### FRAMEWORK

#### 1 Interpretation: The ballot is to determine if the enactment of a topical plan is better than the status quo or a competitive option.

#### 2 Violation:

#### A “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School, ‘4

(5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, <http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm>)

**The colon introduces** the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. **A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:"¶ Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.**

#### B USFG is the national government in DC.

Encarta Online Encyclopedia, 2k

(http://encarta.msn.com)

“The federal government **of the U**nited **S**tates **is centered in** Washington **DC”**

#### C Should means there is a practical reason for action

WordNet in ‘97

Princeton University, 1.6

**Should** v 1 : be expected to: “Parties should be fun” 2 : **expresses an** emotional**, practical,** or other **reason for doing something:** “You had better put on warm clothes”; “You should call your mother-in-law”; *“The State ought to repair bridges*”[syn**:** had better, ought]

#### 3 Vote Negative:

#### Limits on what can be debated protect subversion and meaningful debate.

Shively, 2K

(Former Assistant Politics Professor – Texas A&M, Partisan Politics and Political Theory, pp. 181-4, We have the full text of the card if you want to see it)

At the very least, **we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it.** For instance, once cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one’s target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, **contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagreements.** The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator’s audience must know what is being resisted. In short, **the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it.** In other words, **contestation rests on some basic agreements or harmony.**¶Continues on page 184¶ But, again, the response to the ambiguist must be that **the practice of questioning and undermining rules**, like all other social practices, **needs a certain order. The subversive needs rules to protect subversion. And when we look more closely at the rules protective of subversion, we find that they are roughly the rules of argument** discussed above. In fact, **the rules of argument are roughly the rules of democracy or civility: the delineation of boundaries necessary to protect speech and action from violence, manipulation, and other forms of tyranny.**

#### And, fair division of ground is necessary for meaningful switch-side debate – switch-side debating cultivates a civic attitude which threatens fundamentalism and turns debate into a training ground for progressive politics

Mitchell et al. 07

(Gordon, Eric English, Stephen Llano, Catherine E. Morrison, John Rief, and Carly Woods, Pitt Comm Studies Grad Students, Gordon Mitchell is an Associate Comm Studies Professor @ Pitt, Communication & Critical/Cultural Studies 4)

The problem for Greene and Hicks is that this notion of citizenship becomes tied to a normative conception of American democracy that justifies imperialism. They write, ‘‘The production and management of this field of governance allows liberalism to trade in cultural technologies in the global cosmopolitan marketplace at the same time as it creates a field of intervention to transform and change the world one subject (regime) at a time.’’11 Here, Greene and Hicks argue that this new conception of liberal governance, which epitomizes the ethical citizen as an individual trained in the switch-side technique, serves as a normative tool for judging other polities and justifying forcible regime change. One need look only to the Bush administration’s framing of war as an instrument of democracy promotion to grasp how the switch-side technique can be appropriated as a justification for violence. It is our position, however, that **rather than acting as a cultural technology expanding American exceptionalism, switch-side debating originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes.** **Several prominent voices reshaping the national dialogue on homeland security have come from the academic debate community and draw on its animating spirit of critical inquiry**. For example, Georgetown University law professor **Neal Katyal served as lead plaintiff ’s counsel in Hamdan, which challenged post-9/11 enemy combat definitions**. 12 The foundation for Katyal’s winning argument in Hamdan was laid some four years before, when he collaborated with former intercollegiate debate champion Laurence Tribe on an influential Yale Law Journal addressing a similar topic.13 Tribe won the National Debate Tournament in 1961 while competing as an undergraduate debater for Harvard University. Thirty years later, Katyal represented Dartmouth College at the same tournament and finished third. **The imprint of this debate training is evident in Tribe and Katyal’s contemporary public interventions, which are characterized by meticulous research, sound argumentation, and a staunch commitment to democratic principles**. Katyal’s reflection on his early days of debating at Loyola High School in Chicago’s North Shore provides a vivid illustration. ‘‘I came in as a shy freshman with dreams of going to medical school. Then Loyola’s debate team opened my eyes to a different world: one of argumentation and policy.’’ As Katyal recounts, ‘‘the most important preparation for my career came from my experiences as a member of Loyola’s debate team.’’14 **The success of former debaters like Katyal, Tribe, and others in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security points to the efficacy of academic debate as a training ground for future advocates of progressive change**. Moreover**, a robust understanding of the switch-side technique and the classical liberalism which underpins it would help prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies**. **For buried within an inner-city debater’s files is a secret threat to absolutism: the refusal to be classified as ‘‘with us or against us,’’ the embracing of intellectual experimentation in an age of orthodoxy, and reflexivity in the face of fundamentalism**. But by now, the irony of our story should be apparent\***the more effectively academic debating practice can be focused toward these ends, the greater the proclivity of McCarthy’s ideological heirs to brand the activity as a ‘‘weapon of mass destruction.’’**

#### Dialogue is critical to affirming any axiological values—shutting down deliberation turns the aff regardless of its nuances because their argumentative form evacuates the potential for solvency.

