# DA

### 2NC—Overview

#### The AFF trades off with modernization that is necessary to deter global wars. Russia, China, Iran and North Korea are expanding their nuclear, missile and cyberwar capabilities. Military history proves the risk of weapons use increases if the US is unable to maintain modern capabilities.

#### Prefer our impact—World War I proves that this is the quickest path to global war. It can happen within a decade—that’s Skelton.

## A2 indonesia

Begs question of Asian war defense and solvency d

**Indonesian instability inevitable—lack of faith in democracy**

**New Straits Times in ‘8** (Amy Chew, “Indonesians losing faith in democracy”, 2008, L/N)

IN 1999, some 86 per cent of Indonesians came out to vote, reflecting their hopes for democracy to improve their lives. However, many are now staying away from voting as corruption, combined with social and economic hardship, has made the populace sceptical of democracy as a means to a better life, writes AMY CHEW. It has been 10 years since 35-year-old "Omen" Abdul Rahman led thousands of students to oust President Suharto's autocratic regime, paving the way to turn Indonesia into the world's third largest democracy. But Abdul Rahnan, the former student activist, will not be participating in next year's democratic elections which he helped usher in. "I am going to golput. I believe the number of people who are going to golput is going to be big as their lives have not improved at all," he says. Golput is the Indonesian term for abstention from voting. It stands for Golongan Putih or "White Group" as the members use a piece of white cloth, in contrast to the colourful flags of the political parties, as a symbol of their disillusion with the political system. Politicians and analysts worry over the potentially low voter turnout which will result in a weak administration with little power to govern, enforce law or implement policies. They also worry that the people's disappointment will be exploited by Muslim radicals to push for an Islamic state, arguing that democracy is a Western product which has failed the people. "If voter turnout is less than 50 per cent, it will produce a weak government and a weak country," says Hasyim Wahid of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), the country's second largest political party. "Whoever is elected will suffer from a lack of legitimacy. It will be very difficult to implement policies. "Bilaterals with foreign governments or agreements with foreign investors will be difficult to conclude," Hasyim said. Wahid pointed to the recent local gubernatorial elections in Central and East Java where the number of people who stayed away from voting was 50 per cent and 30 per cent respectively. "I believe the local elections are representative of what will happen in next year's general elections," says Hasyim, who is a younger brother of former President Abdurrahman Wahid. "The voter turnout could be as low as 50 per cent or less," he says. A government with diminished legitimacy will create a vacuum that leaves Indonesia vulnerable to social instability. "The people will distrust the civilian government and there is no military to fill in as the days of military dominance are over," says Hasyim. "Indonesia will become a collapsing state and just a step away from anarchy," he says.

## Group uniqueness args

#### The DoD is shifting to an agile, ready, and technologically advanced force structure, that’s Zee News.

#### And, DOD is at a strategic turning point—Panetta has been able to avoid debilitating cuts

Jaffe 9/3/12 [[Greg Jaffe](http://www.washingtonpost.com/greg-jaffe/2011/03/02/ABX6GIQ_page.html), “With military at ‘turning point,’ defense chief Leon Panetta avoids bold moves,” Washington Post, Published: September 3, 2012, pg. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/with-military-at-turning-point-defense-chief-leon-panetta-avoids-bold-moves/2012/09/03/6188c902-f297-11e1-adc6-87dfa8eff430\_story.html

For most of the past year, Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta has stressed that the vast military complex over which he presides is at a “strategic turning point.”

A decade of grinding guerrilla war is drawing to a close. Defense budgets are shrinking. The implication is that major changes are coming to the military.

So far, however, Panetta has cut few major weapons programs and steered clear of any bold moves aimed at remaking the military for this new era. The watchword for Panetta’s tenure, senior defense officials said, has been “humble.”

“He’s told the service chiefs to be humble in their predictions of warfare,” one senior official said.

Panetta’s approach reflects a management style that throughout his career has placed a premium on consensus over major reforms and collegiality over bold thinking, said officials who have worked with him. “He has always run a happy, productive shop,” said former ambassador James Dobbins, who worked closely with Panetta in the Clinton White House.

Because he has not spent his career in the national security realm, Panetta has tended to rely more heavily on the Pentagon’s top generals for advice than his predecessors did, senior military officials said.

In an interview describing his defense strategy, Panetta said he has helped craft an approach that hedges bets against a range of potential enemies. “It really does provide maximum flexibility,” he said. “The military is going to be smaller, but it is going to be more agile, more flexible and more deployable so that it moves fast and stays on the cutting edge of technology.”

#### DOD is weathering the storm of the current cuts—additional tradeoffs would be disastrous.

Defense Professionals 8/12/12 [“U.S. Defense Secretary Describes Strategy, Warns Against Sequestration,” 14:51 GMT, August 12, 2012, pg. http://www.defpro.com/news/details/38276/?SID=15169abb85c04eebf113cfde56a80fe5

– As the Defense Department adopts a new paradigm for the U.S. military to remain a formidable force while absorbing $487 billion in spending reductions over the next decade, the prospect of an additional $500 billion spending reduction over that period would be “a disaster” not only for national defense, but also for defense communities, Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta said here Aug. 6.
In remarks at an Association of Defense Communities conference, the secretary said the new defense strategy and the Pentagon’s budget decisions reflect the need to bring the government’s budget under control.
“There is a strategic and fiscal imperative that is driving the department to a smaller, … leaner and more agile force—that’s the reality,” Panetta said. “It would be irresponsible not to reduce the budget and do our role in confronting the fiscal challenges facing this country.”
The secretary noted that though the department and the nation are weathering a period of great challenge, an opportunity for planning emerges.
Under the new strategy, Panetta said, the force will remain agile, quickly deployable, flexible, and prepared to deal with crises anywhere in the world. As drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan unfold, the United States will continue to sharpen its focus on matters in the Asia-Pacific region, sparking a rebalance of global posture as part of an overall strategy to maintain a presence elsewhere in the world.
Additionally, he said, vigilance against cyberspace threats is essential. He called the cyber arena the “battlefield for the future,” with the potential to cripple progress for the United States and its allies.
The strategy also must include investment in and protection of DOD’s industrial base, the secretary said.

