### Economy

#### SMR good – manufacturing and jobs

King et. al. 11 (Marcus D. King Associate Director of Research Associate Research Professor of International Affairs. R. LaVar Huntzinger, Center for Naval Analyses. Institute of Naval Studies. Nguyen – Research Staff at CAN)

(March 2011 “Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S. Military Installations” http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear%20Power%20on%20Military%20Installations%20D0023932%20A5.pdf)

Finally, a significant appeal of SMRs is their ability to be manufactured substantially within a factory environment using state-of-the-art fabrication and manufacturing. While other industries already use advanced modular construction techniques, including for the balance- of-plant systems in nuclear plants, they have not been applied to the modularization of the nuclear steam supply system. Development and demonstration efforts will be needed in order to adapt the most advanced technologies and processes to domestic nuclear plant fabrication and manufacture. This should yield significant improvements in product performance, quality, and economics. Such an effort can help support the revitalization of U.S. manufacturing, spurring domestic job creation and international leadership in key nuclear supply areas.

#### Stagnant growth leads to economic nationalism and global nuclear war.

Panzner 9 (Michael Panzner, Prof. at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, p. 136-138)

Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster. But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify.

Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange. Foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the cheap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending.

In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly.

The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation.

In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level.

Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point.

More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

### Elections

Waste disposal concerns

#### Obama supporting SMR now – 500 million

McNelis 11 (David N. McNelis is director of the Center for Sustainable Energy, Environment and Economic Development in the Institute for the Environment at UNC-Chapel Hill.)

(6/24/11 “Safer power from smaller reactors “ http://www.newsobserver.com/2011/06/24/1295895/safer-power-from-smaller-reactors.html)

President Barack Obama has allocated $500 million to be spent on research and development of SMRs over the next five years. Energy Secretary Steven Chu says he expects an SMR to be operating in this country by the end of this decade. In Congress, Republicans and Democrats alike support SMR development.

#### Romney will win – Obama’s convention bounce is subsiding, the GOP is energized and well-funded, and their polls are skewed towards dems

Talgo 9-16

Tyler Talgo |September 16, 2012 Why Romney Will Win The Election http://www.neontommy.com/news/2012/09/why-romney-will-win-election

In the beginning of this election season, Obama had two assets working in his favor: the incumbency advantage and the fundraising effort. With early predictions that the Obama campaign would top the $1 billion mark in fundraising for his reelection bid, many speculators assumed that Romney would clearly be outmatched. However, with less than two months away from the election, the Obama campaign, DNC and Obama-supported super-pac Priorities USA have raised just $587.7 million in total donations—signaling that Obama is running out of gas. His opponents, on the other hand, have been picking up momentum in recent months. Despite being outspent by $107.7 million, the Romney campaign, RNC and Romney-supported super-pac Restore our Future have raised $524.2 million and have almost $200 million in cash on hand—putting both camps at a dead heat on the fundraising front. It was also understood at the beginning of the election season that this race would come down to the independent vote. CNN reports that among independents, Romney leads Obama 52 to 42 percent, and Talking Points Memo reports that Romney has a 46.3 to 43.5 percent lead among independents. The majority of independents in this election have chosen Romney as their candidate because they see him as the one who is better suited to fix the economy: according to Rasmussen, 50 percent trust Romney more on the economy, as compared to the 43 percent that trust Obama more on the same issue. Given the post-convention polling bounces, some may give Obama the advantage at this stage of the race, although the bounces are subsiding. For example, new NBC/WSJ polls of three swing states have Obama leading Romney by 49 to 44 percent in Florida and Virginia, and by 50 to 43 percent in Ohio. However, when we take a closer look at the numbers, a different story is revealed. In the Florida and Virginia polls, Democrats were oversampled by 5 percent, and in Ohio they were oversampled by 10 percent. Not convinced? Here’s another fact: recent CBS/NYT/Quinnipiac polls oversampled Democrats by nine percent in Florida and by eight percent in Ohio. The Florida poll had Obama at 51 percent and Romney at 45 percent, and the Ohio poll had Obama at 50 percent and Romney at 44 percent; so, both leads were smaller than the oversampling gap. If you ask me, the advantage here clearly goes to Romney; and, believe me, these are not the only examples. All of this is revealed in the context of a time in which Republicans are much more enthusiastic than Democrats. Last month the number of Americans who consider themselves Republicans was the highest ever recorded since 2002 at 37.6 percent, compared to only 33.3 percent who consider themselves Democrats. So, assuming that all else is equal, what does it mean when a national poll says something like 47 percent for Obama and 44 percent for Romney, or vise versa? The nature of the missing 10 percent is one of the most important factors that come to play in all presidential reelection campaigns. Historically, the final results in an election are almost always worse than polling suggests for an incumbent president. If you took the undecided vote, according to Gallup, from every general election since 1964 that featured an incumbent president seeking reelection, 89 percent of it went to the president’s challenger. You can bet that the Obama camp understands that a 47-44 poll in its favor is not good news at all. This is why it’s virtually unheard-of for an incumbent president to win reelection when he's polling below 50 percent. Economic indicators that differ per swing state can also play a large role in predicting the outcome of the election. Kenneth Bickers and Michael Berry, two political scientists from the University of Colorado, developed a forecasting model that has successfully predicted every presidential election since 1980. Their model predicts Romney winning the Electoral College by a 320-218 margin and 52.9 percent of the popular vote. What can be drawn from their analysis is that the financial situation of voters will have the largest impact on their ballot. On Obama’s inauguration day, the unemployment rate was 7.8 percent, the average gas price was $1.83 per gallon, the national debt was $10.6 trillion and there were 32 million food stamp recipients. Today, the unemployment rate is 8.1 percent, the average gas price is $3.87 per gallon, the national debt is $16 trillion and the number of food stamp recipients hit a record 46.7 million in June (the latest available report). Americans are not dumb enough to reelect a president who has created more food stamp recipients than jobs. In summary, there are a number of conclusions that can be safely made about the outcome of this election. The fact of the matter is that if Romney is trailing Obama by a considerable amount in a state in which Obama has high polling averages, he does not have much room to compete. But, in states in which Obama is polling in the mid-forties without a significant lead, the undecided gap will most likely favor Romney. Obama will not win any of the swing states in which he has a RealClearPolitics polling average below 49 percent and within three points of Romney, or states in which he does not have more than a five point lead overall. This includes all the swing states except Nevada, Pennsylvania and Michigan. At the end of the day, this election will be a referendum on the president’s record, and whether or not voters are better off today than they were four years ago. Barack Obama may promise hope and change again for round two, but on election day the undecided gap will only remember his promises to cut the deficit in half and maintain the unemployment rate, and his now-infamous statement, “If you’ve got a business, you didn’t build that. Someone else made that happen.” In the words of Michael Moore, “I think people should start to practice the words ‘President Romney.’”

