# Perm

#### ( ) The perm can’t solve and we’ll still win a link – even if reps aren’t directly tied to policy, our link on-balance outweighs their takeouts. And, the perm can’t solve because it’s not enough to take particular actions within a larger discursive field of Western China studies – the entire field that organizes our knowledge of China has to be disrupted and interrogated. This is ONLY possible in a world of the alternative; the perm dooms reflection.

Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, at Deakin University, August 2004, Discourses Of ‘China’ In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 32-34

It is of course possible to overemphasise intellectuals’ responsibility for the (re)formulation of actual and specific policy. As Robert L. Suettinger has argued: it is important to recognize that think tanks and academic discussions have only a limited and indirect impact on the thinking and decisions of key policymakers. Scholars may or may not have direct access to foreign policy officials, their articles may or may not be read, contradictory views may or may not cancel each other out. Generally, however, policy decisions have their own dynamics. Information flows and time horizons often do not accommodate dispassionate, lengthy, well-reasoned academic analysis.116 While recognising this point, we have to be very careful not to push it too far. Scholarly analysis is not the same thing as policy blueprint, but in general terms the two are intimately connected, not least in the sense that scholarly ideas can limit the horizons of political imagination and exclude certain action which might otherwise be taken into consideration as possible, perhaps more sensible, options. In the end, as Foucault puts it simply, “there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.” Thus, how we as scholars think and how we think differently matter. The question of how we can think differently cannot be satisfactorily answered in this thesis. However tempting, the thesis will promise no quick-fix solution to the difficult issues of Chinese foreign relations, particularly with the U.S. Nor is there simple, ready-made alternative to problems of Western discourse which I explore here. For ‘alternatives’ are themselves always in constant flux, and “the search for a source of meaning and order already in place” is in contradiction to the spirit of critical IR studies. Nevertheless, for all its reservations, the thesis does seek to indicate the possibility as well as the necessity of knowing China and its international relations in distinction from the conventional mode of knowledge. Given that at the centre of this disciplinary problem is positivist knowledge, tinkering around the edges of the China field is no longer enough. According to William Connolly, “It is not just this theory or that theory that needs disturbance and destabilization but the field of discourse upon which these theories contend with each other while naturalizing a network of common or complementary assumptions.” In this regard, Edward Said’s critique of Orientalism is again of significance. Concerned with “questions as to how the production of knowledge best serves communal, as opposed to factional, ends, how knowledge that is non-dominative and non-coercive can be produced in a setting that is deeply inscribed with the politics, the considerations, the positions, and the strategies of power,” Said argues that “Orientalism reconsidered in this wider and libertarian optic entails nothing less than the creation of new objects for a new kind of knowledge.” Again, the question of how this new kind of knowledge could be created is beyond the scope of this thesis. In the very least, however, such knowledge will have to go beyond the confines of positivist certainties of subject and object, self and Other, and avoid reducing contingency and difference to either universal sameness or ahistorical Otherness to be controlled or transformed. Also, such knowledge will have to refrain from speaking for the ‘object of study,’ and allow the ‘object’ some kind of subjectivity and ‘sovereign’ voice of its own, though not to the point of reifying that voice as the truth. In short, such knowledge will have to be markedly different from the dichotomised, essentialist knowledge of China as offered by (neo)realist and (neo)liberal perspectives. Indeed, only by exposing the inadequacy and danger associated with the dominant Western discourses of China in international relations, can we prise open spaces for ‘alternative’ ways of knowing China in IR, and construct some more nuanced, more self-reflective, and less dangerous ways of engaging with the complex and important issues of China’s relations with the contemporary world in this increasingly globalised era. In this context, as stated at the outset, we would do well to work more closely with critical social theory in general and critical IR scholarship in particular, and to give discourse analysis a more salient position in the study of Chinese foreign relations. This thesis represents a hesitative step in this direction. I want to begin this journey via a discussion of Western thinking on self and Other—a discourse primarily carried out in an American accent.

### China Scholarship Link

#### ( ) U.S. scholarship that presumes to be particularly qualified to speak for China is not epistemologically neutral – the affirmative reduces China to a discursive construction as an absolute strategic other. In this framework, China’s subjectivity is obliterated and it exists purely for the U.S. self.

Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, at Deakin University, 2004, Alternatives 29, p. 316-18

It is mainly on the basis of this self-fashioning that many U.S. scholars have for long claimed their “expertise” on China. For example, from his observation (presumably on Western TV net­works) of the Chinese protest against the U.S. bombing of their embassy in Belgrade in May 1999, Robert Kagan is confident enough to speak on behalf of the whole Chinese people, claiming that he knows “the fact” of “what [China] really thinks about the United States.” That is, “they consider the United States an enemy— or, more precisely, the enemy. . . How else can one interpret the Chinese government’s response to the bombing?” he asks, rhetori­cally. For Kagan, because the, Chinese “have no other informa­tion” than their government’s propaganda, the protesters cannot rationally “know” the whole event as “we” do. Thus, their anger must have been orchestrated, unreal, and hence need not be taken seriously. Given that Kagan heads the U.S. Leadership Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is very much at the heart of redefining the United States as the’ benevolent global hegemon, his confidence in speaking for the Chinese “other” is perhaps not surprising. In a similar vein, without producing in-depth analysis, Bern­stein and Munro invoke with great ease such all-encompassing notions as “the Chinese tradition” and its “entire three-thousand-year history.” In particular, they repeatedly speak of what China’s “real” goal is: “China is an unsatisfied and ambitious power whose goal is to dominate Asia. . . . China aims at achieving a kind of hegemony.... China is so big and so naturally powerful that [we know] it will tend to dominate its region even if it does not intend to do so as a matter of national policy.” Likewise, with the goal of ab­solute security for the United States in mind, Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen argue: The truth is that China can pose a grave problem even if it does not become a military power on the American model, does not intend to commit aggression, integrates into a global economy, and liberalizes politically. Similarly, the United States could face a dangerous conflict over Taiwan even if it turns out that Beijing lacks the capacity to conquer the island. . . . This is true because of geography; because of America’s reliance on alliances to pro­ject power; and because of China’s capacity to harm U.S. forces, U.S. regional allies, and the American homeland, even while los­ing a war in the technical, military sense. By now, it seems clear that neither China’s capabilities nor intentions really matter. Rather, almost by its mere geographical existence, China has been qualified as an absolute strategic “other,” a discursive construct from which it cannot escape. Because of this, “China” in U.S. IR discourse has been objectified and deprived of its own subjectivity and exists mainly in and for the U.S. self. Little wonder that for many U.S. China specialists, China becomes merely a “national security concern” for the United States, with the “severe disproportion between the keen attention to China as a security concern and the intractable neglect of China’s [own] security con­cerns in the current debate.”

# Their Pan Cards

### ‘Chinese Identity is Fluid’ Link

#### ( ) Their affirmation of multiple and contradictory Chinese identities will be co-opted by the spin doctors in the U.S. to represent China as an irrational, threatening culture, recreating self-Other dichotomies that turn the aff.

Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, at Deakin University, August 2004, Discourses Of ‘China’ In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 151

Unlike Dikötter’s ‘discovery’ of some rigid, singular, essentialised Chinese national identity, other scholars have encountered multiple, ambiguous, or even conflicting Chinese identities, which seem unable to fit into their preconstituted conceptions of what Chinese national identity should look like.89 Consequently, they perceive the Chinese national identity as problematic or in crisis, and hence a cause for worry.90 This has, for example, prompted Samuel Kim to ask “How does China fit into the post-Cold War challenge of establishing a more peaceful, equitable, democratic, and ecological world order?”91 In this way, a dichotomy is again evoked, with ‘us’ as the mainstay of a ‘peaceful,’ ‘democratic’ world order and ‘them’ primarily as an unsettled ‘problem,’ unable to find a “comfortable niche as a nation-state in the modern international system.”92 Hence the ‘China threat’ remains, a conclusion which emerges less from a careful reading of Chinese society than from the self/Other dichotomy built into the national identity perspective, a perspective committed to the positivist search for “a central reference point” in the study of Chinese foreign policy.93

