationship with the world and technology akin to gardening, an ethic that maintains respect for intrinsic value

**Pierce and Paulos, 2010** [James Pierce, Eric Paulos, researcher and Cooper-Siegel Endowed Chair at the Human-Computer Interaction Institute, Carnegie Mellon University “Materializing energy”, <http://www.paulos.net/papers/2010/MaterializingEnergy_DIS2010.pdf>]

**Focal engagement, effort and energy** In *Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life*, philosopher Albert Borgmann building on the work of Martin Heidegger argues that modern technology has over course of the last three centuries developed a distinctive pattern which has given rise to a radically new way of life [4]. Borgmann argues that while technology has served well to, for example, combat human hunger and disease it has also exerted a controlling pattern on our lives and detracted from the richness of human experience. For Borgmann, this is tied to technological availability. In Borgmann’s terms, something is made available by technology if it has been rendered instantaneous, ubiquitous, safe, and easy. Warmth, for example, has been made available by the electric furnace. Borgmann distinguishes between devices, which render commodities such as warmth available, with things, which focally engage and are never purely means to some end. Borgmann gives the example of a central heating plant (a device) in contrast to a wood burning stove (a thing). The stove differs from the central heating plant in that it “was used to furnish more than mere warmth. It was a focus, a hearth, a place that gathered the work and leisure of a family and gave the house a center. … It provided for the entire family a regular and bodily engagement with rhythm of the seasons that was woven together of the threat of cold and solace of warmth, the smell of wood smoke, the exertion of sawing and of carrying, the teaching of skills, and the fidelity to daily tasks.” [4, p. 42]. As another example of what Borgmann terms *focal things* and *focal practices,* the “culture of the table” is contrasted with modern practices around technologically available food: “The Great meal of the day…is a focal event par excellence. It gathers the scattered family around the table…gathers the most delectable things nature has brought forth…recollects and presents a tradition… brings into focus closer relations of national or regional customs, and more intimate traditions still of family recipes or dishes.” [4, p. 204].¶ While Borgmann concludes, in line with Heidegger, that only “pretechnological things” carry the potential for focal engagement, philosopher of technology and design theorist Peter-Paul Verbeek argues that devices, including digital technologies, can also invite experientially enriching and meaningful types of focal engagement [30]. Verbeek—who is critical of Borgmann and Heidegger’s perspectives on technology, which he accuses of being nostalgic and romantic—attempts to rescue Borgmann’s analysis from the “alienation thesis” of technology. [30, p. 185]. In particular, Verbeek refines Borgmann’s concept of *engagement* by distinguishing between *effort* and *focal engagement*. Whereas focal engagement suggests an intrinsically meaningful involvement with a thing, effort suggests a type of engagement that is not intrinsically rewarding and is done only as means to some end. Verbeek gives the example of focal engagement with an electronic keyboard or electronic sewing machine, which is contrasted with the effort involved in refilling the car with gasoline.¶ A major reason that we are drawing so heavily on Borgmann and Verbeek lies in linking the potential unustainability of technological availability and consumption with the possible reduction in the richness of human experience associated with disengaged consumption and technological availability. While Borgmann’s as well as Verbeek’s account of technology and engagement are certainly open to criticism, we nonetheless aim to show how each perspective can be translated into approaches to materializing energy in terms of promoting sustainable focal as opposed to effortful engagement with energy. In particular we outline two different yet related strategies for sustainable energy-interaction design: (i) materializing engagement with energy through engagement with energy devices (e.g., solar panels, mobile phones) and (ii) rematerializing engagement with energy as reengagement with simpler things (e.g., windows, the outdoors, the sun). The former strategy follows Verbeek in assuming that modern technologies can also promote focal engagement. This strategy aims to design for focal engagement with energy by promoting engagement with the material technologies involved in collecting, keeping, sharing, and activating energy. The second strategy follows Borgmann in