Permutation – I’ll do the link debate here

1) they’re reliance upon financial incentives to facilitate the energy transition makes violence and war inevitable – efforts are meant to create a renewable sector that can compete rather than directly confronting, suppressing, and dismantling the violence of coal and oil industries. A market based phase out means that even if they are capable of spilling over, which I don’t think they’ll win they are, they still establish competition between workers globally to determine who controls the last of these resources and for what purposes they are used – proven by the China disad – this dependence on market mechanisms creates unregulated market competition that makes extinction inevitable –

Their sovocool evidence discusses how “renewable power sources provide public benefits that are not yet valued in the electricity market” necessitating not government intervention to distort the market so people are more open to the idea of microgeneration. This does absolutely nothing to address the distancing from the sources of electricity because it maintains the neoliberal economic subject that allows for such things to be considered irrelevant in the first place.

Incentives rely upon the functioning of economic subjects wherein all things become commodifiable.

Adaman and Madra (Bogazici University, Department of Economics) 12

(Fikret & Yahya M., Understanding Neoliberalism as Economization: The Case of the Ecology, http://www.econ.boun.edu.tr/public\_html/RePEc/pdf/201204.pdf)

Michel Foucault’s close reading of some of the key texts of neoliberal thought at his 1979 lectures at the Collège de France (Foucault, 2008; see also Tribe, 2009) moves beyond the popular representations of neoliberalism that reduce it to a set of marketization policies. According to Foucault, neoliberalism is a response to the historical unfolding of a constitutive tension of liberal governmental reason: how might one extend the realm of freedom without inadvertently delimiting it with governmental interventions that are necessary for the extension of the realm of freedom? In contrast to classical liberalism that tried to limit government control over markets, neoliberalism answers this question by aiming at nothing less than modeling “the overall exercise of political power” on the competitive logic of markets (Foucault, 2008: 131). The emergence of neoliberalism, according to Foucault, heralds the birth of a new art of government, a “biopolitical mode of governmentality,” where the state ceases to relate to its subjects as citizen-subjects with social rights, and begins to conduct its functions under the presumption that subjects will respond (**predictably) to economic incentives** in all aspects of their lives. In short, neoliberalism, as a combination of an ideological discourse and practices, entails a push towards a de-politicization of the social through its economization—viz. imposing a logic of cost-benefit analysis to all aspects of life under the assumption that everything is commodifiable (see also Fine and Milonakis, 2009).

Reliance upon market mechanisms to establish green technology maintains the dominance of the entrepreneurial subject, ignoring the relentless and growth-dependent character of capitalism’s distinct metabolism.

Prudham (Department of Geography and Centre for Environment, University of Toronto) 9

(Scott, Pimping climate change: Richard Branson, global warming, and the performance of green capitalism, Environment and Planning A 2009, volume 41, pages 1594 ^ 1613)

The paper features two interrelated arguments. First, Branson’s announcements (particularly the first one) point to a central contradiction in the green capitalist agenda. This agenda pivots in large measure on the problematic suggestion that more sustainable futures can be secured via capitalist investment and entrepreneurial innovation. Whatever truth there may be in particular cases, this obscures the relentless, restless, and growth-dependent character of capitalism’s distinct metabolism, an argument most closely associated with the work of Bellamy Foster (Clark and York, 2005; Foster, 2000), but which draws in turn on Karl Marx. The metabolism critique right- fully identifies a tendency in capitalist political economies for aggregate throughput of material and energy to grow, outstripping any efficiency gains (ie the so- called ‘Jevons paradox’). But accumulation for accumulation’s sake also entails dynamic confrontation, transformation, and redefinition of material, social, and cultural conditions in ways that confound coherent articulation of any notion of fixed ‘limits’ (including ecological ones) to continued expansion. This essentially qualitative problem originates in the **microeconomics of the entrepreneurial subject** who is compelled to accumulate on an expanded scale if only to reproduce himself or herself. What results is a systemic logic of the production of new natures ö integrally connected to the production of space and uneven development more generally (Smith, 2008 [1984]) ö by the anarchic, restless drive to accumulate capital as an end in and of itself. Thus, I argue that, when thinking of capitalism’s so- cal led ‘biospheric rift’ (Clark and York, 2005), it is crucial to attend not only to quantiti es of aggregate material and energy throughput, but also to issues of quality. Secondly, focus on the elite entrepreneurial or bourgeois subject points to the need for a politico-cultural perspective on green capitalism as a sort of ‘drama’ which must be performed. That is, the viability of green capitalism is not only an ‘objective’ question of whether or not entrepreneurial energy, unleashed by neoliberalized green markets, can give rise to sustainable technoeconomic trajectories. Rather, it is also a political agenda whose viability turns on whether or not capitalism and environmen- talism are seen ö subjectively ö to be compatible. Seen in this way, green capitalism has interwoven material ^ semiotic dimensions (Haraway, 1997), one central facet of which is the ‘performance’ of the entrepreneurial subject as environmental crusader. Perform- ances such as Branson’s not only stage the political and cultural fusion of capitalism and environmentalism as green capitalism; they also act to augment the economic foundations of bourgeois power by making the entrepreneur a central figure in climate policy, and, by extension, environmentalism.

