# 1ST Off

#### The aff is not a substantial reduction in restrictions as these are NOT restrictions currently in force. Instead they are parts of PROPOSED RULES that have not yet been enforced.

Federal Register 11—AFF CITE

CURRENT LAW AS OF 2 DAYS AGO- we have a list and a chart if you want to see it

<http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=ecfr&rgn=div5&view=text&node=14:2.0.1.2.9&idno=14>

#### Even the Aff ‘s Legget 12 ev. concedes his complaints are complaints about the “proposed rules” not the current rules.

# States

### 1NC Generic

#### CP text: the 50 States and all relevant Territories should enter into a compact on:

#### providing $100 million of tax credits annually for the development of airborne wind energy. The Compact should collect revenue via a Clean Energy Community Finance Initiative.

#### Compacts solve faster than the federal government

Mountjoy ‘01

John is a policy analyst with the council of State Governments, “Interstate Compacts Make a Comeback,” Spring <http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/ncic/Comeback.pdf>

Some may question the need for interstate compacts to address multi-state policy issues. Why ¶ not leave such regulation to the feds? ¶ “Interstate compacts help us maintain state control,” said Gary McConnell, director of the ¶ Georgia Emergency Management Agency. ¶ During his 10 years as GEMA director, McConnell has played an instrumental role in developing ¶ and promoting a successful interstate compact —the Emergency Management Assistance ¶ Compact, or EMAC. EMAC allows state emergency management agencies to cooperate and ¶ share resources in the event of natural and man-made disasters. ¶ “We can go to the federal government for all kinds of help when natural disasters strike, but the ¶ states [cooperating under an interstate compact] can provide specific resources quicker, which ¶ are likely to be problem specific,” McConnell said. “It’s less bureaucratic, and it’s far cheaper. ¶ It’s easier for us under EMAC to obtain resources from surrounding states than it is to use ¶ federal assistance, which we’d end up having to pay more for anyway. I suspect this is the case ¶ with many other interstate compacts as well.” ¶ “States are rediscovering that they have the power to address their own problems better than the ¶ federal government,” said Rick Masters, The Council of State Governments’ legal counsel and ¶ special counsel for interstate compacts. ¶ CSG, which has tracked interstate compacts for more than 40 years, maintains a clearinghouse of ¶ compact information. More recently, CSG helps administer EMAC and is facilitating the update ¶ of the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision and the Interstate Compact on ¶ Juveniles. Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution laid the legal foundation for interstate ¶ compacts: “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep ¶ Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another ¶ State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent ¶ Danger as will not admit of delay.” Compacts actually preceded the Constitution, having been ¶ used in colonial times to resolve boundary disputes between colonies. ¶ Prior to the 1920s, interstate compacts were typically bi-state agreements, addressing boundary ¶ disputes and territorial claims. In fact, only 36 interstate compacts were formed between 1783 ¶ and 1920. It is only in this century that states have turned to interstate compacts to facilitate ¶ cooperative solutions to multi-state problems. ¶ After a lull in the late 1970s and early 1980s, interstate compacts are beginning to enjoy a ¶ resurgence. Since the early 1990s, states have initiated or updated several high-profile compacts. ¶ Examples include EMAC, the Interstate Compact on Industrialized/Modular Buildings and the ¶ Interstate Insurance Receivership Compact. Interstate compacts can set the framework for cooperative solutions to today’s cross-state ¶ challenges, from policing drugs to supplying energy or controlling sprawl. ¶ “Issues within the states are becoming more complex and aren’t confined by state boundaries. As ¶ a result, solutions are becoming multi-state as well. Compacts are the only tool that is truly ¶ adequate for addressing these multi-state issues,” said Bill Voit, senior project director at The ¶ Council of State Governments. ¶ An example is an interstate compact being considered to facilitate taxation of e-commerce. ¶ Opponents of Internet taxation claim that it would be virtually impossible for online vendors to ¶ comply with the complex, often confusing system of state and local sales and use taxes. Since ¶ Internet sales are expected to reach $184 billion annually by 2004, states have a vested interest in ¶ breaking down this and other barriers to taxing online transactions. ¶ Congress currently is considering the Internet Tax Moratorium Equity Act (S. 512) to help states ¶ simplify their sales and use taxes, in part by authorizing states to enter into an Interstate Sales ¶ and Use Tax Compact. The compact would create a “uniform, streamlined sales and use tax ¶ system,” convenient to remote sales. ¶ At least 18 states are considering the model streamlined sales tax legislation in 2001. Kentucky, ¶ South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming already have signed bills into law. ¶ Existing interstate compacts, many drafted in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, are ripe for ¶ amendment and revision. Technology and the Internet now make the sharing of information ¶ seamless and immediate, yet several interstate compacts are plagued by inadequate ¶ administration. ¶ “Not only do we see the development of new compacts, but we are seeing the re-examination of ¶ existing compacts…revising them to keep pace with our changing world,” Masters said. ¶ Developed in 1937, the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers is ¶ one example of a compact in need of update. Adopted by all 50 states, the compact regulates the ¶ movement of parolees and probationers across state lines. The burgeoning offender population ¶ and the ease with which offenders now can travel have created several problems for the compact, ¶ including: frequent violations of compact rules, inability to enforce compliance, difficulty in ¶ creating new rules and slow, unreliable exchange of case information. ¶ The antiquated compact needed a replacement that would provide states the authority, ¶ enforcement tools and resources to adequately track and ensure supervision of parolees and ¶ probationers. ¶ The new interstate compact, the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision, provides ¶ these solutions. The new compact includes mechanisms for enforcement, accountability, resource provision, information sharing and state-to-state cooperation. Currently, the compact ¶ has been introduced in 39 states and enacted in 18. ¶ Just as technology can smooth the operation of interstate compacts, alternative dispute resolution ¶ techniques can increase their self-sufficiency. Enforcement tools within interstate compacts need ¶ to utilize more of the mediation and arbitration services that have proven successful throughout ¶ state government. By developing additional self-contained enforcement mechanisms, compact ¶ members would not need to rely solely on the crowded docket of the U.S. Supreme Court. ¶ States should further utilize interstate compacts to address new problems and create new ¶ methods of interstate cooperation. If not, federal preemption in certain policy areas is a distinct ¶ possibility.

#### 10 million solves

Graybeal 9-10

“Airborne Wind Technology Could Provide Substantial Source of Energy,”

According to a recent survey conducted by the non-profit organization Near Zero, experts belief airborne wind energy could provide a substantial amount of energy if there were government support for its research and development. Here are the details.¶ \* Airborne wind turbines float higher in the sky -- either through a rigid-wing system or a balloon system -- where wind currents tend to be stronger and more consistent than those near the Earth's surface, Near Zero stated.¶ \* According to a report in Science Daily , a recent study conducted by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, high-altitude windpower harnessed by airborne wind systems could extract more than 1,800 terawatts of kinetic energy, in comparison to 400 terawatts from near-earth turbines.¶ \* Near Zero reported that its formal survey of 31 industry experts, as well as informal discussions, indicated that government funding of $10 million a year could shave years off the amount of time it takes for the industry to reach a significant scale and $100 million per year, the experts say, could bring the industry to the forefront even more quickly.

