## Solvency

## Economy

#### Specifically, there is a growing international market for SMRs

Breakthrough Institute 12

(7/31/12 “‘IAEA Says Nuclear Energy Will Go From Strength to Strength” http://oilprice.com/Alternative-Energy/Nuclear-Power/IAEA-Says-Nuclear-Energy-go-from-Strength-to-Strength.html)

Global production of nuclear energy is expected to grow significantly in future years, despite setbacks in Japan and Germany, as China and the United States eyes next-generation reactors.

Worldwide nuclear electricity generating capacity is expected to increase between 44 percent and 99 percent by 2035, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Nuclear Energy Agency said in their joint biannual report on uranium resources, released this week.

Japan's decision to shut down all but two of its nuclear reactors in the wake of the nuclear accident at Fukushima Daiichi last year played in to Germany's decision to phase out nuclear by 2022, but has apparently not slowed plans in other parts of Asia. Nuclear energy will see the sharpest expansion in China, India, and South Korea, the agencies said in a release, as well as in Russia.

Gary Dyck, head of nuclear fuel cycle and materials at the International Atomic Energy Agency, told Reuters that the long-term impact of Fukushima on global nuclear energy production was a "speed bump... We still expect huge growth in China."

Capacity in East Asia will jump by 125 percent to 185 percent, according to the report.

Though China suspended new nuclear projects in the wake of Fukushima, it now appears that China will react to the incident by turning to newer, domestically produced nuclear reactors, Harvard research scholar Yun Zhou wrote last month.

"It appears that the Fukushima disaster may lead China to adopt newer, third-generation (or Gen III) reactor designs created by Chinese firms, allowing China to wean itself from purely foreign reactor technology much more quickly than was expected pre-Fukushima," she wrote. "In fact, a race to develop indigenous Gen III technology is emerging, with all three major nuclear power companies in China announcing their own Gen III reactor designs."

China's 22 Generation II reactors currently under construction will not go under any major redesigns, but its additional 14 planned reactors are much more likely to be advanced models.

Meanwhile, nuclear advocates are making a push in the US for Generation IV reactors, many of which are viewed as safer and cheaper than large-scale Generation II light water reactors currently in use.

#### Gas is inherently volatile – increasing supply only exacerbates the problem

Lovins and Creyts 12

Amory B. Lovins, co-founder, Rocky Mountain Institute and Chief Scientist and Jon Creyts, Program Director, 9/6/12, “Hot Air About Cheap Natural Gas,” http://blog.rmi.org/blog\_hot\_air\_about\_cheap\_natural\_gas

A leading promoter of shale-gas fracking, asked about this at a recent financial conference, replied, “Trust me!” Gas, he claimed, would remain very cheap for a very long time. So how much gas would he contract to sell for a constant $2–3 per thousand cubic feet for 20–30 years, backed by solid assets unlinked to hydrocarbon prices? Probably none. Actually, you can buy gas today for delivery at least a decade hence. Sure enough, it costs 2–3 times more, or about $6. So why doesn’t a fracking promoter lock in huge profits by shorting gas futures? Because shale gas (unless sweetened by valuable liquid byproducts) has lately sold at below its cash production cost. The reasons include frenetic drilling (driven by use-it-or-lose-it leases and the need to book big reserves to raise cash), pricey oil spurring plays in oily shales, and filled storage due to a mild winter. Those low 2012 natural gas prices will probably prove as transient as the even lower real prices of 1995–2000. The gas industry’s inherent short-term price volatility is due to weather, storage, trade, and other factors. The April 2012 low gas price rose 31% by the end of May and doubled for delivery two years hence. Uncertainties increase further out because economies are complex and unpredic-table. The fracking revolution didn’t repeal basic economics: to get $6¬–8 gas, just assume $3–4 gas, use it accordingly, and watch supply and demand reequilibrate at higher prices. In fact, traders’ confounded attempts to forecast supply and demand dynamics for natural gas have helped accentuate this volatility. The track record of official price forecasts is abysmal (see Figure), and private forecasts weren’t much better. Three times in the past 15 years, huge investments—such as $100-odd billion worth of mistimed combined-cycle gas turbine generators bought in the late ’90s—were painfully stranded or misdirected when gas price forecasts shifted abruptly. Predicting gas supply and demand is unlikely to get much easier. Abundant domestic gas could paradoxically exacerbate price volatility. One reason is trade. Unlike oil, bulk gas has been delivered almost entirely by regional pipelines, de-linking prices between the major markets in Asia, Europe, and the U.S. But huge new export facilities will abruptly send liquefied gas toward the best price, rippling supply adjustments across the global network. U.S. gas, for example, may veer to Japan, where gas fetches $16 because it’s still (for now) contractually linked to oil prices. Exporters would get a windfall; other Americans would pay higher gas prices. Since major shale gas reserves are not just in North America but also such places as China, Argentina, Mexico, Australia, and South Africa, easier global capital markets or faster national gas development could speed gas globalization, with all its benefits and travails.