#### Neither candidate will run against SMRs or risk alienating their base

Cox 10 (Seth P. Cox, J.D. Candidate 2010 UCLA School of Law)

(“The Nuclear Option: Promotion of Advanced Nuclear Generation as a Matter of Policy” http://works.bepress.com/seth\_cox/3/)

Advanced nuclear is a relatively privileged issue in American politics, as both sides of the domestic political spectrum feature wider development of this technology as a central component of modern energy policy. A Baptist-bootlegger coalition of progressive energy policy advocates, national defense voters, entrepreneurs, businesspeople, climate change advocates, and clean air activists favor nuclear as, at least in part, the preferred alternative to meet current baseload generation needs. Progressives and environmentalists look to nuclear because it does not result in significant GHG or traditional CAA-regulated emissions. National defense voters and the business community value nuclear fuel as a “cost-effective alternative to fossil fuels that we can produce right here at home.” As stated by prominent Republican Whip, Senator John Kyl, “[f]or years republicans have sought to boost domestic energy supplies. We’ve supported safe and responsible development of our own resources.” Therefore, nuclear energy is relatively unique issue, because it is attractive to a broad swath of the American body politic. Recently, President Obama publically embraced nuclear energy and emerged as a leader of the charge. President Obama favors a pragmatic, inclusive policy to deliver America to a renewable energy economy. Moving from reliance upon conventional fuels necessitates flexibility, as “changing the ways we produce and use energy...demands of us a willingness to extend our hand across old divides, to act in good faith, to move beyond the broken politics of the past.” The President is pushing ahead with this agenda on many fronts, simultaneously citing development of new nuclear capacity as an engine of job growth, innovation, and increasingly efficient energy. President Obama contends America ignores nuclear at its own peril. Foregoing advanced nuclear threatens to competitively disadvantage innovation in the U.S. as, “the commitment of ... countries [currently constructing new reactors] is not just in generating the jobs in those plants, it’s generating demand for expertise and new technologies.” The President also considers pursuit of new nuclear capacity as an alternative to stalled climate legislation. The President is pushing to “build a new generation of safe, clean, nuclear power plants” as a part of package of a number of diverse alternatives, including, “continued investment in advanced biofuels and clean coal technology, even as we build greater capacity among renewables.” Nuclear is politically privileged, as both sides of the political spectrum, the legislative, and the executive branches of American governance favor promotion of nuclear as a matter of policy. The nuclear energy industry is emerging from the shadows reinvigorated, and gaining political traction. A variety of diverse interests spanning the political spectrum are advocating advanced nuclear. The industry appears primed for a comeback. Yet, promotion of nuclear energy as a matter of policy demands a more robust analysis. In the sections that follow, conditions favorable and adverse to a renewed nuclear sector are presented and analyzed, so as to secure and advance all advantageous conditions and circumstances, while identifying and surmounting significant obstacles to this objective.

#### Empirics prove – both candidates support nuclear expansion

Wood 12

Elisa Wood September 13, 2012 What Obama and Romney Don't Say About Energy http://energy.aol.com/2012/09/13/what-obama-and-romney-dont-say-about-energy/

Fossil fuels and renewable energy have become touchy topics in this election, with challenger Mitt Romney painting President Barack Obama as too hard on the first and too fanciful about the second – and Obama saying Romney is out of touch with energy's future. But two other significant resources, nuclear power and energy efficiency, are evoking scant debate. What gives? Nuclear energy supplies about 20 percent of US electricity, and just 18 months ago dominated the news because of Japan's Fukushima Daiichi disaster – yet neither candidate has said much about it so far on the campaign trail. Romney mentioned nuclear power only seven times in his recently released white paper, while he brought up oil 150 times. Even wind power did better with 10 mentions. He pushes for less regulatory obstruction of new nuclear plants, but says the same about other forms of energy. Obama's campaign website highlights the grants made by his administration to 70 universities for research into nuclear reactor design and safety. But while it is easy to find his ideas on wind, solar, coal, natural gas and oil, it takes a few more clicks to get to nuclear energy. The Nuclear Energy Institute declined to discuss the candidates' positions pre-election. However, NEI's summer newsletter said that both "Obama and Romney support the use of nuclear energy and the development of new reactors."

#### Alt causes to their econ link

Ambinder 12

Marc Ambinder is TheWeek.com's editor-at-large, and writes The Compass blog September 10, 2012 Decoding the next two months http://theweek.com/article/index/233046/decoding-the-next-two-months

The adjectives used to describe the economy post-convention are "anemic" and "persistent" — as in, persistent, anemic job growth. Obama needs to change these adjectives even though he can't change the underlying facts. Simply put, the facts favor Mitt Romney's core argument: that Obama's had four years to fix the economy, and he hasn't. How can Obama change the adjectives? Well, he can refine his argument. And he can hope that somehow, that new argument begins to gel. Given how well Bill Clinton did at the convention, I'm kind of surprised the Obama campaign isn't running ads right now featuring Clinton "arithmetic" sound bite. The problem, of course, is that economic anxiety is not a product of a couple of years of policy decisions. It's not even the result of the Great Recession of 2008. It's the combined result of 30 years of globalization, a widening wealth gap exacerbated by the collapse of the housing market, significantly rising health care costs, the enormous shift in the tax burden to the middle class — and so much more. It's sticky. It doesn't respond to economic conditions. Consumer confidence and the stock market may be more temporary measures of sentiment, but nothing (not even a sustained recovery), will alter the drivers of the American middle class' persistent economic pessimism.

#### The public is more likely to never hear about the plan than to freak out

Wood 12

Elisa Wood is a long-time energy writer whose free newsletter on energy efficiency is available at RealEnergyWriters.com August 8, 2012 What Voters Don't Know About Energy http://energy.aol.com/2012/08/08/what-voters-don-t-know-about-energy/#

