# 1st Off

#### A. Increase financial incentives presumes well developed, pre-existing program

Webster’s Dictionary 19**’**98

Increase: to make greater, augment, implies to what is already well grown, or well developed

#### B. No SMR incentives have been fully developed

Rosner and Goldberg 11

(Robert Rosner, astrophysicist and founding director of the Energy Policy Institute at Chicago. He was the director of Argonne National Laboratory from 2005 to 2009, Stephen Goldberg, Special Assistant to the Director, Argonne National Laboratory ¶ Senior Fellow, Energy Policy Institute at Chicago¶ Research Coordinator, Global Nuclear Future Initiative ¶ American Academy of Arts and Sciences, “Small Modular Reactors – Key to Future Nuclear Power ¶ Generation in the U.S.” Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, <http://csis.org/files/attachments/111129_SMR_White_Paper.pdf>

As illustrated in the previous discussion, until significant learning benefits are achieved, the LEAD SMR plant and some number of FOAK SMR plants may not be competitive with new¶ natural gas combined-cycle generation. Estimates of the number of SMR modules that may not¶ be competitive and the magnitude of the difference in cost are subject to significant uncertainty.¶ The estimates are dependent upon at least three key variables: the initial cost estimates39 for the¶ LEAD SMR design, the learning rate, and the future price of natural gas.40 The potential range of¶ uncertainty is illustrated in Figure 4, which identifies the generation cost differential ($/MWh)¶ between the family of SMR plants (LEAD, FOAK, and NOAK) and gas-fired plants for a variety¶ of natural gas price scenarios. This analysis adopts the 10% learning assumption and the¶ overnight cost estimate of $4,700/kW.¶ Assuming that early SMR deployments will carry cost premiums (until the benefits of learning¶ are achieved), the issue is whether federal government incentives are needed to help overcome this barrier. Some may argue that commercial deployment will occur, albeit at a slower pace, as¶ the cost of alternatives increases to a level that makes initial SMR deployments competitive.¶ Others may argue that SMR vendors should market initial modules at market prices and absorb¶ any losses until a sufficient number of modules are sold that will begin to generate a profit.¶ However, the combination of the large upfront capital investment, the long period before a return¶ on capital may be achieved, and the large uncertainty in the potential level of return on¶ investment make it unlikely that SMRs will be commercialized without some form of¶ government incentive.¶ The present analysis assumes that government incentives will be essential to bridging this gap¶ and accelerating private sector investment (see Appendix D). It is the study team’s understanding¶ that DOE has proposed to share the cost of certain SMR design and licensing study activities.¶ This section analyzes possible options for government incentives for early deployments (LEAD¶ and FOAK plants) in addition to federal cost sharing for the design and licensing effort. The¶ present analysis considers several alternative approaches to providing such incentives, either in¶ the form of direct or indirect government financial incentives, or through market transformation¶ actions that will spur demand for FOAK plants in competitive applications. The study team’s¶ approach is to identify targeted, least-cost incentives that could form the basis for further¶ dialogue between stakeholders and policy makers.¶ Possible financial incentives need to be designed and evaluated relative to a particular¶ management model for deployment of LEAD and FOAK plants. The study team’s management¶ model assumes that these initial SMR plants will be managed and financed by the private sector,¶ consisting of a possible consortium of the SMR vendor, the reactor module manufacturer, other¶ major vendors, a host-site utility company, and one or more other electricity generation or¶ vertically integrated utilities. The types of incentives that could be structured for this type of¶ management model are discussed in the subsections that follow.

#### C. Vote neg-

#### Predictability. We give a predictable list of affs— any increase in ALREADY OFFERED incentives in the federal budget. Their interp eliminates that caselist.

#### Inf. Regr. Their interp legits military procurement for anything production related

#### D. Voter fairness and education

# 2nd Off

**Obama will win- top models and factors prove**

**Klein 9-17**

Ezra is a columnist for the Washington Post and an MSNBC Political Analyst, “The Romney Campaign is in Trouble,” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/09/17/romney-is-behind-and-the-debates-arent-likely-to-save-him/>

First came the changes in strategy. It went from doing everything possible to assure a “referendum” election to picking Paul Ryan as the vice presidential nominee and going for a choice election. It went from focusing relentlessly on the economy to cycling among welfare, Medicare and Libya. The latest ad is about manufacturing jobs in China.¶ Now we’re hearing the calls for a change in strategists. On Sunday night, Politico published a 2,700-word piece mostly dedicated to giving “Romney aides, advisers and friends” space to knife Stuart Stevens, Mitt Romney’s top strategist. “I always have the impression Stuart must save his best stuff for meetings I’m not important enough to attend,” one Romney campaign insider told Politico. “The campaign is filled with people who spend a lot of their time either avoiding him or resisting him.”¶ Ouch.¶ On the presidential level, where everyone running campaigns is very, very good at their jobs, campaign infighting and incoherence tend to be the result of a candidate being behind in the polls, not the cause of it. **Romney is behind and has been** there for quite some time. **According to the Real Clear Politics average** of head-to-head polls, **Romney hasn’t led the race since October 2011**. The closest he came to a lead in the polls this year was during the Republican National Convention, when he managed to … tie Obama.¶ **Romney is also behind in most election-forecasting models**. Political scientist James **Campbell rounded up 13 of the most credible efforts to predict the election outcome: Romney trails in eight of them. He’s also behind in Nate Silver’s election model, the Princeton Election Consortium’s meta-analysis**, Drew **Linzer’s Votamatic model and the Wonkblog election model.**¶But **I didn’t realize quite how dire Romney’s situation was until I began reading “The Timeline of Presidential Elections: How Campaigns Do and Don’t Matter**,” a new book from political scientists Robert Erikson and Christopher Wlezien.¶ **What Erikson and Wlezien did is rather remarkable: They collected pretty much every publicly available poll conducted during the last 200 days of the past 15 presidential elections and then ran test after test on the data to see what we could say about the trajectory of presidential election**s. Their results make Romney’s situation look very dire.¶ For instance: The least-stable period of the campaign isn’t early in the year or in the fall. It’s the summer. That’s because the conventions have a real and lasting effect on a campaign.¶ **“The party that gains pre- to post-convention on average improves by 5.2 percentage points as measured from our pre- and post-convention benchmarks,”** write Erikson and Wlezien. “**On average, the party that gains from before to after the conventions maintains its gain in the final week’s polls**. In other words, its poll numbers do not fade but instead stay constant post-conventions to the final week.”¶ This year, it was the Democrats who made the biggest gains from before to after the conventions. Obama is leading by 3 percent in the Real Clear Politics average of polls, about double his lead before the Republican convention. If that doesn’t fade by the end of the week or so — that is, if it proves to be a real lead rather than a post-convention bounce — then there’s simply no example in the past 15 elections of a candidate coming back from a post-convention deficit to win the popular vote.¶ This is about the point where I’m supposed to write: That said, **the race remains close, and the debates are coming soon. It’s still anyone’s game.**¶But the most surprising of Erikson and Wlezien’s results, and the most dispiriting for the Romney campaign, is that unlike the conventions, the debates don’t tend to matter. There’s “a fairly strong degree of continuity from before to after the debates,” they write. That’s true even when the trailing candidate is judged to have “won” the debates. “Voters seem to have little difficulty proclaiming one candidate the ‘winner’ of a debate and then voting for the opponent,” Erikson and Wlezien say.¶ Gallup agrees. The august polling firm reviewed the surveys it did before and after every televised presidential debate and concluded they “reveal few instances in which the debates may have had a substantive impact on election outcomes. “¶ The Romney campaign tends to point to two elections to show how its candidate could win this thing. There’s 1980, when Jimmy Carter supposedly led Ronald Reagan until the debates, and 1988, when Michael Dukakis was leading by 13 points after his convention. In fact, Reagan led going into the 1980 debates. And although Dukakis’s convention bounce was indeed large, it was wiped out by Bush’s convention bounce, which put him back in the lead.¶ That’s not to say Romney couldn’t win the election. A **3 percent gap is not insurmountable. But we’re quickly approaching a point where his comeback would be unprecedented in modern presidential history**. And if the Romney campaign begins to crack under the pressure, then that comeback becomes that much less likely.

