### 1

#### Plan action has to be in the US – the aff uses carriers that are based internationally

#### “In” means within

Encarta 7 Encarta World English Dictionary, 7 (“In (1)”, 2007

<http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?refid=1861620513>]

in [ [in](http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/Pronounce.aspx?search=in) ] CORE MEANING: a grammatical word indicating that something or somebody is within or inside something. 1. preposition indicates place: indicates that something happens or is situated somewhere He spent a whole year in Russia.

#### The US geographically is only the 50 states and DC

Legal Information Institute 12 <http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/7701>

[USC](http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text) › [Title 26](http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/usc_sup_01_26) › [Subtitle F](http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/usc_sup_01_26_10_F) › [Chapter 79](http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/usc_sup_01_26_10_F_20_79) › § 7701

26 USC § 7701 – Definitions

(9) United States

The term “United States” when used in a geographical sense includes only the States and the District of Columbia.

#### **Voting Issue -** Limits are necessary for negative preparation and clash.

#### Production outside the US unlimits. They could give energy assistance to any country in the world.

### 2

#### Financial incentives include funding and loan guarantees; procurement is a non-financial incentive

**Czinkota et al, 9 -** Associate Professor at the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University (Michael, Fundamentals of International Business, p. 69 – google books)

Incentives offered by policymakers to facilitate foreign investments are mainly of three types: fiscal, financial, and nonfinancial. Fiscal incentives are specific tax measures designed to attract foreign investors. They typically consist of special depreciation allowances, tax credits or rebates, special deductions for capital expenditures, tax holidays, and the reduction of tax burdens. Financial incentives offer special funding for the investor by providing, for example, land or buildings, loans, and loan guarantees. Nonfinancial incentives include guaranteed government purchases; special protection from competition through tariffs, import quotas, and local content requirements, and investments in infrastructure facilities.

#### Procurement of carriers is not topical because it’s not energy production

#### Voter for limits – nonfinancial incentives could be anything from coercion to persuasion – impossible to predict and research

#### Extra topicality is a voting issue – they justify procuring any government technology that uses energy – everything runs on oil, nuclear or some renewable energy

### 3

#### The Aff’s Discourse of Hegemonic Integration Rehashes The Geographies of Exclusion and Barbarism in Nicer Term - The Discourse of “Global Instability” Versus a Stable US Confirm the Hierarchy of Dominant US Identity.

Daavid Campbell et. al. 7, Prof. of Geography @ Durham, ‘7 [*Political Geography* 26, “Performing security: The imaginative geographies of current US strategy,” p. Wiley]

The concept of integration, invoked in different ways and in different measures by both **Kagan** and Barnett, is similarly at the heart of the current administration's foreign and domestic policies. The former Director of Policy at the US State Department, Richard Haass, articulated the central tenets of the concept when he wondered: Is there a successor idea to containment? I think there is. It is the idea of integration. The goal of US foreign policy should be to persuade the other major powers to sign on to certain key ideas as to how the world should operate: opposition to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, support for free trade, democracy, markets. Integration is about locking them into these policies and then building institutions that lock them in even more (Haass in Lemann, 1 April 2002, emphasis added). That the US **is no longer** prepared to tolerate regimes that do not mirror its own democratic values and practices, and that it will seek to persuade such major powers to change their policies and behaviours to fit the American modus operandi, is not without historical precedent (Ambrosius, 2006). Nor does the differently imagined geography of integration replace completely previous Manichean conceptions of the world so familiar to Cold War politics. Rather, the proliferation of new terms of antipathy such as ‘axis of evil’, ‘rogue states’, and ‘terror cities’ demonstrate how integration goes hand in hand with – and is mutually constitutive of – new forms of division**.** Barnett's divide between the globalised world and the non-integrating gap is reflected and complemented by Kagan's divide in ways of dealing with this state of affairs. Much of this imagined geography pivots on the idea of ‘the homeland’. Indeed, in the imaginations of the security analysts we highlight here, there is a direct relationship and tension between securing the homeland's borders and challenging the sanctity of borders elsewhere (see Kaplan, 2003: 87). Appreciating this dynamic requires us to trace some of the recent articulations of US strategy. Since September 11th 2001 the US government and military have issued a number of documents outlining their security strategy. Each recites, reiterates and resignifies both earlier strategic statements as well each other, **creating a sense of boundedness and fixity which naturalizes a specific view of the world**. Initially there was The National Strategy for Homeland Security (Office of Homeland Security, 2002), and then the much broader scope National Security Strategy (The White House, 2002b; see Der Derian, 2003). These were followed by the “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism” and particular plans for Military Strategy, Defense Strategy and the “Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support” (Department of Defense, 2005a, Department of Defense, 2005b, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004 and The White House, 2002a). These are seen as an interlocking whole, where “the National Military Strategy (NMS) supports the aims of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and implements the National Defense Strategy (NDS)” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004: 1); and the “Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support” builds “upon the concept of an active, layered defense outlined in the National Defense Strategy” (Department of Defense, 2005b: iii; see also diagram on 6). The updated National Security Strategy (The White House, 2006) presents a further re-elaboration and re-stating of these principles. As with the understandings we highlighted previously, it should be noted that key elements of these strategies pre-date September 11. Significant in this continuity is the link between the Bush administration's strategic view and the 1992 “Defense Planning Guidance” (DPG). Written for the administration of George H. W. Bush by Paul Wolfowitz and I. Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby, the DPG was the first neoconservative security manifesto for the post-Cold War; a blue print for a one-superpower world in which the US had to be prepared to combat new regional threats and prevent the rise of a hegemonic competitor (Tyler, 8 March 1992; see Mann, 2004: 198ff, 212). Initial versions of the DPG were deemed too controversial and were rewritten with input from then Defense Secretary Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Colin Powell (Tyler, 24 May 1992). Nonetheless, Cheney's version still declared that, “we must maintain the mechanism for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role” (Cheney, 1993: 2). What we find in this is the kernel of the policies implemented in the administration of George W. Bush, reworked through the Clinton period by such organizations as PNAC (discussed above). The assemblage of individuals and organizations – both inside and outside the formal state structures – running from the DPG, through PNAC to the plethora of Bush administration security texts cited above (all of which draw upon well-established US security dispositions in the post-World War II era) demonstrates the performative infrastructure through which certain ontological effects are established, and through which certain performances are made possible and can be understood. As we argue throughout this paper, the distinctive thing about recent National Security Strategies is their deployment of integration as the principal foreign policy and security strategy. It is telling that Bush's claim of “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (Bush, 2001) relies not on a straightforward binary, as is sometimes suggested, but a process of incorporation. It is not simply us versus them, but with us, a mode of operating alongside, or, in the words of one of Bush's most enthusiastic supporters, “shoulder to shoulder” (Blair, 2001; see White & Wintour, 2001). This works more widely through a combination of threats and promises, as in this statement about the Palestinians: “If Palestinians embrace democracy and the rule of law, confront corruption, and firmly reject terror, they can count on American support for the creation of a Palestinian state” (The White House, 2002b: 9). Likewise, it can be found in some of remarks of the British Prime Minister Blair (2004) about the significance of democracy in Afghanistan, Africa and Iraq. Equally Bush's notorious ‘axis of evil’ speech did not simply name North Korea, Iran and Iraq as its members, but suggested that “states like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world” (Bush, 2002a, emphasis added). A comparison of the like, alongside the “with the terrorists” is actually a more complicated approach to the choosing of sides and the drawing of lines than is generally credited. Simple binary oppositions are less useful to an understanding here than the process of incorporation and the policy of integration. These examples indicate the policy of integration or exclusion being adopted by the US and followed by certain allies. It warns those failing to adopt US values (principally liberal ‘representative’ democracy and market capitalism), that they will be excluded from an American-centric world. The place of US allies in these representations is not unimportant. Indeed, the strength of the US discourse relies also on its reflection and reiteration by other key allies, especially in Europe. Above and beyond the dismissive pronouncements of Rumsfeld about Europe's “Old” and “New” – a conception that was inchoately articulated as early as the 1992 DPG – the dissent of (even some) Europeans is a problem for the US in its world-making endeavours (see Bialasiewicz & Minca, 2005). It is not surprising, then, that following his re-election, George W. Bush and Condoleeza Rice embarked almost immediately on a “bridge-building” tour across Europe, noting not trans-Atlantic differences but “the great alliance of freedom” that unites the United States and Europe (Bush, 2005). For although the United States may construct itself as the undisputed leader in the new global scenario, its “right” – and the right of its moral-political “mission” of spreading “freedom and justice” – relies on its amplification and support by allies. The construction of the United States' world role relies also on the selective placement and representation of other international actors who are “**hailed” into specific subject positions** (see Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson, & Duvall, 1999). Of course, different actors are granted different roles and different degrees of agency in the global script: the place of key European allies is different from that bestowed upon the peripheral and semi-peripheral states that make part of the “coalition of the willing”. Both, however, are vital in sustaining the representation of the US as the leader of a shared world of values and ideals. Indeed, the ‘lone superpower’ has little influence in the absence of support. Another important dimension of integration as the key strategic concept is its dissolution of the inside/outside spatialization of security policy. The concluding lines of the “Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support” are particularly telling. It contends that the Department of Defense can “no longer think in terms of the ‘home’ game and the ‘away’ game. There is only one game” (Department of Defense, 2005b: 40). In part this is directed at the previous failure to anticipate an attack from within: indeed, the Strategy remarks that the September 11th 2001 attacks “originated in US airspace and highlighted weaknesses in domestic radar coverage and interagency air defense coordination” (2005b: 22). In other words, the US needs to ensure the security of its homeland from within as much as without, to treat home as away. In part, however, such rhetoric also reflects a continuity with and reiteration of broader understandings with a much longer history, promoted by a range of US “intellectuals of statecraft” since the end of the Cold War: understandings that specified increasingly hard territorialisations of security and identity both at home and abroad to counter the “geopolitical vertigo” (see Ó Tuathail, 1996) of the post-bipolar era. It is important to note here, moreover, that the 2002 National Security Strategy's affirmation that “today, the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing” (The White House, 2002b: 30) also involves the US treating away as a home, or at least, as a concern. From this we can see how the pursuit of integration enables the territorial integrity of other sovereign states to be violated in its name, as specific places are targeted to either ensure or overcome their exclusion (see Elden, 2005). As an example, consider this statement, which recalls the late 1970s enunciation of an ‘arc of crisis’ stretching from the Horn of Africa through the Middle East to Afghanistan: “There exists an ‘arc of instability’ stretching from the Western Hemisphere, through Africa and the Middle East and extending to Asia. There are areas in this arc that serve as breeding grounds for threats to our interests. Within these areas rogue states provide sanctuary to terrorists, protecting them from surveillance and attack” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004: 5). In his foreword to the 2002 National Security Strategy, Bush declared that “We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent” (Bush, 2002b: i). This notion of extension is crucial in understanding the explicitly spatial overtones of this strategy of integration: more than merely about values, democracy and capitalism, it is about a performative geopolitics. Put crudely, it is about specifying the geographies of world politics; it is about specifying “the ways the world (now) is” – a presumably descriptive “geopolitical exercise” but that, as all such exercises, also implicitly contains the prescription for putting the world “right”. Imaginative geographies and popular geopolitics As we have tried to argue, such elaborations of security rely upon the affirmation of certain understandings of the world within the context of which the strategies and understandings advanced by them are rendered believable. What is more, we have tried to highlight how such performances invoke earlier articulations, even as their reiteration changes them. More broadly, we stressed how such articulations provide the conditions of possibility for current – and future – action. Integration thus marks a new performative articulation in US security strategy, but it reworks rather than replaces earlier formulations. One of the ways in which this operates is that the ideal of integration, as we have seen, **necessarily invokes the** idea of exclusion. The imagined divide between the US ‘homeland’ and the threatening ‘frontier’ lands within the circle of Barnett's ‘Non-Integrating Gap’ thus **recalls earlier iterations of ‘barbarism’** even if their identity and spatiality are produced by more than a simple self/other binary. In the final section of this essay, we will make some brief remarks regarding the disjuncture between the theory and the practice of the enactment of such imaginations. First, however, we would like to highlight some other ways in which these deployments of categories of inclusion and incorporation, on the one hand, and exclusion and targeting, on the other, are also performed in the popular geopolitical work done by a wide range of textual, visual, filmic and electronic media supportive of the ‘war on terror’ at home and abroad. These cultural practices resonate with the idea of fundamentally terrorist territories, whilst, at the same time rendering the ‘homeland’ zone of the continental US as a homogenous and virtuous ‘domestic’ community. Such wide-ranging and diffuse practices that are nonetheless imbricated with each other are further indications that we are dealing with performativity rather than construction in the production of imaginative geographies.

