CP

Offense

1. Fair side balance – it balances against strategic advantage of case selection, AFF conditionality in the form of permutations, and many CPs would never be run without it

2. Policy Analysis – hypothetical argumentation is the staple method of flexible questioning of policy and is best suited to debate

3. Logical decision making – not having the option of the status quo would constitute an extreme departure from natural decision making

4. Critical thinking – it forces argument thought on the fly and understanding argument interactions

5. Multiple perms worse – makes the AFF a moving target, creates strategy skew, and not reciprocal to our one CP

Defense

1. No strategic skew – CPs require time investment, arguments spillover to other issues even after the CP is gone, and time skews are inevitable

2. CPs aren’t unique – most are less complex than major DAs or critiques, are susceptible to multiple attacks, and the 1AC is already an indict to the status quo

3. Doesn’t reduce depth of education – teams inevitably go for arguments with little coverage, justifies only runnig disads, and throwaway arguments are inevitable

4. No impact to multiple worlds – permutations create the same problem and complexity isn’t applied to critiques

5. No potential for abuse – clear limits such as only one CP check and the status quo is a logical, limited, and consistent fallback

6. Doesn’t justify AFF conditionality – permutations are a reciprocal form of conditionality, the plan must be the focus in order to ensure debate, and case selection is enough advantage

Heg

Weapons are aimed at the ocean.

Conley and Tsypkin 8 [Jerome, MA is Director of Research at GWU, and Mikhail, associate professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the us Naval Postgraduate School, Perceptions and Misperceptions: Exploring the U.S.-Russian Strategic Impasse, Strategic Insights, Volume VII, Issue 2 (April 2008)

http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2008/Apr/tsypkinApr08.html]

Concerning the potential vulnerability and risk of unauthorized use created by U.S. alert postures, an American expert explained that in addition to a robust set of negative technical and procedural controls to prevent unauthorized use, American weapon systems are also loaded with training packages and targeted on ocean areas. So even if they could theoretically be launched, these weapons would target **only ocean areas**. In response to a question about the unauthorized movement of nuclear cruise missiles from Minot, an American expert emphasized that these missiles were not part of the U.S. alert forces but this does not negate the need for proper planning and accountability of all nuclear assets. In addition, a Russian military expert agreed that Russian and American forces have a robust capability to block the launch of their nuclear forces through the use of negative control systems, but a significant difference in the Russian approach is that they have a “zero flight plan” loaded into the computers on their missiles and the system is not able to receive launch orders with this zero flight plan loaded. Therefore, one would have to enter a flight plan before the computer can receive orders and this is almost impossible for people trying to execute an unauthorized launch.

Launch isn’t automatic or inevitable - no leader’s crazy enough to launch hundreds of warheads when there’s ambiguous evidence of an attack of one or two missiles. That’s Quinlan.

60 years of alert disprove the scenario.

Quinlan 9 [Sir Michael, co-founder and President Emeritus of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principle, Problems, Prospects, p. 68-71]

There have certainly been, across the decades since 1945, many known accidents involving nuclear weapons, from transporters skid- ding off roads to bomber aircraft crashing with or accidentally drop- ping the weapons they carried (in past days when such carriage was a frequent feature of readiness arrangements-it no longer is). A few of these accidents may have released into the nearby environment highly toxic material. None however has entailed a nuclear deto- nation. Some commentators suggest that this reflects bizarrely good fortune amid such massive activity and deployment over so many years. A more rational deduction from the facts of this long experi- ence would however be that the probability of any accident triggering a nuclear explosion is **extremely low**.It might be further noted that the mechanisms needed to set off such an explosion are technically demanding, and that in a large number of ways the past sixty years have seen **extensive improvements in safety arrangements** for both the design and the handling of weapons. It is undoubtedly possible to see respects in which, after the cold war, some of the factors bearing upon risk may be new or more adverse; but some are now plainly less so. The years which the world has come through entirely without accidental or unauthorized detonation have included early decades in which knowledge was sketchier, precautions were less developed, and weapon designs were less ultra-safe than they later became, as well as substantial periods in which weapon numbers were larger, deployments more widespread and diverse, movements more frequent, and several aspects of doctrine and readiness arrangements more tense.

Hegemony is unsustainable – they conceded this argument – means that their impacts are inevitable in the long term – their kagan and o’hanlon evidence is NOT about making a peaceful transition, but rather about maintaining US forward deployed troops far into the future which the affirmative enables. They don’t address the layne evidence which says this form of forward deployment posturing is unsustainable economically in the status quo – means all their impacts are inevitable and its just a question of whether we should try to pursue hegemony in the short term.

1. Fiscal crisis – debt, inflation, and loss of reserve currency will force retrenchment by the end of the decade. That’s Layne.

And primacy makes economic collapse inevitable – fuels bubbles.

Calleo 10 [David P., Dean Acheson Professor and Director of the European Studies Department at the Johns Hopkins University’s Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies ( SAIS), American Decline Revisited, Survival, Volume 52, Issue 4 August 2010 , pages 215 - 227]

The history of the past two decades suggests that adjusting to a plural world is not easy for the United States. As its economic strength is increasingly challenged by relative decline, it clings all the more to its peerless military prowess. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, that overwhelming military power, evolved over the Cold War, is less and less effective. In many respects, America's geopolitical imagination seems frozen in the posture of the Cold War. The lingering pretension to be the dominant power everywhere has encouraged the United States to hazard two unpromising land wars, plus a diffuse and interminable struggle against 'terrorism'. Paying for these wars and the pretensions behind them confirms the United States in a new version of Cold War finance. Once more, unmanageable fiscal problems **poison the currency**, an old pathology that **firmly reinstates the nation on its path to decline.** It was the hegemonic Cold War role, after all, that put the United States so out of balance with the rest of the world economy. In its hegemonic Cold War position, the United States found it necessary to run very large deficits and was able to finance them simply by creating and exporting more and more dollars. The consequence is today's restless mass of accumulated global money. Hence, whereas the value of all global financial assets in 1980 was just over 100% of global output, by 2008, even after the worst of the financial implosion, that figure had exploded to just under 300%.25 Much of this is no doubt tied up in the massive but relatively inert holdings of the Chinese and Japanese. But thanks to today's instantaneous electronic transfers, huge sums can be marshalled and deployed on very short notice. It is this **excess of volatile money** that arguably **fuels the world's great recurring bubbles**. It can create the semblance of vast real wealth for a time, but can also (with little notice) **sow chaos in markets, wipe out savings** and **dry up credit** for real investment. What constitutes a morbid overstretch in the American political economy thus ends up as a **threat to the world economy** in general.

