# 1NC

### Off 1

#### Obama will win- Polls prove but race could shift if an event comes up

Cook 10-4

Charlie is a National Journal Columnist and writes the Cook Political Report, “Mitt Romney Breaks his Losing Streak,” <http://nationaljournal.com/columns/cook-report/the-cook-report-romney-breaks-his-losing-streak-20121004>

Too many political observers see politics in an entirely binary way: Everything has to be either a “0” or a “1”; a race is either tied or it’s over; every election is either won or stolen. Some people never want to admit that their side lost. And some people think that a poll either tells them what they want to hear or is methodologically flawed—or crooked. It’s like an obnoxious sports fan (often found in Philadelphia) who views a ruling by a referee or umpire as either favorable or a bad call. Denial and simplicity reign.¶ The presidential election is neither tied nor over. Of the 16 most recent national polls using live telephone interviewers calling both respondents with landlines and those with cell phones (between 30 and 40 percent of voters do not have landlines and cannot legally be called by robo-pollsters), one has the race even, two have Obama with a narrow 2-point edge, five have 3-point Obama margins, two have 5-point Obama advantages, another pair have 6-point Obama leads, two have 7-point leads, and one has an 8-point Obama lead. This would strongly suggest that the Obama lead is between 3 and 6 percentage points; such brand-name polls as those by CNN, Fox News, and NBC News/Wall Street Journal are among those in that 3- to 6-point range.¶ Conversations with Democratic and Republican pollsters and strategists suggest that Colorado, Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia are the most competitive swing states. Some high-quality private polling shows Romney with very narrow leads in both North Carolina and Virginia, but a few other equally sophisticated surveys show Obama with narrow advantages in those two states. At least one private survey shows Florida even, but most show the Sunshine State and Colorado with narrow Obama leads, in the small- to mid-single-digit range. Just a hair or two better for Obama but still quite close are Nevada and Wisconsin, followed by Iowa. Things really get ugly for Romney in Ohio and Michigan, and, finally, in Pennsylvania, which is no longer competitive. Ohio shows a 5- to 8-point lead for Obama in private polling. In Michigan, Obama’s lead is slightly wider, and in Pennsylvania, Romney faces close to a 10-point deficit. It is mathematically possible for Romney to reach 270 electoral votes without Michigan, Ohio, or Pennsylvania, but it is in reality exceedingly unlikely.¶ It would take a very consequential event to change the trajectory of this race. Time will tell whether Romney’s strong debate performance on Wednesday night was the event that he needed—particularly in swing states such as Ohio. But at least he energized his supporters and sent a clear message that the race is not over.¶ As for down-ballot races, my hunch is that there is a pretty good chance that we may not know which party will hold a majority in the Senate in the next Congress by breakfast or lunch the day after the election. With 10 seats in the toss-up category—five for each party—the Senate outlook couldn’t be more volatile.¶ Republicans can be confident that they will pick up the open seat in Nebraska, but they have to be very worried about their own open seats in Indiana and Maine. The latter is particularly troublesome for the GOP. Republican incumbents Scott Brown in Massachusetts and Dean Heller in Nevada are in very tight races; the odds of Heller winning are better than those for Brown. The newest entry on the toss-up list is the open Republican seat in Arizona, where Democrat Richard Carmona has pulled even or slightly ahead of GOP Rep. Jeff Flake.¶ Conversely, Democrats have to be most worried about hanging on to the open seat in Connecticut, where former pro-wrestling CEO Linda McMahon now has a narrow lead, and in Montana, where incumbent Jon Tester is locked in a nail-biter. The top of the ticket is a challenge for both McMahon and Tester. Open seats in North Dakota, Virginia, and Wisconsin are statistical dead heats, notwithstanding some public polls that show rather substantial leads for former Democratic Gov. Tim Kaine over former Sen. George Allen in the Old Dominion.¶ A look at the polling data shows two inflection points in the presidential contest and many Senate races. The Democratic convention clearly had a positive impact for Democrats, while Republicans took a real hit after the release of the video of Mitt Romney suggesting that 47 percent of voters are basically deadbeats who see themselves as victims. We are now hearing reports of a similar drop for down-ballot Republicans in some districts, particularly in places like California and New York where Romney was already going nowhere. Many GOP candidates took a hit the week of Sept. 17, then stabilized the following week. They didn’t drop further but they didn’t regain any altitude, either.¶ For now, the GOP majority in the House seems fairly secure; The Cook Political Report currently sees GOP losses in the zero- to 10-seat range, well short of the 25-seat net gain Democrats need to gain control.¶ It’s always difficult to gauge how any event will be interpreted and what impact it will have on a campaign, but there is considerable evidence that the “47 percent” video did make a mark. Democratic pollster Peter Hart and his Republican counterpart Bill McInturff asked in the Sept. 26-30 NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll of 832 likely voters nationwide, “Has what you have seen, read, or heard in the past couple of weeks about Mitt Romney and his campaign for president given you a more favorable impression of him or a less favorable impression of him?” Some 28 percent responded that they felt more complimentary about Romney, but 51 percent indicated that what they heard made them feel less likely to support him.¶ Romney had a six-week stretch where nothing broke his way. Now we’ll see if his debate performance was a turning point—or a brief interruption—in the campaign narrative.

#### SMR’s incredibly unpopular- Batman

Deal-Blackwell 7/23

(Deborah, works with Los Alamos, founder of Hyperion Power Generation, ““Dark Knight Rises” Batman movie does infant SMR industry no favors” <http://ixpower.com/tag/small-modular-reactors/>, SEH)

But, I couldn’t believe it …Holy Plot Twist Batman! I cringed when we got to the part where they introduced the little nuclear reactor. ACK! The Nolan Brothers had written in Wayne Enterprises Applied Science Division developing an SMR (Small Modular nuclear power Reactor) that was used by the bad guys to threaten Gotham. In the movie, the bad guys gain access to the SMR and had a scientist magically presto changeo TURN IT INTO A FUSION NUCLEAR BOMB in what seemed like a turn of a screw, and in the space of a few minutes. As the movie progressed, and I became sore from my date nudging me with his elbow, darn it if the characters didn’t flip the sucker onto the back of the truck and drive around Gotham with it …!¶ GROAN! CRINGE! I know it’s just a movie and YOU know it’s just a movie, but golly, gosh darn, The Dark Knight Rises sure doesn’t help the rise of the fledging SMR industry! ¶ Fusion?! Ack! Fusion bomb?! Ack! Quickly retrofitting a power reactor to be a bomb?! Ack! Throwing it in a truck and driving it around the city?! ¶ Double Ack! The fairy tale spun further and further out of control. I wanted to bang my head on the seat in front of me. I don’t recall any other recent movies featuring a small nuclear power being turned into a bomb, and I sure wish this one had not.¶ Misconceptions about nuclear power abound today. Misconceptions and fear about SMRs, I’m afraid, will no doubt skyrocket after everyone gets around to seeing this movie. If you ask me, the release of this Batman flick hands the Union of Concerned Scientists a loaded Batpistol to scare the uninformed majority into opposing the development of SMRs. ¶ This movie could be a pain in the collective butts of those of us who believe SMRs have a place in the future of clean energy for our planet and may come back to haunt the nuclear industry – for both big and small power reactors. I’m pretty sure it will – just as sure as at the end of every Batman movie, the dark knight rises.¶

**Approval Rating is key, lines up perfectly with reelection
Silver ’11**

Nate directs five thirty eight and is a statistician, “Approval Ratings and Reelection Odds,” <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/approval-ratings-and-re-election-odds/>

Earlier this month, we posted the simple version of a finding, based on the historical record, that is worth keeping in mind when you read articles about how Barack Obama’s presidency has (or has not been) been revitalized: It’s just too soon for his approval ratings to tell us very much about his re-election prospects for 2012. This is an overdue follow-up to that article — what you might think of as the slightly-more-complicated version. While **it’s true that approval ratings aren’t of much use now, it’s also the case that, by the time we get close to the election, they will have become a very reliable predictor of Mr. Obama’s chances of winning another term**. Based on Gallup polling, here is what I estimate that the incumbent president’s approval rating was on Election Day in almost every election since 1940. (There is no data for 1944 because Gallup went on wartime hiatus.) There are a few tricks I had to employ to derive these numbers; I’d ask you to take them on faith for a few moments, and then we’ll explain everything later on. **At first glance, the relationship seems nearly perfect: every incumbent with an approval rating of 49 percent or higher won re-election, while every candidate with a rating of 48 percent or lower lost.** In practice, things probably don’t work quite that crisply. For example, Harry Truman, whom we estimate had a 50 percent approval rating on Election Day 1948, won by 4.5 points, and 114 electoral votes, over Thomas E. Dewey, which suggests that he had some margin to spare. And candidate quality clearly makes a difference. Although Robert Dole is sometimes considered a weak Republican nominee, Bill Clinton beat him in 1996 by just 8.5 points, despite Mr. Clinton’s 55 percent approval rating. By contrast, in 1972, Richard Nixon, with an approval rating only a couple of points higher (57 percent), trounced a very weak Democratic nominee, George McGovern, by more than 23 points. Still, the approval rating at which an incumbent candidate goes from being an underdog to a favorite for re-election is somewhere in the high 40s. **The reason the threshold is probably slightly below 50 percent rather than right at 50 percent is that in any approval survey, some people (typically 5 to 10 percent) say they are undecided about the president’s performance**. For instance, at this writing, Barack Obama’s Gallup approval rating is 49 percent but his disapproval rating is just 42 percent, a net margin of +7. If those were the figures on Election Day, he would be a favorite to win unless nearly everybody who was undecided about his performance cast their ballots against him, something that is possible in theory but usually doesn’t occur in practice. Now, then, how did we come up with these numbers? As I said, it’s not quite so straightforward. Gallup has approval ratings data going back to 1937. The problem is that, until fairly recently, they had a habit of stopping their approval ratings polling several months before a presidential election. For instance, in 1956, their last poll of Dwight Eisenhower’s public approval was in early August; they did not survey him again until late November, after he had already defeated Adlai Stevenson. However, we can extrapolate what Mr. Eisenhower’s rating would have been on Election Day 1956 by drawing a smoothed regression line — known in the business as a Loess curve — using the data points before and after that date. The one hitch is that incumbent presidents, whether they win, lose, or don’t run at all, almost always receive a “bounce” in their approval rating after the election, as people either rally around a winner or feel sympathy for the lame duck. The average magnitude of this post-election bounce is 4 points. So, before I fitted the curves, I subtracted 4 points from approval rating polls conducted after Election Day. By applying this process of bounce-adjustment and curve-fitting, we are able to estimate an incumbent president’s Gallup approval rating on Election Day itself or on any day before it, as shown in this nifty-looking graphic: I haven’t labeled the curves by the candidate’s name in the chart, because that which create too much clutter. But I have distinguished those who eventually won re-election (blue lines) from those who lost (red). A couple of cases are worth attention. The red line that you see briefly extending above 80 percent is for George H.W. Bush. His approval ratings, which were already pretty good, shot up following the start of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, when American-led forces drove Iraqi troops back from their occupation of Kuwait. Politically, that made Mr. Bush look like an extremely formidable candidate for re-election: Saturday Night Live ran a sketch later that year entitled “Campaign ’92: The Race To Avoid Being The Guy Who Loses To Bush,” with Democratic candidates at a debate all trying to lose so they would not have to run against him. But Mr. Bush’s approval ratings fell precipitously throughout late 1991 and early 1992, and were below 40 percent by Election Day. If Mr. Bush is the precedent that challengers will cite when their campaign seems to be flailing, the opposite example is the original Comeback Kid, Harry Truman. He’s the blue line that you still see down around 40 percent approval with just five months to go before the election of 1948. It’s hard to know exactly where Mr. Truman’s approval numbers were on Election Day. When Gallup surveyed in late June, he had just 39 percent approval; in January, 1949, after he had beaten Thomas E. Dewey, he was up to 69 percent; and then he reverted back to 50 percent just a couple months later. Our Loess curve estimates that Mr. Truman’s approval rating was probably around 50 percent on Election Day, but this is just a guess. What’s clear is that Mr. Truman was at some point an extremely unpopular president, and he nevertheless — to the great surprise of the Chicago Daily Tribune — defeated Mr. Dewey. Another thing to take from the graphic is how the red and blue lines gradually untangle themselves as the relationship between approval ratings and re-election becomes stronger over time. We can see this a bit more clearly by taking the average approval rating for the 8 winning candidates and the 3 losing ones and tracking them over the two years leading up to the election: I would resist the idea that there is any one magical date when approval ratings go from meaningless to meaningful as predictors of re-election. In the chart, the first time the winners and the losers begin to separate themselves is about 19 months before the election — which would correspond roughly to March of the prior year — but the split would have come a bit earlier if not for Mr. Bush’s Gulf War bounce. There’s also increasing differentiation in the period roughly 10 to 5 months before the election, corresponding with primary season. Still, for the most part, the separation occurs gradually. I’ve also tried to play around with various sorts of logistic regression models that attempt to predict a president’s chances at re-election based solely on his Gallup approval rating and the number of days until the election. Don’t take this terribly seriously — it’s hard to do anything very rigorous based on so few data points (just 11 presidents in the sample), and I can imagine better model designs than the one that I’ve used. But it does yield some ballpark estimates of what this data implies. **For example, a year in advance of the election, the model figures that a president with a 60 percent approval rating is about 90 percent likely to win re-election, whereas a 40 percent rating translates into a win probability of a bit below 40 percent**. So by that point the differences have become fairly meaningful: What does this mean for Barack Obama? Right now, we’re still in the period where the most useful number for estimating his re-election chances is not his approval rating but rather the historical track record of incumbent presidents. As I wrote on Wednesday, since the Civil War, 73 percent of incumbent presidents who sought another term won, as have 70 percent since World War II. Plugging Mr. Obama’s current numbers into the regression model that I described above yields a 65 percent likelihood of re-election — but again, this is a really rough guess, based mostly on the high historical batting average for incumbents rather than anything to do with Mr. Obama himself. What we can say is important is the range in which Mr. Obama’s approval ratings have been varying in recent months: between about 45 and about 50 percent. **If Mr. Obama’s approval rating is at the top of that range, 50 percent, on Nov. 6, 2012 — about where it is now — the model figures that his chances of winning re-election will be greater than 80 percent. But if his approval rating is at the bottom of the range instead, at 45 percent, his chances for a second term will be only about one in three,** and he’ll have to hope that the Republican nominee is a weak one. Much will change between now and then, of course. But Mr. Obama would probably win an election held next Tuesday — and that would not have been true a couple of months ago.

#### He forces China’s hand into a trade war- collapses relations and economy

Roach 8-28

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True to his word as a candidate, a few hours after taking office as US president on January 20, 2013, Mitt Romney issued his first executive order, declaring China guilty of currency manipulation. In accordance with the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, President Romney’s act triggered immediate negotiations between US and Chinese officials. But the negotiations stalled and both parties blamed the other in press releases.¶ In early February, in his first State of the Union address, Mr Romney said: “Enough is enough. It is high time for China to play by our rules.” Congress roared its approval and within a week, overwhelming bipartisan majorities of both houses passed the Defend America Trade Act of 2013. Modelled on the currency manipulation “remedies” of countervailing tariffs first proposed in 2005, DATA was signed into law on President’s Day, February 18 2013. China was quickly deemed to be in violation of the new statute.¶ More¶ At that point negotiations took on a new urgency. But the new leaders in both countries were in no mood for compromise and the talks failed. In accordance with the provisions of DATA, Washington slapped immediate tariffs of 20 per cent on all Chinese products entering the US.¶ As plants shut down across China, Beijing declared this to be an act of economic war and filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization. Li Keqiang, newly installed as premier, announced after the National People’s Congress in March that China had no patience to endure a WTO dispute process that could take anywhere from two to five years to run its course.¶ China’s Ministry of Commerce then announced retaliatory tariffs of 20 per cent on all US exports to China. This hit growth-starved America right between the eyes. With $104bn of American-made goods sold in Chinese markets in 2011, China had become the US’s third-largest and its fastest-growing export market. To add insult to injury, China-dependent Walmart announced average price increases of 5 per cent. Other retailers followed suit. Talk of stagflation was in the air and hard-pressed American consumers hunkered down further.¶ US financial markets swooned. The stock market was hit by pressures on profit margins, growth and inflation. The bond market was also unnerved by the realisation that the Federal Reserve was seriously behind the curve. With good reason. After its meeting in June 2013, the Fed reaffirmed its ever-extending commitment to keep its benchmark policy rate near zero through 2015, and even dangled the possibility of yet another round of quantitative easing, QE4. Yields on 10-year Treasuries moved back above 4 per cent and stocks fell sharply further.¶ Feeling the heat from financial markets, Washington turned up the heat on China. Mr Romney called Congress back from its Independence Day holiday into a special session. By unanimous consent, Congress passed an amendment to DATA – upping the tariffs on China by another 10 percentage points.¶ At that point an indignant China turned to its own version of the big bazooka. The biggest foreign buyer of US debt was nowhere to be seen at the Treasury’s August 2013 auction. Long-term interest rates spiked and within weeks yields on 10-year Treasuries hit 7 per cent. The dollar plunged and the US stock market went into free fall.¶ Just like that, the so-called exorbitant privilege of the haven asset vanished. When asked at a press conference why China would willingly engage in actions that would undermine the value of more than $2tn in Treasuries and other dollar-based holdings, Zhou Xiaochuan, retiring governor of the People’s Bank of China, said: “This is not about risk-adjusted portfolio returns. We are defending our people against an act of economic war.”¶ By the autumn of 2013 there was little doubt of the severity of renewed recession in the US. Trade sanctions on China had backfired. Beleaguered American workers paid the highest price of all, as the unemployment rate shot back up above 10 per cent. A horrific policy blunder had confirmed that there was no bilateral fix for the multilateral trade imbalance of a savings-starved US economy.¶ In China, growth had slipped below the dreaded 6 per cent threshold and the new leadership was rolling out yet another investment stimulus for a still unbalanced and unstable Chinese economy. As the global economy slipped back into recession, the Great Crisis of 2008-09 suddenly looked like child’s play. Globalisation itself hung in the balance.¶ History warns us never to say never. We need only look at the legacy of US Senator Reed Smoot and Representative Willis Hawley, who sponsored the infamous Tariff Act of 1930 – America’s worst economic policy blunder. Bad dreams can – and have – become reality.