Funny thing about Americans. We've got strong opinions about what's wrong with energy, especially when [gasoline prices rise](http://energy.aol.com/2012/02/23/alternatives-highlighted-as-oil-markets-lift-pump-prices/), but our passion tends to exceed our understanding. Polling indicates we hold strong sentiments about [energy independence](http://energy.aol.com/2012/07/10/beyond-energy-independence-us-could-become-exporter/) and renewables. Yet key details elude us. More than half of Americans cannot name one type of renewable energy and nearly 40 percent can't identify a fossil fuel, according to New York-based research organization [Public Agenda](http://energy.aol.com/tag/Public%2BAgenda/). Many wrongly think the US gets most of its oil from the Middle East, and few realize that it will be years before green energy makes up a large portion of our resource mix. Even when there is money on the table, we are often oblivious. An [Associated Press](http://energy.aol.com/tag/Associated%2BPress/)-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research poll found that less than 20 percent of Americans know important details about energy efficiency rebates, tax credits, and other incentives available to them. **Big, controversial energy news passes us by.** Half of the population is unaware of [TransCanada](http://energy.aol.com/tag/TransCanada/)'s Keystone XL project, according to a [Yale University](http://energy.aol.com/tag/Yale%2BUniversity/) and [George Mason University](http://energy.aol.com/tag/George%2BMason%2BUniversity/) study, despite the uproar over President Obama's decision to deny the project a presidential permit in January. What are we Talking About? Yet bring up global warming at a party and watch the opinions fly. (More than two-thirds of Americans say the US should make either a large-scale or medium-scale effort to reduce global warming, according to the Yale/George Mason study.) "We are having all of these big political debates over fossil fuels and a good portion of the population doesn't even know what they are talking about," said Jean Johnson, a senior fellow at Public Agenda and author of the book, "Who Turned Out the Lights?" It's not surprising really; voters are distracted and few have the time or interest to delve into energy complexities. The ailing economy looms as a larger preoccupation. "They have busy lives. They are not sitting over EIA [US Energy Information Administration] books looking at statistics," said Rayola Dougher, senior economic advisor for the American Petroleum Institute, which has a Vote4Energy media campaign underway.

#### Nobody will get anything done next year anyway

Cillizza 12

Chris Cillizza, AUGUST 01, “Think this Congress is bad? Just wait.” http://m.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/think-this-congress-is-bad-just-wait/2012/08/01/gJQAvdTKPX\_blog.html

Polarization in Congress is at record highs. Approval of Congress is at record lows.And yet, it’s a near certainty that whatever lows the 112th Congress has sunk to will be eclipsed (de-clipsed?) by the 113th Congress sworn in next January. Why? A confluence of factors ranging from the kind of people being elected to the circumstances that will greet them when they arrive in Washington. Here’s our look at the five major factors for why the 113th Congress is already on track to be worse than what we have just endured over the past two years.

1. Ideologues on the rise: Instead of Dick Lugar, a noted moderate deal-maker, Indiana is likely to send Richard Mourdock, a tea party aligned conservative to the Senate next year. Texas is subbing Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison, a conservative with a generally moderate approach, to politics for Ted Cruz, a conservative with a no-compromises attitude toward governance. Both Mourdock and Cruz identify much more strongly with the Sen. Jim DeMint (S.C.) approach to politics than the Sen. Mitch McConnell (Ky.) approach. That means an even greater push for ideological purity, a move sure to gum up the Senate works.

2. Moderates on the decline: Retirement has badly thinned the ranks of centrists in the Senate — particularly on the Democratic side. Democratic Sens. Kent Conrad (N.D.), Ben Nelson and Jim Webb (Va.) as well as Lugar and Sen. Olympia Snowe (R-Maine) are all leaving the world’s greatest deliberative body this fall. Of the “Gang of 14” a bipartisan group of Senators formed in 2005 to avert a destructive showdown over judicial confirmations, just seven will be in the Senate in 2013. And that number includes Arizona Sen. John McCain (R) who moved heavily rightward to win his primary in the 2010 election cycle.

3. No presidential mandate: In the aftermath of the 2008 election, President Obama had reason to argue that he had been given a mandate by the American people. (Three hundred sixty five electoral votes will do that.) Regardless of who you think will win on Nov. 6, the electoral vote count will almost certainly look more like 2004 (George W. Bush won with 286 electoral votes) than 2008. And that narrow margin means that neither President Obama nor former Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney will emerge from the election with any real sort of momentum that they can use to push their legislative agenda. It also means that the losing side will be less fearful of what not cooperating could to do them politically.

4. Narrower Congressional margins: Political handicappers seem to have settled on the idea that we are not headed to a(nother) wave House election in 2012. But most also agree that Democrats will cut into Republicans’ House majority this fall, meaning that GOP leaders will have less margin for error when it comes to passing their preferred legislation. (If you need evidence of how little gets done when the House is in­cred­ibly narrowly divided along partisan lines, check out the late 1990s and early 2000s.) On the Senate side, majority control is a toss up at the moment with Republicans insisting they can re-take the chamber and Democrats arguing equally forcefully that they can hold on. Under either scenario, however, neither side will enjoy a governing majority. If Democrats maintain control, it’s likely to be by a single vote — or by the presence of Vice President Joe Biden as the tie-breaker; if Republicans win the majority, it’s likely to be by a single seat (or two). Either way, gridlock will almost certainly be the order of the day.

5. The sequestration cloud: Before we even get to the 113th Congress, the lame-duck version of the 112th has to figure out how to keep the country from falling off a fiscal cliff. If no deal is reached — a real possibility given Congress’ inability to agree on much of anything over the past few years — sequestration, the fancy name for a package of deep cuts to defense and entitlement programs, would kick in. Sequestration, according to most economists, would have drastic consequences for the national and international economy — not to mention establishing a decidedly sour tone for the start of the 113th Congress. In short: If you think this Congress is bad, just wait. There’s plenty of reason to believe it’s going to worse before it gets better.

#### Pubic likes nuclear – years of polls prove

Raftery 11 (Colonel James J. Raftery Jr.)

(Performing actor: Kent H. Butts, Ph.D. Center for Strategic LeadershipUnited States Army EXAMINATION OF TERRESTRIAL NUCLEAR ENERGY’S RELEVANCE TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA553129)

For more than a decade, Gallup has been querying Americans to answer the following question: ―Overall do you strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose the use of nuclear energy as one of the ways to provide electricity for the U.S.?‖33 In each year, except 2001, favorable responses outnumbered opposing ones.34 In an article dated March 22, 2010, Gallup reported that: Support has edged up in the last two years, eclipsing 60% this year for the first time. In addition, 28% of Americans now say they "strongly favor" nuclear power, also the highest Gallup has measured since the question was first asked in 1994.35

#### The more conclusive their uniqueness argument is the less likely it is to be true

**SILVER 12**

NATE SILVER is an American statistician, sabermetrician, psephologist, and writer March 26, 2012, “Models Based on ‘Fundamentals’ Have Failed at Predicting Presidential Elections” http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/models-based-on-fundamentals-have-failed-at-predicting-presidential-elections/?pagewanted=print

The broader point is that we can get into trouble when we exaggerate how much we know about the future. Although election forecasting is a relatively obscure topic, you'll see the same mistakes in fields like finance and earthquake prediction in which the stakes are much higher. The book I've been working on is all about the mistakes made by forecasters and how to improve upon them. Examples like these of predictions failing badly in the real world are very common, and forecasts that seem too good to be true usually are. This year looks to be one of those complicated elections, and already the models are producing wildly diverging results -- everything from a Republican landslide to a lock-solid Obama win. Be careful when you see these forecasts; the most confident-sounding predictions are often the most likely to fail.