A neoliberal green revolution simply shifts to domination and exploitation into other spheres

**White** (post-doctoral research fellow in the School of Cultural and Innovation Studies, University of East London) **2**

(Damian, A Green Industrial Revolution? Sustainable Technological Innovation in a Global Age, Environmental Politics, Vo1.II. No.2, Summer 2002. pp.I-26)

The first point is essentially negative. Notably, it draws attention to the fact that even if all the obstacles to a green industrial revolution posed by the structuring of the current political economy are addressed - ifthere are notforces to make things differently - the type of eco-technological and ecoindustrial reorganisation that triumphs could simply serve and reinforce the patterns of interest of dominant groups. A neo-liberal version of the 'green industrial revolution' could simply give rise to eco-technologies and forms of industrial reorganisation that arc perfectly compatible with **extending social control, military power, worker surveillance and the broader repressive capacities of dominant groups and institutions**. It might even be that a corporate dominated green industrial revolution would simply ensure that employers have 'smart' buildings which not only give energy back to the national grid but allow for new 'solar powered' employee surveillance technologies. What of a sustainable military-industrial complex that uses green warfare technologies that kill human beings without destroying ecosystems? To what extent might a 'nonhero' dominated green industrial revolution simply ensure that the South receives ecotechnologies that primarily express Northern interests (for example, embedding relations of dependency rather than of self management and autonomy?). In short then, a green industrial revolution could simply give rise to new forms of 'green governmentality' [Dorier et aI., 1999].

But the alt can solve (next para)

The second, more positive insight that can be derived from technology studies is that contra the simplistic understanding of technology that underpins tehnophobic ideologies, this result is far from inevitable. There is no inherent reason why technological development need give rise to technocracy, The history and sociology of technology does not simply provide us with gloomy reasons to embrace Luddism. Rather, this literature also demonstrates that opportunities can arise at critical conjunctural moments to reshape the direction of technological development or critically reappropriate technologies and technocultures for different uses [Penley and Ross. 1991]." A sceptic could respond to this observation that such 'conjunctural moments' are infrequent, and the outcomes of such struggles are weighted in favour of powerful groups. This maybe so, yet it is this very possibility that has led figures such as Feenberg and Winner and more recently Beck to argue that if undemocratic design procedures and the broader foreclosing of public debate over technological innovation can have massive consequences for society at large, there is a greater need than ever for the whole series of questions surrounding technology, **technological change and innovation to move from the backroom to the centre stage of a reconstituted public sphere.**

Framework Debate

We control the internal link to political effectiveness – the subjectivity of the competitive neoliberal individual must be analyzed before the policy it is mobilized to support

**Read 9**

(Jason, The University of Southern Maine, A Genealogy of Homo-Economicus: Neoliberalism and the Production of Subjectivity, Foucault Studies, No 6, pp. 25-36, February 2009)

Foucault’s development, albeit partial, of account of neoliberalism as governmentality has as its major advantage a clarification of the terrain on which neoliberalism can be countered. It is not enough to simply oppose neoliberalism as ideology, revealing the truth of social existence that it misses, or to enumerate its various failings as policy. Rather any opposition to neoliberalism must take seriously its effectiveness, the manner in which it has transformed work subjectivity and social relationships. As Foucault argues, neoliberalism operates less on actions, directly curtailing them, then on the condition and effects of actions, on the sense of possibility. The reigning ideal of interest and the calculations of cost and benefit do not so much limit what one can do, neoliberal thinkers are famously indifferent to prescriptive ideals, examining the illegal drug trade as a more or less rational investment, but limit the sense of what is possible. Specifically the ideal of the fundamentally self-interested individual curtails any collective transformation of the conditions of existence. It is not that such actions are not prohibited, restricted by the dictates of a sovereign or the structures of disciplinary power, they are not seen as possible, closed off by a society made up of self-interested individuals. It is perhaps no accident that one of the most famous political implementers of neoliberal reforms, Margaret Thatcher, used the slogan, “there is no alternative,” legitimating neoliberalism based on the stark absence of possibilities. Similarly, and as part of a belated response to the former Prime Minister, it also perhaps no accident that the slogan of the famous Seattle protests against the IMF and World Bank was, “another world is possible,” and it is very often the sense of a possibility of not only another world, but of another way of organizing politics that is remembered, the image of turtles and teamsters marching hand and hand, when those protests are referred to.26 It is also this sense of possibility that the present seems to be lacking; it is difficult to imagine let alone enact a future other than a future dominated by interest and the destructive vicissitudes of competition. A political response to neoliberalism must meet it on its terrain, that of the production of subjectivity, freedom and possibility.

