# 1st

#### Obama will win- Polls prove but race could shift if an event comes up

Cook 10-4

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Too many political observers see politics in an entirely binary way: Everything has to be either a “0” or a “1”; a race is either tied or it’s over; every election is either won or stolen. Some people never want to admit that their side lost. And some people think that a poll either tells them what they want to hear or is methodologically flawed—or crooked. It’s like an obnoxious sports fan (often found in Philadelphia) who views a ruling by a referee or umpire as either favorable or a bad call. Denial and simplicity reign.¶ The presidential election is neither tied nor over. Of the 16 most recent national polls using live telephone interviewers calling both respondents with landlines and those with cell phones (between 30 and 40 percent of voters do not have landlines and cannot legally be called by robo-pollsters), one has the race even, two have Obama with a narrow 2-point edge, five have 3-point Obama margins, two have 5-point Obama advantages, another pair have 6-point Obama leads, two have 7-point leads, and one has an 8-point Obama lead. This would strongly suggest that the Obama lead is between 3 and 6 percentage points; such brand-name polls as those by CNN, Fox News, and NBC News/Wall Street Journal are among those in that 3- to 6-point range.¶ Conversations with Democratic and Republican pollsters and strategists suggest that Colorado, Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia are the most competitive swing states. Some high-quality private polling shows Romney with very narrow leads in both North Carolina and Virginia, but a few other equally sophisticated surveys show Obama with narrow advantages in those two states. At least one private survey shows Florida even, but most show the Sunshine State and Colorado with narrow Obama leads, in the small- to mid-single-digit range. Just a hair or two better for Obama but still quite close are Nevada and Wisconsin, followed by Iowa. Things really get ugly for Romney in Ohio and Michigan, and, finally, in Pennsylvania, which is no longer competitive. Ohio shows a 5- to 8-point lead for Obama in private polling. In Michigan, Obama’s lead is slightly wider, and in Pennsylvania, Romney faces close to a 10-point deficit. It is mathematically possible for Romney to reach 270 electoral votes without Michigan, Ohio, or Pennsylvania, but it is in reality exceedingly unlikely.¶ It would take a very consequential event to change the trajectory of this race. Time will tell whether Romney’s strong debate performance on Wednesday night was the event that he needed—particularly in swing states such as Ohio. But at least he energized his supporters and sent a clear message that the race is not over.¶ As for down-ballot races, my hunch is that there is a pretty good chance that we may not know which party will hold a majority in the Senate in the next Congress by breakfast or lunch the day after the election. With 10 seats in the toss-up category—five for each party—the Senate outlook couldn’t be more volatile.¶ Republicans can be confident that they will pick up the open seat in Nebraska, but they have to be very worried about their own open seats in Indiana and Maine. The latter is particularly troublesome for the GOP. Republican incumbents Scott Brown in Massachusetts and Dean Heller in Nevada are in very tight races; the odds of Heller winning are better than those for Brown. The newest entry on the toss-up list is the open Republican seat in Arizona, where Democrat Richard Carmona has pulled even or slightly ahead of GOP Rep. Jeff Flake.¶ Conversely, Democrats have to be most worried about hanging on to the open seat in Connecticut, where former pro-wrestling CEO Linda McMahon now has a narrow lead, and in Montana, where incumbent Jon Tester is locked in a nail-biter. The top of the ticket is a challenge for both McMahon and Tester. Open seats in North Dakota, Virginia, and Wisconsin are statistical dead heats, notwithstanding some public polls that show rather substantial leads for former Democratic Gov. Tim Kaine over former Sen. George Allen in the Old Dominion.¶ A look at the polling data shows two inflection points in the presidential contest and many Senate races. The Democratic convention clearly had a positive impact for Democrats, while Republicans took a real hit after the release of the video of Mitt Romney suggesting that 47 percent of voters are basically deadbeats who see themselves as victims. We are now hearing reports of a similar drop for down-ballot Republicans in some districts, particularly in places like California and New York where Romney was already going nowhere. Many GOP candidates took a hit the week of Sept. 17, then stabilized the following week. They didn’t drop further but they didn’t regain any altitude, either.¶ For now, the GOP majority in the House seems fairly secure; The Cook Political Report currently sees GOP losses in the zero- to 10-seat range, well short of the 25-seat net gain Democrats need to gain control.¶ It’s always difficult to gauge how any event will be interpreted and what impact it will have on a campaign, but there is considerable evidence that the “47 percent” video did make a mark. Democratic pollster Peter Hart and his Republican counterpart Bill McInturff asked in the Sept. 26-30 NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll of 832 likely voters nationwide, “Has what you have seen, read, or heard in the past couple of weeks about Mitt Romney and his campaign for president given you a more favorable impression of him or a less favorable impression of him?” Some 28 percent responded that they felt more complimentary about Romney, but 51 percent indicated that what they heard made them feel less likely to support him.¶ Romney had a six-week stretch where nothing broke his way. Now we’ll see if his debate performance was a turning point—or a brief interruption—in the campaign narrative.

