Counterplan

Offense –

1. Logic – we shouldn’t be stuck with something that’s worse than the status quo – teaches us better education than their argument responsibility argument

2. Neg flex – must react to aff spins

3. Breadth good – stale debates are worse than shallow ones

4. counter-interpretation (pick one)

-One advantage counterplan, one process counterplan, and one kritik – solves breadth and depth

-One counterplan and one kritik – solves breadth and depth

If their c/I is dispo – dispo doesn’t solve neg strategic flex and it’s the same as conditionality

If their c/I is one CP+one K – their counter-interp is arbitrary, either it links to their offense or it doesn’t allow for enough strategic flexibility

Defense –

1. Best policy option – most objective framework

2. Structural aff advantages – first and last speech, 2ar persuasiveness, and lit favors change

3. Time and strat skew not a voter—it’s arbitrary and breaking a new aff, reading a good strat, and speed are inevitable

4. The worlds aren’t contradictory – the kritik is a prior framework question

5. one world in the 2nr solves their offense

5. If they win conditionality is bad, don’t reject the team – stick us to our advocacy

Russia

Russia has no military capacity for expansion

Ariel Cohen 07, Heritage, November 19, 2007, Domestic Factors Driving Russia’s Foreign Policy, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/bg2084.cfm>

These demographic shifts are already affecting Rus­sia's ability to project power. The Russian military is failing to meet its recruitment targets because of a declining pool of fit conscripts and their semi-legal efforts to avoid the draft Some demographers predict that in just nine years--by 2016--the pool of conscripts will be half Muslim. It is also not clear that a majority Muslim, non-ethnic Russian army will willingly take on missions to carry the Russian flag forward either in the "near abroad" (the 14 other former Soviet republics) or elsewhere. In addition, the workforce will further shrink in size and quality. The population is diseased, aging, and dying. In many countries, immigration has helped to mitigate the economic effects of population decline. In Russia, most immi­grants are from Central Asian former Soviet repub­lics and increasingly from China and Afghanistan. Yet, as growing xenophobia and racism in Russia suggest, ethnic Russians mostly disapprove of non-Slavic immigration.

Exports

2NC LNG Exports

U.S. is decoupled from international prices – shale gas means the game has changed – recent spot prices prove – gas was below $2 in the U.S. and sold for $11 in Europe and $15 in Asia – it’s not a global market. That’s Akerlof.

Their ev is too optimistic about the magnitude of exports. Ebinger, a 1AC author, evindicates indicates that even if we have a natural gas surplus, we won’t export it overnight – your ev doesn’t draw a distinction about the size of export terminals. Exports are also limited by factors other than prices like China shale development.

#### Export capacity is way too small

Philips 12

Matthew Philips, Associate Editor, Bloomberg Businessweek, 4/26/12, “Why Lower Natural Gas Prices Help the U.S. Only a Little,” Bloomberg Businessweek, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-04-26/why-lower-natural-gas-prices-help-the-u-dot-s-dot-only-a-little

We’re also severely limited in our capacity to export natural gas right now. The U.S. has just one export facility, in Alaska. A recently approved LNG export terminal in Louisiana will bring that to a grand total of two once completed in 2015. Regulators aren’t likely to approve any more LNG export projects in the coming year, though they probably will in the future. Depending on domestic demand, abundant natural gas could significantly reduce the U.S. trade deficit and perhaps turn us into a net exporter.

#### Export capability is a long way off

Philips 12

Matthew Philips, Associate Editor, Bloomberg Businessweek, 8/22/12, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-08-22/strange-bedfellows-debate-exporting-natural-gas#r=nav

None of this is likely to be settled anytime soon. The U.S. is almost sure to enter 2013, and probably 2014, exporting the same amount of natural gas as it currently does: which is almost none. The bulk of what it does export (PDF) gets piped into Canada and Mexico. To reach the really big markets in Asia and India and Europe, natural gas has to get super-chilled to -260F, turned into liquefied natural gas (LNG), and put on a ship. The only LNG export facility in the entire country is a small one up in Alaska called Kenai. ConocoPhillips (COP) is sending small shipments of LNG to Japan from Kenai, but there’s demand for so much more. In the last two years, companies have rushed to apply to the Department of Energy for approval to build terminals to export LNG to non-Free Trade Agreement countries, which is basically everybody. Non-FTA countries account for 91 percent of global GDP. The DOE has received 15 applications (PDF) to export domestic LNG, mostly out of the Gulf Coast. It’s approved just one: Cheniere Energy’s (LNG) $10 billion Sabine Pass terminal—which just happens to be located right next to the import facility the company finished in 2008, back when it looked like the U.S. was going to need huge amounts of imported LNG. The timing couldn’t have been worse. The shale gas revolution started in earnest the following year. That idled import facility is evidence of just how volatile the natural gas market is, and how risky it is to build an export facility. This point may or may not be lost on the companies scrambling for approval. According to Levi from the CFR, that long line of applications may represent false demand: While it costs billions to actually build an export terminal, it only costs $50 to apply for the right to.