#### Securitization and its Mediation Ensures Total War and Genocide – Their Representations of [advantage/impacts] Ensure Astonishing Violence.

Karsten **Friis**, UN Sector @ the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, **2k** [*Peace and Conflict Studies* 7.2, “From Liminars to Others: Securitization Through Myths,” http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V7N2.pdf#page=2]

The problem with societal securitization is **one of representation**. It is rarely clear in advance who it is that speaks for a community. There is no system of representation as in a state. Since literately anyone can stand up as representatives, there is room for entrepreneurs. It is not surprising if we experience a struggle between different representatives and also their different representations of the society. What they do share, however, is a conviction that they are best at providing (a new) order. If they can do this convincingly, they gain legitimacy. What must be done is to make the uncertain certain and make the unknown an object of knowledge. To present a discernable Other is a way of doing this. The Other is represented as an Other -- as an unified single actor with a similar unquestionable set of core values (i.e. the capital “O”). They are objectified, made into an object of knowledge, by re-presentation of their identity and values. In other words, the representation of the Other is depoliticized in the sense that its inner qualities are treated as given and non-negotiable. In Jef Huysmans (1998:241) words, there is both a need for a mediation of chaosas well as of threat. A mediation of chaos is more basic than a mediation of threat, as it implies making chaos into a meaningful order by a convincing representation of the Self and its surroundings. It is a mediation of “ontological security”, which means “...a strategy of managing the limits of reflexivity ... by fixing social relations into a symbolic and institutional order” (Huysmans 1998:242). As he and others (like Hansen 1998:240) have pointed out, the importance of a threat construction for political identification, is often overstated. The mediation of chaos, of being the provider of order in general, is just as important. This may imply naming an Other but not necessarily as a threat. Such a dichotomization implies a **necessity** to get rid of all the liminars (what Huysmans calls “strangers”). This is because they “...connote a challenge to categorizing practices through the impossibility of being categorized”, and does not threaten the community, “...but the possibility of ordering itself” (Huysmans 1998:241). They are a challenge to the entrepreneur by their very existence. They confuse the dichotomy of Self and Other and thereby the entrepreneur’s mediation of chaos. As mentioned, a liminar can for instance be people of mixed ethnical ancestry but also representations of competing world-pictures. As Eide (1998:76) notes: “Over and over again we see that the “liberals” within a group undergoing a mobilisation process for group conflict are the first ones to go”. The liminars threaten the ontological order of the entrepreneur by challenging his representation of Self and Other and his mediation of chaos, which ultimately undermines the legitimacy of his policy. The liminars may be securitized by some sort of disciplination, from suppression of cultural symbols to ethnic cleansing and expatriation. This is a threat to the ontological order of the entrepreneur, stemming from inside and thus repoliticizing the inside/outside dichotomy. Therefore the liminar must disappear. It must be made into a Self, as several minority groups throughout the world have experienced, or it must be forced out of the territory. A liminar may also become an Other, as its connection to the Self is cut and their former common culture is renounced and made insignificant. In Anne Norton’s (1988:55) words, “The presence of difference in the ambiguous other leads to its classification as wholly unlike and identifies it unqualifiedly with the archetypal other, denying the resemblance to the self.” Then the liminar is no longer an ontological danger (chaos), but what Huysmans (1998:242) calls a mediation of “daily security”. This is not challenging the order or the system as such but has become a visible, clear-cut Other. In places like Bosnia, this naming and replacement of an Other, has been regarded by the securitizing actors as the solution to the ontological problem they have posed. Securitization was not considered a political move, in the sense that there were any choices. It was a necessity: Securitization was a solution based on a depoliticized ontology.10 This way the world-picture of the securitizing actor is not only a representation but also made into reality. The mythical second-order language is made into first-order language, and its “innocent” reality is forced upon the world. To the entrepreneurs and other actors involved it has become a **“natural” necessity** with a need to make order, even if it implies making the world match the map. Maybe that is why war against liminars are so often total; it attempts a **total expatriation** or a total “solution” (like the Holocaust) and not only a victory on the battlefield. If the enemy is not even considered a legitimate Other, the door may be more open to a kind of violence that is way beyond any war conventions, any jus in bello. This way, securitizing is legitimized: The entrepreneur has succeeded both in launching his world-view and in prescribing the necessary measures taken against it. This is possible by using the myths, by speaking on behalf of the natural and eternal, where truth is never questioned.

#### Alternative – Reject The Affirmative’s Security Logic – This Allows for *Actual Political Thought* – Accepting Their Descriptions and Responses Colonizes the Debate.

Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, 2008 [*Critique of Security*, 185-6]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it remoeves it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'

### 4

#### Obama will win but it will be close – collection of models proves

Wilkins 10-18

Emily Wilkins Staff infoZine October 18, 2012 Models Predict Obama Will Barely Win 2012 Election http://www.infozine.com/news/stories/op/storiesView/sid/53475/

Fluctuating polls aren’t the only way to predict an election. Thirteen different models published in the October issue of Political Science and Politics (PS) give incumbent President Obama the win — but just barely. Washington, D.C. - infoZine - Scripps Howard Foundation Wire - The forecasts, which show the election to be much closer than the 2004 or 2008 elections, give Obama an average .06 percent lead ahead of Romney. James E. Campbell, a political science professor at the University of Buffalo, helped select and edit the models for the October issue of PS. Campbell and three other professors who created forecasts spoke Oct. 16 at the National Press Club. Campbell said that despite the attention given to them, small gaffes and trips do not define an election. “It’s not just ‘Did Mitt Romney say too much?’” Campbell said. “It’s not just ‘Did Paul Ryan drink too much at the debate?’ Those kinds of things aren’t really important.” This is the third election year the models have been collected into PS. In 2004 and 2008, a majority of the models correctly predicted the elections of George W. Bush and Obama.

#### Strong public opposition to nuclear power – the anti-nuclear movement will mobilize with the plans action

The Economist 12

The Economist Feb 18th 2012 The 30-year itch http://www.economist.com/node/21547803

Still, nuclear power faces strong headwinds. A poll taken last year showed that 64% of Americans opposed building new nuclear reactors. The NRC's last new reactor approval predates Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima, all of which dented public support (and not just in America either: nuclear power supplies three-fourths of France's electricity, yet in one poll 57% of French respondents favoured abandoning it). America's anti-nuclear movement has been as quiet as its nuclear industry, but as one comes to life so will the other.