Morson 4

http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331

Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel); and his favorite writers -- Chekhov, Gogol, and, above all, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is especially interested in the relation of literature to philosophy.

Bakhtin viewed the whole process of “ideological” (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic) development as an endless dialogue. As teachers, we find it difficult to avoid **a voice of authority,** however much we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice, because our rebelliousness against society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture.We speak the language and thoughts of **academic educators**, even when we imagine we are speaking in no jargon at all, and that jargon, inaudible to us, sounds with all the overtones of authority to our students. We are so prone to think of ourselves as **fighting oppression** that it takes some work to realize that we ourselves may be felt as oppressive and **overbearing,** and that our own voice may provoke the same reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree. So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image: helpful, but often painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on “The Theme of the Rebel” and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors. There is a famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox opponents. Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isn’t that itself often the root cause? We know from Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who escaped to Poland, that Ivan saw himself as someone who had been oppressed by noblemen as a child and pictured himself as the great rebel against traditional authority when he killed masses of people or destroyed whole towns. There is something in the nature of maximal rebellion against authority that produces ever greater intolerance, unless one is very careful. For **the skills of** fighting or **refuting an oppressive power are not** those of **openness, self-skepticism, or real dialogue**. In preparing for my course, I remember my dismay at reading **Hitler’s** Mein Kampf and discovering that his self-consciousness was **precisely** that of the rebel speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that much of his amazing appeal – otherwise so inexplicable – was to the German sense that they were rebelling victims. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic exploited much the same appeal. Bakhtin surely knew that Communist totalitarianism, **the Gulag,** and the unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power. His favorite writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that the worst oppression comes from those who, with the rebellious psychology of “the insulted and humiliated,” have seized power – **unless they have somehow cultivated the value of dialogue**, as Lenin surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had. Rebels often make the worst tyrants because their word, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has borrowed something crucial from the authoritative word it opposed, and perhaps exaggerated it: the aura of righteous authority. If one’s ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth, one is likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority; and rebels of the next generation may proceed in much the same way, **in an ongoing spiral of intolerance**.

#### State action and coercion key to solve existential problems and turns corporate dominance

Mansbridge ’11

Jane is the Charles Adams Professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, “On the Importance of Getting Things Done,” <http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2FPSC%2FPSC45_01%2FS104909651100165Xa.pdf&code=61d04501e14285b50244640216120c97>

T¶ rend plus inaction equals¶ drift. When a¶ trend has external causes¶ and no one can act to intervene, that inaction leads to¶ drift—the unimpeded trajectory of change. Drift in the¶ United States produces the¶ domination of American¶ democracy by business interests. Drift in international¶ decisions produces global¶ warming. Speciﬁc institutional designs for government, such as the US separation of¶ powers, can cause the inaction that facilitates drift. More fundamentally, ingrained patterns of thinking can cause inaction. Here¶ I argue that the long and multifaceted resistance tradition in the¶ West contributes to inaction by focusing on stopping, rather than¶ using, coercion.¶ By contrast, a political theory of democratic action explicitly¶ recognizes that solving collective action problems requires lawgiving, and that lawgiving requires coercion—getting people to¶ do what they would not otherwise do through the threat of sanction and the use of force. The work of democracy is to make that¶ coercion somewhat more legitimate. Thus, while a theory of democratic action should incorporate resistance, it should not—and¶ cannot—be driven by resistance.¶ In the United States and on the planet, we now face problems¶ vaster than any that James Madison conceived, involving interdependence on a global scale and potential catastrophe for unborn¶ generations. Serious attempts to deal with these problems continue to be stymied, in part by a view of democracy that is in many¶ of its strands a theory of individual and collective resistance, not a¶ theory of collective action.

