Endorsement of the state locks us into a never-ending repression of excess makes catastrophic war inevitable – the state needs to be absent to locate excess in a space that would be free of coercion and domination – that’s the Harney and martin evidence – so long as the state operated, Battie argues that the state can never use up the erotic extensive energies of the accursed share”. Also means that the state’s coercive power has a major affect on the way sacrifices would be implemented. They may act like their sacrifice would be voluntary, but state centered incentives and the way states target their incentives ensure this would not be a neutral or voluntary action, rather the state would target its incentives at those it wants eliminated – they’re going to go down on vaguery of their plan text here and should be punished for it.

We must locate the glory of the blood orgy in our everyday lives – not mediated by the state or the market of financial incentives – that’s the ruckh evidence – everyone’s lives are determined by the interplay of capitalist and state based forces – to ignore the fact that these forces have real effects on the way people make so called “voluntary” decisions is to deny the violence carried out by the seemingly voluntary decisions that constitute structural violence like so called “voluntary” decisions to live near coal factories, to eat fast food, etc all dictated by poverty and neoliberalism. Means only our sacrifice from within a place of privilege is capable of solving is capable of solving – incentivizing others to do it in a way mediated by the state is the epitome of privilege.

Including governmental incentives in the affirmative ensures neoliberal domination by elites and contains problematic understandings of economic rationality – that’s the Adaman and Madra 12 evidence – not only does the use of incentives imply a naïve interpretation of the way governments function – all explained on the other flow, but they also presuppose a certain type of economic subject – someone who wants to accept a positive incentive – this presupposes that individuals are manipulative, predatory, and rent-seeking behavior – performatively limiting the ways in which we can conceive of subjectivity in this round. They don’t have a single piece of evidence defending the use of financial incentives – if they can produce any cards saying that financial incentives are key to the realization of their advocacy, you can vote affirmative but they sure as hell don’t have that card.

We control the internal link to effectiveness - the subjectivity of the competitive neoliberal individual must be analyzed before the policy it is mobilized to support

**Read 9**

(Jason, The University of Southern Maine, A Genealogy of Homo-Economicus: Neoliberalism and the Production of Subjectivity, Foucault Studies, No 6, pp. 25-36, February 2009)

Foucault’s development, albeit partial, of account of neoliberalism as governmentality has as its major advantage a clarification of the terrain on which neoliberalism can be countered. It is not enough to simply oppose neoliberalism as ideology, revealing the truth of social existence that it misses, or to enumerate its various failings as policy. Rather any opposition to neoliberalism must take seriously its effectiveness, the manner in which it has transformed work subjectivity and social relationships. As Foucault argues, neoliberalism operates less on actions, directly curtailing them, then on the condition and effects of actions, on the sense of possibility. The reigning ideal of interest and the calculations of cost and benefit do not so much limit what one can do, neoliberal thinkers are famously indifferent to prescriptive ideals, examining the illegal drug trade as a more or less rational investment, but limit the sense of what is possible. Specifically the ideal of the fundamentally self-interested individual curtails any collective transformation of the conditions of existence. It is not that such actions are not prohibited, restricted by the dictates of a sovereign or the structures of disciplinary power, they are not seen as possible, closed off by a society made up of self-interested individuals. It is perhaps no accident that one of the most famous political implementers of neoliberal reforms, Margaret Thatcher, used the slogan, “there is no alternative,” legitimating neoliberalism based on the stark absence of possibilities. Similarly, and as part of a belated response to the former Prime Minister, it also perhaps no accident that the slogan of the famous Seattle protests against the IMF and World Bank was, “another world is possible,” and it is very often the sense of a possibility of not only another world, but of another way of organizing politics that is remembered, the image of turtles and teamsters marching hand and hand, when those protests are referred to.26 It is also this sense of possibility that the present seems to be lacking; it is difficult to imagine let alone enact a future other than a future dominated by interest and the destructive vicissitudes of competition. A political response to neoliberalism must meet it on its terrain, that of the production of subjectivity, freedom and possibility.

Incentives guarantee failure of their movement – simply replicate what they attempt to solve.