2. Multipolar transition – Layne says risings powers like China wield increasing clout and demand their place at the table. Great powers will convert resources into military assets if they feel threatened by the U.S. – stops American power projection its tracks.

3. Prefer neg ev – cites a consensus of economic forecasters and compares the most important indicators. Unipolar theorists rely on static measures and fail to grasp the velocity of China’s rise.

Evaluate their offense within the lens of sustainability – collapse is inevitable which means it’s only a question of peaceful retrenchment now or miscalculating later in an attempt to prolong primacy.

If we win collapse is inevitable, vote neg on the risk that sustaining heg in the short-term causes backlash and war.

Layne 7 [Christopher, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute,"The Case Against the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate]

The United States has a hegemony problem because it wields hegemonic power. To reduce the fear of U.S. power, the United States must accept some reduction in its relative hard power by adopting a multipolar—and essentially unilateral—offshore balancing strategy that accommodates the rise of new great powers. 130 It also must rein in the scope of its extravagant ambitions to shape the international system in accordance with its Wilsonian ideology. The United States does not need to be an extraregional hegemon to be secure. Its quest for hegemony is driven instead by an ideational, deterritorialized conception of security divorced from the traditional metrics of great power grand strategy: the distribution of power in the international system and geography. 131 Thus, to reduce others' concerns about its power, the United States must practice self-restraint (which is different from choosing to be constrained by others by adopting a multilateral approach to grand strategy). An America [End Page 40] that has the wisdom and prudence to contain itself is less likely to be feared than one that begs the rest of the world to stop it before it expands hegemonically again. If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint, it probably will, at some point, have to fight to uphold its primacy, which is a potentially dangerous strategy. Maintaining U.S. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle, especially given that U.S. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion. Paradoxically, attempting to sustain U.S. primacy may well **hasten its end** by **stimulating more intensive efforts to balance** against the United States, thus causing the United States to become **imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power.** Rather than risking these outcomes, the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems. Unilateral offshore balancing, indeed, is America's next grand strategy.

Retrenchment now is key to maintain any future influence.

Maher 11 [Richard, IR at Brown, The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World, Orbis Volume 55, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 53–68]

It still remains inevitable that America's outsized role in world politics will decline in the years and decades ahead. Rather than seeking to desperately prolong this position at undue expense, which would serve **only** to **hasten** **America's decline and weaken its long-term position**, the United States should start thinking now about how it will exercise its power and influence once its preeminent position is over. The United States is still in a position to shape this new world order, by **defining the rules, institutions, and patterns of legitimacy** that will prevail in this new era of global politics. Periods of change in the global distribution of power are often chaotic, unstable, and violent. The United States will be responsible for maintaining some kind of global equilibrium so the end of one era of world politics and the emergence of a new, different era avoids the overt power competition and instability of previous transitions. While the United States will face more constraints and pushback from the rest of the world, it may actually be able to **preserve and in some cases even expand its influence** in this new era.

Retrenchment’s coming now –

New defense strategy proves.

Layne 12 [Christopher Layne is professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University’s George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service. His next book, for Yale University Press, is After the Fall: International Politics, U.S. Grand Strategy, and the End of the Pax Americana. The (Almost) Triumph of Offshore Balancing January 27, 2012 http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/almost-triumph-offshore-balancing-6405?page=1]

Although cloaked in the reassuring boilerplate about American military preeminence and global leadership, in reality the Obama administration’s new Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) is the **first step** in the United States’ adjustment to the end of the Pax Americana—the sixty-year period of dominance that began in 1945. As the Pentagon document says—without spelling out the long-term grand-strategic implications—the United States is facing “an inflection point.” In plain English, a profound power shift in international politics is taking place, which compels a rethinking of the U.S. world role. The DSG is a response to two drivers. First, the United States is in economic decline and will face a serious fiscal crisis by the end of this decade. As President Obama said, the DSG reflects the need to “put our fiscal house in order here at home and renew our long-term economic strength.” The best indicators of U.S. decline are its GDP relative to potential competitors and its share of world manufacturing output. China’s manufacturing output has now edged past that of the United States and accounts for just over 18 or 19 percent of world manufacturing output. With respect to GDP, virtually all leading economic forecasters agree that, measured by market-exchange rates, China’s aggregate GDP will exceed that of the United States by the end of the current decade. Measured by purchasing-power parity, some leading economists believe China already is the world’s number-one economy. Clearly, China is on the verge of overtaking the United States economically. At the end of this decade, when the ratio of U.S. government debt to GDP is likely to exceed the danger zone of 100 percent, the United States will face a severe fiscal crisis. In a June 2011 report, the Congressional Budget Office warned that unless Washington drastically slashes expenditures—including on entitlements and defense—and raises taxes, it is headed for a fiscal train wreck. Moreover, concerns about future inflation and America’s ability to repay its debts could imperil the U.S. dollar’s reserve-currency status. That currency status allows the United States to avoid difficult “guns-or-butter” trade-offs and live well beyond its means while enjoying entitlements at home and geopolitical preponderance abroad. But that works only so long as foreigners are willing to lend the United States money. Speculation is now commonplace about the dollar’s long-term hold on reserve-currency status. It would have been unheard of just a few years ago. The second driver behind the new Pentagon strategy is the shift in global wealth and power from the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia. As new great powers such as China and, eventually, India emerge, important regional powers such as Russia, Japan, Turkey, Korea, South Africa and Brazil will assume more prominent roles in international politics. Thus, the post-Cold War “unipolar moment,” when the United States commanded the global stage as the “sole remaining superpower,” will be replaced by a multipolar international system. The Economist recently projected that China’s defense spending will equal that of the United States by 2025. By the middle or end of the next decade, China will be positioned to shape a new international order based on the rules and norms that it prefers—and, perhaps, to provide the international economy with a new reserve currency. Two terms not found in the DSG are “decline” and “imperial overstretch” (the latter coined by the historian Paul Kennedy to describe the consequences when a great power’s economic resources can’t support its external ambitions). But, although President Obama and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta may not admit it, the DSG is the **first move** in what figures to be a **dramatic strategic retrenchment** by the United States over the next two decades. This retrenchment will push to the fore a new U.S. grand strategy—**offshore balancing**. In a 1997 article in International Security, I argued that offshore balancing would displace America’s primacy strategy because it would prove difficult to sustain U.S. primacy in the face of emerging new powers and the erosion of U.S. economic dominance. Even in 1997, it was foreseeable that as U.S. advantages eroded, there would be strong pressures for the United States to bring its commitments into line with its shrinking economic base. This would require scaling back the U.S. military presence abroad; setting clear strategic priorities; devolving the primary responsibility for maintaining security in Europe and East Asia to regional actors; and significantly reducing the size of the U.S. military. Subsequent to that article, offshore balancing has been embraced by other leading American thinkers, including John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, Barry Posen, Christopher Preble and Robert Pape.

