# HEG

### 2NC Overview—Tech

#### Weak global regulations risk the accidental release and weaponization of convergence technologies like nanotech, AI, robotics, and biotechnology. We must shift our decision calculus away from short-term thinking to guarantee planetary survival. That’s Masciulli.

#### AND, our impact is 100 million times greater than nuclear war—You should vote neg even if 99% of humanity will perish.

Ćirković 8—Professor of Physics @ University of Novi Sad in Serbia and Senior Research Associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade [Milan M. Ćirković Ph.D. (Fellow of the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies), “How can we reduce the risk of human extinction?,” Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, September 17, 2008, pg. http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/print/2606]

The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, humanity is still threatened by the possibility of a global thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter. We may face evengreater risks from emerging technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might make it possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction-level pandemics. The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are more accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens are self-replicating, allowing a small arsenal to become exponentially destructive. Pathogens have been implicated in the extinctions of many wild species. Although most pandemics “fade out” by reducing the density of susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The intentional or unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of causing human extinction. While such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore’s Law.

Farther out in time are technologies that remain theoretical but might be developed this century. Molecular nanotechnology could allow the creation of self-replicating machines capable of destroying the ecosystem. And advances in neuroscience and computation might enable improvements in cognition that accelerate the invention of new weapons. A survey at the Oxford conference found that concerns about human extinction were dominated by fears that new technologies would be misused. These emerging threats are especially challenging as they could become dangerous more quickly than past technologies, outpacing society’s ability to control them. As H.G. Wells noted, “Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe.”

Such remote risks may seem academic in a world plagued by immediate problems, such as global poverty, HIV, and climate change. But as intimidating as these problems are, they do not threaten human existence. In discussing the risk of nuclear winter, Carl Sagan emphasized the astronomical toll of human extinction:

A nuclear war imperils all of our descendants, for as long as there will be humans. Even if the population remains static, with an average lifetime of the order of 100 years, over a typical time period for the biological evolution of a successful species (roughly ten million years), we are talking about some 500 trillion people yet to come. By this criterion, **the stakes are** one million times greater **for extinction than for** the more modest **nuclear wars that kill “only” hundreds of millions** of people. There are many other possible measures of the potential loss—including culture and science, the evolutionary history of the planet, and the significance of the lives of all of our ancestors who contributed to the future of their descendants. Extinction is the undoing of the human enterprise.

There is a discontinuity between risks that threaten 10 percent or even 99 percent of humanity and those that threaten 100 percent. For disasters killing less than all humanity, there is a good chance that the species could recover. If we value future human generations, then reducing extinction risks should dominate our considerations. Fortunately, most measures to reduce these risks also improve global security against a range of lesser catastrophes, and thus deserve support regardless of how much one worries about extinction.

### 2NC Multilat – solves impact

Multilateral cooperation solves their offense –

1. Cooperation – it generates self-perpetuating cooperation and confidence that obviates the need for imposed solutions – that’s Pouillot.

2. Constraints – multilateral commitments discincentivize aggression – creates a soft landing for declining heg – that’s He.

### 2NC I/L xt

#### Unipolarity prevents multilateralism

#### 1. Power maximization – in a unipolar world the US is unconstrained from pursuing a power-maximization strategy. Only decline prompts policymakers to pay the lock-in price of multilateralism to preserve security. The shift from selective engagement to hegemony after the economic proves there is a direct relationship with US power. That’s He.

#### 2. The bipartisan compact – unipolarity causes partisan squabbling in foreign policy – lack of a credible threat reduces political discipline – prevents effective liberal engagement. That’s Kupchan.

#### [\*\*\*] Prefer our evidence – it’s from peer reviewed professors not neonservative hacks with no truth filter

### 2NC I/L—Unipolarity Prevents Multilat

#### Unipolarity directly trades off with multilateralism.

Carranza 10—Professor of Political Science at Texas A & M University-Kingsville [Mario E. Carranza, “Reality Check: America's Continuing Pursuit of Regional Hegemony,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.31, No.3 (Dec 2010), pp.406–440]

Whether the 21st century will witness a decline of US hegemony is an open question. Yet the evidence presented in this article casts serious doubts on the unipolar optimists’ contention that the United States can do pretty much anything in the international arena without almost any systemic constraints. According to Brooks and Wohlforth, ‘as the concentration of power increases beyond a certain threshold, systemic constraints on the leading state’s security policy become largely irrelevant’.151 Yet Brooks and Wohlforth and other unipolar optimists completely overlook ‘the instability of [American] power, the uncertainties of power, and the perennial difficulty of translating power into desired outcomes, especially desired and durable outcomes in an increasingly complex world’.152 Despite the enormous military power possessed by the United States, and the considerable economic power still at its disposal, it has become increasingly unable to translate its structural power into desired outcomes in South America and South Asia. The evidence presented in this article shows that the Bush administration’s drive for global dominance has not achieved its objectives. Instead, it has created an ‘incoherent empire’153 or—as Andrew Hurrell puts it—an ‘empire of insecurity’. The post-9/11 liberal hegemonic order favoured by Ikenberry can still be established, but only if the United States becomes a ‘normal’ great power respecting the rules of the international society of states. Brooks and Wohlforth argue that unipolarity gives the United States a 20-year window of opportunity to revise international law legitimizing ‘exemptions for the United States from existing and emerging global rules’, but it is precisely this kind of revisionism that undermines US legitimacy as the global hegemon in the eyes of South American and South Asian political elites and public opinion.

What are the prospects for sustainable American hegemony? Even if the Obama administration continues the Bush administration’s drive for primacy, one may argue that the American ‘empire of insecurity’ will not last because it will lack the financial means to stay alive. Many experts believe that the relative increase in economic power by China, India, and other rising regional powers will make US military preponderance less important in the era of globalization.154 The global financial crisis that began in the United States in the Fall of 2008 shows the fragility of the Bush administration’s strategy of global dominance. As Robert Skidelsky argues, ‘By getting other countries to finance its imperial pretensions, the US government has been able to live beyond its means’.155 For how long? The historical record shows that a strong economy is the foundation of lasting imperial power.156 The global economic crisis of 2008–2010, the looming fiscal crisis in the United States, and doubts about the future of the dollar (the Chinese government has proposed to replace the dollar as the international reserve currency) have revived the debate on American decline.157

Yet the Obama administration may not succumb to the ‘hegemon’s temptation’ to overextend itself beyond its means, thus accelerating its collapse. As Robert Jervis points out, ‘Americans do not think of themselves as imperialists, like to be liked, and resist prolonged projects that do not show convincing signs of success’.158 This is confirmed by a CNN poll released in September 2009 showing that 57 per cent of Americans who have an opinion about the war in Afghanistan oppose it. According to a McClatchy-Ipsos survey 56 per cent of Americans oppose sending more US combat troops to that country. President Obama has emphasized the role of diplomacy in American foreign policy and has abandoned the excesses of a foreign policy that seriously neglected diplomacy, especially during the first George W. Bush administration. Whether he will abandon the Bush Doctrine—which justifies unilateralism and preventive wars—is an open question. The Obama administration has rhetorically praised the virtues of multilateralism, thus recovering a certain amount of soft power (especially in Europe and Latin America) unnecessarily squandered during the Bush administration. However, it has not renounced preventive strikes and it has not trimmed the military budget. As Pieterse notes, ‘Past administrations combined multilateralism and the pursuit of primacy’.159 If the Obama administration continues following the path to global dominance it will probably threaten the status of the United States as a presumably benign hegemon, without necessarily improving its security.

