### Extinction O/W

#### Life should be valued as apriori – it precedes the ability to value anything else

Amien Kacou. 2008. WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of “Life”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184

Furthermore, that manner of finding things good that is in pleasure can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,” as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation. Thus, we can see now that, in general, something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself. And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good. However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value. But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

#### Existence precedes the ability to ascribe value [and respect the other]

Paul Wapner. 2003. Associate Prof. and Dir. Global Env’t. Policy Prog. – American U., Dissent, “Leftist criticism of “nature””, Winter, 50:1.

All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions--except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and nonexistence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity. In fact, if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative and, as Jean Francois Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its "incredulity toward meta-narratives." Nonetheless, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept the value of preserving the nonhuman world. The nonhuman is the extreme "other"; it stands in contradistinction to humans as a species. In understanding the constructed quality of human experience and the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of respecting the "other." At the very least, respect must involve ensuring that the "other" actually continues to exist. In our day and age, this requires us to take responsibility for protecting the actuality of the nonhuman. Instead, however, we are running roughshod over the earth's diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems. Postmodern critics should find this particularly disturbing. If they don't, they deny their own intellectual insights and compromise their fundamental moral commitment.

#### Give people the choice to live

Paterson 3 Craig, Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, <http://sce.sagepub.com>

In determining whether a life is worth living or not, **attention should be focused upon an array of ‘interests’ of the person**, and these, for the competent patient at least, are going to vary considerably, since they will be informed by the patient’s underlying dispositions, and, for the incompetent, by a minimal quality threshold. It follows that for competent patients, a broad-ranging assessment of quality of life concerns is the trump card as to whether or not life continues to be worthwhile. Different patients may well decide differently. That is the prerogative of the patient, for the only unpalatable alternative is to force a patient to stay alive. For Harris, life can be judged valuable or not when the person assessing his or her own life determines it to be so. If a person values his or her own life, then that life is valuable**, precisely to the extent that he or she values it**. Without any real capacity to value, there can be no value. As Harris states, ‘. . . the value of our lives is the value we give to our lives’. It follows that the primary injustice done to a person is to deprive the person of a life he or she may think valuable. Objectivity in the value of human life, for Harris, essentially becomes one of negative classification (ruling certain people out of consideration for value), allied positively to a broad range of ‘critical interests’; interests worthy of pursuing — **friendships, family, life goals, etc**. — which are subjected to de facto **self-assessment** for the further determination of meaningful value. Suicide, assisted suicide, and voluntary euthanasia, can therefore be justified, on the grounds that once the competent nature of the person making the decision has been established, the thoroughgoing commensuration between different values, in the form of interests or preferences, is essentially left up to the individual to determine for himself or herself.

### At: Value to Life Impacts

#### Value to life should be individually determined – their impact claims invalidate personal autonomy

SCHWARTZ, HENDRY, & PREECE 2004 Professional Metaphysician, Senior Lecturer, General Practicianer Professor, Academic Surgeon [“Medical Ethics: A case based approach,” Lisa, Paul, and Robert]

Those who choose to reason on this basis hope that if the quality of a life can be measured then the answer to whether that life has value to the individual can be determined easily. This raises special problems, however, because the idea of quality involves a value judgement, and value judgements are, by their essence, subject to indeterminate relative factors such as preferences and dislikes. Hence, quality of life is difficult to measure and will vary according to individual tastes, preferences and aspirations. As a result, no general rules or principles can be asserted that would simplify decisions about the value of a life based on its quality. Nevertheless, quality is still an essential criterion in making such decisions because it gives legitimacy to the possibility that rational, autonomous persons can decide for themselves that their own lives either are worth, or are no longer worth, living. To disregard this possibility would be to imply that no individuals can legitimately make such value judgements about their own lives and, if nothing else, that would be counterintuitive. 2 In our case, Katherine Lewis had spent 10 months considering her decision before concluding that her life was no longer of a tolerable quality. She put a great deal of effort into the decision and she was competent when she made it. Who would be better placed to make this judgement for her than Katherine herself? And yet, a doctor faced with her request would most likely be uncertain about whether Katherine's choice is truly in her best interest, and feel trepidation about assisting her. We need to know which considerations can be used to protect the patient's interests. The quality of life criterion asserts that there is a difference between the type of life and the fact of life. This is the primary difference between it and the sanctity criterion discussed on page 115. Among quality of life considerations rest three assertions: 1. there is relative value to life 2. the value of a life is determined subjectively 3. not all lives are of equal value. Relative value The first assertion, that life is of relative value, could be taken in two ways. In one sense, it could mean that the value of a given life can be placed on a scale and measured against other lives. The scale could be a social scale, for example, where the contributions or potential for contribution of individuals are measured against those of fellow citizens. Critics of quality of life criteria frequently name this as a potential slippery slope where lives would be deemed worthy of saving, or even not saving, based on the relative social value of the individual concerned. So, for example, a mother of four children who is a practising doctor could be regarded of greater value to the community than an unmarried accountant. The concern is that the potential for discrimination is too high. Because of the possibility of prejudice and injustice, supporters of the quality of life criterion reject this interpersonal construction in favour of a second, more personalized, option. According to this interpretation, the notion of relative value is relevant not between individuals but within the context of one person's life and is measured against that person's needs and aspirations. So Katherine would base her decision on a comparison between her life before and after her illness. The value placed on the quality of a life would be determined by the individual depending on whether he or she believes the current state to be relatively preferable to previous or future states and whether he or she can foresee controlling the circumstances that make it that way. Thus, the life of an athlete who aspires to participate in the Olympics can be changed in relative value by an accident that leaves that person a quadriplegic. The athlete might decide that the relative value of her life is diminished after the accident, because she perceives her desires and aspirations to be reduced or beyond her capacity to control. However, if she receives treatment and counselling her aspirations could change and, with the adjustment, she could learn to value her life as a quadriplegic as much or more than her previous life. This illustrates how it is possible for a person to adjust the values by which they appraise their lives. For Katherine Lewis, the decision went the opposite way and she decided that a life of incapacity and constant pain was of relatively low value to her. It is not surprising that the most vociferous protesters against permitting people in Katherine's position to be assisted in terminating their lives are people who themselves are disabled. Organizations run by, and that represent, persons with disabilities make two assertions in this light. First, they claim that accepting that Katherine Lewis has a right to die based on her determination that her life is of relatively little value is demeaning to all disabled people, and implies that any life with a severe disability is not worth living. Their second assertion is that with proper help, over time Katherine would be able to transform her personal outlook and find satisfaction in her life that would increase its relative value for her. The first assertion can be addressed by clarifying that the case of Katherine Lewis must not be taken as a general rule. Deontologists, who are interested in knowing general principles and duties that can be applied across all cases would not be very satisfied with this; they would prefer to be able to look to duties that would apply in all cases. Here, a case-based, context-sensitive approach is better suited. Contextualizing would permit freedom to act within a particular context, without the implication that the decision must hold in general. So, in this case, Katherine might decide that her life is relatively valueless. In another case, for example that of actor Christopher Reeve, the decision to seek other ways of valuing this major life change led to him perceiving his life as highly valuable, even if different in value from before the accident that made him a paraplegic. This invokes the second assertion, that Katherine could change her view over time. Although we recognize this is possible in some cases, it is not clear how it applies to Katherine. Here we have a case in which a rational and competent person has had time to consider her options and has chosen to end her life of suffering beyond what she believes she can endure. Ten months is a long time and it will have given her plenty of opportunity to consult with family and professionals about the possibilities open to her in the future. Given all this, it is reasonable to assume that Katherine has made a well-reasoned decision. It might not be a decision that everyone can agree with but if her reasoning process can be called into question then at what point can we say that a decision is sound? She meets all the criteria for competence and she is aware of the consequences of her decision. It would be very difficult to determine what arguments could truly justify interfering with her choice. Subjective determination The second assertion made by supporters of the quality of life as a criterion for decisionmaking is closely related to the first, but with an added dimension. This assertion suggests that the determination of the value of the quality of a given life is a subjective determination to be made by the person experiencing that life. The important addition here is that the decision is a personal one that, ideally, ought not to be made externally by another person but internally by the individual involved. Katherine Lewis made this decision for herself based on a comparison between two stages of her life. So did James Brady. Without this element, decisions based on quality of life criteria lack salient information and the patients concerned cannot give informed consent. Patients must be given the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they think their lives are worth living or not. To ignore or overlook patients' judgement in this matter is to violate their autonomy and their freedom to decide for themselves on the basis of relevant information about their future, and comparative consideration of their past. As the deontological position puts it so well, to do so is to violate the imperative that we must treat persons as rational and as ends in themselves.

