### 1

#### “In the United States” excludes production in the OCS, military bases and above US airspace

State 12 (US Department of State, “7 FAM 1100 ACQUISITION AND RETENTION OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONALITY,” Manual Volume 7, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86755.pdf)

7 FAM 1112 WHAT IS BIRTH “IN THE UNITED STATES”? (CT:CON-314; 08-21-2009) a. INA 101(a)(38) (8 U.S.C. 1101 (a)(38)) provides that “the term „United States,‟ when used in a geographical sense, means the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands of the United States.”

b. On November 3, 1986, Public Law 94-241, “approving the Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America”, (Section 506(c)),took effect. From that point on, the Northern Mariana Islands have been treated as part of the United States for the purposes of INA 301 (8 U.S.C. 1401) and INA 308 (8 U.S.C. 1408). (See 7 FAM 1120 Acquisition of U.S. Nationality in U.S. Territories and Possessions.) c. The Nationality Act of 1940 (NA), Section 101(d) (54 Statutes at Large 1172) (effective January 13, 1941 until December 23, 1952) provided that “the term „United States‟ when used in a geographical sense means the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands of the United States.” The 1940 Act did not include Guam or the Northern Mariana Islands as coming within the definition of “United States.” See the text of the 1940 Act on the CA/OCS Intranet, Acquisition of Citizenship, Legal and Regulatory Documents. d. Prior to January 13, 1941, there was no statutory definition of “the United States” for citizenship purposes. The phrase “in the United States” as used in Section 1993 of the Revised Statues of 1878 clearly includes states that have been admitted to the Union. (See 7 FAM 1119 b.) e. INA 304 (8 U.S.C. 1404) and INA 305 (8 U.S.C. 1405) provide a basis for citizenship of persons born in Alaska and Hawaii, respectively, while they were territories of the United States. f. See 7 FAM 1100 Appendix B (under development) for guidance as to what constitutes evidence of birth in the United States. 7 FAM 1113 NOT INCLUDED IN THE MEANING OF "IN THE UNITED STATES" (CT:CON-314; 08-21-2009) a. Birth on U.S. Registered Vessel On High Seas or in the Exclusive Economic Zone: A U.S.-registered or documented ship on the high seas or in the exclusive economic zone is not considered to be part of the United States. Under the law of the sea, an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is a maritime zone over which a State has special rights over the exploration and use of natural resources. The Exclusive Economic Zone extends up to 200 nautical miles from the coastal baseline. A child born on such a vessel does not acquire U.S. citizenship by reason of the place of birth (Lam Mow v. Nagle, 24 F.2d 316 (9th Cir., 1928)). NOTE: This concept of allotting nations EEZs to give better control of maritime affairs outside territorial limits gained acceptance in the late 20th century and was given binding international recognition by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982. Part V, Article 55 of the Convention states: Specific legal regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone: The Exclusive Economic Zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea**,** subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention. b. A U.S.-registered aircraft outside U.S. airspace is not considered to be part of U.S. territory. A child born on such an aircraft outside U.S. airspace does not acquire U.S. citizenship by reason of the place of birth. NOTE: The United States of America is not a party to the U.N. Convention on Reduction of Statelessness (1961). Article 3 of the Convention does not apply to the United States. Article 3 provides “For the purpose of determining the obligations of Contracting States under this Convention, birth on a ship or in an aircraft shall be deemed to have taken place in the territory of the State whose flag the ship flies or in the territory of the State in which the aircraft is registered, as the case may be.” This is a frequently asked question. c. Birth on U.S. Military Base Outside of the United States or Birth on U.S. Embassy or Consulate Premises Abroad: (1) Despite widespread popular belief, U.S. military installations abroad and U.S. diplomatic or consular facilities abroad are not part of the United States within the meaning of the 14th Amendment. A child born on the premises of such a facility is not born in the United States and does not acquire U.S. citizenship by reason of birth. (2) The status of diplomatic and consular premises arises from the rules of law relating to immunity from the prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction of the receiving State; the premises are not part of the territory of the United States of America. (See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, Vol. 1, Sec. 466, Comment a and c (1987). See also, Persinger v. Iran, 729 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1984). d. Birth on Foreign Ships In Foreign Government Non-Commercial Service: (1) A child born on a foreign merchant ship or privately owned vessel in U.S. internal waters is considered as having been born subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. (See U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark.) (2) Foreign warships, naval auxiliaries, and other vessels or aircraft owned or operated by a State and used for governmental noncommercial service are not subject to jurisdiction of the United States. Persons born on such vessels while in U.S. internal waters (or, of course, anywhere else) do not acquire U.S. citizenship by virtue of place of birth. e. Alien Enemies During Hostile Occupation: (1) If part of the United States were occupied by foreign armed forces against the wishes of the United States, children born to enemy aliens in the occupied areas would not be subject to U.S. jurisdiction and would not acquire U.S. citizenship at birth. (2) Children born to persons other than enemy aliens in an area temporarily occupied by hostile forces would acquire U.S. citizenship at birth because sovereignty would not have been transferred to the other country. (See U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark.)

#### Prefer our interp

#### Limits are a prerequisite to negative preparation and clash

#### They make topical a huge range of Aff’s are not within the US but are in areas which the US has authority over, forward military bases, SPS all become topical

#### Ground – the Aff’s they allow would fundamentally reshape the topic, making this a military focused and space focused bonanza at the end of the year that would intentionally avoid the important questions of energy policy

### 2

#### Obama will win but it will be close – collection of models proves

Wilkins 10-18

Emily Wilkins Staff infoZine October 18, 2012 Models Predict Obama Will Barely Win 2012 Election http://www.infozine.com/news/stories/op/storiesView/sid/53475/

Fluctuating polls aren’t the only way to predict an election. Thirteen different models published in the October issue of Political Science and Politics (PS) give incumbent President Obama the win — but just barely. Washington, D.C. - infoZine - Scripps Howard Foundation Wire - The forecasts, which show the election to be much closer than the 2004 or 2008 elections, give Obama an average .06 percent lead ahead of Romney. James E. Campbell, a political science professor at the University of Buffalo, helped select and edit the models for the October issue of PS. Campbell and three other professors who created forecasts spoke Oct. 16 at the National Press Club. Campbell said that despite the attention given to them, small gaffes and trips do not define an election. “It’s not just ‘Did Mitt Romney say too much?’” Campbell said. “It’s not just ‘Did Paul Ryan drink too much at the debate?’ Those kinds of things aren’t really important.” This is the third election year the models have been collected into PS. In 2004 and 2008, a majority of the models correctly predicted the elections of George W. Bush and Obama.

#### Obama is walking the line on energy now but drilling legislation will make him lose his balance

SCHNUR 12

DAN SCHNUR April 9, 2012, The President, Gas Prices and the Pipeline http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/09/the-president-gas-prices-and-the-keystone-pipeline/