#### Economic decline causes nuclear war

Harris and Burrows, 09 –

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Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the **Great Depression** is not likely to be repeated, the **lessons** to be drawn from that period **include the harmful effects on** **fledgling** **democracies** and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) **and** on the sustainability of **multilateral institutions** (think League of Nations in the same period). **There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first** as much as in the twentieth **century.** For that reason, the ways in which **the potential for greater conflict could grow** would seem to be even more apt **in a** constantly **volatile economic environment** as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. **Terrorism**’s appeal **will decline if** economic **growth continues** in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the **diffusion of technologies** and scientific knowledge **will place** some of **the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach**. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity **conflict** and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella **could lead to an unintended escalation** and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close **proximity of** potential **nuclear rivals** combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions **may place more focus on preemption** rather than defense, potentially **leading to escalating crises**. 36 Types of **conflict** that the world continues to experience, such as **over resources, could reemerge,** particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. **Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity** will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this **could result in interstate conflicts** if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, **cooperation** to manage changing water resources **is** likely to be increasingly **difficult** both within and between states **in a** more **dog-eat-dog world.**

### Off 2

#### CP text: the 50 States and all relevant Territories should enter into a compact on: Providing substantial funding for High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor energy production funding in the United States. The Compact should collect revenue via a Clean Energy Community Finance Initiative.

#### Compacts solve faster than the federal government

Mountjoy ‘01

John is a policy analyst with the council of State Governments, “Interstate Compacts Make a Comeback,” Spring <http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/ncic/Comeback.pdf>

Some may question the need for interstate compacts to address multi-state policy issues. Why ¶ not leave such regulation to the feds? ¶ “Interstate compacts help us maintain state control,” said Gary McConnell, director of the ¶ Georgia Emergency Management Agency. ¶ During his 10 years as GEMA director, McConnell has played an instrumental role in developing ¶ and promoting a successful interstate compact —the Emergency Management Assistance ¶ Compact, or EMAC. EMAC allows state emergency management agencies to cooperate and ¶ share resources in the event of natural and man-made disasters. ¶ “We can go to the federal government for all kinds of help when natural disasters strike, but the ¶ states [cooperating under an interstate compact] can provide specific resources quicker, which ¶ are likely to be problem specific,” McConnell said. “It’s less bureaucratic, and it’s far cheaper. ¶ It’s easier for us under EMAC to obtain resources from surrounding states than it is to use ¶ federal assistance, which we’d end up having to pay more for anyway. I suspect this is the case ¶ with many other interstate compacts as well.” ¶ “States are rediscovering that they have the power to address their own problems better than the ¶ federal government,” said Rick Masters, The Council of State Governments’ legal counsel and ¶ special counsel for interstate compacts. ¶ CSG, which has tracked interstate compacts for more than 40 years, maintains a clearinghouse of ¶ compact information. More recently, CSG helps administer EMAC and is facilitating the update ¶ of the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision and the Interstate Compact on ¶ Juveniles. Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution laid the legal foundation for interstate ¶ compacts: “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep ¶ Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another ¶ State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent ¶ Danger as will not admit of delay.” Compacts actually preceded the Constitution, having been ¶ used in colonial times to resolve boundary disputes between colonies. ¶ Prior to the 1920s, interstate compacts were typically bi-state agreements, addressing boundary ¶ disputes and territorial claims. In fact, only 36 interstate compacts were formed between 1783 ¶ and 1920. It is only in this century that states have turned to interstate compacts to facilitate ¶ cooperative solutions to multi-state problems. ¶ After a lull in the late 1970s and early 1980s, interstate compacts are beginning to enjoy a ¶ resurgence. Since the early 1990s, states have initiated or updated several high-profile compacts. ¶ Examples include EMAC, the Interstate Compact on Industrialized/Modular Buildings and the ¶ Interstate Insurance Receivership Compact. Interstate compacts can set the framework for cooperative solutions to today’s cross-state ¶ challenges, from policing drugs to supplying energy or controlling sprawl. ¶ “Issues within the states are becoming more complex and aren’t confined by state boundaries. As ¶ a result, solutions are becoming multi-state as well. Compacts are the only tool that is truly ¶ adequate for addressing these multi-state issues,” said Bill Voit, senior project director at The ¶ Council of State Governments. ¶ An example is an interstate compact being considered to facilitate taxation of e-commerce. ¶ Opponents of Internet taxation claim that it would be virtually impossible for online vendors to ¶ comply with the complex, often confusing system of state and local sales and use taxes. Since ¶ Internet sales are expected to reach $184 billion annually by 2004, states have a vested interest in ¶ breaking down this and other barriers to taxing online transactions. ¶ Congress currently is considering the Internet Tax Moratorium Equity Act (S. 512) to help states ¶ simplify their sales and use taxes, in part by authorizing states to enter into an Interstate Sales ¶ and Use Tax Compact. The compact would create a “uniform, streamlined sales and use tax ¶ system,” convenient to remote sales. ¶ At least 18 states are considering the model streamlined sales tax legislation in 2001. Kentucky, ¶ South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming already have signed bills into law. ¶ Existing interstate compacts, many drafted in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, are ripe for ¶ amendment and revision. Technology and the Internet now make the sharing of information ¶ seamless and immediate, yet several interstate compacts are plagued by inadequate ¶ administration. ¶ “Not only do we see the development of new compacts, but we are seeing the re-examination of ¶ existing compacts…revising them to keep pace with our changing world,” Masters said. ¶ Developed in 1937, the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers is ¶ one example of a compact in need of update. Adopted by all 50 states, the compact regulates the ¶ movement of parolees and probationers across state lines. The burgeoning offender population ¶ and the ease with which offenders now can travel have created several problems for the compact, ¶ including: frequent violations of compact rules, inability to enforce compliance, difficulty in ¶ creating new rules and slow, unreliable exchange of case information. ¶ The antiquated compact needed a replacement that would provide states the authority, ¶ enforcement tools and resources to adequately track and ensure supervision of parolees and ¶ probationers. ¶ The new interstate compact, the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision, provides ¶ these solutions. The new compact includes mechanisms for enforcement, accountability, resource provision, information sharing and state-to-state cooperation. Currently, the compact ¶ has been introduced in 39 states and enacted in 18. ¶ Just as technology can smooth the operation of interstate compacts, alternative dispute resolution ¶ techniques can increase their self-sufficiency. Enforcement tools within interstate compacts need ¶ to utilize more of the mediation and arbitration services that have proven successful throughout ¶ state government. By developing additional self-contained enforcement mechanisms, compact ¶ members would not need to rely solely on the crowded docket of the U.S. Supreme Court. ¶ States should further utilize interstate compacts to address new problems and create new ¶ methods of interstate cooperation. If not, federal preemption in certain policy areas is a distinct ¶ possibility.

### Off 3

#### Fiscal Cliff Passes but capital key

Sprung, 9/21

(Andrew Sprung is a political commentator & media consultant. He is the CEO of Sprung PR and hold a PhD from the University of Rochestor, “Ezra Klein's unconvincing theory that Obama misunderstands (or misrepresents) "change," http://xpostfactoid.blogspot.com/2012/09/ezra-kleins-unconvincing-theory-that.html)

In my view, Klein is viewing this question too narrowly. Obama is well aware of the limitations of the bully pulpit, and he's got to know better than any person on the planet that presidential advocacy polarizes, entrenching the opposing party in implacable opposition to whatever the president proposes. Yet, in presenting a revamped theory of how the presidency works, he's not just feeding us a line of BS. And if Obama wins reelection, I believe that we will look back five or ten or twenty years from now and recognize that yes, Obama did change the way Washington works. Or at the very least, he kept the US on a sane policy course in a time of extreme polarization and thus gave (will have given...) the system space to self-correct, as it has in the past. Let's start with Klein's objection to Obama's characterization of how healthcare reform got done: The health-care process, which I reported on extensively, was a firmly “inside game” strategy. There were backroom deals with most every major interest group and every swing legislator.... By the time the law passed, many more Americans viewed it unfavorably than viewed it favorably — exactly the opposite of what you’d expect if health care had passed through an “outside game” strategy in which, as Obama put it, “the American people … put pressure on Congress to move these things forward.” And yet, health care passed. The inside game worked. All true, laddie. And yet, in claiming that the impetus for healthcare reform came from the outside, I don't think Obama is attempting to whitewash this long and messy process -- or is even referring to it. He is alluding to the marshaling or channeling of popular will that got him elected. The essence of Obama's primary election argument against Hillary Clinton was that he was better equipped to marshal the popular will for fundamental change -- with healthcare reform as the centerpiece -- than she was. I well remember the moment when that argument first impressed itself on me. It was in a debate in the immediate aftermath of the Iowa caucuses, on Jan. 5, 2008: Look, I think it's easier to be cynical and just say, "You know what, it can't be done because Washington's designed to resist change." But in fact there have been periods of time in our history where a president inspired the American people to do better, and I think we're in one of those moments right now. I think the American people are hungry for something different and can be mobilized around big changes -- not incremental changes, not small changes. I actually give Bill Clinton enormous credit for having balanced those budgets during those years. It did take political courage for him to do that. But we never built the majority and coalesced the American people around being able to get the other stuff done. And, you know, so the truth is actually words do inspire. Words do help people get involved. Words do help members of Congress get into power so that they can be part of a coalition to deliver health care reform, to deliver a bold energy policy. Don't discount that power, because when the American people are determined that something is going to happen, then it happens. And if they are disaffected and cynical and fearful and told that it can't be done, then it doesn't. I'm running for president because I want to tell them, yes, we can. And that's why I think they're responding in such large numbers.

Cue the political science eye-roll. The American people were not "determined" that healthcare reform per se had to occur. You can't read the results of the 2008 wave election as a "mandate" for a specific policy. In the aftermath, the electoral tide went back out with a vengeance. But it's also true that in two years of campaigning Obama's words did inspire people, that the American people were hungry for change after Bush, that Obama made a broad and conceptually coherent case for moving the center of American politics back to the left with a renewed commitment to shared prosperity and investment in the common good, and that healthcare reform was at the center of that case. True too that the results of that election gave him enough of a majority to persist, even when relentless Republican misinformation and bad-faith negotiation and delay eroded public support. Obama also **used the bully pulpit at crucial point**s, if not to rally public opinion, at least **to re-commit wavering Democrats -**- and also to convince the public, as he enduringly has, that he was more of a **good faith negotiator**, more willing to compromise, than the Republicans. Those pressure points were the September 2009 speech he gave to a joint session of Congress, and the remarkable eight-hour symposium he staged with the leadership of both parties in late February 2010 to showcase the extent to which the ACA incorporated past Republican proposals and met goals allegedly shared by both parties, as well as his own bend-over-backwards willingness to incorporate any Republican ideas that could reasonably be cast as advancing those goals. In a series of posts about Ronald Reagan, Brendhan Nyhan has demonstrated that presidential rhetoric generally does not sway public opinion. Savvy politicians channel public opinion; transformative ones seize an opportunity when their basic narrative of where the country needs to go aligns with a shift in public opinion, usually in response to recent setbacks or turmoil. Obama, like Reagan, effected major change in his first two years because he caught such a wave -- he **amassed the political capital**, and he spent it, and we got what he paid for. The force from outside -- a wave election -- empowered Obama to work change from inside in a system that reached a new peak of dysfunctionality. Klein's also objects to Obama's pitch for how to effect change going forward. In 2011, he notes, Obama highlighted the substantial change won from the messy inside game of legislating, touting the long list of legislative accomplishments of the 111th Congress. In election season, he has reverted to a keynote of his 2008 campaign: change comes from you, the electorate; it happens when ”the American people … put pressure on Congress to move these things forward.” Klein regards this as election season hooey: But while this theory of change might play better, it’s the precise theory of change that the last few years have shattered. Whatever you want to say about the inside game, it worked. Legislation passed. But after the midterm elections, it stopped working. And so the White House moved towards an outside game strategy, where ”the American people … put pressure on Congress to move these things forward.” Perhaps the most public example was Obama’s July 2011 speech, in which he said: I’m asking you all to make your voice heard. If you want a balanced approach to reducing the deficit, let your member of Congress know. If you believe we can solve this problem through compromise, send that message. So many Americans responded that Congress’s Web site crashed. But Obama didn’t get his “balanced approach,” which meant a deal including taxes. Klein goes on to recount that throughout the past year of confrontation with the GOP, pushing a jobs package that had broad popular support, Obama won only one minor victory, extension of the payroll tax cut. He then reverts to two political science tenets: presidential advocacy entrenches the opposition, and it can't move popular opinion. But I think he misreads Obama's pitch, strategy and record on several counts. First, he **understates Obama's** (and the Democrats') **successes in the year of confrontation** that has followed the debt ceiling debacle. He writes off the payroll tax cut and unemployment benefit extension as small beer. But this was actually a near-total victory in two stages against entrenched opposition, and it won Obama some vital back-door stimulus for the second year running in the wake of the GOP House takeover. It was followed by a similar GOP cave-in on maintaining low student loan interest rates -- and then again, by the collapse of the House GOP effort to renege on the Budget Control Act and impose still more spending cuts. Presidential rhetoric may not change the public mind. But when it's in sync with voter's propensities, **it can deploy public opinion to bring pressure to bear on the opposition.** Second, it's true that under threat of GOP debt ceiling extortion, Obama successfully marshaled public opinion in favor of his "balanced" approach to deficit reduction but wasn't able to use that pressure to move the GOP off their no-new-taxes intransigence. **But that battle ain't over yet**, and popular support for Obama's position **is political capital that's still in the bank**. **In the upcoming fiscal cliff negotiations, Obama**, if he wins reelection, **will have the whip hand,** given the expiration of the Bush tax cuts and Republican teeth-gnashing over the defense cuts in the sequester. Speaking of which, Obama's refusal to intervene in the supercommittee negotiations as Republicans stonewalled once again over any tax hikes **banked him further capital in this upcoming fight**. Republicans are screaming much louder than Democrats about the sequester, disastrous though the cuts may be on the domestic side. Third, it's rational for Obama to recast his bid for change in election season, because of course he's seeking further "change" from the outside, i.e., more Democrats elected to Congress. He's not going to win a mandate as in 2008, or, most likely, majorities in both houses of Congress. But he has to make the pitch for being granted renewed tools to advance his agenda. Finally, a key part of Obama's "you are the change" pitch in his convention speech was a frank call to play defense -- to protect the changes wrought in his first term and fend off the further capture of the electoral process and the nation's resources by the oligarchy the GOP represents: If you turn away now – if you buy into the cynicism that the change we fought for isn’t possible … well, change will not happen. If you give up on the idea that your voice can make a difference, then other voices will fill the void: lobbyists and special interests; the people with the $10 million checks who are trying to buy this election and those who are making it harder for you to vote; Washington politicians who want to decide who you can marry, or control health-care choices that women should make for themselves.

#### Plan kills Obama

Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 1/9/12, Obama Plays Safe on Energy Policy, Lexis

With less than a year to go **until he faces re-election**, US President Barack **Obama is trying to avoid controversial energy policy decisions**, postponing the finalization of restrictions on oil refinery and power plant emissions and delaying the approval of a major crude pipeline project. The president’s caution will prolong the status quo on issues where the industry both opposes and supports the administration’s plans, and also illustrates what's at stake for energy policy depending on whether or not Obama is given another four years in office. Most of Obama's original campaign **pledges on promoting alternatives to fossil fuels** and tackling climate change **have not passed muster with Congress**, most notably an ambitious plan for national carbon controls, a subsequent toned-down clean energy standard floated after the carbon legislation failed, and repeated efforts to repeal $30 billion-$40 billion worth of oil industry tax deductions over 10 years ( PIW May9'11 ). The one exception has been the passage of $90 billion in clean energy funding as part of an economic stimulus bill passed early in Obama's term, but **the White House has been unable to repeat** this **success in other energy policy areas** ( PIW Feb.23'09 ).

#### Presidential leadership is key to a compromise – the alternative is the collapse of hegemony, a double-dip recession, and war in the Middle East

Hutchison, U.S. Senator from the great state of Texas, 9/21/2012

(Kay Bailey, “A Looming Threat to National Security,” States News Service, Lexis)

Despite warnings of the **dire consequences**, **America is teetering at the edge of a fiscal cliff**, with January 1st, 2013 as the tipping point. On that date, **unless Congress and the White House can reach agreement** on how to cut the federal deficit, all taxpayers will be hit with higher taxes and deep cuts - called "sequestration" - will occur in almost all government spending, disrupting our already weak economy and putting our national security at risk.¶ According to the House Armed Services Committee, if sequestration goes into effect, it would put us on course for more than $1 trillion in defense cuts over the next 10 years. What would that mean? A huge hit to our military personnel and their families; devastating cuts in funding for critical military equipment and supplies for our soldiers; and **a** potentially **catastrophic blow to our** national defense and **security capabilities** in a time of increasing violence and danger.¶ All Americans feel a debt of gratitude to our men and women who serve in uniform. But Texas in particular has a culture that not only reveres the commitment and sacrifice they make to protect our freedom, we send a disproportionate number of our sons and daughters to serve.¶ The burden is not borne solely by those who continue to answer the call of duty, but by their families as well, as they endure separation and the anxiety of a loved one going off to war. These Americans have made tremendous sacrifices. They deserve better than to face threats to their financial security and increased risks to their loved ones in uniform, purely for political gamesmanship.¶ Sequestration would also place an additional burden on our economy. In the industries that support national defense, as many as 1 million skilled workers could be laid off. With 43 straight months of unemployment above 8 percent, it is beyond comprehension to add a virtual army to the 23 million Americans who are already out of work or under-employed. **Government and private economic forecasters warn that sequestration will push the country back into recession next year**.¶ The recent murder of our Ambassador to Libya and members of his staff, attacks on US embassies and consulates and continued riots across the Middle East and North Africa are stark reminders that great portions of the world remain volatile and hostile to the US. **We have the mantle of responsibility that being the world's lone super-power brings**. **In the absence of U.S. military leadership**, **upheaval in the Middle East would be worse**. **As any student of history can attest**, **instability does not confine itself to national borders**. **Strife that starts in one country can spread like wildfire across a region**.¶ Sequestration's cuts would reduce an additional 100,000 airmen, Marines, sailors and soldiers. That would leave us with the smallest ground force since 1940, the smallest naval fleet since 1915 and the smallest tactical fighter force in the Air Force's history. With the destabilization in the Middle East and other areas tenuous, we would be left with a crippled military, **a diminished stature internationally and a loss of technological** research, development and **advantage** - just as actors across the globe are increasing their capabilities.¶ Sequestration can still be avoided. **But that will require leadership from the President** that has thus far been missing. Congress and the White House must reach a long-term agreement to reduce $1 trillion annual budget deficits, without the harsh tax increases that could stall economic growth and punish working families.