#### SMR’s incredibly unpopular- Batman

Deal-Blackwell 7/23

(Deborah, works with Los Alamos, founder of Hyperion Power Generation, ““Dark Knight Rises” Batman movie does infant SMR industry no favors” <http://ixpower.com/tag/small-modular-reactors/>, SEH)

But, I couldn’t believe it …Holy Plot Twist Batman! I cringed when we got to the part where they introduced the little nuclear reactor. ACK! The Nolan Brothers had written in Wayne Enterprises Applied Science Division developing an SMR (Small Modular nuclear power Reactor) that was used by the bad guys to threaten Gotham. In the movie, the bad guys gain access to the SMR and had a scientist magically presto changeo TURN IT INTO A FUSION NUCLEAR BOMB in what seemed like a turn of a screw, and in the space of a few minutes. As the movie progressed, and I became sore from my date nudging me with his elbow, darn it if the characters didn’t flip the sucker onto the back of the truck and drive around Gotham with it …!¶ GROAN! CRINGE! I know it’s just a movie and YOU know it’s just a movie, but golly, gosh darn, The Dark Knight Rises sure doesn’t help the rise of the fledging SMR industry! ¶ Fusion?! Ack! Fusion bomb?! Ack! Quickly retrofitting a power reactor to be a bomb?! Ack! Throwing it in a truck and driving it around the city?! ¶ Double Ack! The fairy tale spun further and further out of control. I wanted to bang my head on the seat in front of me. I don’t recall any other recent movies featuring a small nuclear power being turned into a bomb, and I sure wish this one had not.¶ Misconceptions about nuclear power abound today. Misconceptions and fear about SMRs, I’m afraid, will no doubt skyrocket after everyone gets around to seeing this movie. If you ask me, the release of this Batman flick hands the Union of Concerned Scientists a loaded Batpistol to scare the uninformed majority into opposing the development of SMRs. ¶ This movie could be a pain in the collective butts of those of us who believe SMRs have a place in the future of clean energy for our planet and may come back to haunt the nuclear industry – for both big and small power reactors. I’m pretty sure it will – just as sure as at the end of every Batman movie, the dark knight rises.¶

**Approval Rating is key, lines up perfectly with reelection
Silver ’11**

Nate directs five thirty eight and is a statistician, “Approval Ratings and Reelection Odds,” <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/approval-ratings-and-re-election-odds/>