# T

### Must Prohibit 1NC shell

#### A. INTERPRETATION. Restrictions prohibit, requirements govern how energy production occurs

Hayden ’05 (J.D., Penn State Dickinson School of Law, 2005)

Tim 13 Penn St. Envtl. L. Rev. 217

B. Telecommunications Act of 1996

¶ In 1996, a major piece of legislation dealing with most aspects of our nation's telecommunications industry was passed. n113 The portion of that legislation dealing with mobile services creates substantive restrictions and procedural requirements dealing with the use of state and local powers by limiting, but not completely preempting, those powers. n114¶ 1. Substantive Restrictions¶ The TCA of 1996 prevents state and local governments from either prohibiting or taking actions which prohibit erecting cellular towers. n115 It was essential that this law be passed because state and local governments could effectively limit the building of cellular towers by passing laws or using strict zoning procedures. n116 In addition to the statutory framework, the circuit courts have further developed case law clarifying what constitutes unreasonable discrimination between functionally equivalent [\*232] services, as well as what amounts to a prohibition. n117 The Third Circuit developed a two-prong test requiring that a significant gap in wireless service exist, and that the manner in which the cellular provider proposes to fill that gap must be the least intrusive in terms of the values the community is trying to preserve. n118 While this test has been modified by other circuits, it is the most widely used. n119¶ 2. Preemption¶ The TCA did not fully preempt the laws of state and local governments. n120 Federal legislation could have completely preempted the laws of the state and local governments which dealt with cellular towers but chose not to, instead allowing those entities to express their values within certain federally created constraints. n121¶ 3. Procedural Requirements¶ Finally, the TCA created procedural requirements that must be met by those seeking to keep a cellular tower from being built. n122 First, the decision making body must act upon the request for authorization within a reasonable period of time. n123 Second, any denial shall be in writing. n124 And lastly, such a denial must be supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record. n125 These procedural requirements ensure that when a ruling is challenged, the courts will have the information relied upon in the decision of the municipality, providing them with a record on which to decide the case. n126¶ In summary, the TCA of 1996 created substantive restrictions on the abuse of the possibly prohibitive powers wielded by state and local governments. It did so without leaving those entities completely bereft of their powers, and at the same time created procedural requirements allowing for meaningful judicial review of decisions. All of this was done with the policy of promoting national wireless service provision in [\*233] mind.

And the restriction must be ON production

Dictionary.com No Date

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/on?s=t

“ON”:16. (used to indicate a source or a person or thing that serves as a source or agent): a duty on imported goods; She depends on her friends for encouragement.

#### B. The aff reduces a condition that makes production harder—that’s NOT A RESTRICTION

Priebe ’99 (Director of Agricultural Economic Law, European Commission)

Rhinehard, *Production Rights in European Agriculture* p.200

The milk quota system, to quote the prime example, is a levy imposed on production in¶ excess of reference quantities, or 'quotas' . The Community does not prohibit surplus production,¶ but it does make it subject to a very dissuasive tax. An 'overproduction tax' as high as¶ that under the milk quota system is tantamount, in economic terms at least, to a prohibition on¶ large-volume production above the limits laid down. The beet quota system, on the other¶ hand, is of a different legal nature. This is based on production limits that are governed in¶ practice by delivery contracts between growers and sugar companies.¶ In other industries, limits exist as conditions for the granting of direct aid. In such cases,¶ this is not a direct restriction on production, in a strictly legal sense. The farmer is free not to¶ comply with these conditions if he chooses not to accept the aid offered. Economically, s/he¶ often has no choice. Accordingly, in order to obtain Community aid, he has to comply with¶ the conditions that apply. For instance, under the support scheme for arable crop growers, aid¶ applications cannot be submitted in respect of land which was used for permanent pasture,¶ permanent crops, forest or non-agricultural uses4 as at 31 December 1991. Such a provision,¶ designed to avoid speculation in arable crops triggered purely by the introduction of the direct¶ aid system in 1992, divides agricultural land into two: land which is eligible for arable land¶ support and ineligible land. This is a permanent division. The set-aside obligation, signifYing¶ each producer's individual contribution to the disciplining of production under the same¶ system, is another example of this form of restriction. **This ev. gender paraphrased**

#### C. REASONS TO PREFER.

#### 1. Fair Ground. Our interp allows afs to remove any restriction that actually prohibits production—siting restrictions, ownership requirements, seasonal drilling restrictions. Their interp allows any aff that makes energy production less profitable—those are regulations or fees—not restrictions.

#### 2. Limits. Their interp justifies any aff that increases the size or profitability of the energy industry, exploding the size of an already large topic.

#### 3. Bright line. Our interp establishes a clear brightline—does the restriction prohibit energy production? If it does, it T, if it don’t, it aint.

#### D. Topicality is a voter for fairness and education.

# Critique

#### THE AFFIRMATIVE’S ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITIZATION IS EPISTEMOLOGICALLY BLIND TO ITS OWN CAUSALITY AND BECOMES A SELF-FUFILLING PROPHECY

Ahmed 11

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The twenty-ﬁrst century heralds the unprecedented acceleration and convergence of multiple, interconnected global crises – climate change, energy depletion, food scarcity, and economic instability. While the structure of global economic activity is driving the unsustainable depletion of hydrocarbon and other natural resources, this is simultaneously escalating greenhouse gas emissions resulting in global warming. Both global warming and energy shocks are impacting detrimentally on global industrial food production, as well as on global ﬁnancial and economic instability. Conventional policy responses toward the intensiﬁcation of these crises have been decidedly inadequate because scholars and practitioners largely view them as separate processes. Yet increasing evidence shows they are deeply interwoven manifestations of a global political economy that has breached the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which it is embedded. In this context, orthodox IR’s ﬂawed diagnoses of global crises lead inexorably to their ‘securitisation’, reifying the militarisation of policy responses, and naturalising the proliferation of violent conﬂicts. Global ecological, energy and economic crises are thus directly linked to the ‘Otherisation’ of social groups and problematisation of strategic regions considered pivotal for the global political economy. Yet this relationship between global crises and conﬂict is not necessary or essential, but a function of a wider epistemological failure to holistically interrogate their structural and systemic causes. In 2009, the UK government’s chief scientiﬁc adviser Sir John Beddington warned that without mitigating and preventive action ‘drivers’ of global crisis like demographic expansion, environmental degradation and energy depletion could lead to a ‘perfect storm’ of simultaneous food, water and energy crises by around 2030. 1 Yet, for the most part, conventional policy responses from national governments and international institutions have been decidedly inadequate. Part of the problem is the way in which these crises are conceptualised in relation to security. Traditional disciplinary divisions in the social and natural sciences, compounded by bureaucratic compartmentalisation in policy-planning and decision-making, has meant these crises are frequently approached as largely separate processes with their own internal dynamics. While it is increasingly acknowledged that cross-disciplinary approaches are necessary, these have largely failed to recognise just how inherently interconnected these crises are. As Brauch points out, ‘most studies in the environmental security debate since 1990 have ignored or failed to integrate the contributions of the global environmental change community in the natural sciences. To a large extent the latter has also failed to integrate the results of this debate.’ 2 Underlying this problem is the lack of a holistic systems approach to thinking about not only global crises, but their causal origins in the social, political, economic, ideological and value structures of the contemporary international system. Indeed, it is often assumed that these contemporary structures are largely what need to be ‘secured’ and protected from the dangerous impacts of global crises, rather than transformed precisely to ameliorate these crises in the ﬁrst place. Consequently, policy-makers frequently overlook existing systemic and structural obstacles to the implementation of desired reforms. In a modest effort to contribute to the lacuna identiﬁed by Brauch, this paper begins with an empirically-oriented, interdisciplinary exploration of the best available data on four major global crises – climate change, energy depletion, food scarcity and global ﬁnancial instability – illustrating the systemic interconnections between different crises, and revealing that their causal origins are not accidental but inherent to the structural failings and vulnerabilities of existing global political, economic and cultural institutions. This empirical evaluation leads to a critical appraisal of orthodox realist and liberal approaches to global crises in international theory and policy. This critique argues principally that orthodox IR reiﬁes a highly fragmented, de-historicised ontology of the international system which underlies a reductionist, technocratic and compartmentalised conceptual and methodological approach to global crises. Consequently, rather than global crises being understood causally and holistically in the systemic context of the structure of the international system, they are ‘securitised’ as ampliﬁers of traditional security threats, requiring counter-productive militarised responses and/or futile inter-state negotiations. While the systemic causal context of global crisis convergence and acceleration is thus elided, this simultaneously exacerbates the danger of reactionary violence, the problematisation of populations in regions impacted by these crises and the naturalisation of the consequent proliferation of wars and humanitarian disasters. This moves us away from the debate over whether resource ‘shortages’ or ‘abundance’ causes conﬂicts, to the question of how either can generate crises which undermine conventional socio-political orders and confound conventional IR discourses, in turn radicalising the processes of social polarisation that can culminate in violent conﬂict.