#### Political opposition prevents exports

Levi 12

Michael Levi, senior fellow for energy and the environment and director of the Program on Energy Security and Climate Change at the Council on Foreign Relations, July/August 12, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists vol. 68 no. 4, http://bos.sagepub.com/content/68/4/52.full

What about consequences beyond the United States? So far the boom in natural gas production has been an exclusively American story. As a result, its impact on nuclear power has been limited globally. Shale gas has not been produced at scale elsewhere in the world. And, since transporting natural gas overseas is an expensive business—it can cost between $4 and $5 to move a thousand cubic feet of natural gas from the United States to Europe or Asia—cheap gas in the United States won’t automatically mean rock-bottom gas abroad, too. In addition, little export of liquefied natural gas from the United States is currently allowed by law; new large-scale gas exports, which are even more politically controversial than coal exports (because they threaten to undermine cheap electricity prices), would need to be approved before US and overseas markets would be fully linked. But there is reason to believe that overseas markets could eventually enjoy some of the benefits of the shale gas boom. Advanced Resources International, a respected consultancy, has estimated that the sheer volume of Chinese shale gas resources exceeds that of US resources, and Argentinean resources are close (EIA, 2011b). Other countries—including South Africa, Brazil, Poland, and France—are also believed to have significant stores. Yet cheaply producing these resources is a separate question. Public opposition has shut down shale gas development in France. The recent nationalization of YPF, the dominant oil and gas company in Argentina, will likely scare away foreign investment and, with it, the technology needed to develop unconventional gas. China may have the strongest prospects for large-scale development—yet too little is known about its shale resources to determine whether it can produce gas at prices anywhere close to those seen in the United States. For the time being, the nuclear power companies outside North America may be safe from the threat of a burgeoning natural gas industry.

The plan doesn’t solve trade leadership – restrictions on exporting to non-FTA countries will still exist – the plan just changes restrictions on production not exports.

And things like the stalled Doha talks, services, agricultural subsides are more important to trade.

#### US LNG would be shipped to Europe, not Asia – it’s much closer

Giberson 12

Michael Giberson, Center for Energy Commerce, Rawls College of Business, Texas Tech University, 2/21/12, “Is Asia the next big LNG market for the US?” http://theenergycollective.com/michaelgiberson/77169/lng-exports-view-brookings-institution

The Brookings Institution’s Energy Security Initiative has been looking at the changing natural gas market including, among other things, potential issues surrounding LNG exports from the United States. Overall it looks like reasonable stuff. But one claim made in a recent Brooking report [pdf], highlighted in a Wall Street Journal article today, had me scratching my head. From Brookings: Owing to growing gas demand, limited domestic supply, and a more rigid and expensive pricing structure, Asia represents a near-to-medium term opportunity for natural gas exports from the United States. The expansion of the Panama Canal by 2014 will allow for LNG tankers to traverse the isthmus, thereby improving the economics of U.S. Gulf Coast LNG shipments to East and South Asian markets and potentially allowing for an even shorter shipping route than from the Gulf Coast to the U.K. This would make U.S. exports competitive with future Middle Eastern and Australian LNG exports to the region. The WSJ quotes from the middle sentence, and I’m having trouble believing it. No matter how I look at it, shipping from the U.S. Gulf Coast to the U.K. appears to be a shorter route than shipping from the U.S. Gulf Coast to any East and South Asian market. (I.e., Houston to Bristol is about 4800 nautical miles, Houston through the Panama Canal to Toyko is about 9400 nautical miles. Hong Kong and other major Asian ports are farther than Toyko. See shipping distance calculator here.) The WSJ article is titled “Natural-Gas Glut Could Bypass Europe,” but if I were a European energy analyst, I wouldn’t bet on it. Sounds more like wishful thinking from Gazprom rather than reasoned analysis.

Japan alliance high and sustainable. OLD

Weitz 11 [Richard, World Politics Review, Global Insights: Japan Doubles Down on U.S. Alliance 28 JUN 2011 http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/9307/global-insights-japan-doubles-down-on-u-s-alliance]

The triple catastrophe represented by Japan's March 11 earthquake, tsunami and nuclear emergency has thus far had two main effects on Japan's national security policies. First, the crisis has focused the attention of Japanese security managers inward toward domestic humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. Second, it has reinforced the Japanese-U.S. alliance, which had already been strengthened by the Japanese government's decision to abandon its earlier quest for a more independent security policy in light of increased external threats from the East Asian mainland. Given this increased salience of external threats, Japan's earthquake-induced domestic preoccupation may prove to be of short duration.