Burden-sharing on the rise disproves power vacuum arguments.

Miner 12 [Michael Miner is a Teaching Fellow at Harvard University. He is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and a graduate of Dartmouth College.  Offshore Balancing in an Age of Austerity Michael Miner on Tuesday, 10 January 2012  http://isnblog.ethz.ch/government/offshore-balancing-in-an-age-of-austerity]

Partial integration of British and French force structure is a **sign of things to come** for Europe. Japan and South Korea are making unheralded inroads toward defensive pacts beyond the US regional presence. New military commitments in Australia further strengthen three big allies in the Pacific, and the recent arms package with Saudi Arabia helps check a potentially aggressive Iran in the Persian Gulf – to say nothing of the special relationship with Israel. Stalwart allies are in the process of expanding capability and responsibility; efforts that not only relieve pressure on an overextended US military, but also strengthen allied states aligned against regional competitors. **Offshore balancing has returned** as the time-tested strategy for American security in the near-term. President Obama and his national security team recognize the volatility of anticipating threats to the national interest, and military force remains a vital policy tool within a complex portfolio of options. With regard to the strategic review, President Obama is quietly stressing the importance of regional alliances in a challenging twenty-first century environment. Balancing against great powers and reducing on-the-ground troop commitments is **the first step** toward a strategic clarity that recognizes an America committed to global leadership, but is pragmatically sound in application and concert with allies around the world.

No transition wars or vacuum – burden-shifting retains credibility by strengthening core commitments and avoiding involvement in militarized disputes. That’s MacDonald – two key distinctions none of their ev accounts for –

1. Rate of decline – aff ev doesn’t assume that the U.S. will still retain nuclear weapons, some conventional capabilities, and play a pivotal role in alliance formation – means the U.S. still influences multilateral institutions and is able to manage the transition through leverage.

2. Credibility loss is inevitable – costly international commitments only hurt credibility on the ones that actually matter – retrenchment frees up resources to preserve true core interests while avoiding unnecessary clashes and risking escalation over outdated ones.

Ours is from IR profs in a peer-reviewed journal that examines the empirical record. Prefer robust data that proves handoffs go smoothly.

MacDonald and Parent 11 [Paul K. MacDonald is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. Joseph M. Parent is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 7–44]

**Wars, preventive or otherwise, do not appear to be a common fate for declining states**, and recovery of lost rank was fairly frequent. Declining great powers found themselves embroiled in an interstate war in only four of the eighteen cases, and in only one of these cases—1935 United Kingdom—did the declining power go to war with the power that had just surpassed it in ordinal rank. 60 In addition, in six of ªfteen cases, declining great powers that adopted a policy of retrenchment managed to rebound, eventually recovering their ordinal rank from the state that surpassed them. These findings suggest that retrenching states rarely courted disaster and occasionally regained their prior position. Further, even if retrenchment was not successful, this does not prove that a preferable policy existed. 61 In many cases of decline, there are few restorative solutions available; politics is often a game of unpalatable alternatives. Short of a miracle, it is hard to say what great powers such as Britain, France, or the Soviet Union could have done to stay aloft, even with the beneªt of hindsight.

No war – counterbalancing coalitions.

Lalwani 11 [Sameer Lalwani, Research Fellow, American Strategy Program, New America Foundation, Joshua Shifrinson, International Security Program Research Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School Whither Command of the Commons? Choosing Security Over Control, New America Foundation September 2011]

Second, in conducting this assessment, a security strategy recognizes that other states have strong, self-interested reasons not to wholly undermine American command of the commons. Rising states such as China and India have profoundly benefitted from the U.S.-led international system. This is particularly true in economic affairs, where the American-backed liberal trade and financial system has enabled exceptional growth and development around the world. To assert other states want to supplant the United States in command of the commons, one would have to assume one or more states are willing to bear the direct costs of conflict, as well as the substantial economic opportunity costs that would be paid afterwards. Given the benefits these powers derive from the current system and the efforts they have made to maintain it, this seems a dubious prospect. 27 In a related fashion, states interested in undermining American command of the commons are constrained in doing so because of the likely political and economic repercussions; this further adds to the incentives other actors have to maintain the extant system. A quick glance at the map reveals that the most plausible challengers to American command—states encompassing a large economy, educated population, technological expertise, and at least moderate military forces—all face potential counterbalancing coalitions that would greatly limit their ability to make a bid for command. In Asia, Japan, China, Russia, and India each have long-standing rivalries with the others and would not look kindly at one trying to seize local command of the commons lest it do so at another’s expense; if one tried, the others would likely come together to prevent it from being successful. 28 An analogous situation holds in Europe and the Middle East, where no one actor can comfortably make a play for regional command without others challenging its efforts. 29 As a result, states in these regions are limited in their ability to challenge U.S. command for the foreseeable future.

Retrenchment solves war – reduces oversized forward deployments that risk acting as tripwires and embroiling the U.S. in conflicts over outdated overseas commitments. That’s MacDonald.

Best statistical evidence proves unipolarity is more conflict-prone. We’ll insert charts into the record of the debate.