#### AND THE ALTERNATIVE IS TO VOTE NEGATIVE TO REJEC THE 1AC AND EMBRACE COMPLEX ECOLOGISM. COMPLEX ECOLOGISM ALONE IS THE ONLY WAY TO SOLVE THEIR TRY OR DIE SCENARIOS

Cudworth and Hobden 2k10

[Erika and Stephen professors university of east London securing what for whom? Multiple complex inequalities and the politics of environmental security in Europe European Consortium for Political Research]

Environmental policy in the EU exemplifies all three articulations of the notion of ‘environmental security’ with which we began this paper. First at the level of rhetoric alone there are some elements of the ‘ecological security’ approach outlined by Dalby. In the language of threat and risk there is also some acknowledgement that it is we humans as a species that are insecure and we have made other species and even planetary life insecure through our economic and social practices. In the analysis of the threats to European societies and ‘natural’ spaces there are elements of a more traditional securitisation approach which carries the language of ‘environmental conflict’. Finally the more common notion of ‘environmental security’ is invoked in a policy analysis which sees human communities as threatened by environmental change and resource depletion and offers statist and supra-statist solutions to the problems raised by these developments. Conclusion As we have seen in the critiques of environmental security guaranteeing security for particular populations is tricky as environmental problems are international in scope or at least move across national and regional boundaries (Wynne 1993). They also exacerbate existing disparities between rich and poor regions states and communities and are resistant to technological fixing (Luke 1999). Most significantly however as we have seen is that they constitute a significant challenge to prevailing social norms both in the West and increasing elsewhere across the globe. The key trajectory of environmental policy in the EU is summarised in this statement: Climate change is a significant challenge to modern society. It must be met at international level with concerted action and long‐term planning. If tackled in the right way our efforts to limit climate change are likely to generate significant opportunities and benefits for business as well as side benefits in terms of reduced air pollution. Industry will be helped to innovate develop new products and services and win new markets on a global scale. But most importantly success will help ensure that future generations inherit a viable environment and sustainable society. (European Commission 2001) Herein a ‘viable environment’ and a ‘sustainable society’ are not most important – they are by‐products of the greening of capitalist production and consumption. There is therefore in our view a radical disjuncture at the heart of environmental policy in the European Union. On the one hand there is the acceptance of considerable threats to our own and other species rhetoric of significant concern and evidence of action which presses for change. On the other hand European Union environmental policy is literally for the most part enabling ‘business as usual’. We suggested that we need a new political framework. Complex ecologism provides a politics and an analytics that takes account both of our17 imperative need to care for the biosphere together with an understanding of the ways in which multiple and complex inequalities shape the securities of different populations. The environmental security approach is significant for the way in which it has prioritised the issue of the global environment yet the way it has prioritised the state and seen the environment as something ‘out there’ from which security can be provided has led to limitations as way of seeing human/non‐human relations and theorizing international environmental politics. Complex ecologism stresses the embeddings of human systems within environments. It implies that the alleviation of environmental crises involves not the provision of security but rather a re‐ orientating of human activity which will reduce the risks for all systems within the biosphere. We do not need business as usual. Rather carboniferous consumer capitalism and social injustices and inequalities are what might become fruitfully less secure in the realisation of a sustainable society in Europe and elsewhere.

# Elections

**Obama will win- top models and factors prove**

**Klein 9-17**

Ezra is a columnist for the Washington Post and an MSNBC Political Analyst, “The Romney Campaign is in Trouble,” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/09/17/romney-is-behind-and-the-debates-arent-likely-to-save-him/>

First came the changes in strategy. It went from doing everything possible to assure a “referendum” election to picking Paul Ryan as the vice presidential nominee and going for a choice election. It went from focusing relentlessly on the economy to cycling among welfare, Medicare and Libya. The latest ad is about manufacturing jobs in China.¶ Now we’re hearing the calls for a change in strategists. On Sunday night, Politico published a 2,700-word piece mostly dedicated to giving “Romney aides, advisers and friends” space to knife Stuart Stevens, Mitt Romney’s top strategist. “I always have the impression Stuart must save his best stuff for meetings I’m not important enough to attend,” one Romney campaign insider told Politico. “The campaign is filled with people who spend a lot of their time either avoiding him or resisting him.”¶ Ouch.¶ On the presidential level, where everyone running campaigns is very, very good at their jobs, campaign infighting and incoherence tend to be the result of a candidate being behind in the polls, not the cause of it. **Romney is behind and has been** there for quite some time. **According to the Real Clear Politics average** of head-to-head polls, **Romney hasn’t led the race since October 2011**. The closest he came to a lead in the polls this year was during the Republican National Convention, when he managed to … tie Obama.¶ **Romney is also behind in most election-forecasting models**. Political scientist James **Campbell rounded up 13 of the most credible efforts to predict the election outcome: Romney trails in eight of them. He’s also behind in Nate Silver’s election model, the Princeton Election Consortium’s meta-analysis**, Drew **Linzer’s Votamatic model and the Wonkblog election model.**¶But **I didn’t realize quite how dire Romney’s situation was until I began reading “The Timeline of Presidential Elections: How Campaigns Do and Don’t Matter**,” a new book from political scientists Robert Erikson and Christopher Wlezien.¶ **What Erikson and Wlezien did is rather remarkable: They collected pretty much every publicly available poll conducted during the last 200 days of the past 15 presidential elections and then ran test after test on the data to see what we could say about the trajectory of presidential election**s. Their results make Romney’s situation look very dire.¶ For instance: The least-stable period of the campaign isn’t early in the year or in the fall. It’s the summer. That’s because the conventions have a real and lasting effect on a campaign.¶ **“The party that gains pre- to post-convention on average improves by 5.2 percentage points as measured from our pre- and post-convention benchmarks,”** write Erikson and Wlezien. “**On average, the party that gains from before to after the conventions maintains its gain in the final week’s polls**. In other words, its poll numbers do not fade but instead stay constant post-conventions to the final week.”¶ This year, it was the Democrats who made the biggest gains from before to after the conventions. Obama is leading by 3 percent in the Real Clear Politics average of polls, about double his lead before the Republican convention. If that doesn’t fade by the end of the week or so — that is, if it proves to be a real lead rather than a post-convention bounce — then there’s simply no example in the past 15 elections of a candidate coming back from a post-convention deficit to win the popular vote.¶ This is about the point where I’m supposed to write: That said, **the race remains close, and the debates are coming soon. It’s still anyone’s game.**¶But the most surprising of Erikson and Wlezien’s results, and the most dispiriting for the Romney campaign, is that unlike the conventions, the debates don’t tend to matter. There’s “a fairly strong degree of continuity from before to after the debates,” they write. That’s true even when the trailing candidate is judged to have “won” the debates. “Voters seem to have little difficulty proclaiming one candidate the ‘winner’ of a debate and then voting for the opponent,” Erikson and Wlezien say.¶ Gallup agrees. The august polling firm reviewed the surveys it did before and after every televised presidential debate and concluded they “reveal few instances in which the debates may have had a substantive impact on election outcomes. “¶ The Romney campaign tends to point to two elections to show how its candidate could win this thing. There’s 1980, when Jimmy Carter supposedly led Ronald Reagan until the debates, and 1988, when Michael Dukakis was leading by 13 points after his convention. In fact, Reagan led going into the 1980 debates. And although Dukakis’s convention bounce was indeed large, it was wiped out by Bush’s convention bounce, which put him back in the lead.¶ That’s not to say Romney couldn’t win the election. A **3 percent gap is not insurmountable. But we’re quickly approaching a point where his comeback would be unprecedented in modern presidential history**. And if the Romney campaign begins to crack under the pressure, then that comeback becomes that much less likely.