#### Panetta has balanced the Defense budget—they force a tradeoff leads to a hollow force.

Parrish 6/13/12 [Karen Parrish, “DOD Leaders Strongly Urge Congress to Preserve Budget Request¶ ,” American Forces Press Service, May 10, 2012, pg. http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=116287

WASHINGTON, June 13, 2012—Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta cautioned Congress today against dismantling the strategic framework that supports the 2013 defense budget request.

Testifying along with Army Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the Senate Appropriations Committee's defense subcommittee, the secretary said some changes to the request could undermine the careful balance department leaders built into military spending projections.

“Some of the [congressional] committees have … made changes with regard to our recommendations that we're concerned about,” Panetta said.

He listed three areas DOD leaders have targeted for cuts, and which some members of Congress have challenged during defense budget consideration.

“Some of the bills seek to reverse the decisions to eliminate aging and lower-priority ships and aircraft,” the secretary noted. “My concern is that if these decisions are totally reversed, then I've got to find money somewhere … to maintain this old stuff.”

Keeping outdated equipment in service would rob needed funds from other areas, he said. That, he added, would lead to what he has long called a “hollow force”—a military that is not trained, manned or equipped to meet current and future threats.

## A2 grid sec o/w

Modernization is key – long range strike, tech, aircraft

Short term outweighs long term

Our impact is specific

Shelton

#### The trade-off will hollow out our forces.

Kelly 8/31/12 [J. F. Kelly, Jr., “Green Politics and the Military,” Colorado Eagle & Journal, Posted: Friday, August 31, 2012 2:05 pm, pg. http://www.coronadonewsca.com/opinion/article\_a1995aca-f3af-11e1-9062-001a4bcf887a.html]

Here’s an even more critical matter of national security that the general might consider. The greatest threat to national security is certainly not dependence on fossil fuel. Rather it’s the ongoing and imminent reductions in defense funding that will result in a shrunken, hollow force barely able to carry out its peacetime commitments, let alone deal with a major conflict. Moreover, we are assuredly not dependent on Middle Eastern oil. We will, in fact, soon be a net exporter of oil, if we aren’t already, and if the Obama administration and the environmental lobby would just get out of the way of progress, we could develop enough of our own ample shale oil and natural gas resources to eliminate oil imports altogether. And, by the way, whether we do this or not will actually have very little impact on the environment anyway because China, India, Russia and the other developing nations containing about three-fourths of the world’s population will continue to burn fossil fuels since they aren’t about to sacrifice growth and cheap electricity for cleaner air.

In this fiscal environment, we cannot afford to require the Defense Department to spend $26 a gallon on green fuels because it makes the liberal politicians in Washington and their green supporters feel good. Every scarce defense dollar should be spent on defense, not on politically-driven anti-fossil fuel programs.

#### Their tradeoffs risk miscalculated wars—our internal link outweighs their link turns.

Gates 11—US Secretary of Defense [Robert M. Gates, “Notre Dame Commencement,” Notre Dame University, Notre Dame, IN, Sunday, May 22, 2011, pg. http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1568]

The problems we as a nation are grappling with are well-known: steep fiscal imbalances and mounting debt, which could develop into a deep crisis for our country.  At the same time, we face a complex and unpredictable international security environment that includes a major war in Afghanistan, winding up the war in Iraq, revolution throughout the Middle East, new rising powers, nuclear proliferation in Iran and Korea, the continued threat of terrorism, and more.

While the challenges I’ve described are unique to this moment in history, their scale is no greater than others this country has dealt with and successfully overcome.  We have battled slavery and intolerance in our own society, and on the global stage prevailed against Nazi Germany and Soviet Communism.  We have seen periods of painful economic collapse give way to renewed and unprecedented prosperity.  Our progress has been sometimes unsteady, and sometimes too slow.  Winston Churchill purportedly said during World War II, “you can always count on the Americans to do the right thing—after they’ve tried everything else.”

But our national story has been, and still is, the envy of the world.  Indeed, the death of Osama Bin Laden after a decade-long manhunt by the United States reminded us earlier this month that, as President Obama said, when faced with tough times “we do not falter.  We don’t turn back.  We pick ourselves up and we get on with the hard task of keeping our country strong and safe.”

Still, we cannot assume, because things have worked out in the past, that the problems we face will eventually solve themselves.  We need the active involvement of our best, most honest citizens, to make our democracy work—whether as candidates for public office, as civil servants, as members of our armed forces or other roles.

And no matter how many smart or talented individuals make up our government, in order to make progress in confronting our most pressing problems, we need leaders able to make tough choices and to work together.  President Kennedy, who in the early 1960s inspired so many young people—like me—to public service, was fond of pointing out that, in the mid-19th century, some of the finest statesmen this nation has ever produced served in Congress.  Men of prodigious talent such as Henry Clay, John C. Calhoun, Thomas Hart Benton and Stephen Douglas, among others.  Yet Kennedy would note that this group, despite their profound integrity and skill and intelligence, could not ultimately stave off a bloody, and ruinous, civil war.

Today, we face challenges that do not threaten America’s unity and very existence as directly­­­­­­­­­­­, but they are in some ways just as complex.  And if there’s consensus in Washington on one thing, it is that we cannot put off dealing with this crisis any longer.  But going forward, we must be clear-eyed about the fact that there are no painless answers.