## Proliferation

#### Statistics go aff

Hellman ’09 Martin E. Hellman, Ph.D., Professor Emeritus (Electrical Engineering) at Stanford University, 9-7-2009. [How Confident Should a Nuclear Optimist Be?, http://nuclearrisk.org/email23.php]

In a five-page essay in the September 7 issue of Newsweek, Jonathan Tepperman explains Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb by quoting the dean of nuclear optimism, Prof. Kenneth Waltz: "We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. It's striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among nuclear states." Tepperman calls for "coldblooded calculations about just how dangerous possessing them [nuclear weapons] actually is." This response rises to that challenge and shows that **the data used to justify nuclear optimism is highly misleading**. In the same way that life-insurance companies utilize statistical analysis to produce cold blooded projections of fatality rates for individuals, **statistics tells us that, to be 95% confident of our statements, we cannot project the last 64 years of nuclear non-use more than 21 years into the future**. And, **with the fate of the earth at stake, a higher confidence level would seem appropriate. To be 99% confident about our statements, nuclear optimism can only be justified for another 14 years**. Statistics does not rule out that we might survive significantly longer than these time horizons, but it does say that **the data thus far cannot be used to justify such hopes with any degree of confidence**. To understand why we can only be confident of surviving time horizons significantly shorter than the 64 years of non-use already experienced, it helps to consider related "space shuttle optimism" arguments that led to the loss of Challenger and her crew. The engineers who had designed the shuttle's booster engine tried to delay Challenger's final launch because the weather that morning was unusually cold, and previous cold weather launches had a higher incidence of partial "burn through" on O-rings designed to seal the booster. But those at NASA responsible for the launch decision suffered from the common misperception that the shuttle's prior 23 successful launches provided ample evidence that it was safe to proceed with launch number 24. Instead, as we now know, that launch suffered catastrophic burn through of the O-rings, with resultant loss of the shuttle and her entire crew. NASA's optimistic reasoning was literally dead wrong. Even 23 perfect launches would not have provided sufficient evidence to confidently predict success for launch number 24, and previous near misses, in the form of partial O-ring burn through, made optimism even more outrageous and unsupportable. **The unassailable, cold blooded conclusion provided by statistics** and Challenger's deadly lesson **is that 64 years of nuclear non-use, particularly with near misses such as the Cuban missile crisis, is no cause for nuclear optimism.**

## POLITICS

#### Politics – Sequestration

#### Sequestration

#### Congress won’t be able to navigate the physical cliff – not enough time in the schedule

Pottorff 9-18

Rich Pottorff, Doane chief economist & Washington analyst September 18, 2012 D.C. Watch: Congress back in session, but don’t expect much http://www.cattlenetwork.com/cattle-news/DC-Watch-Congress-back-in-session-but-dont-expect-much-170083736.html?ref=736

Congress is back in session, but few people expect much to get done before the body adjourns again until after the election. Congress needs to pass another “continuing resolution” to keep the government running beyond the Sept. 30 end of the fiscal year. Legislation concerning the Bush-era tax cuts, the automatic spending cuts that kick in January 1st, raising the debt ceiling and other critical issues will probably be put off until the lame-duck session after the election. Right now, Congress is planning on a lame-duck session that lasts for just 16 legislative days. Some politicians, including House Speaker John Boehner, say they are not sure Congress will be able to take action on these measures and the U.S. economy could go over what is being called a “fiscal cliff.”

#### Fight over coal now – destroying Obama

Geman 12

Ben Geman - 09/17/12

The week ahead: Coal, climate at center of House battle http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/249761-the-week-ahead-coal-climate-at-center-of-house-battle?tmpl=component&print=1&page=

The House is slated to vote this week on the latest GOP bill to thwart White House environmental policies that Republicans call economically burdensome. The “stop the war on coal” package provides Republicans a final chance before November’s election to use the House floor as a platform to slam President Obama’s green agenda. House Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-Va.) said Friday that this week will be the last Capitol Hill work session before the voters go to the polls. The GOP bill combines a number of measures that have already passed the House to curtail policies that Republicans contend will thwart coal-mining and coal-fired power generation. It would nix the Environmental Protection Agency’s power to regulate greenhouse gas emissions and take aim at other air pollution rules; restrict planned EPA rules governing management and disposal of coal ash, a waste product from coal plants; and restrict potential Interior Department rules on coal-mining wastes; among other provisions. Many Democrats and environmentalists say Republicans are seeking to prevent or roll back vital public health protections. They argue that headwinds facing the coal industry stem from low costs and large supplies of natural gas, not federal regulation. A vote is expected Friday, September 21, according to a House GOP leadership aide.

#### Congress will pass only the CR and then promptly leave town

Mascaro 12

Lisa Mascaro September 17, 2012 Congress finishes up truncated schedule to campaign full-time http://www.latimes.com/news/politics/la-pn-congress-campaigning-full-time-20120917,0,5190051,print.story

Congress will meet for only a few final days this week to enable lawmakers to campaign full-time in the battle for control of Congress, leaving much business undone until after the election. The House convenes for three days to wrap up its work, while the Senate, where Democrats have the majority, is considering a similar truncated schedule. Lawmakers had initially been scheduled to work through the first week of October. The one must-pass piece of legislation – a bill to keep the government funded once the new fiscal year begins, Oct.1 -- is set for final approval this week in the Senate after having already cleared the House. Gone, at least for now, are the days when congressional Republicans threatened to shut down the federal government as leverage to extract steep budget cuts in negotiations with President Obama. With the Nov. 6 election looming, lawmakers appear poised to simply keep the government running to avoid a high-stakes show down. The stop-gap measure would fund the government through March 27. INTERACTIVE: Battleground states map The remainder of the congressional agenda in the House and Senate is made up largely of politically themed measures to showcase partisan positions on jobs, the economy and other issues, rather than legislation that is likely to become law.

#### SMR popular – bipartisan, backed by officials, DOE, academia

The Energy Daily 11 (Jeff Beattie)

(Issue 138 Publication year 2011 Publication date Jul 21, 2011. Proquest)

The proposal--and SMRs in general--have comparatively broad support in Congress, including from many Democrats. Among others, Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.), chairman of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, has introduced legislation designed to supports SMR development.

The GOP-controlled House last week approved $67 million for the federal government's contribution to the first year of the SMR cost-share program as part of DOE's fiscal 2012 spending bill. The Senate energy and water spending panel has not yet approved its version of the spending bill.

In recent years, smaller reactors have attracted considerable interest as a cheaper, more easily deployed alternative to the large reactors in use today.