Monteiro 12 [Nuno, Asst. prof of political science at Yale, teaches IR theory and security studies, winter, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful”, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00064]

How well, then, does the argument that unipolar systems are peaceful account for the first two decades of unipolarity since the end of the Cold War? Table 1 presents a list of great powers divided into three periods: 1816 to 1945, [CHART OMITTED – PLACED AT BOTTOM OF PARAGRAPH] multipolarity; 1946 to 1989, bipolarity; and since 1990, unipolarity.46 Table 2 presents summary data about the incidence of war during each of these periods. **Unipolarity is the most conflict prone of all the systems**, according to at least two important criteria: the percentage of years that great powers spend at war and the incidence of war involving great powers. In multipolarity, 18 percent of great power years were spent at war. In bipolarity, the ratio is 16 percent. In unipolarity, however, a remarkable 59 percent of great power years until now were spent at war. This is **by far the highest percentage** in all three systems. Furthermore, during periods of multipolarity and bipolarity, the probability that war involving a great power would break out in any given year was, respectively, 4.2 percent and 3.4 percent. Under unipolarity, it is 18.2 percent—or more than **four times higher.**47 These figures provide **no evidence** that unipolarity is peaceful.48

Table 1. Great Powers since 1816

Multipolarity Bipolarity Unipolarity

Dates Years Dates Years Dates Years

Austro-Hungarian 1816–1918 103

Empire

France 1816–1940 125

Prussia/Germany 1816–1918 / 124

1925–45

Italy 1860–1943 84

Japan 1895–1945 51

United Kingdom 1816–1945 130

Russia / 1816–1917 / 126 1946–89 44

Soviet Union 1922–45

United States 1898–1945 48 1946–89 44 1990–2011 22

Total 791 88 22

SOURCES: Data are from the Correlates of War, ver. 4.0, dataset, modified by the author as

follows: only the Soviet Union and the United States are counted as great powers from

1946 to 1989, and only the United States is counted as a great power since 1990. See Reid

Sarkees and Frank Wayma, *Resort to War: A Data Guide to Inter-state, Extra-state, Intrastate,*

*and Non-state Wars, 1816–2007* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2010).

Table 2. Interstate Wars Involving Great Powers since 1816

Multipolarity Bipolarity Unipolarity

Great power years 791 88 22

Great power years at war 143 14 13

Percentage of great power years at war 18% 16% 59%

Wars involving great powers 33 3 4

Incidence of war per great power year 4.2% 3.4% 18.2%

SOURCES: Data are from the Correlates of War, ver. 4.0, dataset. See Reid Sarkees and Frank

Wayma, *Resort to War: A Data Guide to Inter-state, Extra-state, Intra-state, and Non-state*

*Wars, 1816–2007* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2010).

In sum, the argument that unipolarity makes for peace is heavily weighted toward interactions among the most powerful states in the system. This should come as no surprise given that Wohlforth makes a structural argument: peace flows from the unipolar structure of international politics, not from any particular characteristic of the unipole. 49 Structural analyses of the international system are usually centered on interactions between great powers. 50 As Waltz writes, “The theory, like the story, of international politics is written in terms of the great powers of an era.” 51 In the sections that follow, however I show that in the case of unipolarity, an investigation of its peacefulness must consider potential causes of conflict beyond interactions between the most important states in the system.

[Probably read this]

Primacy spurs war with Russia and China – extinction.

Roberts 10 [Paul Craig Roberts, William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Economic Policy and associate editor of the Wall Street Journal. He was columnist for Business Week, Scripps Howard News Service, and Creators Syndicate. He has had many university appointments. The Road to Armageddon, Foreign Policy Journal, February 26, 2010 http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/02/26/the-road-to-armageddon]

The U.S. has already encircled Iran with military bases. The U.S. government intends to neutralize China by seizing control over the Middle East and cutting China off from oil. This plan assumes that Russia and China, nuclear armed states, will be intimidated by U.S. anti-missile defenses and acquiesce to U.S. hegemony and that China will lack oil for its industries and military. The U.S. government is delusional. Russian military and political leaders have responded to the obvious threat by declaring NATO a direct threat to the security of Russia and by announcing a change in Russian war doctrine to the pre-emptive launch of nuclear weapons. The Chinese are too confident to be bullied by a washed-up American “superpower.” The morons in Washington are **pushing the envelope of nuclear war.** The insane drive for American hegemony **threatens life on earth.** The American people, by accepting the lies and deceptions of “their” government, are facilitating this outcome.

Power projection doesn’t deter – only provokes conflicts with rogue states and escalates.

Cambanis 12 [Thanassis Cambanis, journalist specializing in the Middle East and American foreign policy, and a fellow at The Century Foundation. I write a column for The Boston Globe Ideas section called “The Internationalist,” and I’m a correspondent for The Atlantic. I contribute regularly to other publications including The New York Times, Foreign Affairs, and The National Interest. The Lonely Superpower, Posted January 22nd, 2012The Boston Globe, http://thanassiscambanis.com/2012/01/22/the-lonely-superpower/]

Even worse, Monteiro claims, America’s position as a dominant power, unbalanced by any other alpha states actually **exacerbates dangerous tensions** rather than relieving them. Prickly states that Monteiro calls “recalcitrant minor powers” (think Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan), whose interests or regime types clash with the lone superpower, will have an incentive to provoke a conflict. Even if they are likely to lose, the fight may be worth it, since concession will mean defeat as well. This is the logic by which North Korea and Pakistan both acquired nuclear weapons, even during the era of American global dominance, and by which Iraq and Afghanistan preferred to fight rather than surrender to invading Americans.

Dominance spurs resentment – withdrawal preserves advantages.

