# T

#### A. Definition—Financial incentives are disbursements for procurement contracts, grants, loans, subsidies, and tax expenditures.

Webb 93 (Kernaghan, Lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa, *Thumbs, Fingers, and Pushing on String: Legal Accountability in the Use of Federal Financial Incentives*, 31 Alta. L. Rev. 501 (1993) Hein Online)

One of the obstacles to intelligent discussion of this topic is the tremendous potential for confusion about what is meant by several of the key terms involved. In the hopes of contributing to the development of a consistent and precise vocabulary applying to this important but understudied area of regulatory activity, various terms are defined below.

In this paper, "financial incentives" are taken to mean disbursements 18 of public funds or contingent commitments to individuals and organizations, intended to encourage, support or induce certain behaviors in accordance with express public policy objectives. They take the form of grants, contributions, repayable contributions, loans, loan guarantees and insurance, subsidies, procurement contracts and tax expenditures.19 Needless to say, the ability of government to achieve desired behavior may vary with the type of incentive in use: up-front disbursements of funds (such as with contributions and procurement contracts) may put government in a better position to dictate the terms upon which assistance is provided than contingent disbursements such as loan guarantees and insurance. In some cases, the incentive aspects of the funding come from the conditions attached to use of the monies.20 In others, the mere existence of a program providing financial assistance for a particular activity (eg. low interest loans for a nuclear power plant, or a pulp mill) may be taken as government approval of that activity, and in that sense, an incentive to encourage that type of activity has been created.21 Given the wide variety of incentive types, it will not be possible in a paper of this length to provide anything more than a cursory discussion of some of the main incentives used.22 And, needless to say, the comments made herein concerning accountability apply to differing degrees depending upon the type of incentive under consideration.

By limiting the definition of financial incentives to initiatives where public funds are either disbursed or contingently committed, a large number of regulatory programs with incentive effects which exist, but in which no money is forthcoming, 23 are excluded from direct examination in this paper. Such programs might be referred to as indirect incentives. Through elimination of indirect incentives from the scope of discussion, the definition of the incentive instrument becomes both more manageable and more particular. Nevertheless, it is possible that much of the approach taken here may be usefully applied to these types of indirect incentives as well.24 Also excluded from discussion here are social assistance programs such as welfare and ad hoc industry bailout initiatives because such programs are not designed primarily to encourage behaviors in furtherance of specific public policy objectives. In effect, these programs are assistance, but they are not incentives.

#### B. Violation—Procurement is exclusively purchasing—designing, engineering, demonstrating and deploying are not topical.

Schwartz 10—Specialist in Defense Acquisition @ Congressional Research Service [Moshe Schwartz, “Defense Acquisitions: How DOD Acquires Weapon Systems and Recent Efforts to Reform the Process,” Congressional Research Service, April 23, 2010

The Department of Defense (DOD) purchases goods and services from contractors to support¶ military operations. Any purchase of a good or service by DOD is defined as a procurement. In¶ contrast, the term defense acquisition is a broader term that applies to more than just the purchase or procurement, of an item or service; the acquisition process encompasses the design, engineering, construction, testing, deployment, sustainment, and disposal of weapons or related items purchased from a contractor.1 DOD’s acquisition system is highly complex (see Appendix A), and does not always produce systems that meet anticipated cost or performance expectations. Pg. 1

#### C. Vote Neg—

#### AFF explosion—allowing the AFF to design and reengineer weapon systems to include nuclear fuel sources exponentially expands our research burden to include every weapon has existed or will exist in the future. This shifts the debate away from energy production and in a way that makes it impossible for the neg sustain a competitive research effort.

# Production K (longish but not too long)

### K

#### Energy production discourse traps us in a democratic-authoritarian bargain. Promises of increased supply defer ethical and ecological responsibility to technological expertise.

John **BYRNE** Director Center for Energy and Environmental Policy & Public Policy @ Delaware **AND** Noah **TOLY** Research Associate Center for Energy and Environmental Policy **‘6** in *Transforming Power* eds. Byrne, Toly, & Glover p. 1-3

From climate change to acid rain, contaminated landscapes, mercury pollution, and biodiversity loss ,2 the origins of many of our least tractable environmental problems can be traced to the operations of the modern energy system. A scan of nightfall across the planet reveals a social dilemma that also accompanies this system's operations: invented over a century ago, electric light remains an experience only for the socially privileged. Two billion human beings-almost one-third of the planet's population-experience evening light by candle, oil lamp, or open fire, reminding us that energy modernization has left intact-and sometimes exacerbated-social inequalities that its architects promised would be banished (Smi l, 2003: 370- 373). And there is the disturbing link between modern energy and war.3 Whether as a mineral whose control is fought over by the powerful (for a recent history of conflict over oil, see Klare, 2002b, 2004, 2006), or as the enablement of an atomic war of extinction, modern energy makes modern life possible and threatens its future. With environmental crisis, social inequality, and military conflict among the significant problems of contemporary energy-society relations, the importance of a social analysis of the modern energy system appears easy to establish. One might, therefore, expect a lively and fulsome debate of the sector's performance, including critical inquiries into the politics, sociology, and political economy of modern energy. Yet, contemporary discourse on the subject is disappointing: instead of a social analysis of energy regimes, the field seems to be a captive of euphoric technological visions and associated studies of "energy futures" that imagine the pleasing consequences of new energy sources and devices.4 One stream of euphoria has sprung from advocates of conventional energy, perhaps best represented by the unflappable optimists of nuclear power who ' early on, promised to invent a “magical fire” (Weinberg 1972) capable of meeting any level of energy demand inexhaustibly in a manner too c heap to meter” (Lewis Strauss, ctted tn the New York Ttmes 1954, 1955). In reply to those who fear catastrophic accidents from the "magical fire" or the prolifera~ ion of nuclear weapons, a new promise is made to realize "inherently safe reactors" (Weinberg, 1985) that risk neither serious accident nor intentionally harmful use of high-energy physics. Less grandiose, but no less optimistic, forecasts can be heard from fossil fuel enthusiasts who, likewise, project more energy, at lower cost, and with little ecological harm (see, e.g., Yergin and Stoppard, 2003). Skeptics of conventional energy, eschewing involvement with dangerously scaled technologies and their ecological consequences, find solace in "sustainable energy alternatives" that constitute a second euphoric stream. Preferring to redirect attention to smaller, and supposedly more democratic, options, "green" energy advocates conceive devices and systems that prefigure a revival of human scale development, local self-determination, and a commitment to ecological balance. Among supporters are those who believe that greening the energy system embodies universal social ideals and, as a result, can overcome current conflicts between energy "haves" and "havenots." 5 In a recent contribution to this perspective, Vaitheeswaran suggests (2003: 327, 291 ), "today's nascent energy revolution will truly deliver power to the people" as "micropower meets village power." Hermann Scheer echoes the idea of an alternative energy-led social transformation: the shift to a "solar global economy ... can satisfy the material needs of all mankind and grant us the freedom to guarantee truly universal and equal human rights and to safeguard the world's cultural diversity" (Scheer, 2002: 34).6 The euphoria of contemporary energy studies is noteworthy for its historical consistency with a nearly unbroken social narrative of wonderment extending from the advent of steam power through the spread of electricity (Nye, 1999). The modern energy regime that now powers nuclear weaponry and risks disruption of the planet's climate is a product of promises pursued without sustained public examination of the political, social, economic, and ecological record of the regime's operations. However, the discursive landscape has occasionally included thoughtful exploration of the broader contours of energy-environment-society relations. As early as 1934, Lewis Mumford (see also his two-volume Myth of the Machine, 1966; 1970) critiqued the industrial energy system for being a key source of social and ecological alienation (I 934: 196): The changes that were manifested in every department of Technics rested for the most part on one central fact: the increase of energy. Size, speed, quantity, the multiplication of machines, were all reflections of the new means of utilizing fuel and the enlargement of the available stock of fuel itself. Power was dissociated from its natural human and geographic limitations: from the caprices of the weather, from the irregularities that definitely restrict the output of men and animals. By 1961, Mumford despaired that modernity had retrogressed into a lifeharming dead end (1961: 263, 248): ... an orgy of uncontrolled production and equally uncontrolled reproduction: machine fodder and cannon fodder: surplus values and surplus populations ... The dirty crowded houses, the dank airless courts and alleys, the bleak pavements, the sulphurous atmosphere, the over-routinized and dehumanized factory, the drill schools, the second-hand experiences, the starvation of the senses, the remoteness from nature and animal activity-here are the enemies. The living organism demands ali fe-sustaining environment. Modernity's formula for two centuries had been to increase energy in order to produce overwhelming economic growth. While diagnosing the inevitable failures of this logic, Mumford nevertheless warned that modernity's supporters would seek to derail present-tense7 evaluations of the era's social and ecological performance with forecasts of a bountiful future in which, finally, the perennial social conflicts over resources would end. Contrary to traditional notions of democratic governance, Mumford observed that the modern ideal actually issues from a pseudomorph that he named the "democratic authoritarian bargain" ( 1964: 6) in which the modern energy regime and capitalist political economy join in a promise to produce "every material advantage, every intellectual and emotional stimulus [one] may desire, in quantities hardly available hitherto even for a restricted minority" on the condition that society demands only what the regime is capable and willing to offer. An authoritarian energy order thereby constructs an aspirational democracy while facilitating the abstraction of production and consumption from non-economic social values. The premises of the current energy paradigms are in need of critical study in the manner of Mumford's work if a world measurably different from the present order is to be organized. Interrogating modern energy assumptions, this chapter examines the social projects of both conventional and sustainable energy as a beginning effort in this direction. The critique explores the neglected issue of the political economy of energy, underscores the pattern of democratic failure in the evolution of modern energy, and considers the discursive continuities between the premises of conventional and sustainable energy futures.