As we make the tough choices needed to put this country’s finances in order and to secure our future prosperity—including the sacrifices that will be required of all Americans—there will undoubtedly be calls to shrink America’s role in the world—for us to sharply reduce our international commitments and the size and capabilities of our military.  I would like to address these calls, in this place and at this time.

A recurring theme in America for nearly a century has been a tendency to conclude after each war that the fundamental nature of man and the iron realities of nations have changed.  That history in all of its unpredictable and tragic dimensions has come to a civilized end.  That we will no longer have to confront foreign enemies with size, steel, and strength.  Another tendency, repeated over the last century, has been for Americans repeatedly to avert our eyes in the belief that remote events elsewhere in the world need not engage this country—from the assassination of an Austrian archduke in unknown Bosnia–Herzegovina in 1914 to the rise of a group called the Taliban in Afghanistan and their alliance with an organization called Al Qaeda in the 1990s.  The lessons of history tell us we must not diminish our ability or our determination to deal with the threats and challenges on the horizon, because ultimately they will need to be confronted.

If history—and religion—teach us anything, it is that there will always be evil in the world, people bent on aggression, oppression, satisfying their greed for wealth and power and territory, or determined to impose an ideology based on the subjugation of others and the denial of liberty to men and women.  More than any other Secretary of Defense, I have been a strong advocate of soft power—of the critical importance of diplomacy and development as fundamental components of our foreign policy and national security.  But make no mistake, the ultimate guarantee against the success of aggressors, dictators, and terrorists in the 21st century, as in the 20th, is hard power –the size, strength, and global reach of the United States military.

Beyond the current wars, our military credibility, commitment, and presence are required to sustain alliances, to protect trade routes and energy supplies, and to deter would-be adversaries from making the kind of miscalculations that so often lead to war.

All of these things happen mostly out of sight and out of mind to the average American, and thus are taken for granted.  But they all depend on a properly armed, trained and funded American military, which cannot be taken for granted.

Now to be sure, a strong military cannot exist without a strong economy underpinning it.  At some point fiscal insolvency at home translates into strategic insolvency abroad.  As part of America getting its financial house in order, the size of our defense budget must be addressed.  That means culling more bureaucratic excess and overhead, taking a hard look at personnel and costs, and reexamining missions and capabilities to separate the desirable or optional from the essential.  Throughout this process we should keep in mind historian Donald Kagan’s observation that the preservation of peace depends upon those states seeking that goal having both the preponderant power and the will to accept the burdens and responsibilities required to achieve it.  And we must not forget what Winston Churchill once said, that “the price of greatness is responsibility…the people of the United States cannot escape world responsibility.”

#### The budget has been calibrated to maintain an effective deterrent—the hard choices have already been made.

Parrish 1/6/12 [Karen Parrish, “Panetta: Coming Budget Cuts Demand Careful Balance,” American Forces Press Service, Jan. 6, 2012, pg. http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66698]

WASHINGTON, Jan. 6, 2012—The coming round of defense budget cuts will differ from previous drawdowns, “where the threat kind of went away,” Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta said yesterday.

Terrorism remains a danger, and Iran, North Korea, China and the Middle East pose key defense concerns, Panetta told Jeffrey Brown on the PBS “Newshour” program. DOD must retain the power to counter these and other pressures while reducing redundant structures, trimming its force size, scaling back weapons modernization and adjusting compensation, the secretary noted.
The interview followed yesterday’s budget strategy announcement, during which Panetta and Joint Chiefs Chairman Army Gen. Martin E. Dempsey joined President Barack Obama in an unprecedented Pentagon briefing.

“We are at a strategic turning point,” the secretary told PBS. “We just ended the war in Iraq. We're in a transition course … in Afghanistan. We just completed the NATO mission in Libya. We've made significant progress against terrorism, particularly al-Qaida.”

Given the remaining threats, the change in war footing, and the mandate to slash spending, “what we've got to do is … have a flexible, adaptable, agile force that can deal with a myriad of challenges in today's world. That's what we've got to be able to develop,” Panetta said.

The secretary added some detail to two topics emphasized during the strategy guidance rollout: increased emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region, and the acknowledgement that some risk comes with deep defense cuts.

“What are the risks? When you're smaller and leaner, you're not going to have that large a presence throughout the world,” he noted. An effective smaller force will need to mobilize quickly, bring advanced technology to bear, and rely on partnerships, the secretary said.

Mobilization demands both a strong logistics framework and a robust reserve component, Panetta said. But advanced technology demands ongoing research, innovation and implementation, all of which are costly, he added, and partner relationships require matching efforts from other nations, which also are resource-constrained.

“So you can see the risks that are out there,” Panetta said. “We think they're acceptable, but they are risks.”

But there is no risk that the U.S. military will become a one-front force, he emphasized.

“The United States has to have the capability to deal with more than one enemy … and win,” the secretary said.

The Asia-Pacific region calls for increased U.S. military attention because many factors there could develop into challenges, Panetta said: possible instability on the Korean peninsula, free movement of maritime commerce, nuclear proliferation, humanitarian crises and disasters are all issues that could trigger U.S. power being invoked.

“That's the reason we have got to focus an emphasis on the Pacific region,” he added.

The secretary said that emphasis includes maintaining a strong naval presence in the Pacific, maintaining a military presence in South Korea, pursuing the rotational Marine deployment to Australia the president announced in November, and looking for other, similar opportunities “to enhance our presence, to … indicate that we are a Pacific power and we are there to work with the countries in that area to try to maintain the peace.”

The 2013 defense budget request to be announced in the coming weeks reflects “a lot of hard choices,” Panetta said.