## AT No Politics

#### Evaluating political costs and understanding tradeoffs key to prevent genocide

Lanz 8

(David, Mediation Support Project for Swisspeace, “Conflict Management and Opportunity Cost: the International Response to the Darfur Crisis”)

There are no simple solutions for the contradictions outlined above – they represent complicated dilemmas and tricky trade-offs. It would be naïve to call for more coordination among external actors in Darfur, as the difference of their approaches is structural and refl ects their respective interests and contexts. There are, however, two lessons that we can learn. The fi rst is that resources are scarce and effective confl ict management requires priorities. It is not possible to simultaneously run a humanitarian operation, deploy peacekeepers, try the Sudanese President in an international court, negotiate a peace agreement, and foster the democratic transition of Sudan. We need to think about what is most important and concentrate our resources – money, political capital, personnel – to achieve this objective. The second lesson is that actors working in or on confl ict, whatever approach they take, must be aware that their decisions and actions have opportunity costs and that they can “do harm.” As David Kennedy writes, “the darker sides can swamp the benefi ts of humanitarian work, and well-intentioned people can fi nd themselves unwittingly entrenching the very things they have sought voice to denounce.”30 Also, those involved in the grand scheme of managing confl ict Darfur must realise that they are in essence projecting their morals and a Western political agenda and that, consequently, their good intentions may not be perceived as such, especially in the Arab world. Indeed, moving from selfcentred and self-righteous dogmatism to a pragmatic assessment of causes and consequences would be a big step, and it would certainly improve our ability to manage conflicts in Darfur and elsewhere.

#### You should evaluate our politics DA. Their dogmatic refusal to consider political process implications is grounded in the same destructive blindness the aff criticizes.

David **Chandler**, Centre for the Study of Democracy - University of Westminster, **‘3**

(British Journal of Politics and International Relations 5.3, “Rhetoric without responsibility”)

