#  1NC

#### 1 Interpretation: The ballot is to determine if the enactment of a topical plan is better than the status quo or a competitive option.

#### 2 Violation:

#### A “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School, ‘4

(5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, <http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm>)

**The colon introduces** the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. **A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:"¶ Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.**

#### B USFG is the national government in DC.

Encarta Online Encyclopedia, 2k

(http://encarta.msn.com)

“The federal government **of the U**nited **S**tates **is centered in** Washington **DC”**

#### C Should means there is a practical reason for action

WordNet in ‘97

Princeton University, 1.6

**Should** v 1 : be expected to: “Parties should be fun” 2 : **expresses an** emotional**, practical,** or other **reason for doing something:** “You had better put on warm clothes”; “You should call your mother-in-law”; *“The State ought to repair bridges*”[syn**:** had better, ought]

#### 3 Vote Negative:

#### Limits on what can be debated protect subversion and meaningful debate.

Shively, 2K

(Former Assistant Politics Professor – Texas A&M, Partisan Politics and Political Theory, pp. 181-4, We have the full text of the card if you want to see it)

At the very least, **we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it.** For instance, once cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one’s target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, **contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagreements.** The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator’s audience must know what is being resisted. In short, **the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it.** In other words, **contestation rests on some basic agreements or harmony.**¶Continues on page 184¶ But, again, the response to the ambiguist must be that **the practice of questioning and undermining rules**, like all other social practices, **needs a certain order. The subversive needs rules to protect subversion. And when we look more closely at the rules protective of subversion, we find that they are roughly the rules of argument** discussed above. In fact, **the rules of argument are roughly the rules of democracy or civility: the delineation of boundaries necessary to protect speech and action from violence, manipulation, and other forms of tyranny.**

#### And, fair division of ground is necessary for meaningful switch-side debate – switch-side which solves progressive politics

Mitchell et al. 07

(Gordon, Eric English, Stephen Llano, Catherine E. Morrison, John Rief, and Carly Woods, Pitt Comm Studies Grad Students, Gordon Mitchell is an Associate Comm Studies Professor @ Pitt, Communication & Critical/Cultural Studies 4)

The problem for Greene and Hicks is that this notion of citizenship becomes tied to a normative conception of American democracy that justifies imperialism. They write, ‘‘The production and management of this field of governance allows liberalism to trade in cultural technologies in the global cosmopolitan marketplace at the same time as it creates a field of intervention to transform and change the world one subject (regime) at a time.’’11 Here, Greene and Hicks argue that this new conception of liberal governance, which epitomizes the ethical citizen as an individual trained in the switch-side technique, serves as a normative tool for judging other polities and justifying forcible regime change. One need look only to the Bush administration’s framing of war as an instrument of democracy promotion to grasp how the switch-side technique can be appropriated as a justification for violence. It is our position, however, that **rather than acting as a cultural technology expanding American exceptionalism, switch-side debating originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes.** **Several prominent voices reshaping the national dialogue on homeland security have come from the academic debate community and draw on its animating spirit of critical inquiry**. For example, Georgetown University law professor **Neal Katyal served as lead plaintiff ’s counsel in Hamdan, which challenged post-9/11 enemy combat definitions**. 12 The foundation for Katyal’s winning argument in Hamdan was laid some four years before, when he collaborated with former intercollegiate debate champion Laurence Tribe on an influential Yale Law Journal addressing a similar topic.13 Tribe won the National Debate Tournament in 1961 while competing as an undergraduate debater for Harvard University. Thirty years later, Katyal represented Dartmouth College at the same tournament and finished third. **The imprint of this debate training is evident in Tribe and Katyal’s contemporary public interventions, which are characterized by meticulous research, sound argumentation, and a staunch commitment to democratic principles**. Katyal’s reflection on his early days of debating at Loyola High School in Chicago’s North Shore provides a vivid illustration. ‘‘I came in as a shy freshman with dreams of going to medical school. Then Loyola’s debate team opened my eyes to a different world: one of argumentation and policy.’’ As Katyal recounts, ‘‘the most important preparation for my career came from my experiences as a member of Loyola’s debate team.’’14 **The success of former debaters like Katyal, Tribe, and others in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security points to the efficacy of academic debate as a training ground for future advocates of progressive change**. Moreover**, a robust understanding of the switch-side technique and the classical liberalism which underpins it would help prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies**. **For buried within an inner-city debater’s files is a secret threat to absolutism: the refusal to be classified as ‘‘with us or against us,’’ the embracing of intellectual experimentation in an age of orthodoxy, and reflexivity in the face of fundamentalism**. But by now, the irony of our story should be apparent\***the more effectively academic debating practice can be focused toward these ends, the greater the proclivity of McCarthy’s ideological heirs to brand the activity as a ‘‘weapon of mass destruction.’’**

#### Dialogue is critical to affirming any value—shutting down deliberation devolves into totalitarianism and reinscribes oppression

Morson 4

http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331

Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel); and his favorite writers -- Chekhov, Gogol, and, above all, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is especially interested in the relation of literature to philosophy.

 Bakhtin viewed the whole process of “ideological” (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic) development as an endless dialogue. As teachers, we find it difficult to avoid **a voice of authority,** however much we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice, because our rebelliousness against society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture.We speak the language and thoughts of **academic educators**, even when we imagine we are speaking in no jargon at all, and that jargon, inaudible to us, sounds with all the overtones of authority to our students. We are so prone to think of ourselves as **fighting oppression** that it takes some work to realize that we ourselves may be felt as oppressive and **overbearing,** and that our own voice may provoke the same reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree. So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image: helpful, but often painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on “The Theme of the Rebel” and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors. There is a famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox opponents. Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isn’t that itself often the root cause? We know from Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who escaped to Poland, that Ivan saw himself as someone who had been oppressed by noblemen as a child and pictured himself as the great rebel against traditional authority when he killed masses of people or destroyed whole towns. There is something in the nature of maximal rebellion against authority that produces ever greater intolerance, unless one is very careful. For **the skills of** fighting or **refuting an oppressive power are not** those of **openness, self-skepticism, or real dialogue**. In preparing for my course, I remember my dismay at reading **Hitler’s** Mein Kampf and discovering that his self-consciousness was **precisely** that of the rebel speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that much of his amazing appeal – otherwise so inexplicable – was to the German sense that they were rebelling victims. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic exploited much the same appeal. Bakhtin surely knew that Communist totalitarianism, **the Gulag,** and the unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power. His favorite writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that the worst oppression comes from those who, with the rebellious psychology of “the insulted and humiliated,” have seized power – **unless they have somehow cultivated the value of dialogue**, as Lenin surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had. Rebels often make the worst tyrants because their word, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has borrowed something crucial from the authoritative word it opposed, and perhaps exaggerated it: the aura of righteous authority. If one’s ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth, one is likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority; and rebels of the next generation may proceed in much the same way, **in an ongoing spiral of intolerance**.

**Decisionmaking is the most portable skill—key to all facets of life and advocacy**

**Steinberg**, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, **‘8**

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 9-10)

After several days of **intense debate**, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.

Meanwhile, and perhaps **equally difficult** for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. **Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made**. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.

Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. **Life demands decision making**. We make **countless individual decisions** every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. **Every profession** requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.

We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through **military invasion or diplomacy**? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?

Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? **And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others**. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. **We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?**

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.

Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.

Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.

**Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us**. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

### SHELL

#### BATAILLE’S PERSPECTIVE OF ENERGY MOVEMENT, THE ENVIRONMENT AND ANIMALITY ARE ANTHROPOCENTRIC.

**Tyler 2k5**

[tom, like water in water, journal for cultural research, vol 9, no 3, july]

That which in humans is fully formed appears in animals as a merely “embryonic”¶ proto-manifestation, groping toward full realization.¶ In his opening chapter, Bataille is principally concerned with introducing, and¶ tentatively exploring, the notion of immanence. It is to this end that he embarks¶ on a discussion of animality, and from here later moves to a study of human¶ religious, economic and military affairs.3 That Bataille has no interest in animality¶ or animals in their own right is not, of itself, a matter for concern. But he does¶ here articulate especially clearly a pair of inter-related claims regarding the¶ relationship between humanity, animality and knowledge. These claims¶ frequently surface, more or less explicitly, when the animal comes under scrutiny,¶ and the value of my own rather narrow reading of Bataille’s text thus lies¶ in their analysis, and the broader concerns that they throw open.¶ First, the two claims. On the one hand, the perfect continuity that, according¶ to Bataille, exists between animal and environment, the lack of transcendence,¶ means that phenomena are not distinguished as objects. The animal has no¶ meaning, no knowledge of the world, and exists, as we have seen, like water in¶ water. On the other hand, in virtue of the fact that the existence of the animal¶ consists in this uniformity with the environment, that existence is utterly closed¶ to us. Compelled always to impose precisely those divisions which are denied to¶ the animal, humans cannot entertain any meaningful understanding of animal¶ life. In short, the reason the animal is closed to us, the reason we cannot have¶ knowledge of the animal, is that there is no meaning, no knowledge for the¶ animal. Taken together, the implication of these two claims is that knowledge¶ (meaning, understanding, cognition) is always and only human. We who do and¶ must have knowledge are condemned to our own perspective, to an inevitable¶ anthropocentrism. Any attempt to step outside this limitation, to articulate an¶ understanding or knowledge which is not constrained in this way, will unavoidably¶ descend into poetic babbling.¶ Is (our) knowledge inherently and inevitably constrained in this way? It is¶ unavoidable, Bataille says, that we should regard the animal as lacking transcendence¶ (pp. 23, 24). But he has here already assumed a qualitative difference¶ between human and animal experience which he has not demonstrated. The life¶ of the animal, he says, is closed to us; its place in the world seems in our eyes¶ to be one of complete immanence (pp. 20, 24). The pronouns, here and elsewhere¶ in the chapter, are instructive. They refer exclusively to the human. In so¶ doing, Bataille gives priority to the human perspective, “our” starting point, and¶ suggests that this human perspective is inescapable. When he asserts that “[f]or¶ the moment, I need to set apart from the dazzle of poetry that which, from the¶ standpoint of experience, appears distinctly and clearly” he is attempting to take¶ stock from the standpoint of human experience (p. 23). Despite his poetic¶ 3. Baudrillard suggests that, along with The Accursed Share, Theory of Religion functions as a kind¶ of apologetic, defensive attempt by Bataille to provide a foundation for his vision of the sacred,¶ which is fundamentally at odds with the particularities of his other writings (Baudrillard 1998,¶ p. 191).¶ suggestion that the animal’s immediacy is in fact our own, Bataille assumes that,¶ in a sense, we are human before we are animal.4¶ We will return to this issue of the temporal pre-eminence of the human¶ shortly. First, however, I would like to look a little closer at the question of¶ anthropocentrism. If we are to seize the opportunity to gaze out across new¶ vistas, it is important that we examine the nature of the limitations that have¶ been placed on those eyes, human or otherwise, that would attempt to apprehend¶ a novel landscape. Before we gaze outwards, then, we would do well to¶ look down, toward that perplexing, unfathomable depth.

#### AND, ANTHROPOCENTRIC VIOLENCE CAUSES INFINITE GENOCIDE and DETERMINES THE VALUE TO LIFE. HUMANS ARE DESTROYING ALL LIVING CREATURE TO SUIT THEIR ENDS.