#### They risk wars with Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran.

Rubin 8/30/12—Resident scholar @ American Enterprise Institute and Senior lecturer @ Naval Postgraduate School [[Michael Rubin](http://www.commentarymagazine.com/author/michael-rubin/), "[Will Congress Take Military into the 1970s?](http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2012/08/30/will-congress-take-military-into-the-1970s/),” Commentary, 08.30.2012—1:15 PM, pg. http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2012/08/30/will-congress-take-military-into-the-1970s/

If entitlements are cutback, we know what will happen: the economy will expand and charities and faith communities will pick up the slack; the government will still care for the most needy. If the U.S. ability to project its power is reduced to beneath even Carter administration standards, then the world in which we function will be far different. This may be the Obama administration’s goal. After all, as the Foundation for Defense of Democracy’s Cliff May notes, the scariest statement to which the mainstream media has given short shift was his promise to then-Russian President Medvedev to pursue [even more devastating cutbacks](http://townhall.com/columnists/cliffmay/2012/08/16/obamas_future_flexibility/page/full/) once he no longer has to stand for election.

There will be no savings: When enemies perceive the United States as weak, they act. And—be they Russia, North Korea, China, or Iran—the United States has no shortage of adversaries.

## Link

#### The link is decisively negative—

The aff’s spending will force trade-offs among defense programs. Our evidence is A+ —it quotes Panetta, the Secretary of Defense, and indicates the first thing to be cut would be military modernization, tanking military readiness.

Prefer our evidence—the DoD’s budget reflects the “right mix” among force structure, modernization, and readiness now—different choices by Congress with produce a different mix—that’s Parrish.

#### Plan isn’t alternate financing – their ev says it’s not normal means

#### Reactors are expensive – default to pessimistic cost predictions—bias and empirics

Rosenkranz 10—Dr. Gerd Rosenkranz, holder of a doctorate in material science and graduate engineer in the field of metallurgy, completed his postgraduate studies in communication science and worked as a journalist for national daily and weekly newspapers for 20 years; at last until 2004 five years as editor for the Berlin office of the news magazine *Der Spiegel* specialised in environment and energy policy. Since October 2004 he is head of the department politics and public relations of Deutsche Umwelthilfe e.V. (German Environmental Aid) in Berlin. [September 2010, “Myths about nuclear energy,” Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, European Union, Brussels, http://www.boell.org/downloads/Rozenkrant\_UK\_web.pdf]

This has in no way halted the continual decline of nuclear energy that has been taking place for decades. In the USA eight years of aggressive pro-nuclear power politics under the Bush administration did not lead to the building of one new project. In Western Europe there are merely two construction sites. Nevertheless, studies have been launched since decades with the purpose of demonstrating the ability of new nuclear power plants to compete against other technologies for generating electricity. The drawback of these studies is that while at best their authors and sponsors believe the forecasts, potential investors do not. This is the first reason why there is so much uncertainty about the true costs of a new generation of reactors. There are no reliable data on the large overall cost pools, especially the costs relating to construction, financing, disposal and dismantling – due to the fact that nearly all the published estimates are evaluated by analysts with considerable scepticism. And this in turn is due to the fact that all these figures as a rule originate from constructors who want to sell the reactors or from governments, associations or lobby groups intent on gaining public support for the unpopular idea of nuclear energy by promoting at the very least the expectation of low electricity prices.

However, beyond these matters of self interest there are also problems from an objective perspective. Because each new series of reactor constructions so far has had to face the consequences of huge delays, costly compensation for ‘teething problems’ and lengthy periods of shut down, potential investors regard the ever optimistic prognoses of the builders of new reactors with the utmost discomfort. Their experience: for half a century the nuclear power industry has always been high on promises but short on delivery. In the USA almost half of the orders for over 250 reactors were later cancelled, mainly because the costs of the power plants eventually put into operation had on average more than doubled. The magazine *Forbes* called the collapse of the US nuclear industry in the middle of the 80s “the greatest management catastrophe in economic history”. Of the 1,000 nuclear power stations the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) had expected in the 70s for the turn of the century only about 13% were built. Reactor constructors in Western Europe and in the state economies of Eastern Europe also experienced similar situations.

There can be no reliable predictions as to the performance of a new power plant. This applies even more to the new types of reactors based on mainly untried technology. According to an analysis published in the summer of 2009, the New York rating agency, Moody’s, expects electricity supply companies supporting plans for the construction of new nuclear power plants to be routinely downgraded owing to the incalculable risks involved. Whereas new technologies – also those outside the field of power plant technology – normally move relatively continuously and predictably along a ‘learning curve’ with ever decreasing prices, reactor manufacturers after more than half a century since the start of commercial nuclear fission start over and over again. Therefore in the 1970s and 1980s reactor manufacturers built increasingly bigger reactors in the hope that they would produce, on the whole, cheaper electricity than smaller units. However, switching to economics of scale has not solved the problem. A trend towards less costly reactors has been an unfulfilled promise of reactor manufacturers for decades. Nuclear power remains a high risk technology not only considered from the safety point of view but also from the financial one.

#### SMRs are more expensive and produces more waste—Public will oppose

Baker 12—ASP Adjunct Junior Fellow [Matthew Baker, “Do Small Modular Reactors Present a Serious Option for the Military’s Energy Needs?” American Security Project, June 22, 2012, http://americansecurityproject.org/blog/2012/do-small-modular-reactors-present-a-serious-option-for-the-militarys-energy-needs/]

Unfortunately all the hype surrounding SMRs seems to have made the proponents of SMR technology oblivious to some of its huge flaws.

Firstly like large reactors, one of the biggest qualms that the public has to nuclear is problems associated with nuclear waste. A more decentralized production of nuclear waste inevitably resulting from an increase in SMRs production was not even discussed. The danger of transporting gas into some military bases in the Middle East is already extremely volatile; dangers of an attack on the transit of nuclear waste would be devastating.

