# Condo Good

**1 Interpretation- We Get 1 Conditional CP and 1 Conditional K.**

**2 Key to Neg Flex- Have to test the aff from multiple angles or the 2AC will sit on a position making it impossible to generate offense.**

**4 Real World- Advocacies have to deal with discussions from multiple sides at the same time and carve out reasons their option is best, healthcare proves.**

**6 Community Fracture- People will only debate policy or critical options, fragments the community and is a better internal link to people leaving then my 2AC was hard.**

**7 Err Negative on theory- No uniqueness to DA’s means policy neg’s need more questionable fiat mechanisms to stay even and the aff chooses the discussion area and speaks first and last.**

# Framework

### Framework – Language Key to Understanding IR – China-Specific

#### ( ) Language is essential to understanding IR – the U.S.-China spy plane incident proves

Francois Debrix, assistant professor of international relations at Florida International University, 2003, Language, Agency and Politics in a Constructed World, p. x-xi.

Language, Agency, and Politics in a Constructed World earnestly seeks to return to the question, place, and role of language in post-positivist International Relations. This volume starts from the assumption that language in contemporary international relations is an inescapable component of the life, behavior, and identity of international actors/agents, and that language is crucial in shaping the contemporary outlook of global politics. Diplomatic events generally have a way of reminding us how central language is in everyday international affairs if one cares to pay attention to its meaningful presence. Take, for example, the April 2001 diplomatic crisis between China and the United States over the collision between a US surveillance plane and a Chinese fighter plane, and the subsequent release of the US crew by Chinese authorities (for more on this incident, see Timothy Luke’s chapter in this volume). While few IR scholars actually noted this point, the solution to the alleged crisis hinged on language, its meaning, transmission, and reception. Whether the US President had actually apologized to the Chinese authorities when he uttered the words “I am very sorry,” whether the context in which this somewhat apologetic speech-act took place was appropriate for rules of diplomatic engagement, whether the Chinese government would perceive and interpret the specific utterance as an official apology were all crucial to the outcome of the crisis and bore consequences for the future relations between both nations. Of equal importance was the fact that both parties chose to turn to linguistic strategies (letters, open declarations, translated apologies) to mediate this so-called crisis and produce a semblance of agreement/understanding in the end (Debrix 2002).

# JUSTIFICATION PIC BLOCKS

#### INTERPRETATION: THE AFFIRMATIVE SHOULD PRESENT AND DEFEND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A TOPICAL PLAN. THE NEGATIVE SHOULD PRESENT A COMPETITVE POLICY OPTION AND/OR A CRITIQUE OF THE 1AC’S JUSTIFICATIONS.

#### JUSTIFICATIONS COMPETITION IS GOOD:

#### MORE REAL WORLD – VALUABLE POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS RECOGNIZES THE INTRINSIC IMPORTANCE OF JUSTIFICATION IN POLICYMAKING – IRAQ PROVES BIG POLITICAL DECISIONS HINGE ON THE QUESTION OF REPUTABLE JUSTIFICATION.

#### FAIR, STABLE DIVISION OF GROUND – LINKS ENSURE RECIRPROCITY AND CHECK INFINITE REGRESSION. WE ISOLATE THE METHOD OF COMPETITION WHICH BOLSTERS AFF STABLE IMPACT TURN GROUND BUILT INTO THE 1AC

#### KEY TO EDUCATION. ONLY OUR INTERP PROVIDES EDUCATION ABOUT THE COMPLEX INTERACTIONS BETWEEN ONE’ S JUSTIFICATIONS AND INTENDED MESSAGE OF PERSUASION. THEIR INTERP PRECLUDES THE DEBATE COMMUNITY FROM SELF-REFLEXIVE EVALUATION OF THE ROLE OF ARGUMENT SELECTION.