#### Nuclear war

Barnett 11

 (Professor, Warfare Analysis and Research Dept – U.S. Naval War College, 3-7, Thomas, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads>)

Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts.

### Off 4

**Depictions of the Iranian nuclear bomb threat replicate Orientalism**

**Izadi**, doctoral student in communication, **and Saghaye-Biria**, master’s student in mass communication @ Louisiana State University, **2007**

(Foad and Hakimeh, Journal of Communication Inquiry, Vol 31, No 2, p. )

This study supports Karim (2000) and McAlister’s (2001) findings that, today, **Orientalist depictions of Muslim countries and their political issues concentrate around**  **the idea that Islam is a source of threat. This study also finds that in the case of Iran’s nuclear program, the issue of trust plays a more central role than the actual existence of evidence for Iran’s possession of a clandestine nuclear weapons program. The present critical discourse analysis also reveals how the three elite newspa- pers’editorials selectively framed the issues surrounding the Iranian nuclear dispute by employing linguistic, stylistic, and argumentative maneuvers. Despite their dif- ferences in their policy recommendations, none challenged the underlying assump- tions that Iran has a clandestine nuclear weapons program,that the Islamic nature of its government is a threat, and that it should not be trusted with sensitive nuclear technology. Their inattention to the inconsistent nonproliferation policies of the United States and other European nuclear powers shows the limits of media criticism of official policies.**

**The alternative: Vote Negative to Embrace the 1AC without the justification that the plan should be done to stop Iranian Proliferation. These racist dichotomies grant states the power to exterminate – this is the root of all war**

**Mendieta, 2002**

Eduardo Mendieta, 2002, “To Make Live and to Let Die – Foucault and Racism

This is where **racism intervenes, not from without, exogenously, but** **from within, constitutively**. For **the emergence of biopower as the form of a new form of political rationality, entails the inscription within the very logic of the modern state the logic of racism**. For **racism grants,** and here I am quoting: “**the conditions for the acceptability of putting to death in a society of normalization. Where there is a society of normalization, where there is a power that is, in all of its surface and in first instance, and first line, a bio-power, racism is indispensable as a condition to be able to put to death someone, in order to be able to put to death others. The homicidal [meurtrière] function of the state, to the degree that the state functions on the modality of bio-power, can only be assured by racism** “(Foucault 1997, 227) To use the formulations from his 1982 lecture “The Political Technology of Individuals” –which incidentally, echo his 1979 Tanner Lectures –**the power of the state** after the 18 th century, a power which is enacted through the police, and is enacted over the population**, is a power over living beings, and as such it is a biopolitics. And, to quote more directly, “since the population is nothing more than what the state takes care of for its own sake, of course, the state is entitled to slaughter it, if necessary.** So the reverse of biopolitics is thanatopolitics.” (Foucault 2000, 416). **Racism, is the thanatopolitics of the biopolitics of the total state**. They are two sides of one same political technology, one same political rationality: the management of life, the life of a population, the tending to the continuum of life of a people. And **with the inscription of racism within the state of biopower, the long history of war** that Foucault has been telling in these dazzling lectures has made a new turn: **the war of peoples, a war against invaders, imperials colonizers, which turned into a war of races, to then turn into a war of classes, has now turned into the war of a race, a biological unit, against its polluters and threats. Racism is the means by which bourgeois political power, biopower, re-kindles the fires of war within civil society. Racism normalizes and medicalizes war.** **Racism makes war the permanent condition of society, while at the same time masking its weapons of death and torture.** As I wrote somewhere else, racism banalizes genocide by making quotidian the lynching of suspect threats to the health of the social body. Racism makes the killing of the other, of others, an everyday occurrence by internalizing and normalizing the war of society against its enemies. To protect society entails we be ready to kill its threats, its foes, and if we understand society as a unity of life, as a continuum of the living, then these threat and foes are biological in nature.

### Solvency

#### HTGRs not a “game-changer” and global uranium shortage jacks solvency

Daryan Energy 9/30/12

[http://daryanenergyblog.wordpress.com/ca/part-7-fast-gas/, mg]

Nuclear energy supporters will generally at this point discuss using Thorium and alternative reactor designs. However, I discussed these a while ago in a series of articles and my conclusion was that such designs are in many cases are simply too immature to make any difference to the current or near future energy picture. Even those that are more mature, notably the HTGR gas cooled reactor, offer only a modest gain, not a “game changing” effect. Also, even if we ignore such practicalities, there is simply not enough Uranium (or Thorium) in the world to meet our needs, as I discuss here.

### Russia

**Give a US-Russia war impact zero probability – politics, military superiority, economic concerns, and nuclear security all check war**

Thomas **Graham 7**, senior advisor on Russia in the US National Security Council staff 2002-2007, September 2007, "Russia in Global Affairs” July - September 2007, The Dialectics of Strength and Weakness

<http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1129.html>

An astute historian of Russia, Martin Malia, wrote several years ago that “Russia has at different times been demonized or divinized by Western opinion less because of her real role in Europe than because of the fears and frustrations, or hopes and aspirations, generated within European society by its own domestic problems.” Such is the case today. To be sure, mounting Western concerns about Russia are a consequence of Russian policies that appear to undermine Western interests, but they are also a reflection of declining confidence in our own abilities and the efficacy of our own policies. Ironically, this growing fear and distrust of Russia come at a time when Russia is arguably less threatening to the West, and the United States in particular, than it has been at any time since the end of the Second World War. Russia does not champion a totalitarian ideology intent on our destruction, its military poses no threat to sweep across Europe, its economic growth depends on constructive commercial relations with Europe, and its strategic arsenal – while still capable of annihilating the United States – is under more reliable control than it has been in the past fifteen years and the threat of a strategic strike approaches zero probability. Political gridlock in key Western countries, however, precludes the creativity, risk-taking, and subtlety needed to advance our interests on issues over which we are at odds with Russia while laying the basis for more constructive long-term relations with Russia.

**Prolif co-op will continue despite disagreements**

**Sestanovich et al,’6** ( top Russia expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, Steven, [www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Russia\_TaskForce.pdf](http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Russia_TaskForce.pdf))

We do not believe that either of these approaches is correct. In America’s relations with Russia, the choice between interests and values is a false one. It misreads the connection between internal developments in Russia and the broader foreign policy interests of the United States. • **On** an issue such as the **prolif**eration of nuclear weapons, **both sides are guided by calculations of national security**. **They will not cease to cooperate merely because they disagree on other matters**

**Even with better relations, Moscow won’t prevent a nuclear Iran – fear of economic losses and better Tehran-US relations**

**Legvold ‘9**

Legvold, Robert, Marshall D. Shulman Professor Emeritus at Columbia University and Director of the project Rethinking U.S. Policy Toward Russia.  “The Russia File.” Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Jul/Aug2009, Vol. 88, Issue 4

Admittedly, this apparent **goodwill does not guarantee success with** Moscow, let alone **Tehran. Progress depends**, first, **on whether Russia's leaders can persuade themselves that** the importance of **preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear power outweighs the risks of harming their many other interests involving Tehran**, **such as gaining access to Iranian oil and gas, dividing up Caspian Sea resources, selling arms,** and stemming Islamist extremism in the North Caucasus and Central Asia. **Russian leaders will** also **have to overcome their fear**--no doubt far-fetched-- **that** the recent **softening** of **Washington's approach** to Iran, combined with a win for the moderates in the Iranian elections in June, **could lead to a rapprochement between Washington and Tehran that either government could then use against Moscow.**

**Shipping prevents theft from Russia.**

**Linzer ’04** [Dafna, Washington Post Staff Writer, Dec. 29, <http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?Article_ID=10751>]

Transporting a weapon out of Russia would provide another formidable obstacle for terrorists. Most of the ready-made bombs that could be stolen would be those made with plutonium, which emits far higher levels of radiation and is therefore more easily detected by passive sensors at ports than is highly enriched uranium, or HEU.

**US-Russian relations are cyclical- prevents full relations collapse**

**Xing ‘12**

[Li Xing, director for Russian studies at the School of Political Science and International Studies at Beijing Normal University. Interviewed by Ling Yi at the Global Times.

<http://www.globaltimes.cn/DesktopModules/DnnForge%20-%20NewsArticles/Print.aspx?tabid=99&tabmoduleid=94&articleId=709170&moduleId=405&PortalID=0> ETB]

**Russia-US relations are** constantly **cyclical. As the** **US presidential election is coming** this fall, the **Obama** campaign **wants to show a tough attitude on Russia**, which explains the finger-pointing about Russia's election earlier this year. **But this will improve after the US election. Such high-level ties are always based on mutual interests. Russia has to expand economic cooperation with the US and the White House needs the Kremlin's support on** international **security issues** such as Iran and Syria.

**Long timeframe for relations good impacts**

**Hart and Simes 09**

Gary Hart is the Wirth Chair at the University of Colorado at Denver and is also a former Democratic U.S. senator from Colorado. Dmitri K. Simes is the publisher of The National Interest “The Road to Moscow.” National Interest, 08849382, May/Jun2009, Issue 101

**Even the best American strategy is unlikely to produce breakthroughs .or the sudden transformation of our** **current** **near rivalry into a** beautiful **friendship**. But pretending to cooperate with Russia, as we have done for almost two decades, is not a responsible course in the current troubled world. Especially if the help we need from Moscow on America's national-security priorities is not make-believe, but real.

**No Middle East prolif in response to an Iranian bomb.**

**Yaphne, 05**

(PhD. Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, http://www.iranwatch.org/ourpubs/roundtables/rt-iranianbomb-090105.htm)

**Although an Iranian bomb would cause Iran’s** regional **rivals to consider whether to acquire nuclear weapons** themselves, **they are unlikely to do so. Iran’s neighbors would be forced to adjust their security policies to the new strategic landscape created by a nuclear-armed Iran**. These states would have to decide whether to develop an indigenous nuclear capability to deter Tehran, or to seek protection from the United States. Contrary to conventional wisdom**, the majority** of the panelists **did not find that Iran’s arsenal would prompt its neighbors to develop a matching capability; the so-called “domino theory,”** whereby proliferation begets proliferation, would probably not come to pass. One panelist believes that there is a better than even chance that at least one additional Middle East state will seek a nuclear capability in the near term. A key factor in reinforcing the non-nuclear pledges of many states will be the ability of the United States to bring them into its sphere of influence. **Countries** in the Middle East **that** now **enjoy friendly relations with the U**nited **S**tates **are likely to draw even closer if confronted with a nuclear-armed Iran.** **The smaller Gulf states**—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates—are **likely to be pushed closer to the U**nited **S**tates **whether they want to be or not. They have neither the** scientific **infrastructure nor the human capital to mount a viable program to produce or maintain nuclear weapon**s. Some, like Qatar and Kuwait, have already adopted the equivalent of the post-World War II “Japanese model,” by allowing U.S. troops to be stationed on their soil. Through a combination of additional military assistance and the guarantee of protection under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, the panelists found that **the U**nited **S**tates **is** very **likely to convince these states not to acquire a bomb.**

### China

**HTGR not inherently better for prolif- still carries risk because of high enrichment level**

Arjun **Makhijani** electrical and nuclear engineer who is President of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research and Michele Boyd, former director of the Safe Energy Program at Physicians for Social Responsibility. Previously, Michele was the legislative director of Public Citizen’s Energy Program **2012** [http://www.psr.org/nuclear-bailout/resources/small-modular-reactors-no.pdf-http://www.psr.org/nuclear-bailout/resources/small-modular-reactors-no.pdf](http://www.psr.org/nuclear-bailout/resources/small-modular-reactors-no.pdf-http%3A/www.psr.org/nuclear-bailout/resources/small-modular-reactors-no.pdf)

**The** Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (**PBMR**) is a¶ high-temperature gas-cooled reactor that uses¶ helium as the coolant and graphite as a moderator.¶ The fuel **consists of uranium** oxide or uranium¶ carbide, **enriched to considerably higher¶ levels than present light water reactors** (about¶ 9 percent or more). The kernels are coated with¶ silicon carbide and contained in billiard-ballsized¶ pyrolytic graphite “pebbles” (spheres).¶ Each pebble would contain about 12,000 tiny¶ fuel kernels or grains. The heat generated from¶ the chain reaction is carried away by an inert¶ cooling gas — generally proposed to be helium.¶ In principle, the fuel pebbles move slowly but¶ steadily through the reactor and are replaced¶ by new pebbles, enabling continuous operation.¶ Each pebble would be used up to ten times by¶ refeeding it into the reactor after some cooling.¶ **Gas temperatures are much higher than water¶ temperatures in light water reactors**; in theory,¶ this can lead to higher efficiency electricity¶ production and/or other applications, such as¶ hydrogen production. However, graphite catches fire in the presence¶ of air, which would rush into the reactor in¶ the event of a loss of coolant (helium) accident.¶ In such an event the graphite, which the¶ pebbles contain, would burn. Proponents claim¶ that the silicon carbide coating would resist fire;¶ however, the billions of grains of fuel must not¶ only be generally free of cracks at manufacture¶ but remain free for the entire time they are in¶ the reactor despite the generation of fission¶ product gases as the reactor operates. In this¶ context, **it is important to remember that the¶ burden of proving safety in the context of a loss¶ of coolant accident is quite heavy for a graphite-¶ moderated reactor**, since the worst powergeneration¶ reactor accidents by far have both¶ occurred in graphite-moderated reactors and¶ have been accompanied by graphite fires**. In¶ case a steam cycle is used for power generation,¶ it is essential to design the reactor so that¶ there is no possibility of water entering the core¶ in case of a loss of coolant accident**.15 Since the PBMR design is proposed to be¶ modular, the cost issues raised above for other¶ SMRs would also apply. Finally**, proliferation is¶ a greater concern than with light water reactors**,¶ since the **PBMR would use uranium at¶ higher enrichments than light water reactors or¶ use plutonium fuel.** **Use of thorium as a fertile¶ material is possible, but it would require plutonium¶ or enriched uranium to sustain the initial¶ chain reaction.** It also results in the production¶ of fissile uranium-233.16¶ **Disposal of graphite fuel in a geologic¶ repository would also present new challenges¶ since essentially all work on repository design¶ has been premised either on light water reactor¶ spent fuel** (consisting of uranium dioxide fuel¶ pellets) **or vitrified high level waste**.

#### Tons of other forums for cooperation

John R. Lyman, Atlantic Council, 2009, United States-China Cooperation on nuclear power, http://www.acus.org/files/publication\_pdfs/65/AtlanticCouncil-USChinaNuclearPower.pdf

¶ The U.S. and China signed a Bilateral Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperative Action Plan on September 15, 2007. DOE has similar agreements with Russia, Japan, Australia, and pending signature, France. The organizational structure of the U.S.-China Bilateral activity is shown in Figure 6.¶ This bilateral activity is up and running with a structure approved by both governments and a plan for future progress. The first meeting under the auspices of the U.S./China Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation Action Plan focused on advanced fuel cycle technologies, namely fast reactor technology, fuels and separations technologies, and advanced safeguards and physical protection This meeting was held at was held at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) in), Chicago, Illinois on April 23, 2008. Another meeting of the fuel cycle technology-working group is scheduled to take place the week of May 18th in Beijing, China. Assuming significant progress is made at the May working group, then a formal U.S./China, a Steering Committee meeting could take place either in the summer or fall of 2009. The purpose of this meeting would be to approve of the R&D plan developed in the May meeting, and thereby initiate Phase II of the Action Plan. While it is a somewhat formal process, DOE reports that it is working very well as all parties know what to expect and what the process will produce.¶ 3.4.2 International Cooperation Activities¶ The U.S. spearheaded the establishment of the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) in July 2001 with nine charter countries, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, France, Japan, South Korea, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. Switzerland joined in 2002, EURATOM in 2003, and China and Russia in 2006.¶ The GIF aims to introduce the Gen IV technologies on a wide scale by 2030. The broad program goals feature:¶ • Sustainability, promoted by increasing the availability of nuclear fuel and minimizing the waste stream;¶ • Safety and reliability, with a system that would have a low likelihood and degree of reactor core damage, and a facility that would not need offsite emergency response; Economical system, with life cycle cost advantages over other energy sources and an acceptable level of financial risk; and,¶ • Proliferation resistance, with little attractiveness as a route for weapons-useable materials and improved physical protection attributes to guard against potential terrorist acts.¶ Table 6 outlines the six major technologies currently being investigated by the GIF, a summary of their attributes, and the status of their development. Over 100 international experts participated in selecting these technologies.¶ A Framework Agreement, signed by the GIF partner governments, among other things, specifies R&D projects to be undertaken, assigns the responsible government entities responsible for work, affords intellectual property protection, and allows for multilateral contracts to be given for the R&D work. The focus is on R&D but demonstration plants could conceivably be built under the framework.¶ China is working on the VHTR projects in the areas of materials testing and components and high performance turbines. China’s fast reactor R&D program compliments the DOE’s AFCI activities, and those of the GIF, and will provide fertile ground for further cooperation.¶ The U.S. and China also participate in the U.S.-sponsored Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). This international collaboration between 25 countries14 focuses on how to foster the creation of civilian nuclear power programs in developing countries and to devise an international nuclear fuel supply framework. The GNEP Working Group, under the GNEP Steering Group, charged with developing “Reliable Fuel Services” met in France in March 2009. According to a statement by DOE deputy press secretary Jen Stutsman to Nuclear Engineering, “The Department [DOE] has already decided not to continue the domestic GNEP program of the last Administration. The long-term fuel cycle research and development program will continue, but not the near-term deployment of recycling facilities or fast reactors.”15 DOE’s fuel cycle research and development program will continue under the name “Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative” (AFCI).¶ Both the U.S. and China participate in the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO), which was established in 2001 by the IAEA General Conference. Its objectives are to ensure that nuclear energy is available to contribute, in a sustainable manner, to meeting the energy needs of the 21st century and bring together technology holders and users so that they can consider jointly the international and national actions required for achieving desired innovations in nuclear reactors and fuel cycles. It is basically a forum for discussion for experts and policy makers from industrialized and developing countries on all aspects of nuclear energy planning as well as on the development and deployment of innovative nuclear energy systems.¶ In March 2009 China joined the Global Actinide Cycle International Demonstration (GACID)16 which was formed by France, Japan, South Korea and the U.S. This project, a major GIF activity, is investigating the use of actinide-laden fuel assemblies in fast reactors as part of the sodium- cooled fast reactor program. The work is being undertaken by France’s Atomic Energy Commission, Japan’s Atomic Energy Agency, and the U.S. DOE. The first stage will lead to demonstration fuel containing minor actinides being used in Japan’s Monju reactor.