#### The election is critical for US-Russian co-operation – Romney destroys relations, Obama improves them

Larison 12

Daniel Larison is a Ph.D. graduate from the University of Chicago,He is contributing editor at The American Conservative and writes a column for The Week online. June 20, 2012 “The Presidential Election’s Effects on U.S.-Russian Relations” http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/the-presidential-elections-effects-on-u-s-russian-relations/?print=1

Andrew Weiss considers [1] the reasons for U.S.-Russian tensions, and finds the presidential elections in both countries to be partly responsible: A third big drag on U.S.-Russian relations comes from the so-called silly season that accompanies presidential campaigns in both countries. Of course, 2012 was always supposed to be a dead year in U.S.-Russian relations. Back-to-back presidential campaigns have overshadowed just about everything on the bilateral agenda, and practically no one in Washington or Moscow had been predicting that significant progress could be made this year on the toughest issues. Take missile defense, for example. Putin has shown little interest in cutting deals on major arms control issues with a U.S. president who might not be around in just a few months time to implement them. Not only does Putin have no strong incentive to take risks in pursuing new deals with Obama before the election, but he has good reason to believe that a Romney administration would halt or reverse most or all of Obama’s initiatives related to Russia. If Romney wins in November, Putin has even less incentive to cooperate with the U.S., because he will assume (correctly) that the incoming administration is going to be much more antagonistic. Arms control isn’t likely to be a top priority in a Romney White House. To the extent that he has said anything about arms control, Romney is openly hostile to new agreements and unwilling to make even the smallest concessions on missile defense. The good news is that U.S.-Russian relations might start to recover once the election is over, but that depends on the outcome. Romney’s election would represent the confirmation of Russian hard-liners’ suspicions that the post-2008 thaw in relations was a fluke and couldn’t be sustained. Indeed, the Republican nominee seems to have crafted his Russia policy to maximize distrust and paranoia in Moscow. The 2008 and 2012 campaigns have been unusual in the post-Cold War era for the intensity of anti-Russian sentiment expressed by the Republican nominees in these cycles. If it had just been the 2008 cycle, it could have attributed to McCain’s longstanding anti-Russian attitudes and dismissed as such. The re-emergence of Russophobia as a major theme of Republican foreign policy makes that impossible. Weiss also points to the danger that Putin will contribute to wrecking the relationship for opportunistic domestic reasons: Still, Putin knows how to cater to the two-thirds of the Russian electorate that voted for him in March and reside primarily in Russia’s smaller cities and countryside. He may find it hard to resist the temptation to play upon their worst fears and anti-Western stereotypes. Sacrificing the past several years of dramatic improvement in the U.S.-Russian relationship may seem like a small price to pay if it breathes new life and legitimacy into his rule. If Romney is elected, his desire to scrap good relations with Russia would make it extremely easy for Putin to do just that.

#### Russia-US standoff would Russia cause proliferation, terrorism, and nuclear war.

Alexei Arbatov, Ph.D., fellow, Russian Academy of Sciences, fmr. Deputy Chair, Duma Defense Committee, September 2007. [Russia in Global Affairs (2), Is a New Cold War Imminent? P. **http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1130.html**]

Other “centers of power” would immediately derive benefit from the growing Russia-West standoff, using it in their own interests. China would receive an opportunity to occupy even more advantageous positions in its economic and political relations with Russia, the U.S. and Japan, and would consolidate its influence in Central and South Asia and the Persian Gulf region. India, Pakistan, member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and some exalted regimes in Latin America would hardly miss their chance, either. A multipolar world that is not moving toward nuclear disarmament is a world of an expanding Nuclear Club. While Russia and the West continue to argue with each other, states that are capable of developing nuclear weapons of their own will jump at the opportunity. The probability of nuclear weapons being used in a regional conflict **will increase significantly.** International Islamic extremism and terrorism will increase dramatically; this threat represents the reverse side of globalization. The situation in Afghanistan, Central Asia, the Middle East, and North and East Africa will further destabilize. The wave of militant separatism, trans-border crime and terrorism will also infiltrate Western Europe, Russia, the U.S., and other countries. The **surviving disarmament treaties** (the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty) **will collapse**. In a worst-case scenario, there is the chance that an adventuresome regime will initiate a missile launch against territories or space satellites of one or several great powers with a view to triggering an exchange of nuclear strikes between them. Another high probability is the threat of a terrorist act with the use of a nuclear device in one or several major capitals of the world.

### 5

**The United States Navy should acquire non-nuclear, flywheel energy storage system powered aircraft carriers.**

#### Flywheel application is key to energy storage for next generation electric ships and launch systems – closest viable technology

Hamid A. Toliyat, et al. Advanced Electric Machines & Power Electronics Lab Dcpartment of Elcctrical Engineering Texas A&M University, Salman Talebi, Patrick McMullen, Co Huynh, Alexei Filatov, “Advanced High-speed Flywheel Energy Storage Systems for Pulsed Power Applications”, 2005 IEEE Electric Ship Technologies Symposium//jchen

INTRODUCTION The type of power required on military vessels is different from conventional power generation equipment, which is typically designed for constant load operation. Electrical equipment on a ship includes some loads that require very high powers for short periods of time in order of a few seconds and even milliseconds. Examples include Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch Systems (EMALS), Electromagnetic Guns (EM Guns), and Integrated Fight- Through Power (IFTP) system. A method to efficiently store energy and discharge it at a high rate is necessary to eliminate the cost and weight of oversized generation equipment to support the pulsed power needs of a ship. It was found that power sources for EM Guns require technologies that are very different from the other applications due to very high pulse powers and very short durations (50GW and 6-10 ms) [lj,[2]. Compensated pulsed alternators, homopolar generators, capacitor banks and flux pumps are more suitable for millisecond-long pulses. In contrast, FESS’ for EMALS (120MW and 2s) [3]-[6] stand much closer to the commercial applications, and currently are extensively researched. Besides pulse power applications, FESS’ are capable of delivering powers for a period of time sufficient for a diesel generator to start and take over the load supply in case of a grid failure. Such an application, Integrated Fight-Through Power system [7], is considered in this paper. 11. FLYWHEEL ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEM Flywheels are now being designed with new advancements in rotating machinery including non-contact magnetic bearings and permanent magnet motors generators. New powerful magnet materials and power electronics enable flywheels to effectively fill the niche of short duration, high cycle life applications where batteries and ultra capacitors arc not usable. High-speed operation and high reliability requirements limit selection of motors/generators used in modem flywheels to brushless and windingless-rotor types. Among these, permanent magnet (PM) machines have the most advantages, including higher efficiency and smaller size when compared with other types of motor generators of the same power rating. They also exhibit lower rotor losses and lower winding inductances, which make them more suitable for a vacuum operating environment and the rapid energy transfer in flywheel applications. Very low cogging torque and robust rotor construction with very low part count are additional arguments for using PM motor gcncrators in flywheel applications. A power electronics topology that can be used with the proposed flywheel energy storage system is the back-to-back three-phase IGBT-based converter system shown in Fig. 1. In this topology, during the motoring operation when the flywheel is charged, the front-end converter operates as a rectifier and the machine-side converter operates as an inverter. During power generation, the machine-side converter works as a controlled rectifier and the utility side converter works as an inverter.

#### Every use of nuclear tech increases risk of accidents – causes extinction

Lendmen 11

(Stephen – BA from Harvard University and MBA from Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, “Nuclear Meltdown in Japan” 3/13/11 http://rense.com/general93/nucmelt.htm)