#### Nuclear power is incredibly unpopular- NIMBY, Polls prove

Ramana ’11

M. V. is currently appointed jointly with the Nuclear Futures Laboratory and the Program on Science and Global Security, both at Princeton University, where he works on the future of nuclear energy in the context of climate change and nuclear disarmament, “Nuclear Power and the Public,” <http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/nuclear-power-and-the-public>

On April 10 of this year, nearly a month after a disastrous earthquake and tsunami struck Japan, thousands of protesters took to the streets of Tokyo, calling for an end to nuclear power. In the city's Koenji neighborhood, a large group of mostly younger protesters, many in costume, chanted and banged drums. In Shiba Park, an older and more sober group demanded the closure of the Hamaoka nuclear power plant, located near a fault line about 200 kilometers (125 miles) southwest of Tokyo.¶ ¶ These public protests are symptomatic of a general decline in public support for nuclear power in Japan, a country that derived about 30 percent of its electricity from nuclear power in 2010. Recent polls have suggested that somewhere between 41 and 54 percent of Japanese support scrapping, or reducing the numbers of, nuclear power plants. By comparison, a 2005 poll conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency found that 82 percent of Japanese favored building more plants or maintaining existing ones. Partly in response to the recent growing opposition, on May 6, Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan instructed the operator of Hamaoka to shut down all three reactors there. Four days later, Kan called for a new energy policy with less reliance on nuclear power.¶ Japan is by no means alone. Around the world, nuclear energy has declined in popularity. In the United States, for example, a Washington Post-ABC poll conducted in April 2011 found that 64 percent of Americans opposed the construction of new reactors. Another poll, conducted by CBS News in March 2011, soon after the Fukushima crisis began, found that only 43 percent of those polled would approve of building new reactors, down from a 57 percent approval rating in 2008. Support for nuclear power was similar or lower in countries as varied as Chile (12 percent), Thailand (16.6 percent), Australia (34 percent), and the United Kingdom (35 percent). Even in France, which relies on nuclear power for about three-quarters of its electricity, one poll found that a majority (57 percent) were in favor of abandoning nuclear energy.¶ These approval ratings are not strictly comparable because the polls were conducted by different agencies, asking different questions and providing different kinds of information prior to asking the questions. Nevertheless, there is little doubt among those who study public opinion on nuclear power that, by and large, it does not command much support.

**Approval Rating is key, lines up perfectly with reelection
Silver ’11**

Nate directs five thirty eight and is a statistician, “Approval Ratings and Reelection Odds,” <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/approval-ratings-and-re-election-odds/>

Earlier this month, we posted the simple version of a finding, based on the historical record, that is worth keeping in mind when you read articles about how Barack Obama’s presidency has (or has not been) been revitalized: It’s just too soon for his approval ratings to tell us very much about his re-election prospects for 2012. This is an overdue follow-up to that article — what you might think of as the slightly-more-complicated version. While **it’s true that approval ratings aren’t of much use now, it’s also the case that, by the time we get close to the election, they will have become a very reliable predictor of Mr. Obama’s chances of winning another term**. Based on Gallup polling, here is what I estimate that the incumbent president’s approval rating was on Election Day in almost every election since 1940. (There is no data for 1944 because Gallup went on wartime hiatus.) There are a few tricks I had to employ to derive these numbers; I’d ask you to take them on faith for a few moments, and then we’ll explain everything later on. **At first glance, the relationship seems nearly perfect: every incumbent with an approval rating of 49 percent or higher won re-election, while every candidate with a rating of 48 percent or lower lost.** In practice, things probably don’t work quite that crisply. For example, Harry Truman, whom we estimate had a 50 percent approval rating on Election Day 1948, won by 4.5 points, and 114 electoral votes, over Thomas E. Dewey, which suggests that he had some margin to spare. And candidate quality clearly makes a difference. Although Robert Dole is sometimes considered a weak Republican nominee, Bill Clinton beat him in 1996 by just 8.5 points, despite Mr. Clinton’s 55 percent approval rating. By contrast, in 1972, Richard Nixon, with an approval rating only a couple of points higher (57 percent), trounced a very weak Democratic nominee, George McGovern, by more than 23 points. Still, the approval rating at which an incumbent candidate goes from being an underdog to a favorite for re-election is somewhere in the high 40s. **The reason the threshold is probably slightly below 50 percent rather than right at 50 percent is that in any approval survey, some people (typically 5 to 10 percent) say they are undecided about the president’s performance**. For instance, at this writing, Barack Obama’s Gallup approval rating is 49 percent but his disapproval rating is just 42 percent, a net margin of +7. If those were the figures on Election Day, he would be a favorite to win unless nearly everybody who was undecided about his performance cast their ballots against him, something that is possible in theory but usually doesn’t occur in practice. Now, then, how did we come up with these numbers? As I said, it’s not quite so straightforward. Gallup has approval ratings data going back to 1937. The problem is that, until fairly recently, they had a habit of stopping their approval ratings polling several months before a presidential election. For instance, in 1956, their last poll of Dwight Eisenhower’s public approval was in early August; they did not survey him again until late November, after he had already defeated Adlai Stevenson. However, we can extrapolate what Mr. Eisenhower’s rating would have been on Election Day 1956 by drawing a smoothed regression line — known in the business as a Loess curve — using the data points before and after that date. The one hitch is that incumbent presidents, whether they win, lose, or don’t run at all, almost always receive a “bounce” in their approval rating after the election, as people either rally around a winner or feel sympathy for the lame duck. The average magnitude of this post-election bounce is 4 points. So, before I fitted the curves, I subtracted 4 points from approval rating polls conducted after Election Day. By applying this process of bounce-adjustment and curve-fitting, we are able to estimate an incumbent president’s Gallup approval rating on Election Day itself or on any day before it, as shown in this nifty-looking graphic: I haven’t labeled the curves by the candidate’s name in the chart, because that which create too much clutter. But I have distinguished those who eventually won re-election (blue lines) from those who lost (red). A couple of cases are worth attention. The red line that you see briefly extending above 80 percent is for George H.W. Bush. His approval ratings, which were already pretty good, shot up following the start of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, when American-led forces drove Iraqi troops back from their occupation of Kuwait. Politically, that made Mr. Bush look like an extremely formidable candidate for re-election: Saturday Night Live ran a sketch later that year entitled “Campaign ’92: The Race To Avoid Being The Guy Who Loses To Bush,” with Democratic candidates at a debate all trying to lose so they would not have to run against him. But Mr. Bush’s approval ratings fell precipitously throughout late 1991 and early 1992, and were below 40 percent by Election Day. If Mr. Bush is the precedent that challengers will cite when their campaign seems to be flailing, the opposite example is the original Comeback Kid, Harry Truman. He’s the blue line that you still see down around 40 percent approval with just five months to go before the election of 1948. It’s hard to know exactly where Mr. Truman’s approval numbers were on Election Day. When Gallup surveyed in late June, he had just 39 percent approval; in January, 1949, after he had beaten Thomas E. Dewey, he was up to 69 percent; and then he reverted back to 50 percent just a couple months later. Our Loess curve estimates that Mr. Truman’s approval rating was probably around 50 percent on Election Day, but this is just a guess. What’s clear is that Mr. Truman was at some point an extremely unpopular president, and he nevertheless — to the great surprise of the Chicago Daily Tribune — defeated Mr. Dewey. Another thing to take from the graphic is how the red and blue lines gradually untangle themselves as the relationship between approval ratings and re-election becomes stronger over time. We can see this a bit more clearly by taking the average approval rating for the 8 winning candidates and the 3 losing ones and tracking them over the two years leading up to the election: I would resist the idea that there is any one magical date when approval ratings go from meaningless to meaningful as predictors of re-election. In the chart, the first time the winners and the losers begin to separate themselves is about 19 months before the election — which would correspond roughly to March of the prior year — but the split would have come a bit earlier if not for Mr. Bush’s Gulf War bounce. There’s also increasing differentiation in the period roughly 10 to 5 months before the election, corresponding with primary season. Still, for the most part, the separation occurs gradually. I’ve also tried to play around with various sorts of logistic regression models that attempt to predict a president’s chances at re-election based solely on his Gallup approval rating and the number of days until the election. Don’t take this terribly seriously — it’s hard to do anything very rigorous based on so few data points (just 11 presidents in the sample), and I can imagine better model designs than the one that I’ve used. But it does yield some ballpark estimates of what this data implies. **For example, a year in advance of the election, the model figures that a president with a 60 percent approval rating is about 90 percent likely to win re-election, whereas a 40 percent rating translates into a win probability of a bit below 40 percent**. So by that point the differences have become fairly meaningful: What does this mean for Barack Obama? Right now, we’re still in the period where the most useful number for estimating his re-election chances is not his approval rating but rather the historical track record of incumbent presidents. As I wrote on Wednesday, since the Civil War, 73 percent of incumbent presidents who sought another term won, as have 70 percent since World War II. Plugging Mr. Obama’s current numbers into the regression model that I described above yields a 65 percent likelihood of re-election — but again, this is a really rough guess, based mostly on the high historical batting average for incumbents rather than anything to do with Mr. Obama himself. What we can say is important is the range in which Mr. Obama’s approval ratings have been varying in recent months: between about 45 and about 50 percent. **If Mr. Obama’s approval rating is at the top of that range, 50 percent, on Nov. 6, 2012 — about where it is now — the model figures that his chances of winning re-election will be greater than 80 percent. But if his approval rating is at the bottom of the range instead, at 45 percent, his chances for a second term will be only about one in three,** and he’ll have to hope that the Republican nominee is a weak one. Much will change between now and then, of course. But Mr. Obama would probably win an election held next Tuesday — and that would not have been true a couple of months ago.