supposing the difficulty or impossibility of focal engagement with modern technologies. This strategy instead aims to reduce our reliance on electricity and electricity-consuming devices as well as other technologies that require a source of commodified energy. This approach involves what design philosopher Tony Fry writing on sustainability describes as rematerialization, the “substitution of human labour for machines in a smart way” [12, p. 79] and the “recoding” of such experiences “as means of…being in touch with circumstances and the quality of material things” [12, p. 219]. Based on this discussion, we propose the following research questions: How might we design for sustainable focal engagement with energy and energy technologies? How might we metaphorically aim to design interactions with energy as gardening, tending to the hearth, or preparing and sharing an elaborate meal? Or how might we literally aim to revive such focal practices? And how might we navigate between the two extremes of both strategies of energy engagement?¶ **Local energy and the Local Energy Lamp** In order to explore potentials for different types of focal engagement with energy and energy technologies discussed previously, we focused a material investigation around several renewable microgeneration technologies. In particular, we developed a set of design artifacts and questions around the notion of energy that is actually or perceptually limited in its availability. We presented participants with several functional microgeneration systems including a small-scale solar and hand-powered microgeneration and storage systems. We further designed, prototyped and presented to participants a system employing a redesigned household lamp—the *Local Energy Lamp*—capable of communicating the “quality” of the energy it consumed with the quality of light it produced (Figure 3). *Energy meta-data* concerning the source, age, and other unconventional attributes of electrical energy are visualized by varying the color, brightness, and consistency of the light of the lamp, which still functions primarily as household lamp for indoor lighting. The Local Energy Lamp and microgeneration systems were used to propose various scenarios to participants. For example, the color of the lamp’s light was implemented to subtly change color to correspond to the availability of different sources of power, or the current source of energy being consumed (Figure 3). In response to the various microgeneration technologies presented, all participants at times expressed positive reactions, describing the microgenerated energy as being “free”, “homemade”, “personal”, and “clean.” Several participants described envisioned scenarios we might describe as being characterized by focal engagement. For example, in reaction to scenarios in which he was able to generate solar, wind, and human energy and engage with this energy via the Local Energy Lamp, one participant responded: “I feel like that’d be kinda cool, especially in today’s culture. Cuz you’d get a real sense of satisfaction. … It’d be like gardening but with a laptop, like harvesting power… I wanna compare it to gardening. A lot of people find that pleasurable—in the same way people find cooking pleasurable. Like it’s sort of sustaining your life, but a lot of people find it fun…like tending to your solar garden.” The analogy to gardening, farming, and cooking—all potential examples of focal practices by way of Borgmann—is a recurring and important theme in our limited empirical study as well as other empirical studies of microgeneration technologies. In the previously cited study of microgeneration technologies in the home such comparisons with gardening and food come up on several occasions. For example, one individual using micro-hydro power remarked: “It gives a certain satisfaction knowing that you’re using something you’ve produced yourself, like growing your own vegetables.” [7, p. 3]. These findings point toward design opportunities related to local energy, perhaps communicated and verified with systems employing *energy meta-data*, similar to recent “local food” movements. Another promising finding was several participants claiming that they may change their routine consumption practices in relation to the availability of different energy sources, as communicated by the Local Energy Lamp, such as altering the times at which laundry is done to coincide with the availability of solar or wind energy. Again, evidence from the use of actual microgeneration technologies in the home indicates similar practices. For example, an individual using off-grid wind power describes his alteration of heating practices based on wind conditions: “When the wind is blowing right up then I turn the electric heaters on – rather than use the gas from the gas bottles.” [7, p.7].