Secondly, SMRs pose many of the same problems that regular nuclear facilities face, sometimes to a larger degree. Because SMRs are smaller than conventional reactors and can be installed underground, they can be [more difficult](http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2012/05/23/small-modular-reactors-by-2022-but-no-market-for-them/) to access should an emergency occur. There are also reports that because the upfront costs of nuclear reactors go up as surface area per kilowatt of capacity decreases, SMRs will in fact be more expensive than conventional reactors.

Thirdly, some supporters of SMR technology seem to have a skewed opinion of public perception toward nuclear energy. Commissioner of the [U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission](http://www.nrc.gov/), William C. Ostendorff, didn’t seem to think that the recent Fukushima disaster would have any impact on the development on SMRs. Opinion polls suggest Americans are more likely to think that the costs of nuclear outweigh its benefits since the Fukushima disaster. For SMRs to be the philosopher’s stone of the military’s energy needs the public needs to be on board.

The DESC’s briefing did illustrate the hype that the nuclear community has surrounding SMRs, highlighting some pressing issues surrounding the military’s energy vulnerability. But proponents of SMRs need to be more realistic about the flaws associated with SMRs and realize that the negative impacts of nuclear technology are more costly than its benefits.

#### AND, military SMRs leads to public opposition.

Carmen et al. 10—CNAS Senior Military Fellow Commander [CDR Herbert E. Carmen, Christine Parthemore (CNAS Bacevich Fellow) & Will Rogers (CNAS Research Assistant), “Broadening Horizons: Climate Change and the U.S. Armed Forces,” Center for a New American Security, April 2010]

If improving energy security includes all strategic assets, personnel and logistics involved ¶ with a given base’s activities, then the definition of islanding would similarly need to expand to include parts of the greater community around ¶ the base, for example nearby ports. There is also ¶ a concern over negative public image that could ¶ stem from military bases having vast energy ¶ resources while the surrounding communities ¶ experience disruptions and other problems. This ¶ speaks to the idea that promoting nuclear energy ¶ for the purpose of creating islanding capabilities ¶ for bases would require careful definition of the ¶ goals of this approach and intricate planning. Pg. 19-20

#### This will gut the military budget and hollow out the forces

Skelton 12—Former Chair of the House Armed Services Committee [Ike Skelton, “The Civil-Military Gap Need Not Become a Chasm,” Joint Force Quarterly 64, January 2012, http://www.ndu.edu/press/civil-military-gap.html]

The lack of communication and understanding between the military and society could be detrimental to the military, as it could result in decreased support for ongoing wars, as Richard Cohen suggests we are seeing now. Decreased public support for war efforts amid larger economic difficulties could lead to reductions in the defense budget, increased difficulty in recruitment and retention, and even cuts in military benefits, personnel, training, and equipment. As the American public becomes more disconnected from the military, it will be less willing to lend full support to military endeavors. One of the lessons from Vietnam is that it is difficult and perhaps impossible to sustain a war effort without the understanding and active support of the people.

The growing gap in civil-military relations could have negative impacts on retention, in terms of both quality and quantity. Many of the most talented people may choose to leave the military sooner than they otherwise would if they believe their hard work, dedication, and service are not valued by society. Ultimately, if the military has trouble attracting and retaining high-caliber, intelligent, and motivated individuals, it may become something less than it is today. That has not happened yet, but it is something to watch out for.

#### Security protection will cause a trade off

Carmen et al. 10—CNAS Senior Military Fellow Commander [CDR Herbert E. Carmen, Christine Parthemore (CNAS Bacevich Fellow) & Will Rogers (CNAS Research Assistant), “Broadening Horizons: Climate Change and the U.S. Armed Forces,” Center for a New American Security, April 2010]

Many serious complications must be weighed ¶ as well. Military base personnel often do not ¶ have the necessary training in nuclear reactor ¶ management, oversight and regulatory credentials. Nuclear reactors would necessitate ¶ additional qualified personnel and improved ¶ physical security requirements to meet the 24/7 ¶ operations needs. As with siting for all energy ¶ production, local public resistance could be ¶ problematic. When considering the impact of ¶ a reactor casualty, the resulting impact on the ¶ operational mission effectiveness of the tenant ¶ commands on the base must also be considered ¶ so as to avoid a single point vulnerability that disables all military operations on site. And ¶ while many private companies are touting new ¶ designs for small reactors that would work well ¶ in this capacity, the technology may still be years ¶ away from fully meeting technical requirements ¶ and federal regulatory standards.13 Proliferation ¶ considerations would also need to be part of any ¶ adjudication of what types of reactors are most ¶ suitable for these purposes. Pg. 19

# case

## Solvency

#### They will oppose the long-term lease structure

**Dixon et al. 05** – Chair in Sustainable Futures in the Built Environment @ University of Reading [Dr. Timothy Dixon, Gaye Pottinger (¶ Senior Research Officer in the ¶ College of Estate Management @ University of Reading), Alan Jordan (Lecturer in the ¶ College of Estate Management @ University of Reading), “Lessons from the private finance initiative in the UK: Benefits, problems and critical success factors,” Journal of Property Investment & Finance 23. 5 (2005): 412-423.

Lack of long-term flexibility in PFI contracts was also a major concern amongst interviewees for the project. Whereas the private sector is responding to the increasing pace of change in business environments by moving to shorter leases, the government is going in the opposite direction and signing up to very long-term agreements. Achieving flexibility through PFI, therefore, depends on careful negotiation of contracts to incorporate strategies for dealing with obsolescence and change.

Innovation represented one of the principal ways in which PFI was intended to deliver cost savings in the provision of infrastructure and services and there are signs that raised public sector expectations are not being met.

There are two main perspectives on criticism of lack of innovation, particularly in building design. First that consortia are responding to risk transfer by adopting tried and tested solutions to project delivery, leading to concerns that cost savings in PFI have been achieved at the expense of looked-for improvements in design and service quality. In this sense it is suggested that PFI is acting as a barrier to innovation.