Among other advantages, SMRs are designed to be built in factories and rail-shipped ready for deployment. Most are intended to run for long periods of time without refueling, creating "plug and play" options for military bases, remotely located industrial projects and smaller communities that lack the money or expertise to operate traditional reactors. And several SMRs are designed to be built underground to reduce safety and security concerns.

Among the companies developing SMRs are Babcock & Wilcox (B&W), Westinghouse, Holtec Inc, NuScale Power and Hyperion Power Generation.

Officials with B&W, Westinghouse and NuScale all strongly backed SMRs at the July 14 hearing of the Senate energy and water appropriations panel, as did officials from DOE and academia.

#### No link – just remove licensing restrictions- don’t spend money

#### PC doesn’t spillover

Dickinson 9 [Matthew, professor of political science at Middlebury College. Sotomayor, Obama and Presidential Power May 26, 2009 Presidential Power http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/05/26/sotamayor-obama-and-presidential-power/]

What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power. Political scientists, like baseball writers evaluating hitters, have devised numerous means of measuring a president’s influence in Congress. I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in brief, they often center on the creation of legislative “box scores” designed to measure how many times a president’s preferred piece of legislation, or nominee to the executive branch or the courts, is approved by Congress. That is, how many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually pass Congress? How often do members of Congress vote with the president’s preferences? How often is a president’s policy position supported by roll call outcomes? These measures, however, are a misleading gauge of presidential power – they are a better indicator of congressional power. This is because how members of Congress vote on a nominee or legislative item is rarely influenced by anything a president does. Although journalists (and political scientists) often focus on the legislative “endgame” to gauge presidential influence – will the President swing enough votes to get his preferred legislation enacted? – **this mistakes an outcome with actual evidence of presidential influence**. Once we control for other factors – a member of Congress’ ideological and partisan leanings, the political leanings of her constituency, whether she’s up for reelection or not – we can usually predict how she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the president wants. (I am ignoring the importance of a president’s veto power for the moment.) Despite the much publicized and celebrated instances of presidential arm-twisting during the legislative endgame, then, most **legislative outcomes don’t depend on presidential lobbying**. But this is not to say that presidents lack influence. Instead, the primary means by which presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives from which Congress must choose. That is, presidential power is largely an exercise in agenda-setting – not arm-twisting. And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination. Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation hearings calling every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his Xbox. That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have almost nothing to do with Obama’s lobbying from here on in (or lack thereof). His real influence has already occurred, in the decision to present Sotomayor as his nominee.

#### Winners win – congress and the press will have no choice but to fall in line

Green 10

David Michael Green teaches politics at Hofstra September 18th, 2010 “Do-Nothing 44th President” A Mass Magazine http://www.amassmagazine.com/?tag=david-michael-green

Moreover, there is a continuously evolving and reciprocal relationship between presidential boldness and achievement. In the same way that nothing breeds success like success, nothing sets the president up for achieving his or her next goal better than succeeding dramatically on the last go around. This is absolutely a matter of perception, and you can see it best in the way that Congress and especially the Washington press corps fawn over bold and intimidating presidents l

ike Reagan and George W. Bush. The political teams surrounding these presidents understood the psychology of power all too well. They knew that by simultaneously creating a steamroller effect and feigning a clubby atmosphere for Congress and the press, they could leave such hapless hangers-on with only one remaining way to pretend to preserve their dignities. By jumping on board the freight train, they could be given the illusion of being next to power, of being part of the winning team. And so, with virtually the sole exception of the now retired Helen Thomas, this is precisely what they did.

#### No impact to cuts.

Gillespie 8/21 [Nick, Editor-in-Chief – Reason, If This is What Sequestration Looks Like, No Wonder We Are Already Broke: Defense Spending Edition Aug. 21, 2012 4:13 pm, http://reason.com/blog/2012/08/21/if-this-is-what-sequestration-looks-like]

\*\*\* Veronique de Rugy is a senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University.

Total defense spending, including war funding, crested in 2010, which is what you'd expect from a country winding down a long war in Iraq and futzing around in Afghanistan. What's really in play is that red area above, but even under the worst-case outcome - Budget Control Caps and full sequestration - what you see is minor blip down before the relentless march upwards and onwards toward greater and greater military spending, regardless of need or threat. As de Rugy writes: One important factor in weighing the effect of sequestration is the preemptive measures that policymakers are taking to limit sequestration’s effect on non-war accounts. While sequestration applies to both the base and OCO [war funding] budgets, policymakers can add funds to OCO to make up for losses affecting the base. This is possible because OCO funding is not restricted by the BCA caps. As the chart shows, defense spending has almost doubled in the past decade in current dollar terms and will continue to grow in spite of automatic cuts set by the BCA. Clarifying these figures reveals that sequester cuts do not warrant the fears of policymakers who warn about “savage cuts” to the defense budget. Read the whole piece here. Elsewhere, de Rugy noted that the difference between defenese sequestration and no defense sequestration is the difference between a projected 16 percent increase and a 23 percent increase in funds over the next decade. Put simply, if the U.S. military cannot defend the country for the year or so that sequestration might trim its fat momentarily, we've already lost whatever the hell we're fighting to protect.

#### 1NC Fiscal Cliff

Intervening actors solve.