# Tuthail

### War/Self-Fulfilling Prophecy Impact

#### ( ) Their representations of China make war inevitable

Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, at Deakin University, August 2004, Discourses Of ‘China’ In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 43-44

Like the liberal construction of Other touched on above, this largely realist framing of Other carries with it some profound implications in practice. That is, when the Other is depicted as a fixed geopolitical threat, waging a war (or at least preparing for war) to destroy it often becomes the only rational option to fulfilling the universal self. In this regard, Robert Young notes that “war constitutes the [Western] philosophical concept of being itself. For being is always defined as the appropriation of either difference into identity, or of identities into a greater order…. War, then, is another form of the appropriation of the other….” In this context, not surprisingly, war has figured prominently in U.S. foreign relations: War is always violent, bloody, and destructive. But American wars are fought for great and good ends, and they result in good for America. The Revolution created freedom, independence, and democracy. The Civil War resulted in the expansion of freedom, the destruction of slavery, the growth of industrial might and wealth, and the formation of a unified, powerful nation. Insofar as both liberal and realist framings of Other are derived from the same particular American self-construction, their different approaches to understanding global politics in general and China in particular are basically mutually complementary, rather than mutually exclusive. Recently, this relationship of mutual complement is particularly striking in the emergence of a ‘two worlds’ theory, and its various incarnations such as the new imperialism, liberal imperialism, the New Wilsonianism, and neo-conservatism. As neoconservative commentators William Kristol and Robert Kagan put it, both ‘moral clarity’ and ‘military strength’ are essential if Americans are to continue to be proud of their leading role in world affairs.

### Prefer Propensity for Our Impact

#### ( ) Our impacts are the most likely – once China is represented as a threat, nothing it does can deter the hawks in the U.S. from their commitment to go to war. This was proven by the Iraq war, where the lack of an objective threat couldn’t have stopped the war because of the way Iraq had been represented in the American imagination.

Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, at Deakin University, August 2004, Discourses Of ‘China’ In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 144-45

Thus, the problem is less about the lack of transparency in Chinese official statistics, but more about the pre-constituted image of the China threat which dictates how China and its capabilities/intentions should be interpreted in the first instance. And at the root of this problem is in turn the positivist-cum-realist commitment to the search for an assumed single, essential reality which effectively rules out ambiguity, contingency and indeterminacy. In this case, neorealist observers rest on an either/or certainty: either China guarantees absolute peace, or it represents a threat—there is no half-way house. Since no such guarantee has been forthcoming from China (and I doubt it can be found anywhere), it must be seen as a threat. As noted before, this logic has been clearly at work in the construction of the Iraq threat in the lead up to the current invasion. It is no less evident in the view of Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen, who speculate that: If the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] remains second-rate, should the world breathe a sigh of relief? Not entirely…. Drawing China into the web of global interdependence may do more to encourage peace than war, but it cannot guarantee that the pursuit of heartfelt political interests will be blocked by a fear of economic consequences…. [And] U.S. efforts to create a stable balance across the Taiwan Strait might deter the use of force under certain circumstances, but certainly not all [emphases added]. Consequently, the only certain conclusion is a China threat: The truth is that China can pose a grave problem even if it does not become a military power on the American model, does not intend to commit aggression, integrates into a global economy, and liberalizes politically. Similarly, the United States could face a dangerous conflict over Taiwan even if it turns out that Beijing lacks the capacity to conquer the island…. This is true because of geography; because of America’s reliance on alliances to project power; and because of China’s capacity to harm U.S. forces, U.S. regional allies, and the American homeland, even while losing a war in the technical, military sense. In consequence, in this relentless quest for structural certainty, neither China’s capabilities nor intentions really matter, since China is already framed according to a ready-made image of a strategic threat. Given the a priori belief that “All other states are potential threats,” the China threat is not understood contingently or context-specifically; rather, it is a meaning projected on to China simply because of its mere geographical existence as a state. Therefore, in the end, it is often ironic that some ‘China threat’ theorists sell their policy of containment on the grounds that China is not strong enough. For example, Mearsheimer argues that “China is still far away from having enough latent power to make a run at regional hegemony, so it is not too late for the United States to reverse the course and do what it can to slow China’s rise.” In this sense, it becomes obvious that China can hardly escape from this powerful discursive framework (by, as Georgi Arbatov suggested, simply choosing not to be an enemy of the West). Pertinent to this point is, for example, a perception of China as a troublemaker among some U.S. business analysts. As one report notes, when the U.S. economy suffered deflation a couple of years ago, China was blamed for ‘exporting’ its own deflation through cheap products; and now, when inflation rears its head in America, China, thanks to its buying spree in world commodity markets, once again becomes part of the problem. In short, what is called ‘China’ in this neorealist strategic discourse seems to have little to do with what is going on in China, but for is rather a preconstructed, symbolised ‘national security concern’ the West, and the U.S. in particular. “What is disconcerting, though,” as Yongjin Zhang points out, “is the severe disproportion between the keen attention to China as a security concern and the intractable neglect of China’s [own] security concerns in the current debate.” This, I would suggest, is probably not so surprising once we understand that in the ‘China threat’ literature, the rational Western/American knowing self, given its mission in guaranteeing world order and stability, is assumed to have a privileged right to security concerns, whereas the knowable object (China) is by definition bereft of its own subjectivity, whose security concerns, if any, should already be represented by that of the former. It is at this level that, I argue, the ‘threat’ argument as ‘scientific knowledge’ has shown its most hegemonic character. The following examples help us explain this point.