The alternative policy option for the United States is to abandon the search for global dominance. This policy change would have a greater impact on US policy toward Latin America, where the fig leaf of ‘multilateralism’ through the Organization of American States (OAS) has never been big enough to cover up the fact of US military preponderance, due to a long history of US military interventions in Central America and the Caribbean and the looming threat of military interventions in South America under the cover of Plan Colombia and the ‘war on drugs’. The United States needs to renew its commitment to genuine multilateralism, and reengage the region, in order to overcome the benign neglect of the Bush administration while establishing an effective and lasting partnership with South America for dealing with common economic and security challenges in the 21st century. The Obama administration could strike such a deal with Brazil and its junior partners in Mercosur, but it would have to abandon the ‘hegemonic presumption’. Instead of securitizing radical populism a` la Chavez as a new threat, the Obama administration should address the economic security concerns of countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. As Jason Tockman shows, the rise of radical populist regimes in the region is not a passing fad and has real roots in the disastrous consequences of the failure of the neoliberal model sponsored by the United States to deliver economic security in the 1990s.160

Can the United States abandon the ‘hegemonic presumption’ in South Asia? One may argue that the GWoT has ‘forced’ the United States to abandon ‘offshore balancing’ in South Asia, seeking instead to militarily control the region, as part of the strategy of global military dominance announced in the National Security Strategy of 2002. However, Bush administration officials justified the nuclear deal with India using Waltz’s defensive realist arguments.161 Using similar arguments, Condolezza Rice had argued during the 2000 presidential campaign that the United States should pay closer attention to India’s role in the balance of power in Asia (the broader region) and not only South Asia.162 As a result, the United States is now helping India to become a great power in the global arena, in order to ‘contain’ China’s rise. India is expected to play a key role in the American path to global dominance; but as I have shown, India is unlikely to be so easily manipulated as a client state or to abandon its cherished strategic autonomy. As I have argued, this US strategy may backfire, creating a potential threat to US security, as India continues its nuclear and missile build up. On the other hand, the Obama administration could follow the alternative path of bringing nonproliferation back in to the regional agenda; as part of a broader effort to make progress toward global nuclear arms control and disarmament, along the lines of Obama’s Prague speech of 5 April 2009.163 This policy shift would require the abandonment of the post-9/11 subordination of US nonproliferation policy toward South Asia to the GWoT, putting pressure on India and Pakistan to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) while freezing their stockpiles of weapons-grade fissile materials bilaterally, or as part of a global Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT).

John Ikenberry has argued that the United States can still keep the status of a global liberal hegemon despite the rise of China and India and despite the loss of legitimacy of American hegemony during the Bush administration due to the disastrous Iraq war and the enormous damage that its appalling behaviour over torture and prisoners of war has done to its reputation abroad. According to Ikenberry, ‘despite Washington’s imperial temptation, the United States is not doomed to abandon rule-based order’.164 However, as Layne notes, other states know that they cannot in the end trust the United States as a law-abiding actor: ‘The United States can profess a due regard for others’ interests and a commitment to multilateralism, but everyone knows that whenever it chooses to do so it can break free from multilateralism’s constraints and use its power unilaterally to others’ detriment’.165

Will the United States become a benign hegemon, by playing by the rules of international society? Alternatively, will it become increasingly ‘useless’ for the international society of states? As Hurrell notes, ‘It is an illusion of the critics of the Bush administration that there is an easy, readymade multilateral alternative waiting in the wings. . .The hard-line hegemonist “we can do it alone” is clearly wrong. But the liberal hegemonist version, “we can do it together” depends on who “we” are, on what “it” is, and what is meant by “together”’.166

After the Bush administration’s failed attempt to impose ‘Pax Americana with teeth’ to the rest of the world **there are** **two possible scenarios**: (1) **the U**nited **S**tates **could abandon the ‘hegemonic presumption’** and the post-9/11 search for global dominance **and adopt a truly multilateral approach to** **global issues**, **from** terrorism **to the impending danger of** environmental breakdown, **or** (2) **the U**nited **S**tates **could** attempt to **re-stabilize its hegemony** by ‘manufacturing consent’ in the Gramscian sense, i.e., winning the approval of the majority of the international community to its leadership, and regaining at least some of the soft power lost in the Bush years. Only by becoming a normal member of the international society of states can the United States convert its currently incoherent ‘imperial’ status into real international hegemony and find its way in the new world of the 21st century. In South America, abandoning the Monroe Doctrine may be the only way of building consent and laying the basis for a mature partnership with the region. In South Asia, the United States has been partly successful in ‘manufacturing consent’ with India, as in the US–India nuclear deal or the ‘New Framework’ military agreement of June 2005; but ‘manufacturing consent’ is a tall order in Pakistan, where, as Christine Fair points out, ‘the US will fail to better align with Pakistan unless it can mitigate “the trust deficit”’;167 including Pakistan’s fears about India, that have been exacerbated by the US tilt toward India during the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. Many regional observers argue that the United States must abandon the ‘dreams of empire’ of the Bush era, and adapt its foreign policy to the new geopolitical realities of the 21st century, including the possible emergence of a post-hegemonic ‘world of regions’, in which the United States would be an indispensable actor to solve global problems, but it would be no longer perceived as arrogant and unilateralist. It will be difficult for the United States to find its way in this new world. Yet one may argue that the search for global dominance—even after 9/11—is not ‘worth the candle’,168 and has proved counterproductive. As Robert Cox argues, the challenge for the United States is to transcend the deadly dialectic of ‘empire’ vs. ‘terror’, which converts the GWoT into a war without end:

The state system remains the most feasible means for restoring legitimacy in global governance. Its primary challenge is to induce an American ‘hyperpower’ to abandon the mirage of ‘exceptionalism’ and bring the USA back into membership along with other states in a community of nations.169 **By abandoning the ‘imperial temptation’ the U**nited **S**tates **would be able to make a unique contribution to the implementation of a new security agenda that would** go beyond a narrow conception of the American national interest and **take into consideration the urgent need to achieve** economic and human security **in** Latin America, South Asia, and the rest of **the global South**. This would represent a major shift in post-9/11 American foreign policy, but coupled with **a renewed commitment to genuine multilateralism** it **would** make possible to win the GWoT while **recover**ing **the ability to translate American** structural **power into** agential power and **desired outcomes** both **in the economic and security issue areas**. A return to the liberal international order of the post-World War II era—as suggested by G. John Ikenberry—would be a tall order in the present international environment. On the other hand, a post-9/11 new ‘liberal’ bargain would face a problem of credibility: would it be a ‘genuine institutional engagement’?170 Alternatively, would the United States continue paying lip service to international institutions even as it continues pursuing its own international agenda? A new liberal ‘grand bargain’ would have to provide real assurances of self-restraint and institutional self-binding to regional powers such as Brazil and India, and would require abandoning the drive for global dominance while listening to other voices in the planet. The United States cannot be a leader without followers. However, if it can win acceptance for its preeminence from the rest of the international society of states (scenario 2 above), as ‘first among equals’ it can make a unique contribution to the establishment of a common security regime for the survival of [hu]mankind in the 21st century. Pg. 430-434//gender modified

#### Power disparities discourage multilateral commitments—Cold war proves.

Ikenberry 11—Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University [G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order, 2011]

In addition to renegotiating institutional bargains, the leading state might also make changes in its more basic strategies of rule, which I have described as rule through rules and rule through relationships. During the period of Cold War bipolarity, the United States built order around both these strategies. Each has its attractions as a mechanism to assert political control. Rule through rules involves the negotiation of multilateral agreements that, if successful, can provide a wide-open space of predictable and efficient cooperative relations—and they can help foster a shared sense of legitimacy in the overall international order. The cost to the leading state depending on how strong and undifferentiated the rules in fact are—is in lost autonomy and the ability to directly manipulate specific states.

Rule through relationships involves negotiating bilateral agreements and building patron-client pacts. The attraction of these bilateral relationships is that the leading state can assert more direct control without incurring the costs associated with making binding rule-based agreements. As noted in chapter 3, this is the logic that helps explain America's different strategies of rule in Europe and East Asia in the postwar era. The United States tended to pursue multilateral strategies with Europe and bilateral strategies with East Asia. With Europe, **the U**nited **S**tates had a full agenda: it **wanted a great deal of ongoing cooperation** with its Atlantic partners **and was willing to make multilateral institutional commitments**. With East Asia, the United States wanted less and dominated these states more, and so it could gain the political control it wanted through bilateral pacts without losing its freedom of action. In the shift: from Cold War bipolarity to unipolarity, the attraction of this sort of bilateral strategy of rule would appear to grow. and supporting centrist democratic governments. These goals could not be realized simply by exercising power directly. To get what it wanted, the United States had to bargain with the Europeans, and this meant agreeing to institutionally restrain and commit its power. In East Asia, the building of order around bilateral pacts was more desirable because multilateralism would entail more restraints on American freedom of action.