Sivy 12 [Michael Sivy is a Chartered Financial Analyst and a former securities analyst for an independent stock research firm. He was an investment columnist at Money for more than 23 years as well as a guest columnist for TIME's international edition. Is the U.S. Headed for a Double-Dip Recession?, 8/28, 12 Read more: http://moneyland.time.com/author/michaelsivy/#ixzz25FQyns17

The fiscal cliff. Under current law, a variety of tax increases and spending cuts are scheduled to go into effect next year, with serious consequences. On the plus side, these measures would cut the deficit by more than $500 billion. The Federal debt, as a percentage of GDP, would slowly begin to shrink. All that deficit reduction, however, would come at the price of a likely reduction in the economy’s output of more than two percentage points, resulting in a mild-to-moderate recession. That’s just one of the reasons why these policies aren’t likely to go into effect as they stand. A gridlocked Congress and a closely-contested Presidential election make any sort of legislative action unlikely before November. But neither party wants to allow tax cuts to expire for the middle-class or to see more people get hit with the alternative minimum tax. And while the parties disagree on reductions in defense spending and Medicare payments to doctors, the cuts currently scheduled are so large that they will probably be modified or delayed. Historically, Congress has been very good at avoiding big middle-class tax increases and sudden, disruptive spending cuts. While the fiscal cliff may not be eliminated entirely, odds are it will be greatly reduced – even if only at the last possible moment.

## Kritik

#### 1 - We aren’t saying they’re crazy or incompetent, we just say nuclear weapons are bad. We do not endorse existing nuclear weapons – our escalation scenarios are an indictment of them.

#### Attempt to prevent violent proliferation creates cooperative nonconflictual – not the racism you assume

Walker 7 (William Walker is Professor of International Relations at the University of St Andrews which he joined in 1996.)

(“International nuclear order: a rejoinder” International Affairs. 27 JUL 2007)

Roberts ends his article with a brief section headed ‘An auspicious moment for¶ order?’, his conclusion being that this is not such a moment. It is hard to disagree¶ when confronted with mayhem in the Middle East, Iran’s stubborn defi ance of the¶ UN Security Council, the open-ended Indian and Pakistani weapon programmes,¶ the fl exing of Russian muscles, the loss of US authority, and much else besides.¶ No doubt there are more nasty surprises in store (competition for control over¶ Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities after the current military government’s downfall is¶ becoming a favourite among doomsters). Yet I wonder whether this degree of¶ despondency, which has become commonplace and risks becoming a self-fulfi lling¶ prophecy, will turn out to be justifi ed, especially if leading states and policy entrepreneurs¶ now summon the eff ort to arrest the slide, with the 2010 NPT Review¶ Conference providing an obvious occasion on which to recommit states to the¶ Treaty and associated norms, rules and instruments. Ned Lebow has correctly¶ observed that ‘social orders at every level undergo cycles of consolidation and¶ decline’.18 Might the international nuclear order be heading, after the decline that¶ followed its early post-Cold War consolidation, towards renewed consolidation?¶ Here are six reasons why, hoping against hope, this might occur.¶ First, a chastened United States has embarked on a reconsideration of its international¶ strategies which, if not returning it precisely to the status quo ante, is likely¶ to draw it back towards cooperative actions and innovations, and towards a more¶ respectful attitude towards international norms, laws and institutions, especially¶ after a new President has assumed offi ce in January 2009.

Second, there has recently been more convergence than divergence of objectives¶ and policies among the concerts of power that have formed to manage relations¶ with Iran and North Korea, and among the wide community of states lending¶ support within the IAEA and United Nations.¶ Third, the IAEA has shown remarkable resilience over the past decade, gaining¶ rather than losing international prestige despite many setbacks and a serious shortage¶ of manpower and fi nancial resources. Furthermore, there have been signifi cant¶ advances in the techniques of detection and verifi cation—technical change can¶ be helpful as well as unhelpful—upon which a stronger system of regulation and¶ early warning can now be constructed.¶ Fourth, the need to expand civil nuclear trade and investment in response to¶ global warming is driving a search for means of cooperative governance that will¶ allay fears of weapon proliferation. Although there are drawbacks with Henry¶ Sokolski’s proposals in the special issue, they provide an illustration of the search¶ that is under way.19

Fifth, Hassner rightly emphasizes the hierarchical nature of the NPT, and the¶ problems that are likely to arise when the hierarchy of power that has pertained¶ over most of the Treaty’s lifetime, and is embedded in the Treaty’s identifi cation of¶ specifi c states having rights to call themselves NWS, gives way to another hierarchy¶ of power in coming decades. Power transition theory warns of the confl icts and arms¶ races that can arise when emerging powers, such as China and India in years ahead,¶ challenge established great powers.20 Rising powers in Asia and elsewhere will also¶ wish to play a larger part in the shaping of international norms and institutions.¶ However, the behaviour of China and India could turn out to be more constructive¶ than destructive of nuclear order: China is committed to strategic caution by its¶ pre-eminent interest in economic stability and in avoiding Japan’s nuclearization;¶ and India may (only may) become a constructive force if a mutually satisfying¶ rapprochement with the United States and with the non-proliferation regime can be¶ negotiated. Furthermore, the US development of missile defence might ameliorate¶ rather then aggravate great power relations if it were used as a bargaining stick to¶ negotiate deeper arms reductions, if missile defences were limited to the provision¶ of common protection against proliferating states, and if China and Russia could¶ be given convincing guarantees that missile defences and associated technologies¶ would not be deployed to gain strategic advantage over them. Ideally, the regulation¶ of missile defence should become part of a wider agreement on limiting the¶ militarization of space, including bans on the targeting of satellites.¶ Finally, there has developed a strong common interest among states in¶ preventing terrorist groups, insurgents or their criminal suppliers from gaining¶ access to nuclear materials and technologies. In retrospect, I gave too little attention¶ to the risks that nuclear weapons could, in some form, begin to play a part in¶ irregular warfare, as did other contributors to the special issue. States’ responses to¶ those risks also merited more dicussion The desire to minimize them has tended¶ to unify more than divide states, notwithstanding their many disputes, and will¶ probably continue to do so. Paul Schulte’s remark about the contemporary need, in¶ addition to the systems of deterrence and abstinence, for a ‘system of policing’ has¶ given me particular pause for thought.21