#### Nuclear power advocates perform scientific idolatry – the aff produces authoritarian technology and politics.

Brian **WYNNE** Science Studies and Research Director of the Centre for the Study of Environmental Change @ Lancaster (UK) **’11** *Rationality and Ritual* 2nd Edition p. 2-4

After almost 20 years of virtual global moratorium, civil nuclear energy is being promoted once again, under very different conditions. Not only have climate change and carbon emissions reduction finally arrived as mainstream issues, but also those decision-making processes themselves have changed markedly. Yet some problematic dimensions of that 1977 decision process, and of the social role of science within it, remain largely undisturbed. These unnoticed dimensions of scientific reason as public authority are relevant not only to the return of the nuclear commitment after decades of largely self-inflicted paralysis. They are also perhaps more salient to the deeper and more general question, of whether and how society and politics can avoid trapping itself in quasi-religious fundamentalism - and I mean scientistic fundamentalism, as if science can provide forms of authority and assurance of which it is in principle incapable - over such technological-scientific-social programmes. The Windscale inquiry can be seen now as the opening event in what has since been a fundamental transformation over three decades in the relations of publics and experts in the social appraisal of technology, science and innovation. However while this general issue has massively proliferated - and intensified over this period (Felt et ai, 2007), it has also become more depoliticized, and institutionalized into 'management' as distinct from democratic struggle. Some key dimensions of this process seem to have been overlooked. Thus against a common misrepresentation of my own position on those expert-public relations, I need to emphasize that democratic political conduct of science and technology does not require the practice of some trumped-up populist delusion about citizens' supposedly superior, or even equal, ability to understand and negotiate esoteric scientific-technical issues.2 The point is that the many and varied public issues in which such science is embedded and crucial, are never only scientific-technical issues, yet they are repeatedly reduced to this in practice and even in academic analysis, for example, typically to 'risk issues'. This points to the significance of that current in science and technology studies (STS), and in social sciences more widely, which has rightly problematized how objects of scientific attention are themselves conceptually and socially constructed, here with huge implications because this is scientific knowledge not in a laboratory, but in public arenas.3 More directly, this underlines the key point that is neglected by such as Kusch (2007), and Collins and Evans (2002, 2007), that public policy institutions and processes have effectively allowed science not only to inform policy, as it must, but further, problematically to become sovereign author of public meanings - as the presumptive framing authority that is mistakenly allowed to confuse (public) issues involving scientific questions with scientific issues. The autonomous different meanings and concerns, that is, framings of the issues, which others bring to the arena, are thus deleted and dismissed a priori - just as they were during and after the Wind scale inquiry into THORP. Therefore democratic techno science requires the responsible scientific and policy institutions to retain due modesty and appreciate that non-scientific civic capacities have a necessary role to play in negotiating what public issues and needs such sophisticated technologies are supposed to be addressing, and what other concerns they raise as further public issues. This is only a challenge to 'science' insofar as that 'science' already embodies and tacitly projects normative social commitments and questions. It is not, as it has been continually lampooned, constitutional public irrationality, or anti-science. All too often these public political processes of societal negotiation and learning in technology appraisal have been replaced by presumption on the part of science-infatuated 'expert' policy institutions that typical publics have no capacities for legitimate independent meanings, and science has thus assumed an unduly exaggerated ro le in such public policy culture. It no longer only identifies 'the facts' (including what should also be their uncertainties and conditions), and enlightens the policy issues with these. It has also come effectively to define what the public issues are, which is a far more problematic political role being played by default, and unacknowledged. Institutional idolatry with respect to science - treating it as idol, rather than as instrument, and thereby failing to examine its substantive know ledges and assumptions more thoroughly engenders lack of institutional recognition and reflection about this self-inspired, illegitimate over-reach; and this in turn cultivates provocatively authoritarian and patronizing definitions of public (in)capacities in relation to science and democratic policy processes. My 'public deficit model' critique of the normative impositions of scientific and policy institutions in the name of 'public understanding of science' was never a critique of the claim that publics have technical incapacities - of course they do, as they are usually first to emphasize! This critique was of the dominant habit of using such epistemic incapacity as attempted explanation - and thus dismissal - of public normative difference from institutionally desired policy commitments, rather than recognizing genuine normative difference. Once we recognize that those science and policy institutions have presumptively reduced public meanings to their own, for example to 'risk' (as defined by 'the authorities' alone), then their repeated return (on this, see Wynne 2006) to public deficit explanations of public scepticism and difference is preordained. The Windscale inquiry was an early manifestation of this institutional syndrome of scientism. Countering this institutional culture and its entrenchment, as I have tried to do since the Windscale inquiry, has nothing to do with romantically exaggerating citizen knowledge-abilities, as this project has been caricatured. In his book on Nuclear Fear, historian of science and technology Spencer Weart (1988) has documented in the nuclear case how a kind of universal idolatry and fearful sense of awe pervaded the emergence of nuclear technology in the 1940s and 1950s. The unprecedentedly fearsome power, first manifested in the 1945 instantaneous annihilations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, engendered this social investment of superhuman power in nuclear technology. Even when painted positively during the fervent promotion of civil nuclear technology a decade later, this came wrapped with ageless human insecurities about immanent social-political 'disorder' and threat, to which the awesomely destructive power of nuclear weapons was envisaged as a compelling disciplinary counter-force. It is always a salutary reminder that the 1956 'Atoms for Peace' programme taken up by the UN under US promotion, was an afterthought of ten years or more of the defining objective of nuclear fission technology - weapons of mass destruction - and especially of the escalating fears inspired even amongst experts by the 1953 testing of the first even more powerfully destructive nuclear fusion H-bomb. The THORP plant, and thus the Wind scale inquiry, were enmeshed in this profoundly ambiguous combination of weapons of mass destruction with utopian illusions of magical social benefits like free and limitless electricity. As I show below, a further observation suggested by Weart's admirable documentation of the investment of godly powers in what is after all a human artefact, is that this ambiguous idolatry of the machine also invests godly powers in corresponding human actors and institutions - nuclear experts. A corollary of this is the inevitable demotion of ordinary citizens and 'the public' to the almost subhuman, with no recognized independent capacities of civic reason or collective sense-making - no collective moral substance and thus no worthiness of collective respect.4 This is a despotic politics of technology.

#### Challenging technocratic energy regimes is a pre-requisite for meaningful existence.

Andrew **FEENBERG** Philosophy of Technology @ Simon Fraser (Canada) **’10** *Between Reason and Experience* p. 69-72

The whole life environment of society comes under the rule of technique. In this form the technological essence of the capitalist system can be transferred to socialist regimes built on the model of the Soviet Union. The entire development of modern societies is thus marked by the paradigm of unqualified control over the labor process on which capitalist industrialism rests. Technical development is oriented toward the disempowering of workers and the massification of the public. This is "operational autonomy," the freedom of the owner or her representative to make independent decisions about how to carry on the business of the organization, regardless of the views or interests of subordinate actors and the surrounding community. The operational autonomy of management and administration positions them in a technical relation to the world, safe from the consequences of their own actions. These consequences may be dire where the enterprise rides roughshod over worker and community interests, but from the suppression of the Luddites down to the present, the agents of enterprise have usually been protected from the resulting outcry. In addition, operational autonomy enables them to reproduce the conditions of their own supremacy at each change in the technologies they command. Technocracy is an extension of such a system to society as a whole in response to the spread of technology and management to every sector of social life. Technocracy armors itself against public pressures, sacrifices community values, and ignores needs incompatible with its own reproduction and the perpetuation of its technical traditions. The technocratic tendency of modern societies represents one possible path of development, a path shaped by the demands of power. In subjecting human beings to technical control at the expense of traditional modes of life while sharply restricting participation in design, technocracy perpetuates elite power structures inherited from the past in technically rational forms. In the process it mutilates not just human beings and nature but also technology. Technology has beneficial potentialities that are suppressed under capitalism and state socialism. These potentialities could be realized along a different developmental path were power more equally distributed. Critical theory of technology identifies the limits of the technical codes elaborated under the rule of operational autonomy. The very same process in which capitalists and technocrats were freed to make technical decisions without regard for the needs of workers and communities generated a wealth of new "values," ethical demands forced to seek voice discursively. Democratization of technology is about finding new ways of privileging these excluded values and realizing them in technical arrangements. A fuller realization of technology is possible and necessary. We are more and more frequently alerted to this necessity by the threatening side effects of technological advance. These side effects constitute feedback loops from the objects of our technical control to us as the subjects of that control. Normally the feedback is reduced or deferred so that the subject of technical action is safe from the power unleashed by its own actions. But technology can "bite back," as Edward Tenner reminds us, with fearful consequences as the feedback loops that join technical subject and object become more obtrusive (Tenner 1996). Today we are most obviously aware of this from the example of climate change, an unintended consequence of almost everything we do. The very success of our technology ensures that these loops will grow shorter as we disturb nature more violently in attempting to control it. In a society such as ours, which is completely organized around ever-more-powerful technologies, the threat to survival is clear.

#### Alternative – Break the ritual of nuclear affirmation and technological determinism. Exposing the ideological structure of nuclear rituals opens up space for a true debate over the purpose of energy technology.

Brian **WYNNE** Science Studies and Research Director of the Centre for the Study of Environmental Change @ Lancaster (UK) **’11** *Rationality and Ritual* 2nd Edition p. 184-185

The rhetoric of democratic parliamentary choice involved myth-making about voluntarism in the face of modern technology. The voluntarism was contradictory because it was expressed in the context of the supposedly deterministic force of technology and in the idiom of the Windscale inquiry's expert discovery of a deterministic 'truth'. This contradiction dissolved only because 'voluntarism' here meant 'control' in a situation of potential loss of control, and did not mean 'choice'. The decision-making process involved not choice but an ability to reveal 'the facts' pointing to the proper policy. Thus, in our technocratic society, 'government becomes the business of recognizing what is necessary and efficient for the continued functioning of large-scale systems',58 supported by a judicial approach which is itself extremely technocratic. The new dichotomy is between technological determinism supposedly controlled by discovery, and technological determinism incompletely understood and therefore uncontrolled and threatening. This supersedes the traditional dichotomy between determinism and responsibility. Hemmed in by the power structure and social values concealed in the claimed objective determinism of technology and science, it represents an extremely restricted political vision. It would be idiotic to make decisions in the literal belief that everyone has equal insight and that we choose irrespective of constraining realities. On the other hand, where the boundary between social choices and physical laws is obscure, as it is with modern technology, then exposing the myth of pure voluntarism encourages exploration of the boundary, and the exposure of ideological uses of 'natural law' . Without this impetus to articulate values in social choice, and the unrecognized choices concealed in what is presented as 'technological necessity', there is no pressure on society at large to understand either technical realities or our own human selves. Instead, democracy is gradually abandoned to those who, through 'fact-finding' rituals, can pretend not to choose our future but to make it safe. In the early days of nuclear power it was perhaps impossible to distinguish between an objective deterministic component (the entailments of specific commitments) and a psychological component (the emotional need to believe that 'progress' as defined in this way was inevitable) . It is now possible at least to recognize this distinction, even if we cannot measure it. If we must constantly probe the objective boundaries, we are also perforce questioning its counterpart, the psychological component. Thus the question arises whether the nuclear industry could live with itself in such psychologically undefended conditions. The ritual processes structuring the nuclear issue have so far ensured that this question (and thus also its institutional counterpart) has never presented itself.

# Elections

#### Obama will win – but changes matter

SILVER 10 – 29 – 12 Elections Guru [Nate Silver, Oct. 28: In Swing States, a Predictable Election?, <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/29/oct-28-in-swing-states-a-predictable-election/>]

Even in this last full week before the election, I’d encourage you to take a more macroscopic view of the election. We have seen, broadly speaking, a mild recovery for Mr. Obama over the past week or so in the polls. Among polls that have surveyed the race more than once since Denver, his numbers have improved more often than they have worsened in the most recent edition of the survey, and Mr. Obama’s predicted probability of winning the Electoral College has improved as a result (to 74.6 percent as of Sunday).

Then again, it may be best not to make too much of these mild fluctuations. There certainly seemed to the the possibility in a brief period after Charlotte that Mr. Obama would run away with the race, although even then forecast expected some reversion to the mean.