Impact Debate –

The affirmative does nothing to resolve the untenable relationship between society and the environment because they continue to view those things as separate – we access their byrne evidence far better than they do – byrne says “instead of a social analysis of energy regimes, the field seems seems to be a captive of euphoric technological visions and associated studies of "energy futures" that imagine the pleasing consequences of new energy sources”

There is a tangible way to confront centralized power without adopting incentivizes -

Neoliberalism creates multiple structural trends towards extinction

Szentes (a Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest) 8

(Tamás, “Globalisation and prospects of the world society”, 4/22 [http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/-Events/exco/Glob.\_\_\_prospects\_-\_jav..pdf](http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/Events/exco/Glob.___prospects_-_jav..pdf))

It’ s a common place that human society can survive and develop only in a lasting real peace. Without peace countries cannot develop. Although since 1945 there has been no world war, but --numerous local wars took place, --terrorism has spread all over the world, undermining security even in the most developed and powerful countries, --arms race and militarisation have not ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, but escalated and continued, extending also to weapons of mass destruction and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development, --many “invisible wars” are suffered by the poor and oppressed people, manifested in mass misery, poverty, unemployment, homelessness, starvation and malnutrition, epidemics and poor health conditions, exploitation and oppression, racial and other discrimination, physical terror, organised injustice, disguised forms of violence, the denial or regular infringement of the democratic rights of citizens, women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc., and last but not least, in the degradation of human environment, which means that --the “war against Nature”, i.e. the disturbance of ecological balance, wasteful management of natural resources, and large-scale pollution of our environment, is still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life. Behind global terrorism and “invisible wars” we find striking international and intrasociety inequities and distorted development patterns , which tend to generate social as well as international tensions, thus paving the way for unrest and “visible” wars. It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war. The prerequisites of a lasting peace between and within societies involve not only - though, of course, necessarily - demilitarisation, but also a systematic and gradual elimination of the roots of violence, of the causes of “invisible wars”, of the structural and institutional bases of large-scale international and intra-society inequalities, exploitation and oppression. Peace requires a process of social and national emancipation, a progressive, democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing about equal rights and opportunities for all people, sovereign participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict management, and thus also a global governance with a really global institutional system. Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world, peace is indivisible in both time and space. It cannot exist if reduced to a period only after or before war, and cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world when some others suffer visible or invisible wars. Thus, peace requires, indeed, a new, demilitarised and democratic world order, which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable development. “Sustainability of development” (both on national and world level) is often interpreted as an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with overexhausted resources and polluted environment. However, no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap and intra-society inequalities are substantially reduced. Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any “zero-sum-games”, in which one can gain at the expense of others, but, instead, the “negative-sum-games” tend to predominate, in which everybody must suffer, later or sooner, directly or indirectly, losses. Therefore, the actual question is not about “sustainability of development” but rather about the “sustainability of human life”, i.e. survival of mankind – because of ecological imbalance and globalised terrorism. When Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI, one day we had an exchange of views on the state and future of development studies. We agreed that development studies are not any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries, as the developed ones (as well as the former “socialist” countries) are also facing development problems, such as those of structural and institutional (and even system-) transformation, requirements of changes in development patterns, and concerns about natural environment. While all these are true, today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of) “development studies” we must speak about and make “survival studies”. While the monetary, financial, and debt crises are cyclical, we live in an almost permanent crisis of the world society, which is multidimensional in nature, involving not only economic but also socio-psychological, behavioural, cultural and political aspects. The narrow-minded, election-oriented, selfish behaviour motivated by thirst for power and wealth, which still characterise the political leadership almost all over the world, paves the way for the final, last catastrophe. One cannot doubt, of course, that great many positive historical changes have also taken place in the world in the last century. Such as decolonisation, transformation of socio-economic systems, democratisation of political life in some former fascist or authoritarian states, institutionalisation of welfare policies in several countries, rise of international organisations and new forums for negotiations, conflict management and cooperation, institutionalisation of international assistance programmes by multilateral agencies, codification of human rights, and rights of sovereignty and democracy also on international level, collapse of the militarised Soviet bloc and system-change3 in the countries concerned, the end of cold war, etc., to mention only a few. Nevertheless, the crisis of the world society has extended and deepened, approaching to a point of bifurcation that necessarily puts an end to the present tendencies, either by the final catastrophe or a common solution. Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, human society cannot survive unless such profound intra-society and international inequalities prevailing today are soon eliminated. Like a single spacecraft, the Earth can no longer afford to have a 'crew' divided into two parts: the rich, privileged, wellfed, well-educated, on the one hand, and the poor, deprived, starving, sick and uneducated, on the other. Dangerous 'zero-sum-games' (which mostly prove to be “negative-sum-games”) can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible wars in the world society. Because of global interdependencies, the apparent winner becomes also a loser. The real choice for the world society is between negative- and positive-sum-games: i.e. between, on the one hand, continuation of visible and “invisible wars”, as long as this is possible at all, and, on the other, transformation of the world order by demilitarisation and democratization. No ideological or terminological camouflage can conceal this real dilemma any more, which is to be faced not in the distant future, by the next generations, but in the coming years, because of global terrorism soon having nuclear and other mass destructive weapons, and also due to irreversible changes in natural environment.

Incentives guarantee failure of their movement – simply replicate what they attempt to solve.