Russia will work towards stable relations no matter who is president

UPI 12

UPI Sept. 7, 2012 Russia: Will work with U.S. president http://www.upi.com/Top\_News/World-News/2012/09/07/Russia-Will-work-with-US-president/UPI-26591347019791/

The Russian president's spokesman said Friday he hopes there will be "no place for confrontational words and statements" after the U.S. presidential election. Russian leaders want their country's relationship with the United States to remain positive, no matter who wins the election, President Barack Obama or challenger Mitt Romney, Dmitry Peskov said. "I would like to hope there will be no place for confrontational words and statements," Peskov said. "American voters will decide who will win that race. For us, the key thing is to be confident that regardless of the result, [bilateral] relations will continue to develop and both sides will have the political will for dialogue, for the resolution of all disputable issues through political and diplomatic means," the spokesman for President Vladimir Putin said.

#### 2. Relations are resilient – Russia needs the west for development.

Andrew C. Kuchins 08, director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2-29, 08, The Russian”Election” http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080229\_cq\_russia\_election\_kuchins.pdf

That does not mean, however, that we are on the brink of a new Cold War era of confrontation with Russia. Russia’s primary goal for the next generation will be economic growth and modernization of the country. The needs there are immense. A Cold War–like military competition bankrupted the USSR, and no serious Russian politician wants to re-run that kind of exercise today. The Russian political elite also understand that to have any chance of meeting their ambitious economic goals, they will have to be more and not less integrated in the global economy and especially with Europe. Their real, not imaginary threats are currently radical Islam and terrorism to the south and longer-term concern about China’s development to the east: neither contingency will be effectively addressed by hostility toward the West, just the opposite. On the darker side, we should expect increasing Russian assertiveness often contrary to our interests in the countries on its western periphery including Ukraine, Georgia, and others.

#### Nuclear power reduces CO2 emissions – solves warming.

Barry W. Brook, Sir Hubert Wilkins Chair of Climate Change at the University of Adelaide, November 2011 (http://ceda.com.au/media/153125/nuclearfinal8nov.pdf)

The opportunity cost of not deploying nuclear power is higher carbon emissions. This is a reality that the Germans will quickly discover. Having decided to wind back the deployment of nuclear power, they are planning two-dozen new coalfired power stations.23 Some of the other regularly raised concerns about nuclear energy are that uranium supplies will run out, long-lived radioactive waste will be with us for 100,000 years, large amounts of carbon dioxide are produced over the nuclear cycle, it’s too slow and costly, and a build-up of nuclear power will increase the risk of weapons proliferation. Yet **the reality is surprisingly different, most of these disadvantages of nuclear power no longer apply, and none need do so in the future**. Worldwide, nuclear power is forecast to be an on-going contributor to electricity supply throughout the 21st century24 (although equally, it is not currently being deployed at a rate anywhere near sufficient to displace fossil fuels any time soon). Of the G20 economic forum nations, 15 have nuclear power and four are planning to take it up in the near future25, although now, as noted above, Germany has stated that it will attempt to phase out its use of nuclear fission by 2022. In 2010, nuclear energy was used to generate commercial electricity in 31 countries, providing 74 per cent of total supply in the case of France, and a global total of 2,628 terawatt hours.26 Based on standard emissions intensities for nuclear (20 kg CO2-e/MWh) and coal (930 kg CO2-e/MWh)27, this is an effective saving of 2.4 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide annually.

Only hydroelectricity displaces more fossil fuels than nuclear (3,250 TWh). By comparison, wind generation in 2010 was 14 per cent that of nuclear, while solar generated just 1.5 per cent as much.28 In 2009–10, Australia exported 7,555 tonnes of uranium, all of which was used to fuel nuclear power plants.29 If this electricity had instead been generated from brown coal-fired sources, an additional 370 million tonnes of CO2 would have been released.30 Clearly, foregoing nuclear means overlooking an already significant global contributor to low-carbon electricity

Bullshit – no capabilities.

Reuters 9/4 [Crispian Balmer, Analysis: Chastised Israel seeks way forward with U.S. over Iran, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/04/us-israel-iran-idUSBRE8830QO20120904]

Despite all the obvious activity, it is hard to shake off a sense of skepticism. Although Israel is believed to have the region's only nuclear arsenal, it lacks the sort of conventional firepower pundits believe is necessary to put a serious dent in Iran's far-flung, well-defended atomic installations. **"All this talk of war is bullshit.** If they could do it, then they would have already done it long ago," a senior European diplomat in Israel said.

No strikes.

Walt 8/15 [Stephen, IR – Harvard, Another reason the U.S. shouldn't go to war with Iran Posted By Stephen M. Walt Thursday, August 16, 2012 http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/08/16/why\_the\_us\_shouldn%27t\_go\_to\_war\_with\_iran]

And as Jodi Rudoren reveals in an important New York Times piece today, Israel's leaders understand that fact perfectly well. Based on interviews with a former national security advisor Uzi Dayan, she reports that PM Netanyahu and Defense Minister Barak "had not yet decided to attack Iran's nuclear facilities and could be dissuaded from a strike if President Obama approved stricter sanctions and publicly confirmed his willingness to use military force" (my emphasis). She continues: "Mr. Dayan's assessment seems to buttress the theory that the collective saber rattling is part of a campaign to pressure the Obama administration and the international community, rather than an indication of the imminence of an Israeli strike." In short, as I noted last week, the recurring talk of "closing windows," "red lines," "zones of immunity," and the like is a political ploy, designed to stifle diplomacy, strengthen sanctions, and gradually inch the United States closer and closer to a commitment to use force. The Israelis know that they cannot do the job themselves, and their larger aim is to keep attention riveted on Tehran (and not on settlement expansion) and to make sure that if war does come, the United States does the heavy lifting. In short, all this war talk is a bluff, but one can scarcely blame Israel for employing a tactic that keeps working so well. It's our fault we keep falling for it.

Obama and Romney would handle Iran strikes the same way

**Miller 12**

Aaron David Miller is a distinguished scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars MAY 23, 2012 Barack O'Romney http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/23/barack\_oromney?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full

Iran: Sorry, I just don't see any significant difference between the way Obama is handling Iran's nuclear program and the way Romney might as president. And that's because there's seems to be an inexorable arc to the Iranian nuclear problem. If by 2013 sanctions and negotiations don't produce a sustainable deal and Iran continues its quest for a nuclear weapon, one of two things is going to happen: Israel is likely to strike, or we will. If it's the former, both Obama and Romney would be there to defend the Israelis and manage the mess that would follow. Both would be prepared to intercede on Israel's behalf if and when it came to that. As for a U.S. strike, it's becoming a bipartisan article of faith that the United States will not permit Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon. And both men are prepared to use military strikes against Iran's nuclear sites as a last resort, even if it only means a delay (and that's what it would mean) in Iran's quest for nukes.