Earlier this month, we posted the simple version of a finding, based on the historical record, that is worth keeping in mind when you read articles about how Barack Obama’s presidency has (or has not been) been revitalized: It’s just too soon for his approval ratings to tell us very much about his re-election prospects for 2012. This is an overdue follow-up to that article — what you might think of as the slightly-more-complicated version. While **it’s true that approval ratings aren’t of much use now, it’s also the case that, by the time we get close to the election, they will have become a very reliable predictor of Mr. Obama’s chances of winning another term**. Based on Gallup polling, here is what I estimate that the incumbent president’s approval rating was on Election Day in almost every election since 1940. (There is no data for 1944 because Gallup went on wartime hiatus.) There are a few tricks I had to employ to derive these numbers; I’d ask you to take them on faith for a few moments, and then we’ll explain everything later on. **At first glance, the relationship seems nearly perfect: every incumbent with an approval rating of 49 percent or higher won re-election, while every candidate with a rating of 48 percent or lower lost.** In practice, things probably don’t work quite that crisply. For example, Harry Truman, whom we estimate had a 50 percent approval rating on Election Day 1948, won by 4.5 points, and 114 electoral votes, over Thomas E. Dewey, which suggests that he had some margin to spare. And candidate quality clearly makes a difference. Although Robert Dole is sometimes considered a weak Republican nominee, Bill Clinton beat him in 1996 by just 8.5 points, despite Mr. Clinton’s 55 percent approval rating. By contrast, in 1972, Richard Nixon, with an approval rating only a couple of points higher (57 percent), trounced a very weak Democratic nominee, George McGovern, by more than 23 points. Still, the approval rating at which an incumbent candidate goes from being an underdog to a favorite for re-election is somewhere in the high 40s. **The reason the threshold is probably slightly below 50 percent rather than right at 50 percent is that in any approval survey, some people (typically 5 to 10 percent) say they are undecided about the president’s performance**. For instance, at this writing, Barack Obama’s Gallup approval rating is 49 percent but his disapproval rating is just 42 percent, a net margin of +7. If those were the figures on Election Day, he would be a favorite to win unless nearly everybody who was undecided about his performance cast their ballots against him, something that is possible in theory but usually doesn’t occur in practice. Now, then, how did we come up with these numbers? As I said, it’s not quite so straightforward. Gallup has approval ratings data going back to 1937. The problem is that, until fairly recently, they had a habit of stopping their approval ratings polling several months before a presidential election. For instance, in 1956, their last poll of Dwight Eisenhower’s public approval was in early August; they did not survey him again until late November, after he had already defeated Adlai Stevenson. However, we can extrapolate what Mr. Eisenhower’s rating would have been on Election Day 1956 by drawing a smoothed regression line — known in the business as a Loess curve — using the data points before and after that date. The one hitch is that incumbent presidents, whether they win, lose, or don’t run at all, almost always receive a “bounce” in their approval rating after the election, as people either rally around a winner or feel sympathy for the lame duck. The average magnitude of this post-election bounce is 4 points. So, before I fitted the curves, I subtracted 4 points from approval rating polls conducted after Election Day. By applying this process of bounce-adjustment and curve-fitting, we are able to estimate an incumbent president’s Gallup approval rating on Election Day itself or on any day before it, as shown in this nifty-looking graphic: I haven’t labeled the curves by the candidate’s name in the chart, because that which create too much clutter. But I have distinguished those who eventually won re-election (blue lines) from those who lost (red). A couple of cases are worth attention. The red line that you see briefly extending above 80 percent is for George H.W. Bush. His approval ratings, which were already pretty good, shot up following the start of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, when American-led forces drove Iraqi troops back from their occupation of Kuwait. Politically, that made Mr. Bush look like an extremely formidable candidate for re-election: Saturday Night Live ran a sketch later that year entitled “Campaign ’92: The Race To Avoid Being The Guy Who Loses To Bush,” with Democratic candidates at a debate all trying to lose so they would not have to run against him. But Mr. Bush’s approval ratings fell precipitously throughout late 1991 and early 1992, and were below 40 percent by Election Day. If Mr. Bush is the precedent that challengers will cite when their campaign seems to be flailing, the opposite example is the original Comeback Kid, Harry Truman. He’s the blue line that you still see down around 40 percent approval with just five months to go before the election of 1948. It’s hard to know exactly where Mr. Truman’s approval numbers were on Election Day. When Gallup surveyed in late June, he had just 39 percent approval; in January, 1949, after he had beaten Thomas E. Dewey, he was up to 69 percent; and then he reverted back to 50 percent just a couple months later. Our Loess curve estimates that Mr. Truman’s approval rating was probably around 50 percent on Election Day, but this is just a guess. What’s clear is that Mr. Truman was at some point an extremely unpopular president, and he nevertheless — to the great surprise of the Chicago Daily Tribune — defeated Mr. Dewey. Another thing to take from the graphic is how the red and blue lines gradually untangle themselves as the relationship between approval ratings and re-election becomes stronger over time. We can see this a bit more clearly by taking the average approval rating for the 8 winning candidates and the 3 losing ones and tracking them over the two years leading up to the election: I would resist the idea that there is any one magical date when approval ratings go from meaningless to meaningful as predictors of re-election. In the chart, the first time the winners and the losers begin to separate themselves is about 19 months before the election — which would correspond roughly to March of the prior year — but the split would have come a bit earlier if not for Mr. Bush’s Gulf War bounce. There’s also increasing differentiation in the period roughly 10 to 5 months before the election, corresponding with primary season. Still, for the most part, the separation occurs gradually. I’ve also tried to play around with various sorts of logistic regression models that attempt to predict a president’s chances at re-election based solely on his Gallup approval rating and the number of days until the election. Don’t take this terribly seriously — it’s hard to do anything very rigorous based on so few data points (just 11 presidents in the sample), and I can imagine better model designs than the one that I’ve used. But it does yield some ballpark estimates of what this data implies. **For example, a year in advance of the election, the model figures that a president with a 60 percent approval rating is about 90 percent likely to win re-election, whereas a 40 percent rating translates into a win probability of a bit below 40 percent**. So by that point the differences have become fairly meaningful: What does this mean for Barack Obama? Right now, we’re still in the period where the most useful number for estimating his re-election chances is not his approval rating but rather the historical track record of incumbent presidents. As I wrote on Wednesday, since the Civil War, 73 percent of incumbent presidents who sought another term won, as have 70 percent since World War II. Plugging Mr. Obama’s current numbers into the regression model that I described above yields a 65 percent likelihood of re-election — but again, this is a really rough guess, based mostly on the high historical batting average for incumbents rather than anything to do with Mr. Obama himself. What we can say is important is the range in which Mr. Obama’s approval ratings have been varying in recent months: between about 45 and about 50 percent. **If Mr. Obama’s approval rating is at the top of that range, 50 percent, on Nov. 6, 2012 — about where it is now — the model figures that his chances of winning re-election will be greater than 80 percent. But if his approval rating is at the bottom of the range instead, at 45 percent, his chances for a second term will be only about one in three,** and he’ll have to hope that the Republican nominee is a weak one. Much will change between now and then, of course. But Mr. Obama would probably win an election held next Tuesday — and that would not have been true a couple of months ago.