In the shift: from Cold War bipolarity to unipolarity, the attraction of this sort of bilateral strategy of rule would appear to grow. With greater power disparities between itself and various other states, the United States will want less from them and therefore will be less inclined to entangle itself in rule-based arrangements. The end of the Cold War also contribute to the rule-through-relationship logic, at least as it relates to security. Without a common security threat—such as that imposed by the Soviet Union—the security needs of states are more differentiated. Some will seek American security protection and others will not. The United States also has more differential sorts of security relations with these states. These considerations appear to make bilateral relations—and rule through relationships—more attractive to the unipolar state. But there are also cross-cutting incentives that favor multilateral arrangements. I will return to them later in the chapter Pg. 141-142

### 2NC I/L—Decline leads 2 multilat

#### Power decline will force US leaders to turn to multilateralism.

Ikenberry 11—Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University [G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order, 2011]

The judgments that leaders within the unipolar state make about the country's future power position are a second factor. If these leaders believe that the unipolar distribution of power is semipermanent—that is, that it will last into the foreseeable future—they will be less responsive to the lock-in possibilities of rules and institutions. If, on the other hand, leaders believe that unipolarity will give way in the decades ahead to a bipolar or multipolar distribution of power, they are likely to have a different view of the value of these rule-based mechanisms of governance. An optimistic assessment of the durability of unipolar power will give leaders reasons to ignore losses in legitimacy. The normative approval of the international order led by the unipolar state can decline, but if the material basis of unipolar power remains in place, the leaders can calculate that they can still achieve their goals without the full consent of other states. The costs of lost autonomy associated with making binding commitments to rules and institutions can be avoided—at least, to the extent that those commitments are made primarily for cultivating legitimacy and consent.

But if leaders in the dominant state judge that the unipolar distribution of power will soon or eventually wane, a different set of calculations about rules and institutions are likely. There will be incentives for the unipolar state to put in place a set of rules and institutions that can last beyond unipolarity, creating a favorable institutional environment for the lead state as its relative power declines. The investment incentive for rules and institutions emerges as a consideration in the thinking of the lead state.50 This calculation does not need to stand alone as a factor that shapes the leading state s views on strategies of rule. It is a consideration that will presumably weigh in the balance as decisions are made on specific institutional agreements and on the more general orientation of the state to the character of international order under conditions of unipolarity. pg. 152-153

### 2NC Fettweis—Empirics

#### Hegemonic stability theory is wrong, that’s Fettweis—

1. Global stability exists because of self-policing, not unipolarity. The coexistence of unipolarity and a decrease in global wars is a coincidence. The US can’t force peace on the world if the majority is not politically vested in sustaining the current order.

2. They misread allied threat perception—no country has ever completely contracted out their national security. Their rearm scenarios assume that US allies have made a decision to disarm in the face of an impending military threat. Such a decision is unprecedented in international history. The fact is they do not share the threat perceptions of US neocons and the fact that they are not currently militarizing only proves they don’t perceive Russia, China or any “rogue states” to be a threat.

3. The only empirical data sides with us—the US made massive military cuts in the 90s without triggering regional arm races or security dilemmas. US military posture has empirically had no impact on regional security dynamics.

Empirics trump neocon insanity—you can’t make accurate IR predictions without some grounding in the past. Their impact is based on hubris.

#### Their defense of unipolarity is plagued by conceptual confusion and methodological laziness.

Yang 10—Ph.D Candidate in the Politics & International Relations Program @ University of Southern California [Xiangfeng Yang, The Unipolar Challenge: Power, Culture and Authority and the Advent of War, March 25, 2010, pg. [http://www.stockholm.sgir.eu/uploads/The%20Unipolar%20Challenge,%203rd%20Draft.pdf](http://www.stockholm.sgir.eu/uploads/The%20Unipolar%20Challenge%2C%203rd%20Draft.pdf)]

Turning the conventional wisdom on its head, the positivist intellectual enterprise on unipolarity is seriously impeded by not just conceptual confusion but also the lack of methodological rigor. Conceptually, most researchers, many realists included, are slow to realize that the character of unipolarity is fundamentally different phenomenon from bipolarity and multipolarity and that the study of unipolarity presupposes a new set of analytical assumptions most of the time, if not always. Methodologically and theoretically, the obsession with contemporary US hegemony gives the impression that unipolarity is historically unprecedented, such that scholars use the evidence based on which their hypotheses are developed to test their theoretical propositions, a huge taboo in positivist research (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994). The upshot is often that their policy projections leap far ahead of their theoretical and empirical analyses: the same evidence can be interpreted in rather divergent ways, or that the falsification of their theory still awaits what China or the United States will do in the future.8 pg. 13

#### US restraint is risk free—interdependence and institutions will keep the peace.

Fettweis 10—Professor of Political Science at Tulane University [Christopher J. Fettweis, Dangerous Times?: The International Politics of Great Power Peace, 2010]

If the only thing standing between the world and chaos is U.S. the military presence, then an adjustment in grand strategy would be exceptionally counter-productive. But it is worth recalling that **none of the other explanations for the decline of war—**nuclear weapons, complex economic **interdependence**, international and domestic **institutions, evolutions in** ideas and **norms**—**necessitate an activist America to maintain their validity**. Were America to become more restrained, nuclear weapons would still affect the calculations of the would-be aggressor; the process of globalization would continue, deepening the complexity of economic interdependence; the United Nations could still deploy peacekeepers where necessary; and democracy would not shrivel where it currently exists. Most importantly, the idea that war is a worthwhile way to resolve conflict would have no reason to return. As was argued in chapter 2, normative evolution is typically unidirectional. Strategic restraint in such a world would bevirtually risk free**.** pg. 175-176

### AT: Kagan

#### Kagan is wrong about everything—he ignores reality.

Bacevich 8—Andrew J. Bacevich, Professor of History and International Relations at Boston University (July/August, 2008, “Present at the Re-Creation,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 87, Issue 4, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Premier)

Despite his newfound realism, Kagan balks at considering the possibility that the United States and Americans ought to change. He makes no effort to assess whether the Bush administration's recent revival of an expansionist conception of statecraft serves U.S. interests today. Has the doctrine of preventive war enhanced the well-being of the American people? Has the pursuit of President Bush's "freedom agenda" improved the United States' standing in the world? Or have the policies devised in the wake of 9/11 squandered the United States' power and multiplied its problems?

Although there is abundant empirical evidence bearing directly on these questions, Kagan evinces almost no interest in such data. He has little time for contemplating the costs of Bush's aggressive policies in the Middle East, even though, according to some estimates, the price of the Iraq war alone may reach into the trillions of dollars. Key indicators of basic economic health—such as the size of the national debt, the strength of the dollar, the extent of the trade deficit, and the country's ever-increasing dependence on imported oil—do not figure in his analysis, even though they all have worsened under President Bush.

For Kagan, the United States remains indispensable. It "is still the keystone to the arch," he writes. "Remove it, and the arch collapses." Here, Kagan the recent convert to realism gives way to Kagan the unrepentant neoconservative, who refuses to acknowledge that the United States' traditional foreign policy of expansionism has long been counterproductive. From the end of the Revolutionary War through the 1950s, expansionism did enhance U.S. power and wealth, and it did make freedom possible for ever larger numbers of Americans. But that correlation came undone in the 1960s. Recent efforts at expansion—such as President Bush's ill-fated attempt to pacify the Muslim world—have served only to dissipate U.S. power while weakening the U.S. economy and creating pretexts for the government to curtail individual freedoms at home. Expansionism no longer offers a way out—and this fact, as much as and perhaps more so than the rise of China or the resurgence of Russia, defines the world that must be reckoned with today. But Kagan, eager to move on, bury the Iraq war, and whitewash the entire post-9/11 era, which he and other neo-conservatives have so profoundly misunderstood, cannot or will not acknowledge this new reality.