#### China label kills relations and the economy

Roach 8-28

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True to his word as a candidate, a few hours after taking office as US president on January 20, 2013, Mitt Romney issued his first executive order, declaring China guilty of currency manipulation. In accordance with the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, President Romney’s act triggered immediate negotiations between US and Chinese officials. But the negotiations stalled and both parties blamed the other in press releases.¶ In early February, in his first State of the Union address, Mr Romney said: “Enough is enough. It is high time for China to play by our rules.” Congress roared its approval and within a week, overwhelming bipartisan majorities of both houses passed the Defend America Trade Act of 2013. Modelled on the currency manipulation “remedies” of countervailing tariffs first proposed in 2005, DATA was signed into law on President’s Day, February 18 2013. China was quickly deemed to be in violation of the new statute.¶ More¶ At that point negotiations took on a new urgency. But the new leaders in both countries were in no mood for compromise and the talks failed. In accordance with the provisions of DATA, Washington slapped immediate tariffs of 20 per cent on all Chinese products entering the US.¶ As plants shut down across China, Beijing declared this to be an act of economic war and filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization. Li Keqiang, newly installed as premier, announced after the National People’s Congress in March that China had no patience to endure a WTO dispute process that could take anywhere from two to five years to run its course.¶ China’s Ministry of Commerce then announced retaliatory tariffs of 20 per cent on all US exports to China. This hit growth-starved America right between the eyes. With $104bn of American-made goods sold in Chinese markets in 2011, China had become the US’s third-largest and its fastest-growing export market. To add insult to injury, China-dependent Walmart announced average price increases of 5 per cent. Other retailers followed suit. Talk of stagflation was in the air and hard-pressed American consumers hunkered down further.¶ US financial markets swooned. The stock market was hit by pressures on profit margins, growth and inflation. The bond market was also unnerved by the realisation that the Federal Reserve was seriously behind the curve. With good reason. After its meeting in June 2013, the Fed reaffirmed its ever-extending commitment to keep its benchmark policy rate near zero through 2015, and even dangled the possibility of yet another round of quantitative easing, QE4. Yields on 10-year Treasuries moved back above 4 per cent and stocks fell sharply further.¶ Feeling the heat from financial markets, Washington turned up the heat on China. Mr Romney called Congress back from its Independence Day holiday into a special session. By unanimous consent, Congress passed an amendment to DATA – upping the tariffs on China by another 10 percentage points.¶ At that point an indignant China turned to its own version of the big bazooka. The biggest foreign buyer of US debt was nowhere to be seen at the Treasury’s August 2013 auction. Long-term interest rates spiked and within weeks yields on 10-year Treasuries hit 7 per cent. The dollar plunged and the US stock market went into free fall.¶ Just like that, the so-called exorbitant privilege of the haven asset vanished. When asked at a press conference why China would willingly engage in actions that would undermine the value of more than $2tn in Treasuries and other dollar-based holdings, Zhou Xiaochuan, retiring governor of the People’s Bank of China, said: “This is not about risk-adjusted portfolio returns. We are defending our people against an act of economic war.”¶ By the autumn of 2013 there was little doubt of the severity of renewed recession in the US. Trade sanctions on China had backfired. Beleaguered American workers paid the highest price of all, as the unemployment rate shot back up above 10 per cent. A horrific policy blunder had confirmed that there was no bilateral fix for the multilateral trade imbalance of a savings-starved US economy.¶ In China, growth had slipped below the dreaded 6 per cent threshold and the new leadership was rolling out yet another investment stimulus for a still unbalanced and unstable Chinese economy. As the global economy slipped back into recession, the Great Crisis of 2008-09 suddenly looked like child’s play. Globalisation itself hung in the balance.¶ History warns us never to say never. We need only look at the legacy of US Senator Reed Smoot and Representative Willis Hawley, who sponsored the infamous Tariff Act of 1930 – America’s worst economic policy blunder. Bad dreams can – and have – become reality.