Second, interviewees suggested that public sector expectations have been unrealistic, that the emphasis should be on functionality rather than design quality, and that the main innovation represented by PFI will prove to be through the whole life approach to project delivery.

## defense

### Asian defense

#### No Asia wars – international organizations and stability.

Desker, 2008

[Barry, Dean of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, At the IISS-JIIA Conference 2-4 June 2008, “Why War is Unlikely in Asia: Facing the Challenge from China”, http://www.iiss.org/conferences/asias-strategic-challenges-in-search-of-a-common-agenda/conference-papers/why-war-in-asia-remains-unlikely-barry-desker/]

War in Asia is thinkable but it is unlikely. The Asia-Pacific region can, paradoxically, be regarded as a zone both of relative insecurity and of relative strategic stability**.** On the one hand, the region contains some of the world’s most significant flashpoints – the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the Siachen glacier – where tensions between nations could escalateto the point of resulting in a major war. The region is replete with border issues, the site of acts of terrorism (the Bali bombings, Manila superferry bombing, Kashmir, etc.), and it is an area of overlapping maritime claims (the Spratly Islands, Diaoyutai islands, etc). Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area of strategic significance, sitting astride key sea lines of communication (SLOCS) and important chokepoints. Nevertheless, the Asia-Pacific region ismore stablethan one might believe. Separatism remains a challenge but the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism is a nuisance but its impact is contained. The North Korean nuclear issue, while not fully resolved, is at least moving toward a conclusionwith the likely denuclearization of the peninsula. Tensions between China and Taiwan, while always just beneath the surface, seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict (especially after the KMT victories in Taiwan). The region also possesses significant multilateral structures such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the nascent Six Party Talks forum and, in particular, ASEAN, and institutions such as the EAs, ASEAN + 3, ARF

which ASEAN has conceived. Although the United States has been the hegemon in the Asia-Pacific since the end of World War II, it will probably not remain the dominant presence in the region over the next 25 years. A rising China will pose the critical foreign policy challenge, probably more difficult than the challenge posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This development will lead to the most profound change in the strategic environment of the Asia-Pacific. On the other hand, the rise of China does not automatically mean that conflict is more likely. First, the emergence of a more assertive China does not mean a more aggressive China. Beijing appears content to press its claims peacefully (if forcefully), through existing avenues and institutions of international relations. Second, when we look more closely at the Chinese military buildup, we find that there may be less than some might have us believe, and thatthe Chinese war machine is not quite as threatening – as some might argue. Instead of Washington perspectives shaping Asia-Pacific affairs, the rise of China is likely to see a new paradigm in international affairs – the “Beijing Consensus” – founded on the leadership role of the authoritarian party state, a technocratic approach to governance, the significance of social rights and obligations, a reassertion of the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference, coupled with support for freer markets and stronger regional and international institutions. The emphasis is on good governance. Japan fits easily in this paradigm. Just as Western dominance in the past century led to Western ideas shaping international institutions and global values, Asian leaders and Asian thinkers will increasingly participate in and shape the global discourse, whether it is on the role of international institutions, the rules governing international trade or the doctrines which under-gird responses to humanitarian crises. An emerging Beijing Consensus is not premised on the rise of the ‘East’ and decline of the ‘West’, as sometimes seemed to be the sub-text of the earlier Asian values debate. I do not share the triumphalism of my friends Kishore Mahbubani and Tommy Koh. However, like the Asian values debate, this new debate reflects alternative philosophical traditions. The issue is the appropriate balance between the rights of the individual and those of the state. This debate will highlight the shared identity and shared values between China and the states in the region. I do not agree with those in the US who argue that Sino-US competition will result in “intense security competition with considerable potential for war” in which most of China’s neighbours “will join with the United States to contain China’s power.”[1] These shared values are likely to reduce the risk of conflict and result in regional pressure for an accommodation with China and the adoption of policies of engagement with China, rather than confrontation with an emerging China. China is increasingly economically inter-dependent, part of a network of over-lapping cooperative regional institutions. In Asia, the focus is on economic growth and facilitating China’s integration into regional and global affairs. An interesting feature is that in China’s interactions with states in the region, China is beginning to be interested in issues of proper governance, the development of domestic institutions and the strengthening of regional institutional mechanisms. Chinese policy is not unchanging, even on the issue of sovereignty. For example, there has been an evolution in Chinese thinking on the question of freedom of passage through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. While China supported the claims of the littoral states to sovereign control over the Straits when the Law of the Sea Convention was concluded in 1982, China’s increasing dependence on imported oil shipped through the Straits has led to a shift in favour of burden-sharing, the recognition of the rights of user states and the need for cooperation between littoral states and user states. Engagement as part of global and regional institutions has resulted in revisions to China’s earlier advocacy of strict non-intervention and non-interference. Recent Chinese support for global initiatives in peace-keeping, disaster relief, counter-terrorism, nuclear non-proliferation and anti-drug trafficking, its lack of resort to the use of its veto as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and its active role within the World Trade Organisation participation in global institutions can be influential in shaping perceptions of a rising China. Beijing has greatly lowered the tone and rhetoric of its strategic competition with the United States, actions which have gone a long way toward reassuring the countries of Southeast Asia of China’s sincerity in pursuing a non-confrontational foreign and security strategy. Beijing’s approach is significant as most Southeast Asian states prefer not to have to choose between alignment with the US and alignment with China and have adopted ‘hedging’ strategies in their relationships with the two powers. Beijing now adopts a more subtle approach towards the United States: not directly challenging US leadership in Asia, partnering with Washington where the two countries have shared interests, and, above all, promoting multilateral security processes that, in turn, constrain US power, influence and hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is certainly in the midst of perhaps the most ambitious upgrading of its combat capabilities since the early 1960s, and it is adding both quantitatively and qualitatively to its arsenal of military equipment. Its current national defence doctrine is centered on the ability to fight “Limited Local Wars”. PLA operations emphasize preemption, surprise, and shock value, given that the earliest stages of conflict may be crucial to the outcome of a war. The PLA has increasingly pursued the acquisition of weapons for asymmetric warfare. The PLA mimics the United States in terms of the ambition and scope of its transformational efforts – and therefore challenges the U.S. military at its own game. Nevertheless, we should note that China, despite **a “deliberate and focused course** of military modernization,” is still at least two decades behind the United States in terms of defence capabilities and technology. There is very little evidence that the Chinese military is engaged in an RMA-like overhaul of its organizational or institutional structures. While the Chinese military is certainly acquiring new and better equipment, its RMA-related activities are embryonic and equipment upgrades by themselves do not constitute an RMA. China’s current military buildup is still more indicative of a process of evolutionary, steady-state, and sustaining – rather than disruptive or revolutionary – innovation and change. In conclusion, war in the Asia-Pacific is unlikely but the emergence of East Asia, especially China, will require adjustments by the West, just as Asian societies have had to adjust to Western norms and values during the American century. The challenge for liberal democracies like the United States will be to embark on a course of self-restraint.