The attention to the articulation of a political mission, beyond the petty partisanship of left and right, through foreign policy activism abroad has been an important resource of authority and credibility for western political leaders. The ability to project or symbolise unifying ‘values’ has become a core leadership attribute. George W. Bush’s shaky start to the US presidency was transformed by his speech to Congress in the wake of the World Trade Centre and Pentagon attacks, in which he staked out his claim to represent and protect America’s ethical values against the terrorist ‘heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century’ (Bush 2001). Similarly, Tony Blair was at his most presidential in the wake of the attacks, arguing that values were what distinguished the two sides of the coming conflict: ‘We are democratic. They are not. We have respect for human life. They do not. We hold essentially liberal values. They do not’ (The Guardian, 27 March 1999). Peter Hain, minister of state at the UK Foreign Office, also focused on the ‘values that the terrorists attacked’ in his call for political unity around ‘tough action’ (The Guardian, 24 September 2001). By association with the cause of the victims of international conflicts, western governments can easily gain a moral authority that cannot be secured through the domestic political process. Even general election victories, the defining point of the domestic political process, no longer bring authority or legitimacy. This was clear in the contested victory of George W. Bush in the 2000 elections, which turned on the problem of the ‘hanging’ chad in Florida. However, the problem of deriving legitimacy from elections is a much broader one, with declining voter turnouts. In the British elections in 2001 Tony Blair achieved a landslide second term mandate, but there was little sense of euphoria—this was a hollow victory on a 50 per cent turnout which meant only one in four of the electorate voted for New Labour. The demise of the framework of traditional party politics, the source of western governments’ domestic malaise, is directly associated with the search for an external source of legitimacy. This process is illustrated in Michael Ignatieff’s quote from the writings of British war reporter Don McCullin: But what are my politics? I certainly take the side of the underprivileged. I could never say I was politically neutral. But whether I’m of the right or the left—I can’t say ... I feel, in my guts, at one with the victims. And I find there’s integrity in that stance (Ignatieff 1998, 22–23). Ignatieff suggests that the external projection of legitimacy or moral mission stems from the collapse of the left/right political framework, stating that ‘there are no good causes left—only victims of bad causes’ (ibid., 23). Governments, like many gap-year students, seek to define and find themselves through their engagement with the problems experienced by those in far-off countries. This search for a moral grounding through solidarity with the ‘victims of bad causes’ has led to an increasingly moralised ‘black and white’ or ‘good versus evil’ view of crisis situations in the non-western world.10 The jet-setting UK prime minister, Tony Blair, has been much criticised for appearing to deprioritise the domestic agenda in the wake of September 11, yet even his critics admit that his ‘moral mission’ in the international sphere has been crucial to enhancing his domestic standing. The search for ethical or moral approaches emphasising the government’s moral authority has inexorably led to a domestic shift in priorities making international policy-making increasingly high profile in relation to other policy areas. The emphasis on ethical foreign policy commitments enables western governments to declare an **unequivocal** moral stance, which helps to **mitigate** **awkward** **questions** of government mission and **political** **coherence** in the domestic sphere. The contrast between the moral certainty possible in selected areas of foreign policy and the uncertainties of domestic policy-making was unintentionally highlighted when President George Bush congratulated Tony Blair on his willingness to take a stand over Afghanistan and Iraq: ‘The thing I admire about this prime minister is that he doesn’t need a poll or a focus group to convince him of the difference between right and wrong’ (UKGovernment 2002). Tony Blair, like Bush himself, of course relies heavily on polls and focus groups for every domestic initiative. It is only in the sphere of foreign policy that it appears there are opportunities for western leaders to project a self-image of purpose, mission and political clarity. This is because it is easier to promote a position which can be claimed to be based on clear ethical values, rather than the vagaries of compromise and political pragmatism, in foreign policy than it is in domestic policy. There are three big advantages: first, the object of policy activism, and criticism, is a foreign government; second, the British or American government is not so accountable for matching rhetoric to international actions; and third, credit can be claimed for any positive outcome of international policy, while any negative outcome can be blamed on the actions or inaction of the government or population of the country concerned. The following sections highlight that the lack of connection between rhetorical demands and accountability for policy-making or **policy** **outcomes** has made selected high-profile examples of ethical foreign policy-making a **strong card** for western governments, under pressure to consolidate their standing and authority at home.

#### Ignoring political tradeoffs is totalitarian

Dean Richard **Villa**, Political Theory – UC Santa Barbara, **‘96**

(*Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political*, p. 246-7)

Arendt appropriates Heidegger’s genealogy of the technical sense of action in order to highlight the tradition’s persistent attempt to overcome plurality, the politically most relevant expression of the finitude of the human condition. Subjecting *praxis* to the rule of an end-representing reason makes it possible to exchange the nonsovereign freedom of **plural political actors** for the **command** **and** **control** exercised by the artisan. The Platonic “translation” of acting into the idiom of making established the pattern for deriving action from first philosophy or theory, a pattern that offered an escape from the irreducible relativity which besets the realm of human affairs. The substitution of making for acting initiates a paradigm of correspondence that, as Lyotard notes, delimits the Western tradition of political philosophy. Within the tropological space opened by this substitution, politics is viewed as the means or techné by which “the **‘fashioning’ of a people according to the** idea or **ideal** of just being-together” is accomplished.27

So long as political philosophy sees its task as the articulation of first principles with which actions, peoples, and institutions must be brought into accord, it reiterates the Platonic schema; moreover, it perpetuates the idea that politics resembles a plastic art. Arendt’s critique of the “Platonic” tradition reveals the drive to conflate political and artistic categories at the core of Western political theory, underlining the stubborn persistence of the state as artwork/politics as *techné* tropes. The strength of these figures is measured by the fact that the closure of the tradition barely shakes the logic of justification institutionalized by the Platonic separation of theory and practice. Western political theory, as Schürmann points out, has always demanded that action be grounded in some extrapolitical first (the cosmic order, natural or divine hierarchy, Reason and natural right, History, the greatest good for the greatest number, the emancipatory interest of the discursive community).28 As a result, it never really abandons the view that politics is a kind of **plastic art**, the “fashioning,” more or less **violent**, of a people in conformity with an ideal. The persistence of this trope is explained by its **efficacy for** **reducing plurality and difference**, and by its ability to represent violence and coercive power as “right.”29

Arendt’s theory of nonsovereign, agonistic action smashes this figure, breaking the circuit of justification through the liberation of action from the rule of grounding principles and pregiven ends.30 The essentially normative function of political theory – that is, the theoretical specification of the conditions for the legitimate exercise of power – is suspended.31 In its place Arendt develops a phenomenology of action and a narrative approach to the closure of the public realm in modernity, an approach designed to keep the memory of an agonistic public sphere alive. With this bracketing of the legitimation problematic, a new appreciation of spaces and practices not typically viewed as political becomes possible.32 Moreover, the Arendtian liberation of action throws the antipolitical, not to say the *inhuman*, consequences of the tradition’s conflation of artistic and political categories into sharp relief.

The teleocratic concept of action may be seen as the primary and most enduring expression of this conflation. With the collapse of transcendental grounds for the political, the logic of correspondence and justification built into this concept turns inward. The result is that the fashioning or “fictioning” of the community in conformity with an ideal of Justice is transformed into an exercise in self-production.33 And with this transformation, the threshold of modernity is traced.