#### KEY TO POLICYMAKING RELEVENCE – POLICYMAKERS AND POLITICS OPERATE COMPARATIVELY MORE THROUGH NARRATIVE-EVALUATION RATHER THAN LOGICAL ARGUMENT OR DATA EVALUATION.

Dryzek 2006

**John S. Dryzek, Policy analysis as critique,** John Dryzek is Professor of Political Science and Australian Research Council Federation Fellow, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. He is a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia, former Head of the Departments of Political Science at the Universities of Oregon and Melbourne and the Social and Political Theory program at ANU, and former editor of the Australian Journal of Political Science, Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, pg 194-5

Narrative analysis (Roe 1994) focuses mainly on stories that are told by participants in policy processes. The language of policy, in common with the language of many social settings, features the telling of stories much more than it features argument, deductive logic, or still less quantitative optimization. The effect of a good story is to convince its audience that an issue ought to be framed in a particular way. The facts never ‘‘speak for themselves.’’ For example, a story about rape and murder amid ethnic conflict could be told by a nationalist demagogue in terms of violated ethnic innocence and collective ethnic guilt of its perpetrators. The same facts could also support a story of violation of basic human rights and universal principles of humanity. The action consequences of each story would be vastly different.

#### OUR EPISTEMOLOGY CRITIQUES SHORT CIRCUITS THE ENTIRE EMPIRICISM DEBATE - THERE IS A GAP IN EMPIRICAL DATA ON THE NORMATIVE EFFECTS OF IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION IN KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION.

Alvesson and Robertson 2006

Mats Alvesson and Maxine Robertson, “Identities in Consulting Firms: The Best and the Brightest: The Construction, Significance and Effects of Elite “ Organization 2006; 13; 195

 Many consulting ﬁrms, particularly the smaller niche players, are good examples of the post-bureaucratic organizational form, characterized as they are by relatively few layers of hierarchy, ﬂexibility, a degree of participation in decision-making and loose career structures (Heckscher, 1994; Grey and Garsten, 2001). Others, particularly large consultancy ﬁrms, exhibit signiﬁcant elements of bureaucracyalthough this has its limitations and other, normative forms of control, are at least equally signiﬁcant (Covaleski et al., 1998; K¨ arreman and Alvesson, 2004). **In the absence,** or only partial usefulness, **of institutionalized repositories of organizational routines and method and clearly demarcated bureaucratic structures, it becomes important to develop broadly shared ideas and meanings of what the ﬁrm represents and the direction of the ﬁrm. A clear sense of organizational identity is normatively regulating, promoting co-ordinated, purposeful action and particular instrumental behaviours** within these ambiguous, loosely-coupled environments (Albert et al., 2000). However, h**ow organizational identities might be constructed, and their effects have not on the whole been subject to empirical examination within knowledge intensive settings** such as consultancy ﬁrms (although see Kunda, 1992; Robertson and Swan, 2003).

# Cards

### Specific to Michigan

#### Michigan’s Chinese thorium collapses US competitiveness ev is from a nonsourced BLOG on the Washington Post’s website. No author, no qual’s, mostly hyperbole

The UN-Underlined part of the card concedes that this internal link is “Alarmist” (“The alarmist version of China’s next-gen nuclear strategy come down to this”)

AND, The Martin ’12 evidence is ALSO massive hyperbole and ALSO includes the line “The alarmist version of China’s next-generation nuclear strategy¶ comes down to this: if you like foreign oil dependency, you’re going to¶ love foreign nuclear dependency.”

#### AND, France and Finland are ALSO pursuing Thorium, but the aff ignores those countries as a threat—perhaps because THOSE countries are understood as “white”

#### Pentland ‘11

William http://www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/2011/09/11/is-thorium-the-biggest-energy-breakthrough-since-fire-possibly/

A clutch of companies and countries are aggressively pursuing Dean’s dream of a thorium-powered world. Lightbridge Corporation, a pioneering nuclear-energy start-up company based in McLean, VA, is developing the Radkowsky Thorium Reactor in collaboration with Russian researchers. In 2009, Areva, the French nuclear engineering conglomerate, recruited Lightbridge for a project assessing the use of thorium fuel in Areva’s next-generation EPR reactor, advanced class of 1,600+ MW nuclear reactors being built in Olkiluoto, Finland and Flamanville, France.