#### Don’t believe a word Robert Kagan writes—he has less than zero credibility.

Greenwald 7—Glenn Greenwald, Columnist for Salon, attorney, political and legal blogger, and best-selling author (March 11, 2007, “Why would any rational person listen to Robert Kagan?,” *Salon*, http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/2007/03/11/kagan/, Accessed 09-06-2008)

No rational person would believe a word Robert Kagan says about anything. He has been spewing out one falsehood after the next for the last four years in order to blind Americans about the real state of affairs concerning the invasion which he and his comrade and writing partner, Bill Kristol, did as much as anyone else to sell to the American public.

In April, 2003, Kagan declared the war over and said we won. Since then, he has continuously claimed that things were getting better in Iraq. He is completely liberated from any obligation to tell the truth and is a highly destructive propagandist whose public record of commentary about Iraq ought to disqualify him from decent company, let alone some sort of pretense to expertise about this war.

### AT: wohlforth

#### Wohlforth is wrong—his methodology understates the likelihood of war in unipolar systems.

Monteiro 12—Nuno P. Monteiro, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2011/2012 (“Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful,” *International Security*, Volume 36, Number 3, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals Online, p. 15-17)

Wohlforth offers a concise argument that unipolarity is peaceful:

[T]he current unipolarity is prone to peace. The raw power advantage of the United States means that an important source of conflict in previous systems is absent: hegemonic rivalry over leadership of the international system. No other major power is in a position to follow any policy that depends for its success on prevailing against the United States in a war or an extended rivalry. None is likely to take any step that might invite the focused enmity of the United States. At the same time, unipolarity minimizes security competition among the other great powers. As the system leader, the United States has the means and motive to maintain key security institutions in order to ease local security conflicts and limit expensive competition among the other major powers. For their part, the second-tier states face incentives to bandwagon with the unipolar power as long as the expected costs of balancing remain prohibitive.38 [end page 15]

Wohlforth claims not only that the unipole can stave off challenges and preclude major power rivalries, but also that it is able to prevent conflicts among other states and create incentives for them to side with it.39 The unipole’s advantage is so great that it can settle any quarrel in which it intervenes. As Wohlforth writes, “For as long as unipolarity obtains, . . . second-tier states are less likely to engage in conflict-prone rivalries for security or prestige. Once the sole pole takes sides, there can be little doubt about which party will pre- vail.”40 This is the core logic of Wohlforth’s argument that unipolarity is peaceful. But what specifically does his argument say about each of the six possible kinds of war I identiaed in the previous section?

Clearly, great power war is impossible in a unipolar world. In Wohlforth’s famous formulation: “Two states measured up in 1990. One is gone. No new pole has appeared: 2 - 1 = 1.”41 Furthermore, by arguing that unipolarity precludes hegemonic rivalries, Wohlforth makes no room for wars between the sole great power and major powers. These are, according to him, the two main reasons why a unipolar world is peaceful. Unipolarity, he writes, “means the absence of two big problems that bedeviled the statesmen of past epochs: hegemonic rivalry and balance-of-power politics among major powers.”42

I agree with Wohlforth on these two points, but they are only part of the picture. Granted, the absence of great power wars is an important contribution toward peace, but great power competition—and the conflict it might engender—would signal the emergence of one or more peer competitors to the unipole, and thus indicate that a transition to a bipolar or multipolar system was already under way. In this sense, great power conflict should be discussed [end page 16] within the context of unipolar durability, not unipolar peace. Indeed, including this subject in discussions of unipolar peacefulness parallels the mistakes made in the debate about the Cold War bipolar system. Then, arguments about how the two superpowers were unlikely to-fight each other were often taken to mean that the system was peaceful. This thinking ignored the possibility of wars between a superpower and a lesser state, as well as armed conflicts among two or more lesser states, often acting as great power proxies.43

In addition, Wohlforth claims that wars among major powers are unlikely, because the unipole will prevent conflict from erupting among important states. He writes, “The sole pole’s power advantages matter only to the degree that it is engaged, and it is most likely to be engaged in politics among the other major powers.44 I agree that if the unipole were to pursue a strategy of defensive dominance, major power wars would be unlikely. Yet, there is no compelling reason to expect that it will always follow such a course. Should the unipole decide to disengage, as Wohlforth implies, major power wars would be possible.

At the same time, Wohlforth argues that the unipole’s power preponderance makes the expected costs of balancing prohibitive, leading minor powers to bandwagon. This is his explanation for the absence of wars between the sole great power and minor powers. But, as I show, the costs of balancing relative to bandwagoning vary among minor powers. So Wohlforth’s argument underplays the likelihood of this type of war.

Finally, Wohlforth’s argument does not exclude all kinds of war. Although power preponderance allows the unipole to manage conflicts globally, this argument is not meant to apply to relations between major and minor powers, or among the latter. As Wohlforth explains, his argument “applies with less force to potential security competition between regional powers, or between a second-tier state and a lesser power with which the system leader lacks close ties.”45 Despite this caveat, Wohlforth does not fully explore the consequences of potential conflict between major and minor powers or among the latter for his view that unipolarity leads to peace.

### AT: lashout

### 2NC AT: N/U—Reintervene/Latch-on

#### They have to win this arg to win the debate—

**1. This is pure conjecture**—it is counter-intuitive to think the US would use its declining material power by going to war instead of finding ways to shore up remaining power. We challenge them to provide ONE HISORICAL EXAMPLE that supports their claim.

**2. The alternative is multilat**—the 90s prove that the US decline will cause it to latch on to multilateral institutions as a way to lock-in the current order. That’s our He ev. History should be your guide—it is a superior predictor because it is not tainted by ideology.

**3. Unipolarity causes the impact**—unipolarity and the political polarization that it produces are the primary cause of Bush-style unilateralism. Decline will force Congress to shift to the center and support multilateralism. Their lashout scenario will only occur in world of US unipolarity. That’s Kupchan & Trubowitz.

#### The only comprehensive study proves no transition impact.

MacDonald & Parent 11—Professor of Political Science at Williams College & Professor of Political Science at University of Miami [Paul K. MacDonald & Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 7–44]

In this article, we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments.

First, we challenge the retrenchment pessimists’ claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers, peaceful retrenchment is the most common response, even over short time spans. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61–83 percent. When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations.

Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but necessity is the mother of invention, and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Knowing only a state’s rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined.

Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. Faced with diminishing resources, great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics, retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, retrenchment can be successful. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position. Pg. 9-10

#### Unipolarity causes intervention—social evolution theory proves.

Tang & Long 11—Professor of International Relations @ Fudan University & Professor of history @ Nanyang Technological University [Shiping Tang & S.R. Joey Long “America’s military interventionism: A social evolutionary interpretation,” European Journal of International Relations, May 11, 2011, pg. 1–30]

Our social evolutionary approach has also been able to synthesize negative selection and positive learning organically. According to our framework, how a state behaves in the international system depends on the ideas that it has selected, socialized, and internalized among its constituents, but this whole process of selection and socialization occurs within both the human brain and a particular material setting. Thus, ideas that cannot operate well in a particular ideational and material context will diminish or be eliminated in the long run whereas ideas that survive and thrive within the context tend to dominate the collective consciousness of the people living in that society. Because America’s blessed geographical location and advantages in aggregate power amplified by technological prowess tend to make ideas that favor military adventurism more viable than those that advocate caution, ideas that favor military adventurism have entrenched themselves (or have been diffused) among American elites and the public more stubbornly than among their British and French counterparts.