Like every president seeking re-election, Barack Obama walks the fine line every day between the discordant goals of motivating his party’s strongest loyalists and reaching out to swing voters for their support. A few weeks ago, that pathway took him to a tiny town in Oklahoma, where, caught between the anti-drilling demands of the environmental community and the thirst for more affordable gasoline from unions, business owners and drivers, the president announced his support for building half of an oil pipeline. The economic impact of rising energy prices in itself is considerable, but the psychological toll on voters is just as significant, as tens of millions of motorists are reminded by large signs on almost every street corner of the financial pain of filling their gas tanks. Obama and his political lieutenants are acutely aware that this growing frustration has the potential to complicate an election year that otherwise seems to be shifting in the incumbent’s favor. As a result, Obama has been hitting the energy issue hard in recent weeks, at least as hard as a candidate can hit when forced to navigate between two almost mutually exclusive political priorities. The result is a president who talks forcefully of the benefits of wind and solar power while also boasting about the amount of oil the nation produces under his leadership. There are times when this gets slightly uncomfortable. Obama recently called for increased exploration along the Atlantic Coast but stopped short of calling for expanded drilling in that region. This is the energy policy equivalent of admitting to an experiment with marijuana but not inhaling. Where the issue becomes more tangible and therefore trickier for Obama is when the multiple choices become binary. The debate over the proposed XL Keystone Pipeline that would transport Canadian oil through the nation’s heartland to the Gulf of Mexico crystallizes the choices involved and forces a shades-of-gray conversation into starker hues of black and white. Obama recognizes that the devoted environmentalists who represent a critical portion of the Democratic party base need some motivation to turn out for him in the fall. But he also understands that centrist voters who support him on a range of other domestic and foreign policy matters could be lured away by a Republican opponent who either promises relief at the gas pump or who can lay blame at the White House doorstep for those higher prices. Even more complicated is the role of organized labor, which has poured immense amounts of support into Obama’s re-election but also prioritizes the job-creation potential of the pipeline. The result of these competing political and policy pressures brought Obama to Ripley, Okla., where he tried to satisfy the needs of these various audiences without alienating any of them. First, the president endorsed the southern portion of the Keystone project in order to relieve the glut of domestically drilled oil that is now unable to make it to refineries near the Gulf of Mexico in a timely manner. This had the effect of irritating his environmental allies but failed to mollify the project’s advocates, who pointed out that the review process that the president called for was already underway. He then reiterated the administration’s antipathy toward the northern section of the pipeline, which would allow Canadian-drilled oil to be transported into this country. This provided some comfort to drilling opponents, but infuriated both the pro-oil forces and the Canadian government. The most likely outcome is that Canada will still build a pipeline, but rather one that goes westward to the Pacific Ocean north of the United States border and then ships Canadian oil to China instead of into this country. Even in deep-blue California, where Obama wins hypothetical general election match ups against the Republican candidates by margins approaching voice vote, this is an issue that points to potential difficulties for the president’s re-election campaign. Californians who swooned for Obama in 2008, and who seem poised for a re-swoon this fall, told a recent USC Dornsife/LA Times statewide poll that they were dissatisfied with the president’s handling of the issue of the cost of gasoline by a 29-62 margin. California’s unemployment rate remains around 11 percent, but the state’s residents still give Obama positive marks on his work on job creation, the economy and taxes. They approve of his work on health care and by even larger margins on women’s health issues. But highway-dependent West Coasters, even while they advocate for broader use of solar, wind and other alternative energies, don’t like $4 per gallon gasoline and they will like paying $5 per gallon even less. Obama won’t actually lose California in November, of course. Gas prices would have to hit $10 a gallon for Mitt Romney to win the state this fall. And the same poll shows that voters blame oil companies, rather than either the president or Congress, for those high prices. However, the dissatisfaction that emanates from even a heavily Democratic patch of electoral turf such as California carries much more significant consequences in Ohio, Florida and other swing states. For the time being, Obama is gambling that directing popular anger toward the oil companies — a convenient villain if there ever was one — will allow him to keep the price of gasoline from becoming a roadblock for his campaign. But if gas prices keep rising and voter unhappiness continues to build, look for the administration to find a way to accelerate the review process that would allow the northern leg of Keystone to move forward more quickly. Obama has been careful not to come out in absolute opposition to the pipeline, but only to call for a more meticulous examination of its possible environmental impact. A more closely competitive election than what is now expected, though, could easily lead the president to decide that his administration’s review has been quite thorough enough and that the time for additional drilling has arrived. An energy strategy that Obama now refers to as an “all of the above” approach is unlikely to turn into a “drill, baby drill” refrain between now and November. But maintaining a balance between dissatisfied but docile environmentalists on one hand and drivers whose unhappiness stops just short of violence on the other will be a key to his re-election. If his poll margins begin to narrow, a somewhat longer pipeline than the one he has already endorsed could become a very tempting insurance policy.

#### Romney win ensures nationalist response from China – crushes relations and cooperation

Traub 12

James Traub, Foreign Policy, Jan/Feb, “Foreign Affairs,” http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/january\_february\_2012/features/foreign\_affairs034475.php?page=3

But as with Iran, it’s not clear how much space actually lies on the more aggressive side of the Obama administration’s own policies. Obama has responded to China’s rapidly increasing military budget, its growing presence in the South China Sea, and its assertive claims over disputed territory in the region by offering pointed reassurance to American allies like Japan and South Korea. On a recent swing through Asia, Obama announced that the U.S. would be stationing 2,500 Marines at a base in Australia, and declared, with uncharacteristic brassiness, “The United States is a Pacific power, and we are here to stay.” Even while making these shots across China’s bow, the president has tried to send other, perhaps contradictory, messages. On international finance, administration officials have said that the cheap renminbi is hurting the U.S. economy, but they have not threatened retaliation or action before the WTO. On the military front, the White House has not explicitly said that China is trying to exclude the U.S. from the region, though that is what they fear. A Republican president would, at the very least, shift this delicate balance. The U.S. would more bluntly describe China as a rival and demand changes in Chinese policy more harshly. Conservatives speak of creating a much stronger Asian alliance beefed up by more, and more advanced, American weaponry and a more open acknowledgment of China’s drive for regional hegemony. Indeed, Romney and other conservatives cite the imperative of responding to Chinese militarism as the most powerful argument for increasing the Pentagon budget, rather than cutting it by $450 billion over a decade, as Obama and Congress have agreed to do. Romney would increase defense spending by at least $50 billion a year, and engage in a massive program of shipbuilding aimed in part at deterring Chinese designs. Of course, this would make reducing the budget deficit that much more difficult; Romney has not explained what domestic programs he would cut even more deeply than is currently planned in order to finance such an expansion. China really does seem to have moved away from its doctrine of “peaceful rise” to one more threatening to the neighborhood, which is why Obama has adopted a tougher tone. But toughness carries dangers of its own. China’s cooperation is indispensable on a vast range of issues, including the global economy, energy supplies, and climate change; provoking Chinese nationalism is a sure path to a scratchy relationship. This is why presidents of both parties have tended to accommodate China more than they said they would as candidates. Moreover, it’s not clear that even those allies who fear China’s bullying tactics would welcome a chestier American presence; they, even more than the U.S., have to balance their security concerns with the wish to benefit from China’s locomotive economy. It is an article of faith among Republicans that the twenty-first century, like the twentieth, will be an American century— which is to say, not a Chinese one. But “communist China” is an absurd archaism, and China is not likely to wind up on the ash heap of history. Treating the world’s premier rising power like the Soviet Union in the 1960s would be a mistake of historic proportions.

#### Extinction

Ratliff 95

William Ratliff, Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, July 31 1995, Washington Times, p. A21

Much of the growth and prosperity of the Pacific Rim countries in general – ranging from Japan and China through Southeast Asia to the United States and the Pacific Coast of South America – depends on peace and stability in East Asia. The United States and China must lead other nations in fostering this peace and stability. Today, this means cooperating on such varied issues as the potential nuclear threat of North Korea, the resolution of the China-Taiwan controversy and the exploration of – and safety of sea lanes through – the South China Sea, the superhighway of the Southeast Asian economic miracle. These matters will recur, and other problems unforeseen today will turn up, in the years ahead. So the world spins. To be sure, cooperation often will not be easy, for fear as to Chinese intentions pervades Washington and suspicions of U.S. motives remain widespread here in China. Americans, for example, are particularly concerned at the size of the Chinese military budget and what Beijing intends to do with its modernized and expanded military capacity. Thus as Mr. Perry noted, increasing contacts between the militaries of the two countries, and each nation's clearer understanding of the defense policies and strategic intentions of the other, are essential. This was the particular importance of Mr. Perry's visit to the PLA gathering, a type of exchange both sides must foster in the future for everyone's good. Short-term issues are not necessarily unimportant because they are short-term, but they must be worked out by each side having consistent policies the other can understand that look beyond short-term problems to longer-term interests. The high probability is that the United States and China will be the two superpowers of the early 21st century and our living together in peace will be essential to the prosperity if not the survival of the world.

3

#### New oil drilling trades off with renewables – makes solving warming impossible

Jad Mouawad, airline correspondent for The New York Times. From 2004 to 2010, he covered the global energy industry, reporting on oil and gas developments around the world, OPEC politics, and renewable energy, “Fuel to Burn: Now What?”, 4/10/12, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/11/business/energy-environment/energy-boom-in-us-upends-expectations.html?pagewanted=all//jchen

The increased reliance on these unconventional oil sources, including oil sands and shale oil, has led some energy experts to talk about a “re-carbonization” of energy supplies if that reliance distracts from the need to develop renewable fuels.

“As we run out of conventional fossil fuels, we face some fundamental choices,” said Dan Lashof, the climate program director at the Natural Resources Defense Council. “Are we going to switch to cleaner energy sources, or are we going to switch to dirtier energy sources? That’s why the Keystone pipeline was so hard fought. It’s because we face a real fork in the road. And depending which way we go, solving our environmental problems might become impossible.”