Adaman and Madra (Bogazici University, Department of Economics) 12

(Fikret & Yahya M., Understanding Neoliberalism as Economization: The Case of the Ecology, http://www.econ.boun.edu.tr/public\_html/RePEc/pdf/201204.pdf)

The reduction of ecological valuation through a market mechanism (or various techniques) to a mere aggregation of individual subjective valuations—which is the main premise of neoliberal ideology—may be inappropriate for complex and uncertain phenomena ridden with incommensurabilities and inter- and intra-generational distributional conflicts, such as global warming, where individual valuations will have clear implications for all living beings. Indeed, in making decisions with substantial consequences pertaining to our current life as well as our future (such as the overall growth rate, distributional trajectories, technological path, consumption habits, risk attitude [say, vis-à-vis nuclear energy]), the market response or the aggregation of individuals’ valuation through a set of available techniques (e.g., the contingent valuation) may substantially differ from what could be derived through collective deliberation and negotiation of various stakeholders including the scientific community (see, e.g., Özkaynak, Adaman and Devine, 2012). This criticism applies not only to neoliberal positions that favor the current unequal distribution of power but also to the Post-Walrasian one which although concerned with distributional issues keeps relying on individualist ontologies of calculative and calculable agency. Indeed, there is a growing theoretical and applied literature arguing that in incommensurable cases, where all relevant aspects cannot be captured in a single dimension (such as those derived from monetary cost-benefit analyses), a multi-criteria methodology would seem better placed, as it will be possible to involve not only economic but also political, moral, scientific and cultural inputs from a variety of stakeholders (see, e.g., Martinez-Alier, Munda and O’Neil, 1999; Munda, 2008). The key promise of the multicriteria decision-making tool and other similar participatory and deliberatory dispositifs is that rather than finding a “solution” to a conflictual decision, they shed light on the multifaceted dimensions of the problem at hand and thus facilitate the consensus-building process from below (see, e.g., Adaman, 2012). In this regard, they constitute a formidable path to be explored as an alternative to the surreptitiously normative neoliberal governmental dispositifs, designed by experts from above, under the assumption that all actors are calculative and calculable.

The current indiscriminate application of neoliberal policies over the entire scope of the social field has brought about such political, economic, cultural and ecological devastation that any type of reform suggestion along the line to halt this process is met with much welcoming by many of us—even if some of them are still acting as if economic incentives are the only viable policy tool in town. Consider the case of carbon markets, for example, where the cap is decided either through a scientific body or through aggregating individuals’ preferences. The fact of the matter is that, far from addressing the inefficiencies that emanate from opportunistic and manipulative activities, these mechanisms are vulnerable precisely because they end up soliciting manipulative, predatory, and rent-seeking behavior (because they are designed to function under such behavioral assumptions in the first place). In other words, these solutions subject a commons such as global climate into the economic logic of markets and “performatively” turn it into an object of strategic-calculative logic (MacKenzie, Muniesa and Siu, 2007; Çalışkan and Callon, 2009; MacKenzie, 2009; Çalışkan and Callon, 2010; see also Spash, 2011). Consider, furthermore, the case of price-per-bag policies. Laboratory experiments and anthropological evidence both suggest that charging a price for some activity that should in fact be treated as a duty or a commitment may well create perverse results (see, e.g., Campbell, 1998; Bowles and Hwang, 2008). Monetizing the pollution-generating activity instead of limiting the use of plastic bags (along with an awareness program) may well result in an increase of the unwanted activity. Similarly, while nationalization is the trend in areas of natural resource extraction and energy production, many continue to argue for privatization and private-public partnerships instead. Nevertheless, the problem with the private versus public dichotomy, given our reading of the contemporary state as an agent of economization, is precisely that both forms, to the extent that they are informed by the different variants of neoliberal reason, serve to isolate these critical areas from the deliberations and political demands of various stakeholders and the general public, limiting the only channels for communication available to them to the price (or price-like) mechanisms. However, perhaps most importantly, neither can be immune towards all sorts of rent-seeking activities that occur behind the close doors of the technocracy that operates in the area where state shades into market in the various forms of dispositifs.

Warming Links

As communication scholars we have an obligation to fight the apocalyptic frame at every turn – ten years as the dominant frame for warming discussion has proved it is an utter failure

Foust and Murphy (Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver; doctoral student in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver) 9

(Christina R. Foust & William O'Shannon Murphy, Revealing and Reframing Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse, Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, pages 151-167,Volume 3, Issue 2, 2009)