#### Turn: Tritium Production—a) HTGRs produce tritium, this blurs the line between civilian and military nuclear power

Solomon 92

[Kenneth, RAND report, “Generating Tritium Using Civilian Reactors: A Preliminary Evaluation of Alternative Concepts”, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/2009/N3203-1.pdf>, mg]

General Atomics (LaJolla, CA) has conceived of an HTGR design for generating tritium. This design would also allow steam to be produced to run a turbine and generate electricity. The other civilian-derived concepts would likely be dedicated to pure production. And, as such, separating the civilian energy-producing task from the military, tritium-producing task may offer a specific challenge for the HTGR specifically.

#### b) this crushes US nuclear leadership and fuels terrorism, turns case

GLOBAL SECURITY NEWSWIRE 2/5/10 (http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw\_20100205\_9220.php, MG)

Producing tritium at the second site could raise the threat of terrorism in the region, one opponent of the move contended. "There's simply no need to turn the Sequoyah nuclear power plant into a nuclear weapons plant. If they do that, it becomes much more of a target for terrorists wishing to strike out at the United States," said Ralph Hutchison, coordinator for the Oak Ridge Environmental Peace Alliance. President Barack Obama "came into office with the idea that the days of doing what we say, not what we do, were over and America was going to lead by example," added Arjun Makhijani, head of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research. "In this arena, I think it's especially important that we stop making tritium as Watts Bar, not expand where we are making tritium to another plant."

# 2NC

## States

### A2: Do Both

#### 1 Links to Politics- Federal action requires Obama push and blame, state action doesn’t.

#### 2. Perm links more- Energy lobbies will lobby Congress to not preempt compacts

Every Vote Equal ’11

Every Vote Equal is a policy book advocating for a compact to create a national popular vote for President with chapters on the history of interstate compacts and written by 15 judges and U.S. Representatives, “Background on Interstate Compacts,” <http://www.every-vote-equal.com/pdf/EVECh5new_web.pdf>

Economic interest groups often encourage the establishment of regulatory compacts. Such groups typically lobby Congress not to exercise¶ its preemption powers in a particular area by arguing that coordinated¶ action by the states, by means of an interstate compact, is sufficient to¶ solve a problem.¶

#### 5 50 states act together all the time

Mountjoy ‘01

John is a policy analyst with the council of State Governments, “Interstate Compacts Make a Comeback,” Spring <http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/ncic/Comeback.pdf>

Interstate compacts are contracts between states that carry the force and effect of statutory law. ¶ They are a tool for state governments to address regional or national policy concerns. Compacts ¶ are not a solution per se, but rather they allow a state to enter into a contract with other states to ¶ perform a certain action, observe a certain standard or to cooperate in a critical policy area. ¶ The law and use of interstate compacts is not particularly complex. Like any contract, the ¶ language of a compact needs to be identical in intent and context, if not identical in exact ¶ verbiage between the states. ¶ Although typically overlooked as a state policy option, more than 200 interstate compacts exist ¶ today. Whether large or small, compacts play a role in everyday state relations and activities. ¶ Most interstate compacts cover rudimentary functions, such as regulating boundaries and water ¶ rights, and have less then 15 signatories. For example, the Waterfront Commission Compact ¶ between New Jersey and New York regulates the practices in handling waterfront cargo in the ¶ Port of New York. ¶ Several interstate compacts have 50-state membership, or close to it, and are managed by ¶ administrative or regulatory agencies. The American Association of Motor Vehicle ¶ Administrators oversees the Drivers’ License Compact, which facilitates recognition of drivers’ ¶ licenses issued in other states. The Interstate Compact for Education, administered by the ¶ Education Commission of the States, maintains close cooperation among executive, legislative, ¶ professional and educational leadership on a nationwide basis at the state and local levels.¶

### A2: International Signal

**State governments are representative of the USFG**

Nick **Robinson**, Yale Law School, J.D, Currently Fox Fellow at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, **2007** Akron Law Review “Citizens Not Subjects: U.S. Foreign Relations Law and the Decentralization of Foreign Policy” Lexis

**State** and local **governments are** arguably **seen as representing the U.S.** government **abroad in a more official capacity** than U.S. non-state actors. The **governments of these localities are democratically elected and so it is more likely that they will be seen as acting on behalf of the American people.** Additionally, the federal government generally has a greater ability to control the actions of these localities than non-state actors. Therefore, **there is a greater chance that nonintervention by the federal government to stop offensive activity will be seen as federal endorsement of such activity**. Such logic though should caution against court intervention in these cases rather than encourage it. If localities' actions damage U.S. foreign policy interests, the federal government can easily preempt the state or local policies in question. Further, with the world's increased interconnectedness, it is more likely that if a foreign government takes offense to a locality's policy it can discriminate between the policy of the locality and the policy of the federal government. n155

#### State action spills up, especially in energy policy

Larsen et al 7

Larsen et al, expert on Federal climate and energy policy World Resources Institute, 7¶ (John, Andrew Aulisi, Jonathan Pershing, Paul Posner, “Climate Policy in the State Laboratory: How States Influence Federal Regulation and the Implications for U.S. Policy,” World Resources Institute, September, http://pdf.wri.org/climate\_policy\_in\_the\_state\_laboratory.pdf,

The second most important factor emerging from this ¶ analysis was policy learning. It appeared as a signiﬁ cant ¶ factor in seven of eleven cases, as a somewhat signiﬁ cant ¶ factor in the remaining four, and was strong in both environment/energy and nonenvironment/energy cases. State ¶ policies often demonstrated that a policy could both be ¶ implemented and be effective, thereby carrying the power ¶ of example. For instance, organic farming standards were ¶ developed in the absence of any federal action and over ¶ time provided a powerful example of how best to establish ¶ such standards at the federal level. State gun control laws ¶ also proved that within their respective state boundaries, ¶ provisions like waiting periods and background checks ¶ not only were feasible but actually prevented thousands of ¶ illegal gun sales. But as we note later in our discussion of ¶ state policies that failed to diffuse, the existence of policies ¶ at the state level, even if broadly adopted, does not necessarily guarantee their adoption by the federal government ¶ without a compelling need for federal action

### AT Uncertainty

#### Uncertainty inevitable – companies can cope

Anderson 9-12

Anderson, AOL Energy, 9-12-12¶ (Jared, “The Flawed US Energy Policy Discussion,” http://energy.aol.com/2012/09/12/the-flawed-us-energy-policy-discussion

If it takes as much as 30 years to explore, discover, evaluate, produce, refine and transport oil or natural gas from a reservoir to a market in a profitable manner, that means more than seven presidential administration and 15 congressional reshuffles will occur during the project's lifetime. The likelihood that the regulatory landscape at the project's outset will resemble anything like the political topography at project completion is virtually nil.¶ Nevertheless, companies understand this is a fact of life when doing business in the US – which is a great place to operate, given a well-established rule of law, a strong resource base, liquid markets, access to capital, etc. – and have found ways to deal with the political and regulatory uncertainty for well over 100 years.

### A2: Investor Signal

#### State policies are a better signal for investors

Sinclair, 10

(JD-Cornell & Executive Director of Clean Energy States Alliance, “Federal Climate and Energy Legislation and the States: Legislative Principles

and Recommendations for a New Clean Energy Federalism,” April http://www.cleanegroup.org/assets/Uploads/2011-Files/Reports/CEGCleanEnergyFederalismv3April2010.pdf)

1. States should and will remain the laboratories of experimentation and innovation on technology and economic development because **most energy investment decisions are made at the state and/or local utility and customer level**. 2. State and local clean energy development decisions are **made closer to the markets, are often more politically durable and stable over time, and should be encouraged**. 3. There is no simple, standard or optimal clean energy program design and practice that will achieve carbon stabilization; instead, all states and local jurisdictions should be given adequate federal resources and assistance to create and implement a diverse portfolio of finance, technology, and policy tools to create the necessary fifty state programs to advance a clean energy future. 4. There are many existing, experienced and “best practice” state-based, clean energy institutions that deserve continued and expanded support for their decade-long successes in these areas. 5. States can develop **more nuanced and effective finance mechanisms that can leverage private sector development because they know their markets, their market players and their barriers to success**.¶ 6. Bottom-up, distributed solutions that the states can provide have always proved the most responsive and nimble solutions that best respect the ever changing demands of locally regulated state energy investment decisions, which are the hallmark of the US energy sector. 7. States should be given express authority to enact climate and clean energy policy and laws that are more stringent and aggressive than the federal programs. Specific legislative principles and concepts should inform all recommendations regarding the role of states in future national climate and energy legislation. These overarching principles and concepts frame how the specific proposals made here should be envisioned and realized, and they address the core elements of this report: allowance funding for states, new state-based financing programs, and encouraging disruptive climate technology innovation. State Allowance Funding¶ For allowance funding to the states, Congress should: 1. Rely on the expertise of the existing state programs and agencies that have deployed clean energy over the last decade with tremendous success. 2. Defer to state expertise in the allocation or investment of allowance funding at the state level. 3. Provide states with significant flexibility and specific incentives to employ a broad portfolio of financing tools and strategies to accelerate clean energy deployment to reflect each state’s political and resource context. 4. Call on every state to seek out and develop, wherever possible, opportunities to leverage their emissions allocation-derived funding with associated private capital to the greatest extent possible. 5. Encourage coordination among states to follow best practices and develop effective, program investments based on the storehouse of experience that state clean energy programs offer. 6. Encourage states to use allowance funding to partner and pursue joint multistate clean energy projects and programs to reduce administrative costs and ensure coordinated technology commercialization activities across states and regions.

#### Viewed as more certain and predictable than the fed

Milford, 12

(President-Clean Energy Group, “Clean-Energy Finance to Beat Beltway Blues,” http://www.cleanegroup.org/blog/clean-energy-finance-to-beat-beltway-blues/)

As the country looks for new sources of clean energy finance while Congress remains paralyzed, we might have missed the most obvious funders that have been right under our noses for years. They are the public infrastructure finance agencies all over America that know how to raise capital at the scale needed in this sector. In turn, Congress and the Administration should look to new policies to support this emerging, state-based infrastructure financing trend.

Hundreds of billions of dollars are needed scale up renewable energy, energy efficiency and clean energy manufacturing support. To fill this gap, some are looking to the states, regions and localities, a return to federalism as an investment strategy. Federal gridlock reminds us again that **states have been the clean energy innovators**. State funds have raised and leveraged over $12 billion in clean energy investment in the last decade. And clean energy policy at the state level has been done on a relatively bipartisan basis, unlike in Washington. In this search for new forms of clean energy finance, a large group of state and local finance partners has been overlooked – the public authorities and other entities that do tax-exempt and taxable bond financing – a $3 trillion industry that has financed our nation’s infrastructure and public improvements, from bridges to hospitals to university expansion. In the U.S. over 50,000 state and local agencies help finance economic and community development. To date, these agencies have not been that active in clean energy, with the exception of a few projects; but they now want to aggressively move into clean energy financing. As to the capital they can raise, municipal bond issuers in March 2012 alone brought 1,196 deals to market worth $34.50 billion. That makes $78.3 billion in 2,927 deals in only the first three months of 2012. Let’s compare this scale to the possible declining federal support. Tax equity revenue generated for wind through the uncertain production tax credit was about $3.5 billion in 2011, while federal support for solar through various subsidies was about $2.5 billion. These amounts are what municipal bond authorities finance every few days, every week of the year, all across the country.¶ Now, these bonding instruments are not exact replacements for tax equity investment, but they could usher in new forms of finance strategies. These tools have the **potential to enlist major capital players such as institutional investors** and pension funds that look for **longer term, more predictable returns** from infrastructure bonds—creating a new investment profile for clean energy with **investors that finance at scale.** So far, there are some interesting emerging examples of bond financing in this space. In New Jersey, bond financing is being used to scale up solar installations though traditional public authority activity, now almost $200 million in investment. There are other models in energy efficiency finance and in other sectors that can be scaled up and replicated across the country.Oddly enough, until now no one has ever approached these public infrastructure finance agencies to work on clean energy in any systematic way across clean energy markets. Some good news is that the membership organization of these authorities, the Council of Development Finance Agencies or CDFA, has entered into a partnership with Clean Energy Group and state clean energy funds to begin to explore use of bonding tools to finance clean energy.¶So we have a **unique financing situation for clean energy**. To grow a robust clean energy economy, we have a new group of financial players who know how to raise hundreds of billions of dollars for infrastructure investment. They are motivated to make significant new investments in clean energy using existing bond instruments. They have begun to make small moves into the clean energy space, with a handful of investments. They are interested in becoming major players. While the deadlock in Washington and the **uncertainty over federal support is** unwelcome, it need **not mean a death knell for** the clean **energy** industry. Instead, we have an opportunity to return to our federalist roots and look for our states, regions and local bonding agencies to begin to finance clean energy in the same way we scaled up the infrastructure that made America what it is today. At the same time, there are many ways for the Administration to help, from clarifying various tax exempt rules to favor clean energy bonds to considering other support mechanisms that put the states in the financing lead. Congress too has a role to play to create a more bottom up, federalist financing strategy for clean energy. At the very least, this new state-based policy conversation around infrastructure finance should begin now, to begin to shape a new clean energy investment strategy that does not rely so much on the whims of Washington.

## Elections

**Romney Kills Relations**

**Romney will destroy US-Russian relations – hardline & won’t compromise**

**Larison 6-27**

Columnist for the American Conservative [Daniel Larison “U.S.-Russian Relations Would Get Much Worse Under Romney” <http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/u-s-russian-relations-would-get-much-worse-under-romney/>]

**Putin doesn’t** actually **want a “hard-line conservative in the White House.” Putin distrusts the U.S.** **because he believes** that the **Bush** administration **behaved in an ungrateful and untrustworthy fashion** in the previous decade, **and U.S.-Russian relations improved** as much as they did **because the current administration seemed to be more reliable**. U.S.-Russian **relations reached their lowest poin**t in the last twenty years in no small part **because of a “more active U.S. policy**” toward the Middle East, the South Caucasus, and central Europe. Putin might be willing to deal with a more hard-line American President, but only so long as it this translated into tangible gains for Russia. Provided that the hard-liner was willing to live up to his end of the bargain, there could be some room for agreement, but there isn’t any. Since **Romney’s Russia policy is essentially to never make any deals with the current Russian government, Putin doesn’t have much of an incentive to cooperate. That will guarantee that U.S.-Russian relations will deteriorate much more than they have in the last year.**

**2NC Kills Relations**

**2 Russian perception of Romney**

**LA Times 7-2**

“Russian Official: Romney’s Hardline Could Bring “full-scale crisis,” <http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/02/news/la-pn-russian-official-romneys-hard-line-could-bring-fullscale-crisis-20120702>

**Mitt Romney’s comment that Russia is America’s “No. 1 geopolitical foe,**” a red-meat line for Republicans, **is** also **attracting some attention in Moscow**.¶ Alexey **Pushkov, chairman of the international affairs committee of the** State **Duma, said** in a recent interview that **Russian leaders have noted Romney’s comments with concern,** and are watching with interest as neoconservative and “realist” advisers maneuver for influence within the campaign.¶ “We don’t think that for us Romney will be an easy partner,” said Pushkov, an ally of President Vladimir Putin. “**We think that Romney will be**, on the rhetorical side, **a replay of** the **Bush** administration.”¶ David Horsey - Top of the Ticket cartoons¶ He also noted Romney’s statements that the United States should assert its dominance in the 21st century.¶ “If he is serious about this, I’m afraid he may choose the neocon-type people…**In the first year of his presidency, we may have a full-scale crisis,**” he said.¶ Romney, in an interview with CNN in March, called Russia "without question our No. 1 geopolitical foe, they fight for every cause for the world's worst actors. The idea that [Obama] has more flexibility in mind for Russia is very, very troubling indeed."¶ Pushkov said Russian leaders have noticed that Romney has among his foreign policy advisers several foreign policy figures often described as neoconservatives, such as Robert Kagan. “We don’t find it very positive,” he said.¶ Pushkov said that the “reset” in U.S.-Russia relations that Obama has portrayed as a signature foreign policy accomplishment “is stuck, basically. It needs another reset.”¶ Nevertheless, **though the U.S. and Russia are at odds on issues such as Syria and missile defense, Obama would be “acceptable” as a partner for Russia in a second term, Pushkov said.**

**3. Statements and overconfidence in his negotiating skills kill relations**

**NYT 5-11**

“Romney’s Adversial Role of Russia Stirs Debate,” <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/12/us/politics/romneys-view-of-russia-sparks-debate.html?pagewanted=1>