**KOCHI & ORDAN 2K8**

[tarik and noam, queen’s university and bar llan university, “an argument for the global suicide of humanity”, vol 7. no. 4., bourderlands e-journal]

Within the picture many paint of humanity, events such as the Holocaust are considered as an exception, an aberration. The Holocaust is often portrayed as an example of ‘evil’, a moment of hatred, madness and cruelty (cf. the differing accounts of ‘evil’ given in Neiman, 2004). The event is also treated as one through which humanity comprehend its own weakness and draw strength, via the resolve that such actions will never happen again. However, if we take seriously the differing ways in which the Holocaust was ‘evil’, then one must surely include along side it the almost uncountable numbers of genocides that have occurred throughout human history. Hence, if we are to think of the content of the ‘human heritage’, then this must include the annihilation of indigenous peoples and their cultures across the globe and the manner in which their beliefs, behaviours and social practices have been erased from what the people of the ‘West’ generally consider to be the content of a human heritage. Again the history of colonialism is telling here. It reminds us exactly how normal, regular and mundane acts of annihilation of different forms of human life and culture have been throughout human history. Indeed the history of colonialism, in its various guises, points to the fact that so many of our legal institutions and forms of ethical life (i.e. nation-states which pride themselves on protecting human rights through the rule of law) have been founded upon colonial violence, war and the appropriation of other peoples’ land (Schmitt, 2003; Benjamin, 1986). Further, the history of colonialism highlights the central function of ‘race war’ that often underlies human social organisation and many of its legal and ethical systems of thought (Foucault, 2003). This history of modern colonialism thus presents a key to understanding that events such as the Holocaust are not an aberration and exception but are closer to the norm, and sadly, lie at the heart of any heritage of humanity. After all, all too often the European colonisation of the globe was justified by arguments that indigenous inhabitants were racially ‘inferior’ and in some instances that they were closer to ‘apes’ than to humans (Diamond, 2006). Such violence justified by an erroneous view of ‘race’ is in many ways merely an extension of an underlying attitude of speciesism involving a long history of killing and enslavement of non-human species by humans. Such a connection between the two histories of inter-human violence (via the mythical notion of differing human ‘races’) and interspecies violence, is well expressed in Isaac Bashevis Singer’s comment that whereas humans consider themselves “the crown of creation”, for animals “all people are Nazis” and animal life is “an eternal Treblinka” (Singer, 1968, p.750).

#### Alternative: the judge should vote negative to REJECT THE 1AC’S humanism.

HUDSON 2K4

[Laura, The Political Animal: Species-Being and Bare Life, mediations journal, http://www.mediationsjournal.org/files/Mediations23\_2\_04.pdf]

We are all equally reduced to mere specimens of human biology, mute and uncomprehending of the world in which we are thrown. Species-being, or “humanity as a species,” may require this recognition to move beyond the pseudo-essence of the religion of humanism. Recognizing that what we call “the human” is an abstraction that fails to fully describe what we are, we may come to find a new way of understanding humanity that recuperates the natural without domination. The bare life that results from expulsion from the law removes even the illusion of freedom. Regardless of one’s location in production, the threat of losing even the fiction of citizenship and freedom affects everyone. This may create new means of organizing resistance across the particular divisions of society. Furthermore, the concept of bare life allows us to gesture toward a more detailed, concrete idea of what species-being may look like. Agamben hints that in the recognition of this fact, that in our essence we are all animals, that we are all living dead, might reside the possibility of a kind of redemption. Rather than the mystical horizon of a future community, the passage to species-being may be experienced as a deprivation, a loss of identity. Species-being is not merely a positive result of the development of history; it is equally the absence of many of the features of “humanity” through which we have learned to make sense of our world. It is an absence of the kind of individuality and atomism that structure our world under capitalism and underlie liberal democracy, and which continue to inform the tenets of deep ecology. The development of species-being requires the collapse of the distinction between human and animal in order to change the shape of our relationships with the natural world. A true species-being depends on a sort of reconciliation between our “human” and “animal” selves, a breakdown of the distinction between the two both within ourselves and in nature in general. Bare life would then represent not only expulsion from the law but the possibility of its overcoming. Positioned in the zone of indistinction, no longer a subject of the law but still subjected to it through absence, what we equivocally call “the human” in general becomes virtually indistinguishable from the animal or nature. But through this expulsion and absence, we may see not only the law but the system of capitalism that shapes it from a position no longer blinded or captivated by its spell. The structure of the law is revealed as always suspect in the false division between natural and political life, which are never truly separable. Though clearly the situation is not yet as dire as Agamben’s invocation of the Holocaust suggests, we are all, as citizens, under the threat of the state of exception. With the decline of the nation as a form of social organization, the whittling away of civil liberties and, with them, the state’s promise of “the good life” (or “the good death”) even in the most developed nations, with the weakening of labor as the bearer of resistance to exploitation, how are we to envision the future of politics and society?

### Case

#### Tech thought is inevitable and no impact

Kateb 97

Kateb, professor of politics – Princeton, ‘97

(George, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m2267/is\_/ai\_19952031)

But the question arises as to where a genuine principle of limitation on technological endeavor would come from. It is scarcely conceivable that Western humanity--and by now most of humanity, because of their pleasures and interests and their own passions and desires and motives--would halt the technological project. Even if, by some change of heart, Western humanity could adopt an altered relation to reality and human beings, how could it be enforced and allowed to yield its effects? The technological project can be stopped only by some global catastrophe that it had helped to cause or was powerless to avoid. Heidegger's teasing invocation of the idea that a saving remedy grows with the worst danger is useless. In any case, no one would want the technological project halted, if the only way was a global catastrophe. Perhaps even the survivors would not want to block its reemergence. As for our generation and the indefinite future, many of us are prepared to say that there are many things we wish that modern science did not know or is likely to find out and many things we wish that modern technology did not know how to do. When referring in 1955 to the new sciences of life, Heidegger says We do not stop to consider that an attack with technological means is being prepared upon the life and nature of man compared with which the explosion of the hydrogen bomb means little. For precisely if the hydrogen bombs do not explode and human life on earth is preserved, an uncanny change in the world moves upon us (1966, p. 52). The implication is that it is less bad for the human status or stature and for the human relation to reality that there be nuclear destruction than that (what we today call) genetic engineering should go from success to success. To such lengths can a mind push itself when it marvels first at the passions, drives, and motives that are implicated in modern technology, and then marvels at the feats of technological prowess. The sense of wonder is entangled with a feeling of horror. We are past even the sublime, as conceptualized under the influence of Milton's imagination of Satan and Hell. It is plain that so much of the spirit of the West is invested in modern technology. We have referred to anger, alienation, resentment. But that cannot be the whole story. Other considerations we can mention include the following: a taste for virtuosity, skill for its own sake, an enlarged fascination with technique in itself, and, along with these, an aesthetic craving to make matter or nature beautiful or more beautiful; and then, too, sheer exhilaration, a questing, adventurous spirit that is reckless, heedless of danger, finding in obstacles opportunities for self-overcoming, for daring, for the very sort of daring that Heidegger praises so eloquently when in 1935 he discusses the Greek world in An Introduction to Metaphysics (1961, esp. pp. 123-39). All these considerations move away from anger, anxiety, resentment, and so on. The truth of the matter, I think, is that the project of modern technology, just like that of modern science, must attract a turbulence of response. The very passions and drives and motives that look almost villainous or hypermasculine simultaneously look like marks of the highest human aspiration, or, at the least, are not to be cut loose from the highest human aspiration.

#### BATAILLE'S ATTEMPT TO ESCAPE BECOMING AN OBJECT LEADS TO FASCISM, AND COLLECTIVE MASS DEATH.

FRIEDLAND 2K4

[rodger, dept. of religious studies, uc santa barbara, religious terror and the erotics of exceptional violence, p.google]

For Bataille, the sacred’s first moment was located in that impure sacred, in our attraction to what most repulses, particularly to death, to the violated body and the corpse. Bataille read Freud. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, published in 1920, Freud posited pleasure as a diminution of excitation, asserting the existence of an instinct to cancel this excitation, a cancellation whose logical end was death. “[T]he “aim of all life,” Freud declared, “is death.” Bataille likely appropriated Freud’s theory to radicalize the self-transcendence of Durkheim’s effervescent assembly. Bataille thus located the end of social being in unproductive expenditure, dépense, not saving, investment or production, in the accumulation of power or wealth, which, he argued, are derivative from and subordinate to such expenditure (Bataille, [1933] 1996; see also [1967] 1988).

The sacred, he argued, is constituted through loss, through expenditure, the sovereign operation. Activities like sacrifice, war, spectacle, communal feasts, and sexuality without “genital finality” were occasions affording such expenditure. The bourgeoisie’s hatred of expenditure combined with religion’s decline had opened the way to fascist militarism, its effervescence, the masses’ love of the leader, the purity of its sadism. “The affective flow that united [the leader]...with his followers...is a function of the common consciousness of increasingly violent and excessive energies and powers that accumulate in the person of the leader and through him become widely available” (Bataille: [1933] 1996: 143). As Richard Wolin shows, Bataille esteemed Mussolini’s fascism, was drawn to fascist practices, sharing their disdain for parliamentary representation and their valorization of collective violence, seeking at one point to develop a left fascism, faced with the evident failure of the proletarian revolution (2004). This, of course, included an appreciation of war. War, Caillois, Bataille’s co-founder of the College, declared, was the modern equivalent of the festival, an occasion affording the excess necessary to revitalize the social order (Caillois, 1939, cited in Falasca-Zamponi, 2001). Bataille, too, celebrated collective violence, and war, as a social practice beyond calculation, capable of accessing the sacred, lifting humans beyond the status of mere things, expenditure. Durkheim’s socially procreative erotics had become an aesthetics of violence, collective life made primordially through death.

#### STOEKL’S WORK ON BATAILLE, THE SACRED, AND ENERGY IS A WORK OF ENVIRONMENTAL SCAPEGOATING OF THE MOST UNORIGINAL AND ANTI-SEMTIC TYPE.

Imray 2k9

[katheryn, review of allan stoekl bataille’s peak: energy, religion, and postsustainability, the bible and critical theory vol 5 no 1]

Bataille considered religion and human existence to be ‘inextricable, and the religious experience¶ – sacrifice – as entailing the profligate wastage of energy’. Therein, Stoekl writes, ‘lie the¶ central questions: Which religion? And which energy?’ (p. xiii). The energy, we discover, is the¶ ecstatic and useless energy expended in dance, or in sex without procreation, or in riding one’s¶ bike to work when driving would be more efficient (assuming one doesn’t get stuck in traffic).¶ The religion, despite both Bataille’s and Stoekl’s claims to the contrary, seems to be nothing¶ other than Christianity. Bataille’s religion requires useless sacrifice, and it was in part for this¶ reason Bataille rejected Christianity, where the sacrifice of Jesus has become a means to salvation.¶ But he didn’t really let go of Christianity at all. He was criticised for this, and it is a criticism¶ which can be leveled also at Stoekl. Stoekl seems to write of the three religions of the book – Christianity, Islam, and Judaism – as well as other religions (such as Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism), through use of the¶ umbrella term ‘religion’. Closer inspection however reveals the Christocentric nature of Stoekl’s¶ analysis. For Bataille, and thus for Stoekl, all religions seem to be concerned with personal salvation¶ through sacrifice, and one is not surprised by the repeated references to Jesus on the cross.¶ The few times Stoekl incorporates Judaism or Islam he does so only to contribute his discussion¶ of Christianity. Both progressive and fundamental Christianity are given voice in ‘The atheological¶ text’, but the only Muslim mentioned is ‘a leading modern exponent of … fundamental¶ Muslim law’, and this is only to comment on how ‘Christian tradition neglected the law of the¶ everyday world’ (p. 163). We also learn that it is the advent of Judaism which is responsible for¶ the destruction of the environment (pp. 151, 167).

#### STOEKL MISREADS BATAILLE – THE AFF LINKS TO ITSELF VOTE NEG ON PRESUMPTION.

Dominic Pettman. 2011. Chair of the Culture and Media program at Lang College, and Associate Professor of Liberal Studies at the New School for Social Research Human Error: Species-Being and Media Machines.147-8.