In conclusion, an apocalyptic structure permeates the global warming narrative in the American elite and popular press, with the potential to force the predicted tragedy into being, due to its limitations on human agency. We echo the call for communication scholars of all methodological commitments to join environmental advocates, climate scientists, and others, in their efforts to build a collective will to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Moser & Dilling, [2007](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17524030902916624#CIT0042)). A great part of this effort is in reframing the way the press constitutes climate change discourse (Boykoff, [2007b](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17524030902916624#CIT0008)). These efforts also must extend beyond the media to include other arenas in which an active public is aroused, from kitchen tables and water coolers, to board rooms and classrooms. By providing the public, agenda-setting professionals (e.g., public relations practitioners and journalists), and community leaders with ways to structure communication that promote agency, rhetoricians might advance widespread public action on climate change.The apocalyptic frame, particularly in its tragic version, is not an effective rhetorical strategy for this situation. It has been developed over at least the last decade of press coverage, a time in which the US has refused all but the most paltry political action on greenhouse gas reductions. Tragic apocalyptic discourse encourages belief in prophesy at the expense of practicing persuasion, even as it provokes resignation in the face of a human-induced dilemma. Given the tragic apocalyptic frame's ineffectiveness at inspiring action-or, at least its persistent evacuation of agency-we must promote more action-oriented rhetorical strategies. Together, we may advance the climate change narrative from an apocalyptic tragedy to a more comic telos for humanity.

Must evaluate reps of global warming first if we have any hope of solving

Boykoff et al. 9

(Max Boykoff (University Of Oxford), Mike Goodman (King’s College London), Ian Curtis (University Of Oxford), Environment, Cultural Politics of Climate Change: Interactions in the Spaces of Everyday, Politics and Development Working Paper Series, Department of Geography, King’s College London http://www.kcl.ac.uk/schools/sspp/geography/research/epd/working.html)

Further, the many ‘actors’ in this theatre of discursive and material structuration – from climate scientists to business industry interest and ENGO activists to artists, television and movie stars – are ultimately all members of the ‘public citizenry’. So, responses to media messaging thereby feed back to varying degrees into ongoing environmental science and policy formulations. In other words, the cultural politics of climate change are situated, power-laden, media-ted and recursive and should be conceptualised as such. And, much like many of the growing list of ‘climate change celebrities’, those who have power, access and influence are those who have the advantage in this battlefield of knowledges, understandings and interpretations. Here, mass media representations of climate change actors, action, predicaments and progress remain key influences that shape discourses and bounding considerations for possible climate action. These elements may be as important as formal climate governance architectures – such as those currently being constructed in the lead up to COP15 in Copenhagen – to the long-term success or failure of efforts to take carbon out of the atmosphere or keep it out. To the extent that we fail to examine how these representations and symbols are negotiated through relations of dominance, subordination, and inequalities of access and resources, we miss out on important components of the “scope of [climate] politics” (Rosati 2007, p. 996) and/or the spectrum of possibilities for future climate mitigation and/or adaptation action.

Their extinction claims are scientifically false and produce fatalism

Costello et al (Institute for Global Health, University College London) 11

(Anthony Costello, Mark Maslin, Hugh Montgomery, Anne M. Johnson, Paul Ekins, Global health and climate change: moving from denial and catastrophic fatalism to positive action, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A 13 May 2011 vol. 369 no. 1942)

At the other end of the scale are doom-mongers who predict catastrophic population collapse and the end of civilization. In the early nineteenth century, the French palaeontologist Georges Cuvier first addressed catastrophism and explained patterns of extinction observed in the fossil record through catastrophic natural events [[10](http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/369/1942/1866.full#ref-10)].

We know now of five major extinctions: the Ordovician–Silurian extinction (439 million years ago), the Late Devonian extinction (about 364 million years ago), the Permian–Triassic extinction (about 251 million years ago), the End Triassic extinction (roughly 199 million to 214 million years ago) and the Cretaceous–Tertiary extinction (about 65 million years ago). These mass extinctions were caused by a combination of plate tectonics, supervolcanism and asteroid impacts. The understanding of the mass extinctions led Gould & Eldredge [[11](http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/369/1942/1866.full#ref-11)] to update Darwin’s theory of evolution with their own theory of punctuated equilibrium. Many scientists have suggested that the current human-induced extinction rates could be as fast as those during these mass extinctions [[12](http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/369/1942/1866.full#ref-12),[13](http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/369/1942/1866.full#ref-13)]. For example, one study predicted that 58 per cent of species may be committed to extinction by 2050 due to climate change alone [[14](http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/369/1942/1866.full#ref-14)], though this paper has been criticized [[15](http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/369/1942/1866.full#ref-15),[16](http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/369/1942/1866.full#ref-16)].

Some people have even suggested that human extinction may not be a remote risk [[17](http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/369/1942/1866.full#ref-17)–[19](http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/369/1942/1866.full#ref-19)]. Sherwood & Huber [[7](http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/369/1942/1866.full#ref-7)] point to continued heating effects that could make the world largely uninhabitable by humans and mammals within 300 years. Peak heat stress, quantified by the wet-bulb temperature (used because it reflects both the ambient temperature and relative humidity of the site), is surprisingly similar across diverse climates and never exceeds 31°C. They suggest that if it rose to 35°C, which never happens now but would at a warming of 7°C, hyperthermia in humans and other mammals would occur as dissipation of metabolic heat becomes impossible, therefore making many environments uninhabitable. However, these studies do not take account of geological reconstructions. We know that during the Eocene some 50 million years ago global temperature was at least 5°C higher than today, with forests on Antarctica and rainforest extending as far north as Canada and as far south as Patagonia [[20](http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/369/1942/1866.full#ref-20)]. Some scientists argue that this was the golden age of life, as there could have been at least twice as much living biomass on the Earth as today. At the beginning of this period, there was an extreme period of global warming called the Paleocene–Eocene thermal maximum when global temperatures were at least another 5°C warmer [[21](http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/369/1942/1866.full#ref-21),[22](http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/369/1942/1866.full#ref-22)]. This did lead to some extinction in the oceans but it was not the end of life on the planet nor did mammals suffer mass extinctions. So, while history suggests **that imminent catastrophe is as false as climate change denial**, **it could be as big a threat to action**. Catastrophic speculation, especially when based on limited evidence and without specific time frames, may induce an unnecessary sense of fatalism and helplessness when, in the shorter term, there is a huge scope for positive action.