#### Coercion of State power necessary to prevent extinction and not inherently exclusionary

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Let me suggest another approach, based on two premises. First,¶ we need coercion to solve collective action problems. Second, there¶ can be no such thing as fully legitimate coercion. Therefore we¶ need theories that can guide public action and help improve democratic legitimacy incrementally.We can move toward the ideal of¶ democratic legitimacy without discrediting every state that falls can work through the simple capacity to act (I turn on the light¶ switch—my preferences cause the outcome). When the outcome¶ requires other human beings, the causal relation can work through¶ genuine persuasion on the merits. Neither of these is coercive¶ power.¶ By “coercion” or “coercive power” I mean the threat of sanction or the use of force. I do not view the words “coercion” or¶ “coercive” as inherently negative. It is true that both coercion and¶ the threat of sanction will always have a negative valence. Punishment would not be punishment if those being punished did¶ not want to avoid it. But a relationship, for example between two¶ people, may be better when the partners have equal capacity to¶ sanction each other than when neither has that capacity. When¶ you care for someone, you give that person the capacity to sanction you and to threaten sanctions. Deeply interdependent social¶ relations are, I believe, all built in part on mutual coercion.¶ In short, by coercive power I mean “power over,” not the nicer¶ forms of power such as “power to” (that is, capacity) or “power¶ with” (cooperative power). Although Arendt (1970) described¶ power as the human ability to act in concert, this is not what I¶ mean. Those forms of power are admirable in their place. But to¶ solve collective action problems we also need coercive power, based¶ on the threat of sanction or the actual use of force.¶ 10¶ Why is this the case? The answer has to do with the nature of¶ goods that are non-excludable. Their character is such that everyone can use them without in any way contributing to providing¶ them. Examples include law and order, common defense, roads¶ without tolls, an educated workforce, clean rivers, and breathable¶ air. Collective action problems arise whenever we want to produce such goods. All of these things, and thousands of other desirable collective outcomes, are nonexcludable, or largely so. By their¶ nature, goods like these cannot be parceled out only to those who¶ work or pay to bring them into being. It is only goods like these—¶ nonexcludable goods—that produce the collective action problem, which is, at bottom, a problem of non-contribution.¶ Coercion is not always necessary to solve collective action problems and get people to contribute to producing a nonexcludable¶ good. Sometimes we can produce such goods through voluntary acts of solidarity. Everyone can voluntarily chip in to build a road,¶ defend the country, produce schooling for the poor, or abstain¶ from overﬁshing. But in most cases we also need coercion around¶ the edges to give those who are tempted to free ride on the contributions of others an external incentive to contribute. The need¶ for coercion to solve collective action problems is, in my view, the¶ primary reason for government. Coercion also helps human beings¶ achieve justice together through government.¶ My second premise is that no actual instance of coercion can¶ fully meet the criteria of democratic legitimacy. Over the years,¶ democratic theorists have worked out democratic criteria for¶ moments of both genuine commonality and genuine conﬂict. The¶ criteria for moments of commonality specify, among other things,¶ that deliberations leading to consensus should ideally take place¶ in conditions free from coercive power (free, that is, from the threat¶ of sanction and the use of force).¶ 11¶ In reality, however, the conditions for deliberation are never fully free from coercive power. As¶ for conﬂict, the democratic criteria for moments of conﬂict specify, among other things, that ideally, decisions should be based on¶ the equal power of each participant.¶ 12¶ In reality, however, power¶ is never fully equal in democratic negotiation or even in majority rule, where the agenda always derives from an unequal process.¶ Therefore the coercion that actually existing democracies deploy¶ to implement their decisions will never be completely legitimate.¶ In short, a political theory of democratic action demands a¶ corresponding theory of imperfect legitimacy. Legitimacy is not a¶ dichotomy—a thing you either have or do not have. It is a continuum from more to less.¶ A political theory of democratic action should not neglect the¶ goals of resistance theory. Every means of approximating relatively legitimate coercion has its underside. Every exercise of coercive power puts those on the receiving end of that power at risk.¶ But simply blocking the exercise of power is often a bad solution.¶ One version of resistance theory, attractive to the framers of the¶ American constitution and to many since then, holds that if you¶ put enough institutional veto points in place, the little that gets¶ through is bound to promote the common good.