#### Alternative can’t fulfill it’s potential – the plan’s coherent policy response is necessary to avert catastrophe.

Jeroen Gunning, Lecturer in International Politics @ Univ. of Wales, ‘7 [*Government and Opposition* 42.3, “A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies?” p. Blackwell-synergy]

The notion of emancipation also crystallizes the need for policy engagement. For, unless a ‘critical’ field seeks to be policy relevant, which, as Cox rightly observes, means **combining** ‘critical’ and ‘problem-solving’ approaches, it does not fulfil its ‘emancipatory’ potential.94 One of the temptations of ‘critical’ approaches is to **remain** mired in critique and deconstruction without moving beyond this to reconstruction and **policy** relevance.Vital as such critiques are, the challenge of a critically constituted field is also to engage with policy makers – and ‘terrorists’ – and work towards the realization of new paradigms, new practices, and a transformation, however modestly, of **political structures**. That, after all, is the original meaning of the notion of ‘immanent critique’ that has historically underpinned the ‘critical’ project and which, in Booth's words, involves ‘the discovery of the latent potentials in situations on which to build political and social progress’, as opposed to putting forward utopian arguments that are not realizable. Or, as Booth wryly observes, ‘this means building with one's feet **firmly on the ground**, not **constructing castles** in the air’ and asking ‘what it means for real people in real places’.96 Rather than simply critiquing the status quo, or noting the problems that come from an un-problematized acceptance of the state, a ‘critical’ approach must, in my view, also concern itself with offering concrete a**lternative**s. Even while historicizing the state and oppositional violence, and challenging the state's role in reproducing oppositional violence, it must wrestle with the fact that ‘the concept of the modern state and sovereignty embodies a **coherent response** to many of the **central problems** of political life’, and in particular to ‘the place of violence in political life’. Even while ‘de-essentializing and deconstructing claims about security’, it must concern itself with ‘how security is to be redefined’, and in particular on what theoretical basis.97 Whether because those critical of the status quo are wary of becoming co-opted by the structures of power (and their emphasis on instrumental rationality),98 or because policy makers have, for obvious reasons (including the failure of many ‘critical’ scholars to offer policy relevant advice), a greater affinity with ‘traditional’ scholars, the role of ‘expert adviser’ is more often than not filled by ‘traditional’ scholars.99 The result is that policy makers **are insufficiently challenged to question** the basis of their policies and develop new policies based on immanent critiques. A notable exception is the readiness of European Union officials to enlist the services of both ‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ scholars to advise the EU on how better to understand processes of radicalization.100 But this would have been impossible if more critically oriented scholars such as Horgan and Silke had not been ready to cooperate with the EU. Striving to be policy relevant does not mean that one has to accept the validity of the term ‘terrorism’ or stop investigating the political interests behind it. Nor does it mean that each piece of research must have policy relevance or that one has to limit one's research to what is relevant for the state, since the ‘critical turn’ implies a move beyond state-centric perspectives. End-users could, and should, thus include both state and non-state actors such as the Foreign Office and the Muslim Council of Britain and Hizb ut-Tahrir; the Northern Ireland Office and the IRA and the Ulster Unionists; the Israeli government and Hamas and Fatah (as long as the overarching principle is to reduce the political use of terror, whoever the perpetrator). It does mean, though, that a critically constituted field must work hard to bring together all the fragmented voices from beyond the ‘terrorism field’, to maximize both the field's rigour and its policy relevance. Whether a critically constituted ‘terrorism studies’ will attract the fragmented voices from outside the field depends largely on how broadly the term ‘critical’ is defined. Those who assume ‘critical’ to mean ‘Critical Theory’ or ‘poststructuralist’ may not feel comfortable identifying with it if they do not themselves subscribe to such a narrowly defined ‘critical’ approach. Rather, to maximize its inclusiveness, I would follow Williams and Krause's approach to ‘critical security studies’, which they define simply as bringing together ‘many perspectives that have been considered outside of the mainstream of the discipline’.101 This means refraining from establishing new criteria of inclusion/exclusion beyond the (normative) expectation that scholars self-reflexively question their conceptual framework, the origins of this framework, their methodologies and dichotomies; and that they historicize both the state and ‘terrorism’, and consider the security and context of all, which implies among other things an attempt at empathy and cross-cultural understanding.102 Anything more normative would limit the ability of such a field to create a genuinely interdisciplinary, non-partisan and innovative framework, and exclude valuable insights borne of a broadly ‘critical’ approach, such as those from conflict resolution studies who, despite working within a ‘traditional’ framework, offer important insights by moving beyond a narrow military understanding of security to a broader understanding of human security and placing violence in its wider social context.103 Thus, a poststructuralist **has no greater claim** to be part of this ‘critical’ field than a realist who looks beyond the state at the interaction between the violent group and their wider social constituency.104

### 2AC More Security

#### Perm do both - Desecuritization fails in practice – strategic planning to prevent crisis escalation is the only way out of the security dilemma.