But even if they win that their claim is true, the question of communication strategy has to come first. Science centered attempts at spuring activism are failing now

Brace and Geohegan (Profs at University of Exeter) 11

(Catherine Brace and Hilary Geoghegan, Human geographies of climate change: Landscape, temporality, and lay knowledges, Prog Hum Geogr 2011 35: 284 online 20 August 2)

The paradox is a tricky one. Following Cerezo and Garcia (1996: 54), we would suggest that the social context of scientific knowledge about climate change has not provided it with ‘an epistemic excellence which renders it self- sufficient’ for dealing with a given technological or environmental problem – that is, communicating the science of climate change and possi- ble routes to adaptation and mitigation (see also Ingold and Kurttila, 2000, on the way indi- genous knowledges are constructed and appro- priated by ‘science’). The problem is reflected in work by, for example, Lorenzoni et al. (2007) who demonstrate that the quality of climate change science and consensus have not been enough to compel people to change their behaviour (see also Lowe et al., 2006; Ockwell et al., 2009; O’Connor et al., 1999). Indeed, the ‘provision of scientifically sound information as a means to educate the public, change behaviour and gain support for policy’ has not succeeded precisely because ‘interpretations of science by the public are mediated by societal values, per- sonal experience, and other contextual factors’ (Lorenzoni et al., 2007: 446; see also Kahlor and Rosenthal, 2009, for a review of models of public engagement and scientific literacy). Dickinson (2009: unpaginated) confirms Loren- zoni et al.’s assessment by questioning whether an increased knowledge of the dangers of cli- mate change would generate a ‘sustained rational response’. On the other side of this problem, lay knowl- edges of climate change have also not achieved the rhetorical power of scientific knowledges despite their potential to contribute in the long run to ‘an effective (not merely legitimate) solu- tion of the problems currently tackled by exper- tise’ (Cerezo and Garcia, 1996: 55). According to DEFRA, only 1% of the English public have not heard of climate change, global warming or the greenhouse effect (DEFRA, 2009). Thus, it seems likely that lay understandings of climate change shape, and are shaped by, the associations of the climate in everyday lives and familiar landscapes. However, these associations have failed to inspire behavioural change (Lorenzoni et al., 2007), hinting at the problems with the def- icit model that we alluded to earlier in this paper. The failings of the deficit model are neatly illustrated by Cabecinhas et al. (2006: 504) who insist ‘that having an accurate knowledge of cli- mate change is a requirement for displaying atti- tudes and behaviours aiming at the resolution of the problem and for being able to engage in informed discussions on scientific and policy dimensions’, but then go on to present research which amply demonstrates the ambiguities, complexities and contingencies of people’s lay understandings of climate change. They admit that engaging the public is a very demanding and challenging task (Cabecinhas et al., 2006), which starts to beg the question of whether this is the right task at all. They are not alone in their unwavering insistence that if only the ‘public’ had ‘a correct understanding of the causes of global warming’ (Bord et al., 2000: 205, emphasis added), changes in behaviour that would benefit both adaptation and mitigation would immediately and unproblematically fol- low. This assertion is shared, for example, by Bostrom et al. (1994: 959, emphasis added) who boldly state that ‘in order to educate the citi- zenry, we must start by educating ourselves about what they already know and believe and how it differs from what they need to know in order to make effective decisions’. This senti- ment is echoed by Maibach and Hornig Priest (2009) who suggest that researchers must think more carefully about the knowledge they choose to communicate to the public and moreover how this will be interpreted (see also Whatmore, 2009, on knowledge controversies). So why is it necessary to know what a scientist knows in order to take a view on climate change? In their study of public participation in Integrated Assessment (IA),15 Darier et al. (1999: 351) argue that ‘it is unclear why the public should – or even want to – approach issues (such as climate change) from the epistemologically privileged expert-framed perspectives of IA’. Their analysis of lay knowledges reveals the ‘already existing, always context-dependent complexity, diversity, richness and ambiguity of lay knowledge’ (Darier et al., 1999: 351; Whatmore, 2009).

2NC A2: Environmental Security Good

First, this isn’t offense – the alt does not preclude viewing environmental destruction as threat, the question is the type and scope of that threat. They have to win that extinction level reps are good and necessary.