We can see this transformation at work in the emergence of the Hobbesian problematic: the construction of the “Leviathan” needed to overawe its subjects is the work of those very subjects, in their “natural,” presubjected, and radically dissociated state.14 The example of Hobbes clearly demonstrates how, once the “art” of politics is deprived of its natural ground (once *techné* can no longer be seen as the completion or accomplishment of *physis*), a paradoxical and impossible logic asserts itself. The conundrum is simply put: the people, who do not yet exist *as a people*, must somehow always already be enough of a subject in order to author or fashion themselves *qua* community. The answers to this riddle proposed by the social contract tradition – Hobbes’s pact of association, which is simultaneously a transfer of power to a designated sovereign; Locke’s presupposition of what Laslett has called “natural political virtue”; the Rousseauian mechanism of the total alienation of individual rights and powers by which a communal, sovereign power is formed – have all been unconvincing, to say the least.35 Romanticism can be seen as the attempt to escape this paradox by radicalizing it. Instituting what Jean-Luc nancy has

called an “immanentist” logic of communal self-formation, romanticism elides the distinction between process and end: the subject is redefined as work in the double sense of self-formative activity *and* product.36 As Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe notes, in the romantic vision the community at work creates and works *itself*, thereby accomplishing the “subjective process *par excellence*, the process of self-formation and self-production.”37 The aim of the community of beings becomes “in essence to produce their own essence as community.”38

With this move, a peculiarly *modern* version of the traditional conflation of art and politics is created. The *organicity* of the political, origincally laid down by Plato’s *Republic*, takes a new and extreme form: the figure of the subject who is simultaneously artist *and* work absorbs that of the aesthetically integrated state. This subjectivization of the state as artwork trope culminates in the **totalitarian** **will** **to self-effectuation**: the will to the self-creation of a people characterized by full actualization, complete self-presence.39 The only community capable of achieving such self-presence is one from which plurality, difference, mediation, and alienation have been **expunged**: a community, in other words, that is not a *political* community at all.

### Calculations Good

#### Worst-case scenarios calculate for the sake of responsibility – mobilization is key to effective to political movements that prevent the worst forms of their impact

Michael Williams, Professor of International Politics – U. Wales, Aberystwyth**, ‘5**

(*The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations* p. 165-7)

Moreover, the links between sceptical realism and prevalent post-modern themes go more deeply than this, particularly as they apply to attempts by post-structural thinking to reopen questions of responsibility and ethics.80 In part, the goals of post-structural approaches can be usefully charactised, to borrow Stephen White’s illuminating contrast, as expressions of ‘responsibility to otherness’ which question and challenge modernist equations of responsibility with a ‘responsibility to act’. A responsibility to otherness seeks to reveal and open the constitutive processes and claims of subjects and subjectivities that a foundational modernism has effaced in its narrow identification of responsibility with a ‘responsibility to act’.81 Deconstruction can from this perspective be seen as a principled stance unwilling to succeumb to modernist essentialism which in the name of responsibility assumes and reifies subjects and structures, obscures forms of power and violence which are constitutive of them, and at the same time forecloses a consideration of alternative possibilities and practices. Yet it is my claim that the willful Realist tradition does not lack understanding of the contingency of practice or a vision of responsibility to otherness. On the contrary, its strategy of objectification is precisely an attempt to bring together a responsibility to otherness and a responsibility to act within a wilfully liberal vision. The construction of a realm of objectivity and calculation is not just a consequence of a need to act – the framing of an epistemic context for successful calculation. It is a form of responsibility to otherness, an attempt to allow for diversity and irreconcilability precisely by – at least initially – reducing the self and the other to a structure of material calculation in order to allow a structure of mutual intelligibility, mediation, and stability. It is, in short, a strategy of *limitation*: a wilful attempt to construct a subject and a social world limited – both epistemically and politically – in the name of a politics of toleration: a liberal strategy that John Gray has recently characterized as one of *modus vivendi*.82 If this is the case, then the deconstructive move that gains some of its weight by contrasting itself to a non- or apolitical objectivism must engage with the more complex contrast to a sceptical Realist tradition that is itself a constructed, ethical practice. This issue becomes even more acute if one considers Iver Neumann’s incisive questions concerning postmodern constructions of identity, action, and responsibility.83 As Neumann points out, the insight that identities are inescapably contingent and relationally constructed, and even the claim that identities are inescapably *indebted* to otherness, do not in themselves provide a foundation for practice, particularly in situations where identities are ‘sedimented’ and conflictually defined. In these cases, deconstruction alone will not suffice unless it can demonstrate a capacity to counter in practice and not just in philosophic practice the essentialist dynamics it confronts.84 Here, a responsibility to act must go **beyond** **deconstruction** to consider viable alternatives and counter-practices. To take this critique seriously is not necessarily to be subject yet again to the straightforward ‘blackmail of the Englightenment and a narrow ‘modernist’ vision of responsibility.85 While an unwillingness to move beyond a deconstructive ethic of responsibility to otherness for fear that an essentialist stance is the only (or most likely) alternative expresses a legitimate concern, it should not license a retreat from such questions or their practical demands. Rather, such situations demand also an evaluation of the structures (of identity and institutions) that might viably be mobilized in order to offset the worst implications of violently exclusionary identities. It requires, as Neumann nicely puts it, the generation of compelling ‘as if’ stories around which counter-subjectivities and political practices can coalesce. Wilful Realism, I submit, arises out of an appreciation of these issues, and comprises an attempt to craft precisely such ‘stories’ within a broader intellectual and sociological analysis of their conditions of production, possibilities of success, and likely consequences. The question is, to what extent are these limits capable of success, and to what extent might they be limits upon their own aspirations toward responsibility? These are crucial questions, but they will not be addressed by retreating yet again into further reversals of the same old dicohotomies.