#### Increased domestic production can’t solve dependence and exacerbates warming – causes war

Deborah Gordon, nonresident senior associate in Carnegie’s energy and climate program, “Insecurity in Unconventional Oil”, 6/5/12, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/06/05/insecurity-in-unconventional-oil/b64y//jchen

With North American oil production ramping up, many have rushed to the conclusion that the United States has newfound oil security. The dark days of dependence on the Middle East will soon be gone as new types of oil are found in abundance close to home. But these claims are more hype than reality. The deeper we drill down, the more apparent it becomes that new domestic oil supplies cannot guarantee U.S. geopolitical and economic security. What’s more, the heterogeneous assortment of oils, if pursued absent cautious, deliberate guidelines, could cause collateral damage. New hydrocarbon resources that can be reached or transformed into oil raise the specter of climate security risks. There is precious little public information available about the vast pools of carbon contained in oil sands, oil shale, and other new oil supplies. At a time when the world is struggling to limit carbon emissions, prying open new carbon sources before we fully understand what they are and how to manage them could be a serious security miscalculation. New oils are being produced from increasingly heavy, complex, isolated, and carbon-laden resources. These stores are often locked up deep in the earth, in remote and harsh environments, tightly trapped between or bound to sand, tar, and rock. They require increasingly capital-intensive infrastructure to extract, involve more intensive processing and additives, and yield more high carbon byproducts. The high carbon contents and unfavorable energy balances of many new oils impose high climate burdens. Despite the political rhetoric in the United States about the science of climate change, it is a legitimate threat to U.S. national security. Climate change is a threat multiplier that accelerates global conflict through droughts, desertification, floods, famines, and crop failures. Empirical evidence suggests that climate change can cause domestic and international disputes. Scientists have determined that long-term fluctuations of war frequently follow cycles of temperature change. According to United Nations Environment Programme, climate change exacerbates military conflict—instigating mass migration, armed insurrection, and a further destabilization of volatile regions. Concerns of climate-driven conflict pose a real and present danger. As such, the higher the carbon burden of new oil, the higher the cost in terms of global security. Policymakers have a responsibility to protect the public, bringing solutions to bear. The more new sources of oil deviate from conventional crude, the more citizens will rely on policymakers and industry to demystify oil resources and the risks they pose. The solution rests in strategies that restructure both oil demand and oil supply. The realities of the global market make it clear that reducing oil demand—through increased efficiency, fuel diversification, and expanded travel choice—is an important step along the path to twenty-first century energy security. Every barrel of oil that we avoid consuming makes our economy stronger and less vulnerable to the volatility of the current marketplace. But we also must adopt new rules for the new fuels that are entering the market. Left up to industry, the boomtown approach will likely prevail. The current information vacuum about the climate and other local impacts of North American oil gives industry an advantage. Bridging information gaps and shedding light through up-to-date data on new oils will be key to managing them. The first step along this path is generating robust global data collection that is independently monitored and verified. As new facts surface about oil sources—chemically, geographically, technologically, and commercially—the need for unbiased information will be increasingly important. Armed with information, the next step is to develop appropriate and durable policy guidelines that entail transparency, longevity, and consistency. Ultimately, new oil development will be highly responsive to prudent climate policies. But such policies do not currently exist. If anything, prevailing government policies worldwide have provided fiscal subsidies to accelerate the production of new oil, with limited regulatory oversight and no global leadership. Without better policy, such as an emission fee on carbon, backed by robust, objective analysis, new oils will have a significant market advantage over low-carbon alternatives. One way to guarantee that investment decisions take climate change into account is to price carbon. Pricing carbon could go a long way to address energy security (demand reduction) and climate security (supply reduction). The great irony is that while North American oil supplies cannot ensure domestic economic security, they may actually make global climate security worse. The less we depend on oil, the more knowledgeable we are about new oils, and the more robust the rules for managing new hydrocarbon supplies, the safer we’ll all be.

### 4

#### The Department of Defense should substantially increase United States military presence in the Alaskan Outer Continental Shelf.

#### Their I/L is that oil production increases presence in the region. Counterplan fiats. 1ac ev=solvency advocate.

### Russia

#### Increased imports of Saudi crude now – oil revenues key to maintain regime stability and relations

Amy Jaffe, Wallace S. Wilson fellow for energy studies at Rice University's Baker Institute and co-author of Oil, Dollars, Debt and Crises: The Global Curse of Black Gold, 8/24/12, Foreign Policy, “America's Real Strategic Petroleum Reserve”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/24/Saudi\_Arabia\_Strategic\_Petroleum\_Reserve?page=full //jchen

America's ability to fall back on the Saudis is further imperiled by the inherent instability of the kingdom's political and economic system. Saudi Arabia is going to need more and more oil revenue just to keep its population from growing restive. Riyadh-based Jadwa Investment predicts that Saudi Arabia will be forced to run budget deficits from 2014 onwards, even at a break-even price forecast of $90.70 per barrel in 2015. Other forecasts are even bleaker in the medium term, estimating the breakeven price at $110 a barrel in 2015. Either way, the kingdom's thirst for cash is likely to **mean** that U.S. and Saudi interests diverge. The oil-for-security deal between the two countries has destabilized the kingdom in the past by igniting support for al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and it could be used again by agents of internal opposition groups. Moreover, the recent pro-democracy upheavals in Egypt, Syria, and above all Bahrain are bound to influence U.S.-Saudi relations over time in ways that are hard to predict. For the time being, these risks have been at least temporarily mitigated. Recent leadership successions in the senior ranks of the Saudi security apparatus (defense, interior, and intelligence) and the common interest in containing Iran has brought Saudi oil policy closer in line with White House goals -- at least for now. Saudi oil shipments to the United States have been on the upswing this year -- a reversal of previous policy that favored sales to China -- and the kingdom, together with Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, has stockpiled oil in ships off the coast of Al-Fujairah, outside the critical shipping chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz, and added emergency crude oil stocks in China, Japan, South Korea, and Rotterdam. This coordination helped keep oil prices from spiking when Western countries tightened the sanctions regime against Iran's oil industry. The extra Gulf crude was aimed not only to wean Asian and European buyers off Iranian oil but also to give the United States (or even Israel) more economic leeway for a military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities in the event that diplomatic negotiations stalled out. But as more and more Iranian oil comes off the market and the specter of military action intensifies, the impact of these significant moves is wearing off.

#### Perception of increased US oil production massively lowers oil prices

Neil Munro, reporter for the Daily Caller, “Oil prices fall on rumor, but Obama insists nothing can be done”, Daily Caller, 3/17/12, http://dailycaller.com/2012/03/17/oil-prices-fall-on-rumor-but-obama-insists-nothing-can-be-done/

But the rapid shifts in price shows how the supply of oil is so low that it is bumping against slack demand. That collision raises prices somewhat because oil-traders buy, sell, dump or hoard oil to make incremental profits whenever they predict a local or temporary shortage or surplus.

The mere rumor of a SPR sell-off dropped prices by $2, or 2 percent.

But there was a real sell-off in 2008 when prices fell by $9.26 during a announcement by President George W. Bush that he would push to open up new areas for oil exploration. That presidential promise of more oil yielded a 6.3 percent drop from the prevailing price of $136, even though that oil would not come online for 10 or 15 years.

Thursday’s temporary drop “tells us what the American Petroleum Institute has been saying for weeks — that the president can do **something** **now** that will put downward pressure on prices,” said Eric Wohlschlegel, API’s spokesman.

The price drop shows what could be accomplished if the president really wanted to increase supplies of U.S. oil energy, said Dan Kish, senior vice president at the Institute for Energy Research.

Obama’s claim “that there is nothing he can do about oil prices is pure unadulterated bullshit,” Kish said. “If he announced to forward markets that the United States was going to get serious about starting to produce its energy…. it would put down pressure on price, huge downward pressure,” he said.

“You’re not going to drop it to $50 a barrel, but **you’d** put a huge amount of downward pressure on it,” he said. The oil would not arrive for years, but many people would be immediately hired to help develop the oil fields, he said.

#### Saudi instability risks state collapse and escalating war in the Middle East

**Copley ‘02**

(Gregory, Editor – GIS, Defense and Foreign Affairs Daily, 5-22, Lexis)

Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia's problems have become the problems of virtually the entire Muslim ummah (nation), and are perhaps the real **core** of the schism between Western and Muslim societies. The danger exists that the Saudi leadership could still collapse in the near future and the integrity of the Saudi State could come into question. The problems in Saudi Arabia -- decades in the making -- are at the geopolitical heart of Islam, thus affecting most of the Muslim world and the relationship between Islamic societies and the West. The phenomena of Osama bin Laden's worldwide terrorism network, the radical Islamist anti-state activities under Sudan's Dr Hassan al-Turabi, the related and parallel evolution of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the direction of the Chechen rebellion, and so on, all owe much to the evolving problems in Saudi Arabia as well as to the radical clerics in Iran. Not even Saudi Arabia's leadership has acknowledged the extent of the crisis, although privately many leading Saudi princes have admitted the prospect of an imminent collapse of the House of Sa'ud. Saudi Arabia's problems have an immediate bearing on whether major war occurs between Israel and its neighbors, and whether Saudi Arabia survives with its present form of government. They are therefore critical to the global economy and global strategic stability.