### At: china threat - hege

#### THE CHINA THREAT THESIS IS FALLACIOUS. [answers heg. Scenarios]

Renic 2k12

[neil, ‘rising china’: a threat to international security, phd candidate, contributor e-IR.info]

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the conclusion of a bipolar political order that had defined the world since 1945. In its place emerged a global framework, largely characterised by the hegemonic ascendance of the United States of America (U.S.). The primacy of the U.S. in this unipolar system has led theorists such as Waltz to claim, ‘never since Rome has one country so nearly dominated its world’ (2002: 350). Assertions such as this, however, have been problematised by the rapid rise of China as a global power. Increasingly, contemporary China is being re-conceptualised as a realistic economic, political and military counterbalance to U.S. hegemony. For much of the world, this perception has led to growing anxiety that the rise of China poses a significant threat to international security. This essay, however, will dispute this claim, arguing that China’s potential as a threat to international security is consistently exaggerated and a relatively benign rise is entirely possible. This will be done by first establishing the ways in which the current rise of China is viewed as a threat to international security by many states and individuals. The inevitability of China ‘rising’ to achieve hegemon status will next be critiqued, as well as current perceptions regarding emerging Chinese foreign policy. Next, the importance of China’s economic integration with the rest of the world will be highlighted. Lastly, the likelihood of a more powerful China leading to regional insecurity, particularly surrounding relations with Taiwan, will be examined.¶ For numerous states, the sustained military, political and economic ascension of China is increasingly viewed as a likely threat to international security. The rapid pace in which China has managed its societal transformation is arguably without historical comparison. China’s subsequent increase in military spending, as well as its commitment to modernising its military capabilities, is cited by many, including the U.S., as clear evidence of its growing potential to threaten international security. This concern was evident in the 2006 Quadrennial Defence Review, which cited China, of all major and emerging powers, as having the ‘greatest potential to compete militarily’ with the U.S. and highlighted China’s ability to field military technology ‘that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages’ (2006: 29). As well as China’s general military capacity, the U.S. has grown increasingly concerned over Chinese nuclear ambitions. This was highlighted in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report (NPRR) which cited China’s ‘qualitative and quantitative modernisation’ of its nuclear arsenal, as well as its relative lack of transparency, as significant factors in growing regional and international anxiety (U.S. Department of Defence 2010: V). China’s strengthening military, coupled with a perceived increase in regional antagonism, has generated additional concern for international security. Regarding Chinese regional aspirations, it is the claim of many that China ultimately wished to assert a “Monroe Doctrine”, throughout East Asia, excluding non-regional powers (Bowring 2010: 2). Given the continued U.S. involvement in much of East Asia, if this assessment proves accurate, the ramifications for international security would indeed be severe.¶ As well as China’s military advancements, its economic growth has continued at an unrivalled pace. The meteoric ascent of China’s economy over the last twenty-five years has transformed regional and international power dynamics (Blij 2005: 129). This very phenomena, however, has been cited as a likely cause of future international insecurity. Realists such as Mearsheimer argue that if the rapid economic growth of China continues over the coming decades, an intense security competition between the U.S. and China is likely to result, with a significant potential for war (2006:160). In order to more accurately assess China’s capability to disrupt international security, a more reasoned analysis of China’s current and potential strength as a state must be undertaken.