Hence, although most states in the international system have been selected and socialized to adopt a more moderate stance in global politics, the United States remains an exception. The geographical location and power of the United States have impeded the ability of the (negative) selection and learning process to transform America into a more war-averse state among the great powers. Put simply, because the United States has not suffered as severely as other countries in war due to specific material circumstances, it has not been motivated to select war-averse defensive postures in international politics. Specific material circumstances have enabled America to escape the harsh devastation of war. Consequently, the American elite and populace have less adverse memories of war than their counterparts in other major states. Those clamoring for military action overseas in public debates have usually trumped those advocating military restraint. In the marketplace of ideas on ‘national security’, which inevitably engages American nationalism/patriotism (Cramer, 2007), military interventionism has usually triumphed and America has been the most war-prone among the contemporary great powers.

In contrast, military adventurism generally receded in other major states after World War II. Other powers such as Britain, China, France, and Russia, not to mention Germany and Japan, do not possess the strategic depth, power resources, and social backing to endure a military defeat or quagmire, and hence will be more hesitant to engage in military adventurism. As a result, the elites, but especially the citizenry, of other major powers have consistently expressed less willingness to entertain military intervention in faraway places than those of the United States since 1945.

The blessing of geography and the preponderant power that America has developed over the course of its history may have been of benefit to American security, but they have also enabled America to act in a belligerent manner. As a result, Americans’ blessing also becomes a curse to those on the receiving end of US military interventions as well as to those American military servicemen who risk their lives on battlefields to advance the policy of their interventionist state.

We believe that our interpretation has synthesized material forces and ideational forces into a more coherent framework for understanding America’s military interventionism better than existing studies, either by realists or constructivists. Although both groups recognize that ideas are what immediately underpin specific policies and behaviors, neither has attempted to link material factors with ideational factors more tightly. In contrast, we show that the material pillars — the United States’ geographical location and aggregate power — form the bedrock upon which the ideational edifice that influences US behavior in international affairs sits. We do not deny that ideational factors have played important roles in propelling the United States to intervene militarily abroad. But we do argue that **without some material foundation**, especially the two crucial material factors we accentuate here, **an exclusively ideational explanation of US military intervention abroad cannot be complete and satisfactory.**

Perhaps a simple counterfactual will drive our point home. Suppose the United States were located at the heart of the European continent and were not endowed with immense power. Successive generations of American citizens would have endured the recurring devastating experiences of military conflict. Under these circumstances, would we expect American elites and the public to have been so supportive of their country’s military adventures abroad? The answer, most likely, will be a strong ‘No’.

Conclusion - Geography gives the United States a security environment that other major powers envy. Unlike other major powers, the United States does not have to worry about the potential threat posed by an adversarial and comparatively powerful state situated contiguously to it. America’s geographical location is indisputably a blessing to its people.

In a perfect world, the benign security environment in which the United States finds itself may also have likely benefited other states. Because America is located some distance away from another major continent, the stopping power of water makes it less able to pursue outright occupation of other states located in other regions. As a result, other states have less to fear even if the United States is inherently territory-hungry. With its enormous power, America then could act as the ultimate ‘offshore balancer’. America’s geographical situation and its enormous power could in turn become a blessing to international security.

In the real and imperfect world, however, the protection conferred on the United States by geography has often turned out to be a curse for other countries — and ultimately for America too. The oceans and America’s enormous power and technological might have shielded American elites and the public from the true face of war. Absent the stopping power of adverse memories of war, American elite and public opinion has remained far more supportive of military intervention conducted by their government abroad than the citizens of other major powers since World War II.

Indeed, the United States has been able to behave in an abrasive and proselytizing manner internationally because geography and preponderant power affords it a comforting sense of security. While a state’s foreign policy is necessarily informed by a set of beliefs, active exportation of one’s beliefs through hard power inevitably makes the state very threatening to others that do not share those beliefs. Because no country can be insulated from America’s exercise of its vast power, other states invariably fear it and question its motives, even if American intentions are not malevolent. America’s blessing again becomes a curse to other states and ultimately to the United States as well. Meanwhile, America’s elites and public, informed by an ethnocentric sense of providence and self-righteousness, often cannot appreciate why other countries fear America’s enormous power and its promotion of its supposedly universal beliefs. This apathy toward other countries’ fears inevitably exacerbates the security dilemma and/or spiral between America and other countries. Pg. 19-21

### 2NC Jervis—No GP war

#### No great power wars, that’s Jervis—

1. Path dependence makes it unthinkable—the barriers to great power wars are so robust that peace has become self-perpetuating. Even if unipolarity was necessary to build peace, path dependence makes hegemony unnecessary to sustain it.

2. Low levels of political enmity prevent conflict escalation—this is the first time in history that all major powers are at peace. The preexisting high levels of political hostility that were prerequisites for previous wars don’t exist. You should be highly skeptical about their historical analogies.

3. Their ev is media hype—profit and tenure support are greater for alarmism than clarion calls of peace. Their ev are products of the neocon propaganda machine that is ideologically driven and academically distorted.

### 2NC A2 oil

**Extend the 1nc Mityakov et al. – The US doesn’t get oil from countries that refuse to support its international agenda. The US only trades with countries that it has positive relations with and prevents the need to go to war to preserve access to oil.**

**The increase share of imports from Canada, Brazil and Mexico at the same time that imports from the Mideast are declining proves our arg. Diplomacy and alliances – not aggression – is the primary US strategy for sustaining oil imports.**

 **AND, while our study is robust, they have no empirical support for the claim that the US goes to war to preserve oil access. The most likely scenario for energy war in the Mideast is with a country we are not trading with – Iran. Additionally, we were not trading with Iraq at the time of US invasion. There is not a credible argument for the US going to war with a country that provides us oil.**

**Budgetary constraints prevents Gulf states from curtailing supply – They will sale it as long as they have it**

**Helm 11** – Professor of Energy Policy @ University of Oxford [Dieter Helm, “Peak oil and energy policy—a critique,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Volume 27, Number 1, 2011, pp. 68–91

For members of OPEC, facing rapid population growth, budgetary constraints, revolutions, wars, and serious political challenges to most of their regimes, the temptation to cheat on output quotas is very great. Once the political and ethnic characteristics of each OPEC state (and Russia) are considered in detail, it is obvious that much divides OPEC, and that the political unity necessary to restrict oil supplies on anything other than a temporary basis is largely absent. Indeed, ironically it is OPEC’s internal political conflicts—notably between Iran and its Gulf neighbours—that pose the greatest immediate threat to oil supplies. Add in the economic problems that the OPEC cartel faces—notably different costs, and lack of transparency and enforcement—and the surprise is that OPEC ever managed to act as an effective cartel. It is therefore unsurprising that the economic modelling of OPEC as a cartel has not produced clear-cut results (see Almoguera et al. (2011) in this issue).

Inevitably such pressures tell. In the next few years, OPEC will face the problem of accommodating the return of Iraq to world markets, a possible change of regime in Iran, the growing exports of Russia, and the growing roles of Angola, Nigeria, and Venezuela. Already Angola is a major supplier to China, and Africa ranks high as a source of US imports. Iraq is targeting a rise from 2.5m to 10m barrels by 2020—more than Saudi Arabia’s current production—and Saudi Arabia has built in considerable swing capacity, in part a response to the growing political and military threat from Iran. Pg. 73 //AT: backstopping

**US will diversify away from political opponents**

**Mityakov et al. 11** – Professor of Economics @ Clemson University [Sergey Mityakov, Heiwai Tang (Professor of Economics @ Tufts University, & Kevin K. Tsui (Professor of Economics @ Clemson University) Energy Security and International Relations: Evidence from Oil Import Diversification, March 2011, pg. <http://www.econ.cuhk.edu.hk/dept/seminar/10-11/2nd-term/PoliticsOilTradeCUHK.pdf>

Controlling for oil exporters’ endowment and potential supply disruption due to civil conflict, standard gravity controls, as well as country and year fixed effects, we find that the United States imports significantly less crude oil from her political opponents. In our baseline specification, we find that a one standard deviation increase in political distance (approximately the increase in political distance between the United States and Venezuela during the Chávez administration) reduces US oil imports by more than 0.7 log points. The result is robust to controlling for economic sanctions and militarized interstate disputes, and hence the political oil import diversification is more than a wartime phenomenon. Interestingly, we also find that the incentives to diversify the sources of US oil imports are stronger when the oil exporting countries are nondemocratic. However, such a political import diversification is either weaker or nil for other non-strategic commodities, and the effect is also absent among other oil importers who are not major powers. Pg. 4

**Domestic production solves**

**Preston 12** - Economist @ TD Ameritrade [Leslie Preston, “Risiong U.S. Energy Independence: What Does It Mean For Canada,” TD Economics, May 3, 2012, pg. <http://www.td.com/document/PDF/economics/special/lp0512_energy_independence.pdf>]

The U.S. currently imports 22% of its energy consumption, which has already fallen from a peak of 27%. Reduced dependency on foreign energy has been driven by a combination of increased domestic crude oil and natural gas production, and reduced demand due to increase efficiency standards, greater use of ethanol in gasoline, and rising prices altering consumption patterns.