### Warming

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Warming won’t cause extinction

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(Scott, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, introduction)

First, climate change does not threaten the survival of the human species.5 If unchecked, it will cause other species to become extinction (though biodiversity is being depleted now due to other reasons). It will alter critical ecosystems (though this is also happening now, and for reasons unrelated to climate change). It will reduce land area as the seas rise, and in the process displace human populations. “Catastrophic” climate change is possible, but not certain. Moreover, and unlike an asteroid collision, large changes (such as sea level rise of, say, ten meters) will likely take centuries to unfold, giving societies time to adjust. “Abrupt” climate change is also possible, and will occur more rapidly, perhaps over a decade or two. However, abrupt climate change (such as a weakening in the North Atlantic circulation), though potentially very serious, is unlikely to be ruinous. Human-induced climate change is an experiment of planetary proportions, and we cannot be sur of its consequences. Even in a worse case scenario, however, global climate change is not the equivalent of the Earth being hit by mega-asteroid. Indeed, if it were as damaging as this, and if we were sure that it would be this harmful, then our incentive to address this threat would be overwhelming. The challenge would still be more difficult than asteroid defense, but we would have done much more about it by now.

#### No impact—mitigation and adaptation will solve—no tipping point or “1% risk” arguments

Mendelsohn 9—Robert O. Mendelsohn, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf

The heart of the debate about climate change comes from a number of warnings from scientists and others that give the impression that human-induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20–30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta et al. 2009). Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and well-being may be at risk (Stern 2006).

These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long-range climate risks. What is needed are long-run balanced responses.

### security

Adaptioantion framing good – normative

* Change the political terrain of security – results in ecological conceptions of politics
* Priority shift: including energy security changes priorities towards economic reform. That’s

#### energy security discourse fosters interdependence-internal link turns their security impacts.

Maria Julia TROMBETTA Delft University of Technology ‘8 “The meaning and function of climate security” Paper prepared for the second WISC Conference Lujbljana 23-26 July 2008

What is at stake in the climate security discourse is the possibility of reintroducing a mechanism to deal with transformation and contingencies within a system that tends to rely on the one hand on governing through emergencies, on the other hand on insurance and compensation. The securitization of climate is an attempt to evoke the symbolic power of an environmental discourse based on interdependence and prevention to establish a framework for security governance at global level. It is about renegotiating the spaces in which risk management and market mechanisms prevail, and those in which intervention is legitimated. Securitization remains that very political moment. Its implications largely depend on what is securitized, the means employed to provide security and the logic of security that underlines the process. Arguments linking security and climate change have been promoted by actors interested in both prioritizing environmental problems and transforming security logics. On the one hand, they suggested a move from an antagonist perspective which implies that “my security is others’ insecurity” to one in which “my security depends on others’ security” And yet they brought into the security discourse a precautionary approach aimed at preventing emergencies and largely inspired by the precautionary principle which characterises environmental norms and practices. These discourses supported the creation, at international level, mechanisms of security governance, similar to the safety regulations, environmental standards and social security that characterize domestic policies. On the other hand these arguments were suggesting breaking the link between security and military means; in this sense they were influential on actors like the EU which tended to have limited military capabilities. This has led to a transformation of security practices which has affected other sectors than the environment. A logic of security cannot be translated from one sector to another. Security discourses and logics are related with the specific issues that are considered as threats, the actors involved in the process of securitization and the means these actors are able and legitimized to employ. Conclusion This paper has suggested that the transformation of climate change into a security issue relays on security discourses which includes considerations on the materiality of the impacts, the growing awareness of environmental problems, and the means to deal with these issues. In turn these discourses challenge existing security practices. An approach like securitization provides relevant insights because it allows an exploration of the struggle and mechanisms that are behind the process of transformation of an issue into a security issue. Securitization however, as understood by the Copenhagen School, tends to consider the logic and practices associate with national security as fixed. In this way it imposes a problematic logic based on an antagonist approach to security which is based on the inscription of enemies in a context and the creation of emergencies. This logic, even if it still relevant, does not applies to all the attempts to transform an issue into a security issue. The limits of assuming that this logic applies all the times the word security is evoked are evident in the attempts to securitize a non traditional issue like climate change.