¶ 13¶ This approach¶ privileges stopping the work of the government. It may have been¶ appropriate in a simpler world, where it might reasonably be said¶ that the government is best which governs least, and in a more¶ decentralized world, where the scope of government action did¶ not need to be as great. In a more heavily interdependent world, a¶ democracy needs more collective power to solve the growing number of collective action problems. It can safely allow more collective power through the grid if it reduces the worst eﬀects of that¶ power in other ways.¶ Starting with the aims of the power itself, a democracy can¶ organize itself to make the power that surges through the system¶ more likely to promote the common good—for example, by reforming campaign ﬁnance, reducing corruption, attracting more public spirited individuals to oﬃce, and bringing stakeholders into constructive negotiation with one another. Democracies can also¶ devise targeted safeguards for the vulnerable—for example, by legislation such as the Voting Rights Act of 1964. Democracies can¶ encourage both constructive and critical organization in civil¶ society—for example, by facilitating unionization, subsidizing¶ investigative journalism, and protecting internet access—so that¶ new ideas feed into state power and people can organize eﬀectively when resistance is necessary.¶ More generally, when a good has mixed positive and negative¶ features—and I consider coercion such a mixed good—one should¶ not always block or automatically resist the good, but rather look¶ for practices and institutions that reduce its undesirable eﬀects,¶ protect the vulnerable, compensate the losers, and facilitate ongoing changes for the better.¶ In the tension between resistance and action, context is critical.Tyrannical regimes demand resistance. Deeply corrupt regimes¶ cannot justly claim legitimacy. But when the threat of tyranny is¶ relatively weak and corruption relatively limited, the need for collective action is often greater than the need for resistance. I do not¶ pretend here to oﬀer guidance to political movements on their¶ choice of tactics, many of which are appropriately aimed at resist ing particular injustices or at drawing attention to unsolved problems, such as rising inequality or global warming, even when the¶ protesters do not agree on a plan of action (think “Occupy Wall¶ Street”). I am arguing instead for something deeper: a shift in¶ emphasis within democratic theory, from a long-standing promotion of resistance to the greater embrace of coercion, even while¶ recognizing that the coercion can never be more than partially¶ legitimate. Where might a democratic theory that recognizes the central role¶ of coercive action turn its analytic gaze?Two promising and underexplored areas are negotiation and uncorrupt delegation supplemented by citizen deliberation. Theorists trying to make headway¶ on these problems could beneﬁt from working closely with empirical scholars of conﬂict resolution, comparative government, and¶ perhaps other ﬁelds.¶ To explore the normative complexity of negotiations, we could¶ begin with Denmark. In 2002, two development economists coined¶ the phrase “getting to ‘Denmark’” to describe the goal of helping¶ impoverished countries deliver key public services.¶ 14¶ Francis Fukuyama adopted “getting to Denmark” to describe the historical paths¶ for acquiring an eﬀectively functioning, accountable state under¶ the rule of law (Fukuyama 2011, 14 ﬀ, 431 ﬀ.). Denmark is small,¶ homogeneous, and defended primarily by the armies of others.¶ Like many Nordic states it has a culture that may not be duplicable. Its social welfare model has the inevitable imperfection of¶ requiring signiﬁcant barriers to entry. Yet Denmark could nevertheless serve as one model in an exploration of negotiation—¶ speciﬁcally the contribution of diﬀerent forms of democratic negotiation to relatively legitimate coercion. The outcomes of¶ the Danish political process match what its citizens want relatively closely, and the process itself, although not based on the¶ majority rule of alternating parties, has strong claims to democratic legitimacy.¶ Regarding outcomes, Denmark has the most equal income distribution of any advanced industrialized country. Robert Kuttner¶ reported in 2008 that “Denmark’s ﬁnancial markets are clean and¶ transparent, its barriers to imports minimal, its labor markets the¶ most ﬂexible in Europe, its multinational corporations dynamic¶ and largely unmolested by industrial policies, and its unemployment rate of 2.8 percent the second lowest in the OECD” (Kuttner¶ 2008, 78). In its Index of Economic Freedom, the Heritage Foundation gives Denmark a score of 78.6 out of 100, or eighth place in¶ the world, better than the United States in ninth place. Denmark¶ has universal health insurance, good child-care and generous¶ unemployment compensation. It has the world’s second highest¶ tax rate and spends 50% of its GDP on public services.¶ 15¶ How did Denmark’s democracy become capable of such eﬀective action? First, after a series of reforms in the early and midnineteenth century, Denmark is now tied with New Zealand and¶ Singapore for the distinction of being the least corrupt country¶ on earth in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions¶ Index.