#### That escalates to global nuclear war

**Steinbach ‘02**

(John, Center for Research on Globalization, 3-3, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html)

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a **nuclear escalation**, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)

#### Oil revenue key to reforms

Harris 03

Martha Harris, PhD and Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council, 03, Grave New World, ed. Michael Brown, p. 167

From the perspective of the oil producers, major concerns include the potential for economic slowdown because of stagnant revenues in a prolonged global economic recession and domestic opposition to policies that promote stability through cooperation with the United States and other consumer nations, particularly in the context of the Iraq crisis. Saudi Arabia’s role will continue to be critical, but Russia and other non-OPEC producers have also emerged as key players Russia is now a major oil producer, and its decision late in 2001 to cooperate with OPEC in production cuts forestalled a potential price war. According to the European Commission, Russia could be providing the European Union with 45 percent of its gas imports by 2020.17 Russia **needs oil and gas** revenues to finance social spending and reform programs that will open the market for competition and more efficient production. For the producers that rely heavily on energy export revenues, avoiding price plunges and cycles of unpredictable boom and bust is essential to their domestic political support and to their ability to participate constructively in international energy markets.

#### Reforms now leading to Russian growth

Business New Europe 12

Business New Europe 9/12/12, http://www.bne.eu/storyf3986/Russia\_reforms\_due\_in\_Nov\_seen\_sparking\_ruble\_bond\_rally

In November, Russia's capital market is due to join the international settlement system Euroclear, which for the first time will give foreign investors unfettered access to Russia's sovereign and corporate ruble bond market. Analysts expect demand to increase dramatically, sparking a rally in Russian bonds. "This autumn's capital market reforms could spark a rally, the first signs of which are already apparent. Moscow's major exchanges were merged last year and a Central Securities Depository (CSD) has been created. Next up, Russian local bonds will become accepted for settlement through the Euroclear and Clearstream international settlement systems – probably in November – opening the market to entirely new pools of capital," says Elena Kolchina, a fund manager at Renaissance Asset Managers. Currently, the ruble bond market is dominated by Russian banks, which hold a combined portfolio of about $150bn, or about 60% of domestic corporate bonds and state OFZs. Domestic institutions account for another 20% of investments in the local corporate market. And demand is increasing, as the assets of the Russian banking sector are growing by 20% a year on average. "Despite Russia's robust fundamentals, foreign investors are still ignoring the ruble bond market and account for only 5-8% of [state bonds] OFZs, against the average amongst Russia's emerging market peer group of 20%," says Kolchina. "That will change this autumn when Russia should emerge as one of the hot spots in the world and the Russia's ruble bond market comes of age." The capital market reforms have been implemented steadily over the last few years. Before the introduction of recent liberalisation measures, non-resident investors could buy and sell OFZs on Russia's local exchange, but were forced to opening accounts in Russia, which created obstacles for investors and, depending on the arrangement, presenting legal risks that were often prohibitive. Some big investors – like US pension funds – were precluded entirely due to stringent regulations. In January, over-the-counter trading for OFZ was introduced that allowed better and direct access to the market for some non-residents using local depositories and the international Clearstream settlement system. The first OFZ offered under the new rules in February saw demand spike and the state doubled the size of the offering. However, lingering bureaucratic problems have muted demand. The next change due in November is the big one, when the Russian capital markets will be hooked up to the Euroclear system, which in effect offers full access to the whole of Russia's ruble bond market – both sovereign and corporate.

#### Oil revenues key to the Russian economy

Kuboniwa et. al. 05

Masaaki Kuboniwa, Professor, U.S., European and Russian Economies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University (Japan), Shinichiro Tabata, and Nataliya Ustinova, “How Large is the Oil and Gas Sector of Russia?” Eurasian Geography and Economics, 46, http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no11\_ses/02\_kuboniwa.pdf

It is difficult to overstate the importance of the Russian oil and gas sector, both to the Russian economy and to world hydrocarbon markets. Possessing 6 percent of proved world reserves of oil and 27 percent of natural gas, Russia accounted for 9 percent of global oil exports and 29 percent of gas exports in 2003.1 Major customers included the European Union, China, and Japan, with considerable post-9/11 attention to the prospects for penetrating the U.S. market (e.g., see Aron, 2002; Butler, 2002). And internally, in the words of Clifford Gaddy (2004, p. 346), “It is becoming increasingly clear that Russia’s oil sector has been and will for the foreseeable future continue to be the key to the country’s economic performance.” That being said, there is a considerable range of views as to the size of the sector, and there is a need to assess more critically what is actually being measured in the official statistics. The World Bank (2004a, 2004b) only recently concluded that the share of oil and gas sector in Russian GDP was underestimated in the official GDP statistics compiled by Goskomstat Rossii (Federal State Statistics Service of Russia) due to the prevalence of the transfer pricing.2 In this brief paper we revisit the specific treatment of value added created in the oil and gas sector in Russian statistics and offer an alternative method of calculation based on the use of input-output tables, with “enterprise groups” serving as the units of statistical observation. The official figure for the share of the oil and gas sector in Russian GDP can be derived only from the input-output tables compiled by Goskomstat Rossii. The most recent input-output tables available at present cover the year 2001 (Sistema, 2004). The problem with the official Russian figure is that it is very low, namely 7.8 percent in 2000 and 6.7 percent in 2001 (see Table 1). As discussed below, when we add a part of the value added attributed to the trade and transportation sectors (as trade and transportation margins and net taxes on oil and gas) to the official figure, we obtain substantially different figures: 24.1 percent in 2000 and 20.5 in 2001. If this is the case, the share of industry should be increased by some 10 percent, and the share of the trade sector should be reduced accordingly (here, we neglect net taxes on products). This outcome completely changes the structure of Russian GDP, and the contribution of the oil and gas sector to Russian economic growth must be reconsidered. We begin by outlining the relevant methodology employed by Goskomstat Rossii, and follow by presenting our alternative calculations and a comparison of the two methods.

#### Russian economic decline causes nuclear war

Oliker and Charlick-Paley 02

Olga Oliker, senior international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation. Before coming to RAND in 1999, Oliker worked as an independent consultant and held positions in the U.S. Departments of Defense and Energy and Tanya Charlick-Paley, 02,

Assessing Russia's Decline: Trends and Implications for the United States and the U.S. Air Force, www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph\_reports/2007/MR1442.pdf

What challenges does today’s Russia pose for the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. military as a whole? Certainly Russia cannot present even a fraction of the threat the Soviet monolith posed and for which the United States prepared for decades. Yet, if certain negative trends continue, they may create a new set of dangers that can in some ways prove even more real, and therefore more frightening, than the far-off specter of Russian attack ever was. As a weak state, Russia shares some attributes with “failed” or “failing” states, which the academic literature agrees increase the likelihood of internal and interstate conflict and upheaval. Tracing through the specifics of these processes in Russia reveals a great many additional dangers, both humanitarian and strategic. Moscow’s efforts to reassert central control show that much control is already lost, perhaps irretrievably. This is manifested both in center-periphery relations and in the increasing failure of law and order throughout the country, most clearly seen in the increasing institutionalization of corruption and crime. Although Russia’s weakened armed forces are unlikely, by temperament and history, to carry out a coup, real concerns exist that the forces may grow less inclined to go along with aspects of government policy, particularly if they are increasingly used as instruments of internal control as in Chechnya. Moreover, the fact that the Russian military is unlikely to attempt to take power does not mean that it will not seek to increase its influence over policymaking and policy-makers. The uncertainties of military command and control threaten the possibility of accidental (or intentional) nuclear weapon use, while deterioration in the civilian nuclear sector increases the risk of a tragic accident. Russia’s demographic trajectory of ill health and male mortality bodes ill for the nation’s ability to resolve its economic troubles (given an increasingly graying population) and creates concerns about its continued capacity to maintain a fighting force even at current levels of effectiveness. Finally, the fact that economic, political, and demographic declines affect parts of Russia very differently, combined with increased regional political autonomy over the course of Russian independence and continuing concerns about interethnic and interregional tension, creates a danger that locality and/or ethnicity could become rallying cries for internal conflict. While some might argue that Russia’s weakness, or even the potential for its eventual collapse, has little to do with the United States, the truth is that a range of U.S. interests is directly affected by Russia’s deterioration and the threats that it embodies. The dangers of proliferation or use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), heightened by Russian weakness, quite directly threaten the United States and its vital interests. Organized crime in Russia is linked to a large and growing multinational network of criminal groups that threatens the United States and its economy both directly and through links with (and support of) global and local terrorist organizations. Russia is also a major energy producer and a transit state for oil and gas from the Caspian at a time when the U.S. government has identified that region, and energy interests in general, as key to its national security. Washington’s allies, closer to Russia physically, are not only the customers for much of this energy but are also the likely victims of any refugee flows, environmental crises, or potential flare-ups of violence that Russian decline may spur. Finally, recent history suggests a strong possibility that the Untied States would play a role in seeking to alleviate a humanitarian crisis on or near Russian soil, whether it was caused by epidemic, war, or a nuclear/industrial catastrophe.