### K Team Impact

**Romney win leads to most hostile right wing takeover in history- tax cuts for rich, end of Dodd-Frank, no healthcare and end to key education incentives**

**Alterman 8-8**

Eric is a Distinguished Professor of English at Brooklyn College, “President Romney?” [http://www.thenation.com/article/169287/president-romney#](http://www.thenation.com/article/169287/president-romney)

a Romney White House, those digits may go limp with fatigue. **A Romney victory would** likely **bring with it a large majority in the House and** quite possibly a Republican **Senate** as well, and hence a tsunami of regressive legislation. As the longtime nonpartisan analysts Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein argue, a Republican victory in November will likely prove a key turning point in modern American history. **It will offer Republicans the opportunity**, in Mann’s words, **to put “in place a radical view of policy that goes** well **beyond anything Republicans have proposed in the past**,” one that has moved so far rightward that “no Republican president in the modern era would have felt comfortable being a part of [it].” What’s more, they will likely succeed owing not only to Romney’s eagerness to blow with whatever winds may be buffeting him, but also, as Mann and Ornstein put it, to his party’s “demonstrated willingness to bend, break, or change legislative rules and customs that have stood in the way of radical change in the past.”¶ If you think the Tea Party has gone away, think again. Its members are not holding demonstrations so much anymore because they are staffing campaigns, winning Republican primaries (often against veteran incumbents and well-funded establishment favorites), or replacing the staffers of those they have scared into submission. As Dave Weigel writes in the Washington Monthly, “After 2010, the movement evolved. Activists got jobs with newly elected Republicans. Political organizations like the [corporate and conservative billionaire-funded and -controlled] Americans for Prosperity and FreedomWorks grew their staffs and budgets. Elected Republicans continued to draw on them for strength, support, and warm bodies at campaign events.” Under a Romney administration, many of these ignorant fanatics will be called upon to staff a significant number of the more than 3,000 federal appointments that a president makes, and his hundreds of potential judicial appointments as well.¶ **The result, should Romney become president, will be a mixture of policies that favor the superwealthy**, **punish the poor and middle class, restrict the rights of average Americans**, and—I say this without hyperbole—cause a degree of almost unimaginable and unprecedented chaos in virtually every area of American public life.¶ As president, Romney promises to focus on economic policy, and it is here where his impact may be greatest. The primary purpose of the modern Republican presidency has been to make the extremely rich far richer at the expense of the rest of us, and Mitt Romney promises to outdo all of his predecessors in this regard. George W. Bush’s $2.5 trillion in tax cuts, while ruinous to the nation’s balance of payments, succeeded in distributing only 12.5 percent of those trillions to his friends and cronies in the wealthiest 0.1 percent. **Romney does Bush quite a bit better by proposing**—on top of already unsustainable budget deficits—**an additional $10.7 trillion in tax cuts over the next 10 years, with fully 33 percent directed toward the top one-tenth of 1 percent**. The fine print calls for a reduction in both individual and corporate tax rates, as well as the complete elimination of both the estate tax and the alternative minimum tax. The net result would be that the superwealthy—those who enjoy an income in the vicinity of $3 million annually—keep an additional $250,000. According to the Urban Institute–Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center, the cost will likely exceed $9 trillion in lost revenue in the coming decade.¶ Meanwhile **Romney’s friends on Wall Street can** also expect, under his presidency, to see **the complete defenestration of the Dodd-Frank bill**, which helps (albeit insufficiently)**to protect consumers from the predatory practices of large financial institutions**, while at the same time placing limits on the kinds of malpractice that caused the 2008 financial crisis.¶ **Romney’s budget-busting plans** also **call for a cornucopia of new spending for each of the three major armed services, including** the addition of **100,000 ground troops** for the Army, an additional six new ships each year for the Navy, and more F-35 stealth warplanes for the Air Force. **This adds up to a $2 trillion increase** in the coming decade above what had previously been budgeted. (Congress and President Obama had earlier agreed to a $450 billion reduction.) These increases would come at a moment when the United States spends more on its military than its seventeen next-largest competitors combined. In fact, fully 64 percent of all 4.4 million employees on the federal payroll are already either in the uniformed military or work for the departments of Defense, Veterans Affairs and Homeland Security.¶ How will any of this be paid for? Romney pretends that significant savings will come from closing tax “loopholes,” but this is nonsense. Those loopholes were placed there specifically to reward the donors who pay the costs of our lawmakers’ political campaigns (just like the more straightforward across-the-board tax cuts for the superrich). Tea Party champions, including Senators Jim DeMint of South Carolina and Rand Paul of Kentucky, are trying to prevent the Treasury Department from cracking down even on wealthy expatriate tax cheats. The notion that these loopholes will somehow be eliminated—especially when they continue to be expanded every time the tax code is adjusted—is too childish for adults to take seriously, save perhaps for a few gullible reporters and right-wing pundits.¶ All of the above would put unbearable pressure on an already stretched entitlements budget, as well as on those federal programs for the poor and middle class that have so far escaped the scalpel, while simultaneously raising the tax burden on these households. Regarding the latter, for instance, a tax plan released by Senate Republican Minority Leader Mitch McConnell and Utah Senator Orrin Hatch ends the Child Tax Credit, the American Opportunity Tax Credit (for college tuition) and a more generous Earned Income Tax Credit—which, when added together, would raise taxes on more than 20 million families, according to Seth Hanlon, the director of fiscal reform at the Center for American Progress. It gets worse. **Romney has promised to** use the “reconciliation” process to **repeal Obamacare. But what will replace it?** Well, again, **chaos,** no doubt, **but also the Ryan plan**—named for its author, Wisconsin Republican and Ayn Rand devotee Representative Paul Ryan, and now gospel among the GOP faithful. Romney has called himself “very supportive” of the plan, adding: “I think it’d be marvelous if the Senate were to pick up Paul Ryan’s budget and adopt it and pass it along to the president.” The House of Representatives has already passed it 235 to 193, with only four Republicans in opposition.¶ Among its provisions is a rise in the eligibility age for Medicare for future retirees and a retraction in Medicaid coverage, including its replacement by a voucher system. **The net result would be** not only the jump in the size of the deficit predicted by the Congressional Budget Office, but also, **according to the calculations of the Urban Institute, the loss of Medicaid coverage for 27 million** Americans. Meanwhile, another 30 **million people—many of them children—would lose the insurance** **included in Obamacare**. Add it all up and, according to Harvard health policy researcher (and former Obama administration official) David Blumenthal, writing in The New England Journal of Medicine, “by 2020, 20% of Americans may be uninsured, even as 20% of our gross domestic product is devoted to health care.”¶ America’s children will also feel the wrath of Romney and the radical Republicans when it comes to education policy. **Romney** calls school choice “the civil rights issue of our era.” His education proposals eschew **any new funding for public schools**, preferring to direct it toward private school vouchers, privately managed charter schools and for-profit online schools. Like Wisconsin’s Scott Walker and other Koch-funded right-wing demagogues, Romney blames public school teachers and their unions not only for the failures of the US education system, but also for the fiscal problems facing state and local governments. He hopes to weaken these bastions of Democratic fundraising and people power by using federal funds to reward states for “eliminating or reforming teacher tenure.” (Republican budget plans also slash programs like Head Start.)¶ As education expert Diane Ravitch observes, “Vouchers have been the third rail of education politics since Milton Friedman proposed them in 1955.” But in what she calls a likely “template for the Romney plan,” the Louisiana legislature instituted a voucher system independent of a popular vote. Ravitch explains, “With no increase in funding, all the money for vouchers and private vendors and online charters will be deducted from the state’s public education budget.” Beneficiaries in Louisiana have included outfits like the Eternity Christian Academy, a school with only fourteen students that applied under the voucher system to enroll an additional 135. According to Reuters, its students “sit in cubicles for much of the day and move at their own pace through Christian workbooks, such as a beginning science text that explains ‘what God made’ on each of the six days of creation.” Students are not exposed to the theory of evolution because, as the pastor turned principal explains, “We try to stay away from all those things that might confuse our children.”¶ At the university level, Romney will encourage private sector involvement by inviting commercial banks to profit from the federal student loan program, in keeping with the right-wing Republican fear of (and contempt for) knowledge. Romney also favors the creation of for-profit online universities, recently described in a report by Senator Tom Harkin, chairman of the Senate health and education committee, as institutions characterized by “exorbitant tuition, aggressive recruiting practices, abysmal student outcomes, taxpayer dollars spent on marketing and pocketed as profit, and regulatory evasion and manipulation.”