Adaman and Madra (Bogazici University, Department of Economics) 12

(Fikret & Yahya M., Understanding Neoliberalism as Economization: The Case of the Ecology, http://www.econ.boun.edu.tr/public\_html/RePEc/pdf/201204.pdf)

The reduction of ecological valuation through a market mechanism (or various techniques) to a mere aggregation of individual subjective valuations—which is the main premise of neoliberal ideology—may be inappropriate for complex and uncertain phenomena ridden with incommensurabilities and inter- and intra-generational distributional conflicts, such as global warming, where individual valuations will have clear implications for all living beings. Indeed, in making decisions with substantial consequences pertaining to our current life as well as our future (such as the overall growth rate, distributional trajectories, technological path, consumption habits, risk attitude [say, vis-à-vis nuclear energy]), the market response or the aggregation of individuals’ valuation through a set of available techniques (e.g., the contingent valuation) may substantially differ from what could be derived through collective deliberation and negotiation of various stakeholders including the scientific community (see, e.g., Özkaynak, Adaman and Devine, 2012). This criticism applies not only to neoliberal positions that favor the current unequal distribution of power but also to the Post-Walrasian one which although concerned with distributional issues keeps relying on individualist ontologies of calculative and calculable agency. Indeed, there is a growing theoretical and applied literature arguing that in incommensurable cases, where all relevant aspects cannot be captured in a single dimension (such as those derived from monetary cost-benefit analyses), a multi-criteria methodology would seem better placed, as it will be possible to involve not only economic but also political, moral, scientific and cultural inputs from a variety of stakeholders (see, e.g., Martinez-Alier, Munda and O’Neil, 1999; Munda, 2008). The key promise of the multicriteria decision-making tool and other similar participatory and deliberatory dispositifs is that rather than finding a “solution” to a conflictual decision, they shed light on the multifaceted dimensions of the problem at hand and thus facilitate the consensus-building process from below (see, e.g., Adaman, 2012). In this regard, they constitute a formidable path to be explored as an alternative to the surreptitiously normative neoliberal governmental dispositifs, designed by experts from above, under the assumption that all actors are calculative and calculable. The current indiscriminate application of neoliberal policies over the entire scope of the social field has brought about such political, economic, cultural and ecological devastation that any type of reform suggestion along the line to halt this process is met with much welcoming by many of us—even if some of them are still acting as if economic incentives are the only viable policy tool in town. Consider the case of carbon markets, for example, where the cap is decided either through a scientific body or through aggregating individuals’ preferences. The fact of the matter is that, far from addressing the inefficiencies that emanate from opportunistic and manipulative activities, these mechanisms are vulnerable precisely because they end up soliciting manipulative, predatory, and rent-seeking behavior (because they are designed to function under such behavioral assumptions in the first place). In other words, these solutions subject a commons such as global climate into the economic logic of markets and “performatively” turn it into an object of strategic-calculative logic (MacKenzie, Muniesa and Siu, 2007; Çalışkan and Callon, 2009; MacKenzie, 2009; Çalışkan and Callon, 2010; see also Spash, 2011). Consider, furthermore, the case of price-per-bag policies. Laboratory experiments and anthropological evidence both suggest that charging a price for some activity that should in fact be treated as a duty or a commitment may well create perverse results (see, e.g., Campbell, 1998; Bowles and Hwang, 2008). Monetizing the pollution-generating activity instead of limiting the use of plastic bags (along with an awareness program) may well result in an increase of the unwanted activity. Similarly, while nationalization is the trend in areas of natural resource extraction and energy production, many continue to argue for privatization and private-public partnerships instead. Nevertheless, the problem with the private versus public dichotomy, given our reading of the contemporary state as an agent of economization, is precisely that both forms, to the extent that they are informed by the different variants of neoliberal reason, serve to isolate these critical areas from the deliberations and political demands of various stakeholders and the general public, limiting the only channels for communication available to them to the price (or price-like) mechanisms. However, perhaps most importantly, neither can be immune towards all sorts of rent-seeking activities that occur behind the close doors of the technocracy that operates in the area where state shades into market in the various forms of dispositifs.

Incentives rely upon the functioning of economic subjects wherein all things become commodifiable.