#### Economic collapse will cause nationalist takeover – far worse than Putin

Friedlander 09

Monica Friedlander, “Ken Jowitt Offers New Perspective on Russian Politics,” 5/13/09, http://ls.berkeley.edu/?q=node/911

In a recent lecture on Russian politics, Professor Emeritus of Political Science Ken Jowitt challenged the Western world to shed its outdated and simplistic view of world powers as divided into autocracies and Western-style democracies. With the bipolarism of the Cold War long gone, he said, it is incumbent upon us to look at Russia without either assuming the worst or harboring unrealistic hopes of reshaping it in our image. “It is good to know exactly who and what you’re dealing with, instead of working with the romantic view that there are one hundred million democrats in Russia waiting for the Putin regime to fail and create a Jeffersonian democracy, because it’s not an option,” Jowitt said in an animated, heavily attended talk sponsored earlier this month by the Institute of Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies. An expert in comparative politics and post-Communist societies, Jowitt has taught political science at Berkeley for 37 years. He is the Robson Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Berkeley and the Pres and Maurine Hotchkis Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He’s also a sought-after speaker worldwide. Russia today, Jowitt said, is neither autocratic nor imperialistic. It is neither Communist nor accepting of Western democracy. And though its ruling elite may not be Stalinist in the sense of wielding absolute power, it is openly defiant, even offensive in its policy and rhetoric, both internally and externally. All of this makes old political stereotypes obsolete. Jowitt described Vladimir Putin — the de facto leader of Russia even after having ceded the presidency and assumed the formal title of prime minister — as a vulgar, ruthless politician “with less charisma than this podium.” But he is adept at solidifying his dominance of Russian politics and defining Russia as a great sovereign power whose foreign policy is based on crude self-interest and defiance of the West. “When you create a new identity in the absence of institutions, personality becomes especially important,” Jowitt explained. “And the cult of personality around Putin is a function of making it clear to the outside and the inside that there’s a new name in town and it’s not democracy and it’s not Yeltsin.” For the first time since the French Revolution, Jowitt said, the world has only one prevailing ideology: the Western liberal capitalist democracy. And unlike his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, who tried to mimic the West, Putin feels threatened by it and is determined to keep it at bay. If he feels provoked by NATO’s expansion to or near Russian borders, Putin will push back — as he did when Russia invaded Georgia last year. But such behavior in itself does not make Russia imperialistic. “Last year Putin could have occupied all of Georgia,” Jowitt said. “We’re talking about a state that could not have stood for four more days. And Russia could bring Ukraine to its knees right now.” But it does not, Jowitt said, because Putin’s focus is on political and economic stability, not costly military aggression. Jowitt described Putin as the ultimate ruthless pragmatist. “What’s the deal? Who wins? Who loses? It’s pure interest,” he said. “If Russia’s interest and yours coincide, fantastic. And if they don’t coincide, they can be hostile or violent, so it’s better [for us] to recognize and accommodate them to avoid violence.” Putin’s antagonistic stance, however, is born out of a “high state of anxiety,” not a desire for world domination. Jowitt repeatedly compared him to a rebellious teenager: “Putin and his Russian elite are in their junior-high-school phase. Their behavior is sullen, rude, even combative. They are seen wearing black-leather jackets at rock concerts, hurling hurtful, despicable insults at the United States, claiming that the United States is no better than Stalin and the Nazis.” At home Putin acts the same way, Jowitt said. “He distances himself from ordinary politicians by likening ordinary politicians to tampon salesmen.” Surprise, surprise! Putin’s state of mind must be understood from the standpoint of a regime still unsettled in its attempts to establish its identity, Jowitt said, fearful that its new power will be undermined from either inside or outside. Jowitt attributes this anxiety to three major factors: the pro-democracy movements in former Soviet republics (the “color revolutions” in states like Ukraine and Georgia); the international movement toward globalization; and the flood of “arrogant, self confident American democracy and market advisors” who descended on Russia in the 1990s preaching liberal capitalist ideology to a fragile, emerging democracy. The response? “Surprise, surprise! A lot of Russians weren’t interested.” That’s something that the U.S. never understood, Jowitt said. Americans, he explained, have always subscribed to the view best described by Thomas Paine’s revolutionary words, “We have the power to begin the world all over again.” But, Jowitt said, “Note that he didn’t not include the words ‘in our image.’ This comes up over and over again – Reagan, Woodrow Wilson, George Bush. We don’t take into account that there’s no social, political, or economic critical mass and no desire for western liberal democracy [in Russia today].” Instead, quite the opposite may be true, Jowitt cautioned. Far from becoming more democratic, Russia could fall prey to what he described as “rage-filled, anti-Western” forces” who could take power in a crisis. And leadership that comes out of a crisis, he said, is always unpredictable. “The threat to Russian stability today comes from the inside,” Jowitt said. “If the Russian economy collapses … we might be in a situation where we see the appearance of nihilistic ideologies and movements clustered around leaders trying to form an alliance with parts of the Russian military.” The result of such developments, Jowitt concluded, would be a far less palatable alternative to Putin’s rule. “In light of the economic recession and what Russia is today and what it is not, a state mercantilistic Russia led by non-ideological Putin may not be the optimal political outcome for Russia. But in 2009, it’s not at all a bad second-best.”

#### ----Resurgent Russian nationalism leads to miscalculation and nuclear war

Hellman 08

Martin Hellman, professor of electrical engineering, Stanford, 10/23/08, Asia Times, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Front\_Page/JJ23Aa01.html

A similar situation exists with nuclear weapons. Many people point to the absence of global war since the dawn of the nuclear era as proof that these weapons ensure peace. The MX missile was even christened the Peacekeeper. Just as the laws of physics are used to ensure that a pilot executing a low pass will gain enough altitude to make a safe landing, a law of nuclear deterrence is invoked to quiet any concern over possibly killing billions of innocent people: Since World War III would mean the end of civilization, no one would dare start it. Each side is deterred from attacking the other by the prospect of certain destruction. That's why our current strategy is called nuclear deterrence or mutually assured destruction (MAD). But again, it's important to read the fine print. It is true that no one in his right mind would start a nuclear war, but when people are highly stressed they often behave irrationally and even seemingly rational decisions can lead to places that no one wants to visit. Neither US president John F Kennedy nor Russian premier Nikita Khrushchev wanted to teeter on the edge of the nuclear abyss during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, but that is exactly what they did. Less well known nuclear near misses occurred during the Berlin crisis of 1961, the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) Able Archer exercise of 1983. In each of those episodes, the law of unintended consequences combined with the danger of irrational decision-making under stress created an extremely hazardous situation. Because the last date for a nuclear near miss listed above was 1983, it might be hoped that the end of the Cold War removed the nuclear sword hanging over humanity's head. Aside from the fact that other potential crises such as Taiwan were unaffected, a closer look shows that the Cold War, rather than ending, merely went into hibernation. In the West, the reawakening of this specter is usually attributed to resurgent Russian nationalism, but as in most disagreements the other side sees things very differently.