#### He forces China’s hand into a trade war- collapses relations and economy

Roach 8-28

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True to his word as a candidate, a few hours after taking office as US president on January 20, 2013, Mitt Romney issued his first executive order, declaring China guilty of currency manipulation. In accordance with the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, President Romney’s act triggered immediate negotiations between US and Chinese officials. But the negotiations stalled and both parties blamed the other in press releases.¶ In early February, in his first State of the Union address, Mr Romney said: “Enough is enough. It is high time for China to play by our rules.” Congress roared its approval and within a week, overwhelming bipartisan majorities of both houses passed the Defend America Trade Act of 2013. Modelled on the currency manipulation “remedies” of countervailing tariffs first proposed in 2005, DATA was signed into law on President’s Day, February 18 2013. China was quickly deemed to be in violation of the new statute.¶ More¶ At that point negotiations took on a new urgency. But the new leaders in both countries were in no mood for compromise and the talks failed. In accordance with the provisions of DATA, Washington slapped immediate tariffs of 20 per cent on all Chinese products entering the US.¶ As plants shut down across China, Beijing declared this to be an act of economic war and filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization. Li Keqiang, newly installed as premier, announced after the National People’s Congress in March that China had no patience to endure a WTO dispute process that could take anywhere from two to five years to run its course.¶ China’s Ministry of Commerce then announced retaliatory tariffs of 20 per cent on all US exports to China. This hit growth-starved America right between the eyes. With $104bn of American-made goods sold in Chinese markets in 2011, China had become the US’s third-largest and its fastest-growing export market. To add insult to injury, China-dependent Walmart announced average price increases of 5 per cent. Other retailers followed suit. Talk of stagflation was in the air and hard-pressed American consumers hunkered down further.¶ US financial markets swooned. The stock market was hit by pressures on profit margins, growth and inflation. The bond market was also unnerved by the realisation that the Federal Reserve was seriously behind the curve. With good reason. After its meeting in June 2013, the Fed reaffirmed its ever-extending commitment to keep its benchmark policy rate near zero through 2015, and even dangled the possibility of yet another round of quantitative easing, QE4. Yields on 10-year Treasuries moved back above 4 per cent and stocks fell sharply further.¶ Feeling the heat from financial markets, Washington turned up the heat on China. Mr Romney called Congress back from its Independence Day holiday into a special session. By unanimous consent, Congress passed an amendment to DATA – upping the tariffs on China by another 10 percentage points.¶ At that point an indignant China turned to its own version of the big bazooka. The biggest foreign buyer of US debt was nowhere to be seen at the Treasury’s August 2013 auction. Long-term interest rates spiked and within weeks yields on 10-year Treasuries hit 7 per cent. The dollar plunged and the US stock market went into free fall.¶ Just like that, the so-called exorbitant privilege of the haven asset vanished. When asked at a press conference why China would willingly engage in actions that would undermine the value of more than $2tn in Treasuries and other dollar-based holdings, Zhou Xiaochuan, retiring governor of the People’s Bank of China, said: “This is not about risk-adjusted portfolio returns. We are defending our people against an act of economic war.”¶ By the autumn of 2013 there was little doubt of the severity of renewed recession in the US. Trade sanctions on China had backfired. Beleaguered American workers paid the highest price of all, as the unemployment rate shot back up above 10 per cent. A horrific policy blunder had confirmed that there was no bilateral fix for the multilateral trade imbalance of a savings-starved US economy.¶ In China, growth had slipped below the dreaded 6 per cent threshold and the new leadership was rolling out yet another investment stimulus for a still unbalanced and unstable Chinese economy. As the global economy slipped back into recession, the Great Crisis of 2008-09 suddenly looked like child’s play. Globalisation itself hung in the balance.¶ History warns us never to say never. We need only look at the legacy of US Senator Reed Smoot and Representative Willis Hawley, who sponsored the infamous Tariff Act of 1930 – America’s worst economic policy blunder. Bad dreams can – and have – become reality.