Mitt **Romney’s recent declaration that Russia is America’s top geopolitical adversary drew raised eyebrows** and worse from many Democrats, **some Republicans and the Russians themselves,** **all of whom suggested** that Mr. **Romney was misguidedly stuck in a cold war mind-set**.¶ Related¶ The Caucus: Romney to Avoid Same-Sex Marriage in Commencement Speech, Aides Say (May 11, 2012)¶ Obama Returns to Topic of Economic Recovery (May 12, 2012)¶ The Saturday Profile: A Russian Protest Leader Takes Center Stage (May 12, 2012)¶ Related in Opinion¶ News Analysis: Is There a Romney Doctrine? (May 13, 2012)¶ The Election 2012 App¶ A one-stop destination for the latest political news — from The Times and other top sources. Plus opinion, polls, campaign data and video.¶ Download for iPhone¶ Download for Android¶ Enlarge This Image¶ ¶ Ozier Muhammad/The New York Times¶ Mitt Romney signed posters at a campaign event on Friday in Charlotte, N.C.¶ Readers’ Comments¶ Readers shared their thoughts on this article.¶ Read All Comments (134) »¶ But his statement was not off the cuff — and it was not the first time Mr. Romney had stirred debate over his hawkish views on Russia. **Interviews with Republican foreign policy experts** close to his campaign **and his writings** on the subject show that his stance toward Russia reflects a broader foreign policy view that gives great weight to economic power and control of natural resources. It also **exhibits Mr. Romney’s confidence that his private-sector experience would make him a better negotiator on national security issues than** President **Obama** has been.¶ Mr. Romney’s views on Russia have set off disagreements among some of his foreign policy advisers. They put him in sync with the more conservative members of his party in Congress, who have similarly criticized Mr. Obama as being too accommodating to Russia, and generally reflect the posture of some neoconservatives.¶ But they have frequently put him at odds with members of the Republican foreign policy establishment, like Senator Richard G. Lugar of Indiana, who was defeated in a primary this week, and the party’s shrinking band of foreign policy “realists” — those who advocate a less ideological and more pragmatic view of relations with rival powers.¶ The Romney campaign has been critical of Mr. Obama’s record and positions on a variety of national security issues, including containing Iran’s nuclear ambitions and confronting China’s rise. But many of the positions taken by Mr. Romney, the presumptive Republican presidential nominee, have either been vague or not fundamentally different from those of the administration.¶ Russia, however, is an exception, one where Mr. Romney, the former Massachusetts governor, has carved out a clear contrast to Mr. Obama, who came to office promising to “reset” relations with Moscow, only to find that Russia can be a difficult partner. Just this week, President Vladimir V. Putin abruptly canceled his plans to visit the United States next week for the Group of 8 summit meeting and for talks with Mr. Obama at Camp David.¶ Mr. **Romney was a leading** **opponent of the most recent arms-reduction treaty with Russia**, ratified by the Senate and signed last year by Mr. Obama. Russia figures prominently in Mr. Romney’s book, where he calls it one of four competitors for world leadership, along with the United States, China and “violent jihadism” embraced by Iran and terrorist groups.¶ Some advisers close to Mr. Romney, who declined to be quoted or identified by name, say **Russia is a good illustration of his belief that national security threats are closely tied to economic power — in this case stemming from Russia’s oil and gas reserves**, which it has used to muscle European countries dependent on energy imports. ¶ **They also cite his tendency to view foreign policy conflicts as zero-sum negotiations**. Mr. Romney, an accomplished deal-maker at Bain Capital, views his negotiating skills as an advantage he holds over Mr. Obama.¶ Mr. Romney signaled his stance toward Russia two years ago, when he argued that the New Start missile treaty with Russia should be rejected, putting him at odds with a long line of former Republican secretaries of state and defense. A number of arms control specialists said they were startled by some of Mr. Romney’s assertions, like fretting about intercontinental ballistic missiles mounted on bombers. ¶ “It would be really fun to watch a Russian bomber with an SS-25 strung to its stomach try to take off,” said Steve Pifer, a former American ambassador to Ukraine and now director of the Arms Control Initiative at the Brookings Institution. “Some of the arguments just left people scratching their heads.”¶ Within hours, rebuttal pieces to Mr. Romney’s position, laid out in an op-ed article in The Washington Post, were being circulated among arms control experts. Mr. Lugar, who had spent decades working on arms control issues, publicly disparaged some of Mr. Romney’s arguments as “discredited objections.”¶ Mr. Romney felt the missile treaty was a bad deal partly because it would impede American defenses by preventing ballistic missile silos from being converted to missile defense sites, while treaty supporters said that was not an issue because American officials prefer to build missile defense installations from the ground up.

### A2: Polls Rigged to Look like 2008

#### Polls aren’t based off of Party ID and Obama’s winning

Cohn 9-26

Nate covers Politics for the New Republic, “No, the Polls aren’t Rigged to Look Like 2008,” <http://www.tnr.com/blog/electionate/107778/the-polls-dont-use-2008-turnout-model>

Campaign 2012 has reached the stage where partisans have moved from attacking their opponents to attacking the polls. And while there's been criticism from all sides, the current state of the polls explains why the most vociferous denunciations are coming from the right. One dismayed conservative has even set up a website, unskewedpolls.com, where poll results are re-calibrated in ways that supposedly strips them of their bias.¶ One common complaint in the current conservative fusillade is that many 2012 polls are using the “2008 turnout model.” Karl Rove, for instance, alleges that the pollsters are weighting their surveys to reflect the partisan and racial composition of the 2008 electorate–when Democrats outnumbered their Republican counterparts by 7 points on election day. Conservative critics think the GOP's enthusiasm to oust President Obama means that differential will be a lot smaller this year. That might be valid, but the implication that polls are rigged to reflect the 2008 electorate is outright misleading: most of this year's polls don’t use “the 2008 turnout model.”¶ In fact, the “2008 turnout model” critique is so far off base that responding to it simply entails explaining how polls work.¶ Most pollsters don’t weight their polls to match a preconceived electorate. Instead, they take a demographically representative sample based on actual figures from the US census and then let respondents speak for themselves about whether they’re voting for Obama or Romney. For illustrative purposes, consider the Bloomberg/Selzer poll. They started by taking a sample of all American adults, weighted to match the demographics of all adults in the US census, like, race, education, and marital status. To produce a likely voter sample, they then would have excluded adults who weren’t registered to vote and then asked a series of questions to help determine who was likely to vote.¶ Ultimately, Selzer’s sample found Obama leading by 6 points, by 49-43. Whatever you think of the outcome, it wasn’t the result of Selzer imposing her assumptions upon the sample; she let her sample speak for itself. Did she take a good sample? We’ll find out on Election Day. But if she’s wrong, it won’t be because she used the “2008 turnout model.” In fact, this particular poll had a relatively innocuous Democratic advantage of 6 or 2 points among likely voters, depending on whether you include leaners. But even if Selzer had shown something “crazy” like R+5 for D+15, remember that the party-ID of the sample wouldn’t have been determined by Selzer’s premonitions.¶ This isn't to say that the 2008 election doesn't factor into the polls at all. Some likely-voter models use past voter participation to help determine whether someone will vote in 2012. These polls might, conceivably, under-represent the number Obama '08-Couch '12 voters.¶ To be sure, there actually are some polls that might use something like a “turnout model.” For the most part, these are cheap, automated surveys. Why? Many of them terminate interviews early, sometimes as early as learning that a voter doesn’t intend to vote. That makes interviews cheaper, but it prevents them from weighting their sample to figures in the U.S. Census. But at any rate, this type of poll doesn’t include the top, live-interview pollsters—it's second-tier stuff, like Gravis Marketing, who actually says that its poll is weighted to the “anticipated voting proportions for the 2012 General Election.” Unfortunately, the poll-bashers haven't made that distinction when publicly insisting that the results are skewed by bias.¶ We don’t need pollsters to tell us that Obama would lose if the electorate looks like 2010, nor do we need them to tell us that Obama would win if the electorate looked like 2008. What we need—and what we have—are pollsters with methods that allow us to get a decent grasp on what's going to happen on Election Day. Pollsters are not sooth-sayers who correctly guess the composition of the electorate every four years; they take demographically representative samples of adults and let the sample speak for itself. That’s how polls using the same methodology managed to show Bush winning in 2004, Obama winning big in 2008, and a GOP takeover in 2010. It’s how Ann Selzer managed to show Obama winning the Iowa Caucus’ in 2008, even though there wasn’t any comparable Caucus to mirror as a “turnout model.” None was necessary.

### A2: Party ID in Polls/ “Skewed”

#### Party ID in Polls is correct- Independents and even if wrong not enough for Romney

Hopkins 9-26

Dan is Professor of Political Science at Georgetown, “Polling Biases and Their Potential Impacts,” <http://themonkeycage.org/blog/2012/09/26/polling-biases-and-their-potential-impacts/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+themonkeycagefeed+%28The+Monkey+Cage%29>

Over at the Weekly Standard, Jay Cost argues for caution in viewing recent polling of the Presidential race. Polls of swing states like Ohio and Florida are projecting an electorate that looks more like the 2008 electorate than the 2004 electorate in terms of its partisanship, he notes. In fact, some polls have an electorate that is more Democratic than that in the ‘08 exit polls. In contrast to recent electoral history, contemporary surveys suggest that Republican partisans are defecting at slightly higher rates than are Democratic partisans. What’s more, independents appear to be quite evenly divided between Governor Romney and President Obama, an observation which seems incompatible with the sizable lead several polls now show for President Obama.¶ On the question of independents, John has written plenty about the problem of covert partisans—that is, that most independents act like partisans of one party or the other. But one thing that has been less remarked upon is that the use of the “independent” label appears to have shifted somewhat in recent years, a fact which has implications for using independents as a bellwether. Using 7-category partisan identification data from the most recent NBC/Wall Street Journal poll, which identifies covert partisans in a follow-up question, we can estimate that 24% of Democratic identifiers or leaners call themselves “independent” at first. On the Republican side, the figure is 32%. Nowadays, more of the voters we think of as reliable Republicans are at first calling themselves “independent”—and are classified as such by any poll that doesn’t ask the follow-up question. And if we look back to the same survey’s data in September 2004, we see some noteworthy differences. At that time, leaners made up 30% of those who were willing to term themselves “Democrats” in some form, while they made up just 26% of those who termed themselves “Republicans.” So eight years ago, the situation was reversed, with Democrats a bit more likely to use the “independent” label at first. My point: independents are a moving target.¶ Despite declining response rates, live-interviewer telephone surveys have generally proven accurate in recent years. But it seems to be just a matter of time before we have another Literary Digest moment on a grand scale, and all of the challenges in contemporary telephone polling lead us to systematically misunderstand a Presidential race. So it’s important to ask: what happens to our Presidential forecasts if Cost is right and if the polls are systematically over-estimating support for Obama, just as the 2004 exit polls overstated support for Senator Kerry? Emory political scientist Drew Linzer takes on that question in a new post at Votamatic, a site which shows the results of his 2012 election projections. His projections are drawn from a statistical model that combines polling data with a forecasting model. The site is a must-read from those who want to follow the state of the 2012 race, although don’t expect to see sharp day-to-day swings. One central feature of Linzer’s forecasts has been their stability.¶ Linzer’s post considers a number of scenarios, including the possibility that Cost and others have suggested: a systematic pro-Obama lean in the polls. If that pro-Obama bias is 1 percentage point, if we assume that states swing together, and if we add a good deal of volatility to the forecasting model, Governor Romney wins the electoral college in 20% of simulations. At a bias of 2 percentage points, that chance improves to 37%. Put differently, according to Linzer’s model, it would take a substantial polling bias alongside a nationwide, pro-Romney shift in the campaign to make the Governor the favorite.

### RCP Average

#### Obama Winning- RCP Average

RealClearPolitics 9-21

“General Election: Romney v Obama,” <http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2012/president/us/general_election_romney_vs_obama-1171.html>

General Election: Romney vs. Obama

RCP Electoral Map | Changes in Electoral Count | Map With No Toss Ups | No Toss Up Changes

Polling Data

Poll Date Sample MoE Obama (D) Romney (R) Spread

RCP Average 9/11 - 9/20 -- -- 48.6 44.7 Obama +3.9

Rasmussen Tracking 9/18 - 9/20 1500 LV 3.0 46 45 Obama +1

National Journal 9/15 - 9/19 1055 LV 3.0 50 43 Obama +7

Gallup Tracking 9/14 - 9/20 3050 RV 2.0 47 47 Tie

Associated Press/GfK 9/13 - 9/17 807 LV 4.3 47 46 Obama +1

Reason-Rupe 9/13 - 9/17 787 LV 4.3 52 45 Obama +7

Hartford Courant/UConn 9/11 - 9/18 1186 LV 3.0 46 43 Obama +3

Monmouth/SurveyUSA/Braun 9/13 - 9/16 1344 LV 2.7 48 45 Obama +3

Pew Research 9/12 - 9/16 2268 LV 2.4 51 43 Obama +8

NBC News/Wall St. Jrnl 9/12 - 9/16 736 LV 3.6 50 45 Obama +5

#### RCP average best- average & good polls

Kornacki 9-10

Steve is a political commentator for Salon and Host on MSNBC, “Barack Obama is Winning,” <http://www.salon.com/2012/09/10/barack_obama_is_winning/>

It’s true that Obama’s lead in the RCP average isn’t, and hasn’t been, overwhelming. But it’s important to distinguish the RCP average from one-off polls, which can show fluky results and are best taken with a grain of salt because of the margin of error. An average like RCP’s takes every available and credible poll into account and eliminates the misleading noise that an individual poll can generate. For a candidate to enjoy a consistent lead of several points in a polling average is very, very significant.

### Silver

#### Romney will win- Silver model

Silver 10-5

Nate is a statistician and edits the New York Times’ election blog, “Obama Convention Bounce May not be Receding,” <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/21/sept-20-obamas-convention-bounce-may-not-be-receding/>

Presidential November 6 Forecast- Obama 317.7. Electoral Votes Barack Obama 84.9% chance of winning. Romney 220.3. Mitt Romney 15.1% chance of winning.

### A2: Quinnipiac

#### Obama wins- Job Approval

Trende 9-19

Sean is the Senior Election Analyst at RealClearPolitics, “State of the Race, Part 1: Why Obama Wins,” <http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2012/09/19/state_of_the_race_part_1_why_obama_wins_115499.html>

With the convention season finally behind us, it is good to stop and take stock of where we stand. This is the first of three parts analyzing of the current state of the presidential race. It begins with an examination of arguments that Obama will win. Tomorrow I will make the case that Romney will win. On Friday, I'll present some closing thoughts.¶ Overall, I see Obama as a slight favorite. Most analysts seem to think that assessment is, if anything, too bearish for the president. That makes this article a little easier to write than tomorrow’s. A good starting place is probably this piece, which I wrote back in January: "Gingrich and Romney Are 'Unelectable'? So Is Obama."¶ Its premise was pretty straightforward: Obama’s fundamentals were so weak that he faced an almost impossible task; at the same time, Romney and Gingrich were such terrible candidates that he just might make it happen.¶ So why have things changed, and why have they changed in Obama’s direction? Let’s go through the factors I examined back then. Remember, I’m writing the “Romney wins” piece tomorrow, so there will be pushback on most of these at that time:¶ 1) Job approval. I wrote that “presidents rarely win many votes of those who disapprove of their performance in office. In other words, Obama probably needs to be pretty close to 50 percent approval on Election Day to secure re-election.” At the time, the president’s job approval was 46.8 percent.¶ Today, the president’s job approval stands at 49.2 percent. If this is true on Election Day, he’ll have a good chance of winning.¶ To be sure, we’re on the tail end of a convention bounce, and six of the nine polls in the RCP Average include some data from the weekend immediately following the Democratic convention -- the height of the bounce. So the tendency will probably be for this to come back to Earth some.¶ But there’s no denying that the president’s job approval has recovered since January overall. That month, he averaged 45.9 percent in the polls. In August, before the Democratic convention, that average was still 48.6 percent. Even if his bounce recedes to that level, he’d still be in pretty good position on Election Day.

### A2: SMR Funding Now

#### Obama has backed off SMR’s and dispersing funding

E&E News 9-24

“DOE Funding for Small Reactors Languishes as Parties Clash on Debt,” <http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2012/09/24/3>

Some of the nation's largest nuclear power companies are anxious to hear whether they will get a share of a $452 million pot from the Department of Energy for a new breed of reactors that the industry has labeled as a way to lessen the safety risks and construction costs of new nuclear power plants.¶ The grant program for these "small modular reactors," which was announced in January, would mark the official start of a major U.S. foray into the technology even as rising construction costs -- especially when compared to natural-gas-burning plants -- cause many power companies to shy away from nuclear plants.¶ DOE received four bids before the May 21 deadline from veteran reactor designers Westinghouse Electric Co. and Babcock & Wilcox Co., as well as relative newcomers Holtec International Inc. and NuScale Power LLC. Now the summer has ended with no announcement from DOE, even though the agency said it would name the winners two months ago.¶ As the self-imposed deadline passed, companies started hearing murmurs that a decision could come in September, or perhaps at the end of the year. To observers within the industry, it seems that election-year calculations may have sidelined the contest.¶ "The rumors are a'flying," said Paul Genoa, director of policy development at the Nuclear Energy Institute, in an interview last week. "All we can imagine is that this is now caught up in politics, and the campaign has to decide whether these things are good for them to announce, and how."¶ Small modular reactors do not seem to be lacking in political support. The nuclear lobby has historically courted both Democrats and Republicans and still sees itself as being in a strong position with key appropriators on both sides of the aisle.¶ Likewise, top energy officials in the Obama administration have hailed the promise of the new reactors, and they haven't shown any signs of a change of heart. DOE spokeswoman Jen Stutsman said last week that the department is still reviewing applications, but she did not say when a decision will be made.¶ "This is an important multiyear research and development effort, and we want to make sure we take the time during the review process to get the decision right," she wrote in an email.¶ That the grants haven't been given out during a taut campaign season, even as President Obama announces agency actions ranging from trade cases to creating new national monuments to make the case for his re-election, may be a sign that the reactors are ensnared in a broader feud over energy spending.¶ Grant recipients would develop reactor designs with an eye toward eventually turning those into pilot projects -- and the loan guarantees that these first-of-a-kind nuclear plants are using today to get financing would be blocked under the "No More Solyndras" bill that passed the House last week (Greenwire, Sept. 14).