¶ 16¶ Second, because its list system of proportional representation currently produces eight parties in parliament and no single party has had a parliamentary majority since 1909, passing¶ laws requires negotiation and compromise among parties. This¶ system generates a more cooperative form of negotiation than in¶ the US Congress. Third, Danish democracy has little separation¶ of powers on the national level (although we cannot be sure this¶ is related to its eﬀectiveness). It has a parliamentary system with¶ a unicameral legislature and extremely limited judicial review.¶ Finally, Denmark has evolved a form of eﬀective and far-reaching¶ decentralization in which local elected bodies serve as responsive¶ service-deliverers but not powerful veto points.¶ 17¶ The result of this noncorrupt and negotiated system? Denmark’s citizens have, according to the Eurobarometer, greater¶ trust in their national parliament and their national parties than¶ the citizens of any other country in Europe. They are more “satis-¶ ﬁed with the way democracy works” in their country than the citizens of any other country in Europe. Staggeringly, 94% of the¶ Danish citizens are at least “fairly satisﬁed” with the way democracy works in their country.¶ 18¶ To this sociological legitimacy, add¶ some normativelegitimacy from two features. First, Denmark’s citizens are actively engaged in their politics. Without any compulsory voting, the turnout in the general elections since 1960 has¶ averaged 85%. In The Economist’s 2010 Democracy Index, Denmark has the third highest score in the world, after Norway and¶ Iceland.¶ 19¶ Second, the very process of negotiation adds democratic¶ value by drawing out the reasons and justiﬁcations advanced by¶ the diﬀerent parties.¶ 20¶ Danes have also shown their capacity for resistance when¶ needed. In 1943, when the German army occupied Denmark, the¶ public denunciation of the German plan for deporting the Jews¶ involved the King, the universities, students, the Danish state¶ church, the Supreme Court, the trade unions, the employers’ confederation, the farmers’ organizations, the heads of ministries,¶ and all of the political parties except the small pro-Nazi National¶ SocialistWorkers’ Party of Denmark (Kirchhoﬀ 1995). Denmark’s¶ corporate entities were actually the foci for resistance. I am not saying that the United States can model itself on Denmark. That would be absurd. Nor am I saying that Denmark is a¶ perfect polity. Its protections forits own citizensarearguably related¶ toits relative homogeneity andits barriers toimmigration. Finally,¶ I do not have suﬃcient empirical data to judge the relative merits¶ of the diﬀerent systems that are less prone to deadlock, whether¶ majority-rule Westminster systems or well-structured systems of¶ negotiation, or the roles of diﬀerent kinds of veto points, which in¶ some contexts may promote, rather than hinder, common democratic action (Birchﬁeld and Crepaz 1998). I am saying that these¶ questions need entwined empirical and normative attention. In the¶ future I hope that comparativists will readmore democratic theory¶ and theorists more comparative work, to the point where each can,¶ with the help of their colleagues, contribute productively to the¶ development of bothﬁelds. In particular, Iam urginghere that political theorists can proﬁtably ally with comparativists and other¶ empirical political scientists to investigate the sources of democratic legitimacy in countries other than our own and Great Britain. In Denmark, we might concentrate on the strengths and¶ weaknesses of their forms of negotiation. These forms of negotiation, developed historically not only by Denmark but also by other¶ relatively neocorporatist states in Europe, have heavily inﬂuenced¶ the relatively successful processes of the EU bureaucracies, which¶ unlike Denmark have highly heterogeneous constituencies.¶ Just as one size does not ﬁt all in economic development, so¶ too one size does not ﬁt all in the building of legitimate democratic action.The new ﬁeld of comparative political theory is investigating, among other things, the sources for democratically¶ legitimate action in the cultures and philosophies of nonwestern¶ countries. My point is that as this work goes forward, the focus¶ should be as much on the sources of coordinated, intelligent¶ action—and relatively legitimate coercion—as on resistance.¶ If we think about problems of global scale, like climate change¶ and weapons of mass destruction, the focus on action becomes¶ even more necessary. Decisions at the global level cannot be as¶ democratically legitimate as those at a national scale. In the foreseeable future, decisions at the global level will be even less likely¶ than those at the national level to be discussed, much less resolved,¶ in an arena governed only by the “forceless force of the better¶ argument.” Nor will decisions be made in a way that even approximates the equal power of each individual or the proportionate¶ power of those aﬀected. To achieve action capable of addressing¶ collective action problems on a global level, we will have to accept¶ ongoing coercion that is far less democratically legitimate than¶ the coercion we accept at the level of the nation state.Yet we must¶ take action, as soon as is humanly possible, for the sake of unborn¶ generations.