#### Economic decline causes nuclear war

Harris and Burrows, 09 –

 PhD in European History @ Cambridge and Counselor of the US National Intelligence Council AND Member of the National Intelligence Council’s Long Range Analysis Unit (Mathew J. and Jennifer, “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis,” April, Washington Quarterly, <http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_Burrows.pdf>)

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the **Great Depression** is not likely to be repeated, the **lessons** to be drawn from that period **include the harmful effects on** **fledgling** **democracies** and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) **and** on the sustainability of **multilateral institutions** (think League of Nations in the same period). **There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first** as much as in the twentieth **century.** For that reason, the ways in which **the potential for greater conflict could grow** would seem to be even more apt **in a** constantly **volatile economic environment** as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. **Terrorism**’s appeal **will decline if** economic **growth continues** in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the **diffusion of technologies** and scientific knowledge **will place** some of **the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach**. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity **conflict** and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella **could lead to an unintended escalation** and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close **proximity of** potential **nuclear rivals** combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions **may place more focus on preemption** rather than defense, potentially **leading to escalating crises**. 36 Types of **conflict** that the world continues to experience, such as **over resources, could reemerge,** particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. **Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity** will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this **could result in interstate conflicts** if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, **cooperation** to manage changing water resources **is** likely to be increasingly **difficult** both within and between states **in a** more **dog-eat-dog world.**

# 3rd Off

#### US civil-military relations up

World Politics Review 8-15-12

[Andrew Exum, Sr. Fellow @ Center for New American Security, and a Lecturer in International Affairs @ Columbia, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12263/abu-muqawama-u-s-needs-perspective-not-pedestal-for-military>, mg]

Earlier this summer, I penned two columns on wartime civil-military relations in the United States and came to the conclusion that, despite some handwringing to the contrary, elected decision-makers and their military counterparts in Washington have actually been working effectively and appropriately. On the whole, I argued, civil-military relations were quite healthy.

#### More civilian input is key to balance civil-military relations

BOSTON GLOBE '09

(Sarah Sewall & John White, teach at the Harvard Kennedy

School, where they co-direct the Project on Civil-Military Relations, Jan. 29th, A13, LN, mg)

Finally, the relative imbalance of resources and expertise - whether between DOD and civilian agencies or between the military Joint Staff and the civilian staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense - was an increasing source of concern. The comparative strength of military actors risks overreliance upon military perspectives and capabilities in all aspects of policymaking and execution. An important recommendation for¶ strengthening civil-military relations is a rebalancing of relative civilian and military capacity and authority.

#### Strong CMR key to prevent Middle East nuclear war

Ricks 12

[Thomas, Political author, June 6, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/books/confront-and-conceal-by-david-sanger.html>, mg]

These are minor blemishes in an important book. I raise them mainly because of the warning signal they send about civil-military relations under President Obama. White House mistrust and suspicion of generals is not a recipe for an effective use of military force because it impedes the candid sort of discussion that consciously brings to the surface differences, examines assumptions and hammers out sustainable strategies. ¶ Rather, it suggests that Mr. Obama and those around him are repeating some of the dysfunctionality that characterized the dealings of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson with the Pentagon during the descent into the Vietnam War. With Syria hanging fire, a nuclear-armed Pakistan on the brink and the Afghan war dragging on, that is not a reassuring state of affairs. ¶

# 4th Off

#### A) The Link: their depiction of China as a threat is a discursive construct that doesn’t reflect objective reality. The thesis of a threatening Chinese rise is a falsehood designed to ratify Western power.

Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, at Deakin University, August 2004, Discourses Of ‘China’ In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 141-142

These are some of the questions in the minds of Western/American strategic analysts, who are wondering how to maintain U.S. preponderance in a world of anarchy and uncertainty. The conservative realist Samuel Huntington asks: “If being an American means being committed to the principles of liberty, democracy, individualism, and private property, and if there is no evil empire out there threatening those principles, what indeed does it mean to be an American, and what becomes of American national interests?” Obsessed with this self-imagery, many scholars and policy planners have been keen to reinvoke the timeless, structural certainty of geopolitical rivalry, and to embrace the ‘back to the future’ scenario, maintaining that despite the dawn of the post-Cold War period little has changed—the world remains a dangerous, volatile place. With such searching eyes for an enemy, it would be surprising if China failed to come into view. Indeed, China makes a perfect candidate, in that “China remains the major source of uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific.” That is, not only do the implications of its economic transformation and military ambition remain unclear, but the resilience of the Communist government even after its roundly condemned Tiananmen suppression seems also to fly in the face of the ‘End of History’ triumphalism. Consequently, (and before September 11), the only major certainty coming out of the post-Cold War era seems to be an unpredictable and dangerous China. From the beginning, this ‘China threat,’ I suggest, is not a result of its actual challenge to the West or the United States per se, but primarily a discursive dimension of the neorealist construction of the American self in terms of global supremacy and indispensable leadership. As Huntington makes it clear, “Chinese hegemony will reduce American and Western influence [in Asia] and compel the United States to accept what it has historically attempted to prevent: domination of a key region of the world by another power.” In the absence of such self-fashioning, most of China’s neighbours, which might arguably be more vulnerable to a China threat if there is one, have traditionally adopted a much less alarmist view on the ‘Middle Kingdom.’ Thus, China’s real challenge for America, as Yu Bin notes, “is perhaps more psychological and conceptual—that is, how to deal with a major power whose rise is not necessarily guided by Washington, unlike the post-World War II rise of Japan and Germany.” Also, it can be argued that the existence of an ‘enemy’ is indispensable to the continued imagination of the ‘indispensable nation.’ In Charles Frazier’s novel Cold Mountain, Inman, a soldier returning home from battle during the American Civil War, pondered the question: “What is the cost of not having an enemy?” Such a cost, then, seems very high indeed, for at stake here is what is seen as the ‘fundamental’ modern Western/American self-identity as a (global) rational being and indispensable leader. Heroic leadership would not be so needed if there was little left to fight for. Clearly mindful of this, Georgi Arbatov, Director of Moscow’s Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, told a U.S. audience the year before the collapse of the Berlin Wall: “We are going to do something terrible to you—we are going to deprive you of an enemy.” While he correctly noted that for the U.S. to live without an identity-defining enemy is terrible indeed, Arbatov was only half right, for the ‘enemy’ itself often has no control over its status as an enemy. Rather, as noted before, it is primarily a ready-made discursive category built into the American self-imagination. With this discursive category as the analytical framework for understanding other actors on the world stage, Western and particularly American scholars did not simply ‘discover’ a China threat out there; it was cognitively constructed beforehand.

#### B) The Impact: these representations make war inevitable

Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, at Deakin University, August 2004, Discourses Of ‘China’ In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 43-44

Like the liberal construction of Other touched on above, this largely realist framing of Other carries with it some profound implications in practice. That is, when the Other is depicted as a fixed geopolitical threat, waging a war (or at least preparing for war) to destroy it often becomes the only rational option to fulfilling the universal self. In this regard, Robert Young notes that “war constitutes the [Western] philosophical concept of being itself. For being is always defined as the appropriation of either difference into identity, or of identities into a greater order…. War, then, is another form of the appropriation of the other….” In this context, not surprisingly, war has figured prominently in U.S. foreign relations: War is always violent, bloody, and destructive. But American wars are fought for great and good ends, and they result in good for America. The Revolution created freedom, independence, and democracy. The Civil War resulted in the expansion of freedom, the destruction of slavery, the growth of industrial might and wealth, and the formation of a unified, powerful nation. Insofar as both liberal and realist framings of Other are derived from the same particular American self-construction, their different approaches to understanding global politics in general and China in particular are basically mutually complementary, rather than mutually exclusive. Recently, this relationship of mutual complement is particularly striking in the emergence of a ‘two worlds’ theory, and its various incarnations such as the new imperialism, liberal imperialism, the New Wilsonianism, and neo-conservatism. As neoconservative commentators William Kristol and Robert Kagan put it, both ‘moral clarity’ and ‘military strength’ are essential if Americans are to continue to be proud of their leading role in world affairs