#### Doesn’t collapse the global environment – artic not key – their ev only says it could affect US biodiversity

#### Alt causes to biodiversity – deforestation, pollution, transportation

#### No impact to environment

Easterbrook 95 [Gregg, Distinguished Fellow, Fullbright Foundation, A Moment on Earth pg 25]

IN THE AFTERMATH OF EVENTS SUCH AS LOVE CANAL OR THE Exxon Valdez oil spill, every reference to the environment is prefaced with the adjective "fragile." "Fragile environment" has become a welded phrase of the modern lexicon, like "aging hippie" or "fugitive financier." But the notion of a fragile environment is profoundly wrong. Individual animals, plants, and people are distressingly fragile. **The environment** that contains them **is** close to **indestructible.** The living environment of Earth has survived ice ages; bombardments of cosmic radiation more deadly than atomic fallout; solar radiation more powerful than the worst-case projection for ozone depletion; thousand-year periods of intense volcanism releasing global air pollution far worse than that made by any factory; reversals of the planet's magnetic poles; the rearrangement of continents; transformation of plains into mountain ranges and of seas into plains; fluctuations of ocean currents and the jet stream; 300-foot vacillations in sea levels; shortening and lengthening of the seasons caused by shifts in the planetary axis; collisions of asteroids and comets bearing far more force than man's nuclear arsenals; and the years without summer that followed these impacts. Yet hearts beat on, and petals unfold still. Were the environment fragile it would have expired many eons before the advent of the industrial affronts of the dreaming ape. Human assaults on the environment, though mischievous, are pinpricks compared to forces of the magnitude nature is accustomed to resisting.

#### Nationalism won’t lead to aggression – Putin is rational.

Rifkind 12 [Malcolm, former foreign secretary of the UK, Putin's Cold War politics will fail Russia; The new president's lack of friends – and imagination – will cost his country dear, Daily Telegraph, March 6]

Vladimir Putin's victory is, for the West, not entirely disagreeable. Rather, like the curate's egg, it is good in parts. It guarantees that for the next six years Russia will be **stable and** fairly **predictable.** It will have, as its president, a leader who is tough and cool. He will conduct a foreign policy with which we are already familiar. It will be nationalist, but **not dangerous or irrational** on the supreme questions of peace and war. When you are dealing with a state that still has thousands of nuclear warheads, having Putin in the Kremlin should not cause us to lose too much sleep.

No NATO-Russia war – deterrence checks – their evidence says it would spur an arms race, not conflict.

#### Multipolarity’s inevitable – economic realities make hegemony unsustainable.

Layne 12 [Christopher Layne is professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University’s George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service. His next book, for Yale University Press, is After the Fall: International Politics, U.S. Grand Strategy, and the End of the Pax Americana. The (Almost) Triumph of Offshore Balancing January 27, 2012 http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/almost-triumph-offshore-balancing-6405?page=1]

The DSG is a response to two drivers. First, the United States is in economic decline and will face a **serious fiscal crisis** **by the end of this decade.** As President Obama said, the DSG reflects the need to “put our fiscal house in order here at home and renew our long-term economic strength.” The **best indicators** of U.S. decline are its GDP relative to potential competitors and its share of world manufacturing output. China’s manufacturing output has now edged past that of the United States and accounts for just over 18 or 19 percent of world manufacturing output. With respect to GDP, virtually all leading economic forecasters agree that, measured by market-exchange rates, China’s aggregate GDP will exceed that of the United States by the end of the current decade. Measured by purchasing-power parity, some leading economists believe China already is the world’s number-one economy. Clearly, China is on the verge of overtaking the United States economically. At the end of this decade, when the ratio of U.S. government debt to GDP is likely to exceed the danger zone of 100 percent, the United States will face a severe fiscal crisis. In a June 2011 report, the Congressional Budget Office warned that unless Washington drastically slashes expenditures—including on entitlements and defense—and raises taxes, it is headed for a fiscal train wreck. Moreover, concerns about future inflation and America’s ability to repay its debts could imperil the U.S. dollar’s reserve-currency status. That currency status allows the United States to avoid difficult “guns-or-butter” trade-offs and live well beyond its means while enjoying entitlements at home and geopolitical preponderance abroad. But that works only so long as foreigners are willing to lend the United States money. Speculation is now commonplace about the dollar’s long-term hold on reserve-currency status. It would have been unheard of just a few years ago. The second driver behind the new Pentagon strategy is the shift in global wealth and power from the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia. As new great powers such as China and, eventually, India emerge, important regional powers such as Russia, Japan, Turkey, Korea, South Africa and Brazil will assume more prominent roles in international politics. Thus, the post-Cold War “unipolar moment,” when the United States commanded the global stage as the “sole remaining superpower,” will be **replaced by a multipolar** international **system.** The Economist recently projected that China’s defense spending will equal that of the United States by 2025. By the middle or end of the next decade, China will be positioned to shape a new international order based on the rules and norms that it prefers—and, perhaps, to provide the international economy with a new reserve currency.

#### Heg doesn’t solve conflict.

Fettweis 11 [Christopher, Prof. of Political Science – Tulane, Dangerous Times?: The International Politics of Great Power Peace Page 73-6]

The primary attack on restraint, or justification for internationalism, posits that if the United Stets were to withdraw from the world, a variety of ills would sweep over key regions and eventually pose threats to U.S. security and/or prosperity, nese problems might take three forms (besides the obvious, if remarkably unlikely, direct threats to the homeland): generalized chaos, hostile imbalances in Eurasia, and/or failed states. Historian Arthur Schlesinger was typical when he worried that restraint would mean "a chaotic, violent, and ever more dangerous planet."69 All of these concerns either implicitly or explicitly assume that the presence of the United States is the primary reason for international stability, and if that presence were withdrawn chaos would ensue. In other words, they depend upon hegemonic-stability logic. Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for ex¬ample, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stabil¬ity to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that are gen¬erally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemon, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe.70 Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today's interconnected world, economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would "become a more dangerous place" and, sooner or later, that would "re¬dound to America's detriment."71 If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually provides stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, to believe that US **hegemony is not the** primary **cause of** the current era of s**tability**. First of all, the hegemonic-stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the community of great powers is if self-policing occurs, if states have decided that their interests are served by peace. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could maintain stability. Likewise, if it true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world's population that 2\* m the United States simply could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the nsk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States may be patrolling a neighborhood that has already rid itself of crime. Stability and unipolarity may besimply coincidental., order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest ome World would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment to/ bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always proven to be especiallly eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in War without the presence, whether physical or psychologi-cal, of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to War without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work. Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present. Second, the limited **empirical evidence** we have suggests that there is **little connection** between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on de¬fense in real terms than it had in 1990.72 To internationalists, defense hawks, and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible "peace dividend" endangered both national and global security. "No serious analyst of American military capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace."73 If the pacific trends were due not to U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate War, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable Pentagon, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. **No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no re-gional balancing occurred** once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international War was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and it kept declining as the Bush Administra-tion ramped spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be neces-sary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. It is also worth noting for our purposes that the United States was no less safe. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a con- nection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. One could pre- sumably argue that spending is not the only, or even the best, indication of he- LTm? T 15 inSt6ad US" foreign Political and security commitments Zcre7Tn I ^ ndther was -gnificantly altered during this period, mcreased conflict should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of heg¬emonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is de¬cisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it were true that either U.S. commitments or relative spend-ing accounts for international pacific trends, the 1990s make it obvious that stability can be sustained at drastically lower levels. In other words, even if one believes that there is a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without imperiling global stability, a rational grand strategist would still cut back on engagement (and spending) until that level is determined. As of now, we have no idea how cheap hegemonic stability could be, or if a low point exists at all. Since the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment, engagement should be scaled back until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. And if the constructivist interpretation of events is correct and the global peace is inher-ently stable, no increase in conflict would ever occur, irrespective of U.S. spend-ing, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expec-tations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as evidence for the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the ordy data we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military pending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without ^e presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone. tf the only thing standing between the world and chaos is the U.S. military Presence, then an adjustment in grand strategy would be exceptionally counter-productive. But it is worth recalling that none of the other explanations for the decline of War—nuclear weapons, complex economic interdependence, international and domestic political institutions, evolution in ideas and norms necessitate an activist America to maintain their validity. Were America to be-co\*e more restrained, nuclear weapons would still affect the calculations of the would-be aggressor; the process of globalization would continue, deepening the complexity of economic interdependence; the United Nations could still deploy Peacekeepers where necessary; and democracy would not shrivel where it cur-\*7 exis\*s. Most importantly, the idea that war is a worthwhile way to resolve conflict would have no reason to return. As was argued in chapter 2, normative evolution is typically unidirectional. Strategic restraint in such a world would be virtually risk-free. Finally, some analysts have worried that a de facto surrender of U.S. hege¬mony would lead to a rise of Chinese influence. Indeed, China is the only other major power that has increased its military spending since the end of the Cold War, even if it is still a rather low 2 percent of its GDP. Such levels of effort do not suggest a desire to compete with, much less supplant, the United States. The much-ballyhooed decade-long military buildup has brought Chinese spending up to approximately one-tenth the level of that of the United States. It is hardly clear that restraint on the part of the United States would invite Chinese global dominance. Bradley Thayer worries that Chinese would become "the language of diplomacy, trade and commerce, transportation and navigation, the internet, world sport, and global culture," and that Beijing would come to "dominate sci¬ence and technology, in all its forms" to the extent that soon the world would witness a Chinese astronaut who not only travels to the Moon, but "plants the communist flag on Mars, and perhaps other planets in the future."74 Fortunately one need not ponder for too long the horrible specter of a red flag on Venus, since on the planet Earth, where War is no longer the dominant form of conflict resolution, the threats posed by even a rising China would not be terribly dire. The dangers contained in the terrestrial security environment are less frightening than ever before, no matter which country is strongest.