But other than in that convention bounce period, the polls have usually told about the same story: that Mr. Obama has a modest edge, but far from an insurmountable one, in the states necessary for him to win him 270 electoral votes.

The forecast model is a bit more confident now about Mr. Obama’s potential to turn that edge in to an Electoral College victory because there is so little time remaining in the race.

Still, an election held today would probably keep us up quite late before we knew the result with much certainty — and so, in all likelihood, will the one on Nov. 6.

#### Plan drives a wedge into Obama’s base

Mick 6-19-10 [Jason Daily Tech, Obama Fights For Nuclear, Environmentalists Label Him a Shill http://www.dailytech.com/Obama+Fights+For+Nuclear+Environmentalists+Label+Him+a+Shill/article18781.htm]

Despite these small victories, President **Obama's nuclear vision faces** many impending **obstacles**.  **Despite the fact that you could tear down one of the nation's old reactors, replace it with a dozen modern clean reactor designs and still have less net waste**, some **environmentalist groups remain adamantly opposed to new plant construction.  They have vowed to bury the bid for clean nuclear power under a flood of lawsuits.**  If the suits succeed, they will raise the cost of nuclear so high, that it can't even compete with the most expensive forms of nuclear energy, like solar power.

**And perhaps the biggest obstacle to Obama's nuclear vision will come in 2012**.  That is the year when he will face **reelection**.  That **may prove challenging given that one of his former key constituent groups -- the environmental lobby -- has become one of his staunchest critics**.  Regardless, the U.S. is making its first true nuclear progress in 30 years, and that is among the many factors that will already make President Obama's presidency noteworthy.

#### Obama’s margin for error is small --- plan deflates democrat enthusiasm

TNF 2012 [1-3, The New Fuelist, Obama’s tall environmental task in 2012 http://www.newfuelist.com/blog/obama-coal-regulations-keystone-pipeline]

In case you can’t see it, **that’s a treacherous tightrope** Barack **Obama is walking** on these days **when**ever **he steps into the circus-like national energy and environmental policy debate. And his margin for political error on environmental issues will shrink even more during this election year. To avoid alienating environmentalists who supported him in 2008, he must not forget to occasionally**—and substantially—**lean to the left**. But if he wants to hold on to coveted independent voters who are more worried about the slumping economy than they are about pollution, he must also periodically shift back to the middle and right.

The proposed **Keystone** XL pipeline **embodies the President’s conundrum. From the right, calls for increased “energy security”** and for the creation of (a disputed number) of pipeline-related jobs make it hard for him to say no. **On the left, a large and organized anti-pipeline contingent has taken pains to turn the decision on the pipeline**—which will carry crude made from Canadian oil sands, the extraction and production of which makes the fuel much more greenhouse gas-intense than conventional oil—**into a political make-or-break for Obama on climate change**.

**The administration spent 2011 establishing what it must view as a politically necessary middle ground on the environment**. It engineered a drastic ratcheting up of fuel efficiency standards for automakers, and sold it as a way to both reduce greenhouse gas emissions and the burden on the consumer. It also introduced landmark regulations on air pollution from power plants, while placating utilities—and outraging many supporters—by delaying the EPA’s proposed tightening of the nation’s standards for smog. And it earned at least temporary relief from pressure to decide on the Keystone XL by punting the issue past the election, to 2013.

**But it’s going to be tougher to maintain balance on the tightrope this year**. Congressional **Republicans**, by demanding a much-earlier Obama decision on the Keystone XL in exchange for their support of the recent payroll tax extension, **have hinted at their party’s desire to force the President’s hand on environmental issues.** The GOP’s presidential nominee will undoubtedly attempt to paint Obama as an over-regulator and irrational environmentalist—an attack line which will warrant a defense. And therein lies **Obama’s tall task: to defend his administration’s substantial forays into environmental regulation in terms that resonate with independents whose main concern is the economy—all while simultaneously ensuring that his frustrated environmentalist supporters don’t completely lose their patience**.

#### Romney will undermine Russia relations

LARISON 6 – 27 – 12 Columnist for the American Conservative [Daniel Larison “U.S.-Russian Relations Would Get Much Worse Under Romney” <http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/u-s-russian-relations-would-get-much-worse-under-romney/>]

Putin doesn’t actually want a “hard-line conservative in the White House.” Putin distrusts the U.S. because he believes that the Bush administration behaved in an ungrateful and untrustworthy fashion in the previous decade, and U.S.-Russian relations improved as much as they did because the current administration seemed to be more reliable. U.S.-Russian relations reached their lowest point in the last twenty years in no small part because of a “more active U.S. policy” toward the Middle East, the South Caucasus, and central Europe. Putin might be willing to deal with a more hard-line American President, but only so long as it this translated into tangible gains for Russia. Provided that the hard-liner was willing to live up to his end of the bargain, there could be some room for agreement, but there isn’t any. Since Romney’s Russia policy is essentially to never make any deals with the current Russian government, Putin doesn’t have much of an incentive to cooperate. That will guarantee that U.S.-Russian relations will deteriorate much more than they have in the last year.

#### Nuclear war – Terrorism, Prolif, multiple hotspots, turns case

ALLISON 11 Director @ Belfer Center for Science and Int’l Affairs @ Harvard’s Kennedy School, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Robert D. Blackwill, Senior Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations [Graham Allison, “10 Reasons Why Russia Still Matters”, Politico -- October 31 -- <http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=161EF282-72F9-4D48-8B9C-C5B3396CA0E6>]

That central point is that Russia matters a great deal to a U.S. government seeking to defend and advance its national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s decision to return next year as president makes it all the more critical for Washington to manage its relationship with Russia through coherent, realistic policies. No one denies that Russia is a dangerous, difficult, often disappointing state to do business with. We should not overlook its many human rights and legal failures. Nonetheless, Russia is a player whose choices affect our vital interests in nuclear security and energy. It is key to supplying 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Ten realities require U.S. policymakers to advance our nation’s interests by engaging and working with Moscow. First, Russia remains the only nation that can erase the United States from the map in 30 minutes. As every president since John F. Kennedy has recognized, Russia’s cooperation is critical to averting nuclear war. Second, Russia is our most consequential partner in preventing nuclear terrorism. Through a combination of more than $11 billion in U.S. aid, provided through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and impressive Russian professionalism, two decades after the collapse of the “evil empire,” not one nuclear weapon has been found loose. Third, Russia plays an essential role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile-delivery systems. As Washington seeks to stop Iran’s drive toward nuclear weapons, Russian choices to sell or withhold sensitive technologies are the difference between failure and the possibility of success. Fourth, Russian support in sharing intelligence and cooperating in operations remains essential to the U.S. war to destroy Al Qaeda and combat other transnational terrorist groups. Fifth, Russia provides a vital supply line to 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan. As U.S. relations with Pakistan have deteriorated, the Russian lifeline has grown ever more important and now accounts for half all daily deliveries. Sixth, Russia is the world’s largest oil producer and second largest gas producer. Over the past decade, Russia has added more oil and gas exports to world energy markets than any other nation. Most major energy transport routes from Eurasia start in Russia or cross its nine time zones. As citizens of a country that imports two of every three of the 20 million barrels of oil that fuel U.S. cars daily, Americans feel Russia’s impact at our gas pumps. Seventh, Moscow is an important player in today’s international system. It is no accident that Russia is one of the five veto-wielding, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, as well as a member of the G-8 and G-20. A Moscow more closely aligned with U.S. goals would be significant in the balance of power to shape an environment in which China can emerge as a global power without overturning the existing order. Eighth, Russia is the largest country on Earth by land area, abutting China on the East, Poland in the West and the United States across the Arctic. This territory provides transit corridors for supplies to global markets whose stability is vital to the U.S. economy. Ninth, Russia’s brainpower is reflected in the fact that it has won more Nobel Prizes for science than all of Asia, places first in most math competitions and dominates the world chess masters list. The only way U.S. astronauts can now travel to and from the International Space Station is to hitch a ride on Russian rockets. The co-founder of the most advanced digital company in the world, Google, is Russian-born Sergei Brin. Tenth, Russia’s potential as a spoiler is difficult to exaggerate. Consider what a Russian president intent on frustrating U.S. international objectives could do — from stopping the supply flow to Afghanistan to selling S-300 air defense missiles to Tehran to joining China in preventing U.N. Security Council resolutions. So next time you hear a policymaker dismissing Russia with rhetoric about “who cares?” ask them to identify nations that matter more to U.S. success, or failure, in advancing our national interests.

# CP

### 1NC Biochar CP

#### Text: The United States federal government should establish a nitrogen fertilizer tax of 16 cents per pound of nitrogen, and use the revenue from that tax to provide loan guarantees for farmers to procure biocharcoal technology.

#### A fertilizer tax plus subsidy would incentivize farmers to shift to biochar.

Tom Konrad, 12/14/2009. PhD Mathematics @ Purdue, CFA, financial analyst, freelance writer, and policy wonk specializing in renewable energy and energy efficiency. “The Nitrogen-Biochar Link,” Clean Energy Wonk, http://cleanenergywonk.com/2009/12/14/the-nitrogen-biochar-link/.

[Biochar, used as a soil amendment, improves water and nutrient uptake by plants](http://www.altenergystocks.com/archives/2009/07/biochar_investing.html). It has its greatest effects in poor soils, helping the plants access the nutrients that are available, and this effect can last for centuries after the soil has been amended with biochar. Biochar-ameneded soil should reduce the risks to farmers of using too little fertilizer, and hence reduce the incentive to over-apply, benefiting both the farmers and everyone else in the watershed. Studies suggest that [fertilizer taxes are the most economically efficient way to reduce Nitrogen runoff](http://www.altenergystocks.com/archives/2009/07/biochar_investing.html). If such taxes were in place, farmers would have a stronger incentive to use biochar in order to make the most of the suddenly more expensive fertilizer. For environmentalists interested in reducing carbon emissions, this would have the added benefit of [reducing nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biochar#Enhancing_soil) from heavily fertilized soils, for an additional reduction of greenhouse emissions. Hence, [Biochar advocates](http://www.biochar-international.org/) should team up with groups concerned about the [fisheries](http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/05/0525_050525_deadzone.html) and health effects of runoff to advocate for higher taxes on nitrogen fertilizer. When farmers complain, perhaps we can buy them off by using the revenue for a biochar subsidy?

#### Solves through sequestration without reducing coal emissions.

Technology Review, 4/26/2007. “The Case for Burying Charcoal,” published by MIT, http://www.technologyreview.com/news/407754/the-case-for-burying-charcoal/.