#### Economic decline causes nuclear war

Harris and Burrows, 09 –

 PhD in European History @ Cambridge and Counselor of the US National Intelligence Council AND Member of the National Intelligence Council’s Long Range Analysis Unit (Mathew J. and Jennifer, “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis,” April, Washington Quarterly, <http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_Burrows.pdf>)

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the **Great Depression** is not likely to be repeated, the **lessons** to be drawn from that period **include the harmful effects on** **fledgling** **democracies** and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) **and** on the sustainability of **multilateral institutions** (think League of Nations in the same period). **There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first** as much as in the twentieth **century.** For that reason, the ways in which **the potential for greater conflict could grow** would seem to be even more apt **in a** constantly **volatile economic environment** as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. **Terrorism**’s appeal **will decline if** economic **growth continues** in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the **diffusion of technologies** and scientific knowledge **will place** some of **the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach**. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity **conflict** and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella **could lead to an unintended escalation** and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close **proximity of** potential **nuclear rivals** combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions **may place more focus on preemption** rather than defense, potentially **leading to escalating crises**. 36 Types of **conflict** that the world continues to experience, such as **over resources, could reemerge,** particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. **Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity** will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this **could result in interstate conflicts** if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, **cooperation** to manage changing water resources **is** likely to be increasingly **difficult** both within and between states **in a** more **dog-eat-dog world.\**

# 2nd

#### DoD budget aligned with DoD strategic guidance now—additional tradeoffs collapse the entire package

**Harrison 12**

Todd Harrison, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Priorities, 8/24/2012, ANALYSIS OF THE FY 2013 DEFENSE BUDGET AND SEQUESTRATION, http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2012/08/analysis-of-the-fy2013-defense-budget-and-sequestration/

The Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 defense budget currently being debated in Congress is a departure from previous budgets in several respects. It is the first budget submitted following the release of the Pentagon’s new strategic guidance, marking the beginning of a “pivot” from the wars of the past decade to the Asia-Pacific region. It is also the first budget request in more than a decade to propose a real decline in defense spending from the level currently enacted. Moreover, the prospect of sequestration hangs over the budget, threatening to cut some 10 percent of funding if Congress does not act to prevent it. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has argued that **the budget request is a “complete package**,” that “**there is little room here for** significant **modification**,” and that **any further funding reductions**, such as those called for by sequestration, **would require the Department to fundamentally rethink its new strategy**.1 Nevertheless, the FY 2013 request is unlikely to survive unscathed and the Department will likely be forced to revise its strategic guidance.

#### Nuclear is uniquely cost-prohibitive—massive cost overruns

**USA Today 9**

USA Today, 8/1/2009, Cost overruns for reactors in the offing., www.thefreelibrary.com/Cost+overruns+for+reactors+in+the+offing.-a0206055211

The likely cost of electricity for a new generation of nuclear reactors would be 12 to 20 cents per kilowatt hour, **considerably more expensive** than the average cost of increased use of energy efficiency and renewable energies at six cents per kWh, according to a study by Mark Cooper, a senior fellow for economic analysis at the Institute of Energy and the Environment at Vermont Law School, South Royalton. The report finds that it would cost 1.9 trillion to 4.1 **trillion dollars** more over the life of 100 new nuclear reactors than it would to generate the same elecfricity from a combination of more energy efficiency and renewables.¶ Coopers analysis of more than three dozen cost estimates for proposed **new nuclear reactors** shows that the projected **price tags** for the plants **have quadrupled** since the start of the industry's so-called "Nuclear Renaissance" at the beginning of this decade, a striking parallel to the eventually sevenfold increase in reactor cost estimates that doomed the "Great Bandwagon Market" of the 1960s and 1970s, when half of the planned reactors had to be abandoned or canceled due to **massive cost overruns**.¶ The study notes that the required massive subsidies from taxpayers and ratepayers would not change the real cost of nuclear reactors; they simply would shift the risks to the public. Even with huge subsidies, nuclear reactors would remain more costly than the alternatives, such as efficiency, biomass, wind, and cogeneration.¶ "We are literally seeing nuclear reactor history repeat itself," proclaims Cooper. "The Great Bandwagon Market that ended so badly for consumers was driven by **advocates** who **confused** hope and **hype with reality**. It is telling that, in the few short years since the so-called Nuclear Renaissance began, there has been a fourfold increase in projected costs. In both time periods, the original lowball estimates were promotional, not practical,"¶ Adds former U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission member Peter Bradford: "Having government set a quota of 100 new nuclear reactors by a certain date presumes--against decades of evidence to the contrary--that politicians can pick technological winners. Such a policy combines distraction, deception, debt, and disappointment in a mixture reminiscent of other failed Federal policies in recent years."

#### Plan causes massive tradeoffs undermining the military budget

Spencer 11

research fellow in nuclear energy – Heritage, 6/22/’11

(Jack, “Capability, Not Politics, Should Drive DOD Energy Research,” http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/06/capability-not-politics-should-drive-dod-energy-research)

With multiple wars ongoing, traditional threats looming, and new ones emerging, the U.S. Armed Forces are already under tremendous stress. So introducing a new assignment that needlessly bleeds scarce resources away from core missions to advance a political agenda is untenable. Yet this is exactly what the Obama Administration is doing by ordering the military to lead a green revolution.¶ The White House is pushing the idea that the alternative energy industry would get the kick start it needs if the military will just commit to using them. But the assumptions behind this argument are flawed, and the strategy would increase demands on the military budget while harming national security. Congress should put a stop to it right away.¶ Not a Legitimate Military Mission¶ Catalyzing a commercially viable alternative energy industry is not within the military's purview. Even it if were, the federal government has a horrible track record of developing products for commercial use. In most cases, governments fund things that have no market value—hence the need for government support.