### General Alternative Solvency

#### ( ) We don’t even have to defend a particular alternative way of representing China in order for our alternative to solve. The question this debate should resolve is over the practical consequences of the way we represent China – if we win the aff’s representations are on-balance bad, then all our alternative has to do is abstain from those representations and offer a critical viewpoint. This act of criticism is what makes less dangerous regimes of representation possible in the first place.

Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, at Deakin University, August 2004, Discourses Of ‘China’ In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 259-260

This is not to endorse an ‘anything goes’ attitude on studying China’s foreign relations. Quite the opposite. For the range of social meanings which can be attached to a certain thing is not limitless, and under certain circumstances, it is obvious that some interpretations appear truer than others. Ultimately, it is the different practical consequences associated with different interpretations that matter. Thus, my point here is that while different meaning-giving strategies could all have certain ‘real-world’ implications, some implications are more dangerous than others. Therefore, when we assign some particular meaning to China, we need to remind ourselves of its potential practical effect, and incessantly bear in mind that such effect, if dangerous, may in some degree be undone if a different, more constructive meaning is given. In short, however tempting it might be, we cannot here return to the kind of ‘Hobson’s choice’ between either a new fixed, definite solution or no alternative at all to the continued reign of the conventional meaning-giving regime. Rather, the choice lies in constantly recognising, on the one hand, the impossibility of having a detached, God’s-eye view of some fundamental truth, and on the other hand, the possibility of formulating nuanced, self-reflective, and responsible ways of seeing an inherently changing world. Such choice, as I have demonstrated in this thesis, is not only clearly possible but also imperative in the study of a complex China amid the volatility, danger, as well as vast potential of contemporary global politics. A ‘choice’ which might indeed hold the key to world peace in the decades to come.

### Colonialism Impact

#### ( ) Their representations of China enact the ultimate violence of colonialism – the socially constructed nature of U.S.-China relations means that U.S. pressure causes China to internalize a colonial relationship and emulate the violent power politics of the West. This is the worst violence of colonialism.

Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, at Deakin University, August 2004, Discourses Of ‘China’ In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 6-7