¶ Threats to international security generated by China’s challenge to U.S. hegemony must be viewed more soberly, particularly given the uncertainty of China’s ‘rise’. While China’s economic growth and surge in GDP has been dramatic, its long-term continuation has been challenged by some. One study suggests that by 2015, the odds of China experiencing a significant slowdown in GDP growth rates were over 70% (The Economist 2011: 2). This makes assertions on the inevitability of war, generated by an economic rivalry between the U.S. and China, increasingly problematic. Additionally, while China has indeed experienced an unprecedented surge in national GDP, wealth disparity continues to impede the state’s development. The decision of Chinese leadership to identify inequality as one of the greatest political challenges currently facing its society (Klein 2008: 07:33), clearly demonstrates the continued uncertainty surrounding China’s rise. Similarly, growing anxiety surrounding China’s military spending must also be properly contextualised, particularly given the continued dominance of the U.S. military. In 2009 the U.S. military spent over USD $738 billion, whereas estimates of China’s annual military budget range from USD $69.5 billion to USD $150 billion (Thomson 2010: 87). Additionally, China’s potential nuclear threat, while growing, is still comparatively small and vulnerable when viewed alongside that of the U.S. China’s nuclear stockpile is currently between a tenth and a hundredth the size of the U.S. arsenal (Glaser 2011: 91). These figures suggest that, despite China’s military modernisation attempts, any military exchange between the two states would be hugely asymmetrical. The continued pre-eminence of the U.S. military will be a significant factor in the potential of a growing China to disrupt international security. China, fully aware that an increase in bellicosity can be challenged by the U.S., with overwhelming force, will attempt a peaceful transition to great power status. This is further apparent through an examination of China’s current foreign policy.¶ An analysis of China’s foreign policy suggests that its growth in power and influence will present a minimal threat to international security. Among those who claim that a rising China constitutes a significant risk to international stability, comparisons are often drawn between current U.S./China friction and the Cold-War relationship between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. This, however is misleading. The Cold-War was essentially a conflict of incompatible ideologies. While the capitalist U.S. model advocated individual freedoms, the free market, and political and civil rights; communism sought to promote class equality and an emancipation of the working class (Brady and Said 1993: 591). Crucially, both models were expansionist in nature, ensuring tensions between the two superpowers would escalate in the post-WWII years. This ensuing conflict would play a dominant role in world politics, with both superpowers transforming global security into a zero-sum game (Bisley 2007: 233). The relationship between contemporary China and the U.S. is vastly different, with a far greater likelihood of non-zero-sum solutions arising to emerging problems. Jisi argues that China currently has little interest in transforming itself into a hegemon, viewing its core interests as security, sovereignty, and development, as well as the elevation of its people’s living standards (2011: 5).¶ This challenges the assertions of offensive realists, who claim that achieving hegemon status within the global system is a state’s ultimate goal (Mearscheimer 2001, cited in Snyder 2002:152). Concern over the rise of China often stems from fears that an increase in parity between China and the U.S. will trigger an accelerated security dilemma between the two states. Hertz contends that the security dilemma is an unavoidable condition that results from the anarchical nature of the international system, whereby the defensive security measures of a state can cause a perception of hostile intent by other states (1950, cited in Burke 2007: 148). This can lead to a military build-up in response, resulting in an overall loss of security and increase in anxiety for all states. Given China’s primarily domestic focus, as opposed to the expansionist grand strategy of the Soviet Union, predictions of international insecurity resulting from an emerging security dilemma seems exaggerated. This is made further apparent with an examination of the economic interconnectedness that exists between China and the rest of the world.