#### Resourced strategic guidance key to overall hegemony, and Asia and Middle East stability

**Barno and Bensahel 12**

David Barno, Lieutenant General, Center for a New American Security Senior Advisor and Senior Fellow, Nora Bensahel, Ph.D., CNAS Deputy Director of Studies and Senior Fellow, 1/6/12, You Can't Have It All, www.cnas.org/node/7641

On Thursday, President Barack Obama and his top defense advisers unveiled new strategic guidance to direct the U.S. military as it transitions from a decade of grueling ground wars to an era of new challenges, including a rising China and looming budget cuts. The administration has adopted what is best characterized as a "pivot but hedge" strategy: The United States will pivot to the Asia-Pacific but hedge against unexpected threats elsewhere, particularly in the greater Middle East. This new guidance makes good sense in today's world, but it assumes that the Pentagon will absorb only $487 billion in budget cuts over the next decade. **If** far **deeper cuts occur**, as required by sequestration, **the D**epartment **o**f **D**efense **will not have the resources to execute the guidance**. "**Pivot but hedge" will die in its crib**.¶ The pivot to the Asia-Pacific is essential because the region stands poised to become the centerpiece of the 21st-century global economy. By 2015, East Asian countries are expected to surpass North America and the eurozone to become the world's largest trading bloc. Market opportunities will only increase as the region swells by an additional 175 million people by 2030. As America's economic interests in the Asia-Pacific grow, its diplomatic and military presence should grow to defend against potential threats to those interests.¶ From the perspective of the United States and its Asian allies, China and North Korea represent the most serious military threats to regional security. China's military modernization continues to progress, and its foreign policy toward its neighbors has become increasingly aggressive over the past two years. Meanwhile, the death of Kim Jong Il means that nuclear-armed North Korea has begun a leadership transition that could lead to greater military aggressiveness as his son Kim Jong Un seeks to consolidate his power and demonstrate control. In light of these potential dangers, several Asian nations have asked the United States to strengthen its diplomatic and military presence in the region so it can remain the ultimate guarantor of peace and security. A bolstered U.S. presence will reassure allies who worry about American decline by clearly conveying an unwavering commitment to Asian security.¶ But while the Asia-Pacific is becoming more important, instability across the greater Middle East -- from Tunisia to Pakistan -- still makes it the most volatile region in the world. The Arab Spring unleashed a torrent of political change that has reshaped the region in previously unfathomable ways. Iran continues to pursue nuclear weapons, and it has threatened recently to close the Strait of Hormuz. Trapped in the middle of the upheaval is Israel, a permanent ally and key pillar of America's regional security strategy. Meanwhile, U.S.-Pakistan relations continue to plunge toward a nadir, lessening American influence over a nuclear-armed and terrorist-infested state that is arguably the most dangerous country in the world.¶ Amid these dangers, U.S. interests in the greater Middle East remain largely unchanged: ensuring the free flow of petroleum from a region containing 51 percent of proven global oil reserves, halting nuclear proliferation, and guarding against the diminished but still real threat of Islamist-inspired terror attacks. Protecting these interests will unquestionably require the active involvement of the U.S. military over the next 10 years and beyond, though this certainly does not mean U.S. troops will necessarily repeat the intensive counterinsurgency campaigns of the last decade.¶ The administration's new guidance tries to balance America's rightful new focus on the Asia-Pacific with the continuing reality of deep instability in other areas of the world where U.S. interests are at stake. Yet implementing this "pivot but hedge" strategy successfully depends largely on how much Congress cuts from the Pentagon's budget, something that still remains undecided at the start of a divisive presidential election year.¶ The 2011 Budget Control Act, signed as part of last summer's negotiations over raising the U.S. debt ceiling, contains spending caps that will reduce the Department of Defense's base budget (excluding ongoing war costs in Afghanistan) by at least $487 billion over 10 years, according to Pentagon estimates. This represents a decline of about 8 percent compared to current spending levels. Administration officials have repeatedly described these cuts as painful but manageable. Indeed, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta stated Thursday that these cuts require difficult choices but ultimately involve "acceptable risk."¶ Yet deeper cuts are an entirely different story. Administration officials are extremely concerned about the Budget Control Act's automatic spending reduction process known as sequestration, which was triggered in November by the failure of the deficit reduction "super committee." According to the Congressional Budget Office, this process would roughly double the cuts to the Pentagon's base budget, resulting in nearly $900 billion in total reductions. Current law requires these cuts to take effect in January 2013 unless Congress enacts new legislation that supersedes it.¶ The new guidance says little about what cuts the Department of Defense will make when it releases its fiscal year 2013 budget request next month. But the Pentagon has made clear that its new guidance and budget request assume it will absorb only $487 billion in cuts over the next 10 years. Defense officials have acknowledged that the new guidance cannot be executed if sequestration takes place. When announcing the new strategy, for instance, Panetta warned that sequestration "would force us to shed missions, commitments, and capabilities necessary to protect core U.S. national security interests."¶ Sequestration would likely require the United States to abandon its longstanding global engagement strategy and to incur far greater risk in future military operations. If sequestration occurs, the Pentagon will likely repeat past mistakes by reducing capabilities such as ground forces that provide a hedge against unexpected threats. A pivot to the Asia-Pacific might remain an executable option under these conditions, but the U.S. ability to hedge against threats elsewhere -- particularly in the volatile Middle East -- would be diminished. This is a recipe for high risk in an uncertain and dangerous world.¶ The Pentagon's new strategic guidance presents a realistic way to maintain America's status as a global superpower in the context of shrinking defense dollars. But **further cuts**, especially at the level required by sequestration, **would make this "pivot but hedge" strategy impossible to implement** **and** would **raise serious questions about whether the U**nited **S**tates **can continue to play the central role on the global stage**.