#### Instrumental argumentation and research is key to motivate legislative fence-sitters. Their critical approach is just preaching to the choir which endangers public and decision-making backlashes which turn the case. Only our interp can generate the public debates necessary to ensure survival.

Brown 2k11

[heath, PhD Political Science, Roanoke, Salem, VA, “narrative strategies used by interest groups during the 2008 presidental transition”, 2011 Pat-Net Conference]

Milbrath argues that interest groups must strategically present information so as to ¶ overcome the “perceptual screen” that shields policy makers from absorbing endless amounts ¶ of information. He suggests that groups use facts (scientific information about policy ¶ outcomes), arguments (normative explanations of justness or rightness of action), and power¶ (typically subtle offers of political support or threats of political retribution) to communicate ¶ their interests and make their case for policy action (or inaction). In a more recent approach, ¶ Esterling (2007, p. 79) makes the case that groups can use [using] “instrumental” – “research or ¶ evidence-based causal” arguments -- or “normative” – “intrinsic desirability” arguments. By ¶ emphasizing one of these approaches, a group is tacitly communicating the way it wants to ¶ persuade the target of the information. By emphasizing power or normative arguments, the ¶ group implies that the policy maker should make decisions based primarily on their political ¶ judgment and political future. Conversely, by emphasizing facts-based or instrumental ¶ arguments, the group implies that the policy maker should base decisions primarily on rational ¶ or scientific considerations. In practice, it is difficult to disentangle these two types of ¶ arguments and many groups will likely combine various ways to present information (Wright ¶ 1996; Rochefort and Cobb 1994). The dichotomy though does help clarify the persuasive or ¶ argumentative tone of the information and advice given by groups to policy makers. 6 ¶ While public perceptions of interest groups might suggest crass self-interest, ¶ manipulation, and deception, groups have an incentive to be forthright in the information they ¶ provide and arguments they make. A group that provides shoddy statistics or misleading ¶ arguments will be discounted in future interactions with the policy maker (Kersh 2009; ¶ Easterling 2007). John E. Chubb (1983, p. 145) writes in regard to energy interest groups: ¶ “information and advice that are solely self-serving threaten the bond of trust that facilitates ¶ the informal play of influence.” In fact, rather than targeting political opponents or fence ¶ sitters, much research suggests that groups prefer or are invited to lobby friends and allies over ¶ adversaries (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999; Hall and Deardorff ¶ 2006; Bauer et al. 1963; Holyoke 2004; McCool 1990). If this is the case, the cost of ¶ misrepresenting or overstating information may be particularly high for those engaged in what ¶ Hall and Deardorff (2006) and others have called “legislative subsidy” (Hall and Deardorff 2006; ¶ Esterling 2007a). From this subsidy perspective, if a policy maker is sub-contracting information ¶ collection and analysis to an allied interest group, it behooves that group to be conscientious, ¶ thorough, and consistent in the information and advice it gives. And in many cases, as Wright ¶ (1996) contends, it is relatively easy for policy makers to check the authenticity of the ¶ information provided to them, sometimes simply through the contradictory information ¶ provided by other groups, thereby curtailing the inclination to blatantly misrepresent the truth. ¶ Furthermore, experimental research shows that factual or instrumental information is ¶ preferred by legislative staff (LaPira 2008) and neutral expert lobbyists have more legislative ¶ access than non-experts (Esterling 2007b). Facts may be useful on their own terms in ¶ formulating legislative decisions but scientific or statistically based arguments also serve as a 7 ¶ cue for policy makers to determine the credibility or reliability of the advice they are given ¶ (Sabatier 1978). ¶ Rather than convince those already in agreement, the approach taken by proactive ¶ theorists suggests that groups seek to convince legislative fence sitters or opponents to adopt ¶ the group’s position, advocate the group’s interests, or simply vote in the group’s way through ¶ the offer of, or refusal to give, political support (Smith 1984; Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; ¶ Wright 1996). Wright (1990) for one finds that groups which distribute campaign contributions ¶ to a wide group of legislators are then able to access a wider group, rather than just political ¶ allies (Wright 1990). Similarly, Heberling (2005) shows that one group, the AFL-CIO, seeks out ¶ legislators with unknown political preferences rather than targeting political allies (Heberling ¶ 2005). The field of interest group research has not yet resolved whether groups typically lobby ¶ friends, adversaries, or some combination of the two (Leech and Baumgartner 1998). This is ¶ likely due to the wide variation of group types and also policy domains in which groups operate. ¶ These inter-organizational and inter-policy differences affect the strategies employed and ¶ therefore the content of information presented during lobbying.

### THE CRITIQUE

#### GIROUX IGNORES HOW THE UNIVERSITY IS COMPLICIT IN THE REPLICATION OF NEOLIBERAL RELATIONSHIP TO OBJECTS IN THE WORLD. THAT COMPLETELY TURNS THE CASE BECAUSE THEIR PERFORMANCE IN THE DEBATE SPACE IS THE ENACTMENT OF A HIGHLY SPECIALIZED FORM OF ACADEMIC KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION WHICH IS THE STRATEGIC WASTE OF THEIR ENERGY IN A NON-THREATENING ACADEMIC FORMAT TO SERVE AS A RECUITING TOOL AND RETAINER FOR THE NEOLIBERAL INSTUITIONS USING YOUR PRESENCE HERE LIKE A CHEAP HIGHWAY BILLBOARD FOR THEIR COMMUNICATION DEPARTMENT.

FISH 2K9  
[stanley, “neoliberalism and higher education”, professor of humanities and law at Florida International University, visiting professor cardozo, nyt, mar 8, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/08/neoliberalism-and-higher-education/]