#### Rationality checks miscalculation.

Quinlan 9 [Sir Michael, co-founder and President Emeritus of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principle, Problems, Prospects, p. 68-71]

Similar considerations apply to the hypothesis of nuclear war being mistakenly triggered by false alarm. Critics again point to the fact, as it is understood, of numerous occasions when initial steps in alert sequences for US nuclear forces were embarked upon, or at least called for, by indicators mistaken or misconstrued. In none of these instances, it is accepted, did matters get at all near to nuclear launch-extraordinary good fortune again, critics have suggested. But the rival and more logical inference from hundreds of events stretching over sixty years of experience presents itself once more: that the probability of initial misinterpretation leading far towards mistaken launch is **remote.** Precisely because any nuclear-weapon possessor recognizes the vast gravity of any launch, release sequences have many steps, and human decision is repeatedly interposed as well as capping the sequences. To convey that because a first step was prompted the world somehow came close to accidental nuclear war is wild hyperbole, rather like asserting, when a tennis champion has lost his opening service game, that he was nearly beaten in straight sets. History anyway scarcely offers any ready example of major war started by accident even before the nuclear revolution imposed an order-of-magnitude increase in caution. It was occasionally conjectured that nuclear war might be triggered by the real but accidental or unauthorized launch of a strategic nuclear-weapon delivery system in the direction of a potential adversary. No such launch is known to have occurred in over sixty years. The probability of it is therefore **very low.** But even if it did happen, the further hypothesis of its initiating a general nuclear exchange is **far-fetched.** It fails to consider the real situation of decision-makers, as pages 63-4 have brought out. The notion that cosmic holocaust might be mistakenly precipitated in this way belongs to science fiction. One special form of miscalculation appeared sporadically in the speculations of academic commentators, though it was scarcely ever to be encountered-at least so far as my own observation went-in the utterances of practical planners within government. This is the idea that nuclear war might be erroneously triggered, or erroneously widened, through a state under attack misreading either what sort of attack it was being subjected to, or where the attack came from. The postulated misreading of the nature of the attack referred in particular to the hypothesis that if a delivery system-normally a missile-that was known to be capable of carrying either a nuclear or a conventional warhead was launched in a conventional role, the target country might, on detecting the launch through its earlywarning systems, misconstrue the mission as an imminent nuclear strike and immediately unleash a nuclear counter-strike of its own. This conjecture was voiced, for example, as a criticism of the proposals for giving the US Trident SLBM, long associated with nuclear missions, a capability to deliver conventional warheads. Whatever the merit of those proposals (it is not explored here), it is hard to regard this particular apprehension as having any real-life credibility. The flight time of a ballistic missile would not exceed about thirty minutes, and that of a cruise missile a few hours, before arrival on target made its character-conventional or nuclear-unmistakable. No governent will need, and no nonlunatic government could wish, to take within so short a span of time a step as enormous and irrevocable as the execution of a nuclear strike on the basis of early-warning information alone without knowing the true nature of the incoming attack. The speculation tends moreover to be expressed without reference either to any realistic political or conflict-related context thought to render the episode plausible, or to the manifest interest of the launching country, should there be any risk of doubt, in ensuring-by explicit communication if necessary-that there was no misinterpretation of its conventionally armed launch.

### Artic

#### No arctic conflict or escalation.

Axe 11 [David, Wired, How the U.S. Wins the Coming Arctic War \* January 11, 2011 | \* 2:38 pm | \* Categories: Navy http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/01/how-the-u-s-wins-the-coming-arctic-war/?utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+WiredDangerRoom+%28Blog+-+Danger+Room%29&utm\_content=Google+Reader]

The story always starts and ends the same way. Up top, how global climate change will, by 2015 or so, result in ice-free Arctic summers — allowing shipping and oil and natural-gas extraction. At the bottom, how the U.S. isn’t doing enough to secure its slice of the Arctic pie. I should know: in weaker moments, I’ve written this tale, too. But these tales, my versions included, usually omit two vital points: that **Arctic conflict is unlikely to occur** at all; and even if it does, the U.S. will have an **overwhelming advantage** over any rival. The Washington Post was the latest to repeat the Arctic-war theme, in a story published yesterday. “The Arctic is believed to hold nearly a quarter of the world’s untapped natural resources and a new passage could shave as much as 40 percent of the time it takes for commercial shippers to travel from the Atlantic to the Pacific,” Jacquelyn Ryan wrote. But, she added, “government and military officials are concerned the United States is not moving quickly enough to protect American interests in this vulnerable and fast-changing region.” Specifically, the U.S. does not have enough icebreakers or permanent bases on the Alaskan north slope. Canada and Russia, by contrast, are buying ice-hardened Arctic ships and building new facilities to enforce their Arctic claims, Ryan pointed out. The thing is, it’s not icebreakers and patches of wind-blasted tarmac that would really matter in some future North Pole showdown. In the Arctic, as in any sea battle, American nuclear attack submarines — quiet, versatile and lethal — would make all the difference. U.S. subs have been sneaking around under the Arctic ice, and occasionally surfacing, for decades. Today, they even carry geologists and other scientists in order to help map Arctic mineral deposits. “In addition to being more heavily armed than most foreign boats, U.S. submarines generally have superior quieting and combat systems, better-trained crewmen, and much more rigorous maintenance standards,” Bob Work wrote in 2008, before becoming Navy undersecretary. “As a result, the U.S. submarine force has generally been confident that **it could defeat any** potential undersea **opponent, even if** significantly **outnumbered.”** But in the Arctic, facing only the Canadians, Russians, Danes and Norwegians — none of whom have large or healthy sub fleets — the U.S. Navy’s 50 Los Angeles-, Seawolf- and Virginia-class subs would be more numerous as well as more powerful. And besides, an Arctic war is highly unlikely, at best. “Militarized conflict over the Arctic is unlikely, and regional disputes are unlikely to cause an overall deterioration in relations between or among polar nations,” the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace concluded in a 2009 conference. “Security issues should not be sensationalized in order to attract attention towards the Arctic.” But it’s rare anyone writes stories about how we’ve got enough weapons — and don’t really need them, besides. After all, it’s the sensational stories about shortages and looming disaster that sell newspapers.

#### International dispute settlement checks.

Baker 8 [Betsy, prof. International Law @ Vermont Law School Arctic Mapping and the Law of the Sea, 9-14-08” http://arctic-healy-baker-2008.blogspot.com/2008/09/conflict-in-arctic-tenacity-of-media.html]

Just hours after I returned, a week ago, from my trip to the Arctic Ocean, I was dismayed to open the New York Times and find on its editorial page hyperbole verging on that which other media sources use to perpetuate the myth of "fierce disputes over territory and natural resources" in the Arctic. ("Arctic in Retreat", September 8, 2008). As the sea-ice retreats, states are turning **not to arms** but to **existing legal structures** and a **tradition of scientific and and diplomatic cooperation** to address common problems as well as disagreements. Immediately after transporting our mapping crew to shore last week, The Healy turned right around and began breaking ice for a Canadian icebreaker, the Louis Saint Laurent. This month-long joint mission to map parts of the Arctic Ocean floor is scientific and diplomatic cooperation at its international best. Like the Russian mapping the NYT mentions in its editorial, the US and Canada are gathering data in preparation not for conflict but for submission in a staid and stable legal process designed to provide certainty for all states involved. The Law of the Sea Convention establishes this orderly mechanism of rigorous scientific vetting for states seeking to extend their authority over larger portions of the continental shelf. The United States is the only Arctic state not party to the Convention but is nonetheless mapping for its potential shelf extension in keeping with procedures agreed by the international community.