For Stoekl’s Bataille, the privileged site for the ecstatic burn-off of surplus is the human body: the energy source of “libidinous and divine recycling, not the stockpiled, exploited, and dissipated energy of easily measured and used fossil fuels” (Stoekl 2007, xvii). After a century of species-supernova, the human star must retreat back to its humble origins. And yet, according to the general economy, the human is in essence no less powerful than a jet engine, at least on the level of subjective consciousness (a reading that puts Bataille perilously close to the humanists of our introduction: Frayn, Bloom, and Arendt). Stoekl (2007, 41) admits that “The Accursed Share…presents us with a strange amalgam of awareness of the central role energy plays in relation to economics…and a willful ignorance concerning the socio-relation to economics…and a willful ignorance concerning the socio-technological modes of energy delivery and use, which are far more than mere technical details.” In other words, Bataille has no theory of depletion. Stoekl redresses this shortcoming by updating his concepts for the looming, literal postindustrial age. This results in a vision clad in its own rather steam-punk aesthetic: not a return to premodern idylls (bucolic Amish farms tended by hand by people in hemp clothing) but rather a postmodern iteration (organic vegetable gardens inside the abandoned factories of Detroit, tended by hand-cranked robots and vinyl-clad goths) – not a full circle, but a spiral forward, retroprogress. Tomorrow’s truly renewable society will be “one based on the glorious expenditure of unrefinable energy and not its obsessive and impossible conservation,” which translates into a “muscle-based, human powered” world. The key difference is between “energy as infinite force and profoundly limited available resource” (xx). Negotiating that difference is the human challenge of the twenty-first century. Stoekl’s (2007) case study is recycling. In its current form, this practice fails the Bataille test for being too parsimonious (i.e., sub-scribing to the “austerity – authenticity – sustainability school of social commentary” [123]). In contrast, the desire to reuse allegedly spent objects should be far less modest, “not merely a question of a new slightly more benign form of maintaining a standing reserve…but the orgiastic movement of the parody of meaning, of the expenditure of the energy of meanings and of physical and social bodies, an ethics (and aesthetics) of filth” (xix). (One can smell the powerful whiff of Burning Man in these passages.) Orgiastic recycling works against “a cult of the self, jealous in its marshaling of all available resources” (142). Indeed, it will “tear us from our projects and project us into communication with others, with the void,” and in doing so, expose “the lie of sheer utility” (175).

#### Capital sustainable.

Jerry Taylor, Cato Natural Resource Studies Director, 02 [“Sustainable Development: A Dubious Solution in Search of a Problem,” August 26, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa449.pdf>]

If resources are growing more abundant while the concentration of pollutants in air sheds and watersheds continues to decline, how can we explain the proliferation of various stylized sustainability indices that point to a deterioration of the planet’s resource base? There are five common weaknesses with such reports. First, they are almost always built upon a selective but fundamentally arbitrary or irrelevant set of indicators. Second, they are often built not upon actual resource data but upon hypotheses or theories about resource health that do not comport with the data or that rest upon highly suspect data fundamentally inconsistent with the larger data sets available to analysts. Third, they ignore the well-documented propensity of capitalist societies to create and invent new resources when old resources become relatively more scarce (that is, they assume that resources are fixed and finite when they are not). Fourth, they are highly aggregated and often subjective calculations of data sets that lack common denominators. Finally, they are frequently heavily biased by ideological assumptions about politics and government action. Accordingly, they provide little help to policy analysts or political leaders.

#### Consumption key to peace

Peter T. Leeson, social change graduate research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason and a fellow at the James M. Buchanan Center for Political Economy, 8-22-2002, Chicago Sun-Times, “In America, capitalism is the great uniter,” p. 27, l/n

The world is a big place and home to innumerable customs, religions, tastes and personalities. Does our globe's unending diversity mean unending conflict between differing peoples? If one looks at America, it's obvious the answer is no. The United States may be the most ethnically, religiously and socially diverse nation in the world. Outside the Civil War, why hasn't our "melting pot" led us to wage war on each other? Because, unlike Afghanistan, America is the home of capitalism. And, as Nobel prize-winning economist Milton Friedman is fond of pointing out, capitalism creates peace. Contrary to the sentiments expressed by globalization protesters, capitalism is founded on the principle of peaceful exchange. In order to get what you want in a capitalist society, you must serve the interests of those you don't know. Similarly, those who desire what you have must serve you in return. Enabled by the market, people of different shapes and sizes realize the mutual gains made available through trade. Capitalism brings the Jew, the Gentile and the Muslim together through a common purpose--profits. The process of peaceful exchange that lies at the heart of the free market aligns the interests of otherwise unconnected people in their pursuit of the almighty dollar. Differences over religion, culture or tastes pose no obstacle. In order to generate personal wealth, differing people must peacefully interact with one another. Fighting, on the other hand, is costly and hurts the bottom line. Realizing this, capitalist countries just don't fight. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman's "Golden Arches Theory of Peace" demonstrates this truth. No two countries with McDonald's restaurants have ever been at war with one another. In Afghanistan, however, things are different. There, government intervention prevents markets from doing what they do best--fostering peace and prosperity. When servicing others is no longer an option for getting what you want, pummeling others becomes the rule. To paraphrase the great 19th century political economist Frederic Bastiat, when goods don't cross boundaries (be they national, religious, or otherwise), guns do. Thus, while the Hamburgler remains a fictitious figure of fast food in the United States, he is a model of interaction for much of the Middle East. Jihad is more than a holy war--it is a war on the greatest source of prosperity the world has ever seen. Nations such as Afghanistan breed intolerance of diversity because they lack the uniting principle of private property and the profit motive. This intolerance not only destroys these nations internally; if left untreated, it spreads its ugly violence outside its borders, too.

#### We have crossed the threshold of societal sustainability—technological innovation is the only way to ensure human survival—apathy dooms civilization—try or die for the aff

Atkisson 2k

[Alan AtKisson is President and CEO of The AtKisson Group, an international sustainability consultancy to business and government, “Sustainability is Dead— Long Live Sustainability, ” http://www.rrcap.unep.org/uneptg06/course/Robert/SustainabilityManifesto2001.pdf]

At the dawn of the third milennium human civilization finds itself in a seeming paradox of gargantuan proportions. On the one hand, industrial and technological growth is destroying much of nature, endangering ourselves, and threatening our descendants. On the other hand, we must accelerate our industrial and technological development, **or the forces we have already unleashed** will wreak even greater havoc on the world for generations to come. We cannot go on, and we cannot stop. We must transform. Facing a Great Paradox At precisely the moment when humanity’s science, technology, and economy has grown to the point that we can monitor and evaluate all the major systems that support life, all over the Earth, we have discovered that most of these systems are being systematically degraded and destroyed . . . by our science, technology, and economy. The evidence that we are beyond the limits to growth is by now overwhelming: the alarms include climatic change, disappearing biodiversity, falling human sperm counts, troubling slow-downs in food production after decades of rapid expansion, the beginning of serious international tensions over basic needs like water. Wild storms and floods and eerie changes in weather patterns are but a first visible harbinger of more serious trouble to come, trouble for which we are not adequately prepared. Indeed, change of all kinds—in the Biosphere (nature as a whole), the Technosphere (the entirety of human manipulation of nature), and the Noösphere (the collective field of human consciousness)—is happening so rapidly that it exceeds our capacity to understand it, control it, or respond to it adequately in corrective ways. Humanity is simultaneously entranced by its own power, overwhelmed by the problems created by progress, and continuing to steer itself over a cliff. Our economies and technologies are changing certain basic structures of planetary life, such as the balance of carbon in the atmosphere, genetic codes, the amount of forest cover, species variety and distribution, and the foundations of cultural identity. Unless we make technological advances of the highest order, **many of the destructive changes we are causing to nature are irreversible**. Extinct species cannot (yet) be brought back to life. No credible strategy for controlling or reducing carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere has been put forward. We do not know how to fix what we’re breaking. At the same time, some of the very products of our technology— creations. In the case of certain creations, like nuclear materials and some artificially constructed or genetically modified organisms, our secure custodianship must be maintained for thousands of years. We are, in effect, committed to a high-technology future. **Any slip in our mastery over the forces now under our command could doom our descendants**—including not just human descendants, but also those wild species still remaining in the oceans and wilderness areas—to unspeakable suffering. We must continue down an intensely scientific and technological path, and we can never stop. Sustaining such high levels of complex civilization and continuous development has never before happened in the history of humanity, so far as we know. From the evidence in hand, ancient civilizations have generally done no better than a few hundred years of highly variable progress and regress, at comparatively low levels of technology, with relatively minor risks to the greater whole associated with their inevitable collapse. The only institutions that have demonstrated continuity over millennia are religions and spiritual traditions and institutions. So, while we must be intensely scientific, our future is also in need of a renewed sense of spirituality and the sacred. Given our diversity and historic circumstances, no one religion is likely to be able, now or in the future, to sustain us or unite us.We need a new sense of spirituality that is inclusive of believers, nonbelievers, and those for whom belief itself is not the core of spiritual experience.We need a sense of the sacred that is inclusive of the scientific quest and the technological imperative. We need a common sense of high purpose that connects, bridges, and uplifts all of our religious traditions to their highest levels of wisdom and compassion, while sustaining and honoring their unique historical gifts. We need, especially, all the inspiration and solace they can offer, because the task ahead of us is enormous beyond compare. Our generation is charged with an unprecedented responsibility: to lay secure foundations for a global civilization that can last for thousands of years. To accomplish this task, we must, in the coming decades, maintain and greatly enhance our technical capacities and cultural stability, while simultaneously changing almost every technological system on which we now depend so that it causes no harm to people or the natural world, now or in the future. Our situation is not only without precedent; it is virtually impossible to comprehend. Those who, in the waning decades of the Second Millennium, have been able to comprehend this Great Paradox to some degree often feel themselves emotionally overwhelmed and powerless to effect change—the situation I have elsewhere called “Cassandra’s Dilemma,” after the mythical Trojan prophet whose accurate foresight went unheeded. Those in power, on the other hand, face stiff barriers to comprehension and action, including financial, political, and psychological disincentives. Denial and avoidance have been civilization’s predominant responses to the warnings coming from science and the signals coming from nature during the 1970s, 80s, and 90s. But the feedback from nature, as well as the growing global distress signals from those left behind in either relative or absolute poverty, are both becoming so strong that they can no longer be denied, even by those with the greatest vested interest in denial. These early decades of the Third Millennium—and especially this first decade, which philosopher Michael Zimmerman has said should be declared “the Oughts” to signify the urgency for addressing what ought to be done—are the decades of reckoning, the time for decisively changing course. Modest Changes are Not Enough Change is clearly possible. Modest changes in the direction of greater sustainability are now underway, and modest, incremental changes in both technology and habitual practice can ameliorate—indeed, have ameliorated—some dangerous trends in the short run. But overall, incremental change of this sort has proven exceedingly slow and difficult to effect, and most incremental change efforts fall far short of what is needed. Carbon emissions, which are now causing visible climate change, provide a good example: current global agreements for modest reductions are hard to reach, impossible to enforce, and virtually without effect; and even if they were successful, they would have a negligible impact on the critical trend. Far more dramatic changes are required. Dramatic, rapid change, in the form of extremely accelerated innovation in the Noösphere (conscious awareness and understanding) and the Technosphere (physical practice) is necessary both to prevent continuing and ever more catastrophic damage to the Biosphere, and to adapt to those irreversible changes to which the planet is already committed, such as some amount of climatic instability. The rapid evolution of many social, economic, and political institutions, which mediate between the Noösphere and the Technosphere, is obviously necessary as well. Without extraordinary and dramatic change, the most probable outcome of industrial civilization's current trajectory is convulsion and collapse. “Collapse” refers not to a sudden or apocalyptic ending, but to a process of accelerating social, economic, and ecological decay over the course of a generation or two, punctuated by ever-worsening episodes of crisis. The results would likely be devastating, in both human and ecological terms. The onset of collapse is probably not ahead of us in time, but behind us: in some places, such as storm-ravaged Orissa, Honduras, Bangladesh, Venezuela, even England and France, collapse-related entropy may already be apparent. Trend, of course, is probability, not destiny. It is still theoretically possible, albeit very unlikely, that civilization could continue straight ahead, without any conscious effort to direct technological development and the actions of markets in more environmentally benign and culturally constructive ways, and escape collapse through an unexpected (though currently unimaginable) technological breakthrough or improbable set of events. Some have called this the “Miracle Scenario.” But hoping for a miracle is by far the riskiest choice. The future may be fundamentally unknowable, but certain physical processes are predictable, given adequate knowledge about current trends, causal linkages, and systemic effects. Prediction based on extrapolation is not just the province of physics: much of our economy is focused on efforts to accurately predict the future based on past trends. The Internet economy, for example, relies upon Moore’s Law (that the speed and capacity of semiconductor chips doubles roughly every 18 months). Insurance companies base their entire portfolio of investments and fees on statistical assessments of past disasters and projected trends into the future. When it comes to the prospects for sustaining our civilization, we have to trust our species’ best judgment, which comes from the interpretations and extrapolations of our best experts. These experts—such as the respected Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change—are reporting a disturbingly high degree of consensus about the level of threat to our future well-being. We are in trouble. We must transform our civilization. Transformation is Possible Dramatic civilizational change—transformation, in a word—is not so difficult to imagine. History is full of examples. Global history since the Renaissance, with all our remarkable transformations in technology, economics, and culture, is largely a product of humanity learning to take seriously the evidence of its senses, to reflect on that evidence carefully, and to make provisional conclusions that can be tested. This is the cornerstone of science. If we are to take seriously the evidence of our senses and our science, we must provisionally conclude that we are now largely responsible for living conditions on this planet. We have the power to fundamentally shape climate, manage ecosystems, design life-forms, and much more. The fact that we are currently doing these things very badly obscures the fact that we are doing them, and can therefore learn to do them better. Designing and managing the world is now our responsibility. That is the hypothesis that must now be tested by humanity as a whole, if we are to prevent collapse and succeed in restoration. To succeed, we must take our responsibility as world-shapers far more seriously than we currently do. History demonstrates that we, as a species, have the power to create the future we envision. If, therefore, we give in to despair, collapse will follow. If we cultivate a vision of ourselves as powerful and wise stewards of our planetary home, transformation becomes possible. Examples of cultural transformation occurring in a generation or less abound. The Meiji Restoration transformed Japan from a closed, agricultural society to an industrial one in just a few decades. The wholesale redirection of the North American and European economies during World War II took just a few years. The Apollo Program’s success in putting humans on the moon transpired, on schedule, within a decade. The fall of the Berlin Wall . . . the end of Apartheid . . . the change in China from a state-planned to a market economy . . . much of recent history suggests that transformation is not only possible, but a frequent occurrence in civilizational evolution. None of these events, however, remotely approaches the scale of global transformation we must now effect in technology, energy, transportation, agriculture, infrastructure, and economics, based on a new cultural understanding of our role as nature’s managers, the world's architects, the planet’s artists and engineers. But this testimony from history illustrates something profoundly important about transformation, in addition to its raw and indisputable possibility: no transformative change truly happens suddenly. Nor does transformation involve the magical or instantaneous creation of a new culture. “Transformation” is the name we give to the extremely accelerated adoption of existing innovations, together with the acceleration of innovation itself. Understanding transformation in these terms gives, to those who seek to create one, a reason for hope. An enormous amount of design work, preliminary to a transformation of the kind envisioned here, has already been done. Inventions, policies, models, scenarios, alternatives . . . innovations of all kinds have been developed by thoughtful and committed people over a generation, and the speed of innovation is increasing. Intense and focused commitment by a critical mass of talented, dedicated, and influential people—in business, government, religion, the arts, the civil sector, every walk of life—could accelerate the process by which innovation enters the mainstream of technical and social practice, and thereby turns humanity on a more hopeful course. By framing ambitious and visionary goals, and by highlighting the dangers and risks of inaction, this corps of skilled and forward-looking individuals in groups, organizations, corporations and governments could inspire others. The numbers involved could grow exponentially, and as institutions became thoroughly oriented toward achieving transformation, enormous resources could be mobilized, accelerating the transformation process still further. One generation of intensely focused investment, research, and redevelopment— redesigning our energy systems, overhauling our chemical industries, rebuilding our cities, finding substitutes for wood and replanting lost forests, and so much more—could transform the world as we know it into something far more beautiful, satisfying, and sustainable. This I believe: Sustainability is possible. Sustainability is desirable. Sustainability is a goal worthy of one’s life’s work. Sustainability is the great task of the next century. Sustainability is the next challenge on the road to our destiny. (1-8)