#### Obama nuclear allocations empirically never approved AND he’s cutting them anyway

Bendery, 12

Huffington Post reporter, covered the White House and Congressional leadership for three years at Roll Call

(Jennifer, "Obama's Budget Nixes New Money For Program That Funded Solyndra," Huffington Post, 2-14-12, www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/14/obama-budget-solyndra-program\_n\_1276605.html, accessed 9-13-12,)

In a quiet shift from the past two years, President Barack Obama's 2013 budget includes **no new money** for the Department of Energy loan guarantee program, the same program that House Republicans have scrutinized for losing more than $500 million in taxpayer dollars to the now-defunct solar power company, Solyndra. Obama has regularly included huge increases to the program's loan guarantee authority in his budget, though Congress has not approved his proposals. He provided a $36 billion increase for nuclear reactors in his 2011 budget, and again in his 2012 budget. He also included $200 million in credit subsidies for renewable and energy efficiency projects in his 2012 budget. This year, he provided **nothing**. Meg Reilly, a spokeswoman for the Office of Management and Budget, said in an email that Obama opted not to put new money toward the loan guarantee program this time because the administration is waiting on the results of an evaluation of the Energy Department's loan portfolio. Reilly also said the program still has "a significant amount of remaining resources" from prior years and that the focus will be on putting those funds to use. There's about $10 billion in its reserves. The Energy Department "continues to conduct due diligence and is in active negotiations with a number of additional project sponsors," Reilly said. "It's important to point out here that, as of January 2012, over $24 billion in direct loans and loan guarantees have closed to support a diverse range of over 30 wind, solar, electric vehicles and other clean energy projects projected to fund more than 50,000 jobs." But some environmental groups say Obama's budgetary shift is hugely significant because **it means no new money for** building **nuclear** powerplants -- and they speculate that, at least in part, they have Solyndra to thank for the shift. "The entire loan program has fallen into some disrepute on Capitol Hill ... because of Solyndra and some of the other renewable programs getting in trouble," said Michael Mariotte, executive director of Nuclear Information and Resource Service, an information hub for organizations concerned with nuclear power. The administration "may have decided to cut their losses" and stop providing new funds to the program altogether.

### A2: People Made up Their Minds

#### People haven’t made up their minds

Trende 9-20

Sean is the Senior Election Analyst at RealClearPolitics, “State of the Race, Part 2: Why Romney Wins,” <http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2012/09/20/state_of_the_race_part_2_why_romney_wins_115513-3.html>

People haven’t made up their minds. Finally, it is important to remember that all the claims about people’s minds being set in stone don’t jibe with what respondents tell pollsters. Table 3 shows when voters have made up their minds over the past four elections. Though the percentage of late-undecideds is diminishing, unless there is a major drop-off this cycle, we can safely say that the decisions of a fairly wide swath of the electorate are not yet firm.¶ ¶ So if the election were held today, President Obama would probably win comfortably. But the election isn’t today. In the next seven weeks, the economy, the president’s tepid job approval ratings, and Romney’s spending campaign will continue to exert gravitational forces on Obama’s re-election efforts, along with the typical gravitational forces that drag down a post-convention bounce. Can these forces move things three points in seven weeks? It’s not a particularly tall order.¶ Tomorrow we’ll wrap up all of this, with some additional thoughts on the next four years. ¶

#### History proves people decide late

Cost 9-23

Dr. Jay has a Ph. D in Political Science from Deleware and is a staff writer for the Weekly Standard, “Inside the poll-ercoaster,” <http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/inside_the_poll_ercoaster_KyrxdXSzSgT6knwSlc4m7K>

But political junkies don’t swing elections. In fact, something like 25 percent of voters make their voting decisions after September, and anywhere from 10 percent to 20 percent will make their final choice in the last week.¶ This is why the polls have often swung wildly in the final weeks of a campaign. It’s how “Dewey defeated Truman” in 1948. It’s how a blowout Richard Nixon victory in 1968 turned into a squeaker. It’s how Gerald Ford closed a 10-point gap and actually had a lead in the final Gallup poll in 1976.¶ It’s how a toss-up race between Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan finished with a GOP blowout in 1980. It’s how Bill Clinton went from being up 9 in mid-September, 1992 to a tie with George H.W. Bush by the end of October.¶ It’s how George W. Bush went from being 10 points down in September 2000 to the 43rd president in January 2001. And it’s how the very same Bush “blew” the 11-point lead he enjoyed in late September 2004, defeating John Kerry by just 2 points.¶ In other words, September polls are extremely volatile. And this year’s volatility is compounded by the late date of the Democratic National Convention. It was, in fact, the latest party convention in US history.¶ And when the polls are bouncing around a lot, the chances are much greater that they will disagree with one another — which is exactly what we’re seeing right now.¶ The best way to view this presidential campaign is an NFL divisional grudge match, Steelers-Ravens or Giants-Cowboys. Both sides know each other’s strengths and weaknesses extremely well, so you know the game is going to be close. Sure, one side just scored on a big play, but we’re only halfway through the 3rd quarter, and the other side is due to strike back any moment.¶ As always, the game will come down to some fantastic interception by Troy Polamalu or an unbelievable completion by Eli Manning to Victor Cruz.¶ So sit tight, politics fans: There’s plenty more to come.

### A2: Winners Win

**Wins take too long, healthcare proves**

**Grist**, 7-28, **10**, <http://www.grist.org/article/2010-07-28-lessons-from-senate-climate-fail/>

Perhaps the most fateful decision the Obama administration made early on was to move healthcare reform before energy and climate legislation. I'm sure this seemed like a good idea at the time. Healthcare reform was popular, was seen as an issue that the public cared about on a personal level, and was expected to unite Democrats from all regions. **White House officials and Congressional leaders reassured environmentalists with their theory that success breeds success.** A quick victory on healthcare reform would renew Obama's political capital, some of which had to be spent early on to push the economic stimulus bill through Congress with no Republican help. **Healthcare reform was eventually enacted, but only after an exhausting battle that eroded public support, drained political capital, and created the Tea Party movement**. Public support **for healthcare reform is slowly rebounding** as some of the early benefits kick in and people realize that the forecasted Armageddon is not happening. B**ut this is occurring too slowly to rebuild Obama's political capital in time to help push climate legislation** across the finish line.

### A2: Energy Irrelevant/Aff to small

#### Energy Relevant because it shifts key gropus, overwhelming factor might be the economy in textbooks but the slight shift like Gay Marriage on ballots in 2004 shows smaller issues can change the election.

**1% change in approval is enough to tilt election**
Silver ’12

Nate runs fivethirtyeight and is a statistician, “A 30,000 Foot View on the Presidential Race,” May 15th <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/15/a-30000-foot-view-on-the-presidential-race/>

The last thing to remember is that **when an election is quite close, it does not take very much to shift the race from one candidate being a 60/40 favorite to it being about even**. At the betting market Intrade, Mr. Obama’s odds of re-election have consistently been around 60 percent. While, on the one hand, it is good not to overreact to new data at this early stage of the race, it is also worth remembering that **even a one-point shift in a president’s approval ratings, or a modest change in the economic forecasts, can move a president’s re-election odds at the margin**.

#### Nate Silver is the best around

Leigh Bureau ‘10

the world’s preeminent lecture bureau, “Nate Silver,” http://www.leighbureau.com/speaker.asp?id=498

Nate Silver has been called a "spreadsheet psychic" and "number-crunching prodigy" by New York Magazine.¶ Nate comes out of the world of baseball statistics, but during the 2008 presidential election primaries, he turned his sights and his amazing predictive abilities and forecasting models to the game of politics and current events — with incredible results.¶ He began by predicting 2008 primary election results with stunning accuracy — and often in opposition to the better-known political pollsters. He then moved on to the general election, where he correctly predicted the presidential winner in 49 states and the District of Columbia.¶

#### Energy would become key- the plans decision to focus voter priorities to energy would

Aldrich, Griffin & Rickershausser ‘05

John is an Endowed Professor of Political Science at Duke University and wrote the article with his 2 students, “The Presidency and the Election Campaign: Altering Voters’ Priorities in the 2004 Election,” The Presidency and the Political System, Congrsesional Quaterly Press

We first compare by month the percentage of the electorate that identified an issue as the nation's most important problem and the percentage of each of the candidate's speeches in that month that addressed that issue.¶ Looking first at the war in Iraq, voters of all partisan stripes appear to have responded to variations in the candidates' emphasis on this issue (see Figure 4). For example, President Bush focused much less on Iraq in July than in June; Kerry also emphasized Iraq less. As a result, there was a sharp drop in voters’ identification of Iraq as the nation's most important problem from July to August. Then, in September, both candidates focused more on Iraq than they had in August, and the voters also became more concerned about Iraq. ¶ As for the war on terrorism, Bush generally increased his attention to this concern as the year unfolded. Except in September, Kerry spoke about it less. Among the public, there was fairly low but slowly increasing concern about this issue until the end of the campaign. ¶ Turning to health care, John Kerry emphasized health care issues much more in August than he had in July, and President Bush emphasized health care issues more in September than he had in August (See Figure 5). Among voters, a sharp increase in their identification of health care as the nation's most important problem occurred in September, following the candidates’ increased emphasis on the issue. In October and November, the candidates emphasized health care less than they has in September, and voters, too, cared less about this issue.¶ The economy is a special case. If the incumbent campaigns on the economy, it is to claim that all is well – and therefore it should not be considered an “important problem.” When the challenger addresses the economy, it is to claim that it’s in trouble. The challenger’s speeches therefore should increase expressions of public concern, the incumbent’s should decrease it. This pattern is evident in Figure 6, in which Bush's increased emphasis on the economy in the late fall reduced Republicans’ concern. In contrast, Kerry's somewhat erratic effort to persuade voters that the economy was poor was only modestly effective among Democrats. ¶ An alternative interpretation of these results is that candidates' desire to emphasize issues in response to voters' rising concerns, rather than the other way around. But as we have seen, changes in the candidates' issue emphases in 2004 generally preceded, rather than followed changes in voters' concerns. The voters were responding to the candidates. ¶ A final possibility is that both the voters' concerns and the candidates’ emphases may have been caused by events such as casualty counts in Iraq or changes in the unemployment rate. To be sure, events give the candidates the raw material with which to make credible claims. But the events themselves rarely affect the voters’ choices directly. Events affect elections only when the candidates incorporate them into their appeals.¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ The more time Bush and Kerry spent discussing an issue, the greater the percentage increase in the public’s identification of that issue as important. Issues that were largely ignored by the candidates – education, for example – actually declined in voters’ identification of them as the most important problem. The time the candidates invested discussing Iraq and health care, conversely, significantly increased the public’s concern about them. Note that, in the case of Iraq, external events and media coverage reinforced the attention the candidates gave the issue, while in the case of health care, the increase in public concern can be attributed almost exclusively to the actions of the candidates, because there were few prominent health care related external events.

### Unpopular

#### HTGRs are unpopular--- perceived as expensive and generating nuclear waste

Daryan Energy 9/30/12

[http://daryanenergyblog.wordpress.com/ca/part-7-fast-gas/, mg]

The basic idea behind the Gas-cooled Fast Reactor is to essentially solve one of the problems listed previously, by using an inert gas such as Helium as our coolant, rather than a liquid metal. Helium has an even lower neutron cross section than Sodium. The GcFR combines ideas from the BWR, HTGR and the previous fast neutron reactor projects. In many respects it’s similar to the HTGR, except its fuel has a higher fissile content and lacks a moderator (i.e no graphite matrix). Thus the idea is to marry the high safety factors of the Gas reactor with the breeding/transmutation properties of the fast reactors. The preferred operating temperature range of the GcFR is around 850 °C , allowing them to utilise the Brayton cycle (as shown), indeed they just about fall within the window of being able to use the sulphur-iodine process to make hydrogen.¶ However, the energy production capability of a GcFR is, as it were a bonus. It’s the potential to reduce the many hundreds of thousands of tons of High level nuclear waste in the world, that is of particular interest.¶ 7.4 Technical challenges of the GcFR design¶ Unfortunately, the GcFR still faces a number of technical challenges. While the coolant switch does solve a number of the problems associated with using liquid metals, it certainly doesn’t solve all the problems notably those associated with the high neutron flux. Our material choices are still somewhat constrained. Given the problems encountered with the UK AGR’s with neutron fluxes (which were modest in comparison to those of any fast reactor) I would rule out concrete as a material choice and the operating temperature and neutron flux in question is probably outside the limits of what we can hope any stainless steel to withstand. This limits us to build it out of Refractory’s (metals or ceramics) or Nickel alloys. Remembering that it’s not just the pressure vessel we need to worry about, all those moving parts inside that need to be also constructed out of said materials too. To cope with the neutron flux said parts, regardless of the material choice, will have to be essentially over-designed to ensure a long service life (else like Fast reactors of the past we’ll be turning the things off regularly to replace components that have failed).¶ Also, by using Helium, which again has a much lower thermal heat capacity and density to liquid metals (or water), a GcFR would likely be rather large. This is made worse by the fact that a Helium cooled core will have a relatively small thermal inertia (i.e potentially vulnerable to meltdown) necessitating a large reservoir of helium being kept within the core at all times (should you be wondering why there’s so much empty space in the sketch above). This naturally increases our reactor size (for a given power output) yet further upwards. And inevitably, a large reactor made out of expensive superalloys is likely to yield an expensive reactor, much more expensive than any other so far considered.¶ This issue of superalloy use again applies not just to the reactor but to the turbogenerators as well. As mentioned previously this will make such hardware potentially expensive. An open cycle running turbine (as shown above) is a possibility, though I suspect once those High-vis jacket wearing FMEA form-filling Killjoys have their say, we’ll need to split the cycle and insert a heat exchanger between the core and Brayton cycle turbines. Either that or they’ll insist on containing the entire turbogenerator set within the containment dome, so it would obviously be easier in this situation to just split the cycle in two. This would reduce thermal efficiency by about 10-15%, hardly crippling, but certainly inconvenient. While a GcFR eliminates the graphite core, which I spent sometime in the last chapter fretting over, it would also contain a lot of fairly “nasty” stuff (i.e spent fuel, plutonium from former weapons stockpiles, my used socks, the usual!) and as it lack the HTGR’s near immunity to meltdown, a containment dome would still be necessary. How large and expensive this dome would need to be is difficult to say at present as we have yet to construct any working GcFR’s with which to judge the margins of safety. Indeed that is in part the problem, there is a substantial R&D gap with this reactor design, so anyone planning on them being built in large numbers tomorrow, as unfortunately the US energy secretary Steve Chu seems to believe, is likely to be disappointed.¶ Another issue is the capacity factor. Given that these reactors would likely be used to either breed fuel or “burn” off Actinides, that is going to require regular shutdowns to swap over fuel assemblies. As these reactors lack the ability to fuel while running, this would mean a relatively low capacity factor. Probably not nearly as bad as with past Fast Reactor’s (8-10% worse than wind farms!), but certainly not very high (my guess? 40-60% against 90% with existing reactors). So obviously, this would make such reactors a not terribly reliable source of energy, given that they could well be frequently turned off at incontinent moments. So another source of energy, likely a thermal power station, hydroelectric plant or another nuclear reactor would need to back them up. But like I said, we’d be best looking on any energy these reactors actually generate as something of a bonus, rather than a means to an end. The primary role of them would be fuel processing.¶ 7.5 Fast neutron transmutation of nuclear waste¶ Of course, if such a reactor could be proved to work and work well, then there would still be some merit towards building them, I just won’t hold out for private industry to do anything!¶ Given that nuclear waste disposal is a task that the industry has essentially delegated (rightly or wrongly) to governments, as indeed it has also delegated the task of securing future Uranium fuel reserves, any Fast Reactor program would have to be government sponsored, especially given the considerable amounts of R&D necessary to get this concept to work.¶ This is likely to prove unpopular with taxpayers who’ve been sold the mantra of “oh, we don’t want subsidies” for far too long. Granted, as I mentioned before no nuclear program is ever going to be subsidy free (indeed I’d question whether any energy source, even fossil fuels is truly subsidy free). But there’s a bit of a difference between governments slipping the nuclear industry a fiver from time to time (as is currently the case) while quietly picking up the tab for security, insurance and decommissioning – as opposed to blatantly signing an unending line of blank cheques as would be the case with a GcFR.