PH Liotta, Pell Center for IR & Public Policy, ‘5 [Security Dialogue 36.1, “Through the Looking Glass: Creeping Vulnerabilities and the Reordering of Security,” p. 65-6]

Although it seems attractive to focus on exclusionary concepts that insist on desecuritization, privileged referent objects, and the ‘belief’ that threats and vulnerabilities are little more than social constructions (Grayson, 2003), all these concepts work in theory **but fail in practice**. While it may be true that national security paradigms can, and likely will, continue to dominate issues that involve human security vulnerabilities – and even in some instances mistakenly confuse ‘vulnerabilities’ as ‘threats’ – there are distinct linkages between these security concepts and applications. With regard to environ- mental security, for example, Myers (1986: 251) recognized these linkages nearly two decades ago: National security is not just about fighting forces and weaponry. It relates to water-sheds, croplands, forests, genetic resources, climate and other factors that rarely figure in the minds of military experts and political leaders, but increasingly deserve, in their collectivity, to rank alongside military approaches as crucial in a nation’s security. Ultimately, we are far from what O’Hanlon & Singer (2004) term a global intervention capability on behalf of ‘humanitarian transformation’. Granted, we now have the threat of mass casualty terrorism anytime, anywhere – and states and regions are responding differently to this challenge. Yet, the global community today also faces many of the same problems of the 1990s: civil wars, faltering states, humanitarian crises. We are nowhere closer to addressing how best to solve these challenges, even as they affect issues of environmental, human, national (and even ‘embedded’) security. Recently, there have been a number of voices that have spoken out on what the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has termed the ‘responsibility to protect’:10 the responsibility of some agency or state (whether it be a superpower such as the United States or an institution such as the United Nations) to enforce the principle of security that sovereign states owe to their citizens. Yet, the creation of a sense of urgency to act – even on some issues that may not have some impact for years or even decades to come– is perhaps **the only appropriate first response**. The real cost of not investing in the right way and early enough in the places where trends and effects are accelerating in the wrong direction is likely to be **decades** and decades of economic and political frustration – and, potentially, **military engagement.**  Rather than justifying intervention (especially military), **we ought to be justifying investment.** Simply addressing the immensities of these challenges is not enough. Radical improvements in public infrastructure and support for better governance, particularly in states and municipalities (especially along the Lagos–Cairo–Karachi–Jakarta arc), will both improve security and create the conditions for shrinking the gap between expectations and opportunity. A real debate ought to be taking place today. Rather than dismissing ‘alternative’ security foci outright, a larger examination of **what forms of security are** **relevant** and right among communities, states, and regions, and which even might apply to a global rule-set – as well as what types of security are not relevant – seems appropriate and necessary. If this occurs, a truly **remarkable tectonic shift might** take place in the conduct of international relations and human affairs. Perhaps, in the failure of states and the international community to respond to such approaches, what is needed is the equivalent of the 1972 Stockholm conference that launched the global environmental movement and estab- lished the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), designed to be the environmental conscience of the United Nations. Similarly, the UN Habitat II Conference in Istanbul in 1996 focused on the themes of finding adequate shelter for all and sustaining human development in an increas- ingly urbanized world. Whether or not these programs have the ability to influence the future’s direction (or receive wide international support) is a matter of some debate. Yet, given that the most powerful states in the world are not currently focusing on these issues to a degree sufficient to produce viable implementation plans or development strategies, there may well need to be a ‘groundswell’ of bottom-up pressure, perhaps in the form of a global citizenry petition to push the elusive world community toward collective action. Recent history suggests that military intervention as the first line of response to human security conditions underscores a seriously flawed approach. Moreover, those who advocate that a state’s disconnectedness from globalization is inversely proportional to the likelihood of military (read: US) intervention fail to recognize unfolding realities (Barnett, 2003, 2004). Both middle-power and major-power states, as well as the international com- munity, must increasingly focus on long-term creeping vulnerabilities in order to avoid crisis responses to conditions of extreme vulnerability. Admittedly, some human security proponents have recently soured on the viability of the concept in the face of recent ‘either with us or against us’ power politics (Suhrke, 2004). At the same time, and in a bit more positive light, some have clearly recognized the sheer impossibility of international power politics continuing to feign indifference in the face of moral categories. As Burgess (2004: 278) notes, ‘for all its evils, one of the promises of globalization is the unmasking of the intertwined nature of ethics and politics in the complex landscape of social, economic, political and environmental security’. While it is still not feasible to establish a threshold definition for human security that neatly fits all concerns and arguments (as suggested by Owen, 2004: 383), it would be a tragic mistake to assume that national, human, and environmental security are mutually harmonious constructs rather than more often locked in conflictual and contested opposition with each other. Moreover, aspects of security resident in each concept are indeed themselves embedded with extraordinary contradictions. Human security, in particular, is not now, nor should likely ever be, the mirror image of national security. Yet, these contradictions are not the crucial recognition here. On the contrary, rather than focusing on the security issues themselves, we should be focusing on the best multi-dimensional approaches to **confronting and solving them**. One approach, which might avoid the **massive tidal** impact of creeping vulnerabilities, is to sharply make a rudder shift from constant crisis intervention toward **strategic planning**, strategic investment, **and strategic attention.** Clearly, the time is now to **reorder our** entire **approach** to how we address – or fail to address – security.

## Russia DA

Russia Cards

#### WTO accession solves Russian economy.

Aslund 10 [Anders, Peterson Institute for International Economics10 Reasons Why the Russian Economy Will Recover Op-ed in the Moscow Times November 25, 2010 http://www.piie.com/publications/opeds/oped.cfm?ResearchID=1712]

Russia is finally about to accede to the World Trade Organization (WTO) within a year, which would be a **game changer**. The best available studies predict **enormous gains** for the country. Economists Jesper Jensen, Thomas Rutherford, and David Tarr estimate in a World Bank study that Russia should gain about 3.3 percent of GDP annually in the medium term and 11 percent of GDP in the long term. The gains would mainly come from increased foreign direct investment and services. International integration and convergence will **drive the country's growth for a couple of decades.**

No scenario for military conflict between the US and Russia, regardless of how hostile tensions become.

Nichols 9 [Thomas M., Research Fellow, International Security Program and Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School, June 2009. [International Security Program Policy Memo, “Improving Russia-US Relations: The Next Steps, p. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19135/improving\_russiaus\_relations.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2F19579%2Fpresident\_obamas\_nuclear\_resolution]

1. There is neither an obvious source of military conflict with the Russian Federation nor is there likely to be, **no matter how much** unseemly snarling Moscow and Washington may trade in the short term. Moscow is not going to give Hugo Chavez a nuclear weapon, and NATO is not going start bombing the Russian-Georgian border. Elaborate scenarios for a Russia-NATO conflict—such as the Russian military exercise a decade ago which ended with simulated nuclear strikes against NATO—are **nonsense**, and even the strategists who design them probably know it.