But environmental security has been tried and failed – comprehensive studies prove

Oels (University of Hamburg, Grindelberg) 11

(Angela, Rendering climate change governable by risk: From probability to contingency, Geoforum, 25 November 2011, ScienceDirect)

Existing research on climate change as a security issue **has not been able to identify policy changes as a result of the discursive shift**. The Copenhagen School has investigated if climate change has been articulated as an existential threat by political elites, if these securitizing moves have been accepted by relevant audiences, and if they have enabled extraordinary measures to address the threat ( [[Buzan et al., 1998]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016718511001795#b0075) and [[Waever, 1995]](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016718511001795#b0495)). Extraordinary measures imply a political state of exception where democratic procedures may be circumvented and the law suspended. The Copenhagen School criticises successful securitization as ‘failure’ of the political elites to deal with an issue by ‘normal’ democratic politics ([Waever, 1995](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016718511001795#b0495)). In the case of climate change, successful securitization could “legitimate extraordinary and costly measures that require a progressive increase in energy efficiency and a decarbonisation of the energy system by increasing renewable energy sources” ([Brauch, 2009](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016718511001795#b0050)) or even “**military action against polluting factories”** ([Trombetta, 2008, p. 599](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016718511001795#b0445)). Those who use the Copenhagen framework have concluded that the securitization of climate change (as defined above) has failed, **and that there is no evidence of such extraordinary measures** ([Stripple, 2002](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016718511001795#b0430); [Oels, 2011](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016718511001795#b0540); [Trombetta, 2008](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016718511001795#b0445)). While those drawing on the Copenhagen School support decisive climate mitigation action, the political price paid for ‘extraordinary measures’ is considered too high. From the perspective of discourse theory, [Swyngedouw (2010)](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016718511001795#b0435) argues that the articulation of climate change as a climate apocalypse in public discourse is marked by populism that evacuates ‘the political’ from climate change debates. The threat of climate change is constructed as an aberration to an otherwise unproblematic capitalist system: “CO2 stands here as the classic example of a fetishized and externalised foe that requires dealing with if sustainable climate futures are to be attained” ([Swyngedouw 2010, p. 222](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016718511001795#b0435)). From Swyngedouw’s perspective, the securitization of climate change has the primary function of producing “a socio-ecological fix to make sure nothing really changes” ([Swyngedouw, 2010, p. 222](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016718511001795#b0435)).

And securitization of climate change leads to arms build ups that cause war and trade off with efforts to solve warming

Brzoska (Inst. for Peace Research and Security Policy @ Hamburg) 8

(Micahel, “The Securitization of climate change and the power of conceptions of security” ISA Convention Paper)

In the literature on securitization it is implied that when a problem is securitized it is difficult to limit this to an increase in attention and resources devoted to mitigating the problem (Brock 1997, Waever 1995). Securitization regularly leads to all-round ‘exceptionalism’ in dealing with the issue as well as to a shift in institutional localization towards ‘security experts’ (Bigot 2006), such as the military and police. Methods and instruments associated with these security organizations – such as more use of arms, force and violence – will gain in importance in the discourse on ‘what to do’. A good example of securitization was the period leading to the Cold War (Guzzini 2004 ). Originally a political conflict over the organization of societies, in the late 1940s, the East-West confrontation became an existential conflict that was overwhelmingly addressed with military means, including the potential annihilation of humankind. Efforts to alleviate the political conflict were, throughout most of the Cold War, secondary to improving military capabilities. Climate change could meet a similar fate. An essentially political problem concerning the distribution of the costs of prevention and adaptation and the losses and gains in income arising from change in the human environment might be perceived as intractable, thus necessitating the build-up of military and police forces to prevent it from becoming a major security problem. The portrayal of climate change as a security problem could, in particular, cause the richer countries in the global North, which are less affected by it, to strengthen measures aimed at protecting them from the spillover of violent conflict from the poorer countries in the global South that will be most affected by climate change. It could also be used by major powers as a justification for improving their military preparedness against the other major powers, thus **leading to arms races**. This kind of reaction to climate change would be counterproductive in various ways. Firstly, since more border protection, as well as more soldiers and arms, is expensive, the financial means compensate for the negative economic effects of reducing greenhouse gas emission and adapting to climate change will be reduced. Global military expenditure is again at the level of the height of the Cold War in real terms, reaching more than US $1,200 billion in 2006 or 3.5 percent of global income. While any estimate of the costs of mitigation (e.g. of restricting global warming to 2°C by 2050) and adaptation are speculative at the moment,1 they are likely to be substantial. While there is no necessary link between higher military expenditures and a lower willingness to spend on preventing and preparing for climate change, both policy areas are in competition for scarce resources.

Apocalyptic thinking trades off with focus on ongoing environmental structural violence

Crist (Prof in Department of Science and Technology in Society @ Virginia Tech) 7

(Eileen, Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse, Telos 4 (Winter 2007): 29–55)

Besides coddling humanity’s proclivity for self-centered concern, apocalyptic thinking directs attention toward some future Hollywood- style cataclysm, while dimming awareness of the present and real suffering of nonhumans, disempowered and impoverished people, and consumers beleaguered by clutter and malaise. Life’s ongoing devastation, and humanity’s pathological imbalance with wild nature and schisms within itself, are the predicaments that we are called to face—not the preemption of some imagined crash in some imagined future.