Adaman and Madra (Bogazici University, Department of Economics) 12

(Fikret & Yahya M., Understanding Neoliberalism as Economization: The Case of the Ecology, http://www.econ.boun.edu.tr/public\_html/RePEc/pdf/201204.pdf)

Michel Foucault’s close reading of some of the key texts of neoliberal thought at his 1979 lectures at the Collège de France (Foucault, 2008; see also Tribe, 2009) moves beyond the popular representations of neoliberalism that reduce it to a set of marketization policies. According to Foucault, neoliberalism is a response to the historical unfolding of a constitutive tension of liberal governmental reason: how might one extend the realm of freedom without inadvertently delimiting it with governmental interventions that are necessary for the extension of the realm of freedom? In contrast to classical liberalism that tried to limit government control over markets, neoliberalism answers this question by aiming at nothing less than modeling “the overall exercise of political power” on the competitive logic of markets (Foucault, 2008: 131). The emergence of neoliberalism, according to Foucault, heralds the birth of a new art of government, a “biopolitical mode of governmentality,” where the state ceases to relate to its subjects as citizen-subjects with social rights, and begins to conduct its functions under the presumption that subjects will respond (**predictably) to economic incentives** in all aspects of their lives. In short, neoliberalism, as a combination of an ideological discourse and practices, entails a push towards a de-politicization of the social through its economization—viz. imposing a logic of cost-benefit analysis to all aspects of life under the assumption that everything is commodifiable (see also Fine and Milonakis, 2009).

Neoliberalism also ensures those sacrificed are the global poor

Neoliberalism destroys agency and value to life.

**Rodriguez** (Boise State University) **9**

(Arturo, Anti-capitalist Analytical Fusion: Science, Pedagogy and Revolution, Journal for Activist Science & Technology Education, 1(2))

The classroom as McLaren and Jaramillo relate and as Bencze and Alsop elaborate, were the last truly public domain where students and teachers could engage in a respite from the dominant ideology (2009, 2009). They could take it upon themselves to consider the social relations that exist and their effect on the environment. According to David Hursch, “Neo-liberals’ desire not to intervene in markets and to focus on economic growth, primarily terms of consumption, has both significantly contributed to the environmental problems that we face and to global warming.” (2009: p5) The copper canyons in Utah were not put their by meteors but by mining operations. The depletion of salmon and steelhead in the rivers and streams of California, Oregon and Washington did not happen as a product of the ravages of time. Human constructed, petrochemicals, positions on the treatment of the environment as things existing solely for the purpose of providing the corporatocracy with surplus value created all of it. Critical educators in and out of the classroom stand as a measure of change as the onslaught of neo- liberalism continues. People cause the ravages of time to negatively affect the planet, surplus accumulation whether it is PCB’s in the Hudson, ammonium nitrates at the mouths of the world’s major rivers or the debris from surface and subsurface detonations of nuclear material. Yet there is another more insidious form of surplus accumulation it is the toll on students in classrooms across the globe of curricula and pedagogies ensuring students leave classrooms functionally illiterate. Capable only of reading and acting out the prescribed lives global capitalists have set. Human agency and enslavement result as people live their lives careless to the effect their actions have on the natural environment and each other. Pedagogists in the natural and social sciences do more than share information with their students. They leave a lasting imprint, a seed for enlightenment, which may contribute to the production of knowledge. But, more importantly, offer an alternative to the living currently destroying the planet.

Deification K

The energy of the aff is only heterogenous when seen from within the perspective of sacrifice. But we propose looking at sacrifice ITSELF as a ritual act of expenditure. From that perspective, their commitment to sacrifice re-appears as the fundamental utility of politics

Their supposed transgressive form of sacrifice is actually indistinguishable from the Christian model of recuperation and transcendence. They are merely the inversion of the world they criticize, not anything outside of it

Elisabeth Arnould, lecturer at Johns Hopkins University, “The Impossible Sacrifice of Poetry: Bataille and the Nancian Critique of Sacrifice,” Diacritics 26.2, 1996