Alliance is resilient - NEW

Okamoto 02 (Yukio, Security Adviser to Japanese Cabinet, Washington Quarterly25.2 p. 59-72)

Given the magnitude of the danger that an end of the alliance would pose to both Japan and the United States, both sides will likely want to maintain their security relationship for many years to come. A completely new world would have to emerge for Japan and the United States to no longer need each other. Despite frictions over trade, supposed Japanese passivity, purported U.S. arrogance, and the myriad overwrought "threats to the alliance," the truth is that this military alliance between two democratic states is well-nigh unbreakable--because there are no acceptable alternatives.

Russia Ukraine

Ebinger doesn’t say solve – already conflicts going on

If anything they make it worse

Russia not pursuing imperial expansion.

Celeste A. Wallander 07 is a visiting associate professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., and a member of the Editorial Board of The Washington Quarterly, Washington Quarterly, Spring 2007, http://www.twq.com/07spring/docs/07spring\_wallander.pdf

Neoimperialism as an explanation for Russian foreign and security policy is flawed as well. If the Russian leadership is bent on reestablishing an informal Russian/Soviet empire, why does the Kremlin continue on the path of the malign neglect and failure to reform the Russian military? In contrast to the expectations of a neoimperial model, Russia has been very restrained in the use of force toward its post-Soviet neighbors.

Russia played a constructive role in resolving the crisis over Ajaria in 2004 and has been withdrawing military forces from Georgia. Although Russia did en­dorse fraudulent elections in Ukraine, it also accepted the results of the Orange Revolution and the free and fair elections that ultimately made Viktor Yushchenko president. Russia is now poised to join the World Trade Organiza­tion (WTO) and its leadership remains active in pursuit of that goal, having compromised a great deal and made substantial progress in its negotiations with the United States. The disputes that delayed its WTO accession agreement were not those of an empire and are all too familiar in the normal trade realm of the international economic system. Perhaps the most important anomaly both for neoimperialism and postim­perialism as explanations for Russian foreign policy is the deep complicity of leaderships abroad in Russia’s new activism in international politics and eco­nomics. Russia’s favorable gas deal with Ukraine in January 2006, which keeps Ukraine largely vulnerable and dependent on Russian energy and goodwill, was not imposed on an unwilling Ukrainian leadership. The winning govern­ment of the Orange Revolution agreed to it, and the deal profits not only Gaz­prom but also the Ukrainian joint owners of RosUkrEnergo. Gazprom may be pressuring Belarusian president Aleksandr Lukashenka for partial ownership and thus control of gas pipelines, but without the bil­lions of dollars in implicit and explicit subsidies received over the past years, Lukashenka would face domestic discontent and potentially more effective opposition. Georgia is vulnerable to a Russian blockade precisely because so many illicit economic and commercial relations with Russia sustain the Geor­gian economy. Uzbek president Islam Karimov did not expel the U.S. military presence in 2005 because of Russian neoimperialist pressure. Rather, he saw a common interest in joining with Russia to resist the perceived threat of a Color Revolution that would shake his authoritarian rule. Both models ignore an essential dynamic of Russia’s foreign policy: how the Russian leadership pursues power and wealth. At the level of the international system, this means globalization. At the level of Russia’s emergent domestic political-economic system, the key factor is patrimonial authoritarianism.

Counterplan proper

They say perm do both

Still links to heg bad – internal link is the ability to produce more natural gas – which counterplan doesn’t do

They say don’t want fracked natural gas. This argument makes no sense – japan wants a steady fuel source – 1nc Cronin evidence which is the 1ac Cronin evidence says it’s enough of a gesture to solve.

They are asking for natural gas and it assumes current supply

Avery et. al 12 (5/4/12)

Emma Chanlett-Avery, Coordinator Acting Section Research Manager William H. Cooper Specialist in International Trade and Finance Mark E. Manyin Specialist in Asian Affairs

Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33436.pdf>

In the short term, Japan faces a potential major energy crunch in a time when global energy prices are soaring. With the summer months approaching and the accompanying raised electricity demand, there are concerns that energy supplies will be rationed or cut, despite officials’ assurances to the contrary. More fundamentally, some prominent energy experts, including former International Energy Agency executive director Nobuo Tanaka, warn that Japan’s manufacturing base may pull operations out of the country if they are worried about a consistent energy supply. Concerns about Japan’s excessive reliance on oil supplies from the volatile Middle East have led some in Japan to call for the United States to sell some of its less expensive liquified natural gas (LNG) supply to Japan.

Solves their trade leadership arguments –

It’s also key to solve trade leadership

Levi 1AC AUTHOR 12 (Michael, Senior Fellow for Energy and Environment – Council on Foreign Relations)

(The Case for Natural Gas Exports <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/16/opinion/the-case-for-natural-gas-exports.html?_r=0>)

Also takes out their aff – key to prevent disputes in NAFTA, Japan

We would export now – Cronin and Levi evidence both say companies are trying to export now – this happened in August

All argument about export capcity irrelevant