#### Environmental groups hate wind- species loss

Maxwell ’12

Veery is a third-year law student at UC Hastings, “Wind Energy Development: Can Wind Energy Overcome Substantial Hurdles to Reach the Grid,” West Northwest Journal of Environmental Law and Policy, 18 W.-N.W. J. Env. L. & Pol’y323, lexis

Environmental groups have also been opposed to wind development, particularly in sites inhabited by threatened or endangered species. It seems paradoxical that environmentalists actively oppose emission-free energy production. This incongruous conflict is driven by the fact that wind [\*330] turbines have been known to cause species mortality, and are often sited in rural areas that offer needed species habitat. [n44](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1344988943875&returnToKey=20_T15322965001&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.221529.4818699054" \l "n44) This has caused environmental groups to pursue lawsuits under the Endangered Species Act, Migratory Bird Act, and other environmental protection statutes, in hopes of seeking an injunction against the wind farm construction and operations. [n45](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1344988943875&returnToKey=20_T15322965001&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.221529.4818699054" \l "n45)¶ The Coastal Habitat Alliance sued a Texas wind developer in 2007, demanding an injunction to halt construction on a wind project adjoining the Laguna Madre, an environmentally sensitive bay between the Texas mainland and Padre Island. [n46](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1344988943875&returnToKey=20_T15322965001&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.221529.4818699054" \l "n46) The Coastal Habitat Alliance alleged that the defendant developer impinged its rights under the federal Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 and the Texas Coastal Management Program by not holding public hearings or conducting appropriate environmental review on the wind farm. [n47](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1344988943875&returnToKey=20_T15322965001&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.221529.4818699054" \l "n47) A federal court dismissed the case, holding the statutes did not confer a right of action on private parties. [n48](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1344988943875&returnToKey=20_T15322965001&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.221529.4818699054" \l "n48) However, the case drew attention to the emerging issue of wind turbine siting in ecologically fragile areas.¶ In West Virginia, environmental plaintiffs were successful in halting operations of a wind farm sited in an area home to endangered Indiana bats. [n49](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1344988943875&returnToKey=20_T15322965001&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.221529.4818699054" \l "n49) After exhaustive presentations by expert witnesses, the federal court found, "there is a virtual certainty that Indiana bats will be harmed, wounded, or killed imminently by the Beech Ridge Project, in violation of section 9 of the ESA ...." [n50](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1344988943875&returnToKey=20_T15322965001&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.221529.4818699054" \l "n50) The court held that until the developer undergoes the Incidental Take Permitting process through the Fish and Wildlife Service, no new turbines could be approved by the agencies or constructed for the project. [n51](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1344988943875&returnToKey=20_T15322965001&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.221529.4818699054" \l "n51)¶ The Beech Ridge case was the first wind farm conflict decided under the Endangered Species Act, and demonstrates the need for federal agencies to actively oversee the development of wind farms. [n52](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1344988943875&returnToKey=20_T15322965001&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.221529.4818699054" \l "n52) In order to avoid costly litigation at every turn, the Beech Ridge holding shows that the myriad of federal agencies involved in approving wind farms must develop comprehensive standardized siting and permitting criteria. While the Fish [\*331] and Wildlife Service has been spearheading a collaborative effort to develop wind farm guidelines, only draft voluntary siting guidelines have been published. [n53](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1344988943875&returnToKey=20_T15322965001&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.221529.4818699054" \l "n53)¶ The two most noteworthy examples of environmental groups opposing wind farms, differ dramatically in terms of location, technology, rationale of opposition, and timing. However, in both cases the wind developer has continued to press forward with development and operations. The first case involves the Altamont Pass, located just east of the San Francisco Bay Area, which was a massive experiment in wind energy begun in the 1970s. [n54](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1344988943875&returnToKey=20_T15322965001&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.221529.4818699054" \l "n54) The second case involves the Cape Wind project, which is more modest in size, but located in a high-visibility area of Nantucket Sound. [n55](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.baylor.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1344988943875&returnToKey=20_T15322965001&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.221529.4818699054" \l "n55) The projects are instructive as to the broad range of claims opponents have levied against wind farms. Both cases have directly and indirectly driven a host of solutions to the environmental and local problems generated by wind farms.

#### The environmental vote will decide the election

Lehrer, 12

(Eli, "How Mitt Romney can win the environmental vote", 6/11, Huffington Post,¶ http://rstreet.org/op-ed/how-mitt-romney-can-win-the-environmental-vote/-http://rstreet.org/op-ed/how-mitt-romney-can-win-the-environmental-vote/

Since the (few) positives in Obama’s record and the incumbency are unalterable, the Romney camp can only win by shaving parts of Obama’s base.¶ And environmentalists are one place big place where it could work. Stanford University researchers have found that about 38 million Americans care a lot about the environment and might vote on it. Assuming that environmental voters turn out at roughly the same rate as other citizens who can vote, this means that somewhere between 15% and 19% of the electorate will vote partly on environmental issues.¶ Although there’s no current, detailed polling, it’s likely that Obama currently stands to get around 75% of this group — taking 50% of it would probably be enough to put Romney over the top. So how can he do it?

#### China label kills relations and the economy

Roach 8-28

Stephen is a lecturer at Yale University’s School of Management and Jackson Institute for International Affairs. He is also a Senior executive with Morgan Stanley, “How Romney Could go Wrong from Day 1,” <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c74802de-f0f9-11e1-89b2-00144feabdc0.html#axzz25ue916Yz>