¶ The continued economic benefits of a rising China for the rest of the world, will largely mitigate any potential threat it poses to international security. A key determinant in the likelihood of international hostilities resulting from a growth in China’s status, is China’s current position in the world economy. Unlike the rise of the Soviet Union, which was characterised by confrontation and autarky, China has opted for global integration through its own form of capitalism (Jacques 2005: 1). China’s entry into global economic institutions, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), represents an encouraging development in international security. Liberal theory suggests that the creation of institutions and regimes, such as the WTO, are crucial in blunting the more destructive features of international anarchy and ensuring the prevention of the security dilemma (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 139), which as previously established, is a crucial component in the increase of international insecurity. The economic inter-dependence that exists between China and the rest of the world has hugely increased the potential costs of war, while decreasing its probable gains. This is apparent by observing growing trade between China and other states. Between 2000 and 2005, Chinese imports from the U.S. climbed from USD$16 billion to USD$42 billion, while Chinese exports to the U.S. rose from USD$100 billion to USD$243 billion (Hufbaur, Wong and Sheth 2006: 4). As well as the U.S., China has economically integrated itself with large areas of the globe. States that have recently forged closer bonds with China include Australia, which currently experiences unprecedented and growing economic ties with the rising power (Taylor 2005: 193), and the European Union (EU), which has considered lifting its twenty year arms embargo of China in the hopes of guaranteeing more lucrative trade deals (Cendrowicz 2010: 2). Despite global economic integration contributing to a more benign rise of China, some fear that China’s demand for resources may trigger conflict with other great powers. Bijan suggests that this is unlikely, as China, through efficiency, alternative energies, and conservation, hopes to develop non-zero sum measures to transcend resource scarcity (2005: 22). Even if this is possible, however, many contend that the true threat to international security lies in China’s dealings with other regional powers.¶ Despite alarmist claims to the contrary, the growth of China is unlikely to jeopardise the security of other regional states. When describing the rise of continental powers, Napoleon famously said, ‘the policies of such states are inherent in their geography’ (cited in Kaplan 2010: 23). This is certainly true regarding the rise of contemporary China. Whatever China’s true regional ambitions are, an observation of the East Asian alliance system indicates the improbability of a Chinese “Monroe Doctrine” in the near future. With direct economic and political contestation from both India and Japan, both key allies to the U.S. (Power 2006: 32), any attempt to supplant the U.S. as a regional hegemon, seems increasingly unlikely. Nye states that a more probable scenario for East Asia is one in which the U.S., Japan, Australia, India, and others, from a position of strength, engage China and incentivise it to engage more responsibly with the regional community. By again contrasting the rise of China with that of the Soviet Union, likely regional developments are better able to be ascertained. While the Soviet Union was believed to be a ‘highly revisionist state bent on radically overturning the status quo’ (Glaser 2011: 85), virtually no evidence suggests China shares these qualities. This highlights the reasonable probability of avoiding war within East Asia, as China continues to rise.¶ Finally, the maintenance of the regional status quo seems increasingly likely, given the direct advantage to China of a significant U.S. naval presence in East Asia. Strategic analyst Khalid R. Al-Rodhan argues that the U.S. naval dominance of East Asia serves China strategically by providing security against terrorism and smuggling, maintaining the balance of power by preventing Japanese militarisation, and contributing to general stability (2007: 52). The fact that the U.S. East Asian naval presence allows China to better focus on domestic matters, strongly suggests that peace can be maintained regionally, as China continues to strengthen. Despite these positive developments, virtual unanimity can be found among those concerned with China’s rise, when focus is placed on the volatility that exists between China and Taiwan.