¶ \* \* \*¶ Then there’s the Supreme Court. The Roberts Court is already America’s most conservative since the New Deal. But with the addition of a single Romney nomination, it will become a rubber stamp for the ideological obsessions, corporate demands, and religious fanaticism on display at Tea Party rallies and Fox News–sponsored debates.¶ One need only take note of what former New York Times Supreme Court reporter Linda Greenhouse termed the “breathtaking radicalism” of the four dissenters in the Affordable Care Act decision to see where a Romney-appointed Court will be headed. With their signed opinions in the ACA case, Justices Scalia, Alito, Thomas and Kennedy “outed themselves,” in the words of legal scholar Jeffrey Rosen, “as partisans of the Constitution in Exile—the movement of economic libertarians who want the courts to resurrect pre–New Deal limits on federal power in order to dismantle the regulatory state piece by piece.” **Three** of the **justices will turn 80** or older **during the next four years**, and a fourth will be 77. **One more vote and the Roberts Court will enjoy unchecked power to increase** the legal rights of **corporations to pollute our air and rivers;** mistreat workers and fire them should they complain; **discriminate on the basis of race, gender or sexual orientation**; decertify unions; and control our political discourse with secretive campaign contributions and relentlessly scurrilous advertisements—indeed, to reduce the security of every American citizen. As legal reporter Dahlia Lithwick has written, “**If you care abou**t the future of **abortion** rights, stem cell research, worker protections, **the death penalty, environmental regulation, torture,** presidential power, warrantless surveillance, or any number of other issues, **it’s worth recalling that the last stop on the answer to each** of those matters **will** probably **be** before **someone in a black robe.**”¶ One area where the courts are certain to matter is immigration policy. It was here that Romney chose to burnish his Tea Party credentials most energetically during the primary season. He called Arizona’s draconian SB 1070—the one that allowed anyone’s papers to be checked on suspicion of looking Hispanic—a “model” for the rest of the nation. (This was before the Court found its key provisions unconstitutional.) He came out in favor of “self-deportation”—actually a right-wing euphemism for an immigration strategy of “attrition through enforcement”—and promised to veto the DREAM Act should its supporters somehow manage to pass it. Cognizant of how many votes this belligerent nativism would likely cost him among Hispanic voters, however, Romney has refused to say anything substantive on this issue since wrapping up the nomination. Still, it is no secret where he and his party stand, as immigration is one of the most animating issues for Tea Party enthusiasts.¶ Regarding the foreign policy agenda—which, after all, is where a president has the most freedom of action—an internal dossier from McCain’s presidential campaign noted back in 2008 that “Romney’s foreign affairs résumé is extremely thin, leading to credibility problems.” His disastrous July misadventures abroad did little to disabuse anyone of this view. Romney has surrounded himself with a group of extremely hawkish advisers, who even Colin Powell worries are “quite far to the right.” None had the prescience to oppose America’s disastrous invasion of Iraq, and more than a few give the impression of looking forward to trying something like it again.¶ Like most Republicans—and, to be fair, most Democrats—Romney has had next to nothing to say about America’s major foreign policy headaches of the past decade: Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. But **if Romney becomes president, you’ll be hard-pressed to find a Vegas oddsmaker willing to take bets against an Israeli, American or American/Israeli attack on Iran**. While the Obama administration’s rhetoric on the question has hardly been reassuring to those who continue to favor diplomacy over bombing, Romney almost always manages to go the president one better. **Romney** has **called Iran’s** **leaders the “greatest threat to the world since** the fall of **the Soviet Union**, and before that, Nazi Germany.” He says he would not even consult Congress before beginning an attack. As he explained on CBS’s Face the Nation in mid-June, “If I’m president, the Iranians will have no question but that I will be willing to take military action if necessary to prevent them from becoming a nuclear threat to the world. I don’t believe at this stage, therefore, if I’m president, that we need to have a war powers approval or special authorization for military force. The president has that capacity now.”¶ True, an attack would likely cause a conflagration in the Middle East, including missile attacks on Tel Aviv (as the Iranians have promised), a violent uprising among the Palestinians, the end of the Palestinian Authority and the unchallenged ascension of Hamas on the West Bank and Hezbollah in Lebanon, and a likely wave of terrorism against Israeli and American targets worldwide. But insofar as **Romney and the Republican Party’s current foreign policy is** concerned—**dominated** as it is **by neoconservative adventurists**, **far-right American Jewish funders** like Sheldon Adelson, and **evangelicals obsessed with Israel’s role in biblical revelation**—whatever Bibi Netanyahu wants, Bibi gets.¶ Outside of the Middle East, Romney’s rhetoric has largely consisted of tough-guy talk of the kind that turns sometimes cooperative, sometimes recalcitrant strategic competitors into potentially threatening adversaries. For instance, he calls Russia “without question, our number one geopolitical foe” and accuses it of “always stand[ing] up for the world’s worst actors.” Likewise, Romney complains that China has “run all over us,” stealing American jobs and waging a “trade war” against the United States. Romney has said that he would haul China before the World Trade Organization on charges that it was manipulating its currency to ensure the relatively cheap prices of its exports.¶ About the Author¶ Just how he plans to do this, given our massive reliance on China to continue to buy Treasury (and private sector) bonds—to say nothing of its role in issues like regional security and environmental degradation—Romney doesn’t specify. But should he try it, we can be reasonably certain of the result: chaos.¶ And while Barack Obama’s environmental commitments, both foreign and domestic, have certainly failed to live up to the promise of his campaign, no one should expect any progress on global environmental issues from President Romney. No matter how alarming the threats we face, Romney’s business-first philosophy combined with the Tea Party’s anti-“gummint” fanaticism has created the political equivalent of a brick wall through which literally no environmental regulation will manage to pass. As the New York Times editorial page observes, the post-Massachusetts Romney emerged a “proclaimed skeptic on global warming, a champion of oil and other fossil fuels, a critic of federal efforts to develop cleaner energy sources and a sworn enemy of the Environmental Protection Agency.” Moreover, as with immigration, his post-primary rhetorical efforts to shed the “climate denier” label have not been accompanied by any serious shifts in policy.¶ Under President Romney, the United States will almost certainly ignore the threat from global warming. Indeed, his party is already seeking to strip the Environmental Protection Agency of its power to regulate carbon emissions. House Republicans have even proposed legislation—called the TRAIN Act (for Transparency in Regulatory Analysis of Impacts on the Nation)—to cut its power to regulate anything at all. **A Republican Congress will also reduce or perhaps entirely eliminate subsidies for green energy,** while preserving the tax breaks and subsidies for the oil and gas industries and opening up almost all US parklands, wilderness areas and offshore waters to drilling.¶ These are merely the highlights—and perhaps the most direct consequences—of a Romney win. But there will be many others as well.¶ \* \* \*¶ Some progressives argue that, nonetheless, President Obama has been such a disappointment that his defeat would not be an unmitigated loss for social justice movements. It’s true that with a Republican in the White House, more progressives would feel freer to give full voice to their complaints about America’s continued violations of civil liberties in its pursuit of suspected terrorists; its widespread use of pilotless drones to kill alleged enemies without due process; its inability to make any progress against global warming; its coddling of the criminals in the Bush administration, as well as those in the banking and housing industries who helped cause the 2008 crisis; and so on. But this freedom would come at a great cost: namely, seeing all of these problems—together with pretty much every other cause that progressives hold dear—worsen to a degree that most of us cannot even imagine. Protests will mount. Denunciations will fill the air. And the circulations of left-oriented publications and websites like this one will skyrocket. But the victims of these policies will suffer. Indeed, the millions of Americans who have been forced to live on the edge of financial collapse, or whose health is dependent on affordable and reliable healthcare, will see their margin of survival disappear.¶ Despite the many disappointments of his presidency, Barack Obama remains a vehicle for progressive change in America, one whose weaknesses reflect the weaknesses of the left in a system dominated by money, democratic dysfunction and a myopic media. Those are our real problems—not the attitude of the individual in the White House. And not one of them will improve once the power of the presidency is bestowed upon those who have created those problems and continue to profit by them. Indeed, nearly all of them will reach (and some may exceed) crisis proportions. And what that will lead to, no one—certainly not your author—can predict, save for one thing: chaos.