Several states in this country and a number of Scandinavian countries are trying to supplant some coal-burning by burning biomass such as wood pellets and agricultural residue. Unlike coal, biomass is carbon-neutral, releasing only the carbon dioxide that the plants had absorbed in the first place. But a new research [paper](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biombioe.2007.01.012) published online in the journal Biomass and Bioenergy argues that the battle against global warming may be better served by instead heating the biomass in an oxygen-starved process called pyrolysis, extracting methane, hydrogen, and other byproducts for combustion, and burying the resulting carbon-rich char. Even if this approach would mean burning more coal--which emits more carbon dioxide than other fossil-fuel sources--it would yield a net reduction in carbon emissions, according to the analysis by [Malcolm Fowles](http://technology.open.ac.uk/tm/mf.htm), a professor of technology management at the Open University, in the United Kingdom. Burning one ton of wood pellets emits 357 kilograms less carbon than burning coal with the same energy content. But turning those wood pellets into char would save 372 kilograms of carbon emissions. That is because 300 kilograms of carbon could be buried as char, and the burning of byproducts would produce 72 kilograms less carbon emissions than burning an equivalent amount of coal. ¶ Such an approach could carry an extra benefit. Burying char--known as black-carbon sequestration--enhances soils, helping future crops and trees grow even faster, thus absorbing more carbon dioxide in the future. Researchers believe that the char, an inert and highly porous material, plays a key role in helping soil retain water and nutrients, and in sustaining microorganisms that maintain soil fertility. ¶ [Johannes Lehmann](http://www.css.cornell.edu/faculty/lehmann.html), an associate professor of crops and soil sciences at Cornell University and an expert on char sequestration, agrees in principle with Fowles's analysis but believes that much more research in this relatively new area of study is needed. "It heads in the right direction," he says.¶ Interest in the approach is gathering momentum. On April 29, more than 100 corporate and academic researchers will gather in New South Wales, Australia, to attend the first international conference on black-carbon sequestration and the role pyrolysis can play to offset greenhouse-gas emissions. ¶ Lehmann estimates that as much as 9.5 billion tons of carbon--more than currently emitted globally through the burning of fossil fuels--could be sequestered annually by the end of this century through the sequestration of char. "Bioenergy through pyrolysis in combination with biochar sequestration is a technology to obtain energy and improve the environment in multiple ways at the same time," writes Lehmann in a research paper to be published soon in [Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment](http://www.frontiersinecology.org/). Fowles says that there would be an incentive for farmers, logging communities, and small towns to convert their own dedicated crops, agricultural and forest residues, and municipal biowaste into char if a high enough price emerged for the sale of carbon offsets. "Every community at any scale could pyrolyse its biowaste ... motivated by doing their bit against global warming," he says. Fowles believes that storing black carbon in soil carries less risk, would be quicker to implement, and could be done at much lower cost than burying carbon dioxide in old oil fields or aquifers. And he says the secondary benefits to agriculture could be substantial: "Biochar reduces the soil's requirement for irrigation and fertilizer, both of which emit carbon." Fowles adds that it has also been shown to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases from decay processes in soil. This would include nitrous oxide, a potent greenhouse gas. "Biochar has been observed to reduce nitrous-oxide emissions from cultivated soil by 40 percent."

# Case

## 1NC heg

#### Plan doesn’t solve oil dependence – transportation sector is the biggest cause

#### No regional rebalancing or security dilemmas—the only empirical data goes our way.

Fettweis 11—Professor of Poli Sci @ Tulane University [Christopher J. Fettweis, “The Superpower as Superhero: Hubris in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Paper prepared for presentation at the 2011 meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1-4, Seattle, WA, September 2011, pg. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1902154]

The final and in some ways most important pathological belief generated by hubris places the United States at the center of the current era of relative peace. “All that stands between civility and genocide, order and mayhem,” explain Kaplan and Kristol, “is American power.”68 This belief is a variant of what is known as the “hegemonic stability theory,” which proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules.69 Although it was first developed to describe economic behavior, the theory has been applied more broadly, to explain the current proliferation of peace. At the height of Pax Romana between roughly 27 BC and 180 AD, for example, Rome was able to bring an unprecedented level of peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana in which no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that are generally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemon, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe.70 Unchecked conflicts could bring humanitarian disaster and, in today’s interconnected world, economic turmoil that could ripple throughout global financial markets. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, to doubt that U.S hegemony is the primary cause of the current stability.¶ First, the hegemonic-stability argument shows the classic symptom of hubris: It overestimates the capability of the United States, in this case to maintain global stability. No state, no matter how strong, can impose peace on determined belligerents. **The U.S. military** may be the most imposing in the history of the world, but it can only police the system if the other members generally cooperate. Self-policing must occur, in other words; if other states had not decided on their own that their interests are best served by peace, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could keep them from fighting. The five percent of the world’s population that lives in the United States simply cannot force peace upon an unwilling ninety-five percent. Stability and unipolarity may be simply coincidental.¶ In order for U.S. hegemony to be the explanation for global stability, the rest of the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be preventing them from doing so.71 Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to war without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention, yet few choose to do so.¶ Second, it is worthwhile to repeat one of the most basic observations about misperception in international politics, one that is magnified by hubris: Rarely are our actions as consequential upon their behavior as we believe them to be. The ego-centric bias suggests that while it may be natural for U.S. policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, they are almost certainly overestimating their own importance. At the very least, the United States is probably not as central to the myriad decisions in foreign capitals that help maintain international stability as it thinks it is.¶ Third, if U.S. security guarantees were the primary cause of the restraint shown by the other great and potentially great powers, then those countries would be demonstrating an amount of **trust** in the intentions, judgment and wisdom of another that would be **without precedent in** international **history**. If the states of Europe and the Pacific Rim detected a good deal of danger in the system, relying entirely on the generosity and sagacity (or, perhaps the naiveté and gullibility) of Washington would be the height of strategic irresponsibility. Indeed it is hard to think of a similar choice: When have any capable members of an alliance virtually disarmed and allowed another member to protect their interests? It seems more logical to suggest that the other members of NATO and Japan just do not share the same perception of threat that the United States does. If there was danger out there, as so many in the U.S. national security community insist, then the grand strategies of the allies would be quite different. Even during the Cold War, U.S. allies were not always convinced that they could rely on U.S. security commitments. Extended deterrence was never entirely comforting; few Europeans could be sure that United States would indeed sacrifice New York for Hamburg. In the absence of the unifying Soviet threat, their trust in U.S. commitments for their defense would presumably be lower—if in fact that commitment was at all necessary outside of the most pessimistic works of fiction.¶ Furthermore, in order for hegemonic stability logic to be an adequate explanation for restrained behavior, allied states must not only be fully convinced of the intentions and capability of the hegemon to protect their interests; they must also trust that the hegemon can interpret those interests correctly and consistently. As discussed above, the allies do not feel that the United States consistently demonstrates the highest level of strategic wisdom. In fact, they often seem to look with confused eyes upon our behavior, and are unable to explain why we so often find it necessary to go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. They will participate at times in our adventures, but minimally and reluctantly.¶ Finally, while believers in hegemonic stability as the primary explanation for the long peace have articulated a logic that some find compelling, they are rarely able to cite much evidence to support their claims. In fact, the limited empirical data we have suggests that there is little connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on defense fairly substantially, spending $100 billion less in real terms in 1998 that it did in 1990, which was a twenty-five percent reduction.72 To defense hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace,” argued Kristol and Kagan.”73 If global stability were unrelated to U.S. hegemony, however, one would not have expected an increase in conflict and violence.¶ The verdict from the last two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces.74 No state believed that its security was endangered by a less-capable U.S. military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. **No defense establishments were enhanced** to address power vacuums; **no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred** after the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped that spending back up. The two phenomena are unrelated.¶ These figures will not be enough to convince skeptics. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability, and one could also presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not be expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered.¶ However, two points deserve to be made. First, even if it were true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, it would remain the case that stability can be maintained at drastically lower levels. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still cut back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if, as many suspect, this era of global peace proves to be inherently stable because normative evolution is typically unidirectional, then no increase in conflict would ever occur, irrespective of U.S. spending.75 Abandoning the mission to stabilize the world would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation.¶ Second, it is also worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then surely hegemonists would note that their expectations had been justified. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as evidence for the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the relationship between U.S. power and international stability suggests that the two are unrelated. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.¶ It requires a good deal of hubris for any actor to consider itself indispensable to world peace. Far from collapsing into a whirlwind of chaos, the chances are high that the world would look much like it does now if the United States were to cease regarding itself as God’s gladiator on earth. The people of the United States would be a lot better off as well.

#### Great power wars are unthinkable—unipolarity just results in minor power wars.

Jervis 11—Professor of International Politics @ Columbia University [Robert Jervis (On the board of nine scholarly journals & Former president of the American Political Science Association), “Force in Our Times,” Saltzman Working Paper No. 15, July 2011, pg. <http://www.siwps.com/news.attachment/saltzmanworkingpaper15-842/SaltzmanWorkingPaper15.PDF>]

FORCE TODAY - Two dramatic and seemingly-contradictory trends are central. On the one hand, since the end of the Cold War if not before, the amount of inter-state and even civil war has drastically declined. Of course much depends on the time periods selected and the counting rules employed, but **by any measure international wars are** scarce if not **vanishing**, and civil wars, after blossoming in the 1990s, have greatly diminished.32 Significant instances of civil strife remain and are made salient by the horrific examples that appear in the newspapers every day, but in fact all inventories that I know of conclude that they are fewer than they used to be. Ironically, although realism stresses the conflict–inducing power of international anarchy, the barriers and inhibitions against international war now seem significantly more robust than those limiting civil wars. But even the latter are stronger than they were in the past. Although a central question is whether these trends will be reversed, they truly are startling, of great importance, and were largely unpredicted. They also remain insufficiently appreciated; one rarely reads statements about how fortunate we are to live in such a peaceful era. Perhaps the reasons are that optimism is generally derided in the cynical academic community, peace is not the sort of dramatic event that seizes public (and media) attention, and in the absence of major wars, we all find other things to worry about.

But Plato was not entirely wrong to say that “only the dead have seen the end of war.”33 Force, even when deeply recessed, can come to the surface again. Discussions in the US and Europe about relations with Iran often debate whether force should be “taken off the table.” But, regardless of whether it would be desirable to do so, would this be possible? As long as important disputes with Iran remain, with even the best will in the world there are limits to how far thoughts of the use of force could be pushed out of the minds of all the participants, especially those in Tehran. It is interesting that Tony Blair told the Chilcot commission that with respect to Iraq “even prior to September 11, 2001…. You know, the fact is [that] force was always an option.”34

Don’t try to tell Bashar al-Assad or Muammar Qaddafi that force is no longer important. As Osgood and Tucker noted in their important study over 40 years ago, “if force has lost its utility, its condemnation on moral grounds is superfluous.”35 Libya, in fact, represents the other trend. **Since the end of the Cold War, the US**, and to a lesser but significant extent Britain and France, **have used force more often** than they did before. **Panama, the Gulf War, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Libya are unmatched in the Cold War era.** The US is now fighting three wars, although by the time this article appears in print its military role in Libya and Iraq may be over. Of course these military adventures are all small by comparison with most wars, and certainly by the standards of Korea and Vietnam, let alone the wars between Iran and Iraq and Ethiopia and Eritrea. Nevertheless, they cannot be dismissed.