For years, Helen Caldicott warned it's coming. In her 1978 book, "Nuclear Madness," she said: "As a physician, I contend that nuclear technology threatens life on our planet with extinction. If present trends continue, the air we breathe, the food we eat, and the water we drink will soon be contaminated with enough radioactive pollutants to pose a potential health hazard far greater than any plague humanity has ever experienced." More below on the inevitable dangers from commercial nuclear power proliferation, besides added military ones. On March 11, New York Times writer Martin Fackler headlined, "Powerful Quake and Tsunami Devastate Northern Japan," saying: "The 8.9-magnitude earthquake (Japan's strongest ever) set off a devastating tsunami that sent walls of water (six meters high) washing over coastal cities in the north." According to Japan's Meteorological Survey, it was 9.0. The Sendai port city and other areas experienced heavy damage. "Thousands of homes were destroyed, many roads were impassable, trains and buses (stopped) running, and power and cellphones remained down. On Saturday morning, the JR rail company" reported three trains missing. Many passengers are unaccounted for. Striking at 2:46PM Tokyo time, it caused vast destruction, shook city skyscrapers, buckled highways, ignited fires, terrified millions, annihilated areas near Sendai, possibly killed thousands, and caused a nuclear meltdown, its potential catastrophic effects far exceeding quake and tsunami devastation, almost minor by comparison under a worst case scenario. On March 12, Times writer Matthew Wald headlined, "Explosion Seen at Damaged Japan Nuclear Plant," saying: "Japanese officials (ordered evacuations) for people living near two nuclear power plants whose cooling systems broke down," releasing radioactive material, perhaps in far greater amounts than reported. NHK television and Jiji said the 40-year old Fukushima plant's outer structure housing the reactor "appeared to have blown off, which could suggest the containment building had already been breached." Japan's nuclear regulating agency said radioactive levels inside were 1,000 times above normal. Reuters said the 1995 Kobe quake caused $100 billion in damage, up to then the most costly ever natural disaster. This time, from quake and tsunami damage alone, that figure will be dwarfed. Moreover, under a worst case core meltdown, all bets are off as the entire region and beyond will be threatened with permanent contamination, making the most affected areas unsafe to live in. On March 12, Stratfor Global Intelligence issued a "Red Alert: Nuclear Meltdown at Quake-Damaged Japanese Plant," saying: Fukushima Daiichi "nuclear power plant in Okuma, Japan, appears to have caused a reactor meltdown." Stratfor downplayed its seriousness, adding that such an event "does not necessarily mean a nuclear disaster," that already may have happened - the ultimate nightmare short of nuclear winter. According to Stratfor, "(A)s long as the reactor core, which is specifically designed to contain high levels of heat, pressure and radiation, remains intact, the melted fuel can be dealt with. If the (core's) breached but the containment facility built around (it) remains intact, the melted fuel can be....entombed within specialized concrete" as at Chernobyl in 1986. In fact, that disaster killed nearly one million people worldwide from nuclear radiation exposure. In their book titled, "Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment," Alexey Yablokov, Vassily Nesterenko and Alexey Nesterenko said: "For the past 23 years, it has been clear that there is a danger greater than nuclear weapons concealed within nuclear power. Emissions from this one reactor exceeded a hundred-fold the radioactive contamination of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki." "No citizen of any country can be assured that he or she can be protected from radioactive contamination. One nuclear reactor can pollute half the globe. Chernobyl fallout covers the entire Northern Hemisphere." Stratfor explained that if Fukushima's floor cracked, "it is highly likely that the melting fuel will burn through (its) containment system and enter the ground. This has never happened before," at least not reported. If now occurring, "containment goes from being merely dangerous, time consuming and expensive to nearly impossible," making the quake, aftershocks, and tsunamis seem mild by comparison. Potentially, millions of lives will be jeopardized. Japanese officials said Fukushima's reactor container wasn't breached. Stratfor and others said it was, making the potential calamity far worse than reported. Japan's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) said the explosion at Fukushima's Saiichi No. 1 facility could only have been caused by a core meltdown. In fact, 3 or more reactors are affected or at risk. Events are fluid and developing, but remain very serious. The possibility of an extreme catastrophe can't be discounted. Moreover, independent nuclear safety analyst John Large told Al Jazeera that by venting radioactive steam from the inner reactor to the outer dome, a reaction may have occurred, causing the explosion. "When I look at the size of the explosion," he said, "it is my opinion that there could be a very large leak (because) fuel continues to generate heat." Already, Fukushima way exceeds Three Mile Island that experienced a partial core meltdown in Unit 2. Finally it was brought under control, but coverup and denial concealed full details until much later. According to anti-nuclear activist Harvey Wasserman, Japan's quake fallout may cause nuclear disaster, saying: "This is a very serious situation. If the cooling system fails (apparently it has at two or more plants), the super-heated radioactive fuel rods will melt, and (if so) you could conceivably have an explosion," that, in fact, occurred. As a result, massive radiation releases may follow, impacting the entire region. "It could be, literally, an apocalyptic event. The reactor could blow." If so, Russia, China, Korea and most parts of Western Asia will be affected. Many thousands will die, potentially millions under a worse case scenario, including far outside East Asia. Moreover, at least five reactors are at risk. Already, a 20-mile wide radius was evacuated. What happened in Japan can occur anywhere. Yet Obama's proposed budget includes $36 billion for new reactors, a shocking disregard for global safety. Calling Fukushima an "apocalyptic event," Wasserman said "(t)hese nuclear plants have to be shut," let alone budget billions for new ones. It's unthinkable, he said. If a similar disaster struck California, nuclear fallout would affect all America, Canada, Mexico, Central America, and parts of South America. Nuclear Power: A Technology from Hell Nuclear expert Helen Caldicott agrees, telling this writer by phone that a potential regional catastrophe is unfolding. Over 30 years ago, she warned of its inevitability. Her 2006 book titled, "Nuclear Power is Not the Answer" explained that contrary to government and industry propaganda, even during normal operations, nuclear power generation causes significant discharges of greenhouse gas emissions, as well as hundreds of thousands of curies of deadly radioactive gases and other radioactive elements into the environment every year. Moreover, nuclear plants are atom bomb factories. A 1000 megawatt reactor produces 500 pounds of plutonium annually. Only 10 are needed for a bomb able to devastate a large city, besides causing permanent radiation contamination. Nuclear Power not Cleaner and Greener Just the opposite, in fact. Although a nuclear power plant releases no carbon dioxide (CO2), the primary greenhouse gas, a vast infrastructure is required. Called the nuclear fuel cycle, it uses large amounts of fossil fuels. Each cycle stage exacerbates the problem, starting with the enormous cost of mining and milling uranium, needing fossil fuel to do it. How then to dispose of mill tailings, produced in the extraction process. It requires great amounts of greenhouse emitting fuels to remediate. Moreover, other nuclear cycle steps also use fossil fuels, including converting uranium to hexafluoride gas prior to enrichment, the enrichment process itself, and conversion of enriched uranium hexafluoride gas to fuel pellets. In addition, nuclear power plant construction, dismantling and cleanup at the end of their useful life require large amounts of energy. There's more, including contaminated cooling water, nuclear waste, its handling, transportation and disposal/storage, problems so far unresolved. Moreover, nuclear power costs and risks are so enormous that the industry couldn't exist without billions of government subsidized funding annually. The Unaddressed Human Toll from Normal Operations Affected are uranium miners, industry workers, and potentially everyone living close to nuclear reactors that routinely emit harmful radioactive releases daily, harming human health over time, causing illness and early death. The link between radiation exposure and disease is irrefutable, depending only on the amount of cumulative exposure over time, Caldicott saying: "If a regulatory gene is biochemically altered by radiation exposure, the cell will begin to incubate cancer, during a 'latent period of carcinogenesis,' lasting from two to sixty years." In fact, a single gene mutation can prove fatal. No amount of radiation exposure is safe. Moreover, when combined with about 80,000 commonly used toxic chemicals and contaminated GMO foods and ingredients, it causes 80% of known cancers, putting everyone at risk everywhere. Further, the combined effects of allowable radiation exposure, uranium mining, milling operations, enrichment, and fuel fabrication can be devastating to those exposed. Besides the insoluble waste storage/disposal problem, nuclear accidents happen and catastrophic ones are inevitable. Inevitable Meltdowns Caldicott and other experts agree they're certain in one or more of the hundreds of reactors operating globally, many years after their scheduled shutdown dates unsafely. Combined with human error, imprudently minimizing operating costs, internal sabotage, or the effects of a high-magnitude quake and/or tsunami, an eventual catastrophe is certain. Aging plants alone, like Japan's Fukushima facility, pose unacceptable risks based on their record of near-misses and meltdowns, resulting from human error, old equipment, shoddy maintenance, and poor regulatory oversight. However, under optimum operating conditions, all nuclear plants are unsafe. Like any machine or facility, they're vulnerable to breakdowns, that if serious enough can cause enormous, possibly catastrophic, harm. Add nuclear war to the mix, also potentially inevitable according to some experts, by accident or intent, including Steven Starr saying: "Only a single failure of nuclear deterrence is required to start a nuclear war," the consequences of which "would be profound, potentially killing "tens of millions of people, and caus(ing) long-term, catastrophic disruptions of the global climate and massive destruction of Earth's protective ozone layer. The result would be a global nuclear famine that could kill up to one billion people." Worse still is nuclear winter, the ultimate nightmare, able to end all life if it happens. It's nuclear proliferation's unacceptable risk, a clear and present danger as long as nuclear weapons and commercial dependency exist. In 1946, Enstein knew it, saying: "Our world faces a crisis as yet unperceived by those possessing the power to make great decisions for good and evil. The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking, and thus we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe." He envisioned two choices - abolish all forms of nuclear power or face extinction. No one listened. The Doomsday Clock keeps ticking.

### Navy

Naval power not key to heg.

Goure 10 [Daniel, Department of Defense Transition Team, “Can the Case be Made for Naval Power?” Lexington Institute, 2 July 2010, http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/can-the-case-be-made-for-naval-power-?a=1&c=1171]

More broadly, it appears that the nature of the security challenges confronting the U.S. has changed dramatically over the past several decades. There are only a few places where even large-scale conventional conflict can be considered possible. None of these would be primarily maritime in character although U.S. naval forces could make a significant contribution by employing its offensive and defensive capabilities over land. For example, the administration’s current plan is to rely on sea-based Aegis missile defenses to protect regional allies and U.S. forces until a land-based variant of that system can be developed and deployed. The sea ways, sometimes called the global commons, are predominantly free of dangers. The exception to this is the chronic but relatively low level of piracy in some parts of the world. So, the classic reasons for which nations build navies, to protect its own shores and its commerce or to place the shores and commerce of other states in jeopardy, seem relatively unimportant in today’s world.

#### Naval heg is outdated

Tillman 9 [Barrett, professional writer, speaker, and award-winning historian who has written nearly 50 books and hundreds of articles. His next book is Whirlwind: Bombing Japan 1942-1945, due from Simon & Schuster in 2010. He is also a commentator on The History Channel and National Geographic Channel. Fear and Loathing in the Post-Naval Era, Proceedings Magazine - June 2009 Vol. 135/6/1,276 [15] 2010-06-30, http://www.usni.org/print/4264]

In the absence of power projection, navies default to lesser tasks. "Presence" is an age-old naval mission, better known as "showing the flag." More colorfully, it was called "gunboat diplomacy," with the duty gunboat or (in especially touchy situations) a naval squadron appearing offshore to quell restless natives or opponents with a show of force. The U.S. Navy's Cold War mission of deterrence **largely vanished** with the collapse of the Soviet Union 20 years ago. **The reason is disturbingly simple:** there is **no peer opponent to be deterred**. That leaves the service with a reduced menu of options for justifying its enormous expense. Moreover, if you get Sailors and Marines aside and ask them about their military experience, many express dissatisfaction. They allude to disaster relief as "pizza delivery"—not the reason they enlisted. What, then, is the purpose of "this people's Navy," and how should it be employed? Moreover, how has the use of a navy been perceived throughout history? In his 1987 treatise, The Western Way of War, Victor Davis Hanson described Greek hoplite influence on Western military thought, emphasizing the concept of the decisive battle. The Hellenic states of the 4th century BC regarded decisive battle as necessary, avoiding prolonged attrition and adverse agricultural-economic effects. No less was true of Western naval thought, epitomized in the early 20th-century doctrine of a decisive battle, whether in the North Sea or mid-Pacific. The world's leading navies accepted the idea, building ships, fleets, strategy, tactics, and doctrine around it. For Imperial Japan, it led to disaster at Midway in June 1942. Whatever the doctrine, institutional knowledge of war at sea is a precious commodity, increasingly rare: the junior officers who fought at Leyte Gulf retired between the 1960s and the early 1980s. The average American World War II veteran was born in 1919, making the median age 90 at this writing while the teenaged Sailors of VJ-Day now are in their early 80s. Therefore, personal knowledge of such events is vanishing at an accelerated rate and will be gone in a decade. While few would claim that the specifics of the Leyte Gulf battle apply in the 21st century, Navy supporters should realize that as "the greatest" officers and Sailors depart the scene, so does much of the population disposed to support the service politically. (Only about one-third of Naval Institute members were alive in 1944.) The China Scenario In attempting to justify a Cold War force structure, many military pundits cling to the military stature of China as proof of a possible large conventional-war scenario against a pseudo-peer rival. Since only China possesses anything remotely approaching the prospect of challenging American hegemony—and only in Asian waters—Beijing ergo becomes the "threat" that justifies maintaining the Cold War force structure. China's development of the DF-21 long-range antiship ballistic missile, presumably intended for American carriers, has drawn much attention. Yet even granting the perfection of such a weapon, the most obvious question goes begging: why would China use it? Why would Beijing start a war with its number-two trading partner—a war that would ruin both economies?10 [2] Furthermore, the U.S. Navy owns nearly as many major combatants as Russia and China combined. In tonnage, we hold a **2.6 to 1 advantage over them**. No other coalition—actual or imagined—**even comes close.** But we need to ask ourselves: does that matter? In today's world the most urgent naval threat consists not of ships, subs, or aircraft, but of mines-and pirates.11 [2]