**Romney Labels**

**Romney definitely labels a manipulator and it escalates- platform,**

**Shobert 2-22**

[Benjamin, Managing Director of Rubicon Strategy Group, a consulting firm specialized in strategy analysis for companies looking to enter emerging economies, “Romney lays ground for China trade war”, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China\_Business/NB22Cb01.html]

Part of what **Romney** wrote aligns with his early September 2011 economic plan, where he **announced** that **his administration would** formally **label China a "currency manipulator**". On this point, his Wall Street Journal op-ed doubled down; there, he wrote, " ... on day one of my presidency I will designate it a currency manipulator and take appropriate counteraction." As a head nod to the influential parts of the GOP who represent the interests of big-business, **he** subsequently **added,** "A trade war with China is the last thing I want, but **I cannot tolerate our current trade surrender." For someone who claims not to want a trade war with China, Romney is making a pretty compelling case for how his administration would make one all but certain. It is a temptation to read Romney's op-ed a**s the sort of **positioning during** the primaries that Americans have come to expect during their **elections**. Even in the US-China policy-community, many draw comfort from past election cycles where blustery comments from potential presidential candidates were dramatically toned down - if they did not go away altogether - once their transition into elected office took place. The present administration went through a similar smoothing out of the rough edges about its stance towards China once it emerged victoriously from both the primary and the general election. Admittedly, this is the safest way to interpret Romney's most recent volley towards the Chinese: as the primary shifts back to his "home state", **China presents an issue that certainly has bi-partisan traction in a manufacturing-sensitive** midwestern **economy** like Michigan, where China's economy is perceived to have benefited at the expense of middle-class American blue-collar workers. It is a note the Romney campaign believes can be safely struck not only in the midst of a heated GOP primary, but in the general election as well. Tradition says nothing should be made of Romney's saber rattling towards China, but is tradition wrong? **Choosing to interpret Romney's attitude towards China as something not to be alarmed about overlooks a major difference** between past election cycles and today's: **now the American psyche is deeply frustrated over the difficulties the country's economy must face.** **In the past, the relative confidence** felt **about America's economic future allowed many to overlook the potential threat China might present. Today, that confidence is gone. The** average **American worker remains traumatized** and deeply insecure **since** the **2008 financial crisis**. Many also feel brutalized over the ugly state of American politics, precisely when the latter should be shedding light on how best to deal with the former. An economic crisis has quickly devolved into a political one, leaving many in middle America eager for someone to blame. **Tied to these economic insecurities are deep misgivings about America's place in the world**, **which go back to** the US response to **9/11 and** the subsequent invasions of **Afghanistan and Iraq.** Americans are torn between the GOP world view that argues for America to remain a hegemonic force for good around the world, versus a libertarian-progressive framework that believes that America can be powerful and influential, but must do so within a the realities of both a multi-polar world and the economic limitations imposed on Washington based on years of fiscal imprudence. **When Romney** disparagingly **writes of** President Barack **Obama that he "came** into office **as a** near **supplicant to Beijing", he touches on this insecurity** and appeals to the American desire to appear muscular and able to "go it alone" where others counsel caution and compromise. The popular temper American politicians tap into over China is not necessarily new, although a good argument could be made that **negative portrayals of China** during American elections **has been growing more common** in this, and recent election cycles. **Conventional thinking has it that the real decision-makers** about American policy towards China **are those who never run for elected office, the safe wise men** who, behind closed doors, know how to calm everyone down and focus on how best to maintain the status-quo. **That is precisely why Romney's ongoing diatribe against China is so distressing: he is supposed to be one of those calm, level-headed people** that could be trusted not to demagogue China in order to score cheap political points. For US-China policy-makers, **Romney's elevation of China as an issue for the general election should not be overlooked, downplayed, or rationalized. To have the supposedly most business-savvy candidate** for president the country has seen in years run within the most pro-business, historically free trade American political party with a major plank of his economic plan being to **call out China as a currency manipulator is noteworthy.**

**Romney’s serious- Republicans support and more popular lies to tell**

**Fletcher 9-4**

Ian is a Senior Economist of the Coalition for a Prosperous America, “What’s Romney Really up To?” <http://www.wnd.com/2012/09/whats-romney-really-up-to/>

On the currency manipulation side, retaliating against Chinese currency manipulation while not specifying what other supporting policies will or will not be applied, is also a fairly mild gesture. It could mean a whole lot, or not that much.¶ If, for example, America forces China to stop manipulating the dollar-yuan exchange rate, but does nothing about the backdoor protectionism and industry subsidies of China and other nations that run surpluses with the U.S, the effect on our deficit will be muted. Or if America responds to Chinese currency manipulation with countervailing duties, but these duties are too low to make a difference, again we will have pulled our punch.¶ Above all, currency manipulation is only one tool among many that mercantilist nations can use to manipulate their trade. We need to stop it, but doing so is not a panacea.¶ Furthermore, **Romney has counterbalanced his promise of a crackdown on China with a promise to negotiate more free-trade agreements**. So, as in the case of immigration, he’s playing nationalist softball, not hardball.¶ This mushiness and uncertainty in the Republican positions is maddening from the point of view of the voter. It’s a tease. The party is saying that it might give the voters two fairly big things the voters actually want, according to polls, but just how much is up for grabs.¶ Looked at one way, **the Republican party is actually playing a fairly rational game. It’s offering voters just enough to entice them away from the other side, but no more**. There are good reasons the party doesn’t want to go hard core on either immigration or trade, most of them being Republican vested interests that benefit from one or the other.¶ Before the readers asks – **I believe the Republican pledges on both immigration and trade are probably sincere.** For one thing, **if the party were simply spinning lies to win votes, they could certainly gin up much more popular lies on these issues**. Both positions have been hedged with the kind of equivocation that says “let’s not go too far on this, as we might actually have to live up to it if elected.”¶ **I suspect the Republicans’ tactical embrace of these policies stems from the fact that significant sections of the Republican establishment are actually getting comfortable with them on the policy merits. It’s a lot easier for a political party to embrace something for political reasons when it feels it can accept the actual policy results.**

# 1NR

# Critique

## AT Desalination

#### Desalination inevitable – aff not key

Earth Talk 2012

“Can Ocean Desalination Solve the World’s Water Shortage?” <http://environment.about.com/od/biodiversityconservation/a/desalination.htm>

Population Growth Drives Quest for Water by Desalination¶ With human population expected to balloon another 50 percent by 2050, resource managers are increasingly looking to alternative scenarios for quenching the world's growing thirst. Desalination—a process whereby highly pressurized ocean water is pushed through tiny membrane filters and distilled into drinking water—is being held forth by some as one of the most promising solutions to the problem. But critics point out it doesn't come without its economic and environmental costs.

#### Tons of desalination plants are being built now

Earth Talk 2012

“Can Ocean Desalination Solve the World’s Water Shortage?” <http://environment.about.com/od/biodiversityconservation/a/desalination.htm>

Despite such arguments, the practice is becoming more common. Ted Levin of the Natural Resources Defense Council says that more than 12,000 desalination plants already supply fresh water in 120 nations, mostly in the Middle East and Caribbean. And analysts expect the worldwide market for desalinated water to grow significantly over the coming decades. Environmental advocates may just have to settle for pushing to "green" the practice as much as possible in lieu of eliminating it altogether.

# Solvency

### Solvency

#### **Plan’s demonstration wont spillover – too many uncertainties**

Fahring 11

(T.L. Fahring is a 2011 graduate from the University of Texas School of Law. He is currently a law clerk at the Texas Eleventh Court of Appeals. He is interested in energy law, environmental law, and tax law, “Nuclear Uncertainty: A Look at the Uncertainties of a U.S. Nuclear Renaissance” 41 Tex. Envtl. L.J. 279)

But this initial success does not necessarily ensure that new nuclear construction will take place:¶ In announcing the new reactor license applications ... utilities have made clear that they are not committed to actually building the reactors, even if the licenses are approved. Large uncertainties about nuclear plant construction costs still remain ... All those problems helped cause the long cessation of U.S. reactor orders and will need to be addressed before financing for new multibillion-dollar nuclear power plants is likely to be obtained. n268

#### Russia will destroy its plutonium

Brandt ‘12

[Kirsten Brandt, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/energy-from-the-bomb-russia-to-produce-electricity-with-former-nukes-a-854318.html> ETB]

Russia is planning to destroy plutonium used in thousands of soon to be decommissioned nuclear warheads by using it as fuel in a special new atomic power plant. The reactor is set to begin operating in one year, but time pressures and a vulnerable cooling system make the project a risky one.

#### Russia can’t solve Iran- no leverage

Kozhanov ‘12

[Nikolay Kozhanov, a visiting fellow at the Washington Institute, is a scholar at the non-governmental Institute of the Middle East and a visiting lecturer at the School of Economics of the St. Petersburg State University. <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/russias-position-on-irans-nuclear-program> ETB]

For the Russians, the Iranian nuclear program is traditionally overshadowed by other issues in relations between the two countries. Over the last two decades, Tehran has proved itself to be Russia's friend in times of need, by helping promote peace and stability in the Caspian littoral and in Central Asia, limit the presence of third countries in regional affairs, counteract human- and drug-trafficking activity, deter the spread of internal revolutions, and combat terrorism. Moscow also has certain economic interests in Iran. As a result, little room is left to confront Tehran over the nuclear issue.

#### No risk of acquiring Russian materials and there’s no threat from use.

**Frost ’03** [Robin, MA in Political Science at SFU, October, “An Assessment of the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism,” Oct, <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/symposia/2003/frost.htm>]

Sokov quotes Igor Valynkin, the chief of the 12th GUMO, the Main Department of the Russian Ministry of Defence tasked with handling all nuclear weapons, as saying that the devices would have had very short maintenance schedules, possibly as little as six months. If certain crucial components, such as tritium boosters, were not replaced at regular intervals the bombs would go ‘stale’ and their nuclear yield could drop to close to zero. Since the window of greatest opportunity for theft occurred in the early 1990s, if any weapons were diverted at this point they would by now have missed twenty or more services and would be at or near the end of their useful lives. Sokov argues that stories about the loss of miniature weapons “were most probably not true, and … they were generated by incomplete information or ulterior motives”. His reasons for that conclusion include the fact that “no terrorist group has used such a device or even credibly threatened its use. … Since the majority of feasible scenarios involve Chechens, and since the period of greatest risk was in the early 1990s, the inactivity of Chechens in this matter is significant. Sokov concludes that “[e]ven assuming that some portable nuclear devices were lost, it would be very difficult to use them, and it is almost certain that the features that make portable nuclear devices so dangerous (small size and full-scale nuclear explosion effects) will not be taken advantage of”[[xxii]](http://www.cda-cdai.ca/symposia/2003/frost.htm%22%20%5Cl%20%22_edn22).

#### Russia won’t cooperate on Iran- economic disincentives and preference for other outcomes

Kramer 10

[David J. Kramer took the oath of office as Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor on March 21, 2008. From July 2005 to March of 2008, Mr. Kramer was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, responsible for Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus affairs, as well as regional nonproliferation issues. Previously, he served in the Department of State Office of Policy Planning as a Professional Staff Member, and before that, was Senior Advisor to the Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs. He also was Executive Director of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy in Washington. “Resetting US-Russian Relations: It Takes Two” The Washington Quarterly]

Iran is a different matter entirely. It is true that Russia would prefer that Iran not become a nuclear weapons state, but Moscow does not share the U.S. threat assessment of Iran’s potential danger. Even with agreement in July in Moscow to launch a joint threat assessment of the ‘‘ballistic missile challenges of the 21st century, including those posed by Iran and North Korea,’’ as Obama noted,27 one should not expect a meeting of the minds between Russian and U.S. officials. Moreover, Russian officials are not interested in getting tougher toward Tehran (a position they have stated publicly, and unhelpfully, on numerous occasions) and would much prefer the United States to play the role of bad guy. Russia has too much at stake in its relationship with Iran from maintaining stability in its northern Caucasus to financial interests from arms sales, nuclear reactors, energy, and trade to risk a tougher approach itself.28 Comments by Medvedev at the UN General Assembly meeting and after a meeting with Obama on September 23, 2009 raised hopes that Russia might join in sanctioning Iran, but the real test will come when the resolution is drawn up and voted on.29 Russia, after all, has supported previous resolutions that were significantly watered down at Moscow’s insistence. Andranik Migranyan, director of the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation in New York (a Kremlin-supported organization designed to promote Russia’s image and interests inside the United States) described the possibility of Russian cooperation with the United States in applying further sanctions against Iran as ‘‘highly unlikely.’’ According to Migranyan, ‘‘It is imperative that our U.S. partners understand that maintaining friendly, mutually advantageous relations with Iran meets the strategic interests of the Russian state.’’ For Russia to go along with sanctions against Iran, Migranyan writes: . it is no longer enough to give hollow promises that there will be no NATO expansion to the east, that missile-defense systems will not be deployed in the Czech Republic and Poland, that the Georgian army will not be rearmed, that there will be no blunt and unceremonious interference in the internal affairs of the former Soviet republics, and that there will be no support of political forces that are hostile to Russia.30

Russia would have to be ‘‘duly compensated’’ i.e., bribed.31 It is hard to see how such a view represents a merging of national interests. More cynically, Migranyan notes that Russia would benefit from U.S. or Israeli military action against Iran because ‘‘Russia will come out on top’’: In this scenario, America would bypass the UN Security Council and stir up the ire of the entire Muslim world, which would force even moderate Muslim countries to assume a tough stance against the United States. Furthermore, Iran can unleash large-scale terrorist activity against America and its allies, which would destabilize the situation in the Middle East and cause an inevitable immediate upturn in oil prices. The United States would be even more heavily mired in the confrontation with the Islamic world, robbing it of huge resources, energy and opportunities. The upsurge in oil prices would make Russia a major winner, giving it the necessary financial resources to restructure its economy and allow for further economic development and increases in living standards.32 Migranyan’s views are echoed by Dimitri Simes, president of The Nixon Center, who writes that: ‘‘Although Russian officials strongly oppose any military strike against Iran’s nuclear installations, they privately acknowledge that such an attack could benefit Russia by increasing energy prices and creating a global backlash against the United States.’’33 If the Russian leadership sees benefits from such a scenario, it is hard to see what kind of cooperation can exist between Russia and the United States.

# China

#### Prefer our ev—recent trends show nuclear is crashing, but their authors always think that the Renaissance is around the corner

Maize ‘12, staff writer – POWER Magazine, 8/6/’12

(Kennedy, “A Bumpy Road for Nukes,” POWERnews)

Washington, D.C., 6 August 2012 — It’s been a rough road for nuclear advocates in the U.S. of late, although nothing seems to dent the Pollyanna armor of the nuclear crowd, always appearing to believe a revival is just over the horizon and headed into view. Here are a few fraught developments for the nuclear business that suggest the positive vision just might be a mirage. \* GE CEO Jeff Immelt in a recent interview with the Financial Times revealed a surprising and somewhat uncharacteristic realism with regard to the company’s nuclear future and that of its partner in radioactivity, Hitachi. In London for the Summer Olympics, Immelt told a reporter for the FT, “It’s really a gas and wind world today. When I talk to the guys who run the oil companies, they say look, they’re finding more gas all the time. It’s just hard to justify nuclear, really hard. Gas is so cheap, and at some point, really, economics rule.” For the nuclear industry, economics has always been the fundamental enemy – not the green-tinged, hairy anti-nuke activists, but the folks with the green eye shades, sharp pencils and, today, even sharper spreadsheets. The nuclear execs long have pursued governments as their bulwark against markets, and that has often worked. Today, as Immelt notes, gas has made the market forces so overwhelming, at least in those places such as the U.S. where gas is astonishingly abundant, that even government likely can’t come to the rescue of nuclear power. Could that have something to do with the abject failure of the 2005 Energy Policy Act’s loan guarantee provisions, which have not worked for renewables any better than they have worked for nukes? Indeed, the threat of gas is at least as potentially toxic for many wind and solar projects as it is for nuclear and coal new build. \* In Georgia, the Southern Company is facing what looks like growing problems with its Vogtle project, which aims for two new nuclear units using the unproven but promising Westinghouse AP1000 reactor design. With its federal loan in jeopardy (Southern says it can go ahead without taxpayer funds) and the project running behind schedule and over budget, the Atlanta-based utility now faces lawsuits brought by the reactor vendor and the construction contractor Shaw Group. The amount in dispute, some $29 million, is tiny compared to the multi-billion-dollar price tag for the project. But it may be revealing of ruptures in the deal. Robert Marritz, an energy lawyer and veteran industry observer, publisher of ElectricityPolicy.com, commented that “the very filing of a lawsuit at this stage of the first nuclear plant construction in decades is stunning, reflecting stresses in a relationship that should, one would think, be contained and resolved rather than boiling over into public view.” Indeed, the parties are also engaged in a larger, perhaps nastier, dispute involving $800 million that has not gotten much public exposure. And that’s real money. \* Moving to California, the long-running saga of Edison International’s San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS, how’s that for an inept acronym?) continues, with little clarity in sight. The plant has been out of service since January as a result of unexpected and still unexplained tube wear in the plant’s steam generators. According to Bloomberg New Energy Finance, the outage is costing the utility about $1.5 million a day just in lost revenue. The cost to the state in jeopardized reliability hasn’t been calculated, although Edison has started up mothballed gas capacity to fill the supply gap. There is no firm date for restart at the nuclear plant. In the meantime, the California Public Utilities Commission is planning a formal investigation of the outage and Edison’s response, but recently decided to delay that until the utility files a legally-required report with the CPUC November 1. CPUC President Mike Peevey is a former executive with the Los Angeles-based utility.

#### U.S. can convince allies to stay with U.S. nuclear umbrella

Saab ‘12

Bilal is a visiting fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation studies, “No Hotline to Tehran,” <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/no-hotline-tehran-6489>

The elements of an alternative policy—containment and deterrence—are well-known by now. (The American Enterprise Institute’s December 2011 report, “Containing and Deterring a Nuclear Iran,” did a superb job of detailing them.) These include but are not limited to boosting defense ties with Gulf Cooperation Council states, providing them with a nuclear umbrella and deploying missile defenses on their territories, bolstering the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf, and solidifying diplomatic relations with U.S. allies in the region and within NATO. The costs of this policy are also clear: An Iranian bomb would deal a huge blow to (or even totally collapse) the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, aspirations of global disarmament and the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. The United States, whose armed forces are already stretched thin, would need to allocate significant military resources to the Persian Gulf and spend a lot of political capital convincing its Middle Eastern allies (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and possibly Qatar and the UAE) not to seek their own nuclear weapons. This would be extremely difficult. But if the United States was able to protect its allies during the Cold War from nuclear blackmail by the Soviets, it can do so with a much less powerful adversary—even an Iran in possession of the bomb. But just as with the Soviet Union, the United States would need a genuinely credible deterrent posture. A nuclear Iran must believe that Washington is both able and willing to inflict massive pain on Tehran, should it misbehave. What Iran’s leaders say and do immediately after they get the bomb could make a difference in how the United States reacts. Clear signaling of intentions by Iran’s leaders could tip the balance in favor of a particular U.S. response. To be sure, there may not be much difference in what Iran says and does once it acquires a nuclear-weapons capability. The United States might have already decided in favor of a military strike and the domestic, regional and international pressures might be too strong—but Iran will still have a choice to make.