# 2NC

### A2: We are the USFG

#### 1. No you are not –Extend the Encarta evidence- you have to be the government in D.C.

#### 2 This links to all our limits DA’s explained in the overview- everyone in the world is not the USFG and if they were there would be no limit to what the dude at the steak and shake 3 spots behind me will do.

#### 3. Turn – Political Disempowerment

#### A—Assuming the state is tied to what as individuals advocate participates in the material and discursive practices that are disempowerment.

Mohan & Stokke, 2k

Portsmouth Geography Professor, Oslo Sociology Lecturer, Third World Quarterly, vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 247-8

Recent **discussions** in development **have moved** away from holistic theorisation **towards more localised, empirical and inductive approaches.** In development practice **there has been a parallel move towards local 'participation' and 'empowerment'**, which has produced, albeit with very different agendas, a high level of agreement between actors and institutions of the 'new' Left and the 'new' Right. This paper examines the manifestations of this move in four key political arenas: decentralised service delivery, participatory development, social capital formation and local development, and collective actions for 'radical democracy'. We argue that, **by focusing so heavily on 'the local', the see manifestations tend to underplay both local inequalities and power relations as well as national and transnational economic and political forces.** ¶Continues¶ **Another effect of 'going local' is that the state is downgraded in importance**. **The liberal assumption of much participatory research is that the state has been too centralised, but better localised** research **will make bureaucrats more aware and in touch with locals** so that more appropriate development is achieved. ^^ **Such an assumption ignores the ways in which the state has used 'the local' politically through material and discursive practices that disempower**. For example, colonial Indirect Rule and the apartheid system were at one level about celebrating and politicising local difference in order to govem, but their corollary was that they fragmented political opposition as well as fuelling divisions between 'ethnic' groups.^\* This means that, **instead of romanticising the role of local civil society in** development theory and **practice, we need to examine the political use of 'the local' by various actors.**

#### B—Our model of debate solves this -- Pretending to be policy-makers has defiant performative possibilities that open spaces for resistance to bureaucracy and critical alternatives.

Kulynych, ‘97

(Winthrop University, Winter, Polity, pg. 344-5)

**Although citizens were minimally successful in influencing or controlling the outcome of the policy debate and experienced a considerable lack of autonomy in their coercion into the technical debate, the goal-oriented debate** within the energy commissions **could be seen as a defiant moment of performative politics**. **The existence of a goal oriented debate within a technically dominated area defied the normalizing separation between expert policymakers and consuming citizens**. **Citizens momentarily recreated themselves as policymakers in a system that defined citizens out of the policy process, thereby refusing their construction as passive clients**. **The disruptive potential of the energy commissions continues to defy technical bureaucracy even while their decisions are non-binding. Where traditional understandings of political participation see the** energy **commissions' failure to recapture the decisionmaking process as an expression of the power of the bureaucracy, and discursive understandings see the tendency toward devolution into technical debate and procedural imperative, the performative perspective explains and highlights the moments of defiant creativity and disruptive diversity that inevitably accompany citizen expeditions into unexplored territory.** This attitude of defiance, manifest in the very chaos and spontaneity that Hager points toward as a counter to Habermas's strictly dialogic and procedural approach, simply cannot be explained by an exclusively discursive theory. **It is the performative aspects of participation that cannot be constrained within the confines of rational discourse, that gesture toward meanings that are inexpressible and identities that are unimaginable within the current cultural imagery. These performances provide the resource for diversity and spontaneity.**

### A2: State Demands/Insturmentalization Bad

#### State action and coercion key to solve existential problems and turns corporate dominance

Mansbridge ’11

Jane is the Charles Adams Professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, “On the Importance of Getting Things Done,” <http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2FPSC%2FPSC45_01%2FS104909651100165Xa.pdf&code=61d04501e14285b50244640216120c97>

T¶ rend plus inaction equals¶ drift. When a¶ trend has external causes¶ and no one can act to intervene, that inaction leads to¶ drift—the unimpeded trajectory of change. Drift in the¶ United States produces the¶ domination of American¶ democracy by business interests. Drift in international¶ decisions produces global¶ warming. Speciﬁc institutional designs for government, such as the US separation of¶ powers, can cause the inaction that facilitates drift. More fundamentally, ingrained patterns of thinking can cause inaction. Here¶ I argue that the long and multifaceted resistance tradition in the¶ West contributes to inaction by focusing on stopping, rather than¶ using, coercion.¶ By contrast, a political theory of democratic action explicitly¶ recognizes that solving collective action problems requires lawgiving, and that lawgiving requires coercion—getting people to¶ do what they would not otherwise do through the threat of sanction and the use of force. The work of democracy is to make that¶ coercion somewhat more legitimate. Thus, while a theory of democratic action should incorporate resistance, it should not—and¶ cannot—be driven by resistance.¶ In the United States and on the planet, we now face problems¶ vaster than any that James Madison conceived, involving interdependence on a global scale and potential catastrophe for unborn¶ generations. Serious attempts to deal with these problems continue to be stymied, in part by a view of democracy that is in many¶ of its strands a theory of individual and collective resistance, not a¶ theory of collective action.