#### No chance of naval competitors – The US is far ahead and more capable now – we’ll have 10 carrier groups instead of 11

The American Prospect, 20’11, [The False Decline of the U.S. Navy, <http://prospect.org/comment/11760>] VN

The United States Navy currently operates eleven aircraft carriers. The oldest and least capable is faster, one third larger, and carries three times the aircraft of Admiral Kuznetsov, the largest carrier in the Russian Navy. Unlike China’s only aircraft carrier, the former Russian Varyag, American carriers have engines and are capable of self-propulsion. The only carrier in Indian service is fifty years old and a quarter the size of its American counterparts. No navy besides the United States' has more than one aircraft carrier capable of flying modern fixed wing aircraft. The United States enjoys similar dominance in surface combat vessels and submarines, operating twenty-two cruisers, fifty destroyers, fifty-five nuclear attack submarines, and ten amphibious assault ships (vessels roughly equivalent to most foreign aircraft carriers). In every category the U.S. Navy combines presumptive numerical superiority with a significant ship-to-ship advantage over any foreign navy. This situation is unlikely to change anytime soon. The French Navy and the Royal Navy will each expand to two aircraft carriers over the next decade. The most ambitious plans ascribed to the People’s Liberation Army Navy call for no more than three aircraft carriers by 2020, and even that strains credulity, given China’s inexperience with carrier operations and the construction of large military vessels. While a crash construction program might conceivably give the Chinese the ability to achieve local dominance (at great cost and for a short time), the United States Navy will continue to dominate the world’s oceans and littorals for at least the next fifty years. In order to try to show that the U.S. Navy is insufficient in the face of future threats, Kaplan argues that we on are our way to “a 150 ship navy” that will be overwhelmed by the demands of warfighting and global economic maintenance. He suggests that the “1,000 Ship Navy” proposal, an international plan to streamline cooperation between the world’s navies on maritime maintenance issues such as piracy, interdiction of drug and human smuggling, and disaster relief, is an effort at “elegant decline,” and declares that the dominance of the United States Navy cannot be maintained through collaboration with others. It’s true that a 600 ship navy can do more than the current 250-plus ship force of the current U.S. Navy, but Kaplan’s playing a game of bait and switch. The Navy has fewer ships than it did two decades ago, but the ships it has are far more capable than those of the 1980s. Because of the collapse of its competitors, the Navy is relatively more capable of fighting and winning wars now than it was during the Reagan administration. Broadly speaking, navies have two missions; warfighting, and maritime maintenance. Kaplan wants to confuse the maritime maintenance mission (which can be done in collaboration with others) with the warfighting mission (which need not be). A navy can require the cooperation of others for the maintenance mission, while still possessing utter military superiority over any one navy or any plausible combination of navies on the high seas. Indeed, this is the situation that the United States Navy currently enjoys. It cannot be everywhere all at once, and does require the cooperation of regional navies for fighting piracy and smuggling. At the same time, the U.S. Navy can destroy any (and probably all, at the same time) naval challengers. To conflate these two missions is equal parts silly and dishonest. The Navy has arrived at an ideal compromise between the two, keeping its fighting supremacy while leading and facilitating cooperation around the world on maritime issues. This compromise has allowed the Navy to build positive relationships with the navies of the world, a fact that Kaplan ignores. While asserting the dangers posed by a variety of foreign navies, Kaplan makes a distortion depressingly common to those who warn of the decline of American hegemony; he forgets that the United States has allies. While Kaplan can plausibly argue that growth in Russian or Chinese naval strength threatens the United States, the same cannot reasonably be said of Japan, India, France, or the United Kingdom. With the exception of China and Russia, all of the most powerful navies in the world belong to American allies. United States cooperation with the navies of NATO, India, and Japan has tightened, rather than waned in the last ten years, and the United States also retains warm relations with third tier navies such as those of South Korea, Australia, and Malaysia. In any conceivable naval confrontation the United States will have friends, just as the Royal Navy had friends in 1914 and 1941. Robert Kaplan wants to warn the American people of the dangers of impending naval decline. Unfortunately, he’s almost entirely wrong on the facts. While the reach of the United States Navy may have declined in an absolute sense, its capacity to fight and win naval wars has, if anything, increased since the end of the Cold War. That the United States continues to embed itself in a deep set of cooperative arrangements with other naval powers only reinforces the dominance of the U.S. Navy on the high seas. Analysts who want to argue for greater U.S. military spending are best advised to concentrate on the fiascos in Iraq and Afghanistan.

#### Multipolarity’s inevitable – economic realities make hegemony unsustainable.

Layne 12 [Christopher Layne is professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University’s George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service. His next book, for Yale University Press, is After the Fall: International Politics, U.S. Grand Strategy, and the End of the Pax Americana. The (Almost) Triumph of Offshore Balancing January 27, 2012 http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/almost-triumph-offshore-balancing-6405?page=1]

The DSG is a response to two drivers. First, the United States is in economic decline and will face a **serious fiscal crisis** **by the end of this decade.** As President Obama said, the DSG reflects the need to “put our fiscal house in order here at home and renew our long-term economic strength.” The **best indicators** of U.S. decline are its GDP relative to potential competitors and its share of world manufacturing output. China’s manufacturing output has now edged past that of the United States and accounts for just over 18 or 19 percent of world manufacturing output. With respect to GDP, virtually all leading economic forecasters agree that, measured by market-exchange rates, China’s aggregate GDP will exceed that of the United States by the end of the current decade. Measured by purchasing-power parity, some leading economists believe China already is the world’s number-one economy. Clearly, China is on the verge of overtaking the United States economically. At the end of this decade, when the ratio of U.S. government debt to GDP is likely to exceed the danger zone of 100 percent, the United States will face a severe fiscal crisis. In a June 2011 report, the Congressional Budget Office warned that unless Washington drastically slashes expenditures—including on entitlements and defense—and raises taxes, it is headed for a fiscal train wreck. Moreover, concerns about future inflation and America’s ability to repay its debts could imperil the U.S. dollar’s reserve-currency status. That currency status allows the United States to avoid difficult “guns-or-butter” trade-offs and live well beyond its means while enjoying entitlements at home and geopolitical preponderance abroad. But that works only so long as foreigners are willing to lend the United States money. Speculation is now commonplace about the dollar’s long-term hold on reserve-currency status. It would have been unheard of just a few years ago. The second driver behind the new Pentagon strategy is the shift in global wealth and power from the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia. As new great powers such as China and, eventually, India emerge, important regional powers such as Russia, Japan, Turkey, Korea, South Africa and Brazil will assume more prominent roles in international politics. Thus, the post-Cold War “unipolar moment,” when the United States commanded the global stage as the “sole remaining superpower,” will be **replaced by a multipolar** international **system.** The Economist recently projected that China’s defense spending will equal that of the United States by 2025. By the middle or end of the next decade, China will be positioned to shape a new international order based on the rules and norms that it prefers—and, perhaps, to provide the international economy with a new reserve currency.

#### Heg doesn’t solve conflict.

Fettweis 11 [Christopher, Prof. of Political Science – Tulane, Dangerous Times?: The International Politics of Great Power Peace Page 73-6]

The primary attack on restraint, or justification for internationalism, posits that if the United Stets were to withdraw from the world, a variety of ills would sweep over key regions and eventually pose threats to U.S. security and/or prosperity, nese problems might take three forms (besides the obvious, if remarkably unlikely, direct threats to the homeland): generalized chaos, hostile imbalances in Eurasia, and/or failed states. Historian Arthur Schlesinger was typical when he worried that restraint would mean "a chaotic, violent, and ever more dangerous planet."69 All of these concerns either implicitly or explicitly assume that the presence of the United States is the primary reason for international stability, and if that presence were withdrawn chaos would ensue. In other words, they depend upon hegemonic-stability logic. Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for ex¬ample, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stabil¬ity to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that are gen¬erally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemon, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe.70 Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today's interconnected world, economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would "become a more dangerous place" and, sooner or later, that would "re¬dound to America's detriment."71 If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually provides stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, to believe that US **hegemony is not the** primary **cause of** the current era of s**tability**. First of all, the hegemonic-stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the community of great powers is if self-policing occurs, if states have decided that their interests are served by peace. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could maintain stability. Likewise, if it true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world's population that 2\* m the United States simply could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the nsk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States may be patrolling a neighborhood that has already rid itself of crime. Stability and unipolarity may besimply coincidental., order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest ome World would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment to/ bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always proven to be especiallly eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in War without the presence, whether physical or psychologi-cal, of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to War without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work. Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present. Second, the limited **empirical evidence** we have suggests that there is **little connection** between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on de¬fense in real terms than it had in 1990.72 To internationalists, defense hawks, and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible "peace dividend" endangered both national and global security. "No serious analyst of American military capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace."73 If the pacific trends were due not to U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate War, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable Pentagon, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. **No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no re-gional balancing occurred** once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international War was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and it kept declining as the Bush Administra-tion ramped spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be neces-sary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. It is also worth noting for our purposes that the United States was no less safe. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a con- nection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. One could pre- sumably argue that spending is not the only, or even the best, indication of he- LTm? T 15 inSt6ad US" foreign Political and security commitments Zcre7Tn I ^ ndther was -gnificantly altered during this period, mcreased conflict should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of heg¬emonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is de¬cisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it were true that either U.S. commitments or relative spend-ing accounts for international pacific trends, the 1990s make it obvious that stability can be sustained at drastically lower levels. In other words, even if one believes that there is a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without imperiling global stability, a rational grand strategist would still cut back on engagement (and spending) until that level is determined. As of now, we have no idea how cheap hegemonic stability could be, or if a low point exists at all. Since the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment, engagement should be scaled back until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. And if the constructivist interpretation of events is correct and the global peace is inher-ently stable, no increase in conflict would ever occur, irrespective of U.S. spend-ing, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expec-tations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as evidence for the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the ordy data we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military pending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without ^e presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone. tf the only thing standing between the world and chaos is the U.S. military Presence, then an adjustment in grand strategy would be exceptionally counter-productive. But it is worth recalling that none of the other explanations for the decline of War—nuclear weapons, complex economic interdependence, international and domestic political institutions, evolution in ideas and norms necessitate an activist America to maintain their validity. Were America to be-co\*e more restrained, nuclear weapons would still affect the calculations of the would-be aggressor; the process of globalization would continue, deepening the complexity of economic interdependence; the United Nations could still deploy Peacekeepers where necessary; and democracy would not shrivel where it cur-\*7 exis\*s. Most importantly, the idea that war is a worthwhile way to resolve conflict would have no reason to return. As was argued in chapter 2, normative evolution is typically unidirectional. Strategic restraint in such a world would be virtually risk-free. Finally, some analysts have worried that a de facto surrender of U.S. hege¬mony would lead to a rise of Chinese influence. Indeed, China is the only other major power that has increased its military spending since the end of the Cold War, even if it is still a rather low 2 percent of its GDP. Such levels of effort do not suggest a desire to compete with, much less supplant, the United States. The much-ballyhooed decade-long military buildup has brought Chinese spending up to approximately one-tenth the level of that of the United States. It is hardly clear that restraint on the part of the United States would invite Chinese global dominance. Bradley Thayer worries that Chinese would become "the language of diplomacy, trade and commerce, transportation and navigation, the internet, world sport, and global culture," and that Beijing would come to "dominate sci¬ence and technology, in all its forms" to the extent that soon the world would witness a Chinese astronaut who not only travels to the Moon, but "plants the communist flag on Mars, and perhaps other planets in the future."74 Fortunately one need not ponder for too long the horrible specter of a red flag on Venus, since on the planet Earth, where War is no longer the dominant form of conflict resolution, the threats posed by even a rising China would not be terribly dire. The dangers contained in the terrestrial security environment are less frightening than ever before, no matter which country is strongest.