### Security K

#### Attempt to prevent violent proliferation creates cooperative nonconflictual – not the racism you assume

Walker 7 (William Walker is Professor of International Relations at the University of St Andrews which he joined in 1996.)

(“International nuclear order: a rejoinder” International Affairs. 27 JUL 2007)

Roberts ends his article with a brief section headed ‘An auspicious moment for¶ order?’, his conclusion being that this is not such a moment. It is hard to disagree¶ when confronted with mayhem in the Middle East, Iran’s stubborn defi ance of the¶ UN Security Council, the open-ended Indian and Pakistani weapon programmes,¶ the fl exing of Russian muscles, the loss of US authority, and much else besides.¶ No doubt there are more nasty surprises in store (competition for control over¶ Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities after the current military government’s downfall is¶ becoming a favourite among doomsters). Yet I wonder whether this degree of¶ despondency, which has become commonplace and risks becoming a self-fulfi lling¶ prophecy, will turn out to be justifi ed, especially if leading states and policy entrepreneurs¶ now summon the eff ort to arrest the slide, with the 2010 NPT Review¶ Conference providing an obvious occasion on which to recommit states to the¶ Treaty and associated norms, rules and instruments. Ned Lebow has correctly¶ observed that ‘social orders at every level undergo cycles of consolidation and¶ decline’.18 Might the international nuclear order be heading, after the decline that¶ followed its early post-Cold War consolidation, towards renewed consolidation?¶ Here are six reasons why, hoping against hope, this might occur.¶ First, a chastened United States has embarked on a reconsideration of its international¶ strategies which, if not returning it precisely to the status quo ante, is likely¶ to draw it back towards cooperative actions and innovations, and towards a more¶ respectful attitude towards international norms, laws and institutions, especially¶ after a new President has assumed offi ce in January 2009.

Second, there has recently been more convergence than divergence of objectives¶ and policies among the concerts of power that have formed to manage relations¶ with Iran and North Korea, and among the wide community of states lending¶ support within the IAEA and United Nations.¶ Third, the IAEA has shown remarkable resilience over the past decade, gaining¶ rather than losing international prestige despite many setbacks and a serious shortage¶ of manpower and fi nancial resources. Furthermore, there have been signifi cant¶ advances in the techniques of detection and verifi cation—technical change can¶ be helpful as well as unhelpful—upon which a stronger system of regulation and¶ early warning can now be constructed.¶ Fourth, the need to expand civil nuclear trade and investment in response to¶ global warming is driving a search for means of cooperative governance that will¶ allay fears of weapon proliferation. Although there are drawbacks with Henry¶ Sokolski’s proposals in the special issue, they provide an illustration of the search¶ that is under way.19

Fifth, Hassner rightly emphasizes the hierarchical nature of the NPT, and the¶ problems that are likely to arise when the hierarchy of power that has pertained¶ over most of the Treaty’s lifetime, and is embedded in the Treaty’s identifi cation of¶ specifi c states having rights to call themselves NWS, gives way to another hierarchy¶ of power in coming decades. Power transition theory warns of the confl icts and arms¶ races that can arise when emerging powers, such as China and India in years ahead,¶ challenge established great powers.20 Rising powers in Asia and elsewhere will also¶ wish to play a larger part in the shaping of international norms and institutions.¶ However, the behaviour of China and India could turn out to be more constructive¶ than destructive of nuclear order: China is committed to strategic caution by its¶ pre-eminent interest in economic stability and in avoiding Japan’s nuclearization;¶ and India may (only may) become a constructive force if a mutually satisfying¶ rapprochement with the United States and with the non-proliferation regime can be¶ negotiated. Furthermore, the US development of missile defence might ameliorate¶ rather then aggravate great power relations if it were used as a bargaining stick to¶ negotiate deeper arms reductions, if missile defences were limited to the provision¶ of common protection against proliferating states, and if China and Russia could¶ be given convincing guarantees that missile defences and associated technologies¶ would not be deployed to gain strategic advantage over them. Ideally, the regulation¶ of missile defence should become part of a wider agreement on limiting the¶ militarization of space, including bans on the targeting of satellites.¶ Finally, there has developed a strong common interest among states in¶ preventing terrorist groups, insurgents or their criminal suppliers from gaining¶ access to nuclear materials and technologies. In retrospect, I gave too little attention¶ to the risks that nuclear weapons could, in some form, begin to play a part in¶ irregular warfare, as did other contributors to the special issue. States’ responses to¶ those risks also merited more dicussion The desire to minimize them has tended¶ to unify more than divide states, notwithstanding their many disputes, and will¶ probably continue to do so. Paul Schulte’s remark about the contemporary need, in¶ addition to the systems of deterrence and abstinence, for a ‘system of policing’ has¶ given me particular pause for thought.21

#### Alternative can’t fulfill it’s potential – the plan’s coherent policy response is necessary to avert catastrophe.

Jeroen Gunning, Lecturer in International Politics @ Univ. of Wales, ‘7 [*Government and Opposition* 42.3, “A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies?” p. Blackwell-synergy]