¶ Despite the severe risk to international security presented by China and Taiwan’s fractious relationship, the chances of a peaceful resolution are greater than the alternative of war. Tensions between China and Taiwan, resulting from Taiwan’s uncertain international status, have been regularly identified as having the potential to cause massive international instability, and until this point have been dealt with by a combination of legal manipulation, complex diplomacy and a detachment from political realities (DeLisle 2000: 35). Despite the situation’s current failure to escalate into internecine conflict, fears are growing that the rapid rise of China may manifest into revisionism of Taiwan’s status, triggering hostilities. Given its potential to entangle the U.S. and China in large scale war, the Taiwan Strait is viewed by many as one of the most dangerous areas on Earth. (Mandelbaum 1998/99: 31). Some contend, however, that while potentially grave, the Taiwan situation shows signs of stability. Johnston identifies potential processes between China and Taiwan such as noncooperation and conflictual actions, as well as an escalation of ‘malign reciprocation’ (2003: 50), as indicators of an emerging security dilemma. The failure of this situation to so far occur should be grounds for guarded optimism. Currently the vast majority of Taiwanese citizens favour either unification with the Chinese mainland, or maintenance of the present status-quo (Chang and Wang 2005: 42). This, combined with an improvement in cross-straight relations and institutional cooperation since the 2008 electoral victory of the Kuomintang Party in Taiwan (Bitzinger and Desker 2008: pg106), should provide additional hope among proponents of peace. Lastly, given that Taiwan’s naval power is still technologically superior to China’s, it is predicted that even without direct U.S. assistance, were diplomacy to collapse, China would be unable to invade Taiwan for at least ten years, if not considerably longer (O’Hanlon 2000: 53, my emphasis). These factors, when viewed in concert, suggest a high probability for future peaceful negotiations of the Taiwan situation, despite the strengthening of China.¶ This essay has sought to challenge the claim that a rising China poses a significant threat to international security. The relatively sudden propulsion of China to great power status, through the exponential growth of both its military and economy, has generated considerable anxiety among numerous states. Some contend that as China grows, its contestation with the U.S. for hegemon status may escalate into large-scale warfare. These concerns, however, seem less credible when a realistic comparison of China and the U.S. is undertaken. While the accelerated growth of China’s GDP is indeed enviable, current problems concerning its wealth disparity has the potential to cripple further developments. Additionally, while China and the U.S. are approaching overall economic parity, a huge military asymmetry remains. This will almost certainly inhibit more severe forms of bellicosity from China as it continues to strengthen. Those who fear an emerging Cold War between the U.S. and China consistently fail to comprehend how vastly different the structure of the Chinese state is to that of the former Soviet Union. While the U.S.S.R was largely defined by its confrontational foreign policy and economic isolationism, contemporary China presents an inversion of this grand strategy. By prioritising domestic issues over expansionist foreign policy, as well as a direct economic engagement with the global community, China has forged strong and lasting financial links with other powerful states, which should prevent an escalation of any emerging hostilities. Despite continued concerns over China’s regional ambitions, the strength of the U.S.’s alliance system within East Asia, seems likely to pressure China’s acceptance of the regional status-quo for some time to come. Lastly, given the potential for a rapid and irreversible acceleration into a large-scale conflict, the situation involving Taiwan’s status does constitute a credible threat to international security. However, given the apparent lack of will from either China, Taiwan, or the U.S. to disrupt the political equilibrium, coupled with indicators that suggest China is not seeking overall regional revisionism, the risk to international security seems manageable. While uncertainties regarding the future of China are legion, the peaceful integration into the international order of a strengthening and influential China is entirely possible. Through interaction and increased inter-dependence, the peaceful rise of China can be assured.