True to his word as a candidate, a few hours after taking office as US president on January 20, 2013, Mitt Romney issued his first executive order, declaring China guilty of currency manipulation. In accordance with the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, President Romney’s act triggered immediate negotiations between US and Chinese officials. But the negotiations stalled and both parties blamed the other in press releases.¶ In early February, in his first State of the Union address, Mr Romney said: “Enough is enough. It is high time for China to play by our rules.” Congress roared its approval and within a week, overwhelming bipartisan majorities of both houses passed the Defend America Trade Act of 2013. Modelled on the currency manipulation “remedies” of countervailing tariffs first proposed in 2005, DATA was signed into law on President’s Day, February 18 2013. China was quickly deemed to be in violation of the new statute.¶ More¶ At that point negotiations took on a new urgency. But the new leaders in both countries were in no mood for compromise and the talks failed. In accordance with the provisions of DATA, Washington slapped immediate tariffs of 20 per cent on all Chinese products entering the US.¶ As plants shut down across China, Beijing declared this to be an act of economic war and filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization. Li Keqiang, newly installed as premier, announced after the National People’s Congress in March that China had no patience to endure a WTO dispute process that could take anywhere from two to five years to run its course.¶ China’s Ministry of Commerce then announced retaliatory tariffs of 20 per cent on all US exports to China. This hit growth-starved America right between the eyes. With $104bn of American-made goods sold in Chinese markets in 2011, China had become the US’s third-largest and its fastest-growing export market. To add insult to injury, China-dependent Walmart announced average price increases of 5 per cent. Other retailers followed suit. Talk of stagflation was in the air and hard-pressed American consumers hunkered down further.¶ US financial markets swooned. The stock market was hit by pressures on profit margins, growth and inflation. The bond market was also unnerved by the realisation that the Federal Reserve was seriously behind the curve. With good reason. After its meeting in June 2013, the Fed reaffirmed its ever-extending commitment to keep its benchmark policy rate near zero through 2015, and even dangled the possibility of yet another round of quantitative easing, QE4. Yields on 10-year Treasuries moved back above 4 per cent and stocks fell sharply further.¶ Feeling the heat from financial markets, Washington turned up the heat on China. Mr Romney called Congress back from its Independence Day holiday into a special session. By unanimous consent, Congress passed an amendment to DATA – upping the tariffs on China by another 10 percentage points.¶ At that point an indignant China turned to its own version of the big bazooka. The biggest foreign buyer of US debt was nowhere to be seen at the Treasury’s August 2013 auction. Long-term interest rates spiked and within weeks yields on 10-year Treasuries hit 7 per cent. The dollar plunged and the US stock market went into free fall.¶ Just like that, the so-called exorbitant privilege of the haven asset vanished. When asked at a press conference why China would willingly engage in actions that would undermine the value of more than $2tn in Treasuries and other dollar-based holdings, Zhou Xiaochuan, retiring governor of the People’s Bank of China, said: “This is not about risk-adjusted portfolio returns. We are defending our people against an act of economic war.”¶ By the autumn of 2013 there was little doubt of the severity of renewed recession in the US. Trade sanctions on China had backfired. Beleaguered American workers paid the highest price of all, as the unemployment rate shot back up above 10 per cent. A horrific policy blunder had confirmed that there was no bilateral fix for the multilateral trade imbalance of a savings-starved US economy.¶ In China, growth had slipped below the dreaded 6 per cent threshold and the new leadership was rolling out yet another investment stimulus for a still unbalanced and unstable Chinese economy. As the global economy slipped back into recession, the Great Crisis of 2008-09 suddenly looked like child’s play. Globalisation itself hung in the balance.¶ History warns us never to say never. We need only look at the legacy of US Senator Reed Smoot and Representative Willis Hawley, who sponsored the infamous Tariff Act of 1930 – America’s worst economic policy blunder. Bad dreams can – and have – become reality.

#### Economic decline causes nuclear war

Harris and Burrows, 09 –

 PhD in European History @ Cambridge and Counselor of the US National Intelligence Council AND Member of the National Intelligence Council’s Long Range Analysis Unit (Mathew J. and Jennifer, “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis,” April, Washington Quarterly, <http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_Burrows.pdf>)

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the **Great Depression** is not likely to be repeated, the **lessons** to be drawn from that period **include the harmful effects on** **fledgling** **democracies** and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) **and** on the sustainability of **multilateral institutions** (think League of Nations in the same period). **There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first** as much as in the twentieth **century.** For that reason, the ways in which **the potential for greater conflict could grow** would seem to be even more apt **in a** constantly **volatile economic environment** as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. **Terrorism**’s appeal **will decline if** economic **growth continues** in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the **diffusion of technologies** and scientific knowledge **will place** some of **the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach**. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity **conflict** and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella **could lead to an unintended escalation** and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close **proximity of** potential **nuclear rivals** combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions **may place more focus on preemption** rather than defense, potentially **leading to escalating crises**. 36 Types of **conflict** that the world continues to experience, such as **over resources, could reemerge,** particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. **Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity** will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this **could result in interstate conflicts** if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, **cooperation** to manage changing water resources **is** likely to be increasingly **difficult** both within and between states **in a** more **dog-eat-dog world.**

# South China Sea

### A2- China/Taiwan

#### China would crush Taiwan – no chance for escalation

Miks ‘10

Jason. “Taiwan War Games” http://the-diplomat.com/china-power/2010/08/10/taiwan-war-games/

According to a computerised simulation conducted by Taiwan’s military, China would capture the island’s capital in just three days if the two sides went to war. The war games scenario was based on the assumption of conflict taking place next year, with China’s People’s Liberation Army launching air raids before sending in ground troops. The Washington Times quoted a Taiwanese Defence Ministry official as saying that ‘The purpose of the drill is...to test our defence capabilities in case the People's Liberation Army launched an invasion.’ If that’s the case, then the results must have been something of a blow to Taiwan’s defence planners, and came only days before a report in the Liberty Times quoting a senior intelligence official stating that China is planning to ‘reinforce its defence along its southeast coastlines by increasing the existing some 1,500 missiles to at least 1,800 with an aim to counter America's potential presence in the Taiwan Strait.’

#### Defacto unification is occurring now – time is on Beijing’s side and won’t involve U.S.

Chan ‘8

Steve. (Department of Political Science, U. of Colorado) Steve Chan, China, the U.S., and the Power-Transition Theory: A Critique. 2008. P. 91-92

Several logical and empirical implications follow from the ongoing trends. China has become Taiwan's main trade partner, and Taiwan has become an important investor in China. In 2005, 70 percent of Taiwan's foreign direct investment and 40 percent of its exports went to China (including Hong Kong).16 Bilateral tourist exchanges have been on the rise, and direct, regularly scheduled shipping and air travel between the two sides are likely to be established in the near future. It has been reported that almost 1 million Taiwanese businesspeople and their families have taken up residence on the Mainland. For all practical purposes, there has been an ongoing process of economic and cultural integration despite continued political separation. If the current trends continue, there will be de facto unification. Thus, Beijing has time on its side. Accordingly, it should have little incentive to alter the current processes that would further enhance its bargaining position over time. Conversely, the pro-independence advocates on Taiwan are faced with the challenge of working against these processes. This perspective in turn implies that any challenge to the status quo is more likely to come from Taipei than from Beijing. 17 Only one country can reverse the asymmetric cross-Strait relation working in Beijing's favor. For obvious reasons, Beijing wants to neutralize the U.S. influence. Thus, another implication from this discussion is that far from desiring a confrontation with Washington, Beijing has every incentive to avoid this possibility. Should a Sino-American confrontation take place over Taiwan, it would not be because Beijing wants to have such a showdown, but rather because it has been unable to persuade Washington to refrain from intervening.18 If, as some have suggested, one can draw a historical lesson from Anglo-German relations in 1914, it would be that the U.K. joined the anti-German coalition not because Berlin had sought to involve London in a fight but rather because it had failed in its effort to prevent London from becoming involved.