#### Collapse of heg solves war

MacDonald and Parent 11 [Paul K. MacDonald is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. Joseph M. Parent is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 7–44]

Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for opti- mism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift bur- dens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in **fewer militarized disputes** than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credi- bility. Yet our analysis suggests prone than other moments of acute relative de- cline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons **still have formidable capabil- ity**, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. We believe **the empirical record supports these conclusions.** In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo- American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been inºuenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impend- ing Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or en- gage in foreign policy adventurism.94 Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a “moderate” decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two.95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incen- tives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness.96 Given the im- portance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation. In short, the United States should be able to reduce its foreign policy com- mitments in East Asia in the coming decades without inviting Chinese expan- sionism. Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could reap potential beneªts. The drawdown and repositioning of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an im- provement in the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul.97 U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conºict.98 Moreover, Washington’s support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to en- hance U.S. prestige while embedding China within a more transparent re- gional order.99 A policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing regional security dilemmas. In- deed, even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold additional ter- ritory.100 By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the United States can **strengthen the credibility of its core commit- ments** while accommodating the interests of a rising China. Not least among the beneªts of retrenchment is that it helps **alleviate an unsustainable finan- cial position**. Immense forward deployments will only **exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes.**101

#### Naval balance with China is stable now – new ships tip the scale

Andrew H. Ring, U.S. Navy , Fellow Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Harvard University, 7-4-12, [“A U.S. South China Sea Perspective: Just Over the Horizon,” <http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/sites/projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/fellows/files/ring.pdf>] E. Liu

The economies of ASEAN states and China have been become closely linked, which is advantageous as these states have become somewhat interdependent and cooperative. Thus U.S. naval buildup and a possible military conflict in the South China Sea could negatively impact the current relatively stable relations in the region. The U.S. Navy should indeed continue its prominent role in the region to help protect commerce and maintain a balance of power to assist ASEAN nations achieve progress at the negotiation table. This process will likely take a long time, years, possibly decades, but time is required for military-to-military relations to improve with China. If the United States intensifies its communications with the Chinese military it will help build a stronger relationship that can serve to provide stability, cooperation and prosperity to the region. However, the United States must not be too heavy-handed and move more warships into the area. In this precarious balance of power, less is more.

#### CHINESE NAVAL SUPREMACY KEY TO SECURE SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION

David Axe, military editor for Aviation Week's Defense Technology, military correspondent, 2/12/10, The Diplomat, “China’s Navy—Good for Us All?”, http://the-diplomat.com/2010/02/12/china%e2%80%99s-navy-good-for-us-all/ {jchen}

Aside from Taiwan and the question of its ‘show carriers,’ China is focusing most of its efforts on developing defensive forces, as well as forces optimized for cooperating with its current rivals, rather than simply blasting them out of the water. Defensive ‘anti-access’ systems–in China’s case, anti-ship missiles and submarines–make perfect sense for any powerful country. ‘Nations that aspire to regional hegemony have big navies; it’s just what they do,’ Farley says. China has long aspired to be a regional and even global power, but as recently as the mid-1990s was incapable of even protecting its own coastline. In many ways, the most surprising thing about China’s naval development is how late and ultimately modest it has been, considering China now has the world’s second-biggest economy. ‘I try to think of it from their shoes,’ Wertheim says. ‘I don’t think they’re acting unreasonably in building a bigger fleet.’ The Chinese ‘have this huge impact on the world economy,’ he says. ‘They have a tremendous amount of economic sea lanes to defend. It’s really, really important to remember that in some ways it would be irresponsible for them as a country not to have some sort of build-up.’ And this build-up has the potential for far-reaching–even global–benefits if it can work alongside the United States. ‘The simple presence of naval power reduces the anarchy and lawlessness that otherwise might prevail on the high seas,’ Farley says. In 2008, China mobilized three warships to join the now 40-strong international fleet patrolling the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean to protect commercial ships from increasingly aggressive and more numerous Somali pirates. While most nations’ vessels sailed singly inside static ‘patrol boxes,’ the Chinese adopted a World II-style convoy system — that is, sailing alongside merchant ships — that has actually proved the most effective way of intercepting pirates, according to naval experts and shipping officials. On the basis of this experience, late last year the PLAN asked to take a turn leading the international naval committee that coordinates the counter-pirate operations. The European Union backed China’s request, and in January the so-called ‘Shared Awareness and Deconfliction’ body, also known as ‘SHADE,’ approved the move. Beijing must now sign off on the PLAN playing this larger role. Leadership in SHADE would actually require the PLAN boost its contributions to the counter-piracy fleet with additional vessels. In addition, the PLAN had reportedly also volunteered to support the US-led naval force that patrols the sea lanes between Somalia and Yemen, aiming to intercept illegal arms shipments between Islamic terrorist groups in Africa and the Middle East. Until this year, the Japanese navy had provided a naval oiler to refuel the US task force, but in 2007 Tokyo considered suspending the assistance. At that point, the PLAN reportedly made an unofficial offer to make one of its oilers available, though according to the Japanese newspaper The Daily Yomiuri, US officials turned down the offer. Still learning China is one of the few countries that has naval forces to spare, thanks to the recent surge in ship construction. The UK had to divert a frigate from its traditional Falklands patrol to add to its own counter-piracy efforts, while even the US Navy, the world’s biggest, suffers ship shortages. In January, an amphibious ship bound for training off the West African coast had to defer its deployment in order to join a US hospital ship and aircraft carrier rushing medical and engineering assistance to earthquake-ravaged Haiti.

#### SLOCS KEY TO RESOURCES AND CCP STABILITY – PREVENTS RAMPANT NATIONALISM

Christopher J. Pehrson, lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Air Force currently assigned to the Air Staff at the Pentagon, graduate of Squadron Officer School, B.S. degree from the University of Michigan, an M.S. degree from Boston University, an M.S. degree from the Air Force Institute of Technology, and a Master of Strategic Studies from Air University, “string of Pearls: meeting the challenge of china’s rising power across the asian littoral”, July 2006, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub721.pdf {jchen}

Motivation Behind the String of Pearls. China’s development, from its expanding economy and increased global influence to its growing military might and demand for energy, presents tremendous challenges to China’s leaders as they manage the turmoil of massive structural, technological, and social changes. The governing elites of China have three overarching concerns: regime survival, territorial integrity, and domestic stability.12 Regime survival is the foremost concern of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and party leadership is acutely aware that their success hinges upon the satisfaction of the Chinese people and the government’s ability to protect Chinese national interests. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War exposed communism as a bankrupt ideology with a flawed economic system. As the last remaining major communist state, China’s leaders have sought to avoid the fate of the Soviet Union and other Eastern European communist regimes by turning away from traditional Marxist-LeninistMaoist ideology and adopting a “socialist market economy,” a thinly-veiled euphemism for Chinesestyle capitalism.13 The CCP has maintained authoritarian control amid a sea change of economic and social reforms and, as long as reforms stay on track and the economy continues to thrive and resurgent nationalism remains manageable, expectations are that regime survival will not be threatened. Since the end of the Cold War, China has made progress with respect to territorial integrity. Although the unification of Taiwan persists as a contentious issue and territorial disputes remain, such as a competing claim with Japan over sovereignty of the Diaoyutai (Senkaku) Islands, China successfully has stabilized and demilitarized its land borders in North and Central Asia.14 China is becoming more influential in Central Asia under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), whose member states consist of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, along with the observer members of India, Pakistan, Iran, and Mongolia.15 On the southwestern border, a longstanding territorial dispute with India over Chinese-controlled portions of Kashmir and northeastern India is showing signs of slow but pragmatic progress. During Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to China in 2003, India, for the first time, recognized China’s claims to Tibet and China reciprocated by recognizing India’s claim to the Himalayan state of Sikkim.16 Even with respect to Taiwan, Chinese policy attempts to balance the “stick” of diplomatic and military pressure with the “carrot” of mutually beneficial cross-strait economic ties.17 The demands of increased economic development are the driving forces behind China’s improved relations with her neighbors. Successful economic development is perceived as key to China’s third area of strategic concern, domestic stability. China’s central government is focused inward, and primarily domestic politics drive China’s foreign and economic policies. Changes to the economic system and the decision to embrace globalization are causing major shifts in Chinese society. Disparities between booming coastal regions and poorly developed interior regions, effects of the information revolution, rampant corruption, and emerging class distinction due to economic stratification are but a few examples of the disruptive forces affecting the social fabric of China. These changes clash with the very nature of communist ideology and the authoritarian political system favored by Chinese elites and vested interest groups.18 Recent manifestations of social discontent include antigovernment demonstrations by peasants, protests by laid-off workers, and religious activism by groups such as the Falun Gong.19 Although repression has not been as intense as what occurred during the Tiananmen Square crackdown of June 1989, the regime is attentive to dissidence and prepared to use substantial coercive and persuasive power in response to social discontent. The regime’s priority and preoccupation due to the legacy of the Cultural Revolution and other periods of social unrest is to maintain domestic stability by fostering economic prosperity to satisfy the demands and expectations of the Chinese people.20 **China’s largest strategic concerns—regime survival, territorial integrity, and domestic stability**— **are inexorably linked to the economy**. China’s greatest strength and its greatest vulnerability is the economy, and therefore it is the centerpiece of Chinese policy and strategy. **To sustain economic growth, China must rely increasingly upon external sources of energy and raw materials. SLOCs are vitally important** because most of China’s foreign trade is conducted by sea, and China has had little success in developing reliable oil or gas pipelines from Russia or Central Asia. Since energy provides the foundation of the economy, China’s economic policy depends on the success of its energy policy.21 **Securing SLOCs for energy and raw materials supports China’s energy policy and is the principal motivation behind the “String of Pearls.”** This is how and why the “String of Pearls” relates to China’s grand national strategy.