#### Disputes inevitable, they don’t escalate.

##### Swanström & Kokubun, ‘8

[Niklas, Program Director of the Central Asia -Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, Ryosei, Director, Institute of East Asian Studies, Keio University, “Sino-Japanese Relations: The Need for Conflict Prevention and Management,” <http://www.c-s-p.org/flyers/9781847186201-sample.pdf>]

The Sino-Japanese relationship during the last decade has been marked by political strife and tension both among the elite as well as at the grassroots. Fortunately, this has not escalated into a military conflict, even though the tension has been troublesome, especially at a political level. Throughout this period, trust between the states and their populations has decreased and both peoples have commonly viewed the “other side” with a great deal of skepticism. This has changed since 2006, but the political relationship is still very fragile and with the demise of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and the emergence of a new leader in Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda it is relatively difficult to predict future development and how China will perceive these changes. Furthermore, the political reshuffling that occurred at the seventeenth Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party has been largely unnoticed despite its importance for the bilateral relations. The political tension between China and Japan has been reinforced by negative perceptions at the grassroots. Nonetheless the current tension is not only a question regarding tension over contemporary issues but it also has a strong historical linkage that is still vivid, especially for the Chinese. Japan’s occupation of sizeable areas of China in the first half of the 20th century and—according to the Chinese a failure by the Japanese to apologize for this—still is crucial for China. History has been widely used by both sides, at times justifiably and at other times seemingly more to stir up confusion and cause tension. It is important to note here that the large majority of the ruling elite is eager to improve the relations between the two states and they have viewed recent improvements in relations with keen interest.

#### No escalation.

Berry, 2001

[Nicholas, Center for Defense Information Senior Analyst, Defense Monitor, “Disputes don't escalate”, XXX:4, May, http://www.cdi.org/dm/2001/issue4/asiansecurity.html]

What emerges from this historical memory is an environment loaded with latent hostility that makes the region's international security relations a fragmented array of bilateral ties. In effect, the widespread latent hostility in the region inhibits multilateral initiatives, security coalitions, and cooperative ventures which the United States sought under President Bill Clinton. "Peace is in pieces," as one academic phrased it in a different context. China, as the most assertive, rising power in this fractured environment, will play an ever-increasing role in determining the level of tension in the region. China is challenging American pre-eminence in Asia. It is not an overstatement to say that how well Beijing and Washington handle this competition will be the big story in the early decades of the 21st century. Much of the latent hostility remains in the background, only occasionally bursting forth into public disputes. Thus, major war remains unlikely. Nevertheless, security cooperation in this setting will be difficult.

### Arctic D

#### Their ev is alarmism -- cooperation outweighs in the Arctic.

Macalister, 7-6-11

[Terry, energy editor of the Guardian, “US and Russia stir up political tensions over Arctic,” <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/06/us-russia-political-tensions-arctic>]