Maher 11 [Richard, PhD candidate in Political Science – Brown, The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States Will Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World, Orbis Volume 55, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 53–68]

And yet, despite this material preeminence, the United States sees its **political and strategic influence diminishing around the world.** It is involved in two costly and destructive wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, where success has been elusive and the end remains out of sight. China has adopted a new assertiveness recently, on everything from U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, currency convertibility, and America's growing debt (which China largely finances). Pakistan, one of America's closest strategic allies, is facing the threat of social and political collapse. Russia is using its vast energy resources to reassert its dominance in what it views as its historical sphere of influence. Negotiations with North Korea and Iran have gone nowhere in dismantling their nuclear programs. Brazil's growing economic and political influence offer another option for partnership and investment for countries in the Western Hemisphere. And relations with Japan, following the election that brought the opposition Democratic Party into power, are at their frostiest in decades. To many observers, it seems that America's vast power is not translating into America's preferred outcomes. As the United States has come to learn, raw power does not automatically translate into the realization of one's preferences, nor is it necessarily easy to maintain one's predominant position in world politics. There are many costs that come with predominance – material, political, and reputational. Vast imbalances of power create **apprehension and anxiety** in others, in one's friends just as much as in one's rivals. In this view, it is not necessarily American predominance that produces unease but rather American predominance. Predominance also makes one a **tempting target**, and a **scapegoat** for other countries’ own problems and unrealized ambitions. Many a Third World autocrat has blamed his country's economic and social woes on an ostensible U.S. conspiracy to keep the country fractured, underdeveloped, and subservient to America's own interests. Predominant power likewise **breeds envy, resentment, and alienation.** How is it possible for one country to be so rich and powerful when so many others are weak, divided, and poor? Legitimacy—the perception that one's role and purpose is acceptable and one's power is used justly—is indispensable for maintaining power and influence in world politics. As we witness the emergence (or re-emergence) of great powers in other parts of the world, we realize that American predominance cannot last forever. It is inevitable that the distribution of power and influence will become more balanced in the future, and that the United States will necessarily see its relative power decline. While the United States naturally should avoid hastening the end of this current period of American predominance, it should not look upon the next period of global politics and international history with dread or foreboding. It certainly should not seek to maintain its predominance at any cost, devoting unlimited ambition, resources, and prestige to the cause. In fact, contrary to what many have argued about the importance of maintaining its predominance, America's position in the world—both at home and internationally—could very well be strengthened once its era of preeminence is over. It is, therefore, necessary for the United States to start thinking about how best to position itself in the “post-unipolar” world.

Heg doesn’t solve conflict –

1. Neocons overestimate influence and ignore overwhelming data that proves no correlation between interventionism and stability. In the 90s the U.S. made cuts and no rivalries developed. That’s Fettweis.

2. Other explanations still hold true in a world of multipolarity – nuclear peace, economic interdependence, and other entrenched norms all hold true regardless of power distribution in the international system.

3. Their list of vague impacts is academic junk – you should correct for cognitive.

Fettweis 11 [Political Science – Tulane, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO]

Assertions that without the combination of U.S. capabilities, presence and commitments instability would return to Europe and the Pacific Rim are usually rendered in rather vague language. If the United States were to decrease its commitments abroad, argued Robert Art, “the world will become a more dangerous place and, sooner or later, that will redound to America's detriment.” 53 From where would this danger arise? Who precisely would do the fighting, and over what issues? Without the United States, would Europe really descend into Hobbesian anarchy? Would the Japanese attack mainland China again, to see if they could fare better this time around? Would the Germans and French have another go at it? In other words, where exactly is hegemony is keeping the peace? With one exception, these questions are rarely addressed. That exception is in the Pacific Rim. Some analysts fear that a de facto surrender of U.S. hegemony would lead to a rise of Chinese influence. Bradley Thayer worries that Chinese would become “the language of diplomacy, trade and commerce, transportation and navigation, the internet, world sport, and global culture,” and that Beijing would come to “dominate science and technology, in all its forms” to the extent that soon the world would witness a Chinese astronaut who not only travels to the Moon, but “plants the communist flag on Mars, and perhaps other planets in the future.” 54 Indeed China is the only other major power that has increased its military spending since the end of the Cold War, even if it still is only about 2 percent of its GDP. Such levels of effort do not suggest a desire to compete with, much less supplant, the United States. The much-ballyhooed, decade-long military buildup has brought Chinese spending up to somewhere between one-tenth and one-fifth of the U.S. level. It is hardly clear that a restrained United States would invite Chinese regional, must less global, political expansion. Fortunately one need not ponder for too long the horrible specter of a red flag on Venus, since on the planet Earth, where war is no longer the dominant form of conflict resolution, the threats posed by even a rising China would not be terribly dire. The dangers contained in the terrestrial security environment are less severe than ever before. Believers in the pacifying power of hegemony ought to keep in mind a rather basic tenet: When it comes to policymaking, specific threats are more significant than vague, unnamed dangers. Without specific risks, it is just as plausible to interpret U.S. presence as redundant, as overseeing a peace that has already arrived. Strategy should not be based upon vague images emerging from the dark reaches of the neoconservative imagination. Overestimating Our Importance One of the most basic insights of cognitive psychology provides the final reason to doubt the power of hegemonic stability: Rarely are our actions as consequential upon their behavior as we perceive them to be. A great deal of experimental evidence exists to support the notion that people (and therefore states) tend to overrate the degree to which their behavior is responsible for the actions of others. Robert Jervis has argued that two processes account for this overestimation, both of which would seem to be especially relevant in the U.S. case. 55 First, believing that we are responsible for their actions gratifies our national ego (which is not small to begin with; the United States is exceptional in its exceptionalism). The hubris of the United States, long appreciated and noted, has only grown with the collapse of the Soviet Union. 56 U.S. policymakers famously have comparatively little knowledge of—or interest in—events that occur outside of their own borders. If there is any state vulnerable to the overestimation of its importance due to the fundamental misunderstanding of the motivation of others, it would have to be the United States. Second, policymakers in the United States are far more familiar with our actions than they are with the decision-making processes of our allies. Try as we might, it is not possible to fully understand the threats, challenges, and opportunities that our allies see from their perspective. The European great powers have domestic politics as complex as ours, and they also have competent, capable strategists to chart their way forward. They react to many international forces, of which U.S. behavior is only one. Therefore, for any actor trying to make sense of the action of others, Jervis notes, “in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, the most obvious and parsimonious explanation is that he was responsible.” 57 It is natural, therefore, for U.S. policymakers and strategists to believe that the behavior of our allies (and rivals) is shaped largely by what Washington does. Presumably Americans are at least as susceptible to the overestimation of their ability as any other people, and perhaps more so. At the very least, political psychologists tell us, we are probably not as important to them as we think. The importance of U.S. hegemony in contributing to international stability is therefore almost certainly overrated. In the end, one can never be sure why our major allies have not gone to, and do not even plan for, war. Like deterrence, the hegemonic stability theory rests on faith; it can only be falsified, never proven. It does not seem likely, however, that hegemony could fully account for twenty years of strategic decisions made in allied capitals if the international system were not already a remarkably peaceful place. Perhaps these states have no intention of fighting one another to begin with, and our commitments are redundant. European great powers may well have chosen strategic restraint because they feel that their security is all but assured, with or without the United States.