#### Case outweighs—climate change is a greater risk than green biopolitics.

Robyn ECKERSLEY Politcs @ Melbourne ‘4 *The Green State* p. 89-93

Green poststructuralists have likewise sought to deconstruct the disciplinary effects of biopower and green governmentality, while green critics of technocracy have lamented the cult of the expert the so-called the scientization of politics, and the concomitant disenfranchisement of the lay public and vernacular knowledge in affairs of state administration." The bureaucratic rationality of the administrative state is inn as too rigid, hierarchical, and limited to deal with the variability, nonreducability, and complexity of ecological problems." Bureaucratic rationality responds to complex problems by breaking them down, comparnncntalizing them, and assigning them to different agencies that respond to a hierarchical chain of command. This often leads to the routine displacement of prob- lems acn bureaucratic system boundaries,' Once we add to these developments the more recent revolution in public sector management, we have good reasons to concur with Paul Hint that the traditional liberal architecture has increasingly "become a gross misdescription of the structure of modern societies?" The tenuous link between popular political participation and control and technocratic state administration has also been a major theme in the work of Ulrich Beck. Indeed, Beck (like Martin Janickel argues that politicians and state functionaries act in ways that seek to mask problems rather than solve them. Ecological problems pens because they are generated by the same economic, scientific, and political institutions that are called upon to solve them. While the state cannot but acknowl- edge the ecological crisis, it nonetheless continues to function as qir were not present by denying, donplaying, and naturalizing ecological prob- lems and declining to connect such problems with the basic structure and dynanücs of rccmomic and bureaucratic rationality. According to Beck, this organized irresponsibility can sometimes take on a Kafkaesque form. The state seeks to manufacture security by providing social insurance systems-health services, unemployment benefits, pensions, and workers compensation-but it can provide no protection against major hazards that can pierce the thin veneer of normality and expose the inadequacies of the welfare stare As Beck puts it 'What good is a legal system which prosecutes technically manageable small risks, but legalises large scak hazards on the strength of its authority, foisting them on everyone, including even those multitudes who still resist them?' It might be tempting to conclude from this general critique that states are part of the problem rather than the solution to ecological degradation. With its roots in the peace and antinuclear movements, the green movement has long been critical of the coercive modality of state power-including the state-military-industrial complex-and might therefore be understandably sceptical toward the very poiisibility of reforming or transforming states into mare democratic and ecologically responsive structures of gosemment The notion that the state might come to represent an ecological savior and trustee appears both fanciful and dangerous rather than empowering. Yet such an anti-statist posture cannot withstand critical scrutiny from a critical ecological perspective. The problem seems to be that while states have been associated with violence, insecurity, bureaucratic domination, injustice, and ecological degradation, there is no reason to assume that any alternatives we might imagine or develop will necessarily be free of, or less burdened by, such problems. As Medley Bull warns, violence, insecurity, injustice, and ecological degradation pre-date the state system, and we cannot rule out the possibility that they are likely to survive the demise of the state system, regardless of what new political structures may arise." Now it could be plausibly argued that these problems might be Lessened under a more democratic and possibly decentralized global political architecture (as hioregionalists and other green decentralists have argued). However, there is no basis upon which to assume that they will be lessened any more than under a more deeply democratized state system. Given the seriousness and urgency of many ecological problems (e.g., global warming), building on the state governance structures that already exist seems to be a more fruitful path to rake than any attempt to move beyond or around states in the quest for environmental sustainab.ility.2t' Moreover, as a matter of principle, it can be argued that environmental benefits are public goods that ought best be managed by democratically organized public power, and not by private power." Such an approach is consistent with critical theory's concern to work creatively with current historical practices and associated understandings rather than fashion utopias that have no purchase on such practices and understandings. In short, there is more mileage to be gained by enlisting and creatively developing the existing norms,, rules, and practices of state governance in ways that make start power more democratically and ecologically accountable than designing a new architecture of global governance de novo (a daunting and despairing proposition). Skeptics should take heart from the fact that the organized coercive power of democratic states is not a totally untamed power, insofar as such power must be exercised according to the rule of law and principles of democratic oversight. This is not to deny that state power can sometimes he seriously abused (e.g., by the police or national intelligence agencies). Rather, it is merely to argue that such powers are not un- limited and beyond democratic control and redress. The focus of criti- cal ecological attention should therefore be on how effective this control and redress has been, and how it might be strengthened. The same argument may be extended to the bureaucratic arm of the state. In liberal democratic stares, with the gradual enlargement, spe- cialization, and depersonalization of state administrative power have also come legal norms and procedures that limit such power according to the principle of democratic accountability. As (,ianfranco Poggi has observed, at the same time as the political power of the state has become more extensive in terms of its subject matter and reach, so too have claims for public participation in the exercise of this power widened? This is also to acknowledge the considerable scope for further, more deep-seated democratic oversight. Indeed, it is possible to point to a raft of new ecological discursive designs that have already emerged as partial antidotes to the technocratic dimensions of the administrative state, such as community right-to-know legislation, CornmtlnLtV environmental monitoring and reporting, third-party litigation rights, environmental and technology impact assessment, statutory policy advisory committees, citizens' juries, consensus conference.,-, and public environmental inquiries. Each of these initiatives may he understood as attempts to con- front both public and private power with its consequences, to widen the range of voices and perspectives in stare administration, to expose or prevent problem displacement, and/or to ensure that the sites economic, social, and political power that create and/or are responsible for ecological risks are made answerable to all those who may suffer the consequences This is precisely where an ongoing green critical locus on the state can remain productive.

### Cooption