Furthermore, I want to argue that associated with Western control and domination is the social construction of Chinese foreign relations. Here, I refer not only to China’s official foreign policy, but also underlying Chinese attitudinal and theoretical positions on issues concerning international relations in general and China’s place in the world in particular. Issues associated, for example, with national interests, national identity, power, sovereignty, security, peace, war, interdependence, globalisation, the free market, economic development, democracy, human rights, international norms, and world order. Thus understood, the way we give meaning to China not only sets the conditions for how we deal with it, but also comes to influence and construct ‘Chinese reality’ in the international context. Contrary, therefore, to the orthodox assumption that China and its foreign relations belong to the category of pregiven, independent variables and a realm of pregiven knowable knowledge, I emphasise that this knowledge cannot be detached from mainstream Western studies of Chinese foreign relations. This position is basically in agreement with that of the late Edward W. Said, who wrote, in reference to Western constructions of Islam, that “even if we do not blame everything that is unhealthy about the Islamic world on the West, we must be able to see the connection between what the West has been saying about Islam and what, reactively, various Muslim societies have done.” Such connection, more specifically, has been characterised by Ashis Nandy in terms of the phenomenon of the ‘intimate enemy.’ A phenomenon by which colonised peoples, striving to defeat the West at its own game, end up accepting and actively imitating the same kind of attitudes and strategies that the West had used to subjugate them. This, argues Nandy, effectively leads to a kind of ‘self-Othering’ or ‘self- Orientalisation’ on the part of the colonised, and represents “the ultimate violence which colonialism does to its victims, namely that it creates a culture in which the ruled are constantly tempted to fight their rulers within the psychological limits set by the latter.” Although Nandy’s concern is mainly about the relationship between the colonialists and the colonised, this phenomenon also has resonance within the context of historical and contemporary Sino-Western interactions. Consequently, throughout this thesis, I will seek to illustrate how mainstream Western discursive practice contributes to the formation of an ‘intimate enemy’ relationship between the West and China.

# J-PiCs Good

### JUSTIFICATION PIC BLOCKS

#### INTERPRETATION: THE AFFIRMATIVE SHOULD PRESENT AND DEFEND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A TOPICAL PLAN. THE NEGATIVE SHOULD PRESENT A COMPETITVE POLICY OPTION AND/OR A CRITIQUE OF THE 1AC’S JUSTIFICATIONS.

#### JUSTIFICATIONS COMPETITION IS GOOD:

#### MORE REAL WORLD – VALUABLE POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS RECOGNIZES THE INTRINSIC IMPORTANCE OF JUSTIFICATION IN POLICYMAKING – IRAQ PROVES BIG POLITICAL DECISIONS HINGE ON THE QUESTION OF REPUTABLE JUSTIFICATION.

#### FAIR, STABLE DIVISION OF GROUND – LINKS ENSURE RECIRPROCITY AND CHECK INFINITE REGRESSION. WE ISOLATE THE METHOD OF COMPETITION WHICH BOLSTERS AFF STABLE IMPACT TURN GROUND BUILT INTO THE 1AC

#### KEY TO EDUCATION. ONLY OUR INTERP PROVIDES EDUCATION ABOUT THE COMPLEX INTERACTIONS BETWEEN ONE’ S JUSTIFICATIONS AND INTENDED MESSAGE OF PERSUASION. THEIR INTERP PRECLUDES THE DEBATE COMMUNITY FROM SELF-REFLEXIVE EVALUATION OF THE ROLE OF ARGUMENT SELECTION.

#### KEY TO POLICYMAKING RELEVENCE – POLICYMAKERS AND POLITICS OPERATE COMPARATIVELY MORE THROUGH NARRATIVE-EVALUATION RATHER THAN LOGICAL ARGUMENT OR DATA EVALUATION.

Dryzek 2006

**John S. Dryzek, Policy analysis as critique,** John Dryzek is Professor of Political Science and Australian Research Council Federation Fellow, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. He is a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia, former Head of the Departments of Political Science at the Universities of Oregon and Melbourne and the Social and Political Theory program at ANU, and former editor of the Australian Journal of Political Science, Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, pg 194-5

Narrative analysis (Roe 1994) focuses mainly on stories that are told by participants in policy processes. The language of policy, in common with the language of many social settings, features the telling of stories much more than it features argument, deductive logic, or still less quantitative optimization. The effect of a good story is to convince its audience that an issue ought to be framed in a particular way. The facts never ‘‘speak for themselves.’’ For example, a story about rape and murder amid ethnic conflict could be told by a nationalist demagogue in terms of violated ethnic innocence and collective ethnic guilt of its perpetrators. The same facts could also support a story of violation of basic human rights and universal principles of humanity. The action consequences of each story would be vastly different.