Currently, coal is the largest domestically-produced source of energy, and the U.S. is already net exporter of coal. Booming production of shale gas has led the U.S. to surpass Russia to be the top producer of dry natural gas, but it does still import 14% of its consumption (90% of that from Canada). U.S. imports of natural gas are down 25% from in 2007, and those piped in from Canada have fallen 18% over the same period.

Perhaps the more impressive part of America’s declining reliance on imported energy is the 30% drop in net imports of oil and petroleum products since their peak in 2005. That has led the import share of consumption to fall from 64% to 44% in the first quarter of this year – the lowest level since 1996 (see Chart 1). The main driver of this trend has been declining U.S. demand for petroleum products, which has fallen 13% since its peak in the first quarter of 2007. Rising domestic crude oil production has played a supporting role, up 15% over the same period, but starting from a much lower level so it has contributed a relatively smaller 0.8 M b/d to the import decline (see Chart 2).

However, Canada has bucked the declining-import trend over the past few years, increasing its shipments of crude oil and petroleum products to the United States. That means Canada has increased its relative share of U.S. imports to roughly 25%, and is now America’s largest individual supplier of oil (OPEC as a whole is still 40%). Pg. 2

# Counterplan

### Solvency

### 2NC Solves Warming

#### The CP solves warming through carbon sequestration and the prevention of NO2 and methane emissions from agriculture --- biochar would be able to sequester more CO2 than the totality of fossil fuel emissions by the end of the century without displacing coal --- that’s the MIT Tech Review.

#### It’s the closest we’ve got to a silver bullet.

Alok Jha, 3/13/2009. Green technology correspondent for the Guardian (UK). “'Biochar' goes industrial with giant microwaves to lock carbon in charcoal,” The Guardian, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/mar/13/charcoal-carbon>.

Giant microwave ovens that can "cook" wood into charcoal could become our best tool in the fight against global warming, according to a leading British climate scientist. Chris Turney, a professor of geography at the University of Exeter, said that by burying the charcoal produced from microwaved wood, the carbon dioxide absorbed by a tree as it grows can remain safely locked away for thousands of years. The technique could take out billions of tonnes of CO2 from the atmosphere every year. Fast-growing trees such as pine could be "farmed" to act specifically as carbon traps — microwaved, buried and replaced with a fresh crop to do the same thing again. Turney has built a 5m-long prototype of his microwave, which produces a tonne of CO2 for $65. He plans to launch his company, Carbonscape, in the UK this month to build the next generation of the machine, which he hopes will process more wood and cut costs further. He is not alone in touting the benefits of this type of charcoal, known as biochar or biocharcoal. The Gaia theorist, James Lovelock, and Nasa's James Hansen have both been outspoken about the potential benefits of biochar, arguing that it is one of the most powerful potential solutions to climate change. In a recent paper, Hansen calculated that producing biocharcoal by current methods of burning waste organic materials could reduce global carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere by 8ppm (parts per million) over the next 50 years. That is the equivalent of three years of emissions at current levels. Turney said biochar was the closest thing scientists had to a silver-bullet solution to climate change. Processing facilities could be built right next to forests grown specifically to soak up CO2. "You can cut trees down, carbonise them, then plant more trees. The forest could act on an industrial scale to suck carbon out of the atmosphere." The biochar could be placed in disused coal mines or tilled into the ground to make soil more fertile. Its porous structure is ideal for trapping nutrients and beneficial micro-organisms that help plants grow. It also improves drainage and can prevent up to 80% of greenhouse gases such as nitrous oxides and methane from escaping from the soil. In a recent analysis of geo-engineering techniques published in the journal Atmospheric Chemistry, Tim Lenton, a climate scientist at the University of East Anglia, rated producing charcoal as the best technological solution to reducing CO2 levels. He compared it to other geo-engineering techniques such as dumping iron in oceans or seeding clouds to reflect the sun's radiation and calculated that by 2100 a quarter of the effect of human-induced emissions of CO2 could be sequestered with biochar production from waste organic matter, giving a net reduction of 40ppm in CO2 concentration. Johannes Lehmann of Cornell university has calculated that it is realistically possible to fix 9.5bn tonnes of carbon per year using biochar. The global production of carbon from fossil fuels stands at 8.5bn tonnes.

#### Solves quickly --- we’d be out of the danger zone by the middle of the century.

Tim Flannery, 1/11/2008. Division of Environmental and Life Sciences Macquarie Uni. “Australian of the Year 2007, Tim Flannery talks bio char and why we need to move into the renewable age,” Beyond Zero Emissions, <http://www.beyondzeroemissions.org/2008/03/19/tim-flannery-australian-of-the-year-2007-talks-bio-char-why-we-need-to-move-into-the-renewable-age>.

Matthew Wright: In a recent address to the American Geophysical Union, Dr. James Hanson from NASA said that we need to go below 350 parts per million to have a stable atmosphere that we are used to experiencing for our agricultural needs, and our biodiversity and ecological systems. In terms of your call about trying to aim for say 5% sequestration per year over 20 years in order to remove that carbon debt, if we can get that going, how do you see, where do you see us going for a stable climate, a safe climate that can continue and maintain the huge populations that we've got around the world now?

Tim Flannery: Well that's a very good question. I mean I suppose implicit in James Hansons' comments is the reality that we are living right now with unacceptable climate risk, very high levels of unacceptable risk, and we need to draw that down as quickly as we can. Now if you used these agri-char based technologies and you have your aggressive reaforestation projects for the worlds tropics, you could conceivably be drawing down in the order of 10 to 15 tonnes, gigatonnes sorry, of carbon per annum by about 2030. At that rate we could bring ourselves down below the dangerous threshold as early as the middle of this century, but whether the world can actually get its act together and do that is another matter. This is the first real directed experiment at planetary engineering that we are talking about here, and we don't really have the political structures in place to enable us to implement the technology that we already have. So I would see the change basically as a political one. Its a global political change and the Kyoto process that rolls out now from Potsdam this year and then Copenhagen next year will be the key factors in the success or failure of us humans to do that.

### 2NC AT: Storage Fails

#### Storage failure evidence doesn’t assume biochar --- its highly stable for centuries and gets tilled directly into soil. Risks associated with storage in aquifers or oil wells do not apply --- that’s MIT Tech Review.

#### Problems with other sequestration technologies don’t apply.

Christoph Steiner, June 2010. phD from the University of Bayreuth and a MSc. in Agriculture and Biology from the Universities of Göttingen and Salzburg. “BiochAr in AgricUltUrAl And forestry ApplicAtions,” The Center for Energy and Environmental Security @ U Colorado, www.biochar-us.org/pdf%20files/biochar\_report\_lowres.pdf.