#### Chinese nationalism ensures naval conflict escalates to nuclear war

Scott Moore, Undergraduate Research Assistant, East Asia Nonproliferation Program, CNS, NTI, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 10/18/06, “Nuclear Conflict in the 21st Century: Reviewing the Chinese Nuclear Threat”, http://www.nti.org/e\_research/e3\_80.html {jchen}

The depth of Chinese nationalist sentiment towards Taiwan has a parallel, though not an exact one, in anti-Japanese feeling. Like the Taiwan issue, these feelings run both deep and broad in Chinese society. The memory of Japan's invasion during the Second World War is particularly poignant; one 1996 survey reported that the word "Japan" made 81.3% of Chinese youth think most easily of the "war of resistance against Japanese aggression."[44] The strength of anti-Japanese sentiment suggests that the Chinese government may take an aggressive stance on major increases in Japan's military capability in general, and the acquisition of nuclear weapons in particular. Anti-Japanese nationalism has been described as "the stomach-burning passion of Chinese patriots."[45] In April 2005, large protests erupted in many Chinese cities after United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan urged a plan intended to give Japan a permanent seat on the Security Council.[46] An online petition that allegedly garnered 42 million signatures in opposition to a permanent Security Council seat for Japan[47] suggests the popular resonance of these protests. Additional protests were organized in a grassroots, popular campaign largely conducted via the Internet, a feat accomplished because of the strength of anti-Japanese sentiment.[48] This phenomenon is particularly notable because much of this online protest occurred without direction by the government; an example is Japanpig.com, which simply features a sword piercing the Japanese flag.[49] This hyper-nationalism is at odds with official policy, most particularly with regards to the Diaoyu/Senkaku, a group of islands claimed by both China and Japan in the East China Sea. One internal Chinese government poll suggested that 82% of mainland citizens opposed the government's policy towards Japan and favored a more aggressive one.[50] The gap between popular opinion and elite policy suggests that under current circumstances a hyper-nationalist nexus is unlikely to form between elite and popular interests. However, if Japan pursues a policy of nuclearization, these circumstances may change. It also **bodes ill for the cause of moderation in the case of conflict.** Some already regard Japan as a "de facto nuclear weapons state" because it possesses stockpiles of plutonium, the necessary technological base to produce nuclear weapons, and because it possesses advanced space launch technology that could easily be applied to intercontinental ballistic missiles.[51] Furthermore, although Japan has a strong political tradition renouncing nuclear weapons, there are some signs this may be changing. In April 2002, Ichiro Ozawa, the leader of Japan's opposition Liberal Party, warned that "if China gets too inflated, the Japanese people will become hysterical," and claimed it would be easy for Japan to produce nuclear weapons.[52] Although the Chinese Foreign Ministry response to Ozawa's statements was muted,[53] there appears to be some perception that Japan is embarked on a long-term path of aggression towards China. In an article published in the Shanghai Journal of Social Studies, one analyst claimed that "all-out strategic precautions against China have become one of the main contents of Japan's strategy towards China."[54] If such a policy were seen to threaten China with Japanese nuclear weapons capabilities, hyper-nationalist elite and popular interests may converge to advocate an aggressive response. Despite the depth of anti-Japanese sentiment, there is no direct link between a nuclearized Japan and a nuclear conflict with China. Thus the threat of a nuclear-armed Japan is more one of instability. Given the resonance of anti-Japanese feeling, there may be significant potential for a hyper-nationalist nexus to form against Japan than against the United States, including the threatened use of nuclear weapons. Acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan would probably at a minimum induce Chinese decision makers to reconsider the NFU policy, particularly if Japan also acquired a ballistic missile capability. Any such situation would also involve the United States. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security obligates the United States to "act to meet the common danger" in the event of an attack on Japanese territory.[55] Chinese analysts, moreover, emphasize strong U.S.-Japan ties,[56] suggesting that were a conflict to develop, all parties expect the involvement of the United States. **The implications of any such conflict are enormous, involving** as it would **three of the world's most powerful militaries, all of which**, in this scenario, would **have** a mature or putative **nuclear weapons capability**. The specter of this kind of confrontation is worth considering as one contemplates the future of Sino-American relations in the nuclear context.

#### CCP instability causes unauthorized nuclear use

Busch 04

Nathan E. Busch, Senior Research Associate, Center for International Trade and Security, UGA, 04, No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation, pp. 151-2

The events during the Cultural Revolution and the Tiananmen Square crisis suggest a troubling weakness in China’s command and control over its nuclear weapons. China’s command-and-control structure seems to work well enough under normal, peaceful circumstances, but has proven to be vulnerable in times of acute political crisis. During these times, the risk of unauthorized use of Chinese nuclear weapons may have increased significantly. This fact seems especially disturbing, as China has experienced a great deal of political turmoil since its revolutionary beginning in 1949, including the Great Leap Forward in 1958-1960, the Cultral Revolution from 1966-1971, Lin Biao’s attempted coup d’etat in 1971, and the Tiananmen Square crisis in 1989. And, one must recall, a number of these incidents occurred while China possessed nuclear weapons. Moreover, as we have seen, there are continuing possibilities of serious economic, political, and social upheavals in China in the future. Given China’s current system of nuclear controls, this political instability could have very severe consequences. According to Jones et al., “the possibilities run the spectrum from a breakup of China into multiple states, the breakdown of central authority and the rise of regional warlords, or a steady deterioration of central authority that would increase the opportunity for theft and smuggling of nuclear materials or weapons.”112

#### Multipolarity key to solve China-India war.

Malone and Mukherjee 10 [David M. Malone is President of Canada's International Development Research Centre (IDRC). A former Canadian ambassador to the UN and High Commissioner to India, he is currently completing a book, "Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy" for Oxford University Press. An occasional scholar of the UN Security Council and related issues of war and peace, he teaches at the NYU Law School and is an associate faculty member of the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton, Rohan Mukherjee is a senior research specialist at the Institutions for Fragile States research program at Princeton University. He holds a Master's in public affairs with a specialization in international development from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. He has worked with the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, and the National Knowledge Commission, Government of India. His principal interests are in the international relations of emerging powers, the political economy of development, and service delivery in developing countries. India and China: Conflict and Cooperation Survival, Volume 52, Issue 1 February 2010 , pages 137 - 158]

And yet, beyond the recognition of its status as a meaningful global power, India does not yet seem to have much of a project for its global reach, while China, which might well have one, is exercising great prudence in articulating it publicly. In a genuinely multipolar world where the principal powers engage one another constantly across a wide range of issues in many different forums, India and China should be able to manage their parallel rise **without generating shocks** on their own continent. A more systematic dialogue, going well beyond high-level visits and acknowledging differences instead of emphasising imagined similarities, could lay the foundations for a better understanding of the domestic compulsions that drive the two countries' foreign policies and help both sides manage their nationalist impulses, transform public perceptions and learn to pre-empt situations before they can develop into **full-blown confrontation.**

#### Causes extinction.

Kahn 9 [Jeremy, independent journalist who writes about international affairs, politics, business, the environment and the arts. His work has recently appeared in Newsweek International, The New York Times, The Atlantic, Smithsonian, The Boston Globe, The New Republic, Slate, Foreign Policy, Fortune, and Inc., as well as other publications. He has also contributed to the public radio program "Marketplace." Kahn was the managing editor at The New Republic from 2004 to 2006. October 19, 2009, “Why India Fears China,” online: http://www.newsweek.com/id/217088]

The implications for India's security—and the world's—are ominous. It turns what was once an obscure argument over lines on a 1914 map and some barren, rocky peaks hardly worth fighting over into a flash point that could spark a war between two nuclear-armed neighbors. And that makes the India-China border dispute into an issue of concern to far more than just the two parties involved. The United States and Europe as well as the rest of Asia ought to take notice—a conflict involving India and China could result in a **nuclear exchange.** And it could suck the West in—either as an ally in the defense of Asian democracy, as in the case of Taiwan, or as a mediator trying to separate the two sides.

#### Heg spurs war with Russia and China – extinction.

Roberts 10 [Paul Craig Roberts, William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Economic Policy and associate editor of the Wall Street Journal. He was columnist for Business Week, Scripps Howard News Service, and Creators Syndicate. He has had many university appointments. The Road to Armageddon, Foreign Policy Journal, February 26, 2010 http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/02/26/the-road-to-armageddon]

The U.S. has already encircled Iran with military bases. The U.S. government intends to neutralize China by seizing control over the Middle East and cutting China off from oil. This plan assumes that Russia and China, nuclear armed states, will be intimidated by U.S. anti-missile defenses and acquiesce to U.S. hegemony and that China will lack oil for its industries and military. The U.S. government is delusional. Russian military and political leaders have responded to the obvious threat by declaring NATO a direct threat to the security of Russia and by announcing a change in Russian war doctrine to the pre-emptive launch of nuclear weapons. The Chinese are too confident to be bullied by a washed-up American “superpower.” The morons in Washington are **pushing the envelope of nuclear war.** The insane drive for American hegemony **threatens life on earth.** The American people, by accepting the lies and deceptions of “their” government, are facilitating this outcome.