### AT: JUST AN ALT SOLVES

#### WE MEET – THEY CAN’T DISTINGUISH OUR ALTERNATIVE FROM WHATEVER THEY THINK AN ALT. IS – AFF CAN’T DICTATE THE MEANS OF NEGATIVE COMPETITION THROUGH APPEAL TO ARTIFICAL AUTHORITY.

#### UNDER THEIR INTERP, THE 2NC WILL PROLIFERATE 10 LINK ARGS AND THEN CLAIM A NEBULOUS REJECTION OF THE THINGS THEY CONVEINIANTLY DEFINE SOLVES ALL THE LINKS – THAT’S WORSE FOR AFF PREDICTABILITY AND EDUCATION. UNDER OUR INTERP, THE JUSTIFICATION HAS TO BE PRESENT IN THE 1AC, UNDER THEIRS, IT COULD BE ANY COMPETITIVE IDEOLOGY OR A FIAT’D GLOBAL SUICIDE ALT. FLIPS ALL THEIR PREDICTABILTY INFINITE GRESSIONS AND GROUND CLAIMS.

#### LINKS TO OUR OFFENSE – IT DE-EMPHESIZES JUSTIFICATION TO DO THE AFF BY COERCING THE NEGATIVE INTO REDUCTIONIST, STRAWPERSON VERSIONS OF THEIR CLAIMS. JUSTIFICATIONS EDUCATION IS KEY TO EFFECTIVE POLICYMAKING.

#### LINKS MORE TO THEIR OFFENSE AGAINST OUR INTERP – IT INCENTIVIZES NEGS TO MAKE NONUNIQUE GENERIC REPS Ks WHICH IS ACTUALLY WHAT THE AFF SPEECHES ARE DESIGNED TO PROVE IS BAD. FLIPS THEIR OFFENSE.

#### IS UNIQUELY WORSE FOR THE AFF – NEBULOUS “REJECT” ALTS STILL SOLVE THE ENTIRETY OR PARTS OF THE AFF AND FORCE AFFS TO DEBATE THEMSELVES. THAT ALSO PROVES NO UNIQUENESS TO THEIR GROUND LOSS CLAIMS.

#### OUR INTERP GIVES THE AFF MORE STABLE GROUND BY SPECIFYING THE POINT OF CLASH MEANING THAT BECAUSE THE LINK PROVES ITS PERTINENCE TO THE AFF, ANY GOOD 1AC BY DEFINITION HAS A RECIPROCAL AND INTRINSIC IMPACT TURN IN THE 1AC.

#### INCENTIVIZES STRATEGIC MISCOMMUNICATION AND VAGUENESS – THAT’S WORSE DEBATEABILITY FOR THE AFF BECAUSE IT ALLOWS THE NEG TO GARNER SOLVENCY NOT THROUGH THE STRENGTH OF ARGUMENT BUT BY PROLIFERATING DISCRETE, UNCLEAR AND BROAD SOLVENCY CLAIMS.

#### EVEN IF WE LOSE THIS ARTICULATION OF THE ALT, REJECT IT BUT OUR CRITIQUE STILL PROVES THE AFF CAUSES A UNIQUELY NEGATIVE IMPACT WHICH IMPUNES THEIR SOLVENCY CLAIMS AND RISKS AN EXTERNAL IMPACT WHICH TURNS AND OUTWEIGHS THE AFF. YOU CAN STIL L VOTE NEGATIVE BECAUSE THE AFFRIMATIVE TEAM’S CHOSEN ARGUMENTS ARE CONSEQUENTIALLY UNDESIRABLE. THAT MORE CLEARLY FITS THE ASSIGNED TASK OF THE JUDGE - EVALUATING WHO DID THE BETTER JOB DEBATING AS OPPOSED TO WHO MORE CLOSELY PRESENTED THE MOST ACCURATE .