#### C) The Alternative: Vote Negative to Endorse the affirmative without the justification that China is a threat.

Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, at Deakin University, August 2004, Discourses Of ‘China’ In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 259-260

This is not to endorse an ‘anything goes’ attitude on studying China’s foreign relations. Quite the opposite. For the range of social meanings which can be attached to a certain thing is not limitless, and under certain circumstances, it is obvious that some interpretations appear truer than others. Ultimately, it is the different practical consequences associated with different interpretations that matter. Thus, my point here is that while different meaning-giving strategies could all have certain ‘real-world’ implications, some implications are more dangerous than others. Therefore, when we assign some particular meaning to China, we need to remind ourselves of its potential practical effect, and incessantly bear in mind that such effect, if dangerous, may in some degree be undone if a different, more constructive meaning is given. In short, however tempting it might be, we cannot here return to the kind of ‘Hobson’s choice’ between either a new fixed, definite solution or no alternative at all to the continued reign of the conventional meaning-giving regime. Rather, the choice lies in constantly recognising, on the one hand, the impossibility of having a detached, God’s-eye view of some fundamental truth, and on the other hand, the possibility of formulating nuanced, self-reflective, and responsible ways of seeing an inherently changing world. Such choice, as I have demonstrated in this thesis, is not only clearly possible but also imperative in the study of a complex China amid the volatility, danger, as well as vast potential of contemporary global politics. A ‘choice’ which might indeed hold the key to world peace in the decades to come.

# 5th Off

#### The United States Department of Defense should increase procurement contracts for small modular nuclear reactors deployed on United States foreign military bases outside of the United States.

# Solvency

### Grid Failure 🡪 Meltdowns

#### Decade before solvency

St. Louis Post-Dispatch ‘12

[Jeffrey Tomich, <http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/business/2012/05/10/small-problem.html> ETB]

For all the hype, small reactors are still at least a decade away. And that’s if design, licensing and commercial development go at the pace hoped for by the nuclear industry.¶ And even then, the potential for small reactors hinges on how they compete in the energy marketplace. More than concerns about nuclear safety in the wake of the Fukushima disaster in Japan or the problem of where to dispose of highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel, the technology’s future will be dictated by economics.¶ Jackson said Westinghouse aspires to make small reactors whose costs are equal to or less than full-size reactors.¶ For now, there’s no cost data for small reactors and no firm evidence they will produce electricity at a lower price than larger plants.¶ “It’s too early to determine that,” Klein said. “We’re going to have to see some built.”

#### Grid failure leads SMRs to meltdown

Riches 2/17

(Dennis, Professor Seijo University, “The (False?) Promise of Small Modular Reactors” <http://nf2045.blogspot.com/2012/02/false-promise-of-small-modular-reactors.html>, SEH)

The most fascinating argument that Palley presents is in his discussion of the black swan, civilization-ending massive solar flare which would knock out power grids all over the world. He uses this as an argument for breaking up large, interconnected grids into local isolated grids powered by SMRs. This could save the world from a complete, prolonged blackout. Such a flare actually occurred in 1859 and it caused fires, and destruction of the small telegraph grid that was in place at the time. No one knows for sure how a recurrence would effect electricity grids now. After sufficiently scaring the life out of his readers, he may not have wanted to associate this disaster with its effect on nuclear power plants. He conveniently omits mention of this long blackout leading to hundreds of nuclear power plants running out of fuel for backup cooling systems, after which they would go into meltdowns. Fukushima X 400 (or 400 Chernobyls, as this report explains it).

#### SMRs being put into place now

PACE 11

(People’s Alliance for Clean Energy, “Smaller Size, Big Price Tag: Small modular reactors are risky” <http://pacevirginia.org/2011/01/12/smaller-size-big-price-tag-small-modular-reactors-are-risky/>, SEH)

Claim: New nuclear power technologies must be part of a future energy plan.¶ Reality: Safe, clean and affordable energy options exist TODAY that do not pose the serious risks that SMR’s or other forms of new nuclear energy technologies do. The United States can already implement energy efficiency measures and produce clean, renewable energy at a cheaper rate than building any type of new nuclear reactor. This can be done here in the Southeast too. Unfortunately, nuclear proponents in the Southeast have shown interest in constructing SMR’s. On November 5, 2010 the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) sent the Nuclear Regulatory Commission a key assumptions letter, which is an introductory step towards the federal licensing of a nuclear power plant. TVA stated that it will seek to construct up to six small 125MW Babcock & Wilcox mPower design modular reactors near Oak Ridge, Tennessee at its Clinch Valley site in Roane County. The NRC sent a reply and meeting with TVA and the NRC was then held on December 14, 2010. Furthermore, Hyperion Power Generation has signed a memorandum of understanding with Savannah River Nuclear Solutions to build a prototype SMR at the Department of Energy’s sprawling Savannah River Site nuclear weapons complex in South Carolina. Other states are also keeping a watchful eye as these “mini-nukes” go through the NRC certification process.

#### Can’t Solve--- military is an incompetent bureaucracy--- delays implementation

Exum 12

[Andrew, Sr. Fellow @ Center for New American Security, and a Lecturer in International Affairs @ Columbia, July 11th, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12150/abu-muqawama-breaking-down-the-barriers-between-the-u-s-and-its-military, mg)

If Democrats are guilty of being too wary of the military, Republicans are by and large guilty of not being wary enough. The disastrous first six years of the George W. Bush administration demonstrate the consequences of a president placing too much trust in his military subordinates and not thinking critically enough about the military as an institution. The U.S. military might be the most trusted national institution in the United States, but any serving or former military officer can provide a litany of reasons why it is also often a collection of marginally competent, self-serving bureaucracies that resist innovation. The deference with which many Republicans -- with a few notable exceptions, such as Sens. John McCain and Lindsey Graham -- treat the military is shocking. Rather than ask tough questions and treat the military as any other government bureaucracy prone to waste and incompetence, many Republicans instead place it on a pedestal that serves neither the military nor the country.

# Advantage 1

## Readiness

####  ( ) No impact to hard power –

#### A. Military power does not translate into security.

Hachigan and Sutphen 08

(Nina, Senior Fellow at American Progress, senior political scientist at RAND Corporation and served as the director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy for four years, From 1998 to 1999, Hachigian was on the staff of the National Security Council in the White House, Monica Sutphen, Stanford Center for International Security, 2008, The Next American Century, p. 168-9

*IN PRACTICE*, the strategy of primacy failed to deliver. While the fact of being the world’s only superpower has substantial benefits, a national security strategy based on pursuing and maintaining primacy has not made America more secure. America’s military might has not been the answer to terrorism, disease, climate change, or proliferation. Iraq, Iran, and North Korea have become more dangerous in the last seven years, not less. Worse than being ineffective with transnational threats and smaller powers, a strategy of maintaining primacy is counterproductive when it comes to pivotal powers. If America makes primacy the main goal of its national security strategy, then why shouldn’t the pivotal powers do the same? A goal of primacy signals that sheer strength is most critical to security. American cannot trumpet its desire to dominate the world military and then question why China is modernizing its military.