No Russia war – mutual interests.

The Guardian 7 [The Guardian (London), Simon Jenkins, 7/18/7, “A new cold war? Nonsense,” L/N]

The trouble is that the current mess in Anglo-Russian relations has absolutely nothing to do with the cold war. That was a titanic ideological struggle, a battle of utopias between forces armed with unprecedented destructive power. The iwari was constrained by the horror of that power until it was finally resolved by economic attrition. It was the greatest military gamble ever taken by mankind. It was terrifying and it is over, and any comparison with present conflicts is puerile. Today's dispute is more a 19th- century trial of strength over resources and national pride. It has nothing like the cataclysmic potential of the cold war, but it is still dangerous because both sides are unpredictably led. The myriad tripwires and monolithic spheres of influence are no longer in place. Russia under Vladimir Putin is defeated, jumpy and thinks itself vulnerable. The US under George Bush thinks itself vulnerable, is jumpy and is about to be defeated. In such circumstances mutual trust is hard to find, but finding it is a burden that must lie most on the more powerful player, and that is the west. This week's diplomatic expulsions were necessary but petty. Russia is never going to extradite the man suspected of the London killing of Alexander Litvinenko, any more than Britain is going to extradite emigres such as Boris Berezovsky, despite accusations of a flagrant breach of his asylum terms not to promote rebellion back home. No, they are not the same, but in diplomacy nothing is. Russia is never going to approve the west's client statelet of Kosovo, any more than the west is going to curb its criticism of Russian repression in Chechnya. Russia will not lay aside oil and gas as weapons to terrorise former colonies on its western border, any more than the west is going to stop attacking Putin for suppressing free speech. In other words, welcome back to old-fashioned diplomacy, to jabbing and feinting, threatening and bluffing, testing interest against influence. Gone are the platitudes of Tony Blair's crusader interventionism, iwhere in the end values and interests merge i. That confused idealism led straight to the blood-soaked streets of Baghdad and the killing fields of Helmand. In its place comes Lord Salisbury's diplomacy, as iwise concession one moment, far-sighted persistence another, sleepless tact, immovable calmness and patience that no folly, no provocation, no blunders can shake i. Above all, back comes the maxim, know your enemy, in this case understand Russia. Putin's revival of the oldest paranoia in his nation's history, of continental encirclement, was bound to follow defeat in the cold war. The US's breach of understandings reached in the 1990s between Russia and an enlarged Nato by proposing to locate military installations in Poland and the Czech Republic was as provocative and militarily useless as could be imagined. Russia's iretargetingi of its missiles and withdrawal from the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty were comparatively mild responses. It is not surprising that Putin should also counter with his energy weapon. Hence his pipeline deal with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and Gazprom's partnership with France and Italy rather than the US or Britain. Putin regards London, with some justice, as like pre-Castro Havana, an open city awash in the laundered loot of Yeltsin's privatisations, draining the new Russia of investment and talent and giving refuge to people he sees as tax-dodgers and thieves. This he will have to lump, and perhaps make Moscow a less vulgar and dangerous place in which young Russians can make an honest rouble. But when someone in his apparat orders the killing of an emigre in a London restaurant, the British government cannot just ignore it. Such low-key tit-for-tat “bad relations” can presumably continue indefinitely, since it is hard to see how they might degenerate to military confrontation. Besides, there will soon be new rulers in Moscow and Washington oas there is a new and enigmatic one in London. A surface hostility can be stable, if that is what the pride and prejudice of the parties require for their internal political status. Or it can be superseded by a realisation of some shared purpose. Russia and the western powers have an agenda of shared interests whose importance towers over these spats. It includes the containment of a nuclear Iran, impossible by any plausible military means. This is achievable only by joint east-west diplomacy, which bad relations are impeding. The agenda includes the sensible routing of the new oil and gas pipelines out of central Asia towards Europe and Africa. It is madness for this global resource to be aligned, at massive extra cost, so that Russia can control it. The agenda also includes the confronting of Islamist militancy now seeping north from Bush's legacy, the iarc of instabilityi from the Middle East to Pakistan, and potentially heading deep into the former Soviet Union. Russia may gloat over American and British discomfiture in the region but it has no interest in a war of Kurdish independence, or the fall of the Pakistan government, or a rash of secessionist uprisings in the Caucasus. When America and Britain finally summon up the courage to withdraw troops from the region, both they and Russia, with 10 million resident Muslims, have a powerful interest in minimising the ensuing chaos.

#### Diversification solves.

Times (UK) 12/20/2007 “Looking to diversify from an oil economy”