## Kato

#### Perm solves best – only by institutional political change can the impact of nuclear waste be mitigated

Jens Birkholzer et al. 2012. Earth Sciences Division, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. Geologic Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Waste: Status, Key Issues and Trends. <http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-environ-090611-143314>

Institutional processes are important in the development of high-level waste disposal systems.¶ Because the time frame for societal cost and impact of waste is much longer than the generally¶ quite short time frame for market economic¶ forces, governance is needed to bring these¶ costs and impacts into balance. Governance¶ for radioactive waste is generally implemented¶ through a governmental regulatory process,¶ which has been followed by all countries faced¶ with high-level radioactive waste disposal issues¶ (20). Some differences among nuclear nations¶ exist and are mainly in the details of how the¶ regulations have been written (see Section 5.1)

### War O/W Structural Violence Impacts

#### War fuels structural violence, not the other way around

Goldstein 2001. IR professor at American University (Joshua, War and Gender, p. 412, Google Books)

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps. among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.9 So, “if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

## Coviello

### Threat Con Impact Defense

#### Threat construction doesn’t result in war

Stuart J. Kaufman, 2009. Prof Poli Sci and IR – U Delaware, “Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,” Security Studies 18:3, 400 – 434

Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly present, war occurs only if these factors are harnessed. Ethnic narratives and fears must combine to create significant ethnic hostility among mass publics. Politicians must also seize the opportunity to manipulate that hostility, evoking hostile narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by riding a wave of chauvinist mobilization. Such mobilization is often spurred by prominent events (for example, episodes of violence) that increase feelings of hostility and make chauvinist appeals seem timely. If the other group also mobilizes and if each side's felt security needs threaten the security of the other side, the result is a security dilemma spiral of rising fear, hostility, and mutual threat that results in violence. A virtue of this symbolist theory is that symbolist logic explains why ethnic peace is more common than ethnonationalist war. Even if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity exist, severe violence usually can still be avoided if ethnic elites skillfully define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across group lines to prevent violence: this is consociationalism.17 War is likely only if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.