#### B. Readiness doomed – multiple reasons.

Burns ‘6

(Robert, AP Military Writer, January 24, Associated Press, “Study: Army Stretched to Breaking Point,” <http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060124/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/army_breaking_point;_ylt=AkDwbD7AfATSH1tnoIHL_xSs0NUE;_ylu=X3oDMTA3ODdxdHBhBHNlYwM5NjQ->)

Stretched by frequent troop rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army has become a “thin green line” that could snap unless relief comes soon, according to a study for the Pentagon. Andrew Krepinevich, a retired Army officer who wrote the report under a Pentagon contract, concluded that the Army cannot sustain the pace of troop deployments to Iraq long enough to break the back of the insurgency. He also suggested that the Pentagon’s decision, announced in December, to begin reducing the force in Iraq this year was driven in part by a realization that the Army was overextended. As evidence, Krepinevich points to the Army’s 2005 recruiting slump — missing its recruiting goal for the first time since 1999 — and its decision to offer much bigger enlistment bonuses and other incentives. “You really begin to wonder just how much stress and strain there is on the Army, how much longer it can continue,” he said in an interview. He added that the Army is still a highly effective fighting force and is implementing a plan that will expand the number of combat brigades available for rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan. The 136-page report represents a more sobering picture of the Army’s condition than military officials offer in public. While not released publicly, a copy of the report was provided in response to an Associated Press inquiry. Illustrating his level of concern about strain on the Army, Krepinevich titled one of his report’s chapters, “The Thin Green Line.” He wrote that the Army is “in a race against time” to adjust to the demands of war “or risk `breaking’ the force in the form of a catastrophic decline” in recruitment and re-enlistment. Col. Lewis Boone, spokesman for Army Forces Command, which is responsible for providing troops to war commanders, said it would be “a very extreme characterization” to call the Army broken. He said his organization has been able to fulfill every request for troops that it has received from field commanders. The Krepinevich assessment is the latest in the debate over whether the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have worn out the Army, how the strains can be eased and whether the U.S. military is too burdened to defeat other threats. Rep. John Murtha (news, bio, voting record), the Pennsylvania Democrat and Vietnam veteran, created a political storm last fall when he called for an early exit from Iraq, arguing that the Army was “broken, worn out” and fueling the insurgency by its mere presence. Administration officials have hotly contested that view. George Joulwan, a retired four-star Army general and former NATO commander, agrees the Army is stretched thin. “Whether they’re broken or not, I think I would say if we don’t change the way we’re doing business, they’re in danger of being fractured and broken, and I would agree with that,” Joulwan told CNN last month. Krepinevich did not conclude that U.S. forces should quit Iraq now, but said it may be possible to reduce troop levels below 100,000 by the end of the year. There now are about 136,000, Pentagon officials said Tuesday. For an Army of about 500,000 soldiers — not counting the thousands of National Guard and Reserve soldiers now on active duty — the commitment of 100,000 or so to Iraq might not seem an excessive burden. But because the war has lasted longer than expected, the Army has had to regularly rotate fresh units in while maintaining its normal training efforts and reorganizing the force from top to bottom. Krepinevich’s analysis, while consistent with the conclusions of some outside the Bush administration, is in stark contrast with the public statements of Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and senior Army officials. Army Secretary Francis Harvey, for example, opened a Pentagon news conference last week by denying the Army was in trouble. “Today’s Army is the most capable, best-trained, best-equipped and most experienced force our nation has fielded in well over a decade,” he said, adding that recruiting has picked up. Rumsfeld has argued that the experience of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan has made the Army stronger, not weaker. “The Army is probably as strong and capable as it ever has been in the history of this country,” he said in an appearance at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies in Washington on Dec. 5. “They are more experienced, more capable, better equipped than ever before.” Krepinevich said in the interview that he understands why Pentagon officials do not state publicly that they are being forced to reduce troop levels in Iraq because of stress on the Army. “That gives too much encouragement to the enemy,” he said, even if a number of signs, such as a recruiting slump, point in that direction. Krepinevich is executive director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a nonprofit policy research institute. He said he concluded that even Army leaders are not sure how much longer they can keep up the unusually high pace of combat tours in Iraq before they trigger an institutional crisis. Some major Army divisions are serving their second yearlong tours in Iraq, and some smaller units have served three times.

#### C. Hard power too high now.

Friedman and Preble 10

(Benjamin Friedman is a research fellow in defense and homeland security studies at the Cato Institute, Christopher Preble is director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Budgetary Savings from Military Restraint, September 22, 2010 Cato Policy Analysis No. 667 September 23, 2010 <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA667.pdf>)

As for our potential great power rivals— Russia and China—we would have no good reason to fight a war with either in the foreseeable future if we did not guarantee the security of their neighbors. Both lag far behind us in military capability. That would remain the case even with the reductions proposed here.6 As it stands today, the United States spends about five times more on defense than those states collectively. We account for nearly 50 percent of all military spending; our allies and potential strategic partners contribute much of the rest. (See Figure 2.)

## Hegemony

#### The Unipolar Moment is over and can’t be recovered – 08 financial crash means the US can’t prevent competition

Rachman 11

(Gideon Rachman, Financial Times chief foreign affairs commentator, Zero-Sum Future, 2011, pp 3-4)

But the economic crisis that struck the world in 2008 has changed the logic of international relations. It is no longer obvious that globalization benefits all the world's major powers. It is no longer clear that the United States faces no serious international rivals. And it is increasingly apparent that the world is facing an array of truly global problems-such as climate change and nuclear proliferation-that are causing rivalry and division between nations. After a long period of international cooperation, competition and rivalry are returning to the international system. A win-win world is giving way to a zero-sum world. Both as individuals and as a nation, Americans have begun to question whether the "new world order" that emerged after the cold war still favors the United States. The rise of Asia is increasingly associated with job losses for ordinary Americans and with a challenge to American power from an increasingly confident China. The crash has heightened awareness of American economic vulnerability and the country's reliance on continued Chinese and Middle Eastern lending. Of course, even after the crash, the United States remains the most powerful country in the world-with its largest economy, its most powerful military, and its leading universities. But the United States will never recover the unchallenged superiority of the "unipolar moment" that began with the collapse of the Soviet Union

#### Entitlement spending makes hege collapse inevitable

Cohen ‘12

[Michael A. Cohen is a regular columnist for Foreign Policy's Election 2012 Channel and a fellow at the Century Foundation. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/21/rotting_from_the_inside_out?page=full> ETB]

There is, however, one serious problem with this analysis. Any discussion of American national security that focuses solely on the issue of U.S. power vis-à-vis other countries -- and ignores domestic inputs -- is decidedly incomplete. In Kagan's New Republic article, for example, he has little to say about the country's domestic challenges except to obliquely argue that to focus on "nation-building" at home while ignoring the importance of maintaining U.S. power abroad would be a mistake. In fact, in a recent FP debate with the Financial Times' Gideon Rachman on the issue of American decline, Kagan diagnoses what he, and many other political analysts, appear to believe is the country's most serious problem: "enormous fiscal deficits driven by entitlements." Why is this bad? It makes it harder, says Kagan, for the United States to "continue playing its vital role in the world" and will lead to significant cutbacks in defense spending. However, a focus on U.S. global dominance or suasion that doesn't factor in those elements that constitute American power at home ignores substantial and worsening signs of decline. Indeed, by virtually any measure, a closer look at the state of the United States today tells a sobering tale of rapid and unchecked decay and deterioration in a host of areas. While not all of them are generally considered elements of national security, perhaps they should be.