Primacy ensures base races – triggers China and Russia war.

Vine 12 [David, assistant professor of anthropology at American University, in Washington, DC, The Military's New Lily-Pad Strategy, July 16, 2012, http://www.thenation.com/article/168898/militarys-new-lily-pad-strategy#]

Finally, a proliferation of lily pads means the creeping militarization of large swaths of the globe. Like real lily pads -- which are actually aquatic weeds -- bases have a way of growing and reproducing uncontrollably. Indeed, bases tend to beget bases, creating “base races” with other nations, **heightening military tensions**, and **discouraging diplomatic solutions** to conflicts. After all, how would the United States respond if China, Russia, or Iran were to build even a single lily-pad base of its own in Mexico or the Caribbean? For China and Russia in particular, ever more U.S. bases near their borders **threaten to set off new cold wars.** Most troublingly, the creation of new bases to protect against an alleged future Chinese military threat may prove to be a **self-fulfilling prophecy**: such bases in Asia are likely to create the threat they are supposedly designed to protect against, **making a catastrophic war with China more**, not less, **likely.** Encouragingly, however, overseas bases have recently begun to generate critical scrutiny across the political spectrum from Republican Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison and Republican presidential candidate Ron Paul to Democratic Senator Jon Tester and New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof. With everyone looking for ways to trim the deficit, closing overseas bases offers easy savings. Indeed, increasingly influential types are recognizing that the country simply can’t afford more than 1,000 bases abroad. Great Britain, like empires before it, had to close most of its remaining foreign bases in the midst of an economic crisis in the 1960s and 1970s. The United States is undoubtedly headed in that direction sooner or later. The only question is whether the country will give up its bases and downsize its global mission by choice, or if it will follow Britain’s path as a fading power forced to give up its bases from a position of weakness. Of course, the consequences of not choosing another path extend beyond economics. If the proliferation of lily pads, special operations forces, and drone wars continues, the United States is likely to be drawn into new conflicts and new wars, generating unknown forms of blowback, and untold death and destruction. In that case, we’d better prepare for a lot more incoming flights -- from the Horn of Africa to Honduras -- carrying not just amputees but caskets.

Multipolarity key to solve China-India war.

Malone and Mukherjee 10 [David M. Malone is President of Canada's International Development Research Centre (IDRC). A former Canadian ambassador to the UN and High Commissioner to India, he is currently completing a book, "Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy" for Oxford University Press. An occasional scholar of the UN Security Council and related issues of war and peace, he teaches at the NYU Law School and is an associate faculty member of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton, Rohan Mukherjee is a senior research specialist at the Institutions for Fragile States research program at Princeton University. He holds a Master's in public affairs with a specialization in international development from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. He has worked with the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, and the National Knowledge Commission, Government of India. His principal interests are in the international relations of emerging powers, the political economy of development, and service delivery in developing countries. India and China: Conflict and Cooperation Survival, Volume 52, Issue 1 February 2010 , pages 137 - 158]

And yet, beyond the recognition of its status as a meaningful global power, India does not yet seem to have much of a project for its global reach, while China, which might well have one, is exercising great prudence in articulating it publicly. In a genuinely multipolar world where the principal powers engage one another constantly across a wide range of issues in many different forums, India and China should be able to manage their parallel rise **without generating shocks** on their own continent. A more systematic dialogue, going well beyond high-level visits and acknowledging differences instead of emphasising imagined similarities, could lay the foundations for a better understanding of the domestic compulsions that drive the two countries' foreign policies and help both sides manage their nationalist impulses, transform public perceptions and learn to pre-empt situations before they can develop into **full-blown confrontation.**

Causes extinction.

Kahn 9 [Jeremy, independent journalist who writes about international affairs, politics, business, the environment and the arts. His work has recently appeared in Newsweek International, The New York Times, The Atlantic, Smithsonian, The Boston Globe, The New Republic, Slate, Foreign Policy, Fortune, and Inc., as well as other publications. He has also contributed to the public radio program "Marketplace." Kahn was the managing editor at The New Republic from 2004 to 2006. October 19, 2009, “Why India Fears China,” online: http://www.newsweek.com/id/217088]

The implications for India's security—and the world's—are ominous. It turns what was once an obscure argument over lines on a 1914 map and some barren, rocky peaks hardly worth fighting over into a flash point that could spark a war between two nuclear-armed neighbors. And that makes the India-China border dispute into an issue of concern to far more than just the two parties involved. The United States and Europe as well as the rest of Asia ought to take notice—a conflict involving India and China could result in a **nuclear exchange.** And it could suck the West in—either as an ally in the defense of Asian democracy, as in the case of Taiwan, or as a mediator trying to separate the two sides.

Primacy ensures continued proliferation – countries go after nukes to try and deter U.S. interventions, especially in a post-Libya environment. That’s Monteiro.

Hegemony guarantees eventual escalation.