### Russian Threat Con Good

#### EU energy competition proves Russia must be discussed using a realist lens

Helen 10 POLIS Journal Vol.4, Winter 2010

Postgraduate student in politics, university of Leeds

<http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/ma-winter-10/helen-e.pdf>

Energy policy is also an integral part of Russian foreign policy. As will be shown throughout this paper, Russia uses energy as a foreign policy tool, particularly in its ‘near abroad’, in countries within Moscow’s sought-after sphere of influence. Russian geopolitical realism comes into conflict with EU policies in the ‘common neighbourhood’, but also in the Caspian, where EU is trying to establish new energy relationships to reduce its dependence on Russia. To protect its own energy security – the security of demand – and to maintain its strategically highly advantageous position as the dominant supplier of gas to Europe, Russia is actively undermining the EU’s efforts to diversify the sources of its energy supply. Indeed, rather than being a ‘strategic partnership’, it will be argued that, the overall EU-Russia relationship is characterised by strategic rivalry. The ‘special relationships’ that Russia cultivates with key EU countries are an integral component of Moscow’s ‘divide and rule’ strategy towards the EU; a conscious effort to exacerbate the energy and overall divide between member states while securing further deals for Gazprom, in essence, tightening the ‘energy grip’ around the EU. The Russo-German relationship, the closest bilateral relationship, and a prime example of how ‘economic nationalism’ combined with Moscow’s ‘divide and rule’ strategy undermines the EU’s efforts to construct a cohesive energy security policy, and its most significant outcome – the Nord Stream gas pipeline – with potentially extremely significant geopolitical consequences, will then be examined in detail. Finally, and most quintessentially, this paper will argue that, the EU’s most underlying problem in its energy, and overall, relationship with Russia, is a fundamental misperception of the nature of Russia. It will be asserted that the EU seems to fail to view Russia in realistic terms, as the rising power and strategic and ideological rival that it is, and instead seems to cling to the ‘end of history’ utopia, where the norms and values of the EU are universal.

## Disaster Good

#### Prefer specific scenarios – even if we invoke some security logic, the fact that others will securitize means that we have to make worst-case assessments to avoid escalation

Ole Waever, Senior Research Fellow – Copenhagen Peace Research Inst., 2K

(I. R. Theory & the Politics of European Integration, ed Kelstrup/Williams p. 282-285)

The other main possibility is to stress responsibility. Particularly in a field like security one has to make choices and deal with the challenges and risks that one confronts – and not shy away into long-range or principled transformations. The meta-political line risks (despite the theoretical commitment to the concrete other) implying that politics can be contained within large ‘systemic’ questions. In line with the classical revolutionary tradition, after the change (now no longer the revolution but the meta-physical transformation), there will be no more problems whereas in our situation (until the change) we should not deal with the ‘small questions’ of politics, only with the large one (cf. Rorty 1996). However, the ethical demand in post-structuralism (e.g. Derrida’s ‘justice’) is of a kind that can never be instantiated in any concrete political order – it is an experience of the undecidable that exceeds any concrete solution and re-inserts politics. Therefore, politics can never be reduced to meta-questions; there is no way to erase the small, particular, banal conflicts and controversies. In contrast to the quasi-institutionalist formula of radical democracy which one finds in the ‘opening’ oriented version of deconstruction, we could with Derrida stress the singularity of the event. To take a position, take part, and ‘produce events’ (Derrida 1994: 89) means to get involved in specific struggles. Politics takes place ‘in the singular event of engagement’ (Derrida 1996: 83). Derrida’s politics is focused on the calls that demand response/responsibility in words like justice, Europe and emancipation. Should we treat security in this manner? No, security is not that kind of call. ‘Security’ is not a way to open (or keep open) an ethical horizon. Security is a much more situational concept oriented to the handling of specifics. It belongs to the sphere of how to handle challenges – and avoid ‘the worst’ (Derrida 1991). Here enters again the possible pessimism hich for the security analyst might be occupational or structural. The infinitude of responsibility (Derrida 1996: 86) or the tragic nature of politics (Morgenthau 1946, Chapter 7) means that one can never feel reassured that by some ‘good deed’, ‘I have assumed my responsibilities’ (Derrida 1996: 86). If I conduct myself particularly well with regard to someone, I know that it is to the detriment of an other; of one nation to the detriment of another nation, of one family to the detriment of another family, of my friends to the detriment of other friends or non-friends, etc. This is the infinitude that inscribes itself within responsibility; otherwise there would be no ethical problems or decisions. (ibid.; and parallel argumentation in Morgenthau 1946; Chapters 6 and 7) Because of this there will remain conflicts and risks – and the question of how to handle them. Should developments be securitized (and if so, in what terms)? Often our reply will be to aim for de-securitization and then politics meet meta-politics; but occasionally the underlying pessimism regarding the prospects for orderliness and compatibility among human aspirations will point to scenarios sufficiently worrisome that responsibility will entail securitization in order to block the worst. As a security/securitization analyst, this means accepting the task of trying to manage and avoid spirals and accelerating security concerns, to try to assist in shaping the continent in a way that creates the least insecurity and violence – even if this occasionally means invoking/producing ‘structures’ or even using the dubious instrument of securitization. In the case of current European configuration, the above analysis suggests the use of securitization at the level of European scenarios with the aim of preempting and avoiding numerous instances of local securitization that could lead to security dilemmas and escalations, violence and mutual vilification.