#### Asia conflict likely and goes nuclear war

Landy 2k

Landy, National Security Expert @ Knight Ridder, 3/10/’2K ¶ (Jonathan, Knight Ridder, lexis)

Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. “Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile,” said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. “We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster.” In an effort to cool the region’s tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia’s capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia \_ with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources \_ indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.

# 3rd

#### The 1ac’s failed states discourse is ahistorical. It fails as an explanatory method and entrenches inequity.

Jones 2k8

[branwen, the global political economy of social crisis: towards a critique of the failed state ideology, dept of politics Goldsmith College, review of internal political economy, 15:2, 180-205]

Three defining features of the ‘failed states’ discourse determine its ahistorical nature and inadequate explanatory power. First is the enormous proliferation of descriptive terminology. States are characterized as weak, fragile, failing, imploding, disintegrating, failed or collapsed – and the list continues. This rich array of descriptors functions in a manner which appears self-evident, acting by way of tautology to form a substitute for historically informed social analysis and explanation. Borrowing the incisive phrase of Cedric Robinson (1986: 38), the ‘failed states’ discourse is characterized by a tendency to ‘relegate history to adjectival explicatives’. Second, ‘state failure’ is characterized as being primarily of local origin. This rests on a linear conception of processes of social change, assuming an atomistic ontology of externally related like units (states). The generic form of explanation locates the causes of ‘failure’ in terms of internal agency – ‘Destructive decisions by individual leaders have almost always paved the way to state failure’ (Rotberg, 2002: 1; see also Zartman, 1995, Chapter 1) – with little serious regard to history, structure and the international. Third, the analytical/descriptive approach operates through a logic of comparison with an ideal and ahistorical notion of what ‘the state’ is or should be (Ayers, 2004; Grovogui, 2002; Mamdani, 1996). Some of the more nuanced analyses do recognize international ‘failures’, for example, of development policy (Cliffe and Luckham, 1999), but there is insufficient attention to the deeply historical and structural causes of contemporary societal conditions within neocolonial states. By absenting the history of imperial structures and practices in the very creation of conditions attributed to internal ‘state failure’, the reproduction and entrenchment of imperial structures and in- terventions is legitimized and normalized.

Failed state discourse creates perpetual others against whom to define the western norm of responsible governance.
Hill 2k5
[jonathon, beyond the other? a postcolonial critique of the failed state thesis, african identities, vol 3, no 42, p139-154, lecturer in defense studies at joint services command and staff college]