It is beyond my scope to explore all the possible explanations for either of these trends, but it does seem clear that the rise in American military activity was caused at least in part by the end of the Cold War and the related fact that the US is now the sole superpower. The new configuration means that the US is no longer deterred from entering local conflicts by the fear of a confrontation with the Soviet Union, makes others rely even more on the US to be a policeman (if often a misguided one), and elevates the salience of both threats and values that were previously trumped by the superpower rivalry. Opportunities loom larger for the US and the UK than they did during the Cold War, and new threats calling for military intervention have increased in visibility if not in actual occurrence. To start with the latter, although terrorism was a concern during the Cold War, it played nothing like the role that it does now. Of course the US never suffered an attack like 9/11 before, but while I will briefly discuss the extent of the danger of terrorism later, here I want to argue that the common placement of terrorism at the top of the list of threats is a product not only of the attacks over the past decade, but also of the paucity of other threats. The felt need to use force against terrorists, states that support them and even countries that might work with them in the future in part stems from a security environment that is remarkably benign.

THE SECURITY COMMUNITY - Alongside and in part responsible for the two contrasting trends in the use of force is the existence of a security community among the world’s leading powers. Although I can be brief because I have discussed this elsewhere,40 the point is of fundamental importance. **For the first time in history, the leading states of the world** (the US, most of Europe, and Japan) not only are at peace with each other, butfind the idea of war within this group literally unthinkable (which is the definition of a security community).41 Although Russia and China remain outside the community (which is not to say that war with or between them is highly likely, but only that it is within the realm of possibility), the change in world politics is enormous. War among the leading powers of the world and, at least as much, fear of war, preparation for war, and the desire to avoid such wars if possible--and prevail in them if not--has been the driving motor of international politics for centuries. At the risk of hyperbole, I think we can say that turning off this motor is the greatest change in international politics that we have ever seen. Its implications remain hard to grasp, and indeed how citizens and leaders come to understand this new world will strongly shape how they behave. But even now it is clear that the existence of the security community is crucial to world politics, international relations theory, and our lives.

Obvious questions are what caused the community to form, what could lead it to be replicated elsewhere, and what if anything could lead it to unravel. I have discussed the first question in my earlier writings and so will discuss only the latter two topics here. Of course speculations about what could bring the community to an end are not unrelated to analysis of its causes despite the fact that path-dependence could be at work and the possibility that the community could survive an end to the factors that brought it into being. Nevertheless, just as the community was formed by changes in domestic regimes, ruling values and ideas, and the costs and benefits of war and peace, so factors in these categories might bring us back to earlier and less fortunate relations. On top of all the normal unknowns in dealing with possible futures, our speculations are limited by the fact that the security community is particularly psychological in that it is defined by the unthinkability of war among the members. If we know little about how events move from being seen as possible to actually coming about, we know even less about what forces and processes move them from being unthinkable to being seen as possible.42

Here it is worth stressing that the fact that war among the members is unthinkable has real consequences beyond the fact that peace is maintained. When I ask my undergraduates whether they think they will live to see a war with another leading power, they look at me as though I have lost my mind because such an idea has never crossed theirs. What—among other things—they fail to realize is that their state of mind is without precedent and that the ability to go about their lives without the slightest concern that they or their country might—just might—have to fight another leading power shapes a good deal of their lives and our society. This is not to say that their lives are now free from worry, but only that their freedom from worrying about what used to be considered the greatest scourge of the human race gives them freedom to worry about other things.

On a larger scale, societies and governments within the community can go about their business without thinking about how this might affect the prospects for peace or the outcome of war with other members. Like my students’ lack of concern, we take this for granted, but in fact it represents a sharp break from the past. Rivalries, concern for relative position, and the desire for bargaining advantages still remain, but the intensity and consequences are quite different when war is out of the question. The whole tenor of inter-state relations and fundamental attitudes toward conflict and cooperation are different from the time a century ago when a British observer could return from a trip to Germany saying “Every one of those new factory chimneys is a gun pointed at England.”43

I see no reason to expect the community to come to an end. Indeed, the fact that it is defined by the participants’ beliefs that war cannot occur means that if they thought it would end, then in fact it would be dissolved (although war might not actually occur). More broadly, **just as** I noted earlier that **expectations of war can be** self-fulfilling**, so can expectations of peace**. But since academic musings have little impact, it is safe to pursue our scholarly duty of asking about what developments, currently unforeseen, might destroy the community.

Just as one pillar of the community was the transformation of the old idea that war was honorable and glorious by the almost universal repugnance of it44 (and this is one reason why any war now has to be carefully sold to the public), the community would be at least weakened if this attitude changed. Is it conceivable that war could come back into fashion? It is literally unimaginable that slavery or monarchical rule could return to favor. The current replacements for these ideas are deeply woven into the fabric of the social order, and the current conception of war as a terrible enterprise similarly does not stand alone and presumably could not change without wide-ranging alteration of our societies. **One dreadful** but I think unlikely **possibility would be that the** success of a series of **military interventions** of the type **we have seen recently could lead to a general reevaluation of not only the utility of this kind of force, but of its fundamental role in human endeavors**. Even without this, might values change in a cyclical fashion? Might boredom lead to a resurrection of the idea that force is noble? Could males, finding themselves losing power and status in their societies, seek a return to a world in which the arena of violence in which they have a comparative advantage is seen more positively? If it impossible to say that this cannot occur, it seems at least as difficult to foresee a chain of events that would bring this about. (But it is worth noting that before September 11, 2001 few of us believed that torture might come back into the inventory of state behavior.) Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes?45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy, and bring back old-fashioned beggar-thy-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed—states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a pre-existing high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

In the past, the conflict of interest that has sparked war has involved territory more often than economic issues, although of course the two are often linked.46 Thus the rise of the security community has been accompanied by a decline in territorial conflicts, and reciprocal causation is surely at work here. Could territorial conflicts resume a salient place in relations among the leading power? Territory in the guise of self-determination continues, as the likely coming of a referendum on Scottish independence indicates. But a reduced attachment to territory is indicated by the fact that the rest of the UK is not willing to fight to prevent this, just as it would be willing to part with Northern Ireland if the majority of the inhabitants desired to join the Irish Republic. Indeed, the existence of a security community and the related decline in traditional security threats makes it easier for sub-national units to split off.

Concern for territory has not entirely disappeared, of course, and the recent Danish claim on large portions of the Arctic reminds us that changes in climate and technology can endow areas with new value.47 But the virulent disputes we see around the world stem from the break-up of states or the partition of areas of the globe previously ruled by others, and within the community it is hard to see either likely candidate territorial disputes or general trends that would return to traditional values. Could anything occur that would lead Germany to feel that it was vital to reclaim Alsace and Lorraine? If this were to happen, we would be in a different world. But to turn this around, we would have to be in a very different world for this to occur.

The security community is underpinned not only by the benefits it is believed to bring, but also by the perceived high costs of war. If large-scale conventional war would be very destructive, the presence of nuclear weapons pushes the costs off the scale (and it is worth remembering that although Germany and Japan do not have nuclear weapons, they could develop them very quickly). One does not have to accept all the precepts of standard deterrence theory to believe that it would take extraordinary incentives for the states to contemplate war with so many nuclear weapons scattered around. The other side of the coin is that the security community might be weakened if the costs of war were to become much less. The good news—from this perspective—is that there are few prospects of this. Even President Obama, who has stressed the need to abolish nuclear weapons, admits that this cannot be done in his lifetime. Missile defenses, endorsed by all American presidents since Reagan, remain out of reach, and no technologies or tactics are in sight that could render conventional war quick and relatively bloodless.

A more likely change would be an erosion of American hegemony. Among the leading powers, all are not equally leading. The strength, interests, and military presence of the US remain sufficient to see that others in the community do not challenge either it or each other. A decline in American power and a partial withdrawal of its influence are certainly possible, and at minimum, American troops might be withdrawn from Europe in the coming years. But would this matter? **Even if American dominance played a large role in forming the community, it may not be necessary for the community’s** maintenance. Path dependence **may operate strongly here**, and although firm evidence is hard to come by, I would argue that in the absence of other changes of the kind I have discussed, **it is** very unlikely **that pulling off the American security blanket would lead to thoughts of war**. (On the level of policy prescription, however, I am cautious enough not to want to run the experiment.)Pg. 13-20

#### Decline now facilitates US multilateralism—paves the way for a soft landing that prevents their transition impacts.

He 10—Professor of Political Science at Utah State University [Kai He (Postdoctoral fellow in the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program at Princeton University (2009–2010) and a Bradley fellow of the Lynda and Harry Bradley Foundation (2009–2010), “The hegemon’s choice between power and security: explaining US policy toward Asia after the Cold War,” Review of International Studies (2010), 36, pg. 1121–1143]

When US policymakers perceive a rising or a stable hegemony, the anarchic nature of the international system is no longer valid in the mind of US policymakers because the preponderant power makes the US immune from military threats. In the self-perceived, hierarchic international system with the US on the top, power-maximisation becomes the strategic goal of the US in part because of the ‘lust for power’ driven by human nature and in part because of the disappearance of the security constraints imposed by anarchy. Therefore, selective engagement and hegemonic dominion become two possible strategies for the US to maximise its power in the world. The larger the power gap between the US and others, the more likely selective engagement expands to hegemonic dominion. When US policymakers perceive a declining hegemony in that the power gap between the hegemon and others is narrowed rather than widened, US policymakers begin to change their hierarchic view of the international system. The rapid decline of relative power causes US policymakers to worry about security imposed by anarchy even though the US may remain the most powerful state in the system during the process of decline. Offshore balancing and multilateralism, therefore, become two possible policy options for the US to maximise its security under anarchy. The possible budget constraints during US decline may lead to military withdrawals from overseas bases. In addition, the US becomes more willing to pay the initial ‘lock-in’ price of multilateral institutions in order to constrain other states’ behaviour for its own security.

US foreign policy towards Asia preliminarily supports the power-perception hegemonic model. When President George H. W. Bush came to power, the US faced ‘dual deficits’ even though the US won the Cold War and became the hegemon by default in the early 1990s. The domestic economic difficulty imposed a declining, or at least uncertain, hegemony to the Bush administration. Consequently, Bush had to withdraw troops from Asia and conducted a reluctant offshore balancing strategy in the early 1990s. Although the US still claimed to keep its commitments to Asian allies, the US words with the sword became unreliable at best.

During President Clinton’s first tenure, how to revive US economy became the first priority of the administration. The perception of a declining hegemon did not totally fade until the middle of the 1990s when the US economy gradually came out of the recession. Multilateral institutions, especially APEC, became Clinton’s diplomatic weapon to open Asia’s market and boost US economy. In addition, the US also endorsed the ARF initiated by the ASEAN states in order to retain its eroding political and military influence after the strategic retreats in the early 1990s.

However, the US ‘new economy’ based on information technology and computers revived policymakers’ confidence in US hegemony after the Asian miracle was terminated by the 1997 economic crisis. The second part of the 1990s witnessed a rising US hegemony and the George W. Bush administration reached the apex of US power by any measure in the early 21st century. Therefore, since Clinton’s second tenure in the White House, US foreign policy in general and towards Asia in particular has become more assertive and power-driven in nature. Besides reconfirming its traditional military alliances in Asia, the US deepened its military engagement in the region through extensive security cooperation with other Asian states.