#### Coercion of State power necessary to prevent extinction and not inherently exclusionary

Mansbridge ’11

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Let me suggest another approach, based on two premises. First,¶ we need coercion to solve collective action problems. Second, there¶ can be no such thing as fully legitimate coercion. Therefore we¶ need theories that can guide public action and help improve democratic legitimacy incrementally.We can move toward the ideal of¶ democratic legitimacy without discrediting every state that falls can work through the simple capacity to act (I turn on the light¶ switch—my preferences cause the outcome). When the outcome¶ requires other human beings, the causal relation can work through¶ genuine persuasion on the merits. Neither of these is coercive¶ power.¶ By “coercion” or “coercive power” I mean the threat of sanction or the use of force. I do not view the words “coercion” or¶ “coercive” as inherently negative. It is true that both coercion and¶ the threat of sanction will always have a negative valence. Punishment would not be punishment if those being punished did¶ not want to avoid it. But a relationship, for example between two¶ people, may be better when the partners have equal capacity to¶ sanction each other than when neither has that capacity. When¶ you care for someone, you give that person the capacity to sanction you and to threaten sanctions. Deeply interdependent social¶ relations are, I believe, all built in part on mutual coercion.¶ In short, by coercive power I mean “power over,” not the nicer¶ forms of power such as “power to” (that is, capacity) or “power¶ with” (cooperative power). Although Arendt (1970) described¶ power as the human ability to act in concert, this is not what I¶ mean. Those forms of power are admirable in their place. But to¶ solve collective action problems we also need coercive power, based¶ on the threat of sanction or the actual use of force.¶ 10¶ Why is this the case? The answer has to do with the nature of¶ goods that are non-excludable. Their character is such that everyone can use them without in any way contributing to providing¶ them. Examples include law and order, common defense, roads¶ without tolls, an educated workforce, clean rivers, and breathable¶ air. Collective action problems arise whenever we want to produce such goods. All of these things, and thousands of other desirable collective outcomes, are nonexcludable, or largely so. By their¶ nature, goods like these cannot be parceled out only to those who¶ work or pay to bring them into being. It is only goods like these—¶ nonexcludable goods—that produce the collective action problem, which is, at bottom, a problem of non-contribution.¶ Coercion is not always necessary to solve collective action problems and get people to contribute to producing a nonexcludable¶ good. Sometimes we can produce such goods through voluntary acts of solidarity. Everyone can voluntarily chip in to build a road,¶ defend the country, produce schooling for the poor, or abstain¶ from overﬁshing. But in most cases we also need coercion around¶ the edges to give those who are tempted to free ride on the contributions of others an external incentive to contribute. The need¶ for coercion to solve collective action problems is, in my view, the¶ primary reason for government. Coercion also helps human beings¶ achieve justice together through government.¶ My second premise is that no actual instance of coercion can¶ fully meet the criteria of democratic legitimacy. Over the years,¶ democratic theorists have worked out democratic criteria for¶ moments of both genuine commonality and genuine conﬂict. The¶ criteria for moments of commonality specify, among other things,¶ that deliberations leading to consensus should ideally take place¶ in conditions free from coercive power (free, that is, from the threat¶ of sanction and the use of force).¶ 11¶ In reality, however, the conditions for deliberation are never fully free from coercive power. As¶ for conﬂict, the democratic criteria for moments of conﬂict specify, among other things, that ideally, decisions should be based on¶ the equal power of each participant.¶ 12¶ In reality, however, power¶ is never fully equal in democratic negotiation or even in majority rule, where the agenda always derives from an unequal process.¶ Therefore the coercion that actually existing democracies deploy¶ to implement their decisions will never be completely legitimate.¶ In short, a political theory of democratic action demands a¶ corresponding theory of imperfect legitimacy. Legitimacy is not a¶ dichotomy—a thing you either have or do not have. It is a continuum from more to less.¶ A political theory of democratic action should not neglect the¶ goals of resistance theory. Every means of approximating relatively legitimate coercion has its underside. Every exercise of coercive power puts those on the receiving end of that power at risk.¶ But simply blocking the exercise of power is often a bad solution.¶ One version of resistance theory, attractive to the framers of the¶ American constitution and to many since then, holds that if you¶ put enough institutional veto points in place, the little that gets¶ through is bound to promote the common good.¶ 13¶ This approach¶ privileges stopping the work of the government. It may have been¶ appropriate in a simpler world, where it might reasonably be said¶ that the government is best which governs least, and in a more¶ decentralized world, where the scope of government action did¶ not need to be as great. In a more heavily interdependent world, a¶ democracy needs more collective power to solve the growing number of collective action problems. It can safely allow more collective power through the grid if it reduces the worst eﬀects of that¶ power in other ways.¶ Starting with the aims of the power itself, a democracy can¶ organize itself to make the power that surges through the system¶ more likely to promote the common good—for example, by reforming campaign ﬁnance, reducing corruption, attracting more public spirited individuals to oﬃce, and bringing stakeholders into constructive negotiation with one another. Democracies can also¶ devise targeted safeguards for the vulnerable—for example, by legislation such as the Voting Rights Act of 1964. Democracies can¶ encourage both constructive and critical organization in civil¶ society—for example, by facilitating unionization, subsidizing¶ investigative journalism, and protecting internet access—so that¶ new ideas feed into state power and people can organize eﬀectively when resistance is necessary.¶ More generally, when a good has mixed positive and negative¶ features—and I consider coercion such a mixed good—one should¶ not always block or automatically resist the good, but rather look¶ for practices and institutions that reduce its undesirable eﬀects,¶ protect the vulnerable, compensate the losers, and facilitate ongoing changes for the better.¶ In the tension between resistance and action, context is critical.Tyrannical regimes demand resistance. Deeply corrupt regimes¶ cannot justly claim legitimacy. But when the threat of tyranny is¶ relatively weak and corruption relatively limited, the need for collective action is often greater than the need for resistance. I do not¶ pretend here to oﬀer guidance to political movements on their¶ choice of tactics, many of which are appropriately aimed at resist ing particular injustices or at drawing attention to unsolved problems, such as rising inequality or global warming, even when the¶ protesters do not agree on a plan of action (think “Occupy Wall¶ Street”). I am arguing instead for something deeper: a shift in¶ emphasis within democratic theory, from a long-standing promotion of resistance to the greater embrace of coercion, even while¶ recognizing that the coercion can never be more than partially¶ legitimate. Where might a democratic theory that recognizes the central role¶ of coercive action turn its analytic gaze?Two promising and underexplored areas are negotiation and uncorrupt delegation supplemented by citizen deliberation. Theorists trying to make headway¶ on these problems could beneﬁt from working closely with empirical scholars of conﬂict resolution, comparative government, and¶ perhaps other ﬁelds.¶ To explore the normative complexity of negotiations, we could¶ begin with Denmark. In 2002, two development economists coined¶ the phrase “getting to ‘Denmark’” to describe the goal of helping¶ impoverished countries deliver key public services.¶ 14¶ Francis Fukuyama adopted “getting to Denmark” to describe the historical paths¶ for acquiring an eﬀectively functioning, accountable state under¶ the rule of law (Fukuyama 2011, 14 ﬀ, 431 ﬀ.). Denmark is small,¶ homogeneous, and defended primarily by the armies of others.¶ Like many Nordic states it has a culture that may not be duplicable. Its social welfare model has the inevitable imperfection of¶ requiring signiﬁcant barriers to entry. Yet Denmark could nevertheless serve as one model in an exploration of negotiation—¶ speciﬁcally the contribution of diﬀerent forms of democratic negotiation to relatively legitimate coercion. The outcomes of¶ the Danish political process match what its citizens want relatively closely, and the process itself, although not based on the¶ majority rule of alternating parties, has strong claims to democratic legitimacy.¶ Regarding outcomes, Denmark has the most equal income distribution of any advanced industrialized country. Robert Kuttner¶ reported in 2008 that “Denmark’s ﬁnancial markets are clean and¶ transparent, its barriers to imports minimal, its labor markets the¶ most ﬂexible in Europe, its multinational corporations dynamic¶ and largely unmolested by industrial policies, and its unemployment rate of 2.8 percent the second lowest in the OECD” (Kuttner¶ 2008, 78). In its Index of Economic Freedom, the Heritage Foundation gives Denmark a score of 78.6 out of 100, or eighth place in¶ the world, better than the United States in ninth place. Denmark¶ has universal health insurance, good child-care and generous¶ unemployment compensation. It has the world’s second highest¶ tax rate and spends 50% of its GDP on public services.¶ 15¶ How did Denmark’s democracy become capable of such eﬀective action? First, after a series of reforms in the early and midnineteenth century, Denmark is now tied with New Zealand and¶ Singapore for the distinction of being the least corrupt country¶ on earth in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions¶ Index.¶ 16¶ Second, because its list system of proportional representation currently produces eight parties in parliament and no single party has had a parliamentary majority since 1909, passing¶ laws requires negotiation and compromise among parties. This¶ system generates a more cooperative form of negotiation than in¶ the US Congress. Third, Danish democracy has little separation¶ of powers on the national level (although we cannot be sure this¶ is related to its eﬀectiveness). It has a parliamentary system with¶ a unicameral legislature and extremely limited judicial review.¶ Finally, Denmark has evolved a form of eﬀective and far-reaching¶ decentralization in which local elected bodies serve as responsive¶ service-deliverers but not powerful veto points.¶ 17¶ The result of this noncorrupt and negotiated system? Denmark’s citizens have, according to the Eurobarometer, greater¶ trust in their national parliament and their national parties than¶ the citizens of any other country in Europe. They are more “satis-¶ ﬁed with the way democracy works” in their country than the citizens of any other country in Europe. Staggeringly, 94% of the¶ Danish citizens are at least “fairly satisﬁed” with the way democracy works in their country.¶ 18¶ To this sociological legitimacy, add¶ some normativelegitimacy from two features. First, Denmark’s citizens are actively engaged in their politics. Without any compulsory voting, the turnout in the general elections since 1960 has¶ averaged 85%. In The Economist’s 2010 Democracy Index, Denmark has the third highest score in the world, after Norway and¶ Iceland.¶ 19¶ Second, the very process of negotiation adds democratic¶ value by drawing out the reasons and justiﬁcations advanced by¶ the diﬀerent parties.¶ 20¶ Danes have also shown their capacity for resistance when¶ needed. In 1943, when the German army occupied Denmark, the¶ public denunciation of the German plan for deporting the Jews¶ involved the King, the universities, students, the Danish state¶ church, the Supreme Court, the trade unions, the employers’ confederation, the farmers’ organizations, the heads of ministries,¶ and all of the political parties except the small pro-Nazi National¶ SocialistWorkers’ Party of Denmark (Kirchhoﬀ 1995). Denmark’s¶ corporate entities were actually the foci for resistance. I am not saying that the United States can model itself on Denmark. That would be absurd. Nor am I saying that Denmark is a¶ perfect polity. Its protections forits own citizensarearguably related¶ toits relative homogeneity andits barriers toimmigration. Finally,¶ I do not have suﬃcient empirical data to judge the relative merits¶ of the diﬀerent systems that are less prone to deadlock, whether¶ majority-rule Westminster systems or well-structured systems of¶ negotiation, or the roles of diﬀerent kinds of veto points, which in¶ some contexts may promote, rather than hinder, common democratic action (Birchﬁeld and Crepaz 1998). I am saying that these¶ questions need entwined empirical and normative attention. In the¶ future I hope that comparativists will readmore democratic theory¶ and theorists more comparative work, to the point where each can,¶ with the help of their colleagues, contribute productively to the¶ development of bothﬁelds. In particular, Iam urginghere that political theorists can proﬁtably ally with comparativists and other¶ empirical political scientists to investigate the sources of democratic legitimacy in countries other than our own and Great Britain. In Denmark, we might concentrate on the strengths and¶ weaknesses of their forms of negotiation. These forms of negotiation, developed historically not only by Denmark but also by other¶ relatively neocorporatist states in Europe, have heavily inﬂuenced¶ the relatively successful processes of the EU bureaucracies, which¶ unlike Denmark have highly heterogeneous constituencies.¶ Just as one size does not ﬁt all in economic development, so¶ too one size does not ﬁt all in the building of legitimate democratic action.The new ﬁeld of comparative political theory is investigating, among other things, the sources for democratically¶ legitimate action in the cultures and philosophies of nonwestern¶ countries. My point is that as this work goes forward, the focus¶ should be as much on the sources of coordinated, intelligent¶ action—and relatively legitimate coercion—as on resistance.¶ If we think about problems of global scale, like climate change¶ and weapons of mass destruction, the focus on action becomes¶ even more necessary. Decisions at the global level cannot be as¶ democratically legitimate as those at a national scale. In the foreseeable future, decisions at the global level will be even less likely¶ than those at the national level to be discussed, much less resolved,¶ in an arena governed only by the “forceless force of the better¶ argument.” Nor will decisions be made in a way that even approximates the equal power of each individual or the proportionate¶ power of those aﬀected. To achieve action capable of addressing¶ collective action problems on a global level, we will have to accept¶ ongoing coercion that is far less democratically legitimate than¶ the coercion we accept at the level of the nation state.Yet we must¶ take action, as soon as is humanly possible, for the sake of unborn¶ generations.

### A2: Consensus Bad

#### Maintaining game rules is not the type of consensus they critique

Tally ‘07

Tally, English – Texas State University, ‘7

(Robert T, “The Agony of the Political,” Post Modern Culture 17.2)

**Mouffe's image of a we/they politics** in which collective identities vie with one another for hegemony **looks a bit like organized sports**. Consider the football game: **rival sides squared off in a unambiguously agonistic struggle** for dominance**, with a clear winner and loser**, yet **agreeing to play by certain shared rules, and above all unwilling to destroy the sport itself** (i.e., the political association) **in order to achieve the side's particular goals**. Football **teams have no interest in dialogue, and the goal is not consensus**, **but victory**. The winner is triumphant, and the loser must regroup, practice, and try again later. **A clearly defined "we" will fight against the "they," but the aim is to win, not to destroy "them" or the sport itself**. But, noteworthy in the extended metaphor, some organizing body (rarely democratic) has established the rules and standards by which the sport is played. The players have no say in how the game is structured.¶ If the sports analogy seems too facile, consider Mouffe's own characterization. **Responding to** the "fundamental question for democratic theory" (i.e., **how to maintain antagonism in politics without destroying political association**), **Mouffe answers that it requires distinguishing between the categories of "antagonism" (relations between enemies) and "agonism" (relations between adversaries) and envisaging a sort of "conflictual consensus" providing a common symbolic space among opponents who are considered "legitimate enemies." Contrary to the dialogic approach, the democratic debate is conceived as a real confrontation.** Adversaries do fight--even fiercely--but according to a shared set of rules, and their positions, despite being ultimately irreconcilable, and accepted as legitimate perspectives. (52)¶ Play ball! Of course this means that, if the opposition party--oh, let's go ahead and call them the Reds--wishes to change the relations of power, it must do so within the political framework (e.g., legislative body or rules of the game). **To be outside of the framework is to not be playing the game at all.**¶A better model might be that of games on the playground. On the playground, children both organize and play games, often coming up with and changing the rules as they go along. Their **power relations are constantly adjusted, modified so as to make the game more fair** ("you get a head start"), **more safe** ("no hitting"), **more interesting** ("three points if you can make it from behind that line"), and so on. The overall structure of the game does not necessarily change, **but the specifics of how the game is played can vary**. This is not a utopian vision, obviously. The power relations on display at most playgrounds are not the most salutary. But t**his** model at least **provides an image of what a radical version of Mouffe's agonistic, democratic politics might look like**. How this would work outside the playground, in a global political context, is a different question. Can we get the world's diverse "teams" together on the same playground? Would a multipolar world system enable multiple grounds for playing? Who would or would not be allowed to play? Who would decide?¶ These practical questions are exceedingly tough to answer. **The agonistic model of politics requires an arena where contestants can hold competitions. It requires rules that may be altered but that also must be in place in order to know what game is being played**. And it requires a system that allows the sport to continue when particular games end. (That is, the winner cannot cancel further contests, a problem that has plagued nascent democracies.) A radical democracy founded on adversarial politics cannot simply replicate existing structures of liberal, parliamentary democracy. It must change the game.