#### Arctic countries will use peaceful and diplomatic dispute resolution mechanisms

McBride 11 (Blake McBride, Commander and part of U.S. Navy Task Force Climate Change, Climate Skepticism & Ways Forward, 2011, Center for a better life)

All evidence suggests that differences over sovereignty claims by the Arctic nations will be adjudicated through diplomatic means under the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea. While the United States has not formally acceded to the Convention, it does comply with provisions governing traditional uses of oceans. In addition, the U.S. is a member of the Arctic Council, an intergovernmental forum for the eight Arctic nations. Last May the Arctic Council completed a search and rescue agreement that focuses on coordination, cooperation and defined areas of responsibility. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton signed the agreement for the U.S., an indicator of its diplomatic importance to the Obama Administration.

#### No chance of war or nuclear conflict in the Arctic – Cooperation, resources divided now

Chernitsa 9-13-12

(Polina, reporter, “Arctic: Politics against speculations”, The Voice of Russia, http://english.ruvr.ru/2012\_09\_13/Arctic-Politics-against-speculations/)

Among the announced topics are studying the development of the Arctic Region and the discussion of the regional development strategy. More than 350 specialists from Russia and other Arctic states have arrived in Arkhangelsk. One of the main topics is the broadening of international cooperation in the Arctic Region. Anton Vasiliyev says.¶ "The threat of a nuclear conflict has been eliminated, strategic weapons are being reduced, and the development of bilateral and multilateral cooperation is gaining momentum there."¶ Alexander Vasiliev says that the opinion that the Arctic Region has become an arena of fierce struggle for resources is far-fetched. The current arrangement of forces in the region can trigger neither conflicts nor wars, the Russian ambassador said. According to him, all issues are being settled in a civilized way – the more so as the greater part of the resources has already been divided between the Arctic states. Tensions are being fanned by those who are either unable to understand what is happening there or by those who want to intentionally distort the reality. Really, earlier Moscow’s plans to establish a military brigade for work in the Arctic caused sharp criticism in the West. Alexander Vasiliev says that this measure is only Moscow’s answer to the changes in the region: the thawing of the Arctic ice makes Russia’s northern borders more passable – that is why the strengthening of the coast guard is inevitable.

#### Arctic conflict empirically denied during cold war – diplomatic ties solve and it’s all media spin

Spencer Ackerman, American national security reporter for The New Republic and Wired, 7/8/11, “War For the Arctic: Never Mind”, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/06/war-for-the-arctic-never-mind///jchen

It wasn’t long ago that the press was running wild with hyperbolic claims of the U.S. losing out in an impending Arctic conflict. After all, global warming is freeing up access to large deposits of oil, gas and minerals right in the backyard of the Russians. But the press forgot to tell other polar nations to freak out.Indeed, at a forum convened on Wednesday by the Center for Strategic and International Security, ambassadors from four polar nations, includingsome traditionally menaced by Russia, were sanguine about the future of polar exploration.“We actually think we handled these areas for decades during the Cold War rather well,” saidWeggerStrommen, Norway’sman in Washington. The U.S Geological Survey assesses that the North Pole holds about 13 percent of the world’s untapped oil supplies.Companies and nations are champing at the bit to expand exploration as the ice caps melt. The Russians have an advantage: a fleet of six nuclear powered icebreakers on its northern shore. By contrast, the U.S. Coast Guard has just one, the cutter Healy. But no one’s sweating it. Should there actually be an arctic sea conflict, the U.S. submarine fleet is second to none, as my colleague David Axe has pointed out. And a massive Arctic oil rush is “years off,”Strommen added, since the “climate is harsh, the conditions are difficult and it’s incredibly expensive.” Beyond that, the Russians are warm in the Arctic. Russia finalized a maritime border with Norway on Tuesday that took 30 years to negotiate. Strommen’scolleagues from Greenland, Canada and Sweden gave high marks to a meeting last month of the Arctic Council, the diplomatic contact group of arctic nations, in which Russia signed onto an accord for search and rescue missions in the cold waters. Think of it as a diplomatic thaw.

### **Solvency**

#### Offshore open now – oil companies aren’t using 72% of open areas

Mackenzie Bronson, intern with the energy policy team at the Center for American Progress, 10/23/12,” Use It Or Lose It: Report Shows Oil And Gas Companies Sitting On Thousands Of Unused Leases,” http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/10/23/1072351/use-it-or-lose-it-report-shows-oil-and-gas-companies-sitting-on-thousands-of-unused-leases/

Mitt Romney, the American Petroleum Institute, and other fossil fuel allies constantly agitate to open more federal lands and waters to drilling, claiming that they aren’t getting enough access. But a new report from Representative Edward Markey titled “Use It or Lose It” finds that 131 oil and gas companies have 3,684 idle leases in the Gulf of Mexico alone. The Big Five oil companies — BP, Chevron, Shell, ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips — are responsible for 40 percent of the 20.7 million acres “not undergoing exploration, development, or production” in the region. According to the report, a majority of offshore leases and onshore leases are not being used by oil companies: Oil companies have failed to explore, develop or produce these leases while simultaneously calling on Congress and the Interior Department to lease more federal offshore lands. This issue, which has been hotly debated in recent years, came up in last Tuesday’s presidential debate when Republican nominee Mitt Romney wrongly accused President Obama of curtailing oil and gas drilling off America’s coasts and on public land. In fact, oil and gas production from public lands is higher than it was during the last three years of the George W. Bush administration, and the Obama administration is trying to further boost production through “use it or lose it” policies for idle federal drilling leases. Oil and gas companies are currently not using 72 percent of the total acres leased offshore and 56 percent of the total acres leased onshore.

#### Wave of new leases prove investors don’t care about regulations

Jeremy Alford, Capitol Correspondent, “Does lease sale restore interest in Gulf oil?”, 6/22/12, http://www.dailycomet.com/article/20120622/ARTICLES/120629850?p=all&tc=pgall//jchen

BATON ROUGE — Louisiana energy boosters contend this week’s record-setting federal lease sale is prompting oil and gas investors to bet heavily on the Gulf of Mexico’s central region.

The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management oversaw the sale Wednesday from the Mercedes-Benz Superdome in New Orleans and the resulting numbers paint an optimistic picture for the near future.

There were 593 bids submitted by 48 companies on 454 federally owned drilling tracts that brought in more than $1.7 billion. Statoil, a Norway-based energy firm, was behind a $157 million bid — the largest in more than 30 years — for a tract just south of Louisiana’s central coastline.

While the sale certainly set a record in regard to bid sizes, it was still off pace compared to other Gulf-area lease sales from just a few years ago. For example, a 2008 Gulf sale generated $9.4 billion for the U.S. treasury through new leases and another in 2010 attracted bids from 77 companies.

Still, this week’s sale does trump the $337 million that was collected in December, which was the first bidding process held for Gulf waters since the 2010 BP oil spill.

Lori LeBlanc, executive director of the Gulf Economic Survival Team, a nonprofit advocacy group, said she blames the long recovery on regulatory uncertainty on the federal level. But she also noted the renewed interest in the Gulf — in terms of dollars, it tops all similar sales held since 2009 — proves investors are willing to jump through more than a few hoops to get into the waters.

“Despite continuing bottlenecks in terms of extended review periods for plans, limited permits for unique wells designated to reach hydrocarbons, and an overall lack of predictability concerning permits for future operations, companies continue to bet on the vast potential of the Gulf,” LeBlanc said.

#### Regulatory uncertainty is over – companies are confident they can meet federal guidelines

Jennifer Dlouhy, reporter, Fuelfix, “Record-setting Gulf drilling auction nets $1.7 billion”, 6/20/12, http://fuelfix.com/blog/2012/06/20/record-setting-gulf-drilling-auction-nets-1-7-billion///jchen

Analysts said Wednesday’s sale results signal that oil and gas companies believe they can satisfy new safety mandates imposed since the Deepwater Horizon disaster and win permits to drill in the Gulf.

“The strong interest in the lease sale shows the confluence of pent-up demand, recent central Gulf of Mexico discoveries and the emerging confidence among the oil and gas industry that they will be able to acquire the plans and permits needed to develop the resources,” said Benjamin Salisbury, an analyst with FBR Capital Markets.

Salisbury said there was more excitement heading into the sale.

“The enthusiasm level was higher going into this because the operators feel like they’re getting a straight deal from the Department of Interior,” Salisbury said. “They think they have strong communication and are being evaluated on the merits. And they understand what is required of them to a greater extent than they did before.”

That represents a turnaround from the industry’s tangling with federal regulators over new drilling safety rules and a deep-water drilling moratorium two years ago.

Salazar called the auction results “proof positive that the oil and gas industry is confident they can meet the heightened requirements.”