Harvey and the other critics of neoliberalism explain that once neoliberal goals and priorities become embedded in a culture’s way of thinking, institutions that don’t regard themselves as neoliberal will nevertheless engage in practices that mime and extend neoliberal principles — privatization, untrammeled competition, the retreat from social engineering, the proliferation of markets. These are exactly the principles and practices these critics find in the 21st century university, where (according to Henry Giroux) the “historical legacy” of the university conceived “as a crucial public sphere” has given way to a university “that now narrates itself in terms that are more instrumental, commercial and practical.” (“Academic Unfreedom in America,” in Works and Days.) This new narrative has been produced (and necessitated) by the withdrawal of the state from the funding of its so-called public universities. If the percentage of a state’s contribution to a college’s operating expenses falls from 80 to 10 and less (this has been the relentless trajectory of the past 40 years) and if, at the same time, demand for the “product” of higher education rises and the cost of delivering that product (the cost of supplies, personnel, information systems, maintenance, construction, insurance, security) skyrockets, a huge gap opens up that will have to be filled somehow. Faced with this situation universities have responded by (1) raising tuition, in effect passing the burden of costs to the students who now become consumers and debt-holders rather than beneficiaries of enlightenment (2) entering into research partnerships with industry and thus courting the danger of turning the pursuit of truth into the pursuit of profits and (3) hiring a larger and larger number of short-term, part-time adjuncts who as members of a transient and disposable workforce are in no position to challenge the university’s practices or agitate for an academy more committed to the realization of democratic rather than monetary goals. In short, universities have embraced neoliberalism. Meanwhile, even those few faculty members with security of employment do their bit for neoliberalism when they retire to their professional enclaves and churn out reams of scholarship (their equivalent of capital) that is increasingly specialized and without a clear connection to the public interest: “[F]aculty have progressively . . . favored professionalism over social responsibility and have . . . refused to take positions on controversial issues”; as a result they have “become disconnected from political agency and thereby incapable of taking a political stand” (McClennen, Works and Days). Of course that’s what I urge — not an inability to take political stands, but a refraining from doing so in the name of academic responsibility — and it now becomes clear (even to me) why McLennen would see in what I write an implicit support for the neoliberization of academic life. When I say to my fellow academics “aim low” and stick to your academic knitting or counsel do your job and don’t try to do someone else’s or warn against the presumption of trying to fashion a democratic citizenry or save the world, I am encouraging (or so McLennen says) a hunkering down in the private spaces of an academic workplace detached from the world’s problems. And when I define academic freedom as the freedom to do the academic job, not the freedom to expand it to the point where its goals are infinite, my stance “forecloses the possibility of civic engagement and democratic action.” (McClennen) That’s not quite right. I don’t foreclose the possibility; I just want to locate it outside the university and the classroom. But for McClennen, Giroux, Harvey and many others, this is a distinction without a difference, for the result of what I advocate would still be faculty members who are “models of moral indifference and civic spectatorship,” at least when they’re being faculty members. (Henry Giroux and Susan Searls Giroux, “Take Back Higher Education.”) By defining academic freedom narrowly, as a concept tied to a guild and responsive only to its interests, I am said to ignore the responsibility academics have to freedom everywhere, not only in the classroom or in the research library but in the society at large and indeed in the entire world. In the view of the critics of the neoliberal university, a limiting definition of academic freedom forfeits the good that academics, highly trained and articulate as they are, might do if they took a stand against injustice and unfreedom wherever they are found. That line of reasoning leads directly to the academic left’s support for the boycott of Israeli academics, an issue I shall take up in my next column.

### ABLEISM

#### The aff’s discussion of waste and trash in the context of energy masks that calculations of waste are steeped in ableism. They are in a double bind – either the aff is a discussion of waste in an analogous context to energy i.e. they link or they aren’t and none of their framework defense will be true.

Gregor Wolbring, Verlyn Leopatra, and Jacqueline Noga. 2012. Dept of Community Health Science at the U of Calgary, Canada; Bachelor of Health Sciences, Faculty of Medicine at the U of Calgary; Faculty of Medicine at the U of Calgary. The Sentiment of Waste and the Measure of Footprints Evaluated Through an Ableism Lens. Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics. 22. http://ucalgary.academia.edu/GregorWolbring/Papers/1556464/The\_sentiment\_of\_waste\_and\_the\_measure\_of\_footprints\_evaluated\_through\_an\_ableism\_lens

The concept of waste is everywhere. There is radioactive waste [1;2], carbon waste [3] and electronic waste [4]. There is the notion of wasted lives [5;6],bodies [7] [8] and the phrase ‘wasted effort’ is everywhere. Waste is covered in fiction [9;10], has a cultural component [11-13] is gendered [14] and indicators exist [15]. The meaning of waste [16-20] as well as what one can label and what is labeled as waste has changed over time and continues to change. However, why do we label some things and actions as waste or wasteful as beneficial or costly and others not? Cost benefit is a measure used in many areas such as environmental policy decisions.[21-23]. Its theoretical origin dates back to issues in infrastructure appraisal in France in the 19th century.[24]. Footprint (e.g. water, carbon, energy, ecological) calculations are recently employed for many products and services as a means to highlight certain costs. Water footprint measures, for example, the amount of water needed to generate a given consumer product or service [25]. Water footprint calculations exist for among others coffee, crops andenergy and can be generated for regions and countries[25]. Energy [26] and ecological [27] footprints embodied in trade are calculated. Carbon footprints are calculated for many purposes such as household activities in the UK[28]. Footprints are one measure to inform cost/benefit evaluations among others in the sustainability [22;29;30]and waste discourse [31]. However cost by itself does not define what is perceived as waste or wasteful. The benefit calculation is an important part in labeling something as waste or wasteful. This paper deploys ableism as an analytical framework to shed light on the dynamic of labeling some things and actions as waste and others not. Every person cherishes certain abilities and finds others non-essential. Favoring certain abilities often morphs into ableism where one not only cherishes certain abilities but where one perceives certain abilitiesin oneself or others as essential. Ableism reflects anability-based and ability-justified understanding of oneself, one’s body and one’s relationship with others of one’s species, other species and one’s environment [32].The author submits that abilities one favors and ableisms one exhibits are key influences in what one perceives as waste, the extent and nature of waste generation one finds acceptable, and which waste one wants to minimize or avoid. It influences which footprint costs one judges as more important to deal with than others and what solutions one envisions for a given ecological problem.The paper contends that analyzing a discourse through the ability-desires-of-the-players lens adds to the tool arsenal allowing one to set waste strategies, to predict certain outcomes in given waste discourses with given players involved and to predict when something will be seen as waste or not.