#### Asian war is unlikely --- all potential conflicts are solved by regional stability initiatives

Bitzinger & Desker ‘8

 senior fellow and dean of S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies respectively (Richard A. Bitzinger, Barry Desker, “Why East Asian War is Unlikely,” Survival, December 2008, <http://pdfserve.informaworld.com-/678328_731200556_906256449.pdf>)

The Asia-Pacific region can be regarded as a zone of both relative insecurity and strategic stability. It contains some of the world’s most significant flashpoints – the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the Siachen Glacier – where tensions between nations could escalate to the point of major war. It is replete with unresolved border issues; is a breeding ground for transnationa terrorism and the site of many terrorist activities (the Bali bombings, the Manila superferry bombing); and contains overlapping claims for maritime territories (the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) with considerable actual or potential wealth in resources such as oil, gas and fisheries. Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area of strategic significance with many key sea lines of communication and important chokepoints. Yet despite all these potential crucibles of conflict, the Asia-Pacific, if not an area of serenity and calm, is certainly more stable than one might expect. To be sure, there are separatist movements and internal struggles, particularly with insurgencies, as in Thailand, the Philippines and Tibet. Since the resolution of the East Timor crisis, however, the region has been relatively free of open armed warfare. Separatism remains a challenge, but the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism is a nuisance, but its impact is contained. The North Korean nuclear issue, while not fully resolved, is at least moving toward a conclusion with the likely denuclearisation of the peninsula. Tensions between China and Taiwan, while always just beneath the surface, seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict any time soon, especially given recent Kuomintang Party victories in Taiwan and efforts by Taiwan and China to re-open informal channels of consultation as well as institutional relationships between organisations responsible for cross-strait relations. And while in Asia there is no strong supranational political entity like the European Union, there are many multilateral organisations and international initiatives dedicated to enhancing peace and stability, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In Southeast Asia, countries are united in a common geopolitical and economic organisation – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – which is dedicated to peaceful economic, social and cultural development, and to the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. All this suggests that war in Asia – while not inconceivable – is unlikely.

#### No Asian conflict

Kato ‘8

(Yoichi, bureau chief of the American General Bureau of the Asahi Shimbun, “Return from 9/11 PTSD to Global Leader,” Washington Quarterly, Fall 2008, lexis)

The challenges that the Asia Pacific will face in the foreseeable future will not likely require the actual use of force or will likely be low intensity if they do. Both major potential flashpoints--North Korea and the Taiwan Strait--are showing a decline in tension. North Korea has recently provided a report of its nuclear facilities, although the contents have turned out to be far from satisfactory to other members of the six-party talks and the path to final denuclearization is not yet clear. Taiwan has elected a new president, Ma Ying-jeou, who has demonstrated more willingness for and flexibility in working with mainland China; and as a result, cross-strait tension has substantially declined. China has been continuing its military buildup and has engaged in some provocative actions, such as its January 2007 antisatellite test, but it has not shown any intention to challenge U.S. supremacy openly in the immediate future. For the time being, especially with the Beijing Olympic Games this year and the Shanghai World Exposition in 2010, it is widely speculated that China will concentrate on the peaceful growth of its economy while avoiding any military adventurism against the United States.

#### Deterrence checks Asian escalation

Alagappa ‘8

(Muthiah, Distinguished senior fellow at the East-West Center, The Long Shadow, pg. 508-509)

The grim scenarios associated with nuclear weapons in Asia frequently rely on worst-case political and military situations; often they are seen in isolation from the national priorities of regional states that emphasize economic development and modernization through participation in regional and global economies and the high priority accorded to stability in domestic and international affairs. The primary goal of regional states is not aggrandizement through military aggression but preservation of national integrity, state or regime survival, economic growth and prosperity, increase in national power and international influence, preserva­tion or incremental change in the status quo, and the construction of regional and global orders in which they are subjects rather than objects. Seen in this broader perspective, nuclear weapons and more generally military force are of greater rel­evance in the defense, deterrence, and assurance roles than offensive ones. This does not imply that offensive use of force or military clashes will not occur; only that force is not the first option, that military clashes will be infrequent, and that when they do occur they will be limited in scope and intensity. Security interaction in Asia increasingly approximates behavior associated with defensive realism.

# Food Prices

### A2- Food Prices

#### Trade solves.

Hansch ‘8

Senior Associate, Center for the study of migration. “FOOD, NUTRITION AND LIVELIHOOD PREPAREDNESS FOR A PANDEMIC INFLUENZA DISASTER GUIDANCE FOR LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES” Steve Hansch H2P Food Security Working Group1 June 15, 2008 <http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADU257.pdf>

The major reason food shortages have become less lethal in modern history is the ability of global food supplies to buffer any individual region, that is, food has become fluid enough that a rise in food prices anywhere is met by increased supply from the outside. A pandemic will de-couple that connection. Food price rises in urban areas will be balanced by food price declines in nearby rural areas; they will not equilibrate.

#### There’s enough food for 9 billion people.

Dyson 2 (Tim, LSE, http://www.fathom.com/feature/122659/index.html, KF)

If one looks into the future, the key issue is whether agricultural yields are going to continue to rise at reasonable rates. I see no reason to believe that they will not. I don't foresee any kind of major food crisis in the coming decades. There are major problems that we do need to address, but on balance things have been getting better. In terms of major world problems, I don't think food production should be at the top of the agenda--certainly not in comparison to the issue of climate change, which could be extremely serious. We should be able to produce enough food for the 9 billion people that there will be on the planet in a few decades time. Getting sufficient food to the poorest among the 9 billion is an issue. There will still be problems in that area in 20 or 30 years.

#### Energy costs makes the impact inevitable.

Dawson ‘6

[Thomas, January 5. American Chronicle, “Food for Thought and the Price of Food,” <http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/viewArticle.asp?articleID=4533>]

It may seem to many that we are living in a period in which there are potentially insurmountable problems facing us on every side. Certainly the world is on the precipice of a population explosion that we will be unable to sustain. The consumption of our natural resources and the destruction of our environment continue on a scale never imagined by the majority of us. However, nearly every generation of mankind has seen periods of hard times and some of us have experienced some very good times as well. The very nature of life on earth has been a history of turmoil and upheaval, from subsistence and mere survival to prosperity and a degree of security, and sometimes, back again. Don’t expect things to change for the better in the very near future regardless of our sophisticated economy. Consider the single aspect of food prices in the western world. Food has been relatively inexpensive in the western world, except in war-torn areas for the entire lifetime of our generation. This will probably not be the case for the next generation. It was only a few years ago that the population explosion was in the news all the time, almost to the same extent that we are currently preoccupied with the energy crunch usually referred to as “peak oil”, and the erosion of the western standard of living by “globalization”. The media let up on the problems of population growth because people got tired of hearing about it. After all, the western world didn’t appear to be particularly affected by it. The population explosion has since been generally ignored in the news until recently. That is not to infer that the problem went away. It took thousands of years of human history to produce and sustain a population of a billion people by the early nineteenth century. In the past 200 years, we have multiplied that population by six. There are now over six billion people in the world and we will add the next billion people in only about a dozen years. With the advent of the industrial revolution, the western world became trade oriented over the last couple of centuries. Since the cold war has ended, our international companies have seized opportunities to sharply increase their profits by arbitraging the labor markets of Asia while selling products at home; sometimes referred to as globalization. This employment of large numbers of people has given impetus and acceleration to the already rising prosperity of a small percentage of the population in various parts of Asia. This small increase in prosperity affecting such large numbers of people has spawned a demand for resources and commodities around the world. Suddenly, a few people in the more populated parts of the world have the monetary wherewithal to improve their standard of living and have hopes for a better life for their children. They have needs of infrastructure, electricity and transportation as well as food. Now the western world finds itself competing for limited resources, especially energy. The most efficient forms of energy are oil and gas. The owners of oil and gas find themselves in an enviable position where they have an asset worthy of preservation. They will probably never again allow the prices to fall very much for any extended period of time. The cost of energy and fertilizer (usually made from natural gas) are substantial costs in food production, not to mention the cost of transporting that food. The 2006 crops will be affected by the recent increase of prices in oil and gas. Expect food prices to accelerate their rise in the next year and continue to rise thereafter. To exacerbate the problem, many farmers around the world can now make more money raising crops for bio-diesel fuels than they can make raising food. Across South Asia, in the Amazon and elsewhere, farmers are razing the forests to plant crops capable of making biofuels. Even in this country, laws will be enacted to require some percentage of ethanol or the addition of some kind of bio-fuels to gasoline and diesel fuels to further subsidize and satisfy the farm lobby.