#### Doesn’t link to their offense

Hatab ‘02

Hatab, Prof Philosophy – Old Dominion University, ‘2

(Lawrence J, “Prospects for a Democratic Agon,” Why we can still be Nietzscheans: The Journal of Nietzsche, Muse)

Moreover, the structure of an agon conceived as a contest can readily underwrite political principles of fairness. Not only do I need an Other to prompt my own achievement, but **the significance of any "victory" I might achieve demands an able opponent**. **As in athletics, defeating an incapable or incapacitated competitor winds up being meaningless**. So **I should not only will the presence of others in an agon, I should also want that they be able adversaries, that they have opportunities and capacities to succeed in the contest**. **And I should be able to honor the winner of a fair contes**t. Such is the logic of competition that contains a host of normative features, which might even include active provisions for helping people in political contests become more able participants. 25 In addition, agonistic respect need not be associated with something like positive regard or equal worth, a dissociation that can go further in facing up to actual political conditions and problematic connotations that can attach to liberal dispositions. Again allow me to quote my previous work.¶ Democratic respect forbids exclusion, it demands inclusion; but respect for the Other as other can avoid a vapid sense of "tolerance," a sloppy "relativism," or a misplaced spirit of "neutrality." Agonistic respect allows us to simultaneously affirm our beliefs and affirm our opponents as worthy competitors [End Page 142] in public discourse. Here we can speak of respect without ignoring the fact that politics involves perpetual disagreement, and we have an adequate answer to the question "Why should I respect a view that I do not agree with?" In this way beliefs about what is best (aristos) can be coordinated with an openness to other beliefs and a willingness to accept the outcome of an open competition among the full citizenry (demos). **Democratic respect, therefore, is a dialogical mixture of affirmation and negation, a political bearing that entails giving all beliefs a hearing**, refusing any belief an ultimate warrant, and perceiving one's own viewpoint as agonistically implicated with opposing viewpoints. In sum, we can combine 1) the historical tendency of democratic movements to promote free expression, pluralism, and liberation from traditional constraints, and 2) a Nietzschean perspectivism and agonistic respect, to arrive at a postmodern model of democracy that provides both a nonfoundational openness and an atmosphere of civil political discourse. 26¶ **An agonistic politics construed as competitive fairness can sustain a robust conception of political rights, not as something "natural" possessed by an original self, but as an epiphenomenal, procedural notion conferred upon citizens in order to sustain viable political practice.** Constraints on speech, association, access, and so on, simply insure lopsided political contests. We can avoid metaphysical models of rights and construe them as simply social and political phenomena: social in the sense of entailing reciprocal recognition and obligation; political in the sense of being guaranteed and enforced by the state. **We can even defend so-called positive rights, such as a right to an adequate education, as requisite for fair competition in political discourse.**¶ **…Hatab Continues…**¶ Can there be more than a simply negative register in such a tragic conception? I think so. Just as, for Nietzsche, the tragic allows us to be sensitized and energized for the fragile meanings of existence, thus enhancing life, **a tragic politics could wean us from false comforts in foundations and open us to the urgent finite conditions of political life in an enhanced way. And even if one conceded the existence of foundational self-evident political principles**, would the force of such principles by themselves necessarily be able to prevent non-democratic outcomes? If not, the force of such principles [End Page 144] would be restricted to the solace of intellectual rectitude that can comfort theorists while the walls are coming down. The nonexistence of foundational guarantees surely does not prevent one from living and fighting for democratic ideals. What is to be said of someone who, in the absence of a guarantee, would hesitate to act or be obstructed from acting or see action as tainted or less than authentic? Nietzsche would take this as weakness. The most profound element in Nietzsche's conceptions of will to power, agonistics, and eternal recurrence, in my view, can be put in the following way. For Nietzsche, to act in the world is always to act in the midst of otherness, of resistances or obstacles. Hence to dream of action without otherness is to annul action. To affirm one's Other as necessarily constitutive of oneself is not only to affirm the full field of action (which is the sense of eternal recurrence), but also to affirm action as action, that is to say, a real move in life amidst real resistances, as opposed to the fantasy of self-sufficient, fully free, uncontested occurrences born in Western conceptions of divine perfection and continued in various philosophical models of demonstrative certainty and theoretical governance. The irony of a tragically open, agonistic politics is that it need not "infect" political life but in fact spur it toward the existential environment of it enactment. And as radically open, **an agonistic politics has the virtue of precluding the silencing of any voice, something especially important when even** **purportedly democratic dispositions are comfortable with exclusions (frustrated by citizens who will not come around to being impartial enough, rational enough, secular enough, deliberative enough, communal enough, virtuous enough, and so on), thereby becoming susceptible to the most ironic and insidious form of tyranny done in democracy's name.**

### A2: State Demands/Insturmentalization Bad

#### State action and coercion key to solve existential problems and turns corporate dominance

Mansbridge ’11

Jane is the Charles Adams Professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, “On the Importance of Getting Things Done,” <http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2FPSC%2FPSC45_01%2FS104909651100165Xa.pdf&code=61d04501e14285b50244640216120c97>

T¶ rend plus inaction equals¶ drift. When a¶ trend has external causes¶ and no one can act to intervene, that inaction leads to¶ drift—the unimpeded trajectory of change. Drift in the¶ United States produces the¶ domination of American¶ democracy by business interests. Drift in international¶ decisions produces global¶ warming. Speciﬁc institutional designs for government, such as the US separation of¶ powers, can cause the inaction that facilitates drift. More fundamentally, ingrained patterns of thinking can cause inaction. Here¶ I argue that the long and multifaceted resistance tradition in the¶ West contributes to inaction by focusing on stopping, rather than¶ using, coercion.¶ By contrast, a political theory of democratic action explicitly¶ recognizes that solving collective action problems requires lawgiving, and that lawgiving requires coercion—getting people to¶ do what they would not otherwise do through the threat of sanction and the use of force. The work of democracy is to make that¶ coercion somewhat more legitimate. Thus, while a theory of democratic action should incorporate resistance, it should not—and¶ cannot—be driven by resistance.¶ In the United States and on the planet, we now face problems¶ vaster than any that James Madison conceived, involving interdependence on a global scale and potential catastrophe for unborn¶ generations. Serious attempts to deal with these problems continue to be stymied, in part by a view of democracy that is in many¶ of its strands a theory of individual and collective resistance, not a¶ theory of collective action.

#### Coercion of State power necessary to prevent extinction and not inherently exclusionary

Mansbridge ’11

Jane is the Charles Adams Professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, “On the Importance of Getting Things Done,” <http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2FPSC%2FPSC45_01%2FS104909651100165Xa.pdf&code=61d04501e14285b50244640216120c97>

Let me suggest another approach, based on two premises. First,¶ we need coercion to solve collective action problems. Second, there¶ can be no such thing as fully legitimate coercion. Therefore we¶ need theories that can guide public action and help improve democratic legitimacy incrementally.We can move toward the ideal of¶ democratic legitimacy without discrediting every state that falls can work through the simple capacity to act (I turn on the light¶ switch—my preferences cause the outcome). When the outcome¶ requires other human beings, the causal relation can work through¶ genuine persuasion on the merits. Neither of these is coercive¶ power.¶ By “coercion” or “coercive power” I mean the threat of sanction or the use of force. I do not view the words “coercion” or¶ “coercive” as inherently negative. It is true that both coercion and¶ the threat of sanction will always have a negative valence. Punishment would not be punishment if those being punished did¶ not want to avoid it. But a relationship, for example between two¶ people, may be better when the partners have equal capacity to¶ sanction each other than when neither has that capacity. When¶ you care for someone, you give that person the capacity to sanction you and to threaten sanctions. Deeply interdependent social¶ relations are, I believe, all built in part on mutual coercion.¶ In short, by coercive power I mean “power over,” not the nicer¶ forms of power such as “power to” (that is, capacity) or “power¶ with” (cooperative power). Although Arendt (1970) described¶ power as the human ability to act in concert, this is not what I¶ mean. Those forms of power are admirable in their place. But to¶ solve collective action problems we also need coercive power, based¶ on the threat of sanction or the actual use of force.¶ 10¶ Why is this the case? The answer has to do with the nature of¶ goods that are non-excludable. Their character is such that everyone can use them without in any way contributing to providing¶ them. Examples include law and order, common defense, roads¶ without tolls, an educated workforce, clean rivers, and breathable¶ air. Collective action problems arise whenever we want to produce such goods. All of these things, and thousands of other desirable collective outcomes, are nonexcludable, or largely so. By their¶ nature, goods like these cannot be parceled out only to those who¶ work or pay to bring them into being. It is only goods like these—¶ nonexcludable goods—that produce the collective action problem, which is, at bottom, a problem of non-contribution.¶ Coercion is not always necessary to solve collective action problems and get people to contribute to producing a nonexcludable¶ good. Sometimes we can produce such goods through voluntary acts of solidarity. Everyone can voluntarily chip in to build a road,¶ defend the country, produce schooling for the poor, or abstain¶ from overﬁshing. But in most cases we also need coercion around¶ the edges to give those who are tempted to free ride on the contributions of others an external incentive to contribute. The need¶ for coercion to solve collective action problems is, in my view, the¶ primary reason for government. Coercion also helps human beings¶ achieve justice together through government.¶ My second premise is that no actual instance of coercion can¶ fully meet the criteria of democratic legitimacy. Over the years,¶ democratic theorists have worked out democratic criteria for¶ moments of both genuine commonality and genuine conﬂict. The¶ criteria for moments of commonality specify, among other things,¶ that deliberations leading to consensus should ideally take place¶ in conditions free from coercive power (free, that is, from the threat¶ of sanction and the use of force).¶ 11¶ In reality, however, the conditions for deliberation are never fully free from coercive power. As¶ for conﬂict, the democratic criteria for moments of conﬂict specify, among other things, that ideally, decisions should be based on¶ the equal power of each participant.¶ 12¶ In reality, however, power¶ is never fully equal in democratic negotiation or even in majority rule, where the agenda always derives from an unequal process.¶ Therefore the coercion that actually existing democracies deploy¶ to implement their decisions will never be completely legitimate.¶ In short, a political theory of democratic action demands a¶ corresponding theory of imperfect legitimacy. Legitimacy is not a¶ dichotomy—a thing you either have or do not have. It is a continuum from more to less.¶ A political theory of democratic action should not neglect the¶ goals of resistance theory. Every means of approximating relatively legitimate coercion has its underside. Every exercise of coercive power puts those on the receiving end of that power at risk.¶ But simply blocking the exercise of power is often a bad solution.¶ One version of resistance theory, attractive to the framers of the¶ American constitution and to many since then, holds that if you¶ put enough institutional veto points in place, the little that gets¶ through is bound to promote the common good.¶ 13¶ This approach¶ privileges stopping the work of the government. It may have been¶ appropriate in a simpler world, where it might reasonably be said¶ that the government is best which governs least, and in a more¶ decentralized world, where the scope of government action did¶ not need to be as great. In a more heavily interdependent world, a¶ democracy needs more collective power to solve the growing number of collective action problems. It can safely allow more collective power through the grid if it reduces the worst eﬀects of that¶ power in other ways.¶ Starting with the aims of the power itself, a democracy can¶ organize itself to make the power that surges through the system¶ more likely to promote the common good—for example, by reforming campaign ﬁnance, reducing corruption, attracting more public spirited individuals to oﬃce, and bringing stakeholders into constructive negotiation with one another. Democracies can also¶ devise targeted safeguards for the vulnerable—for example, by legislation such as the Voting Rights Act of 1964. Democracies can¶ encourage both constructive and critical organization in civil¶ society—for example, by facilitating unionization, subsidizing¶ investigative journalism, and protecting internet access—so that¶ new ideas feed into state power and people can organize eﬀectively when resistance is necessary.¶ More generally, when a good has mixed positive and negative¶ features—and I consider coercion such a mixed good—one should¶ not always block or automatically resist the good, but rather look¶ for practices and institutions that reduce its undesirable eﬀects,¶ protect the vulnerable, compensate the losers, and facilitate ongoing changes for the better.¶ In the tension between resistance and action, context is critical.Tyrannical regimes demand resistance. Deeply corrupt regimes¶ cannot justly claim legitimacy. But when the threat of tyranny is¶ relatively weak and corruption relatively limited, the need for collective action is often greater than the need for resistance. 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### A2: Predictability Bad