The selective engagement policy of the US in the late 1990s was substantially expanded by the Bush administration to hegemonic dominion after 9/11. The unrivalled hegemony relieved US of concerns over security threats from any other states in the international system. The ‘lust for power’ without constraints from anarchy drove US policymakers to pursue a hegemonic dominion policy in the world. The ‘pre-emption strategy’ and proactive missile defence programs reflected the power-maximising nature of the hegemonic dominion strategy during the George W. Bush administration.

What will the US do in the future? The power-perception hegemonic model suggests that the US cannot escape the fate of other great powers in history. When US hegemony is still rising or at a stable stage, no one can stop US expansion for more power. When its economy can no longer afford its power-oriented strategy, the US will face the same strategic burden of ‘imperial overstretch’ that Great Britain suffered in the 19th century. However, the power-perception hegemonic model also argues that US foreign policy depends on how US policymakers perceive the rise and fall of US hegemony.

If historical learning can help US policymakers cultivate a prudent perception regarding US hegemony, the early implementation of offshore balancing and **multilateralism may facilitate the soft-landing** **of declining US hegemony**. More importantly, the real danger is whether the US can make a right choice between power and security when US hegemony begins to decline. If US policymakers cannot learn from history but insist on seeking more power instead of security even though US hegemony is in decline, the likelihood of hegemonic war will increase. However, if US policymakers choose security over power when US hegemony is in decline, offshore balancing and multilateralism can help the US maximise security in the future anarchic, multipolar world. Pg. 1141-1143

\*Heg encourages power maximization

\*Decline forces them to worry about security. Leads to multilateralism/OSB

\*US willing to pay lock-in price to constrain peer competitor

\*1990’s prove

\*Multilateralism creates a soft landing during decline

#### Unipolarity is destroying bipartisan compact needed to sustain support for multilateralism—makes our policies erratic and incoherent.

Kupchan & Trubowitz 7—Professor of International Affairs @ Georgetown University & Professor of Government @ University of Texas-Austin [Charles A. Kupchan (Senior Fellow @ Council on Foreign Relations, and Henry A. Kissinger Scholar at the Library of Congress) & Peter L. Trubowitz (Senior Fellow @ Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law), “Dead Center: The Demise of Liberal Internationalism in the United States,” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Fall 2007), pp. 7–44]

The conditions that sustained liberal internationalism have of late been rapidly disappearing, dramatically weakening its grip on the nation’s politics. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, U.S. primacy has reduced the incentives for Republicans and Democrats alike to adhere to the liberal internationalist compact. Unipolarity has heightened the geopolitical appeal of unilateralism, a trend that even the threat of transnational terrorism has not reversed. Unipolarity has also loosened the political discipline engendered by the Cold War threat, leaving U.S. foreign policy more vulnerable to growing partisanship at home. “Red” and “Blue” America disagree about the nature of U.S. engagement in the world; growing disparities in wealth have reawakened class tensions; and political pragmatism has been losing ground to ideological extremism.

The polarization of the United States has dealt a severe blow to the bipartisan compact between power and cooperation. Instead of adhering to the vital center, the country’s elected officials, along with the public, are backing away from the liberal internationalist compact, supporting either U.S. power or international cooperation, but rarely both. President Bush and many Republicans have abandoned one side of the liberal internationalist compact: multilateralism has received little but contempt on their watch. Meanwhile, the Democrats have neglected the other side: many party stalwarts are uneasy with the assertive use of U.S. power. As the partisan gyre in Washington widens, the political center is dying out, and support for **liberal internationalism is dying with it**. According to Jim Leach, one of the Republican moderates to lose his House seat in the 2006 midterm elections, “[The United States’] middle has virtually collapsed. And how to reconstruct a principled center, a center of gravity in American politics, may be the hardest single thing at this particular time.”5

Prominent voices from across the political spectrum have called for the restoration of a robust bipartisan center that can put U.S. grand strategy back on track.6 According to Democratic Senator Hillary Clinton, “For more than a half a century, we know that we prospered because of a bipartisan consensus on defense and foreign policy. We must do more than return to that sensible, cooperative approach.” Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney echoes this sentiment: “It seems that concern aboutWashington’s divisiveness and capability to meet today’s challenges is the one thing that unites us all. We need new thinking on foreign policy and an overarching strategy that can unite the United States and its allies.”7

These exhortations are in vain. The halcyon era of liberal internationalism is over; the bipartisan compact between power and partnership has been effectively dismantled. If left unattended, the **political foundations of U.S. statecraft will** continue to **disintegrate**, exposing the country to the dangers of an erratic and incoherent foreign policy. To avoid this fate, U.S. leaders will have to fashion a new brand of internationalism—one that will necessarily entail less power and less partnership if it is to have a chance of securing broad domestic support. To find a new equilibrium between the nation’s commitments abroad and its polarized politics at home, the United States will need a grand strategy that is as selective and judicious as it is purposeful. Pg. 8-10

#### Multilat leads to global coop and power sharing—it creates shared framework of interaction changes the way states interpret global politics

Pouliot 11—Professor of Poli Sci @ McGill University [Vincent Pouliot, “Multilateralism as an End in Itself,” International Studies Perspectives (2011) 12, 18–26]

Because it rests on open, nondiscriminatory debate, and the routine exchange of viewpoints, the multilateral procedure introduces three key advantages that are gained, regardless of the specific policies adopted, and tend to diffuse across all participants. Contrary to the standard viewpoint, according to which a rational preference or functional imperative lead to multilateral cooperation, here it is the systematic practice of multilateralism that creates the drive to cooperate. At the theoretical level, the premise is that it is not only what people think that explains what they do, but also what they do that determines what they think (Pouliot 2010). Everyday multilateralism is a self-fulfilling practice for at least three reasons.¶ First, the joint practice of multilateralism creates mutually recognizable patterns of action among global actors. This process owes to the fact that practices structure social interaction (Adler and Pouliot forthcoming).2 Because they are meaningful, organized, and repeated, practices generally convey a degree of mutual intelligibility that allows people to develop social relations over time. In the field of international security, for example, the practice of deterrence is premised on a limited number of gestures, signals, and linguistic devices that are meant, as Schelling (1966:113) put it, to ‘‘getting the right signal across.’’ The same goes with the practice of multilateralism, which rests on a set of political and social patterns that establish the boundaries of action in a mutually intelligible fashion. These structuring effects, in turn, allow for the development of common frameworks for appraising global events. Multilateral dialog serves not only to find joint solutions; it also makes it possible for various actors to zoom in on the definition of the issue at hand—a particularly important step on the global stage.¶ The point is certainly not that the multilateral procedure leads everybody to agree on everything—that would be as impossible as counterproductive. Theoretically speaking, there is room for skepticism that multilateralism may ever allow communicative rationality at the global level (see Risse 2000; Diez and Steans 2005). With such a diverse and uneven playing field, one can doubt that discursive engagement, in and of itself, can lead to common lifeworlds. Instead, what the practice of multilateralism fosters is the emergence of a **shared framework of interaction**—for example, a common linguistic repertoire—that allows global actors to make sense of world politics in mutually recognizable ways. Of course, they may not agree on the specific actions to be taken, but at least they can build on an established pattern of political interaction to deal with the problem at hand—sometimes even before it emerges in acute form. In today’s pluralistic world, that would already be a considerable achievement.¶ In that sense, multilateralism may well be a constitutive practice of what Lu (2009) calls ‘‘political friendship among peoples.’’ The axiomatic practice of principled and inclusive dialog is quite apparent in the way she describes this social structure: ‘‘**While conflicts**, especially over the distribution of goods and burdens, **will inevitably arise, under conditions of political friendship among peoples, they will be negotiated within** a global background context of norms and **institutions based on mutual recognition**, equity in the distribution of burdens and benefits **of global cooperation**, **and power-sharing** in the institutions of global governance rather than domination by any group’’ (2009:54–55). In a world where multilateralism becomes an end in itself, this ideal pattern emerges out of the structuring effects of axiomatic practice: take the case of NATO, for instance, which has recently had to manage, through the multilateral practice, fairly strong internal dissent (Pouliot 2006). While clashing views and interests will never go away in our particularly diverse world, as pessimists are quick to emphasize (for example, Dahl 1999), the management of discord is certainly made easier by shared patterns of dialog based on mutually recognizable frameworks.¶ Second, the multilateral procedure typically ensures a remarkable level of moderation in the global policies adopted. In fact, a quick historical tour d’horizon suggests that actors engaged in multilateralism tend to avoid radical solutions in their joint decision making. Of course, the very process of uniting disparate voices helps explain why multilateralism tends to produce median consensus. This is not to say that the multilateral practice inevitably leads to lowest common denominators. To repeat, because it entails complex and often painstaking debate before any actions are taken, the multilateral procedure forces involved actors to devise and potentially share similar analytical lenses that, in hindsight, make the policies adopted seem inherently, and seemingly ‘‘naturally,’’ moderate. This is because the debate about what a given policy means takes place before its implementation, which makes for a much smoother ride when decisions hit the ground. This joint interpretive work, which constitutes a crucial aspect of multilateralism, creates outcomes that are generally perceived as inherently reasonable. Participation brings inherent benefits to politics, as Bachrach (1975) argued in the context of democratic theory. Going after the conventional liberal view according to which actors enter politics with an already fixed set of preferences, Bachrach observes that most of the time people define their interests in the very process of participation. The argument is not that interests formed in the course of social interaction are in any sense more altruistic. It rather is that the nature and process of political practices, in this case multilateralism, matter a great deal in shaping participants’ preferences (Wendt 1999). In this sense, not only does the multilateral practice have structuring effects on global governance, but it is also constitutive of what actors say, want, and do (Adler and Pouliot forthcoming).¶ Third and related, multilateralism lends legitimacy to the policies that it generates by virtue of the debate that the process necessarily entails. There is no need here to explain at length how deliberative processes that are inclusive of all stakeholders tend to produce outcomes that are generally considered more socially and politically acceptable. In the long run, the large ownership also leads to more efficient implementation, because actors feel invested in the enactment of solutions on the ground. Even episodes of political failure, such as the lack of UN reaction to the Rwandan genocide, can generate useful lessons when re-appropriated multilaterally—think of the Responsibility to Protect, for instance.3 From this outlook, there is no contradiction between efficiency and the axiomatic practice of multilateralism, quite the contrary. The more multilateralism becomes the normal or self-evident practice of global governance, the more benefits it yields for the many stakeholders of global governance. In fact, multilateralism as an end in and of itself could generate even more diffuse reciprocity than Ruggie had originally envisioned. Not only do its distributional consequences tend to even out, **multilateralism as a global governance routine** also **creates** self-reinforcing dynamics and new focal points for strategic interaction**. The axiomatic practice of multilateralism helps define problems in commensurable ways and craft moderate solutions** with wide-ranging ownership—three processual benefits that further strengthen the impetus for multilateral dialog. Pg. 21-23

#### That cooperation is key to planetary survival—weak regulations risk extinction.

Masciulli 11—Professor of Political Science @ St Thomas University [Joseph Masciulli, “The Governance Challenge for Global Political and Technoscientific Leaders in an Era of Globalization and Globalizing Technologies,” Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society February 2011 vol. 31 no. 1 pg. 3-5]

What is most to be feared is enhanced global disorder resulting from the combination of weak global regulations; the unforeseen destructive consequences of converging technologies and economic globalization; military competition among the great powers; and the prevalent biases of short-term thinking held by most leaders and elites. But no practical person would wish that such a disorder scenario come true, given all the weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) available now or which will surely become available in the foreseeable future. As converging technologies united by IT, cognitive science, nanotechnology, and robotics advance synergistically in monitored and unmonitored laboratories, we may be blindsided by these future developments brought about by technoscientists with a variety of good or destructive or mercenary motives. The current laudable but problematic openness about publishing scientific results on the Internet would contribute greatly to such negative outcomes.