### ARGUMENT CULTURE DA

#### AND, FOREGROUNDING JUSTIFICATIONS IS KEY TO A CRITICAL ARGUMENTATIVE CULTURE.

ZAREFSKY 2K9

[david, Informal Logic, Vol 29, No 3, 296-308, Prof. Communication Studies, Northwestern University]

Fourth, an argument culture embraces the process of justifying,¶ rather than proving, one’s claims. Because matters are uncertain,¶ there is an inferential leap between one’s premises and one’s¶ conclusions. Argumentation recognizes this leap and offers reasons¶ for making it.7 The reasons are acceptable if they would convince a¶ reasonable person who was exercising critical judgment. If so, we¶ may say that the claim has been justified. The more critical the¶ “critical” listener, who assents to the argument, the more confident¶ the arguer can be that his or her claim is sound.¶ Justification, then, is subjective and is dependent upon the¶ particular audience. It says not that something is true rather that a¶ person should believe it. What is “justified” is commitment to a¶ position or standpoint, not certification of its truth. In emphasizing¶ justification rather than proof, an argument culture implies that¶ people are open-minded and willing to be convinced without the¶ assurance of truth, yet skeptical enough not to take statements just¶ on faith. Moreover, justification has degrees of strength, ranging¶ from the merely plausible to the highly probably, and the strength¶ attributed to the argument will vary accordingly.¶ What counts as justification—the sorts of evidence and¶ reasoning structures that will be convincing—will depend on the¶ context, including such factors as the importance of the issue to the¶ participants, the status the arguers have in the controversy, and the¶ possibility of reversing course if the justification is found to be in¶ error. The meaning and importance of justification remain constant,¶ but the criteria for and strength of justification are contextspecific.¶ 8

#### AND, THE ARGUMENTATIVE CULTURE CONTROLS UNIQUENESS FOR AND FLIPS ALL THEIR INTERNAL LINKS – IT’S A PRE-REQUISITE FOR DEBATEABILITY.

ZAREFSKY 2K9

[david, Informal Logic, Vol 29, No 3, 296-308, Prof. Communication Studies, Northwestern University]

In contrast, matters that are uncertain are potentially¶ controversial; they always could be otherwise. However strongly¶ we may believe about them, we cannot know for sure.¶ Argumentation, then, is characterized by the existence of opposing¶ viewpoints, and an argument culture is one that valorizes dissensus¶ rather than seeking either to ignore or to squelch disagreements.6¶ Continuing the discussion is a higher priority than is achieving an¶ artificial settlement. Some conflicts can be resolved; others can¶ only be clarified. But argumentation can be productive in either¶ case.¶ This being so, in an argument culture people respect one¶ another regardless of the beliefs they espouse. Disagreements take¶ place over standpoints, not individuals. Any arguer deserves¶ respect for contributing to the conversation, not disdain for¶ prolonging it. (In turn, each persons has an obligation genuinely to¶ contribute, not merely to rehash or to distract.)¶ Third, an argument culture is one that, even in the face of¶ uncertainty, values conviction. To put it another way, individuals¶ do not wallow in uncertainty, indifferent to choices and content to¶ follow the path of least resistance. Nor are they paralyzed by the¶ inability to decide conclusively. On the contrary, they argue both to¶ form and to test their beliefs. They do the former through problemsolving¶ discussions; the latter, through dialogue, disputation, and¶ debate. Even when people have beliefs so strong that they think¶ they know for sure, like the Minnesota high school students who¶ wrote me that everyone knows that human life begins at conception¶ and abortion is chosen only for convenience, still they test their¶ beliefs by submitting them to the scrutiny others will offer through¶ argument. To be challenged is not a sign of weakness, nor is¶ answering a challenge a sign that the challenge was unfounded.¶ What sustains convictions on this view is not prejudice or¶ closed-mindedness, not reaffirmation of cant or dogma, but the fact¶ that the convictions have withstood meaningful testing through¶ argument. What leads one to change convictions is not force or¶ seduction, not indifference or withering in the face of a challenge.

### EPISTEMOLOGY FIRST

#### OUR EPISTEMOLOGY CRITIQUES SHORT CIRCUITS THE ENTIRE EMPIRICISM DEBATE - THERE IS A GAP IN EMPIRICAL DATA ON THE NORMATIVE EFFECTS OF IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION IN KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION.