### Air Power

#### 1. Air power is light years ahead.

Carpenter 8 [US Air Force Colonel and Brigadier General of the Air Force Quadrennial Defense Review Division, respectively [Mace Carpenter and David Deputla, “Aerospace nations; Invest in improving the Air Force,” The Washington Times, 2-21-2008, LexisNexis]

We are an aerospace nation in many ways. Our commercial air arm towers over any other nation. Our Navy's ability to project airpower from the sea is unmatched by any other navy. Our Marines' ability to provide close support to surface forces is "par excellence." Our Army's helicopter force - more than 6,000 strong - is the largest in the world. Our Air Force leads the world in aerospace capability in all aspects of the third dimension. Charged with leading military operations in air, space, and cyberspace, the Air Force provides the global vigilance, global reach and global power that underpin us as the world's sole superpower. National security actions are conducted much faster today than in the past; therefore, the speed and accuracy of air, space and cyber operations has become increasingly important. With other nations' growing ability to conduct precise kinetic and cyber attacks against us, we must preserve our capability to preempt, defend and rapidly respond.

#### 2. Air power doesn’t deter – not perceived.

Allan 94 [Charles, Air Force Ntl Defense Fellow @ CSIS, “Extended Conventional Deterrence: In from the Cold and Out of the Nuclear Fire?” Washington Quarterly, Summer]

Information. As we have seen, imperfect information about a defender's commitment may be present for both the defender and the attacker. Prior to the crisis, the "intended deterrees [themselves] will not know how much of a politically and technically credible threat it would take to deter them" (Gray 1991, 14). In addition, as Arquilla and Davis point out (Arquilla and Davis 1992; Davis and Arquilla 1991), adversaries have historically discounted key elements of U.S. power such as strategic mobility, precision weapons, maritime power, and airpower due to lack of familiarity with these systems. Without understanding these elements of U.S. military strength, the regional aggressor will view the absence of U.S. heavy ground forces as evidence of a lack of both capability and commitment. Moreover, Adam Garfinkle (1992) asserts that third world leaders are frequently misled into overly optimistic views of their own forces' capabilities. Without clear recognition of U.S. power, deterrence cannot hold.

#### Land forces check – US army demonstrates deterrence and resolve

#### Any skirmishes won’t escalate.

Kang 10 [David, professor of international relations and business and director of the Korean Studies Institute at the University of Southern California. His latest book is East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute (Columbia University Press, 2010). 12/31 . http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/koreas-new-cold-war-4653]

Local skirmishing has stayed local for sixty years. The key issue is whether a local fight could escalate into all-out war, such as North Korea shelling Seoul with artillery or missiles. Such a decision would clearly have to be taken at the top of the North Korean leadership. Especially when tensions are high, both militaries are on high alert and local commanders particularly careful with their actions. Without a clear directive from the top, it is not likely that a commander one hundred kilometers away from the military exercises would make a decision on his own to start shooting at Seoul. For their part, North Korean leaders have not made such a decision in sixty years, knowing that any major attack on Seoul would cause a massive response from the South Korean and U.S. forces and would carry the war into Pyongyang and beyond. After the fighting, North Korea would cease to exist. Thus, while both North and South Korean leaders talk in grim tones about war, both sides have kept the actual fighting to localized areas, and I have seen no indication that this time the North Korean leadership plans to expand the fighting into a general war.

#### No cyber war – deterrence.

Lewis 11 [Project Director James A. Lewis January 2011 a report of the csis commission on cybersecurity for the 44th presidency Cybersecurity Two Years Later Commission Cochairs Representative James R. Langevin Representative Michael T. McCaul Scott Charney Lt. General Harry Raduege, USAF (ret.) <http://csis.org/files/publication/110128_Lewis_CybersecurityTwoYearsLater_Web.pdf>]

However, we are not engaged in a cyber war. Short of armed conflict, nation-states are unlikely to launch cyber attacks against the United States. **The political risk is too high.** Just as with missiles and aircraft, countries can strike the United States using cyber attack, but they know this would trigger a violent if not devastating response. The risks are too high for frivolous engagement.

#### Fears of cyberapocalypse are threat inflation of the highest order.

Brito and Watkins 12 [Jerry, Senior Research Fellow, Mercatus Center at George Mason University and Tate, Research Associate, Mercatus Center at George Mason University. Loving the Cyber Bomb? The Dangers of Threat Inflation in Cybersecurity Policy, http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Vol.-3\_Brito\_Watkins1.pdf]

Cybersecurity is an important policy issue, but the alarmist rhetoric coming out of Washington that focuses on worst-case scenarios is unhelpful and dangerous. Aspects of current cyber policy discourse parallel the run-up to the Iraq War and pose the same dangers. Pre-war threat inflation and conflation of threats led us into war on shaky evidence. By focusing on doomsday scenarios and conflating cyber threats, government officials threaten to legislate, regulate, or spend in the name of cybersecurity based largely on fear, misplaced rhetoric, conflated threats, and credulous reporting. The public should have access to classified evidence of cyber threats, and further examination of the risks posed by those threats, before sound policies can be proposed, let alone enacted.

#### Hegemony enables allied free-riding and continued asian conflict.

Walt 9/3 [The 'goldilocks problem' in East Asia Posted By Stephen M. Walt Monday, September 3, 2012 - 12:24 PM Share http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/09/03/the\_goldilocks\_problem\_in\_east\_asia]

But equally important, an overly energetic U.S. policy will **encourage** its regional **allies to misbehave** in a number of ways. First, if the U.S. does too much to reassure its allies that it is ready to help them, they will free-ride and let Uncle Sam bear most of the burden of containing China. Second, if America's regional allies are too confident that Washington will protect them no matter what, they will continue to indulge assorted bilateral squabbles and devote insufficient attention to ironing out lingering historical enmities. (Case in point: the continued territorial dispute between South Korea and Japan, and the domestic uproar in South Korea that derailed a useful intelligence cooperation agreement with Tokyo).

#### Asian militaries are self-sufficient – prevents regional war.

Scoblete 8/27 [Greg, Editor – RealClearWorld, AUGUST 27, 2012 How to Contain China: Romney Campaign Edition http://www.realclearworld.com/blog/2012/08/how\_to\_contain\_china.html]

In fact, Asian militaries have been bulking up since before the Obama administration made its famous "pivot" to Asia. There is every reason to believe that Asian states will continue to invest in their defenses and that American moves to beef up their own defenses, particularly the kind of lavish, Cold War-style commitment Friedberg advocates, would take the pressure off. At a time when the U.S. is up to its eyeballs in red ink, this hardly makes much sense.

**No Asian war.**

Acharya 12 [Amitav Acharya is Professor of International Relations at American University, Washington, DC. This article is from East Asia Forum (www.eastasiaforum.org) at the Crawford School, ANU. China’s rise and security in the Asian century May 6th, 2012 Author: Amitav Acharya, AU http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/05/06/china-s-rise-and-security-in-the-asian-century/]

The problem with these scenarios is that they **ignore significant changes** that have taken place in Asia in recent decades. Asian security in the aftermath of World War II was shaped by three forces: economic nationalism, security bilateralism (anchored on the US’s ‘hub-and-spoke’ alliances), and political authoritarianism. Over the decades, Asia has seen a major growth in economic internationalism, multilateral institutions and democratisation. Since the mid-1950s, intra-Asian trade has nearly doubled to over 50 per cent of the region’s total trade. The effect of economic interdependence and multilateral institutions in promoting peace has been well documented by international relations scholars. In Asia today, production networks straddle national boundaries, making them especially costly to break; multipurpose regional institutions have proliferated; and cooperative institutions now outnumber formal military alliances, thus reversing the Cold War pattern. Democracies in Asia today outnumber autocracies and, despite fears that democratic transitions might produce aggressively nationalistic regimes, no newly democratic regime in Asia has behaved this way. The Asian regional order today resembles neither the 19th century Concert of Europe, nor the EU of today. The EU model is implausible in a highly sovereignty-conscious Asia. An Asian concert of powers is unrealistic and dangerous. The two most important pitfalls of this idea are long-known. First, for a concert to function successfully it requires a degree of ideological convergence among the major powers. Such a convergence does not exist pending China’s democratisation. On the other hand, a concert based on current ideological conditions would be a welcome gift to China’s authoritarian rulers, as it would preserve a conservative status quo that would arrest China’s democratisation. A concert of this type would also necessarily marginalise weaker states. The Concert of Europe, as historian Richard Elrod points out, ensured a degree of self-restraint among the great powers toward each other, but also brought about ‘great power tutelage over the rest of Europe’ before collapsing over ideological divergence. An Asian concert would imply de facto Sino–US joint rule, but will the rest of Asia really want to live under Chinese or US tutelage? In contrast, Asia’s regional groups like the ASEAN Regional Forum or the East Asian Summit facilitate the peaceful engagement of great powers with each other and with the region, without reducing weaker states to the status of vassals and pawns. The rise of China requires adjustments and strengthening of the current order — not reinventing an outdated model. Asia’s future need not resemble Europe’s past or present. Nor will it resemble past US foreign policy. The revival of a tributary order would be similarly countered by the economic, strategic and cultural influence of the US, Japan, India and Russia. Moreover, a concert model may not serve Australia’s security interests because it will almost certainly be excluded from it. Asia and Australia are better served by a model based on the kind of ‘entrepreneurial’ and ‘intellectual’ leadership to which Japan, Australia and ASEAN (now South Korea, Indonesia and India) have made a contribution, and which has brought about the simultaneous engagement of China and the US. For all its recent diplomatic assertiveness, China supports and sustains Asian economic interdependence and institutions, as do the US, Japan and India. At the same time, US alliances and security ties with India offer a hedge against any future uncertainty in Chinese behaviour. In Asia today there are **multiple mechanisms of stability**: economic interdependence raises the stakes of mutual survival and well-being; US-centred alliances preserve the balance of power; and cooperative institutions develop a habit of dialogue and thereby moderate extreme, unilateral behaviour. None of these is sufficient by itself to guarantee order, but together they create the conditions for stability.