#### Heg not solve war –

#### A. No threats require primacy and other factors ensure security.

Friedman and Preble 10 (Benjamin Friedman is a research fellow in defense and homeland security studies at the Cato Institute, Christopher Preble is director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Budgetary Savings from Military Restraint, September 22, 2010 Cato Policy Analysis No. 667 September 23, 2010 <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA667.pdf>

The United States confuses what it wants from its military, which is global primacy or hegemony, with what its needs, which is safety. Our leaders tend to exaggerate the capability of the enemies we have and invent new enemies by defining traditional foreign troubles —geopolitical competition among states and instability within them, for example—as pressing threats to our security. Geography, wealth, and nuclear weapons provide us with safety that our ancestors would envy. Our hyperactive military policies damage it by encouraging rivalry and resentment. Global military primacy is a game not worth the candle.56

#### B. No war – States have an incentive to avoid it.

Zakaria 08 (Fareed Zakaria, editor of Newsweek International, 2008, The Post-American World, p. 244)

In certain areas – the South China Sea, for example – U.S. military force is likely to be less relevant than that of China. In international negotiations, America will have to bargain and compromise with the others. Does all this add up to instability and disorder? Not necessarily. Two hundred years of Anglo-American hegemony has in fact created a system that is not as fragile is it might have been in the 1920s and 1930s. (When British power waned, American power was unwilling to stip in, and Europe fell through the cracks). The basic conception of the current system – an open world economy, multilateral negotiations – has wide acceptance. And new forms of cooperation are growing. Ann-Marie Slaughter has written about how legal systems are constructing a set of standards without anyone’s forcing them to do so—creating a bottom-up, networked order. Not every issue will lend itself to such stabilization, but many will. In other words, the search for a superpower solution to every problem may be futile and unnecessary. Small work-arounds might be just as effective.

## Forward Basing

# Advantage 2

### 1NC- Nuke Leaderhip Adv

#### US won’t be able to exert prolif leadership — too many bureaucratic constraints.

NEI, ’12

~["Improved Policies for Commercial Nuclear Trade Will Create American Jobs," June, http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/newplants/policybrief/improved-policies-for-commercial-nuclear-trade-will-create-american-jobs?page=1~~]

While U.S. firms offer some of the most innovative and safest nuclear energy technologies, they are hampered by cumbersome trade regulations, lack of coordination among the federal agencies involved, an inefficient export licensing process, limited options for financing nuclear exports and the absence of an international liability regime. These companies face intense competition from suppliers in nations with less restrictive policies and substantial government subsidies for their nuclear industries.¶ To facilitate a greater U.S. role in the global commercial nuclear market, government support must be integrated into a seamless mechanism that includes coordination of nuclear trade policy, creation of bilateral agreements, export control reform and enhanced export financing. It also is vital that the United States pursue the international adoption of effective civil nuclear liability regimes.

#### SMR deployment overstretches the IAEA- turns prolif

Lyman 11

(Edwin, senior scientist at Global Security Program Union of Concerned Scientists, “An Examination of the Safety and Economics of Light Water Small Modular Reactors” Senate Hearing, <http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/lyman-appropriations-subcom-7-14-11.pdf>, SEH)

The distributed deployment of small reactors would also put great strains on existing licensing ¶ and inspection resources. Nuclear reactors are qualitatively different from other types of ¶ generating facilities, not least because they require a much more extensive safety and security ¶ inspection regime. Similarly, deployment of individual small reactors at widely distributed and ¶ remote sites around the world would strain the resources of the International Atomic Energy ¶ Agency (IAEA) and its ability to adequately safeguard reactors to guard against proliferation, ¶ since IAEA inspectors would need to visit many more locations per installed megawatt around ¶ the world. Maintaining robust oversight over vast networks of SMRs around the world would be ¶ difficult, if feasible at all.

#### Nuclear leadership doesn’t prevent proliferation.

Fuhrmann, ’9

~[Matthew, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of South Carolina, Summer, "Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation," International Security Vol. 34, No. 1. MIT Press Journals~]

This article examines the relationship between peaceful nuclear cooperation¶ and nuclear weapons proliferation. Speciªcally, it explores whether countries¶ receiving civilian nuclear aid over time are more likely to initiate weapons programs and build the bomb. The conventional wisdom is that civilian nuclear¶ cooperation does not lead to proliferation. Most scholars argue that nuclear weapons spread when states have a demand for the bomb—not when¶ they have the technical capacity to proliferate.¶ 4¶ Those who recognize the importance of the supply side of proliferation argue that certain types of nuclear¶ assistance enable countries to build nuclear weapons but that others are innocuous or even positive from a nonproliferation standpoint. Nuclear suppliers,¶ for instance, generally restrict the sale of uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing facilities because these can be used directly to produce ªssile material for a bomb, but suppliers routinely build research or power reactors in¶ other countries and train foreign scientists.¶ 5¶ A recent study finds that countries¶ receiving enrichment and reprocessing facilities, bomb designs, or significant¶ quantities of weapons-grade fissile material are more likely to acquire the¶ bomb.¶ 6¶ The implication of this research is that other forms of atomic assistance¶ do not lead to the spread of nuclear weapons.¶ This article argues that the conventional wisdom is wrong—and dangerous.¶ All types of civilian nuclear assistance raise the risks of proliferation. Peaceful¶ nuclear cooperation and proliferation are causally connected because of the¶ dual-use nature of nuclear technology and know-how.¶ 7¶ Civilian cooperation¶ provides technology and materials necessary for a nuclear weapons program¶ and helps to establish expertise in matters relevant to building the bomb. I develop four hypotheses based on this general insight. First, receiving civilian¶ nuclear assistance over time increases the likelihood that states will begin nuclear weapons programs because it reduces the expected costs of such a campaign and inspires greater confidence among leaders that the bomb could be¶ successfully developed. Second, militarized disputes with other countries condition the effect of civilian nuclear assistance on program initiation. The likelihood that nuclear assistance causes countries to begin weapons programs¶ increases as their security environments worsen. Third, peaceful aid increases the probability that countries will successfully build nuclear weapons. Fourth,¶ this is especially true when a country’s security environment deteriorates.¶ To test these hypotheses, I produced a data set on civilian nuclear assistance¶ based on the coding of all NCAs signed from 1945 to 2000.¶ 8¶ A combination of¶ qualitative and quantitative analysis yields support for my arguments, even¶ when controlling for the other variables thought to inºuence proliferation. The¶ results from my statistical analysis indicate that other factors, such as industrial capacity and membership in the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT),¶ also have signiªcant effects on proliferation. But peaceful cooperation is¶ among the few variables that is consistently salient in explaining both nuclear¶ weapons program onset and weapons acquisition.

#### There’s a greater likelihood it backfires — resentment causes countries to pursue nuclear capabilities.

Farmer ’10

[J. Doyne Farmer of the Santa Fe Institute and Arjun Makhijani of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research. “As US Nuclear Future? Not wanted, not needed.” Nature 467, 391–393 (23 September 2010) ETB]

There are also undesirable side effects of using nuclear power. To make a large dent in CO2 emissions, 2,000–3,000 reactors would be needed worldwide by 2050 to replace an equivalent coal capacity and to increase the share of nuclear electricity to about 30%. This poses a huge proliferation hazard. Two medium-sized uranium–enrichment plants would need to be built every year to fuel so many nuclear reactors, increasing the risk that some fuel would be diverted and enriched to weapons-grade material. A major US push for nuclear power will make developing countries more likely to demand the capacity to enrich their own fuel, vastly hampering efforts to clamp down on nuclear proliferation.