This North/South inequality creates multiple structural trends towards extinction

Szentes ‘8

Tamás Szentes, a Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest. “Globalisation and prospects of the world society” 4/22/08 http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/Events/exco/Glob.\_\_\_prospects\_-\_jav..pdf

It’ s a common place that human society can survive and develop only in a lasting real peace. Without peace countries cannot develop. Although since 1945 there has been no world war, but --numerous local wars took place, --terrorism has spread all over the world, undermining security even in the most developed and powerful countries, --arms race and militarisation have not ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, but escalated and continued, extending also to weapons of mass destruction and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development, --many “invisible wars” are suffered by the poor and oppressed people, manifested in mass misery, poverty, unemployment, homelessness, starvation and malnutrition, epidemics and poor health conditions, exploitation and oppression, racial and other discrimination, physical terror, organised injustice, disguised forms of violence, the denial or regular infringement of the democratic rights of citizens, women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc., and last but not least, in the degradation of human environment, which means that --the “war against Nature”, i.e. the disturbance of ecological balance, wasteful management of natural resources, and large-scale pollution of our environment, is still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life. Behind global terrorism and “invisible wars” we find striking international and intrasociety inequities and distorted development patterns , which tend to generate social as well as international tensions, thus paving the way for unrest and “visible” wars. It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war. The prerequisites of a lasting peace between and within societies involve not only - though, of course, necessarily - demilitarisation, but also a systematic and gradual elimination of the roots of violence, of the causes of “invisible wars”, of the structural and institutional bases of large-scale international and intra-society inequalities, exploitation and oppression. Peace requires a process of social and national emancipation, a progressive, democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing about equal rights and opportunities for all people, sovereign participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict management, and thus also a global governance with a really global institutional system. Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world, peace is indivisible in both time and space. It cannot exist if reduced to a period only after or before war, and cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world when some others suffer visible or invisible wars. Thus, peace requires, indeed, a new, demilitarised and democratic world order, which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable development. “Sustainability of development” (both on national and world level) is often interpreted as an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with overexhausted resources and polluted environment. However, no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap and intra-society inequalities are substantially reduced. Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any “zero-sum-games”, in which one can gain at the expense of others, but, instead, the “negative-sum-games” tend to predominate, in which everybody must suffer, later or sooner, directly or indirectly, losses. Therefore, the actual question is not about “sustainability of development” but rather about the “sustainability of human life”, i.e. survival of mankind – because of ecological imbalance and globalised terrorism. When Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI, one day we had an exchange of views on the state and future of development studies. We agreed that development studies are not any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries, as the developed ones (as well as the former “socialist” countries) are also facing development problems, such as those of structural and institutional (and even system-) transformation, requirements of changes in development patterns, and concerns about natural environment. While all these are true, today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of) “development studies” we must speak about and make “survival studies”. While the monetary, financial, and debt crises are cyclical, we live in an almost permanent crisis of the world society, which is multidimensional in nature, involving not only economic but also socio-psychological, behavioural, cultural and political aspects. The narrow-minded, election-oriented, selfish behaviour motivated by thirst for power and wealth, which still characterise the political leadership almost all over the world, paves the way for **the final, last catastrophe**. One cannot doubt, of course, that great many positive historical changes have also taken place in the world in the last century. Such as decolonisation, transformation of socio-economic systems, democratisation of political life in some former fascist or authoritarian states, institutionalisation of welfare policies in several countries, rise of international organisations and new forums for negotiations, conflict management and cooperation, institutionalisation of international assistance programmes by multilateral agencies, codification of human rights, and rights of sovereignty and democracy also on international level, collapse of the militarised Soviet bloc and system-change3 in the countries concerned, the end of cold war, etc., to mention only a few. Nevertheless, the crisis of the world society has extended and deepened, approaching to a point of bifurcation that necessarily puts an end to the present tendencies, either by the final catastrophe or a common solution. Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, human society cannot survive unless such profound intra-society and international inequalities prevailing today are soon eliminated. Like a single spacecraft, the Earth can no longer afford to have a 'crew' divided into two parts: the rich, privileged, wellfed, well-educated, on the one hand, and the poor, deprived, starving, sick and uneducated, on the other. Dangerous 'zero-sum-games' (which mostly prove to be “negative-sum-games”) can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible wars in the world society. Because of global interdependencies, the apparent winner becomes also a loser. The real choice for the world society is between negative- and positive-sum-games: i.e. between, on the one hand, continuation of visible and “invisible wars”, as long as this is possible at all, and, on the other, **transformation of the world order** by demilitarisation and democratization. No ideological or terminological camouflage can conceal this real dilemma any more, which is to be faced not in the distant future, by the next generations, but in the coming years, because of global terrorism soon having nuclear and other mass destructive weapons, and also due to irreversible changes in natural environment.