One man who thinks so is Igor Vdovin, the flamboyant multimillionaire who chairs Russia’s National Agency for Direct Investment (Nadi). A leader in the field diversifying the country’s energy-focused economy, Vdovin may be better known inside Russia for his summer wedding to Anastasia Volochkova, a ballerina once allegedly fired from the Bolshoi Theatre after gaining too much weight. When not gracing the society pages or the Kremlin’s banquet halls, Vdovin is leading a multimillion-dollar venture to draw in foreign investment and spread the wealth beyond Moscow and St Petersburg. From the troubled Caucasus republics on Russia’s southern border to the inhospitable climes of the Far East, Nadi aims to provide the link between regional governments and interested investors to ease entry into Russia’s messy business environment. “We understand that, in spite of significant changes in the Russian economy, the development of business in Russia is often hampered by various issues – lack of financial transparency and accurate information, as well as the poor quality of local managers,” Vdovin says. While Russia has left the chaotic 1990s far behind, doing business is an exercise in jumping hurdles. Transparency International recently ranked the country 143rd out of 179 countries on its corruption perception ranking. Yet Vdovin remains optimistic. “Recent reforms have created favourable conditions for business development and attracting investment into the Russian economy,” he says. Indeed, Russia drew in double the amount of foreign investment this year, taking in $45 billion against $26 billion last year. That number was already double the amount of foreign investment in 2005. The numbers are starting to spread beyond the saturated markets of Moscow and St Petersburg. Southern regions such as Krasnodar, with their proximity to key ports and export markets, are becoming top destinations. The nearby port of Novorossisk, which handles the bulk of Russia’s shipping traffic, saw revenues soar by 76.5 per cent this year to $332 million after a heavily oversubscribed share float in London last month that raised about $1 billion. Western retail powerhouses such as Ikea and Auchan are opening shop in coming months, capitalising on a consumer boom that has begun to spread outside of Russia’s main cities. Nadi helped SABMiller and Mars to set up production centres in the southern Saratov region, and is hoping to cash in on projects aiming to boost Krasnodar’s ageing transport network.

## 2AC Water Wars

#### Global SMR solves water – impact is wars and millions of premature deaths

Palley 11 (Reese Palley - 1945-1949 The New School for Social Research¶ 1949-1952 The London School of Economics. Writer and historian)

(*The Answer: Why Only Inherently Safe, Mini Nuclear Power Plants Can Save Our World.* Pg. 168-171)

Desalinization and World Water Shortage

In 1990 Florida, Georgia, and Alabama began fighting over scarce water rights from increasingly scarce sources. After twenty years of fighting over the water from Lake Lanier, the sole source of most of the potable water for Atlanta, the city lost a federal court decision and now faces the daunting task of finding six hundred million gallons of potable water a day that just might not exist.

This is far from an isolated case in the United States, as states and municipalities are loading increas¬ing demands on limited supplies of water. The battle in the West has so far been contained within the courts.

The third world has long been rent in recent droughts, by the search for water. In subsistence economies, on marginal land water is not a convenience but a matter of life and death. As a result small wars have been fought, rivers diverted, and wells poisoned in what could be a warning of what is to come as industrialized nations begin to face failing water supplies.

Quite aside from ,the demand for potable water is the dependence of enormous swaths of industry and agriculture on oceans of water used for processing, ena¬bling, and cleaning a thousand processes and products. It is interesting to note that fresh water used in both industry and agriculture is reduced to a nonrenewable resource as agriculture adds salt and industry adds a chemical brew unsuitable for consumption.

More than one billion people in the world already lack access to clean water, and things are getting worse. Over the next two decades, the average supply of water ^per person will drop by a third, condemning millions of people to waterborne diseases and an avoidable prema¬ture death.81

So the stage is set for water access wars between the first and the third worlds, between neighbors down-stream of supply, between big industry and big agricul¬ture, between nations, between population centers, and ultimately between you and the people who live next door for an already inadequate world water supply that is not being renewed. As populations inevitably increase, conflicts will intensify.82

It is only by virtue of the historical accident of the availability of nuclear energy that humankind now has the ability to remove the salt and other pollutants to supply all our water needs. The problem is that desali¬nation is an intensely local process. Some localities have available sufficient water from renewable sources to take care of their own needs, but not enough to share with their neighbors, and-it is here that the scale of nuclear energy production must be defined locally.

Large scale 1,000 MWe plants can be used to desal¬inate water as well as for generating electricity. However we cannot build them fast enough to address the prob¬lem, and, if built they would face the extremely expen¬sive problem of-distributing the water they produce. Better, much better, would be to use small desaliniza-tion plants sited locally.

Beyond desalination for human use is the need to green some of the increasing desertification of vast areas such as the Sahara. Placing twenty 100 MWe plants a hundred miles apart along the Saharan coast would green the coastal area from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea, a task accomplished more cheaply and quickly than through the use of gigawatt plants.83 This could proceed on multiple tracks wherever deserts are avail¬able to be reclaimed.

Leonard Orenstein, a researcher in the field of desert reclamation, speculates:

If most of the Sahara and Australian outback were planted with fast-growing trees like eucalyptus, the forests could draw down about 8 billion tons of carbon a year—nearly as much as people emit from burning fossil fuels today. As the forests matured, they could continue taking up this much carbon for decades.84

The use of small, easily transported, easily sited, and walk away safe nuclear reactors dedicated to desali-nation is the only answer to the disproportionate distri¬bution of water resources that have distorted human habitation patterns for millennia. Where there existed natural water, such as from rivers, great cities arose and civilizations flourished. Other localities lay barren through the ages. We now have the power, by means of SMRs profiled to local conditions, not only to attend to existing water shortages but also to smooth out dispro¬portionate water distribution and create green habita¬tion where historically it has never existed.

The endless wars that have been fought, first over solid bullion gold and then over oily black gold, can now engulf us in the desperate reach for liquid blue gold. We need never fight these wars again as we now have the nuclear power to fulfill the biblical ability to "strike any local rock and have water gush forth."

#### Water wars go nuclear.

Weiner ’90(Jonathan, Prof at Princeton U, *The Next 100 Years*. p.270)

If we do not destroy ourselves with the A-bomb and the H-bomb, then we may destroy ourselves with the C-bomb, the Change Bomb. Andin a world as interlinked as ours, one explosion may lead to the other**.** Already in the Middle East, tram North Africa to the Persian Gulf and from the Nile to the Euphrates, tensions over dwindling water supplies and rising populations are reaching what many experts describe as a flashpoint A climate shift in that single battle-scarred nexus might trigger international tensions that will unleashsome at the 60.000 nuclear warheadsthe world has stockpiled since Trinity.