To be sure, if the global disorder-emergency scenario occurred because of postmodern terrorism or rogue states using biological, chemical, or nuclear WMDs, or a regional war with nuclear weapons in the Middle East or South Asia, there might well be a positive result for global governance. Such a global emergency might unite the global great and major powers in the conviction that a global concert was necessary for their survival and planetary survival as well. In such a global great power concert, basic rules of economic, security, and legal order would be uncompromisingly enforced both globally and in the particular regions where they held hegemonic status. That concert scenario, however, is flawed by the limited legitimacy of its structure based on the members having the greatest hard and soft power on planet Earth.

At the base of our concerns, I would argue, are human proclivities for narrow, short-term thinking tied to individual self-interest or corporate and national interests in decision making. For globalization, though propelled by technologies of various kinds, “remains an essentially human phenomenon . . . and the main drivers for the establishment and uses of disseminative systems are hardy perennials: profit, convenience, greed, relative advantage, curiosity, demonstrations of prowess, ideological fervor, malign destructiveness.” These human drives and capacities will not disappear. Their “manifestations now extend considerably beyond more familiarly empowered governmental, technoscientific and corporate actors to include even individuals: terrorists, computer hackers and rogue market traders” (Whitman, 2005, p. 104).

In this dangerous world, if people are to have their human dignity recognized and enjoy their human rights, above all, to life, security, a healthy environment, and freedom, we need new forms of comprehensive global regulation and control. Such **effective global leadership** **and governance** with robust enforcement powers **alone can adequately respond to destructive current global problems, and prevent new ones**.

However, successful human adaptation and innovation to our current complex environment through the social construction of effective global governance will be a daunting collective task for global political and technoscientific leaders and citizens. For our global society is caught in “the whirlpool of an accelerating process of modernization” that has for the most part “been left to its own devices” (Habermas, 2001, p. 112). We need to progress in human adaptation to and innovation for our complex and problematical global social and natural planetary environments through global governance. I suggest we need to begin by ending the prevalent biases of short-termism in thinking and acting and the false values attached to the narrow self-interest of individuals, corporations, and states.

I agree with Stephen Hawking that the long-term future of the human race must be in space. It will be difficult enough to avoid disaster on planet Earth in the next hundred years, let alone the next thousand, or million. . . . There have been a number of times in the past when its survival has been a question of touch and go. The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 was one of these. The frequency of such occasions is likely to increase in the future. We shall need great care and judgment to negotiate them all successfully. But I’m an optimist. If we can avoid disaster for the next two centuries, our species should be safe, as we spread into space. . . . But we are entering an increasingly dangerous period of our history. Our population and our use of the finite resources of planet Earth, are growing exponentially, along with our technical ability to change the environment for good or ill. But our genetic code still carries the selfish and aggressive instincts that were of survival advantage in the past. . . . Our only chance of long term survival is not to remain inward looking on planet Earth, but to spread out into space. We have made remarkable progress in the last hundred years. But if we want to continue beyond the next hundred years, our future is in space.” (Hawking, 2010)

Nonetheless, to reinvent humanity pluralistically in outer space and beyond will require securing our one and only global society and planet Earth through effective global governance in the foreseeable future. And **our dilemma is that** the enforcement powers of multilateral institutions **are not likely to be strengthened because** of the competition for greater (relative, not absolute) hard and soft power by the **great** and major **powers**. They **seek** their **national** or alliance **superiority**, or at least, parity, for the sake of their state’s survival and security now. Unless the global disorder-emergency scenario was to occur soon—God forbid—the great powers will most likely, recklessly and tragically, leave global survival and security to their longer term agendas. Pg. 4-5

#### US has diversified away from political opponents – No oil wars

**Mityakov et al. 11** – Professor of Economics @ Clemson University [Sergey Mityakov, Heiwai Tang (Professor of Economics @ Tufts University, & Kevin K. Tsui (Professor of Economics @ Clemson University) Energy Security and International Relations: Evidence from Oil Import Diversification, March 2011, pg. <http://www.econ.cuhk.edu.hk/dept/seminar/10-11/2nd-term/PoliticsOilTradeCUHK.pdf>]

We have documented a significant negative association between political distance and oil imports to major powers. While we do not completely rule out the possibility of reverse causality, our stylized examples and the timing of the changes in relations (especially when they are driven by political leadership turnover) in our regressions suggest that international relations affect oil trade. More importantly, this effect is **robust** to controlling for economic sanctions and militarized interstate disputes, and hence the political oil import diversification is more than a wartime phenomenon. In other words, the effect of political distance we focus on is distinct from a disruption effect, and we demonstrate this by showing that the effect survives even when all countries engaged in militarized dispute are excluded from the data.

To the extent that major powers do not minimize transportation cost of oil trade, we have identified a political cost of oil dependence even in the absence of interstate conflict or foreign intervention. Quantifying this cost of oil dependence provides a useful step towards a better understanding of the relationship between energy policy and foreign policy. Our paper also adds to the growing literature of the role of politics in international trade. The evidence we presented suggest that **bilateral trade can be a political choice**, with an important qualification that the effects of international politics on bilateral trade are heterogeneous across both countries and commodities. In particular, international politics matters more for major powers importing strategic commodities. Furthermore, in the case of the United States, the incentive to diversify the sources of oil imports away from her political opponents appears to be stronger when the exporter is nondemocratic.

Until recently, none of the major oil producers of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region are democratic. The revolutions and protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, and other parts of the MENA region are one of the most important political events since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Yet, it is still highly uncertain about the types of governments that will emerge in these countries. Our findings suggest that both the form of the new governments and their relations with the United States as well as other major power can have profound impact on the global oil trade pattern and the cost of energy.

## Warming

#### Warming is slowing because of sulfur aerosols.

[Louise Gray](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/journalists/louise-gray/), 11/26/2010. Environment Correspondent for the Telegraph. “Global warming has slowed because of pollution,” The Telegraph, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/environment/climatechange/8159991/Global-warming-has-slowed-because-of-pollution.html.

The latest figures from more than 20 scientific institutions around the world show that global temperatures are higher than ever. ¶ However the gradual rise in temperatures over the last 30 years is slowing slightly. Global warming since the 1970s has been 0.16C (0.3F) but the rise in the last decade was just 0.05C (0.09F), according to the Met Office. ¶ Sceptics claim this as evidence man made global warming is a myth. ¶ But in a new report the Met Office said the reduced rate of warming can be easily explained by a number of factors. And indeed the true rate of warming caused by man made greenhouse gases could be greater than ever. ¶ One of the major factors is pollution over Asia, where the huge growth in coal-fired power stations mean aerosols like sulphur are being pumped into the air. This reflects sunlight, cooling the land surface temperature. ¶ Dr Vicky Pope, Head of Climate Change Advice, said pollution may be causing a cooling effect. ¶ “A possible increase in aerosol emissions from Asia in the last decade may have contributed to substantially to the recent slowdown,” she said. “Aerosols cool the climate by reflecting the sunlight.”

#### Reducing coal emissions would trigger rapid warming due to reduced aerosol cooling.

N. Chalmers et al, 1,2 E. J. Highwood,1 E. Hawkins,1,2 R. Sutton,1,2 L. J. Wilcox1, 8/21/2012. 1Department of Meteorology, University of Reading, Reading, U.K.; 2NCAS-Climate, University of Reading, Reading, U.K. “Aerosol contribution to the rapid warming of 2 near-term climate under RCP 2.6,” Manuscript, accepted for publication in Geophysical Research Letters, www.met.reading.ac.uk/~ed/home/chalmers\_etal\_2012\_accepted.pdf.

\*\*\*RCP="Representative Concentration Pathways." These are IPCC scenarios designed for use in climate models, that essentially project different scenarios for changes (or lack thereof) in global emissions. RCP2.6 is a scenario of significant emissions reductions. RCP4.5 is the baseline "business as usual" scenario.

\*\*\*CDNC=cloud droplet number concentration

The period during which global mean surface temperature in RCP2.6 is higher than in 130 RCP4.5, discussed in the previous section, is directly related to a rapid increase in global 131 mean surface temperature in RCP2.6, between around 2010 and around 2025 (Figure 1a). 132 In this section we investigate the causes of this rapid warming, and relate this event to 133 the comparison with RCP4.5. Figure 3 shows maps of the differences between the 10 year 134 means before and after the rapid warming. In this case a positive value indicates a larger 135 value after the sudden warming identified in Figure 1.¶ 136 As expected, there is a large reduction in sulphate load, and corresponding decrease 137 in CDNC over most of the northern hemisphere, consistent with a change in the indirect 138 aerosol effect. An increase in the effective radius is also seen (not shown). This reduces 139 the optical depth of the clouds when they are present, meaning more downward shortwave 140 flux is transmitted to the surface. There is also a prominent decrease in cloud fraction over 141 the subtropical northeastern Pacific Ocean which could be a consequence of the impact 142 of reduced sulphate aerosol on cloud lifetime. Lu et al. [2009] show that drizzle rate from 143 clouds in this region is indeed inversely related to aerosol concentration. Kloster et al. 144 [2010] also suggested that a change in cloud water path in their simulations with aggres-¶ 145 sive aerosol reductions resulted from enhanced drizzle formation. We hypothesise that 146 the localised nature of this feature by comparison with the sulphate and CDNC change 147 is due to the cloud in this region being particularly sensitive to a change in aerosol. Cli- 148 matologically, this region is a transition zone between open and closed mesoscale cellular 149 convection [Rosenfeld et al., 2011], aerosol concentrations being lower in the open celled 150 regions [Woods et al., 2011]. Although the details of these processes are unlikely to be 151 represented explicitly in global models, the localised strong decrease in cloud fraction in 152 the northeastern Pacific ocean would be consistent with a change in cloud regime driven 153 by decreased aerosol. Other regions show increases in cloud fraction, which cannot readily 154 be explained as a direct response to the decrease in sulphate load. It is likely that instead 155 these reflect non-local adjustments of the coupled ocean-atmosphere system in response 156 to the change in forcing.¶ 157 Figure 3 also shows the difference in surface shortwave flux (panel d), surface air tem- 158 perature (panel e), and global energy balance (panel f). The predicted increase in surface 159 downward shortwave radiation is seen in the global mean and particularly in the regions 160 of decreased cloud fraction and sulphate load. A negative anomaly in surface SW is co- 161 located with the positive cloud fraction changes. The pattern of surface air temperature 162 change shows large warming over the northern continents and the Arctic, and also a local 163 maximum over the subtropical northeastern Pacific coincident with the region of reduced 164 cloud fraction. The same localised pattern appears in all the simulations of Kloster et al. 165 [2010] that include aerosol reductions, but is absent from their simulations considering 166 only future changes in greenhouse gases.¶ 167 The surface energy budget shows the expected increases in downward shortwave radia- 168 tion. In addition there is an increase in downward longwave radiation in response to the 169 increase in GHG concentrations between the two periods, and also reflecting changes in 170 clouds. The warming due to increases in net surface downward radiation is balanced by 171 increases in latent and (over land) sensible heat fluxes.¶ 4. Discussion and Conclusions¶ 172 In this study we have compared projections of near term climate in the HadGEM2-ES 173 model under RCP4.5 and RCP2.6. GHG forcing under these scenarios is almost identical 174 until 2020, and then declines in RCP2.6 relative to RCP4.5. However, between 2018 and 175 2037 global annual mean surface air temperature is warmer under RCP2.6. The start of 176 this period is characterised by a period of particularly rapid warming.¶ 177 Our results provide compelling evidence that the warming in RCP2.6 is a result of a 178 rapid decrease in sulphate aerosol load. This decrease is caused by a decrease in sulphur 179 emissions in RCP2.6, as a result of the rapid decrease in coal use needed to reduce GHG 180 emissions. Thus our results highlight the difficulty of reducing the rate of global warming 181 in the near term in this model, even under extreme scenarios for reducing GHG emissions, 182 and is consistent with previous simulations by Wigley [1991] and Johns et al. [2011].