But if finitude thus appropriates itself in a self-sacrifice that reveals its truth, if it becomes "its own subject," how can we, once again, make a difference between the philosophical, Christian version of sacrifice and the modern Bataillian interpretation? Do they not entertain the same goal: mastery of the unthinkable excess of finitude? And do they not both pretend to manifest a truth of the experience of nonknowledge: a truth that is, on the one hand, that of an ideal or divine resurrection and, on the other, a purely immanent but nonetheless presentable reality of death? The figure of a self-immolating Rimbaud and the inner experience it embodies are, intentionally or not, analogous in design and purpose to the ontotheological figures of the idealist and dialectical tradition. And this particular sacrificial figure is all the more suspect in that it recasts and replays the much-talked-about "sacrifice of poetry" constitutive of the Western philosophical tradition. It is scarcely necessary to remind the reader that the emblematic scene of the birth of philosophy in the West has traditionally been represented both by the sacrifice of the poet in the public square and the legendary tale of self-sacrifice depicting young Plato burning his poems. Now, Bataille, it would seem, is merely reproducing these scenes. His version resituates the immolation of poetry in the context of a nonknowledge, but **this new context does not alter the fundamental identity of the meaning and purpose of these sacrifices.** Plato's sacrifices sought to demonstrate that truth, though hidden, is accessible through the sacrificial machination of a philosophical dialectic. Similarly, Bataille reasserts that finitude, though absent, is accessible through the negativity and self-immolation of the experience. Just as Plato and Socrates informed us that, in order to obtain the idea in its purity, it must first be abstracted from the verbiage of representational falsification by way of sacrificing the falsifier, the mimetician, so Bataille informs us that only a sacrifice of poetry will allow the experience to achieve the inner void of its nonknowledge. Hence, the experience separates its "inner" truth from a poetic exteriority that could only "simulate," as Bataille himself often writes, "its absence." And it is as this inner "presence-to-itself of absence" ("présence-à-soi de l'absence") that Bataille seems to be conceptualizing finitude. Finitude is the "impossible presence" that one must preserve and purify through a renewed sacrifice of meaning. How can we thus avoid thinking that such an experience, intent upon wresting its finitude from the bad repetition of a mimesis, not only misjudges the nature of finitude but also the nature of a poetry whose "mimetic imposture" could actually, as Nancy says, teach us a few things about the "impossible"--or "inappropriable"--nature of finitude itself.

Sacrifice exceeds their desire. By attempting to deny meaning and UTILITY in the act, it requires ever-further expansions of blood-spilling.

If the plan means nothing, it’s genocide. If it means something, it collapses under its own weight and ceases to be true sacrifice

C. Michael Minkoff, “Existence is Sacrificeable, But It Is Not Sacrifice,” April 25, 2007, http://smartech.gatech.edu/dspace/bitstream/1853/14446/8/Michael%20Minkoff--LCC%204100--Animal\_Sacrifice.pdf

What Nancy admits is that “strictly speaking we know nothing decisive about the old sacrifice” and that “the Western economy of sacrifice has come to a close…it is closed by the decomposition of the sacrificial apparatus itself” (Nancy, 35). These confessions are significant because it indicates the fear that Nancy has of appropriating a symbol which has a remainder and a vector he cannot predict or control. What Bataille wanted from sacrifice was one thing, but Nancy fears that sacrifice carries its own valence. It is like the art that accedes to extinction, but suspends above it indefinitely. **The force to accede to extinction is not guaranteed to suspend**. The force that Bataille borrows from sacrifice is not guaranteed to behave in the way atheism dictates. Nancy reasserts that Western sacrifice always knew it sacrificed to nothing, but this latent knowledge makes the institution of sacrifice absurd, and Nancy is not willing to deny that sacrifice “sustained and gave meaning to billions of individual and collective existences” (Nancy, 35) What Nancy fears is this ignorance. He knows he does not understand the significance of the old sacrifice. If sacrifice was to no one and everyone knew it; why Page 8 was and is it so universal and why have so many been tempted into believing its significance? But if one assumes that there is no one to whom one sacrifices, Bataille may not use sacrifice as the centerpiece of his philosophy because if sacrifice is not to anyone, it is not truly significant. If it is not significant or meaningful, it has no power. It becomes comedic. **And it becomes massacre**. That is why Nancy spends much of his time talking about the sacrifice of the Jews at Auschwitz. Without over-determining the significance, the sacrifice becomes a genocide or a holocaust. Bataille is trapped between two uncomfortable positions—let the blood continue to spill to make sacrifice real and significant and concrete, or deny the death the status of sacrifice, which in Bataille’s mind, would be to deny it realization. Nancy asks if Bataille’s “dialectical negativity expunges blood or whether, on the contrary, blood must ineluctably continue to spurt” (Nancy, 27). If Bataille spiritualizes sacrifice, it no longer has the power of real death, the concreteness of finiteness and the ability to rupture finitude. But if Bataille insists on the real death, he necessitates the constant spilling of blood in mimetic repetition until history is completed in the Sage