The notion of emancipation also crystallizes the need for policy engagement. For, unless a ‘critical’ field seeks to be policy relevant, which, as Cox rightly observes, means **combining** ‘critical’ and ‘problem-solving’ approaches, it does not fulfil its ‘emancipatory’ potential.94 One of the temptations of ‘critical’ approaches is to **remain** mired in critique and deconstruction without moving beyond this to reconstruction and **policy** relevance.Vital as such critiques are, the challenge of a critically constituted field is also to engage with policy makers – and ‘terrorists’ – and work towards the realization of new paradigms, new practices, and a transformation, however modestly, of **political structures**. That, after all, is the original meaning of the notion of ‘immanent critique’ that has historically underpinned the ‘critical’ project and which, in Booth's words, involves ‘the discovery of the latent potentials in situations on which to build political and social progress’, as opposed to putting forward utopian arguments that are not realizable. Or, as Booth wryly observes, ‘this means building with one's feet **firmly on the ground**, not **constructing castles** in the air’ and asking ‘what it means for real people in real places’.96 Rather than simply critiquing the status quo, or noting the problems that come from an un-problematized acceptance of the state, a ‘critical’ approach must, in my view, also concern itself with offering concrete a**lternative**s. Even while historicizing the state and oppositional violence, and challenging the state's role in reproducing oppositional violence, it must wrestle with the fact that ‘the concept of the modern state and sovereignty embodies a **coherent response** to many of the **central problems** of political life’, and in particular to ‘the place of violence in political life’. Even while ‘de-essentializing and deconstructing claims about security’, it must concern itself with ‘how security is to be redefined’, and in particular on what theoretical basis.97 Whether because those critical of the status quo are wary of becoming co-opted by the structures of power (and their emphasis on instrumental rationality),98 or because policy makers have, for obvious reasons (including the failure of many ‘critical’ scholars to offer policy relevant advice), a greater affinity with ‘traditional’ scholars, the role of ‘expert adviser’ is more often than not filled by ‘traditional’ scholars.99 The result is that policy makers **are insufficiently challenged to question** the basis of their policies and develop new policies based on immanent critiques. A notable exception is the readiness of European Union officials to enlist the services of both ‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ scholars to advise the EU on how better to understand processes of radicalization.100 But this would have been impossible if more critically oriented scholars such as Horgan and Silke had not been ready to cooperate with the EU. Striving to be policy relevant does not mean that one has to accept the validity of the term ‘terrorism’ or stop investigating the political interests behind it. Nor does it mean that each piece of research must have policy relevance or that one has to limit one's research to what is relevant for the state, since the ‘critical turn’ implies a move beyond state-centric perspectives. End-users could, and should, thus include both state and non-state actors such as the Foreign Office and the Muslim Council of Britain and Hizb ut-Tahrir; the Northern Ireland Office and the IRA and the Ulster Unionists; the Israeli government and Hamas and Fatah (as long as the overarching principle is to reduce the political use of terror, whoever the perpetrator). It does mean, though, that a critically constituted field must work hard to bring together all the fragmented voices from beyond the ‘terrorism field’, to maximize both the field's rigour and its policy relevance. Whether a critically constituted ‘terrorism studies’ will attract the fragmented voices from outside the field depends largely on how broadly the term ‘critical’ is defined. Those who assume ‘critical’ to mean ‘Critical Theory’ or ‘poststructuralist’ may not feel comfortable identifying with it if they do not themselves subscribe to such a narrowly defined ‘critical’ approach. Rather, to maximize its inclusiveness, I would follow Williams and Krause's approach to ‘critical security studies’, which they define simply as bringing together ‘many perspectives that have been considered outside of the mainstream of the discipline’.101 This means refraining from establishing new criteria of inclusion/exclusion beyond the (normative) expectation that scholars self-reflexively question their conceptual framework, the origins of this framework, their methodologies and dichotomies; and that they historicize both the state and ‘terrorism’, and consider the security and context of all, which implies among other things an attempt at empathy and cross-cultural understanding.102 Anything more normative would limit the ability of such a field to create a genuinely interdisciplinary, non-partisan and innovative framework, and exclude valuable insights borne of a broadly ‘critical’ approach, such as those from conflict resolution studies who, despite working within a ‘traditional’ framework, offer important insights by moving beyond a narrow military understanding of security to a broader understanding of human security and placing violence in its wider social context.103 Thus, a poststructuralist **has no greater claim** to be part of this ‘critical’ field than a realist who looks beyond the state at the interaction between the violent group and their wider social constituency.104

#### 2AC More Security

#### Perm do both Desecuritization fails in practice – strategic planning to prevent crisis escalation is the only way out of the security dilemma.

PH Liotta, Pell Center for IR & Public Policy, ‘5 [Security Dialogue 36.1, “Through the Looking Glass: Creeping Vulnerabilities and the Reordering of Security,” p. 65-6]

Although it seems attractive to focus on exclusionary concepts that insist on desecuritization, privileged referent objects, and the ‘belief’ that threats and vulnerabilities are little more than social constructions (Grayson, 2003), all these concepts work in theory **but fail in practice**. While it may be true that national security paradigms can, and likely will, continue to dominate issues that involve human security vulnerabilities – and even in some instances mistakenly confuse ‘vulnerabilities’ as ‘threats’ – there are distinct linkages between these security concepts and applications. With regard to environ- mental security, for example, Myers (1986: 251) recognized these linkages nearly two decades ago: National security is not just about fighting forces and weaponry. It relates to water-sheds, croplands, forests, genetic resources, climate and other factors that rarely figure in the minds of military experts and political leaders, but increasingly deserve, in their collectivity, to rank alongside military approaches as crucial in a nation’s security. Ultimately, we are far from what O’Hanlon & Singer (2004) term a global intervention capability on behalf of ‘humanitarian transformation’. Granted, we now have the threat of mass casualty terrorism anytime, anywhere – and states and regions are responding differently to this challenge. Yet, the global community today also faces many of the same problems of the 1990s: civil wars, faltering states, humanitarian crises. We are nowhere closer to addressing how best to solve these challenges, even as they affect issues of environmental, human, national (and even ‘embedded’) security. Recently, there have been a number of voices that have spoken out on what the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has termed the ‘responsibility to protect’:10 the responsibility of some agency or state (whether it be a superpower such as the United States or an institution such as the United Nations) to enforce the principle of security that sovereign states owe to their citizens. Yet, the creation of a sense of urgency to act – even on some issues that may not have some impact for years or even decades to come– is perhaps **the only appropriate first response**. The real cost of not investing in the right way and early enough in the places where trends and effects are accelerating in the wrong direction is likely to be **decades** and decades of economic and political frustration – and, potentially, **military engagement.**  Rather than justifying intervention (especially military), **we ought to be justifying investment.** Simply addressing the immensities of these challenges is not enough. Radical improvements in public infrastructure and support for better governance, particularly in states and municipalities (especially along the Lagos–Cairo–Karachi–Jakarta arc), will both improve security and create the conditions for shrinking the gap between expectations and opportunity. A real debate ought to be taking place today. Rather than dismissing ‘alternative’ security foci outright, a larger examination of **what forms of security are** **relevant** and right among communities, states, and regions, and which even might apply to a global rule-set – as well as what types of security are not relevant – seems appropriate and necessary. If this occurs, a truly **remarkable tectonic shift might** take place in the conduct of international relations and human affairs. Perhaps, in the failure of states and the international community to respond to such approaches, what is needed is the equivalent of the 1972 Stockholm conference that launched the global environmental movement and estab- lished the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), designed to be the environmental conscience of the United Nations. Similarly, the UN Habitat II Conference in Istanbul in 1996 focused on the themes of finding adequate shelter for all and sustaining human development in an increas- ingly urbanized world. Whether or not these programs have the ability to influence the future’s direction (or receive wide international support) is a matter of some debate. Yet, given that the most powerful states in the world are not currently focusing on these issues to a degree sufficient to produce viable implementation plans or development strategies, there may well need to be a ‘groundswell’ of bottom-up pressure, perhaps in the form of a global citizenry petition to push the elusive world community toward collective action. Recent history suggests that military intervention as the first line of response to human security conditions underscores a seriously flawed approach. Moreover, those who advocate that a state’s disconnectedness from globalization is inversely proportional to the likelihood of military (read: US) intervention fail to recognize unfolding realities (Barnett, 2003, 2004). Both middle-power and major-power states, as well as the international com- munity, must increasingly focus on long-term creeping vulnerabilities in order to avoid crisis responses to conditions of extreme vulnerability. Admittedly, some human security proponents have recently soured on the viability of the concept in the face of recent ‘either with us or against us’ power politics (Suhrke, 2004). At the same time, and in a bit more positive light, some have clearly recognized the sheer impossibility of international power politics continuing to feign indifference in the face of moral categories. As Burgess (2004: 278) notes, ‘for all its evils, one of the promises of globalization is the unmasking of the intertwined nature of ethics and politics in the complex landscape of social, economic, political and environmental security’. While it is still not feasible to establish a threshold definition for human security that neatly fits all concerns and arguments (as suggested by Owen, 2004: 383), it would be a tragic mistake to assume that national, human, and environmental security are mutually harmonious constructs rather than more often locked in conflictual and contested opposition with each other. Moreover, aspects of security resident in each concept are indeed themselves embedded with extraordinary contradictions. Human security, in particular, is not now, nor should likely ever be, the mirror image of national security. Yet, these contradictions are not the crucial recognition here. On the contrary, rather than focusing on the security issues themselves, we should be focusing on the best multi-dimensional approaches to **confronting and solving them**. One approach, which might avoid the **massive tidal** impact of creeping vulnerabilities, is to sharply make a rudder shift from constant crisis intervention toward **strategic planning**, strategic investment, **and strategic attention.** Clearly, the time is now to **reorder our** entire **approach** to how we address – or fail to address – security.