#### That would double warming and quickly take us above the “2-degree threshold.”

Dr Andrew Glikson, 6/6/2011. Earth and paleoclimate science, Australian National University. “Global warming above 2° so far mitigated by accidental geo-engineering,” Crikey, http://www.crikey.com.au/2011/06/06/global-warming-above-2%C2%B0-so-far-mitigated-by-accidental-geo-engineering/.

According to NASA’s Goddard Institute of Space Science climate reports, global warming is already committed to a rise above two degrees. The magical two degrees ceiling determined by governments is only holding thanks to effective, if unintended, geo-engineering by sulphur dioxide emitted from industry, holding global warming to about half of what it would be otherwise. Recent publications by Hansen and his [research](http://www.columbia.edu/%7Ejeh1/mailings/2011/20110415_EnergyImbalancePaper.pdf) [group](http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1105/1105.0968.pdf) indicate the rise of atmospheric energy (heat) level due to greenhouse gases and land clearing are committed to +2.3 degrees (+3.1 Watt/m2), currently mitigated by the transient effect of sulphur aerosols and the cooling effect of the oceans. Sulphur dioxide is emanated from coal, oil and the processing of minerals (breakdown of sulphides to produce copper, zinc, lead and so on), and from other chemical industries. It combines with water in the atmosphere to produce sulphuric acid, which (being heavier than air) condenses and settles to the ground within a few years. Aerosols stay in the atmosphere and stratosphere on time scales ranging from hours to days and to years, depending on their grain size, chemistry and height in the atmosphere and on the physical state and temperature of the atmosphere at different altitudes and latitudes. The aerosols are short-lived, i.e. on time scales of up to a few years, but since they are continuously emitted from industry the overall level is increasing as burning of fossil fuels is rising. The continuing emission of sulphur aerosols in effect constitute a global geo-engineering process without which the atmosphere would warm by another 1.2 degrees (1.6 Watt/m2) above the present level, resulting in near-doubling of global warming ([Figure 1](http://www.columbia.edu/%7Ejeh1/mailings/2011/20110415_EnergyImbalancePaper.pdf)).

#### No spillover – tech won’t be adopted by China or India – can’t solve warming without the biggest emitters on board

#### Slowing now due to natural forcings – no risk of runaway warming

Klimenko 11 [VV, Research Assistant at the [Department of Theoretical Astrophysics](http://www.ioffe.ru/astro/) of the [Ioffe Physico-Technical Institute](http://www.ioffe.ru/), “Why Is Global Warming Slowing Down?,” 5-20, Doklady Earth Sciences, 2011, Vol. 440, Part 2, pp. 1419–1422]

The first decade of the present century has ended with a remarkable climatic event: for the first time over the past 65 years, the five year average global temperature over 2006–2010 turned out to be lower than the value for the previous five year interval (2001–2005). In addition, the absolute maximum temperature, which was attained as long ago as in 1998, has not been surpassed for thirteen years. Both these facts seem ingly support the arguments of the opponents of global warming theory, at least those who regard the anthro pogenic origin of warming questionable or even farfetched. Indeed, the anthropogenic emission of carbon dioxide, which is the major greenhouse atmospheric component, has risen by 60% from 5.2 giga tons to 8.5 gigatons of carbon, and its concentration has increased from 339 to 390 ppmv (parts per million by volume). How then do we explain the apparent slowdown in the rate of global warming? Evidently, the observed global rise in temperature (Fig. 1) is a response of the climatic system to the combined action of both anthropogenic and natural impacts. Some of the latter are precisely the factors responsible for the current climatic paradox. Further, we will attempt to identify these factors and, based on their analysis, forecast the global climatic trends for the next decades. Figure 2 presents the wavelet spectra yielded by continuously analyzing the time series of global tem perature over 1850–2011 [1]. Here, we analyze only one of three existing global temperature datasets which are continuously updated, namely the HadCRUT3 temperature series provided by the Uni versity of East Anglia (accessible at http://www.cru. uea.ac.uk/cru/data/temperature/), because this is, as of now, the only dataset covering more than a 150-year interval, which is crucial for our study. We note that it only recently became possible to analyze such long time series and, thus, identification of multidecade rhythms became a solvable task. The temperature data were preliminarily rid of the longterm anthropogenic trend associated with the accumulation of greenhouse gases and aerosols in the atmosphere; this trend was calculated from the energybalance climate model developed at the Moscow Power Engineering Institute (MPEI) [2]. The resulting temperature series, free of anthropogenic trends, will contain important infor mation on the influence of natural factors. Figure 2 shows that, throughout the entire interval of instrumental observations since the mid nineteenth century, the data contain rather stable 70 year and 20 year cyclic components. A less significant 9year cycle was present in most observations (during 1870– 1900 and 1940–2000), and a 6year cycle persisted over a considerable part of the entire time span. Closely consistent results were also obtained when analyzing the temperature series by the maximum entropy method (MEM) (Fig. 3). As the order of the auroregression (AR) method is known to significantly affect the result, in our case this parameter was chosen to be onethird the length of the studied data series: according to the long experience in application of MEM in climate research, this value is suitable for providing useful information. All the harmonic com ponents identified above are statistically significant with a confidence level of 90%. Supposedly, the source of the dominant 70year cycle is the North Atlantic, where this harmonic is reliably identified not only in the ocean [3–5] but also on the continental margins: in Greenland [6], England [7], Finland [8], at the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago, and on the Yamal Peninsula [9]. Moreover, this periodical component is not only recognized in the instrumental data but it is also revealed in the time series of paleotemperature and pressure which date back to over hundreds and even thousands of years ago. We believe that this rhythm is associated with the quasiperiodical changes in the atmospheric and oceanic circulation known as the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) and with the related pulsations in the advection of warm waters to the basins of the Nor wegian and Barents seas. Indeed, the time series of the NAO index contain an approximately 60to 70year component [10] and show a strong positive correlation with the time series of temperature in the Northern hemisphere [11]. The positive phases of NAO indices are character ized by a more intense westerly air mass transport and a noticeable warming of the major part of the nontrop ical zone in the northern hemisphere, which is most prominent in the winter–spring season. Incidentally, the most rapid phase of the presentday warming (1975–2005) just featured such seasonal asymmetry, which is more evidence in favor of the hemispherical and global temperatures being related to NAO. Finally, it turns out that the 70year periodicity is present in the globally averaged temperature and in the temperature averaged over the northern hemisphere, whereas in the spectrum for the southern hemisphere, this harmonic component is rather weak (Fig. 3). This is an important additional argument in favor of the North Atlantic origin of the 70year cycle. The existence of the quasibidecadal oscillations is often attributed to the influence of the Sun. However, the situation is not so simple: in our case, this cycle is almost not recognizable in the northern hemisphere, although clearly pronounced in the southern hemisphere (Fig. 3). This fact motivates one not to con strain the probable origin of this periodicity to the behavior of the Sun, but also to search for its possible correlations to the variability in the Southern Oscillation (SO) whose index has a peak at a period of 22 years [12, 13]. The latter hypothesis is supported by the fact that the temperature series over the equatorial and southern portions of the Pacific as well as those over the entire water area of the Indian Ocean contain a distinctly expressed quasibidecadal oscillation [3]. In turn, the SO, which largely controls the tempera ture regime of the southern hemisphere, is undoubt edly affected by the variations in the rate of the Earth’s rotation, which also have a significant periodical com ponent at 22 years [14]. As of now, the nature of the 9year oscillations is least clear. We suppose it to be a result of superimposi tion of oscillations associated with the lunar–solar tides that have characteristic times of 8.85 (the perigee period of the Moon) and 9.86 years (the period of barycenter of the Sun–Jupiter system), which are cer tainly able to cause significant changes to the atmo spheric circulation and, therefore, temperature. The comparison of the instrumental data series since 1850 with the results of calculations using the energy balance model with superimposed main cyclic components is presented in Fig. 1. The calculated curve in the interval 1850–2011 accounts for more than 75% of the observed variability in the data and clearly demonstrates that the natural factors may considerably enhance or, quite the opposite, reduce the ongoing warming up to its complete disappearing or even shortterm cooling, as has occurred during the last 6–8 years. We suppose warming will resume shortly in the years to come (Fig. 1). However, up to the end of the century, its rate will likely be lower than the value attained in 1975–2005 when the extremely intense positive phases of NAO and SO concurrent with the highest solar irradiation over the last 600 years [15] resulted in a rate of warming as high as in excess of 0.2°C per decade. In the next few decades, the natural forcings will restrain the process of global warming. This will be primarily associated with the decline in solar activity and the transition to the negative phase in NAO, which features a weaker westerly air mass transport. Recent measurements show that both these processes are gaining strength. Indeed, the NAO index has consistently decreased since early 1990 and is now at a 40year low (http://www.cgd. ucar.edu/cas/jhurrell/indices.html). At the same time, the minimal solar constant over the entire 33year history of satellite observations has been recorded in the current, solar cycle 24, which started in the fall of 2008 (http://www.pmodwrc.ch/pmod.php?topic=tsi/ composite/SolarConstant/).