Maass 10 [Richard, PhD candidate – Notre Dame, Nuclear Proliferation and Declining U.S. Hegemony, http://www.hamilton.edu/documents//levitt-center/Maass\_article.pdf]

Conclusions Allison’s ideas seem sound in theory, but cannot be applied in practice. Proliferation is inevitable, and its effects will ultimately deteriorate U.S. hegemony. The world could very plausibly witness the proliferation of five or ten new nuclear states within the next few decades. As more states acquire nuclear instruments, the U.S. will be forced to further change its policies and adapt to a multi-lateral nuclear theater. Proliferation places conventionally weaker states in a better bargaining position with the United States, forcing the U.S. into a position of acquiescence. A multilateral nuclear theater poses **too many issues** for the United States to resolve unilaterally. States such as North Korea and Pakistan refuse U.S. intervention; North Korea even withdrew from the 1994 Agreed Framework and “may have diverted fissile material for nuclear weaponry”(US Department of Defense, 2001). Though riddled with domestic instability and stricken by insurgency, Pakistan refuses U.S. aid in directly securing its nuclear sites and continues to hide their locations. Russia’s control over its vast nuclear arsenal slowly diminishes with time, increasing the likelihood that terrorist groups may seize a weapon. To continue as the sole hegemon, the U.S. inevitably must violate national sovereignty to promote its interests. Infringement on states’ rights would only escalate tensions, **eventually leading to conflict**. In order to fight a multi-front war on such a large scale, the U.S. needs to radically change its policies. Regardless, the U.S. cannot continue to project power in the manner it has done since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Steve Sagan is right in asserting that more is worse regarding the spread of nuclear weapons. The U.S. no longer will be the sole international hegemon; rather it will merely be the first among states equally capable of instigating the ultimate catastrophe.

Prolif spurs new arms races and rapid weapons deployments that cause miscalculation and nuclear extinction. That’s Sokolski.

Retrenchment solves.

Mearsheimer 10 [John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. He is on the Advisory Council of The National Interest, and his most recent book, Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics, was published in January 2011 by Oxford University Press. Imperial by Design December 16, 2010 http://nationalinterest.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576]

Offshore balancing is also a better policy than global dominance for combating nuclear proliferation. It has two main virtues. It calls for using military force in only three regions of the world, and even then, only as a matter of last resort. America would still carry a big stick with offshore balancing but would wield it much more discreetly than it does now. As a result, the United States would be less threatening to other countries, which would lessen their need to acquire atomic weapons to protect themselves from a U.S. attack. Furthermore, because offshore balancing calls for Washington to help local powers contain aspiring regional hegemons in Northeast Asia, Europe and the Gulf, there is no reason that it cannot extend its nuclear umbrella over its allies in those areas, thus diminishing their need to have their own deterrents. Certainly, the strategy is not perfect: some allies will want their own nuclear weapons out of fear that the United States might not be there for them in a future crisis; and some of America’s adversaries will still have powerful incentives to acquire a nuclear arsenal. But all things considered, offshore balancing is still better than global dominance for keeping proliferation in check.

Hegemony spurs prolif.

Mearsheimer 10 [John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. He is on the Advisory Council of The National Interest, and his most recent book, Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics, was published in January 2011 by Oxford University Press. Imperial by Design December 16, 2010 http://nationalinterest.org/article/imperial-by-design-4576]

IF ALL of this were not enough, global dominance, especially the Bush administration’s penchant for big-stick diplomacy, **negatively affects nuclear proliferation** as well. The United States is deeply committed to making sure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear arsenal and that North Korea gives up its atomic weapons, but the strategy we have employed is likely to have the opposite effect. The main reason that a country acquires nuclear weapons is that they are the ultimate deterrent. It is extremely unlikely that any state would attack the homeland of a nuclear-armed adversary because of the fear that it would prompt nuclear retaliation. Therefore, any country that feels threatened by a dangerous rival has good reason to want a survivable nuclear deterrent. This basic logic explains why the United States and the Soviet Union built formidable stockpiles during the Cold War. It also explains why Israel acquired atomic weapons and refuses to give them up. All of this tells you that when the United States places Iran, Iraq and North Korea on the “axis of evil” and threatens them with military force, it gives those countries a powerful incentive to acquire a nuclear deterrent. The Bush administration, for example, would not have invaded Iraq in March 2003 if Saddam had an atomic arsenal because the Iraqi leader probably would have used it, since he almost certainly was going to die anyway. It is not clear whether Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons today, but given that the United States and Israel frequently hint that they might attack it nevertheless, the regime has good reason to want a deterrent to protect itself. Similarly, Pyongyang would be foolish to give up its nuclear capability in the absence of some sort of rapprochement with Washington. And there is no good reason to think that spreading democracy would counter proliferation either. After all, five of the nine nuclear-armed states are democracies (Britain, France, India, Israel and the United States), and two others (Pakistan and Russia) are borderline democracies that retain significant authoritarian features. In short, the Bush administration’s fondness for threatening to attack adversaries (oftentimes with the additional agenda of forced democratization) encouraged nuclear proliferation. The best way for the United States to maximize the prospects of halting or at least slowing down the spread of nuclear weapons would be to stop threatening other countries because that gives them a compelling reason to acquire the ultimate deterrent. But as long as America’s leaders remain committed to global dominance, they are likely to resist this advice and keep threatening states that will not follow Washington’s orders.

Independently, containment destroys the dollar – crushes growth.

Kirshner 10 [Jonathan Kirshner, Prof of IR - Cornell University, USA The tragedy of offensive realism: Classical realism and the rise of China August 2010 European Journal of International Relations March 2012 vol. 18 no. 1 53-75]

China holds over two trillion dollars in foreign exchange reserves, most of which are in the form of US dollar assets, in particular US government debt. This can sound ominous, but, in practice, this position gives China much less practical coercive leverage over the US than it might seem. China has found itself (if with mixed emotions after the financial crisis of 2007–8) with considerable vested interests in both the future of the dollar and in the general health of the US economy, its largest export market. China would be a big loser in a confrontation that undermined either the greenback or American consumer demand. But if push came to shove cooler heads would be unlikely to prevail, and a Sino-American macroeconomic tussle that seriously implicated the dollar would leave both countries much worse off. 15 But it is not hard to imagine China going ‘financially nuclear’ in response to US policies explicitly designed to take down the People’s Republic. In aggressively confronting China, the US would be inviting the very high costs of an unwanted and major crisis of the dollar, which would seriously harm not just its economy, but America’s global military capacity as well (Kirshner, 2008: 431).

Retrenchment key to solve China war.