#### Overview is good on why are form of predictability is good and outweighs.

#### Predictability maintains meaningful politics and empathy even if their DA is correct

Massaro, Prof Law – Florida, ’89

(Toni M, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2099)

Yet despite their acknowledgment that some ordering and rules are necessary, empathy proponents tend to approach the rule-of-law model as a villain. Moreover, they are hardly alone in their deep skepticism about the rule-of-law model. Most modern legal theorists question the value of procedural regularity when it denies substantive justice. 52 Some even question the whole notion of justifying a legal [\*2111] decision by appealing to a rule of law, versus justifying the decision by reference to the facts of the case and the judges' own reason and experience. 53 I do not intend to enter this important jurisprudential debate, except to the limited extent that the "empathy" writings have suggested that the rule-of-law chills judges' empathic reactions. In this regard, I have several observations.¶ My first thought is that the rule-of-law model is only a model. If the term means absolute separation of legal decision and "politics," then it surely is both unrealistic and undesirable. 54 But our actual statutory and decisional "rules" rarely mandate a particular (unempathetic) response. Most of our rules are fairly open-ended. "Relevance," "the best interests of the child," "undue hardship," "negligence," or "freedom of speech" -- to name only a few legal concepts -- hardly admit of precise definition or consistent, predictable application. Rather, they represent a weaker, but still constraining sense of the rule-of-law model. Most rules are guidelines that establish spheres of relevant conversation, not mathematical formulas.¶ Moreover, legal training in a common law system emphasizes the indeterminate nature of rules and the significance of even subtle variations in facts. Our legal tradition stresses an inductive method of discovering legal principles. We are taught to distinguish different "stories," to arrive at "law" through experience with many stories, and to revise that law as future experience requires. Much of the effort of most first-year law professors is, I believe, devoted to debunking popular lay myths about "law" as clean-cut answers, and to illuminate law as a dynamic body of policy determinations constrained by certain guiding principles. 55¶ As a practical matter, therefore, our rules often are ambiguous and fluid standards that offer substantial room for varying interpretations. The interpreter, usually a judge, may consult several sources to aid in decisionmaking. One important source necessarily will be the judge's own experiences -- including the experiences that seem to determine a person's empathic capacity. In fact, much ink has been spilled to illuminate that our stated "rules" often do not dictate or explain our legal results. Some writers even have argued that a rule of law may be, at times, nothing more than a post hoc rationalization or attempted legitimization [\*2112] of results that may be better explained by extralegal (including, but not necessarily limited to, emotional) responses to the facts, the litigants, or the litigants' lawyers, 56 all of which may go unstated. The opportunity for contextual and empathic decisionmaking therefore already is very much a part of our adjudicatory law, despite our commitment to the rule-of-law ideal.¶ Even when law is clear and relatively inflexible, however, it is not necessarily "unempathetic." The assumed antagonism of legality and empathy is belied by our experience in rape cases, to take one important example. In the past, judges construed the general, open-ended standard of "relevance" to include evidence about the alleged victim's prior sexual conduct, regardless of whether the conduct involved the defendant. 57 The solution to this "empathy gap" was legislative action to make the law more specific -- more formalized. Rape shield statutes were enacted that controlled judicial discretion and specifically defined relevance to exclude the prior sexual history of the woman, except in limited, justifiable situations. 58 In this case, one can make a persuasive argument not only that the rule-of-law model does explain these later rulings, but also that obedience to that model resulted in a triumph for the human voice of the rape survivor. Without the rule, some judges likely would have continued to respond to other inclinations, and admit this testimony about rape survivors. The example thus shows that radical rule skepticism is inconsistent with at least some evidence of actual judicial behavior. It also suggests that the principle of legality is potentially most critical for people who are least understood by the decisionmakers -- in this example, women -- and hence most vulnerable to unempathetic ad hoc rulings.¶ A final observation is that the principle of legality reflects a deeply ingrained, perhaps inescapable, cultural instinct. We value some procedural regularity -- "law for law's sake" -- because it lends stasis and structure to our often chaotic lives. Even within our most intimate relationships, we both establish "rules," and expect the other [\*2113] party to follow them. 59 Breach of these unspoken agreements can destroy the relationship and hurt us deeply, regardless of the wisdom or "substantive fairness" of a particular rule. Our agreements create expectations, and their consistent application fulfills the expectations. The modest predictability that this sort of "formalism" provides actually may encourage human relationships. 60

### A2: We Provide Some Limits

#### RULES of DIALOGUE are key – bad T interpretations make the dialogue TERRIBLE even if it’s TECHNICALLY a dialogue

Bostad 4

[http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/140391690X%20-%20-%20Bakhtinian%20Perspectives%20on%20Language%20and%20Culture~%20Meaning%20in%20Language,%20Art%20and%20New%20.pdf](http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/140391690X%20-%20-%20Bakhtinian%20Perspectives%20on%20Language%20and%20Culture~%20Meaning%20in%20Language%2C%20Art%20and%20New%20.pdf)¶ Finn Bostad is Associate Professor of Applied Linguistics at The Norwegian¶ University of Science and Technology in the field of human communication¶ and new technology. He has run and worked on national and university¶ projects on meaning-making in Internet environments, published¶ internationally on electronic discourse, and supervised a research programme¶ on ICT and learning at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology. He is currently researching multimedia semiotics

 Very often a dialogue exists only if the persons involved in the communication act observe and **respect some rules** of dialogism, and some of these main ‘rules’ or principles may be a mutual trust or reciprocity (Rommetveit 1992), a sharing of power and comprehension that gives everybody an equal opportunity to have his or her voice heard. In addition there must be a conscious effort on the part of the participants to **achieve something together** and actively participate in the process of negotiating meaning that a dialogue is. Negotiated meaning, or understanding, grows out of the response as ‘[u]nderstanding and response are dialectically merged and mutually condition each other; one is impossible without the other’ (Bakhtin 1981: 282). It is possible to generate a long catalogue of such principles, which Linell does in his work (Linell 1998). There is also a **wide range** of dialogical varieties from, at the one end, a **top-down monologue where one party dominates communication** and leaves no room for sharing and participation, to, at the other end, a communicative event where power and dominance is more or less equally shared between the participants. In this near ideal situation there is no real centre of power, but a sharing of it.

#### T CRITQUES ARE INTRINSCIALLY MONOLOGUES – only a topical STASIS point solves

Lillis 3

 Student Writing as 'Academic Literacies': Drawing on Bakhtin to Move from Critique to Design

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<http://www.writing.ucsb.edu/wrconf08/Pdf_Articles/Lillis_Article2.pdf>

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 Academic Literacies as Design: From **Monologism to Dialogism** 'Academic literacies' has proved to be highly generative as a critical research frame, but as a design frame it has yet to be developed. I am using'design' here in the broad sense of the application of research generated understandings to pedagogy. I will outline how this broad sense of design connects with Kress's particu- lar notion of design in relation to critique below. The point 1 want to make here is simply that, to date, little explicit attention has been paid to exploring how an academic literacies stance might inform the theory and practice of student writing pedagogy. Perhaps the nearest example vet of what might be considered a design response to academic literacies critique can be found in the notion and practice of critical language awareness (CLA), coined by Clark et al. (1990) and developed in the work of higher education teacher-researchers in the UK and by others in different parts of the world, notably in South Africa (for UK develop- ments see Clark, 1992; Clark & Ivanic, 1997; Wallace, 1999; for South Africa, see Janks, 1999;Thesen, 1997; for Singapore, see Kramer-Dahl, 2001 ). This pedagogi- cal approach, drawing explicitly on critical discourse analysis, involves consciousness-raising amongst learners about power and ideology in relation to language use (for recent overview see Clark & I vanic, 1999). Academic literacies researchers share many of the same preoccupations as CLA researcher/ers, often share similar intellectual roots and, indeed, in some cases are the same people. But, apart from the small amount of CLA work which tends to hover at the margins of the academy, particularly within the UK context (within specifically designated language/literacy areas of the curriculum such as writing support, critical language awareness courses, English for Academic Purposes (EAP) courses) there has been little to suggest how we might enact understandings generated from an academic literacies' stance within disciplinary areas of the curriculum in higher education more broadly. In any case, and of more fundamental concern to me in this paper is CLA the design we should be looking towards? I am increasingly coming to see that CLA tends to share one of the major limitations of more conventional writing peda- gogy within higher education. By this 1 mean, briefly - and I speak as someone interested in and who has drawn on CLA work-that **meaning making continues to be construed as monologic**, with an emphasis on a single, unified version of truth. This is evident in terms of CLA's own theoretical and pedagogical framing: • Theoretical framing: CLA tends to work from within a dialectic approach to meaning making. By 'dialectic' here I'm referring to traditions of reasoning informing CLA work which emphasise the following: (a) synthesis as the goal of meaning making, and (b) **a version of dialectic governed by binary framings** where one version of truth is privileged over others. I return to both of these dimensions below, but for the moment here wish to point to CLA's emphasis on binaries. Consider such 'either/or' framings in accounts of CLA -such as dominant/dominated (groups), **oppressive/non-oppres- sive** (practices), dominant/oppositional (practices, forces),**existing/alterna- tive (conventions).** These binary framings have continued to inform much work in CLA, including mv own (see e.g. Clark & Ivanic, 1999; Clark et al 1990, 1991; Lillis, 1997). • Pedagogical framing: CLA tends to assume that an (already critical) expert is engaged in raising awareness of an (as yet uncritical) student about language, power and ideology. In this sense, there is a danger that CLA pedagogy, like more conventional pedagogy, privileges only the tutor/ insti- tution's perspectives and denies students' contributions to, and struggles around, meaning making. Consider, for example, Gark and Ivanic's (1999: 67) aims as stated in a recent editorial introduction to CLA where the 'we' and 'they' is clearly signalled: 'We aim to help students become more aware of the complex relationship between the institution, discourse, social power relations, identities and agency in shaping these practices'. Within this fram- ing, it is the tutor who still holds the main responsibility for posing the prob- lem to which she is assumed to know the answer; the tutor thus maintains her position as 'interpreter of the world' (Reynolds in Lather, 1991:59). Aspects of the latter element, pedagogy, have been problematised (see e.g. Thesen, 1997) but have not to date been explicitly linked to the former, theory. Yet these elements are interrelated and arise in part, I think, from **staying within a critique rather than a design conceptual space**. Kress usefully foregrounds a distinction between **critique** and design at an epistemological level in the follow- ing way: Design rests on a chain of processes of which critique ... is one: it **can** , however, **no longer be the focal** one, or be the major **goal** of textual prac- tices. Critique leaves the initial definition of the domain of analysis to the past, to past production. (Kress, 2000: 160) And he explicitly builds into this more creative force of epistemology- as-design the interests of actual designers, that is the users of language: 'Design shapes the future through deliberate deployment of representational resources in the designer's interest' (Kress, 1998: 77).