#### Food price volatility irrelevant, stats prove

Barrett & Bellemare ’11

(Chris is a distinguished professor economics at Cornell and Marc is assistant professor of public policy at Duke, “Why Food Price Volatility Doesn’t Matter,” July 12th) <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67981/christopher-b-barrett-and-marc-f-bellemare/why-food-price-volatility-doesnt-matter>

Since volatile food prices do not necessarily harm poor consumers, it does not make sense to blame volatility for increased poverty or political unrest. In a recent [statistical analysis](http://marcfbellemare.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/BellemareFoodPricesJune2011.pdf), the FAO [food price](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007%E2%80%932008_world_food_price_crisis) index and an indicator of political unrest were positively correlated. But a measure of food price volatility and political unrest had a strong negative correlation. Although the food price spikes that occurred in the late spring and early summer of 2008, at the end of 2010, and at the beginning of 2011 coincided with political unrest, increases in food price volatility more commonly occurs after, not before, patches of political unrest. So, although commentators and politicians frequently blame food price volatility for human suffering and political unrest, they are either misunderstanding or misrepresenting the problem. Perhaps not coincidentally, their emphasis on tempering price volatility favors the same large farmers who already enjoy tremendous financial support from G-20 governments.

#### laundry list of alt causes

Cohen 8

Roger, April, Bring on the Right Biofuels, New York Times, Lexis

Before I get to that, some myths need dispelling. If Asian rice prices are soaring, along with the global prices of wheat and maize, it's not principally because John Doe in Iowa or Jean Dupont in Picardy has decided to turn yummy corn and beet into un-yummy ethanol feedstock. Much larger trends are at work. They dwarf the still tiny biofuel industry (roughly a $40 billion annual business, or the equivalent of Exxon Mobil's $40.6 billion profits in 2007). I refer to the rise of more than one-third of humanity in China and India, the disintegrating dollar and soaring oil prices. Hundreds of millions of people have moved from poverty into the global economy over the past decade in Asia. They're eating twice a day, instead of once, and propelling rapid urbanization. Their demand for food staples and once unthinkable luxuries like meat is pushing up prices. At the same time, the rising price of commodities over the past year has largely tracked the declining parity of the beleaguered dollar. Rice prices have shot up in dollar terms, far less against the euro. Countries like China are offloading depreciating dollar reserves to hoard stores of value like commodities. Food price increases are also tied to oil being nearly $120 a barrel. Fossil fuels are an important input in everything from fertilizer to diesel for tractors.

#### High Prices leads to backstopping—prevents hunger

Duffield et al ‘8

James A. Duffield, Ph.D. is an agricultural economist with the Office of Energy Policy and New Uses, United States Department of Agriculture, Irene Xiarchos, Ph.D. is also an agricultural economist with the Office of Energy Policy and New Uses, United States Department of Agriculture, Steve A. Halbrook, Ph.D. is Vice President of Farm Foundation, Oak Brook, Illinois, and a member of the District of Columbia Bar, 53 S.D. L. REV. 425

However, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations has a more balanced viewpoint of ethanol and other biofuels. While FAO recognizes the potential negative effects of expanding biofuel production on low-income consumers, it also is aware that the growing biofuel market offers new opportunities for small farmers around the world. [130](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1837b3d43a2944d397c077229527ffa6&docnum=2&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAt&_md5=c669b6588daba46f3573a124c378bfee&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all#n130) The rapidly growing biofuels market is drawing down crop surpluses in industrialized countries and causing world commodity prices to rise, which provides an incentive for farmers in poor countries to grow more of their own crops. Overproduction of food in industrialized countries has depressed agricultural commodity prices and for decades these low prices have been a major cause of economic stagnation in poor countries. [131](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1837b3d43a2944d397c077229527ffa6&docnum=2&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAt&_md5=c669b6588daba46f3573a124c378bfee&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all#n131) However, FAO cautions that a plan is needed to formulate bioenergy polices to ensure "that everybody benefits." [132](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1837b3d43a2944d397c077229527ffa6&docnum=2&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAt&_md5=c669b6588daba46f3573a124c378bfee&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all#n132) The ultimate aim is to grow enough crops to meet both fuel and food demand.

# Pakistan Collapse

### A2- Pakistani Collapse

#### ( ) No Pakistani collapse impacts –

#### A. Won’t happen.

Bandow 09- Senior Fellow @ Cato, former special assistant to Reagan (11/31/09, Doug, “Recognizing the Limits of American Power in Afghanistan,” Huffington Post, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=10924)

From Pakistan's perspective, limiting the war on almost any terms would be better than prosecuting it for years, even to "victory," whatever that would mean. In fact, the least likely outcome is a takeover by widely unpopular Pakistani militants. The Pakistan military is the nation's strongest institution; while the army might not be able to rule alone, it can prevent any other force from ruling. Indeed, Bennett Ramberg made the important point: "Pakistan, Iran and the former Soviet republics to the north have demonstrated a brutal capacity to suppress political violence to ensure survival. This suggests that even were Afghanistan to become a terrorist haven, the neighborhood can adapt and resist." The results might not be pretty, but the region would not descend into chaos. In contrast, warned Bacevich: "To risk the stability of that nuclear-armed state in the vain hope of salvaging Afghanistan would be a terrible mistake."

#### B. The Pakistan army won’t allow the transfer of nuclear weapons to the Taliban

Simon, and Stevenson, 9 \* adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, AND \*\*Professor of Strategic Studies at the US Naval War College, (Steven and Jonathan, “Afghanistan: How Much is Enough?” Survival, 51:5, 47 – 67, October 2009 http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a915362559&fulltext=7132409)

The United States' next logical move would be to intensify pressure, raising civilian casualties, increasing political pressure on the Kabul and Islamabad regimes, and ultimately weakening them, which would only help al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In fact, some evidence of this dynamic has already materialised, as the Pakistani government has faced difficulties in dealing with hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis displaced by the military campaign, undertaken at Washington's behest, in the Swat Valley. Certainly worries about Islamabad's ability to handle the Taliban on its own are justi fied. Some Taliban members are no doubt keen on regime change in favour of jihadists, as noted by Bruce Riedel, who headed up the Obama administration's 60-day policy review.29 But Pakistan's military capabilities should not be given short shrift. The Pakistani army, however preoccupied by India, is seasoned and capable, and able to respond decisively to the Taliban should its activities reach a critical level of destabilisation. Inter-Services Intelligence, devious though it may be, would be loath to allow the transfer of nuclear weapons to the Taliban.