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#### 2AC More Security

#### Security is Not Survivalism - It is a Pre-requisite to Justice and Human Flourishing

Alex J. Bellamy, Lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Queenss, and Matt McDonald, Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of New South Wales, ‘4 [*Australian Journal of Political Science* 39.2, “'Securing international society: towards an English school discourse of security,” p. informaworld]

As noted, a pluralist conception of security can be read through the works of Hedley Bull and Robert Jackson. For Bull, the provision of international security (the absence of conflict between states, or negative peace) was an important prerequisite for the pursuit of justice (and hence security more broadly defined) within states. This was the normative aspect of Bull’s conception of security. There ‘ought to be’ an international society that allows a plurality of culturally diverse political communities to pursue their own conceptions of justice and security. The ‘five pillars’ of international order that he identifies in The Anarchical Society reflect his concern with the ‘what is’ (Bull 1977, 101–232). In modernity, international order is provided by the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war and the great powers, with these pillars being historically contingent rather than timeless. Bull recognised the possibility of extending the boundaries of political community beyond states in international society,4 although was generally sceptical about the imminent possibility of such reform and even its desirability, seeing it as a move away from the pluralist ideal. Thus, as we noted earlier, Bull shared Carr’s belief that the forceful articulation of political values would destabilise international order and make it harder for states to provide security for their citizens. Robert Jackson has taken up the idea of a pluralist conception of security more recently. According to Jackson (2000, 16), world politics is predicated on a global covenant that constitutes a pluralist society that sits somewhere between Machiavellian power politics and the Kantian ‘community of mankind’. The global covenant consists of procedural and prudential norms that revolve around the mutual recognition of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and the foundational principle of non-intervention. Jackson follows Bull in using a communitarian conception of the moral community rather than a realist conception of the de facto ontological primacy of the state as the grounding for a pluralist idea of security whose subject matter is nevertheless very similar to that of realism. Lest there be any doubt about that, Jackson (2000, 185) echoes Carr’s understanding of the political when he explains that, ‘security is not only or even primarily an instrumental question … it is a moral question. Security is a foundation value of human relations**’**. Jackson (2000, 186) continues by echoing Bull in arguing that national security ‘is a norm that often pre-empts other fundamental norms’. Here, he means that without national (read state) security there can be no hope of meeting other aspirations of social life, such as ‘economic security’ and ‘environmental security’. Indeed, Jackson (2000, 195) argues that these are not security issues: ‘an economic depression might threaten my personal welfare as well as the national welfare, but it is no threat to my safety or my country’s security’. We should not think of these wider issues as security issues, therefore. Moreover, as there is no agreement in the world about what human rights, economic rights, environmental rights and the rest are, ‘the consistent enforcement of human security around the world is impossible’ (Jackson 2000, 214) and would create more disorder than ‘security’.

#### Conditionality

#### Conditionality is bad –

#### 1. Depth and aff strategy – they incentivize teams going for the least developed instead of the best arguments and contradictory worlds forces double-turns

#### 2. Time skew – moots aff speech time, kills fairness

#### 3. Aff ground – they can nullify our offense by saying “not going for it” – kills education

#### 4. voting issue – dispo solves their offense

### Consumption K

Nuclear renaissance

Focus on production not consumption

Wealthier countries consume

#### Growth sustainable – skeptics always wrong

Mills 8/25 [Mark P., CEO of the Digital Power Group, an adjunct fellow of the Manhattan Institute, and former chief tech strategist for a tech venture fund. He writes the "Energy Intelligence" blog for Forbes.com and is co-author of The Bottomless Well. The Next Great Growth Cycle Saturday, August 25, 2012 http://www.american.com/archive/2012/august/the-next-great-growth-cycle]

Today’s techno-pessimists say technology and America have plateaued. Such naysayers flourish during economic recessions. They have been wrong in every one of the 19 economic downturns we have experienced since 1912. They’re wrong again. Apple went public in December 1980, before today’s 50 million millennials were born. And there followed the longest run of economic growth in modern history, spanning five presidencies from Reagan through Clinton. Apple grew to become the world’s largest market cap company and a tech icon. That was then. This is now. According to today’s techno-pessimists, nothing like that can happen again because technology and America have plateaued. Such naysayers, who flourish like mushrooms in the depths of economic recessions, have been wrong in every one of the 19 economic downturns we have experienced since 1912. And they’re wrong again. Let’s quote a few prominent examples: “We have failed to recognize that we are at a technological plateau.” — Tyler Cowen, economist, popular blogger, and author of The Great Stagnation. “The harsh reality … is that the next 25 years (2013-2038) are highly unlikely to see more dramatic changes than science and technology produced in the last 25 (1987-2012).” — Niall Ferguson, uber-historian, Harvard professor, and widely read author. “No more fundamental innovations are likely to be introduced to change the structure of [today’s] society .... Like every previous civilization, we have reached a technological plateau.” — Jean Gimpel, technology historian, professor, and author. There is one salient difference amongst the above three views. The first two were written in 2011 and 2012, respectively, while Gimpel’s conclusion comes from his excellent 1975 book, The Medieval Machine; The Industrial Revolution of the Middle Ages, wherein he extrapolated history’s lessons to inform the future. On the book-flap of the 2003 re-release of Gimpel’s book we find: Gimpel … did not foresee the digital boom of the 1980s and 90s and the development of post-industrial economies. Nevertheless, his predictions may provide valuable material for historians of the recent past. Indeed they should. The issue is more than an academic exercise. The techno-pessimists are innovation Malthusians cut from the same cloth as the resource Malthusians. Every time reality proves them wrong following each crisis, they say a variant of the same thing: I may have been wrong before, but I’m right this time.