Layne 12 [Christopher, IR at Texas A&M, The National Interest - April 25, 2012, nationalinterest.org/article/world-transformation-6794]

Certainly, the Chinese have not forgotten. Now Beijing aims to dominate its own East and Southeast Asian backyard, just as a rising America sought to dominate the Western Hemisphere a century and a half ago. The United States and China now are competing for supremacy in East and Southeast Asia. Washington has been the incumbent hegemon there since World War II, and many in the American foreign-policy establishment view China’s quest for regional hegemony as a threat that must be resisted. This contest for regional dominance is **fueling escalating tensions** and possibly **could lead to war.** In geopolitics, two great powers cannot simultaneously be hegemonic in the same region. **Unless one of them abandons its aspirations, there is a high probability of hostilities.** Flashpoints that could spark a Sino-American conflict include the unstable Korean Peninsula; the disputed status of Taiwan; competition for control of oil and other natural resources; and the burgeoning naval rivalry between the two powers.

Only attempts at containment trigger China buildup.

Monteiro 11 [Nuno, I’m an assistant professor of political science at Yale. My research and teaching focus on international politics and security. My commentary covers books, ideas, academia, and current events in international relations. Read more or follow me on twitter. What Would a Chinese Hegemon Look Like? 21June201 http://www.nunomonteiro.org/what-would-a-chinese-hegemon-look-like]

Friedberg acknowledges en passant the opposite argument — that “in a world of global markets and nuclear weapons, the fears and ambitions that motivated previous rising powers are no longer as potent” — but he dismisses it without much engagement. Friedberg grounds this dismissal on evidence that Chinese ideology has for centuries asserted that, in the words of Martin Jacques, “their natural position lies at the epicentre of East Asia”. I think this line of reasoning has two glitches. First, a desire to put China at the epicenter of East Asia is different from a desire to put China in a global hegemonic position. Second, China can become the epicenter of East Asia and beyond by asserting its economic might, with no need to assert convert such power into military assets. The key question here is to figure out whether in an age of global markets and nuclear werapons, military competition is the right strategy for a rising economic power. In Friedberg’s view, it is. In my view, not necessarily. As I argue in this working paper, whether China will put up a global military challenge to US power preponderance depends on whether the US accommodates or tries to contain Chinese economic growth. For Friedberg, this makes no difference — accommodation, which he would call appeasement, would only whet China’s appetite for influence.

Forward deployments crushes relations.

Klare 11 [Michael T. Klare, Nation defense correspondent, is professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College.... Playing With Fire: Obama's Risky Oil Threat to China December 6, 2011 This article originally appeared at TomDispatch.com. To stay on top of important articles like these, sign up to receive the latest updates from TomDispatch.com. Click here to listen to the author discuss the American military build-up in the Pacific.]

Such thinking, with its distinctly military focus, appears dangerously provocative. The steps announced entail an increased military presence in waters bordering China and enhanced military ties with that country’s neighbors—moves certain to arouse alarm in Beijing and strengthen the hand of those in the ruling circle (especially in the Chinese military leadership) who favor a more activist, militarized response to US incursions. Whatever forms that takes, one thing is certain: the leadership of the globe’s number-two economic power is not going to let itself appear weak and indecisive in the face of an American buildup on the periphery of its country. This, in turn, means that we may be sowing the seeds of a **new cold war** in Asia in 2011.

Retrenchment solves Asian war.

Friedman and Logan 12 [Benjamin H. research fellow in defense and homeland security studies at the Cato Institute, and Justin, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Why the U.S. Military Budget is ‘Foolish and Sustainable’, Orbis, Volume 56, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 177–191, February 2012]

Chinese efforts to engage in old-fashioned conquest are unlikely, at least beyond Taiwan. Its more probable objective is a kind of Asian Monroe doctrine, meant to exclude the United States.6 China naturally prefers not to leave its maritime security at the whim of U.S. policymakers and, thus, has sought to improve its anti-access and area-denial capabilities. In the longer term, China's leaders will likely pursue the ability to secure its trade routes by building up longer-range naval forces. They may also try to leverage military power to extract various concessions from nearby states. Washington's defense analysts typically take those observations as sufficient to establish the necessity that U.S. forces remain in Asia to balance Chinese military power. But to justify a U.S. military presence there, one also needs to show both that Asian nations cannot or will not balance Chinese power themselves and that their failure to do so would greatly harm U.S. security. Neither is likely. Geography and economics suggest that the states of the region will successfully balance Chinese power—even if we assume that China's economic growth allows it to continue to increase military spending.7 Bodies of water are natural defenses against offensive military operations. They allow weaker states to achieve security at relatively low cost by investing in naval forces and coastal defenses. That defensive advantage makes balances of power **more stable.** Not only are several of China's Asian rivals islands, but those states have the wealth to make Chinese landings on their coast prohibitively expensive. India's mountainous northern border creates similar dynamics. The prospects of Asian states successfully deterring future Chinese aggression will get even better if, as seems likely, threats of aggression provoke more formal security alliances. Some of that is already occurring. Note for example, the recent joint statement issued by the Philippines and Japan marking a new “strategic partnership” and expressing “common strategic interests” such as “ensuring the safety of sea lines of communication.”8 This sort of **multilateral cooperation would likely deepen with a more distant U.S. role.** Alliances containing disproportionately large states historically produce free-riding; weaker alliance partners lose incentive to shore up their own defenses.9 Even if one assumes that other states in the region would fail to balance China, it is unclear exactly how U.S. citizens would suffer. China's territorial ambitions might grow but are unlikely to span the Pacific. Nor would absorbing a few small export-oriented states slacken China's hunger for the dollars of American consumers

Attempts at containment ensure war.

Clemens 12 [Walter C. Clemens, Jr. is Professor of Political Science, Boston University, and Associate, Harvard University Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. This article originally appeared in Global Asia here. Why Pick a Fight With China? May 05, 2012 http://thediplomat.com/2012/05/05/why-pick-a-fight-with-china/?all=true]

Having achieved little and lost much in Iraq and Afghanistan, the White House and Pentagon in 2012 are turning their focus to the Asia-Pacific region. Top U.S. leaders seem to believe that the world’s oldest major democracy must confront the world’s oldest civilization and most populous country. Washington orphans engagement and upgrades containment. A tough line toward China may buttress President Barack Obama’s prospects in this November elections, but could also jeopardize long-term U.S. and world security. Washington risks becoming **trapped in a self-fulfilling policy**. Expecting and preparing for a confrontation with China, U.S. policies may push China to the very behaviors Washington would like to prevent, and toward a collision that no sane person could welcome.