#### C. Stable now. US Aid and markets solve.

APP, 10 (Associated Press of Pakistan, “WE NEED MORE MARKET ACCESS, ZARDARI TELLS HOLBROOKE”, Business Recorder, 6/24/2010, Lexis)

President Asif Ali Zardari on Wednesday said the government looked forward to international assistance in facing challenges and called for trade and market access for its products to put its economy on the path of stability and prosperity. He was talking to Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke who called him here at the Aiwan-e-Sadr. Ambassador Holbrooke was accompanied with Ms Anne W Patterson, US Ambassador and senior US officials. Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi, Secretary General to the President M Salman Faruqui, Ms Hina Rabbani Khar, Secretary to the President Salman Siddique, Malik Asif Hayat and Spokesperson to the President former Senator Farhatullah Babar were also present during the meeting. that the legislation on ROZs, would be expedited and counter productive labour provision be softened. The President also emphasised on early reimbursement of arrears in Coalition Support Fund (CSF). President Asif Ali Zardari appreciating the US humanitarian assistance said that the people of Pakistan, especially the displaced persons, have paid a heavy price in terms of both human and material losses in fighting militancy. He said the government owes its success to these people who not only supported efforts to root out militancy but also faced immense hardships for the peace of the region. The President said that overpowering and neutralising the extremist elements in affected areas must be accompanied with the creation of an environment so that extremism and militancy is not allowed to rear its head. This, he said, can only be materialised through creation of opportunities for the people so that their energies could be utilised for creative and developmental purposes. He said that Pakistan had made huge human and material sacrifices to overcome the challenges of terrorism and militancy and its contribution towards counter terrorism is unmatched. "The government, security forces and our people are determined to eliminate this menace at any cost," the President emphasised. Talking about the regional situation, the President said that Pakistan being a responsible country was aware of its obligations and responsibilities. "We are committed to the peace and stability of the region and we welcome efforts for promotion of peace and stability in the region," he said.

#### ( ) Transition will be peaceful and won’t cause war with India.

Puntambekar, Indian Defence Review, 1/14/11 (Puntambekar, Ashish, "Possible Collapse of Pakistan: Quantifying the fallout," http://www.indiandefencereview.com/geopolitics/Possible-Collapse-of-Pakistan-Quantifying-the-Fallout.html)

The Stratfor article however has important strategic implications for South Asia , If Stratfor’s information is correct, it would mean that the US and Europe have no real interest or strategic rationale any more for keeping Pakistan together. They will let it fail as it will then allow them to independently target the militants in the various breakaway states. Balochistan has been wanting independence for a long time now. It is a movement which has found renewed strength since last year when Musharraf killed the Balochi leader Akbar Khan Bugti. The most likely scenario then would be that sensing a weak central government, the Balochis, who are warriors, will make the first move and declare independence. If Sindh also simultaneously decides to pull out of the union, or if there is civil war in the province, there is no way that the Pakistani Military will be able to fight on two or three different fronts and still keep its troops on the Indian border. This kind of scenario is not impossible. The Pakistani army is already demoralized after the defeat it suffered at the hands of the Taliban in southern Waziristan. In that incident the Taliban captured more than 200 regular army troops, and later released them in what amounted to a humiliating reversal for the army. This may have had a lasting impact on troop morale throughout Pakistan, and in any case, fighting on three different fronts is difficult for any army from a logistical standpoint.

# Airpower

### A2- Air Power

#### ( ) No air power impact --

#### A. We’ve got plenty of it now.

Friedman and Preble 10

(Benjamin Friedman is a research fellow in defense and homeland security studies at the Cato Institute, Christopher Preble is director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Budgetary Savings from Military Restraint, September 22, 2010 Cato Policy Analysis No. 667 September 23, 2010 <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA667.pdf>)

We would also eliminate six fighter wing equivalents from the Air Force. There are three justifications for this cut. First, the Navy already provides enough airpower from the sea to deal with most wars.14 Second, the Air Force lacks enemies that challenge its air superiority. Third, advancements in weapons guidance greatly increased the destructive power of each airframe. These factors mean that the fighter capability we maintain is more than what is needed to support likely ground conflicts or conduct bombing raids. Because we want an offshore posture rather than a forward defense, we retain our current bomber and refueling tanker procurement plans. We also maintain the Air Force’s spending on unmanned aerial vehicles, given their flexibility and low cost relative to manned aircraft.

#### B. Air power fails.

Kelly ‘2 (Michael, editor of the Atlantic Monthly, April, The Atlantic Monthly, “The Air-Power Revolution,” http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2002/04/kelly.htm)

But air power did not succeed in these tasks. Germany rested its (always doubtful) hopes for a successful invasion of Britain entirely on an air offensive (the [Battle of Britain](http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/bobhome.html)) that was intended to reduce a demoralized British people to surrender, or at least to destroy Britain’s defenses against invasion. The Luftwaffe’s campaign (including [the Blitz](http://www.iwm.org.uk/duxford/batt_ex5.htm)) killed about 43,000 people but unified and strengthened British will rather than crushing it, and never came close to wrecking Britain’s air defenses. In air power’s second great test failure was less absolute but more consequential in terms of future war-making. Britain’s Bomber Command believed not only that bombing could win the war but that precision bombing could win the war. The heavy bombers of the Royal Air Force would pulverize Germany’s manufacturing, transportation, and communication networks—thereby forcing Germany’s surrender without resorting to “area bombing,” the saturation bombing of civilians and their homes. Thus bombing would win the war without the mass slaughter of noncombatants—a civilized victory, even a humanitarian victory. Precision bombing proved markedly imprecise. In the first year of British bombing more than two thirds of the sorties failed to hit their targets. Even large targets, such as rail yards, could be hit only on moonlit nights. By the end of the first year the Bomber Command had admitted that precision bombing alone could not do the job (although later in the war inventions such as the British Pathfinder force and the American Norden bombsights made precision bombing much more precise), and Allied bombers turned increasingly to area bombing, which was to culminate in the horrors of Hamburg (45,400 dead), Dresden (50,000), Hiroshima (118,661), and Nagasaki (73,884). (Tallies are from The Oxford Companion to World War II.) Bombing could not produce victory except through civilian slaughter—unpalatable to people who wished to think of themselves as civilized. Indeed, it seemed, bombing could not produce victory even at that price. The mass bombing of Germany did not crush the German will or destroy (although it certainly crippled) Germany’s industrial capacity. And worse: bombing proved to be lethal not only to the bombed but to the bombers. Britain’s Bomber Command lost almost 56,000 [pilots] men in the war; American air forces, which engaged in high-risk daylight bombing, also lost almost that number.

#### C. Won’t use it, public constrains, it doesn’t deter, and fails generally.

Eyal ’99 (Jonathan, director of studies at the Royal United Studies Institute, June 16, The Guardian, “So air power was not enough,” http://www.guardian.co.uk/Kosovo/Story/0,2763,207624,00.html)

But this is only a small part of the story. The reality is that, even for a relatively cost-free operation (at least in western lives), much consensus-building was necessary. The crisis started in earnest in February last year. Many mediation efforts ensued and many promises were accepted from the same Mr Milosevic whom everyone knew to be a liar and a cheat. Air strikes were first threatened last September, only to be aborted by a last-minute, frivolous deal which none other than the Americans - those great exponents of air power - negotiated. Ultimately, 13 months of diplomatic wriggling, hundreds of Nato council meetings, scores of UN Security Council resolutions and two “peace” conferences were required before the west went to war. Theoretically, cruise missile buttons can be pressed at will; in practice, democracies still need consent and public support, and in larger quantities than military planners may assume. The threat of air strikes did not persuade Milosevic into compromise; the deterrence effect of air power was therefore negligible. The air campaign was launched in order to avert a humanitarian disaster. Yet again, a failure: although Nato cannot be blamed for what Milosevic did to his own citizens, it is a fact that air strikes unleashed the biggest humanitarian disaster Europe has known since 1945. Nato’s involvement merely meant that this disaster happened much more quickly and that, at least theoretically, it is now reversible if the refugees chose to return home. The Yugoslav episode may make democracies more willing to confront dictators. However, as the complications of the last few days indicate, it is premature to conclude that future confrontations can be conducted only from the air, or that they carry negligible risks. In short, the armchair generals still have their uses.