Biochar carbon sequestration is fundamentally different to other forms of bio-sequestration. The issues of per- manence, land tenure, leakage, and additionality are less significant for biochar projects than for projects that sequester C in biomass or soil though management of plant productivity. Biochar carbon sequestration might avoid difficulties such as accurate monitoring of soil carbon which are the main barriers to inclusion of agricul- tural soil management in emissions trading. Using the turnover rate and the quantity of carbon has been sug- gested as a method to be used in assessment of the carbon sequestration potential (Gaunt and Cowie 2009) and that could be done independently from biochar’s use as soil amendment or other non-fuel purposes.¶ Biochar formation decelerates the carbon cycle with important implications for carbon management. Carbon dating of charcoal has shown some C material to be over 1500 years old, fairly stable, and a permanent form of carbon sequestration (Lal 2003). Kuzyakov et al. (2009) assessed a half-life of 1400 years for carbonized plant materials. Spokas et al. (2009) could not find mineralization of biochar in an incubation experiment. Assuming a constant supply of biomass and conversion to biochar and energy a difference in half-life of 100 or 1000 years would result in a negligible difference in the carbon sequestration potential (Gaunt and Lehmann 2008). Lenton and Vaughan (2009) rated biochar as the best geo-engineering option to reduce CO2.

#### Biochar storage is safe.

Tek Narayan Maraseni, Guangnan Chen, and Qian Guangren, October 2010. Australian Centre for Sustainable Catchments, University of Southern Queensland; National Centre for Engineering in Agriculture, Faculty of Engineering and Surveying, University of Southern Queensland; and School of Environmental & Chemical Engineering, Shanghai University. “Towards a faster and broader application of biochar: appropriate marketing mechanisms,” International Journal of Environmental Studies 67.6, 851–860.

Biochar has enormous GHG benefits. On a global scale, ‘a strategy combining biochar with biofuels could ultimately offset 9.5 billion tons of carbon per year - an amount equal to the total current fossil fuel emissions’ [26]. In the USA alone, pyrolysis of forest residue, crop resi- due and fast growing vegetation, can sequester 30% of the USA’s annual fossil fuel emissions. Even if the GHG benefit of biochar only is considered, biochar production and application would still remain economically viable in the USA when the value of the avoided CO2 emissions reaches U$37/t [17]. Given lower labour and resource costs in developing countries, biochar would be feasible, even at lower prices than those in the USA. Similarly, if we move from ‘slash and burn’ to ‘slash and char’ systems, we can annually offset ∼12% of all man-made land use change emissions [10], which have contributed 18% of global man-made GHG emissions.¶ In regard to carbon trading issues, biochar is relatively free of criticism. Unlike biodiesel and corn ethanol, biochar does not need to use land that is normally used for food production. Unlike carbon capture and storage, biochar is safe from volcano and earthquake and can be applied safely anywhere in the world. As noted, production and application of biochar to farm soils can tackle many global and domestic policy issues. Nevertheless, the application of biochar at the farm level is discouragingly slow, largely due to financial constraints.

### 2NC/1NR Conditionality GOOD

#### Our offense ---

#### 1. Logical decision making --- dispo requires the judge to vote for the plan if its better than a straight-turned CP even if the status quo is better --- the terminal impact to debate is good decision making that can determine what is or isn’t a cost and evaluate policies.

#### 2. 2AC strategic thinking --- conditionality forces the 2ac to tailor their straight turns to what the CP can’t solve --- this increases analytic education.

#### 3. Structural aff bias justifies --- the persuasive value of the 2AR outweighs the strategic benefit of the block and they get to pick the focus of the debate and the DAs on this topic are non-unique and bad --- multiple options are key to overwhelm their specificity bias.

#### Our defense ---

#### 1. Time skew inevitable --- we could read more DAs or T violations and some teams are faster.

#### 2. 2nr checks --- collapsing our strategy allows the 2AR to frame the debate in response.

#### \*\*\*[And --- No strategy skew --- no solvency deficit or addon against the CP will hurt them against the status quo --- if we revert to the status quo they get back 9 minutes of offense the CP might have captured.]

#### \*\*\*[And --- Increases education- We force the aff to think in multiple worlds, which increases time efficiency and smarter strategic choices.]

Incr aff advocacies skills – forces them to defend from multiple angles – we learn advocacy skills on the aff

#### And --- Theory interpretations are illegitimate --- they allow the affirmative to arbitrarily allow practices that are *slightly* better for them, creating a race to the bottom that incentivizes going for theory over substance.

## Space

#### Space colonization *won’t* prevent extinction—dependent on Earth and susceptible to superintelligence.

Anissimov 8 — Michael Anissimov, science and technology writer focusing specializing in futurism, founding director of the Immortality Institute—a non-profit organization focused on the abolition of nonconsensual death, member of the World Transhumanist Association, associate of the Institute for Accelerating Change, member of the Center for Responsible Nanotechnology's Global Task Force, 2008 (“We Are in Trouble,” *Accelerating Future*—Michael Anissimov’s futurism blog, September 22nd, Available Online at http://www.acceleratingfuture.com/michael/blog/2008/09/we-are-in-trouble/, Accessed 09-09-2011)

Space stations or lunar settlements won’t help mankind avoid numerous types of extinction risks. This is because 1) any colony would remain near-completely dependent on Earth unless very large and in possession of advanced nanotechnology, and 2) the greatest danger, from superintelligence, could easily reach its long arm into space and crush any human colony if it wanted to. This is not a challenge we can run away from. We have to stay here and fix it. Space will not swoop down and save the day.

#### Colonies would remain dependent on Earth.

Hickman 10 — John Hickman, Associate Professor of Political Science at Berry College, 2010 (“Why don’t people understand the urgency of colonizing other planets?,” *io9*, Excerpt from *Reopening the Space Frontier*, December 24th, Available Online at http://io9.com/5717779/why-dont-people-understand-the-urgency-of-colonizing-other-planets, Accessed 03-09-2012)

There are other reasons to reject the "irresponsible elites exit option" argument. Establishing a permanent human settlement on the Moon or Mars would enhance our chances of survival as a species, but a human settlement in space is likely to remain closely tied to and dependent in countless ways upon the much larger human population on Earth for a long time. Survival of a small human settlement in space after a major catastrophe that causes human extinction or descent into barbarism on Earth would be tenuous and the lives of its members culturally impoverished. Historically, the tendency for colonies to look to their mother countries for fresh infusions of high culture is marked. That is likely to be evident in the case of human settlements in space. Far from isolating themselves from terrestrial society, they are likely to seek sustained contact because their small populations will otherwise constrain their development. That dependence would give space settlers a strong interest in the continuing welfare of the human population on Earth.

#### Human extinction is inevitable regardless of where we are because of chromosomal malfunction.

The Guardian 4

[“How Likely is Human Extinction?” http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian/2004/apr/22/guardianweekly.guardianweekly11]

Every species seems to come and go. Some last longer than others, but nothing lasts for ever. Humans are a relatively recent phenomenon, jumping out of trees and striding across the land around 200,000 years ago. Will we persist for millions of years, or are we headed for an evolutionary makeover, or even extinction? According to Reinhard Stindl, of the Institute of Medical Biology in Vienna, the answer to this question could lie at the tips of our chromosomes. In a controversial new theory he suggests that all eukaryotic species (everything except bacteria and algae) have an evolutionary "clock" that ticks down through generations to an eventual extinction date. This clock might help to explain some of the more puzzling aspects of evolution, but it also overturns current thinking and even questions the orthodoxy of Darwin's natural selection. For more than 100 years scientists have grappled with the cause of "background" extinction. Mass extinction events, like the wiping out of dinosaurs 65m years ago, are impressive and dramatic, but account for only around 4% of now extinct species. The majority slip away quietly and without any fanfare. More than 99% of all the species that ever lived on Earth have already passed on, so what happened to the species that weren't annihilated during mass extinction events? Current natural selection models suggest that evolution is a slow and steady process, with continuous genetic mutations leading to new species that find a niche to live in, or die. But digging through the layers of rock, palaeontologists have found that evolution seems to go in fits and starts. Most species seem to have long stable periods followed by a burst of change: not the slow, steady process predicted by the theory of natural selection. The quiet periods in the fossil record puzzle scientists: evolution can't just switch on and off. More than 20 years ago the late Stephen Jay Gould suggested that internal genetic mechanisms could regulate these quiet periods, but until now no one could explain how it might work. Stindl argues that the protective caps on the end of chromosomes, called telomeres, provide the answer. Like plastic tips on the end of shoelaces, telomeres prevent instability. However, cells seem to struggle to copy telomeres properly when they divide, and gradually the telomeres become shorter. Stindl's suggests that there is a tiny loss of telomere length between each generations, mirroring the individual ageing process. Once a telomere becomes critically short it causes diseases related to chromosomal instability, or limited tissue regeneration, such as cancer. "The shortening of telomeres between generations means that eventually the telomeres become critically short for a particular species, causing outbreaks of disease and finally a population crash," says Stindl. "It could explain the disappearance of a seemingly successful species, like Neanderthal [hu]man, with no need for external factors such as climate change."