Consumption focus alone will fail – the alt would have to reshape all of society and economics which must include a production focus

Fitz (editor of Synthesis/Regeneration: A Magazine of Green Social Thought) 9

(Don, Production-Side Environmentalism: Can we produce less and consume more?, http://climateandcapitalism.com/2009/01/12/production-side-environmentalism-can-we-produce-less-and-consume-more/)

The greatest barrier to coping with climate change, peak oil, toxins and habitat destruction is **the total mass of production**. This mass is increasing; its increase vastly outpaces any real or imagined increase in consumption; and its increase is made worse by peddling green gadgets as some sort of solution. A deep green view understands that too much production is the core problem. Necessary changes do not require any reduction in “consumption”, at least in any meaningful sense of that word. If a corporate economy cannot allow production to decrease, it only makes sense that preserving the Earth requires replacing corporate power with a democratic economy A knife going into a person’s stomach can be the death blow of a thief or life-saving surgery. Which is to say: An action can have opposite effects, depending on its context. A plea to replace or reduce individual consumptive habits in a society where market forces dictate that every decrease in energy here is offset by an increase somewhere else is a plea falling on deaf bank statements. But if we could replace production for profit with production for what we need and want, people would have the power to alter society to change its wants and even redesign its needs. With the link between production and consumption restored, lowering consumption would indeed affect production — but only in a deep green society. This is production-side environmentalism.

Perm fails - Alt fails – kills collective action, masks structural inequality and marginalizes women

Paterson (International Relations, Keele University) 2

(Matthew, Shut up and shop! Thinking politically about consumption, http://www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/press/211paterson.htm)

In other accounts, politics and consumption are connected by contrast. Maniates (2001) exemplifies this position in his focus on the way that focusing on consumption tends to **individualise responses** to environmental problem, whereas they should be more properly thought of in terms of collective action and individuals as consumers not citizens. This critique has appeared in different forms in various debates around green strategy. A classic argument is Mark Sagoff’s account emphasising the contrast between consumer identities, rooted in individualism, and citizen identities, rooted in a conception of community and collective choice (Sagoff 1988). It is also a standard critique of environmentalists by those on the left, who suggest that green’s tendency to focus on actions which individuals can take to ‘save the earth’, especially in the discourses of ‘green consumerism’ negate the importance of political action and often also take away from a **focus on structural inequalities** (e.g Luke 1997: ch. 6). Another variant of this argument is that a focus on consumption also raises significant questions about gender inequalities. Bretherton (1996) argues that a focus on consumption is one of a series of environmental discourses which tends to make women the ‘problem’

(1996: 101) as they undertake the majority of consuming acts. Such discourses neglect again the structural inequalities within households which such a simplistic focus on the act of purchasing masks. Again, the implication is principally that a focus on consumption is to abstract from a more properly political ecological project. As Maniates argues, a more politically adequate account would assume that: Individual consumption choices are environmentally important, but that their control over these choices is constrained, shaped, and framed by institutions and political forces that can be remade **only through collective citizen action,** as opposed to individual consumer behaviour. (Maniates 2001: 50, emphasis added)

Alt

#### Alt fails – elite backlash.

Anderson 84

Perry Anderson, Professor of Sociology at UCLA, Marxist Scholar, 1984, In the tracks of historical materialism, p. 102-103

That background also indicates, however, what is essentially missing from his work. How are we to get from where we are today to where he point us to tomorrow? There is no answer to this question in Nove. His halting discussion of “transition” tails away into apprehensive admonitions to moderation to the British Labor Party, and pleas for proper compensation to capitalist owners of major industries, if these are to be nationalized. Nowhere is there any sense of what a titanic political change would have to occur, with what fierceness of social struggle, for the economic model of socialism he advocates ever to materialize. Between the radicalism of the future end-state he envisages, and the conservatism of the present measures he is prepared to countenance, there is an unbridgeable abyss. How could private ownership of the means of production ever be abolished by policies less disrespectful of capital than those of Allende or a Benn, which he reproves? What has disappeared from the pages of The Economics of Feasible Socialism is virtually all attention to the historical dynamics of any serious conflict over the control of the means of production, as the record of the 20th century demonstrates them. If capital could visit such destruction on even so poor and small an outlying province of its empire in Vietnam, to prevent its loss, is it likely that it would suffer its extinction meekly in its own homeland? The lessons of the past sixty-five years or so are in this respect without ambiguity or exception, there is no case, from Russia to China, from Vietnam to Cuba, from Chile to Nicaragua, where the existence of capitalism has been challenged, and the furies of intervention, blockade and civil strife have not descended in response. Any viable transition to socialism in the West must seek to curtail that pattern: but to shrink from or to ignore it is to depart from the world of the possible altogether. In the same way, to construct an economic model of socialism in one advanced country is a legitimate exercise: but to extract it from any computable relationship with a surrounding, and necessarily opposing, capitalist environment—as this work does—is to locate it in thin air.

#### Alt doesn’t solve cap

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(Uri, Anarchist Economics in Practice in The Accumulation of Freedom, pg. 205-7)

Withdrawal

Perhaps better defined as a "non‑practice" than as a practice, the term "withdrawal" here indicates the various ways in which anarchists may abstain from participation in central institutions of the capitalist economy‑primarily the wage system and the consumption of purchased goods. The goal of such a strategy is to weaken capitalism by sapping its energy, reducing its inputs in terms of both human labor and cultural legitimation. To be sure, the ubiquity of capitalist relations means that the options for withdrawal remain partial at best. Most of us must work for someone else to survive, and buy necessities that are not otherwise available for acquisition. Nevertheless, there are ways in which participation in capitalism can be significantly reduced, or undertaken on its qualitatively different margins. Rather than seeking full employment and aspiring to a lifelong career, anarchists can choose to work part‑time or itinerantly, earning enough to supply their basic needs but not dedicating more time to waged work than is absolutely necessary‑perhaps on the way towards the abolition of work as compulsory, alienated production.3 In the area of housing, squatting a living space rather than renting one also abstains from participation in capitalism, though this option is less sustainable in most countfies since it will almost certainly end in eviction. Anarchists may also reduce their participation in the moneyed circulation of commodities by reusing and recycling durable goods, and by scavenging or growing some of their own food rather than purchasing it from the supermarket. 4 **Such practices can never by themselves destroy capitalism, since in the final analysis they remain confined to the level of personal lifestyle and rely on capitalism’s continued existence in order to inhabit its margins and consume its surpluses**. Nevertheless, strategies of withdrawal **do complement** other practices in carving out a separate space from capitalism, as well as in expressing a rejection of its ideologies of dedication to the workplace and of consumption as the road to happiness.