#### Ableism has empirically been used to justify sexism, disablism, racism, and classism

Gregor Wolbring. 2008. Dept. of Community Health Sciences at the University of Calgary, Alberta, Canada. The Politics of Ableism. Development. 51 (252-258).

Ableism against disabled people (Wolbring, 2007a, b, c) reflects a preference for species typical normative abilities leading to the discrimination against them as ‘less able’ and/or as ‘impaired’disabled people (Wolbring, 2004, 2005). This type of ableism is supported by the medical, deficiency, impairment categorization of disabled people (medical model) (Wolbring, 2004, 2005). It rejects the ‘variation of being’, biodiversity notion and categorization of disabled people (social model). It leads to the focus on ‘fixing’ the person or preventing more of such people being born and ignores the acceptance and accommodation of such people in their variation of being (Wolbring, 2005). Ableism has also long been used to justify hierarchies of rights and discrimination between other social groups, and to exclude people not classified as ‘disabled people’. Sexism is partly driven by a form of ableism that favours certain abilities, and the labelling of women as not having those certain necessary abilities is used to justify sexism and the dominance of males over females. Similarly, racism and ethnicism are partly driven by forms of ableism, which have two components. One favours one race or ethnic group and discriminates against another. The book The Bell Curve (Herrnstein and Murray, 1994) judged human beings on their ‘cognitive abilities’ (their IQ). It promoted racism by claiming that certain ethnic groups are less cognitively able than others. The ableist judgement related to cognitive abilities continues justifying racist arguments. Casteism, like racism, is based on the notion that socially defined groups of people have inherent, natural qualities or ‘essences’ that assign them to social positions, make them fit for specific duties and occupations (Omvedt,2001).The natural inherent qualities are ‘abilities’ that make them fit for specific duties and occupations.

### 1nc case

#### THEIR CLAIMS ABOUT NEOLIBERALISM ARE JUST CONJECTURE; THERE IS NO SHARED academic UNDERSTANDING OF NEOLIBERALISM NOR ACCUMULATION OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE SO THERE IS NO EPISTEMOLOGICAL BASIS FOR THEIR CLAIMS.

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[taylor and Jordan, neoliberalism: from new liberal philosophies, professor of political science uc Berkeley,

Despite its prevalence, scholars’ use of the term neoliberalism presents a puzzle. Neoliberalism shares many attributes with “essentially contested” concepts such as democracy, whose multidimensional nature, strong normative connotations, and openness to modification over time tend to generate substantial debate over their meaning and proper application (Gallie 1956). In stark contrast to such concepts, the meaning of neoliberalism has attracted little scholarly attention. In a review of 148 articles on neoliberalism published in the top comparative politics, development, and Latin American studies journals between 1990 and 2004, we did not find a single article focused on the definition and usage of neoliberalism, nor are we aware of one published elsewhere. In this article, we analyze contemporary scholars’ unusual use of neoliberalism in the study of political economy and offer an explanation for why this situation has come about. Based on a content analysis of journal articles, the first section of the article documents three key characteristics of this use. First, neoliberalism is employed asymmetrically across ideological divides: it is used frequently by those who are critical of free markets, but rarely by those who view marketization more positively. In part, proponents avoid the term because neoliberalism has come to signify a radical form of market fundamentalism with which no one wants to be associated. Second, neoliberalism is often left undefined in empirical research, even by those who employ it as a key independent or dependent variable. Third, the term is effectively used in many different ways, such that its appearance in any given article offers little clue as to what it actually means. The contemporary use of neoliberalism is even more striking because scholars once employed the term nearly the opposite of how it is commonly used today. As we demonstrate in the second section, the term neoliberalism was first coined by the Freiberg School of German economists to denote a philosophy that was explicitly moderate in comparison to classical liberalism, both in its rejection of laissez-faire policies and its emphasis on humanistic values. These characteristics imbued neoliberalism with a common substantive meaning and a positive normative valence: it denoted a “new liberalism” that would improve upon its classical predecessor in specific ways. Only once the term had migrated to Latin America, and Chilean intellectuals starting using it to refer to radical economic reforms under the Pinochet dictatorship, did neoliberalism acquire negative normative connotations and cease to be used by market proponents. We argue that the patterns of asymmetric use emerging out of this historical transformation contribute to current scholars’ tendency to apply the term neoliberalism broadly, yet offer few precise definitions. In developing this explanation, the third section of the article expands upon Gallie’s (1956) framework for analyzing essentially contested concepts, arguing that there are multiple levels of contestation. Scholars may contest not only the meaning and application of a concept, but also its normative valence and the term used to denote it. In the case of neoliberalism, the contested normative valence of the free market-related concepts to which the term refers, combined with terminological contestation over how to label these concepts, has led scholars with divergent normative assessments of the free market to adopt different terminology. When the use of language expresses only one side of a politically charged argument, choice of terminology takes the place of a direct confrontation of ideas, and meaningful debate suffers