The message was clear: the US is putting itself at the centre of the debate about the future of the far north at a time when a new oil and mineral "cold rush" is under way as global warming makes extraction more easy. And being the US, the soft diplomacy was backed up with a bit of symbolic hardware. A few weeks earlier two nuclear-powered submarines were sent to patrol 150 miles north of Prudhoe Bay, Alaska. Meanwhile Russia – also on the eight-nation council – was happy to push off the agenda any idea that countries such as China could gain observer status. The US navy move comes as Russia is said to have increased missile testing in the region and Norway has moved its main military base to the far north. Meanwhile China has started to woo countries such as Greenland, which are rich in rare earth minerals needed for mobile phones and other hi-tech equipment. The competing commercial interests in the Arctic are complicated by the lack of a comprehensive agreement on who owns what. Many countries are in the process of submitting competing land claims to the UN as part of its Law of the Sea Convention – a treaty as yet unsigned by the US. Canada and others were also disturbed when Artur Chilingarov, a veteran Russian polar explorer, placed a flag on the Arctic seabed in 2007. He told reporters his mission was to show the Arctic was Russian, adding: "We must prove the north pole is an extension of the Russian landmass." Canada took exception to the Russian move, seeing it as provocative, but Moscow dismissed the furore, insisting it was a theatrical gesture by a scientist hired by private companies to make the descent. But it is telling that the following year Chilingarov – also a member of the state parliament – was awarded a new title, Hero of the Russian Federation. Concerns about a new cold war – if not just a cold rush – have led academics such as Rob Huebert, a professor of political science at the University of Calgary, to warn in a recent paper prepared for the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute that "an arms race may be beginning". Huebert says he has heard the Russian prime minister, Vladimir Putin, talking of the need to establish a "zone of peace" in the Arctic but sees contrary actions as well. "Not withstanding the public statements of peace and co-operation in the Arctic issued by the Arctic states, tThe strategic value of the region is growing. As this value grows, each state will attach a greater value to their own national interests in the region. The Arctic states may be talking co-operation, but they are preparing for conflict." Meanwhile Admiral James Stavridis, Nato's supreme allied commander in Europe, in a foreword to a recent Whitehall Ppaper published by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies in London, argued: "For now, the disputes in the north have been dealt with peacefully, but climate change could alter the equilibrium over the coming years in the race of temptation for exploitation of more readily accessible natural resources." Stavridis believes military assets, such as coastguards, have an important role to play with international co-ordination in the area – but mainly for specialist assistance around commercial and other interests. He added: "The cascading interests and broad implications stemming from the effects of climate change should cause today's global leaders to take stock, and unify their efforts to ensure the Arctic remains a zone of co-operation – rather than proceed down the icy slope towards a zone of competition, or worse a zone of conflict." Huebert points out that as well as opening a new ultra-hi-tech operations centre inside a mountain at Reitan, in the far north of Norway, Oslo is also spending unprecedented money on new military hardware, not least five top-of-the-range frigates. The class of vessel is called Fridtjof Nansen, after the famous polar explorer, which perhaps indicates where the navy plans to deploy them. Meanwhile Canada's then foreign minister, Lawrence Cannon, voiced confidence his nation would win the territory. "We will exercise sovereignty in the Arctic," he told his Russian counterpart in talks in Moscow. But optimists say the fears are exaggerated and point to positive developments, not least Norway and Russia agreeing a mutually acceptable boundary line dividing up the Barents Sea. A partnership between Russia, Norway, the US and Britain has been quietly and successfully working away at decommissioning nuclear submarines and tackling other radioactive waste problems in the Kola Peninsula and Arkhangelsk regions. One former foreign minister told the Guardian: "We want to avoid complacency but all this alarmist talk of meltdown should be shunned. The Arctic is quite pacific. It is not a place of turmoil but an area of low tension."

### Water wars lit flawed

#### Water wars lit is flawed

Katz, ’11 [David Katz is Director of the Akirov Institute for Business and Environment at Tel Aviv University. He is also Adjunct Lecturer at Tel Aviv University’s Recanati School of Management and Porter School of Environmental Studies where he teaches courses in environmental and resource economics and corporate environmental strategy. “Hydro-Political Hyperbole:”. Global Environmental Politics, Volume 11, Number 1, February 2011. <http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.library.emory.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v011/11.1.katz.html>]

A number critiques have been leveled against both the theory and the empirical evidence behind the water wars hypothesis. One critique of the environmental security literature, of which much of the published material on water wars is guilty, is that warnings and threats of future violence are often considered as evidence.28 Statements from the 1980s that the next war in the Middle East will be over water have already proven false. Research has shown, however, that even the more general predictions of imminent water wars that are based on comments by officials may be suspect. Leng, for instance, found no correlation between the frequency of threats of war and the onset of war.29 Examining conflict and cooperation over water resources, Yoffe and colleagues noted over 400 incidents of water-related verbal exchanges by political figures between 1948 and 1999 that were conflictual in nature, but only 37 instances of violent conflict of varying levels of intensity. Thirty of these were from the Middle East, none were [End Page 15] more recent than 1970, none were all-out wars, and in none was water the central cause of conflict.30

Proponents of water war scenarios often premise their dire conclusions on the fact that water is essential for life and non-substitutable.31 Yet water for basic needs represents a small share of total water use, even in arid countries.32 Economists and others point out that over 80 percent of world freshwater withdrawals are for the agricultural sector, a relatively low-value use and one in which large gains in efficiency could be made by changes in irrigation techniques and choice of crops. Thus, economic critiques of the water war hypothesis stress that the value of water that would be gained from military conflict is unlikely to outweigh the economic costs of military preparation and battle, much less the loss of life.33

Some authors have even questioned the empirical basis for the conclusion that freshwater is increasingly scarce,34 an assumption on which the water war hypothesis relies. Such a “cornucopian” view claims that people adapt to scarcity through improvements in technology, pricing, and efficiency—rendering water less scarce, not more so.

Perhaps the strongest case against the likelihood of water wars is the lack of empirical evidence of precedents. Wolf found only one documented case of war explicitly over water, and this took place over 4500 years ago.35 Moreover, he could document only seven cases of acute conflict over water. Yoffe and colleagues also find that armed conflict over water resources has been uncommon.36 They found that cooperation was much more common than conflict, both globally and in all world regions except the Middle East/North Africa. This pattern may explain why only a limited number of case studies of water conflict are presented in the water wars literature.

Analysts have criticized environmental security arguments that are based on case studies because such works tend to have no variation in the dependent variable.37 Many large sample statistical studies have attempted to address such shortcomings, however, in several cases these studies too have come under fire. For instance, a number of large-sample statistical studies find correlations between water-related variables and conflict, however, few, if any, provide convincing support for causal relationships. Moreover, several studies found that water availability had no impact on the likelihood of either domestic or international conflict,38 including at least one study that attempted to replicate earlier studies [End Page 16] that claimed to have found such correlations.39 Moreover, the results of several studies that do find correlations between water and conflict are either not robust or are contrasted by other findings. For instance, Raleigh and Urdal find that the statistical significance of water scarcity variables is highly dependent on one or two observations, leading them to conclude that actual effects of water scarcity “are weak, negligible or insignificant.”40 Jensen and Gleditsch find that the results of Miguel and colleagues are less robust when using a recoding of the original dataset.41 Gleditsch and colleagues found that shared basins do predict an increased propensity for conflict, but found no correlation between conflict and drought, the number of river crossings, or the share of the basin upstream, leading them to state that “support for a scarcity theory of water conflict is somewhat ambiguous.”42