#### No weapons prolif- most states want nuclear programs for peaceful purposes

Ferguson 11

(Charles, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Science and Technology on the Council of Foreign Relations, November 2011, “Think Again: Nuclear Power” Foreign Policy)<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/think_again_nuclear_power?page=0,6>

Maybe. It's true that the nuclear enrichment and reprocessing facilities used to produce fuel for peaceful reactors can just as easily be used to make fissile material for bombs. For now, however, this threat starts and ends with Iran. Most of the 30 countries that use nuclear power don't build their own enrichment or reprocessing facilities, instead buying fuel for their nuclear power plants from external suppliers. The only countries with enrichment facilities that don't have nuclear weapons as well are Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Iran, Japan, and the Netherlands -- and only one of those six keeps nonproliferation hawks up at night.¶ The rest of the world has been willing by and large to abide by arrangements like the 2009 deal between the United States and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Under its terms, the UAE passed a national law banning the construction of enrichment and reprocessing facilities in exchange for access to a reliable source of nuclear fuel. Such agreements could maintain the status quo as long as the same standard is enforced across the board. Unfortunately, U.S. President Barack Obama's administration is in the process of eroding this precedent in deals it is pursuing with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam, which could impose less strict terms -- and possibly lead the UAE to rethink its self-imposed moratorium. In April, the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee unanimously passed a resolution backing legislation to make terms like those in the UAE deal the norm, but it has yet to become law.

### Inevitable

#### US inevitably leads on SMR- domestic interest

O’Connor 11

(Dan, Policy Fellow in AEL’s New Energy Leaders Project, “Small Modular Reactors: Miracle, Mirage, or Between?” <http://leadenergy.org/2011/01/small-modular-reactors-miracle-mirage-or-medium/>, SEH)

From an international leadership perspective, the SMR may be one of the few remaining technologies which the US stands to commercialize more successfully and rapidly than its competitors. Interest among nations like China and India in SMR technology development is weaker than in the US, principally because their rapidly growing energy demand and comparably quick nuclear implementation policies are conducive to constructing large reactors.¶

### Terrorism

#### Technical barriers prevent nuclear terrorism—the risk is less than 1 in a million

Mueller ‘8

(John, poli sci prof at Ohio State Univ, “The Atomic Terrorist: Assessing the Likelihood,” 1-1, Prepared for presentation at the Program on International Security Policy, Univ of Chicago, 1-15-2008, http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF)

Appraising the barriers. As noted earlier, most discussions of atomic terrorism deal rather piecemeal with the subject--focusing separately on individual tasks such as procuring HEU or assembling a device or transporting it. But, as the Gilmore Commission, a special advisory panel to the President and Congress, stresses, building a nuclear device capable of producing mass destruction presents "Herculean challenges" and requires that a whole series of steps be accomplished. The process requires obtaining enough fissile material, designing a weapon "that will bring that mass together in a tiny fraction of a second, before the heat from early fission blows the material apart," and figuring out some way to deliver the thing. And it emphasizes that these merely constitute "the minimum requirements." If each is not fully met, the result is not simply a less powerful weapon, but one that can't produce any significant nuclear yield at all or can't be delivered (Gilmore 1999, 31, emphasis in the original). Following this perspective, an approach that seems appropriate is to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome by a terrorist group in order to carry out the task of producing, transporting, and then successfully detonating Allison's "large, cumbersome, unsafe, unreliable, unpredictable, and inefficient" improvised nuclear device. Table 1 attempts to do this, and it arrays some 20 of these--all of which must be surmounted by the atomic aspirant. Actually, it would be quite possible to come up with a longer list: in the interests of keeping the catalogue of hurdles down to a reasonable number, some of the entries are actually collections of tasks and could be divided into two or three or more. For example, number 5 on the list requires that heisted highly-enriched uranium be neither a scam nor part of a sting nor of inadequate quality due to insider incompetence; but this hurdle could as readily be rendered as three separate ones. In assembling the list, I sought to make the various barriers independent, or effectively independent, from each other, although they are, of course, related in the sense that they are sequential. However, while the terrorists must locate an inadequately-secured supply of HEU to even begin the project, this discovery will have little bearing on whether they will be successful at securing an adequate quantity of the material, even though, obviously, they can't do the second task before accomplishing the first. Similarly, assembling and supplying an adequately equipped machine shop is effectively an independent task from the job of recruiting a team of scientists and technicians to work within it. Moreover, members of this group must display two qualities that, although combined in hurdle 9, are essentially independent of each other: they must be both technically skilled and absolutely loyal to the project. Assessing the probabilities. In seeking to carry out their task, would-be atomic terrorists effectively must go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do so, they are likely to find their prospects daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even dispiriting. To bias the case in their favor, one might begin by assuming that they have a fighting chance of 50 percent of overcoming each of these obstacles even though for many barriers, probably almost all, the odds against them are much worse than that. Even with that generous bias, the chances they could successfully pull off the mission come out to be worse than one in a million, specifically they are one in 1,048,567. Indeed, the odds of surmounting even seven of the twenty hurdles at that unrealistically, even absurdly, high presumptive success rate is considerably less than one in a hundred. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion--specifically 3,486,784,401. What they would be at the (entirely realistic) level one in ten boggles the mind. Comparisons with the 9/11 conspiracy. The difficulties confronting the 9/11 hijackers were considerable, but they were nothing like those confronting the atomic terrorist. The 9/11 conspirators did maintain extensive secrecy and group loyalty on their daring and risky endeavor, and their planning does seem to have been meticulous. But the size of the conspiracy was very small, they never had to trust strangers or criminals, technical requirements were minimal, obtaining flight training only took the money to pay for it, the weapons they used could legally be brought on planes, and, most importantly, they were exploiting an environment in which the policy was to cooperate with hijackers rather than fight and risk the entire plane--indeed, only a few months earlier three Muslim terrorists, in this case Chechens, had commandeered a Russian airliner and had it flown to Saudi Arabia where they were then overcome by local security forces with almost no loss of life (Kramer 2004/05, 58). Even at that, the 9/11 hijackers failed to accomplish their mission with the last of the four planes. A comparison of the personnel requirements for each case may make this clear. The 9/11 plot necessitated the recruitment and the training (minimal, except for the pilots) of a single group of men who were absolutely loyal to the cause. However, aside from a general physical ability and a capacity to carry out orders, they needed little in the way of additional qualities. In the case of the terrorist bomb, the conspiracy--or, actually, the sequential sets of conspiracies--mandate the enlistment of a much larger number of people, and most of these must not only be absolutely loyal, but also extremely skilled at an elaborate series of technical, organizational, and conspiratorial tasks. The bottom line. Keller suggests that "the best reason for thinking it won't happen is that it hasn't happened yet," and that, he worries, "is terrible logic" (2002). "Logic" aside, there is another quite good reason for thinking it won't happen: the task is bloody difficult. The science fiction literature, after all, has been spewing out for decades--centuries, even--a wealth of imaginative suggestions about things that might come about that somehow haven't managed to do so. We continue to wait, after all, for those menacing and now-legendary invaders from Mars.

#### Terrorists won’t pursue nuclear weapons—al Qaeda memo proves

Mueller ‘8

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Meanwhile, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all (thus far, at least) have relied on conventional destructive methods--there hasn't even been the occasional gas bomb. In effect the terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al-Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: "Make use of that which is available...rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach" (Whitlock 2007). That is: Keep it simple, stupid. In fact, it seems to be a general historical regularity that terrorists tend to prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones (Rapoport 1999, 51; Gilmore 1999, 37; Schneier 2003, 236). Indeed, the truly notable innovation for terrorists over the last few decades has not been in qualitative improvements in ordnance at all, but rather in a more effective method for delivering it: the suicide bomber (Pape 2005, Bloom 2005).