Alvesson and Robertson 2006

Mats Alvesson and Maxine Robertson, “Identities in Consulting Firms: The Best and the Brightest: The Construction, Significance and Effects of Elite “ Organization 2006; 13; 195

 Many consulting ﬁrms, particularly the smaller niche players, are good examples of the post-bureaucratic organizational form, characterized as they are by relatively few layers of hierarchy, ﬂexibility, a degree of participation in decision-making and loose career structures (Heckscher, 1994; Grey and Garsten, 2001). Others, particularly large consultancy ﬁrms, exhibit signiﬁcant elements of bureaucracyalthough this has its limitations and other, normative forms of control, are at least equally signiﬁcant (Covaleski et al., 1998; K¨ arreman and Alvesson, 2004). **In the absence,** or only partial usefulness, **of institutionalized repositories of organizational routines and method and clearly demarcated bureaucratic structures, it becomes important to develop broadly shared ideas and meanings of what the ﬁrm represents and the direction of the ﬁrm. A clear sense of organizational identity is normatively regulating, promoting co-ordinated, purposeful action and particular instrumental behaviours** within these ambiguous, loosely-coupled environments (Albert et al., 2000). However, h**ow organizational identities might be constructed, and their effects have not on the whole been subject to empirical examination within knowledge intensive settings** such as consultancy ﬁrms (although see Kunda, 1992; Robertson and Swan, 2003).

#### THEIR INTERP DESTRYOS THE ABILITY FOR DEBATERS TO ANALYZE THE COMMUNICATIVE INFLUENCE OF POLICY ADVOCACY.

Gherke 1998

 (Pat J, Former Debate Coach and Rhetorical Scholar, “Critique Arguments as Policy Analysis: Policy Debate Beyond the Rationalist Perspective,” Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, 19, 1998, pp. 18-39)

Arguably, some policies may intend no more than their implementation. However, that does not free such policies from responsibility for far more than they intend. While methods for considering these interpretive and communicative aspects of a policy are beyond the rationalist perspective, any evaluation of policy options must consider these communicative perspectives. To limit these interpretations to the intentional and the naïve is to limit policy discourse and policy analysis, destroying our ability to consider the communicative effects and influences of policy advocacy. In her analysis of the published reports of the Tuskegee study, Martha Solomon notes that one reason the Tuskegee experiment continued for as long as it did was that the rhetorical conventions of the scientific community obscured and encouraged neglect of crucial human concerns (243­244). Her focus necessarily extends far beyond the intentional, naive, rogate meanings of the Tuskegee texts. While recognizing these language choices were not intentional attempts to deceive or manipulate, Solomon accounts for their occurrence and impact upon the policy process. Attempts at similar analysis of proposed policies might act as a check against policy actions such as the Tuskegee study. Ignorance of these aspects of policy analysis may persuade debaters that policies that meet rational cost-benefit criteria are always the most effective and preferential policy options, regardless of how they characterize individuals or communicate roles and obligations. Similarly, it will leave debaters unable to account for the often enduring and dramatic effects of the communicative aspects of policies and policy advocacy.

#### And – you can’t separate the policy from the narratives that give it meaning.

Rothberg 2012

(Michael Rothberg, Professor of English and Conrad Humanities Scholar at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Progress, Progression, Procession: William Kentridge and the Narratology of Transitional Justice. Narrat ive, Vol 20, No. 1 (January 2012))

Invictus is, of course, a blatantly Americanized version of South Africa’s transition. Yet, as such, it also emblematizes the transnational forces that are shaping the narrative of transitional justice today. As human rights scholar Paul Gready explains, “Globalisation as a whole is forging transitions and democracies characterised by continuity as well as change, by structures of inequality and patterns of conflict that are reconfigured rather than brought to an end” (Era of Transitional Justice 8).11 While predominantly a matter for political contestation, the limits of transitional justice in confronting such structures and patterns are also narrative limits, for, as Robert Cover has influentially argued, “No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning” (4). The generic conventions of the narrative of transition help install powerful ideological parameters that limit the field of possibility for new stories of transformation.