### Self-fulfilling prophecy !

#### AND THE CHINA-THREAT THESIS IS A SELF-FUFILLING PROPHECY – GIVING INTELLECTUAL LEGITIMACY TO THEIR THREAT CONSTRUCTION ENTRENCHES COMPETING INTERESTS.

Al-Rodhan 2k7

[khalid, a critique of the china threat theory: a systematic analysis, asian perspective 31, 3, 41-66]

Methodologically, the "China threat" is a hypothesis about¶ the future. Its supporting examples are imperfect analogies (e.g.,¶ to Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany). Each nation's experience Is dif-¶ ferent and so are the circumstances of the international order.¶ Projecting from these assumptions tends to skew predictions.¶ The forecast that China will be a threat to U.S. national security¶ is a worst-case estimate. It assumes that China's economy and¶ military will continue to grow at the same rates, that its social¶ cohesion will not be disrupted, and that political stability will¶ not be seriously challenged. These assumptions may hold, but¶ they also may not.¶ The theoretical foundations of the "China threat" suffer¶ from two contradictions. First, it is based on an assumption¶ about Chinese grand strategic intentions. Guessing intentions is¶ often a fruitless exercise. It leads to nothing more than guessti-¶ mates about possible futures. The "China threat" theory, simply¶ put, chooses the worst-case scenario of those possible futures;¶ proponents of the theory often use language that reflects certain-¶ ty and inevitability. Second, as with many theories, there are¶ exceptions to Mearsheimer's offensive realism; the most recent¶ example is the rise of the United States without war during the¶ early 20th century. Neorealists would argue that the United¶ States and Great Britain, the dominant powers at that time, had¶ "shared values," which made a war unlikely. This is, however, a¶ unit-level explanation that would not pass the test of systemic¶ theories under neorealism. In either case, the important point to¶ highlight here is that if internal factors matter, then there are¶ many indicators that would point to a different future from the¶ one envisioned by offensive realists.¶ Strategically, the "China threat" thesis is as dangerous as it¶ is misleading. Arm waving by policy makers in Washington can¶ force China to militarize its intentions, even if they were benign,¶ which could lead to enhancing the tensions and making the¶ "China threat" a self-fulfilling prophecy. Overestimating the¶ threat posed by any nation can lead to the wrong policies to con-¶ tain the threat, which could hurt the United States strategically¶ in the long run. It is not at all clear what China's exact intentions¶ are. Assuming the worst may be a wise strategy, if one discounts¶ the threats China faces and its security concerns, including insta-¶ bility in Central Asia, North Korea's nuclear weapons, maritime¶ security in the Pacific, and the potential militarization of Japan.

#### And, their re-circulation of the China threat literature is the knowing participation of orientalist and racist depictions of the world and inter-state behavior. To evaluate this advantage and impact argument is to create the most likely conditions for the impact’s realization.

Trigaux 2k12

[david, MA Political Science University of South Florida St .Petersberg, the us, china, and rare earth metals – the future of green technology, military tech, and a potential achielle’s heel to American hegemony”, p. google]

But what of the bilateral relationship between China and the United States? This relationship has gotten a lot of attention in the media in the last year, as legislation in congress sought trade restrictions against China, labeling it a currency manipulator. This debate largely rotated around the construction that the PRC is an enemy of the United States. A media storm that centers on the “big bad China” who is trying to subvert the American economy isn‟t just contained to our shores. Chinese America specialists look at domestic media and listen to American politicians speak, and must have felt accused, targeted and belittled. The ways in which the debate concerning China is portrayed in the United States is a decisive factor in how the Chinese view the United States, so the construction of a China threat may actually become a reality.191

All of this discourse focuses on a single overarching factor; the creation of an “Us” and “Them” separation. Modern “politics aims at the creation of unity in a context of conflict and diversity; it is always concerned with the creation of an “us” by the determination of a “them”.”192 This categorization is the basis of modern US Chinese relations, defined as a comparison of two unique (one familiar and the other mysterious and foreign) political entities. In the status quo, the realist lens identifies this dichotomy as a productive portrayal of the bilateral relations. Clearly defined threats are helpful for the analysis of realists, but often results in threats being created rather than identified.

The way that scholars in the United States construct China as a threat is very pervasive. Reading scholarly literature on the U.S-China relationship is virtually encompassed by "China threat" literature, dichotomizing the West as the self, and the People‟s Republic of China as a distant „other.‟ Originally, this discourse was perpetuated to bolster the dual ideas of American Exceptionalism, and American hegemony in a post-Cold War era.