#### We can survive here on Earth

Williams 10 **–** (Lynda, M.S. in Physics and a physics faculty member at Santa Rose Junior College, “Irrational Dreams of Space Colonization,” Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 22.1, Spring, pg 7-8)

According to scientific theory, the destruction of Earth is a certainty. About five billion years from now, when our sun exhausts its nuclear fuel, it will expand in size and envelope the inner planets, including the Earth, and burn them into oblivion. So yes, we are doomed, but we have 5 billion years, plus or minus a few hundred million, to plan our extraterrestrial escape. The need to colonize the Moon or Mars to guarantee our survival based on this fact is not pressing. There are also real risks due to collisions with asteroids and comets, though none are of immediate threat and do not necessitate extraterrestrial colonization. There are many Earth-based technological strategies that can be developed in time to mediate such astronomical threats such as gravitational tugboats that drag the objects out of range. The solar system could also potentially be exposed to galactic sources of high-energy gamma ray bursts that could fry all life on Earth, but any Moon or Mars base would face a similar fate. Thus, Moon or Mars human based colonies would not protect us from any of these astronomical threats in the near future.

### 1NC Turn—Aliens

#### Colonization will lead to alien contact

Lombardo 8 [Tom, founder and Executive Director of the Center for Future Consciousness Space Exploration and Cosmic Evolution, 4/10/8, p. 2, accessed 6/28/11]

It is clear why traveling into outer space holds such great appeal and captures the imagination of humanity. It is the adventure of humanity into the cosmos, the journey into the mysteries of the universe. It offers the possibility of exploring a myriad of other worlds. Through space travel and colonization, humanity and life will spread through the universe and potentially diversify and multiply in mind-spinning ways. The further growth of science, technology, and civilization to depths and heights that would dwarf our present human reality are also part of the potential saga of space exploration. As we imagine the incredible expanse of the universe, there to be explored and settled, the future and the time needed to accomplish this immense and variegated journey stretches outward into thousands, millions, and even billions of years. Space travel also offers the possibility of contact with alien intelligent minds and strange and wondrous cultures. What will we learn, what will we see within ourselves, as a consequence of meeting other sentient beings? Perhaps the single most important event of the coming centuries, if not within the entire history of humanity, will be contact with our cosmic neighbors. With these hopes and dreams there are also great fears, for space is a metaphor for mystery and uncertainty. There are the fears, beginning with H.G. Wells’ The War of the Worlds, and popularized so well in contemporary science fiction, that aliens will destroy us or inflict some great cultural shock upon us. For every one of the fantastic and uplifting dreams associated with the journey into outer space, there is a potential demon, nightmare, or unsettling reality lurking in the darkness. All told, space travel has been seen as a central metaphor on the future and the ultimate adventure of tomorrow, filled with both great uncertainties and promises, extending outward to the infinities of existence.

#### Aliens would wipe out humans—they want our resources

Leake 10 [Jonathan, Journalist, “Don’t talk to aliens, warns Stephen Hawking”, April 25th, 2010, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/science/space/article7107207.ece]

THE aliens are out there and Earth had better watch out, at least according to Stephen Hawking. He has suggested that extraterrestrials are almost certain to exist — but that instead of seeking them out, humanity should be doing all it that can to avoid any contact. The suggestions come in a new documentary series in which Hawking, one of the world’s leading scientists, will set out his latest thinking on some of the universe’s greatest mysteries. Alien life, he will suggest, is almost certain to exist in many other parts of the universe: not just in planets, but perhaps in the centre of stars or even floating in interplanetary space. Hawking’s logic on aliens is, for him, unusually simple. The universe, he points out, has 100 billion galaxies, each containing hundreds of millions of stars. In such a big place, Earth is unlikely to be the only planet where life has evolved. “To my mathematical brain, the numbers alone make thinking about aliens perfectly rational,” he said. “The real challenge is to work out what aliens might actually be like.” The answer, he suggests, is that most of it will be the equivalent of microbes or simple animals — the sort of life that has dominated Earth for most of its history. One scene in his documentary for the Discovery Channel shows herds of two-legged herbivores browsing on an alien cliff-face where they are picked off by flying, yellow lizard-like predators. Another shows glowing fluorescent aquatic animals forming vast shoals in the oceans thought to underlie the thick ice coating Europa, one of the moons of Jupiter. Such scenes are speculative, but Hawking uses them to lead on to a serious point: that a few life forms could be intelligent and pose a threat. Hawking believes that contact with such a species could be devastating for humanity. He suggests that aliens might simply raid Earth for its resources and then move on: “We only have to look at ourselves to see how intelligent life might develop into something we wouldn’t want to meet. I imagine they might exist in massive ships, having used up all the resources from their home planet. Such advanced aliens would perhaps become nomads, looking to conquer and colonise whatever planets they can reach.” He concludes that trying to make contact with alien races is “a little too risky”. He said: “If aliens ever visit us, I think the outcome would be much as when Christopher Columbus first landed in America, which didn’t turn out very well for the Native Americans.” The completion of the documentary marks a triumph for Hawking, now 68, who is paralysed by motor neurone disease and has very limited powers of communication. The project took him and his producers three years, during which he insisted on rewriting large chunks of the script and checking the filming.

### 1NC Turn—Disease

#### Space colonization leads to rapid growth of incurable diseases—extinction

Wickramasinghe 10 (Chandra, Ph.D., Centre for Astrobiology, Cardiff University, UK; Journal of Cosmology, “Are Intelligent Aliens a Threat to Humanity? Diseases (Viruses, Bacteria) From Space”, May 2010, http://journalofcosmology.com/Aliens106.html)

The real risk to humanity of alien life may be in the form of viral and bacterial genomes arriving at the Earth which are sometimes pathogenic (Joseph and Wickramasinghe 2010). Fred Hoyle and the present author have argued the thesis of “Diseases from Space” over several decades (Hoyle and Wickramasinghe, 1979, 1982, 1990; Hoyle et al, 1985; Wickramasinghe et al, 2003). Despite criticisms that have often been made against this concept the basic arguments remain cogent to the present day (Joseph and Wickramasinghe 2010). With increasing evidence to support the view that life could not have arisen indigenously on the Earth, the idea that the evolution of life is modulated by genes arriving from comets has acquired a new significance. Darwinian evolution operates in an open system where new genes continue to be added from a cosmic source. Pandemics of viral and bacterial disease become an inevitable part of this thesis. One could argue that if not for such genetic additions from outside, evolution would have come to a standstill a long time ago (Hoyle and Wickramasinghe, 1982; Joseph and Wickramasinghe 2010). In this context it should be noted that the human genome has recently been found to contain more than 50 percent of its content in the form of well defined inert viral genes. It is possible to understand this data if our ancestral line of descent over a few million years had suffered a succession of near-culling events following outbreaks of viral pandemics (Joseph and Wickramasinghe 2010). On each such occasion only a small breeding group survived the members of which had assimilated the virus into their reproductive line. Hoyle and the present author have cited numerous instances from the history of medicine where outbreaks of pandemic disease could be elegantly explained in terms of space incident viruses. Even the modern scourge of influenza is likely to be driven by periodic injections of genetic components from space. Aspects of the epidemiology of influenza otherwise remains difficult to explain (Hoyle and Wickramasinghe, 1979, 1991). In conclusion, we note that the aliens we have to fear are not superintelligent creatures arriving in space ships and intending to conquer and subdue us, but sub-micron sized viral invaders that may threaten the very existence of our species.