# 1NR

## Case

#### Your Card is the link

Land

process of liquidation that can be suspended by the acumulative efforts whose zenith form is that of the capitalist bourgeoisie, but only for a while. For solar economy ‘[e]xcess is the incontestable point of departure’ [VII 12], and excess must, in the end, be spent.

### AT We Solve Your Impact

**Opening up space for new ways of knowing won't affect international violence**

**O'Callaghan ‘2**

( Lecturer in IR, 02 (Terry , lecturer in the school of International Relations at the University of South Australia, International Relations and the third debate, ed: Jarvis, 2002, p. 80-81)

There are also a host of technological and logistical questions that plague George's scheme and make problematic his recommendations. For example, through what medium are those on the fringes of the international system going to speak to the world? Although it may be true that the third world has now been integrated into the global polity via the advent of technological innovations in communications, allowing for remote access to information sources and the Internet, it also remains true that the majority of those on the fringes continue to be disenfranchised from such mediums, whether as a result of a lack of economic resources, the prevalence of illiteracy, or social, cultural and political circumstances that systemically exclude, women (among others) from economic resources and certain political and social freedoms. Need we remind George that **social, political, and individual autonomy is at a minimum in these parts of the world, and an intellectual approach as controversial as postmodernism is not likely to achieve the sorts of goals that George optimistically foreshadows**. Indeed, **on practical questions** such as these, matters otherwise central to the success of postmodern visions, **George prefers to be vague, suggesting instead that the intricacies of such details will somehow work themselves out** in a manner satisfactory to all. Such a position reveals George's latent idealism and underscores how George's schema is an intellectual one: a theory of international politics written for other theorists of international politics. George's audience is thus a very limited and elite audience and begs the question of whether a senior, middle-class scholar in the intellectual heartland of Australia can do anything of real substance to aid the truly marginalized and oppressed. How is it possible to put oneself in the shoes of the "other," to advocate on his or her behalf, when such is done from a position of affluence, unrelated to and far removed from the experiences of those whom George otherwise champions? **Ideals are all good and well, but it is hard to imagine that the computer keyboard is mightier than the sword, and hard to see how a small, elite, affluent assortment of intellectuals is going to generate the type of political momentum necessary to allow those on the fringes to speak and be heard!** 1 . Moreover, **why should we assume that states and individuals want to listen and will listen to what the marginalized** and the oppressed **have to say?** There is precious little evidence to suggest that "listening" is something the advanced capitalist countries do very well at all. Indeed, one of the allegations so forcefully alleged by Muslim fundamentalists as justification for the terrorist attacks of September I I is precisely that the West, and America in particular, are deaf to the disenfranchised and impoverished in the world. Certainly, there are agencies and individuals who are sensitive to the needs of the "marginalized" and who champion institutional forums where indigenous voices can be heard. But on even the most optimistic reckoning, such forums and institutions represent the exception, not the rule, and remain in the minority if not dwarfed by those institutions that represent Western, first world interests. To be sure, this is a realist power-political image of the current configuration of the global polity, but one apparently, and ironically, endorsed by George if only because it speaks to the realities of the marginalized, the imposed silences, and the multitude of oppressions on which George founds his call for a postmodern ethic. **Recognizing such realities, however, does not explain George's penchant for ignoring them entirely, especially in terms of the structural rigidities they pose for meaningful reform.** Indeed, **George's desire to move to a new "space beyond International Relations" smacks of wishful idealism, ignoring the current configuration of global political relations and power distribution;** of the incessant ideological power of hyperindividualism, consumerism, advertising, Hollywood images, and fashion icons; **and of the innate power bestowed on the (institutional) barons of global finance, trade, and transnational production**. George seems to have little appreciation of the structural impediments such institutions pose for radical change of the type he so fiercely advocates. **Revolutionary change** of the kind desired by George **ignores that fact that many individuals are not disposed to concerns beyond their family, friends, and daily work lives. And institutional, structural transformation requires organized effort, mass popular support, and dogged single-mindedness if societal norms are to be challenged, institutional reform enacted**, consumer tastes altered, **and political sensibilities reformed**. Convincing Nike that there is something intrinsically wrong with paying Indonesian workers a few dollars a week to manufacture shoes for the global market requires considerably more effort than postmodern platitudes and/or moral indignation. **The cycle of wealth creation and distribution** that sees Michael Jordan receive multimillion dollar contracts to inspire demand for Nike products, while the foot soldiers in the factory eke out a meager existence producing these same products **is not easily, or realistically, challenged by pronouncements of moving beyond International Relations to a new, nicer, gentler nirvana.** More generally, of course, what George fails to consider is the problem of apathy and of how we get people to care about the plight of others. What do we with the CEOs of multinational corporations, stockbrokers, accountants, ctory workers, and the unemployed, who, by and large, fail to consider the omeless and destitute in their own countries, let alone in places they have never isited and are never likely to visit? **Moral indignation rarely translates into action, and apathy about the plight of others is a structural impediment as strong any idea**, theory, or writing. What **George's treatise** thus **fails to consider is how we overcome this, and how we get others to listen**. He needs to explain how the social, political, psychological, and moral structures that define the parameters of existence for the many millions of ordinary citizens in the first world, and that deflects attention from the marginalized and the oppressed can be broken down. Unfortunately, there is little to indicate that George has thought much about this, suggesting that his commitment to postmodern theory is not likely to make much difference. In fact, **in the academy the postmodern light is already beginning to dim in certain quarters, having registered scarcely a glimmer in the broader polity, where, if change was to ensue, it needed to burn brightly.** Even among those versed in the nomenclature of scholarly debate, theorists of international politics remain skeptical of the value of postmodern discourse, by and large rejecting it. This does not portend well for postmodern visionaries and the future of postmodern discourse. But can George really be surprised by this? After all, his discourse indicts the "backward discipline" for complicity in crimes against humanity, calling for a repudiation of realism and with it a repudiation of the lifelong beliefs and writings of eminent theorists like Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, and Stephen Krasner who have otherwise defined the parameters of the discipline, its projects, and research agendas. Can George really expect discipline-wide capitulation to an intellectual diaspora that would see theorists repudiate their beliefs and works in order to take up the creed of postmodernism, as vague, open-ended, and indeterminate as it is? **Without a clear and credible plan** of how to get from "incarceration and closure" to intellectual freedom, creativity, and openness, George's **postmodern musings have understandably attracted few disciples.**

### Framing

### Util

**All lives are infinitely valuable, the only ethical option is to maximize the number saved**

**Cummisky, 96**

(David, professor of philosophy at Bates, Kantian Consequentialism, p. 131)

Finally, **even if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and compensate for killing one**—**because dignity cannot be added and summed in this way**—this **point still does not justify deontologieal constraints**. On the extreme interpretation, **why would not killing one person be a stronger obligation than saving two persons**? If I **am concerned with the priceless dignity of each**, it would seem that 1 may still saw two; it **is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of the** one. Consider Hills example of a priceless object: If **I can save two of three priceless statutes only by destroying one. Then 1 cannot claim that saving two makes up for the loss of the one.** But Similarly, the loss of the two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed. Indeed, **even if dignity cannot be simply summed up. How is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible?** Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus compensate for the lass of the one, **each is priceless**: **thus, I have good reason to save as many as I can**. In short, it is not clear how the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing'letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better.\*

# Anthro

### Link

#### THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCT OF DEHUMANIZATION/THE SUBHUMAN OPERATIONALIZES GLOBAL SPECIEST, GENDERED, RACIALIZED, AND ECONOMIC VIOLENCE. WE NEED TO REFUSE THE ATTEMPT TO PARTIALLY INCLUDE GROUPS INTO THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN AND INSTEAD REJECT HUMANIZING DISCOURSE BECAUSE IT MERELY DISPLACES THE VIOLENCE OF THE 1AC IMPACT SCENARIOS ONTO WHOM-EVER IS CONSIDERED NONHUMAN.

Deckha 2k10

[Maneesha, faculty of law, university of Victoria, “it’s time to abandon the idea of human rights”, the scavenger, dec. 10]

The category of the ‘subhuman’ is inherent in global gendered, racialized and economic violence, throwing up questions around the relevance of concepts of ‘human rights’ and ‘human dignity’ for effective theories of justice, policy and social movements. Instead of fighting dehumanization with humanization, a better strategy may be to minimize the human/nonhuman boundary altogether. A new discourse of cultural and legal protections is required to address violence against vulnerable humans in a manner that does not privilege humanity or humans, nor permit a subhuman figure to circulate as the mark of inferior beings on whom the perpetration of violence is legitimate. We need to find an alternative discourse to theorize and mobilize around vulnerabilities for “subhuman” humans, § Marked 08:05 § writes Maneesha Deckha. 13 December 2010 One of the organizing narratives of western thought and the institutions it has shaped is humanism and the idea that human beings are at the core of the social and cultural order. The cultural critique humanism has endured, by way of academic theory and social movements, has focused on the failure of its promise of universal equal treatment and dignity for all human beings. To address this failing, a rehabilitative approach to humanism is usually adopted with advocates seeking to undo humanism’s exclusions by expanding its ambit and transporting vulnerable human groups from “subhuman” to “human” status. Law has responded by including more and more humans under the coveted category of “personhood”. Yet, the logic of the human/subhuman binary typically survives this critique with the dependence of the coveted human status on the subhuman (and the vulnerabilities it enables) going unnoticed. This gap in analysis is evident in how most of us think about violence and its related concept of vulnerability. Some would even say that what sets us apart from nonhumans is a capacity for vulnerability. Others who address human-nonhuman relationships more closely might say that what sets human apart from nonhuman animals, if anything, is our capacity for violence. More particular still, feminists would highlight the masculinist orientation of this violence against nonhumans, animals and otherwise, noting that institutionalized violence against nonhumans primarily occurs in male-dominated industries. Yet, the discourse around (hu)man violence against animals is muted in mainstream debates about violence, vulnerability and exploitation in general. More common is a concern with violence against humans and how to eliminate it and make humans less vulnerable. This theorizing largely proceeds through affirmations of the inviolability or sanctity of human life and human dignity, establishing what it means to be human through articulation of what it means to be animal. The humanist paradigm of anti-violence discourse thus does not typically examine the human/nonhuman boundary, but often fortifies it. The failure to address this boundary and its creation and maintenance of the figure of the subhuman undermines anti-violence agendas.

### AT: PERM

#### And the perm uniquely links more.

**Tyler 2k5**

[tom, like water in water, journal for cultural research, vol 9, no 3, july]

Glendinning puts it best when he suggests that the problem is not so much, as¶ Derrida claims, that we cannot find a place for the animal within the basic¶ concepts of Heidegger’s analytic, § Marked 08:07 § as the fact of the “unexamined privilege¶ conferred on the human being” by those concepts (Glendinning 1996, p. 78). The¶ distinctive co-dependence of thinking, word and hand sets humanity apart.¶ Heidegger’s objection to traditional humanism is, in part, that it does not sufficiently¶ emphasize the unique and privileged relationship that “homo humanus”¶ has to Being: “the highest determinations of the essence of man in humanism still¶ do not realize the proper dignity of man” (Heidegger 1993, pp. 233–234, 245).¶ Only once we recognize the special role of Man as guardian over the truth of¶ Being is he restored to his proper place. This done, Heidegger is prepared to¶ contemplate the possibility of reclaiming the term humanism (Heidegger 1993,¶ pp. 245, 247–248). The humanistic (or hyperhumanistic) phenomenology from¶ which Heidegger starts has thus already precluded the possibility of his recognizing¶ or discovering a human–animal continuity, a human–animal Mitsein (beingwith)¶ perhaps, and thus condemns him to an anthropocentrism in which human¶ being is foremost.18