This discursive construction, however, has deeper roots, that go back a century and a half to the first wave of Chinese immigration to the United States. Chinese laborers took jobs that the new settlers in California, and the rest of western America desperately needed. Their willingness to work for less undercut many middle and lower class jobs, and resulted in a resentment that translated into blatant racism.193 A perfect example is the construction of the transcontinental railroad by a mostly Chinese workforce. The Chinese exclusion acts limited Chinese, and Asian immigration as a whole shortly thereafter, but the damage was done. The United States has been threatened economically by the Chinese for centuries, whether in person by the loss of jobs in the United States, or the more abstract threat of a large, foreign nation having a position of power over American currency, and now, vital resources.194 This largely orientalist construction of the Chinese has its roots in an imperialist mindset that denigrates non-Westerners.195 Many of our conceptions of the Chinese as sneaky, manipulative (such as in relation to the US currency, and now, our rare earth supplies) and militaristic (such as interpretations of their military programs as a challenge to the U.S.) are imbedded in what Edward Said described as “orientalism.”196 This semi-paternal, semi racist mindset subtly makes actions by the PRC as threatening, because of who is doing them, and translates into how we view actions by the Chinese.197 “Like orientalism, the U.S. construction of the Chinese "other" does not require that China acknowledge the validity of that dichotomous construction.” 198

This has created a self-fulfilling prophecy.199 The realist quest for security has another casualty, for “so long as the United States continues to stake its self-identity on the realization of absolute security, no amount of Chinese cooperation would be enough” to overcome these constructions.200The United States has always constructed itself as against someone as a leading part of its identity. The early colonists opposed the Native Americans, then the British. Soon after the British was the Western Native Americans, and moral crusade against slavery. The United States turned its newfound moral authority against imperialism, even though it began a series of imperialist wars and occupations. Two World Wars later left the United States locked in a titanic ideological and, in many nations, violent conflict with the Soviet Union and Communism. “After the demise of the Soviet Union, the vacancy of other was to be filled by China, the "best candidate" the United States could find in the post-Cold War, unipolar world.”201 “Only an uncertainty with potentially global consequences such as China could justify U.S. indispensability or its continued world dominance.”202

### Self-fulfilling prophecy extension

#### And, our self-fulfilling prophecy arguments are empirically corroborated – Chinese hardliners gain public and institutional legitimacy when responding to China threat literature with escalatory zero-sum security challenges.

Hoffmann 2k12

[Jeanne, unpacking images of china using causal layered analysis, Macquarie university, Australia, journal of future studies, 16(3):1-24, PhD Candidate – Political Science, March]

The People’s Republic of China has countered the “China threat” theories by equating them with a cold war mentality, ill will and a bias against China. There is a fear of China being surrounded by the US and jeopardising China’s national interests. Chinese realists argue that “Western attempts to enlist greater Chinese involvement in global management and governance is a dangerous trap aimed at tying China down, burning up its resources, and retarding its growth” (Shambaugh, 2011, p.13). “If China does not oppose the US, the US will abuse China’s interests and China will become America’s puppet”, says Zhang Ruizhang (as cited in Shambaugh, 2010, p.13). According to Dai Xu in response to an agreement between South Korea and the United States to construct a naval base to protect Seoul from attack, he states that Beijing “cannot always put up with American provocations” and that China “must draw a clear red line against American attempts to surround it”. (Global Times, online). Dai Xu further states that the US is trying to create a kind of “Asian NATO” with the purpose to “create a global empire, and China will be the first to be threatened, because this undercover Asian NATO will be distributed along China’s soft underbelly similar to the “encirclement” seen during the Cold War” (Global Times, online).¶ Any slight to national pride and sovereignty adds fuel to the historic sense of victimization. From a Chinese perspective, the threat comes from a United States along with other Western powers, Japan, India and Taiwan that is hostile to China’s political values and wants to contain its rise by supporting Taiwan’s separation from mainland China, sympathy for Dalai Lama and Uighur separatists, US military alliances perceived to encircle the Chinese mainland and the sustained argument that China should slow its growth. The unrest that has erupted; in Tibet in 2008 Xinjiang in 2009 and the awarding of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to Lui Xiabo are all evidence of “foreign hostile forces” and Westerners’ “ill intentions” (Wang, 2011, p.69).¶