### Your Author Goes Neg

#### Visa’s block deep cooperation – their author

Lyons et al. ’9 ((~~[Blythe J. Lyons, John R. Lyman, Mihaela Carstei, and General Richard L. Lawson (USAF), "United States-China Cooperation On Nuclear Power: An Opportunity for Fostering Sustainable Energy Security", Atlantic Council, 3-4/3-6 2009, http://www.acus.org/files/publication\_pdfs/65/AtlanticCouncil-USChinaNuclearPower.pdf-http://www.acus.org/files/publication\_pdfs/65/AtlanticCouncil-USChinaNuclearPower.pdf, Based on the Dialogue Sponsored by the Atlantic Council and the U.S./China Energy and Environment Technology Center

10. One of the roadblocks to the development of cooperative¶ opportunities is the U.S. visa issuance system. The¶ Atlantic Council was encouraged to ask the U.S.¶ Department of State to improve its processing of visa¶ applications to significantly shorten the time needed for¶ Chinese nationals involved in nuclear power to obtain¶ a visa for travel to the U.S. Consider, for example, that¶ France provides a dedicated consulate. It is important¶ to recognize that U.S. authorities must take into¶ consideration the security of nuclear facilities but that¶ a better balance can be reached. This is a problem that¶ can be solved

#### Cooperation now – their author

Lyons et al. ’9 ((~~[Blythe J. Lyons, John R. Lyman, Mihaela Carstei, and General Richard L. Lawson (USAF), "United States-China Cooperation On Nuclear Power: An Opportunity for Fostering Sustainable Energy Security", Atlantic Council, 3-4/3-6 2009, http://www.acus.org/files/publication\_pdfs/65/AtlanticCouncil-USChinaNuclearPower.pdf-http://www.acus.org/files/publication\_pdfs/65/AtlanticCouncil-USChinaNuclearPower.pdf, Based on the Dialogue Sponsored by the Atlantic Council and the U.S./China Energy and Environment Technology Center

13. Cooperation on the development of advanced fuel¶ cycle technologies, already underway in U.S.-China¶ working groups, will provide significant opportunities¶ to share rather than duplicate knowledge and funding.¶ Generation IV (Gen IV) international collaboration on R&D¶ is necessary and beneficial for all participants to share¶ costs, facilities and experience. Specific fuel cycle R&D¶ opportunities proposed by the State Nuclear Power¶ Technology corporation (SNPTC) include the following:¶ Advanced fuel, such as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, and¶ metal fuel;¶ Transmutation technology, such as fast reactor and¶ accelerator driven systems;¶ Reprocessing technologies, such as MOX spent fuel¶ reprocessing, dry processing, on-site recycle; and,¶ Repository design technology.

#### Dialogue is ongoing – their author

Lyons et al. ’9 ((~~[Blythe J. Lyons, John R. Lyman, Mihaela Carstei, and General Richard L. Lawson (USAF), "United States-China Cooperation On Nuclear Power: An Opportunity for Fostering Sustainable Energy Security", Atlantic Council, 3-4/3-6 2009, http://www.acus.org/files/publication\_pdfs/65/AtlanticCouncil-USChinaNuclearPower.pdf-http://www.acus.org/files/publication\_pdfs/65/AtlanticCouncil-USChinaNuclearPower.pdf, Based on the Dialogue Sponsored by the Atlantic Council and the U.S./China Energy and Environment Technology Center

In 2007, the Atlantic Council of the United States (the¶ Council) partnered with the U.S./China Energy and¶ Environment Technology Center (EETC) at Tsinghua¶ and Tulane Universities to hold a series of dialogues¶ to foster cooperation between the United States (U.S.)¶ and China on increasing secure and sustainable energy¶ supplies. Over the past several years, the Council and¶ EETC have invited key organizations, experts from industry¶ and government, and representatives from relevant U.S.¶ and Chinese government agencies to become directly¶ involved in these meetings designed to identify concrete¶ recommendations for increasing official governmental and¶ industry cooperation between the U.S. and China.1¶ Between March 4 and 6, 2009, a Dialogue on U.S.-China¶ Cooperation on Nuclear Power was held in Washington,¶ DC. Approximately one dozen Chinese participants¶ representing the Institute of Nuclear and New Energy¶ Technology at Tsinghua University, the Embassy of the¶ People’s Republic of China, the State Nuclear Power¶ Technology Company (SNPTC), and the Shanghai Nuclear¶ Engineering Research and Design Institute attended the¶ meeting either as speakers or as participants. On the U.S.¶ side, there were speakers and/or participants from the¶ nuclear industry including Areva, Babcock and Wilcox,¶ General Electric Hitachi Nuclear Energy, Hyperion Power¶ Generation, and the Westinghouse Electric Corporation and¶ The Shaw Group Inc. (partners in the Westinghouse and Shaw AP 1000 Consortium [the Consortium]); consulting¶ firms including M.S. Chu and Associates, Gee Strategies,¶ Energy Resources International Inc., and Fraser Energy;¶ U.S. government agencies such as the U.S. Nuclear¶ Regulatory Agency (NRC), the White House Council on¶ Environmental Quality and the Departments of Energy,¶ Commerce, and Treasury, and Sandia National Laboratory;¶ and non-governmental organizations including the World¶ Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), the Nuclear¶ Energy Institute (NEI), the Electric Power Research Institute¶ (EPRI), and the Edison Electric Institute (EEI). In short,¶ there was a wide range of U.S. and Chinese participants¶ closely involved in commercial nuclear commerce and¶ bilateral government programs. The list of speakers and¶ participants is included in Annex I. The Dialogue agenda¶ can be found in Annex II.

## Coop inev

#### China’s not a dangerous power- Westinghouse Reactor is designed by the U.S. and happened because we asked the Chinese to build it

Ramana & Saikawa ’11

M.V. and Eri are respectively, a Nuclear Futures Laboratory and Program on Science and Global Security, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 221 Nassau Street, Floor 2, Princeton, NJ 08542, USA Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 Massachusetts Avenue, MIT bldg. 54-1413, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA, “Choosing a Standard Reactor: International Competition and Domestic Politics in Chinese Nuclear Policy,” Energy Volume 36, Issue 12, December

In September 2004, China put out tenders for two Generation III reactors to be installed in Sanmen and Yangjiang. SNPTC, directly under China’s State Council, was in charge of technology selection [6]. More than 10 international nuclear vendors put in bids, with Areva and Westinghouse being shortlisted [1]. Areva’s bid was backed by Coface, the French export credit agency while the Export Import Bank of the United States approved $5 billion in loan guarantees for the Westinghouse tender [63]. The decision on reactor type was delayed, and came under review at the highest political level rather than China’s energy planning bureaucracy [64].¶ One reason for the delay was CNNC reportedly pushing for its indigenous reactor designs at both sites [6]. Eventually, in 2006, the Westinghouse bid to construct two AP-1000s was accepted. Areva’s EPR lost out to Westinghouse’s AP-1000 because Westinghouse was more open to the idea of transferring its technology to China [2].¶ Soon thereafter, early in 2007, the two units planned for Yangjiang were shifted to Haiyang. The following year, the government approved the largest nuclear project till that point, which is to involve the construction of six CPR-1000s [65]. Just eleven days later, after a ceremony to celebrate the start of work on these units, construction of two more CPR-1000s started in Fangjiashan [66]. Note that the chosen reactor designs were not the CNP-1000 that CNNC had designed, but something that CGNPC favored. At the same time, this is a Generation II reactor design.¶ Much political capital was invested by the United States in securing the contract for Westinghouse. Letters of support were provided by officials at the U.S. Departments of Commerce, Energy, and State as well as the U.S. ambassador to China [67]. The U.S. Commercial Service introduced Westinghouse officials to high-level Chinese decision makers. Westinghouse officials were included in an official trade mission led by the U.S. Secretary of Commerce. Another factor in favor of the choice of Westinghouse was intense U.S. pressure on China to reduce its trade balance with the United States [68].¶ Westinghouse had played an important part in getting the U.S. government to allow nuclear reactor sales to China in the mid 1990s. Around that period, U.S. nuclear vendors started becoming increasingly restive about not being allowed to sell reactors to China due to United States not having a nuclear agreement with the country.16 Westinghouse teamed up with companies such as Bechtel, Asea Brown Boveri, and Stone & Webster Engineering in a lobbying and public relations campaign that stressed domestic job creation in the United States from reactor and other nuclear technology sales to China [69]. Michael Jordan, chairman and chief executive of Westinghouse, argued that continuation of nuclear sanctions would “result in the loss of tens of thousands of jobs across 28 states and the gradual elimination of the trained personnel base now supporting more than 100 U.S. nuclear power plants and the nuclear Navy”. The lobbying was successful, in part because it fit well within the broader strategy of the Clinton administration, which focused on exports and was seeking for a way by which U.S. companies could beat the challenge from European, Canadian and Japanese competitors in Asia’s energy sector.

# 2NR

**Rasmussen sucks- Inaccurate & consistently biased for Republicans**

**Silver ‘10**

Nate is a statistician and runs fivethirtyeight for the New York Times, “Rasmussen Polls were Biased and Inaccurate; Quinnipiac, Survey USA Performed Strongly,” <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/rasmussen-polls-were-biased-and-inaccurate-quinnipiac-surveyusa-performed-strongly/>

Every election cycle has its winners and losers: not just the among the candidates, but also the pollsters.¶ On Tuesday, polls conducted by the firm **Rasmussen** Reports — which released more than 100 surveys in the final three weeks of the campaign, including some commissioned under a subsidiary on behalf of Fox News **— badly missed the margin in many states, and also exhibited a considerable bias toward Republican candidate**s.¶ Other polling firms, like SurveyUSA and Quinnipiac University, produced more reliable results in Senate and gubernatorial races. A firm that conducts surveys by Internet, YouGov, also performed relatively well.¶ What follows is a preliminary analysis of polls released to the public in the final 21 days of the campaign. **Our process here is quite simple: we’ve taken all such polls in our database, and assessed how accurate they were,** on average, in predicting the margin separating the two leading candidates in each race. For instance, a poll that had the Democrat winning by 2 percentage points in a race where the Republican actually won by 4 would have an error of 6 points.¶ We’ve also assessed whether a company’s polls consistently missed in either a Democratic or Republican direction — that is, whether they were biased. The hypothetical poll I just described would have had a 6 point Democratic bias, for instance.¶ The analysis covers all polls issued by firms in the final three weeks of the campaign, even if a company surveyed a particular state multiple times. In our view, this provides for a more comprehensive analysis than focusing solely on a firm’s final poll in each state, since polling has a tendency to converge in the final days of the campaign, perhaps because some firms fear that their results are an outlier and adjust them accordingly.¶ (After a couple of weeks, when results in all races have been certified, we’ll update our official pollster ratings, which use a more advanced process that attempts to account, for instance, for the degree of difficulty in polling different types of races.)¶ **The 105 polls released** in Senate and gubernatorial races **by Rasmussen** Reports and its subsidiary, Pulse Opinion Research, **missed the final margin** between the candidates **by 5.8 points, a considerably higher figure than** that achieved by **most other pollsters**. Some **13 of its polls missed by 10 or more points, including one** in the Hawaii Senate race **that missed the final margin** between the ca**ndidates by 40 points, the largest error ever recorded** in a general election in FiveThirtyEight’s database, which includes all polls conducted since 1998.¶ Moreover, **Rasmussen’s polls were quite biased, overestimating the** standing of the **Republican** candidate **by almost 4 points** on average. In just 12 cases, Rasmussen’s polls overestimated the margin for the Democrat by 3 or more points. But it did so for the Republican candidate in 55 cases — that is, in more than half of the polls that it issued.¶ If one focused solely on the final poll issued by Rasmussen Reports or Pulse Opinion Research in each state — rather than including all polls within the three-week interval — it would not have made much difference. Their average error would be 5.7 points rather than 5.8, and their average bias 3.8 points rather than 3.9.¶ Nor did it make much difference whether the polls were branded as Rasmussen Reports surveys, or instead, were commissioned for Fox News by its subsidiary Pulse Opinion Research. (Both sets of surveys used an essentially identical methodology.) Polls branded as Rasmussen Reports missed by an average of 5.9 points and had a 3.9 point bias. The polls it commissioned on behalf of Fox News had a 5.1 point error, and a 3.6 point bias.¶ Rasmussen’s polls have come under heavy criticism throughout this election cycle, including from FiveThirtyEight. **We have critiqued the firm for its cavalier attitude toward polling convention. Rasmussen,** for instance, **generally conducts all of its interviews during a single, 4-hour window; speaks with the first person it reaches** on the phone **rather than using a random selection** process; **does not call cellphones**; does not call back respondents whom it misses initially; **and uses a computer script rather than live interviewers to conduct its surveys.** These are cost-saving measures which contribute to very low response rates and may lead to biased samples.¶ Rasmussen also weights their surveys based on preordained assumptions about the party identification of voters in each state, a relatively unusual practice that many polling firms consider dubious since party identification (unlike characteristics like age and gender) is often quite fluid.¶ Rasmussen’s polls — after a poor debut in 2000 in which they picked the wrong winner in 7 key states in that year’s Presidential race — nevertheless had performed quite strongly in in 2004 and 2006. And they were about average in 2008. But their polls were poor this year.¶ The discrepancies between Rasmussen Reports polls and those issued by other companies were apparent from virtually the first day that Barack Obama took office. **Rasmussen showed** Barack **Obama’s disapproval rating at 36 percent**, for instance, **just a week after his inauguration, at a point when no other pollster had that figure higher than 20 percent.**¶ Rasmussen Reports has rarely provided substantive responses to criticisms about its methodology. At one point, Scott Rasmussen, president of the company, suggested that the differences it showed were due to its use of a likely voter model. A FiveThirtyEight analysis, however, revealed that its bias was at least as strong in polls conducted among all adults, before any model of voting likelihood had been applied.¶ Some of the criticisms have focused on the fact that Mr. **Rasmussen is himself a conservative** — the same direction in which his polls have generally leaned — although he identifies as an independent rather than Republican. In our view, that is somewhat beside the point. What matters, rather, is that **the methodological shortcuts that the firm takes may now be causing it to pay a price in terms of the reliability of its polling**.¶ \*-\*¶ The table below presents results for the eight companies in FiveThirtyEight’s database that released at least 10 polls of gubernatorial and Senate contests into the public domain in the final three weeks of the campaign, and which were active in at least two states.¶ The most accurate surveys were those issued by Quinnipiac University, which missed the final margin between the candidates by 3.3 points, and which showed little overall bias.¶ The next-best result was from SurveyUSA, which is among the highest-rated firms in FiveThirtyEight’s pollster rankings: it missed the margin between the candidates by 3.5 points, on average.¶ SurveyUSA also issued polls in a number of U.S. House races, missing the margin between the candidates by an average of 5.2 points. That is a comparatively good score: individual U.S. House races are generally quite difficult to poll, and the typical poll issued by companies other than SurveyUSA had missed the margin between the candidates by an average of 7.3 points.¶ In some of the house races that it polled, SurveyUSA’s results had been more Republican-leaning than those of other pollsters. But it turned out that it had the right impression in most of those races — anticipating, for instance, that the Democratic incumbent Jim Oberstar could easily lose his race, as he eventually did.¶ YouGov, which conducts its surveys through Internet panels, also performed fairly well, missing the eventual margin by 3.5 points on average — although it confined its polling to a handful of swing races, in which polling is generally easier because of high levels of voter engagement.¶ Other polling firms that joined Rasmussen toward the bottom of the chart were Marist College, whose polls also had a notable Republican bias, and CNN/Opinion Research, whose polls missed by almost 5 points on average. Their scores are less statistically meaningful than that for Rasmussen Reports, however, because they had only released surveys in 14 and 17 races, respectively, as compared to Rasmussen’s 105 polls.

**Romney will win- Silver model**

**Silver 10-5**

Nate is a statistician and edits the New York Times’ election blog, “Obama Convention Bounce May not be Receding,” <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/21/sept-20-obamas-convention-bounce-may-not-be-receding/>

Presidential **November 6 Forecast- Obama 317.7. Electoral Votes Barack Obama 84.9% chance of winning.** Romney 220.3. Mitt Romney 15.1% chance of winning.

**A2: Euro Zone**

**Manufacturing growth shield and Euro optimism is up**

**AP, 10-1-12**

(“US stock futures rise on cautious Euro optimism,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20121001/us-wall-street-premarket)

**U.S. stock market futures rose Monday**, **following European markets higher**, as **investors cautiously welcomed the result of stress tests of Spain's banks** **and** **a** slight **improvement** in a survey **of the eurozone's manufacturing sector**.

**Eurozone is stabilizing now**

**Kilgore**, MarketWatch, **10-1**-12

(Tomi, “U.S. Stock Futures Rally on Back of Encouraging Euro-Zone Data,” http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20121001-705922.html)

U.S. stock futures rallied to kick off the fourth quarter on a bright note as some **encouraging data out of Europe helped build investor confidence ahead of a reading on manufacturing activity**.¶ About 90 minutes ahead of the open, Dow Jones Industrial Average futures climbed 56 points, or 0.4%, to 13411.¶ Standard & Poor's 500-stock index futures advanced five points, or 0.3%, to 1439 and Nasdaq 100 futures hiked up 14 points, or 0.5%, to 2806. Changes in stock futures don't always accurately predict stock moves after the opening bell.¶ The Institute for Supply Management's manufacturing purchasing manager's index for September is due out at 10 a.m. EDT. The median estimate of economists surveyed by Dow Jones Newswires is for a slight decline to 49.5 from 49.6 in August. Also at 10 a.m., construction spending in August is seen rising 0.4% on the month, after falling 0.9% in July.¶ **European markets rallied**, with the Stoxx Europe 600 up 0.8%, **as investors cheered data showing some stabilization in the euro-zone economy and the results of Spain's bank stress tests**.¶ **The euro-zone's manufacturing** purchasing manager's **index** for September **was revised up to 46.1**, up from a preliminary estimate of 46 and from a reading of 45.1 in August. Readings below 50 imply contraction.¶ Separately, Spain said after the European markets closed Friday that half of the 14 Spanish banks subjected to stress tests would need further capital totaling 59.3 billion euros, or about $76.3 billion, which was slightly less than expected. **Spain's IBEX-35 index rose 0.6%**.