The state failure literature’s promotion of African states as the deviant Other stems from how it identifies failed states. The successful state standard constructed by this literature is based on the concept of positive sovereignty, which is in turn based on Weber’s ideal state. Although Jackson and Rosberg (1986b) are critical of Weber’s lack of exploration of the international legal dimension of territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty, it is Weber’s definition of statehood, in terms of the empirical capabilities of the dominant corporate group, that is key to distinguishing between successful and failed states. The historic model upon which Weber based his definition was ‘the classical European state, which is the model for all modern states’ (Jackson and Rosberg 1986a, p. 3). Through the adoption of this definition, the failed state literature casts the European state as the model of successful statehood. Given this, African states, failed and non-failed alike, are compared with a model of statehood that is based upon strictly European values, customs, practices, organisation and structures. Underpinning the failed state literature therefore, is a European or Western universalism. Identification of failed states is achieved through the construction of a state/failed state dichotomy built on a fixed, universal standard of what constitutes a successful state. Success is defined as the possession of certain capabilities and by the nationhood of the population of that state’s population. Western states represent the normative, universal standard of success and it is the inability of certain African states to replicate the political, economic, social and cultural conditions within Western states that has, according to the failed state literature, resulted in their failure. Even those African states not described as failed are portrayed as inauthentic and ‘ramshackle’ (Warner 2000, p. 322), as being somehow undeserving of the statehood that most of them achieved in the aftermath of the Second World War, precisely because they lack the requisite capabilities and their populations did not constitute real nations. It is the Western universalism underpinning the failed state literature that leads it to position African societies as the West’s deviant Other. The deviancy of failed states from a Western norm is further emphasised by the language, imagery and analogies used to describe them by some failed state analysts. Helman and Ratner for example liken state failure to ‘serious mental or physical illness’, to a debilitating disease that prevents the afflicted states from acting and functioning as they should (Helman and Ratner 1992—1993, p.12). Zartman similarly argues that ‘state collapse is a long-term degenerative disease’ (Zartman 1995, p.8). Such analogies are significant not only because they highlight the difference of failed states from successful states, but also because they present this difference in negative terms. More specifically, whilst successful states are represented in these analogies as all that is healthy and vigorous, failed states are portrayed as sick and decrepit. Failed states are not simply different they are abnormal in the pejorative sense. The state failure literature therefore compares and contrasts states to a static, ahistorical definition of the state based on the European state. In addition to making it Western-centric, the comparative approach to identifying failed states adopted by the state failure literature also makes it unable to adequately explain the development of individual states. Indeed, rather than explaining why the socio-political problems of an individual state have developed, this comparative approach merely highlights that African states are different from those in the First World before condemning African states for being different. States are identified as failed not by what they are, but by what they are not, namely, successful in comparison to Western states. The identification process of failed states is therefore analytically unhelpful in explaining why states are experiencing the political, economic and social problems that have resulted in their description as failed.

#### Text: the judge should vote negative to affirm the plan without the 1ac’s failed state justification.

and, this rejection of their failed state discourse is key to contest their imperial myths.

Hill 2k5
[jonathon, beyond the other? a postcolonial critique of the failed state thesis, african identities, vol 3, no 42, p139-154, lecturer in defense studies at joint services command and staff college]

Since the late 1980s, descriptions of African states as weak, quasi, failed and collapsed have become increasingly commonplace within the discipline of International Relations (IR). Such descriptions stress the supposed weaknesses and inabilities of African states compared to those of Western Europe and North America, and are made by academic writers whose works contribute to the growing body of literature dedicated to examining state failure. Despite differences between these works in focus and emphasis, they are united by a variety of shared assumptions.1 Drawing on insights gained from postcolonial studies,2 this article argues that, similar to the European colonisers of Africa of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, failed state analysts constitute the identities of African societies (failed and non-failed alike) in relation to Western societies, attributing negative characteristics to the former and positive to the latter. Moreover, again like the European colonisers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, failed state analysts use the alleged deviancy of African societies to promote and justify their political and economic domination by Western states and other international actors. This article challenges the failed state thesis by calling for a rejection of such terms as weak state, quasi state, failed state and collapsed state. This constitutes not simply a rejection of a particular set of labels which are applied to African states, but of the continued positioning of African states and societies as the deviant Other to those of Western Europe and North America.

Toward that end the article is divided into two main sections. The first part outlines what insights this article derives from postcolonial studies. To be clear, it is not being claimed that the understanding of postcolonial studies posited here is definitive. Neither is it being argued that no insights other than the ones outlined can be derived from postcolonial studies. Rather this article posits an understanding of postcolonialism and draws on only those insights relevant and useful to the task it has set itself. The second part provides an overview of the failed state thesis focusing in particular on the understanding of the state adopted by most state failure analysts and their comparative approach to identifying so-called failed states. The article concludes that only by abandoning such terms as weak state, quasi state, failed state and collapsed state can representations of African states and societies as imperfect copies of West European and North American states be countered.

# 4th

#### The Department of Defense should procure small modular nuclear reactors for use on United States’ military bases that are outside of the United States. The United States federal government should pass the March version of the Cybersecurity Act of 2012

#### Local community backlash - Even your solvency advocates admit the link is true and highly likely

Andres and Breetz 11

Richard Andres, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, and Hanna Breetz, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Small Nuclear Reactorsfor Military Installations:Capabilities, Costs, andTechnological Implications, www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf

Small reactors used on domestic military bases are ¶ likely to face a number of additional siting hurdles. As a ¶ distributed energy source, they are likely to face substantial “not-in-my-backyard” battles. Moreover, dispersing a ¶ large number of reactors leads to questions about longterm nuclear waste disposal.¶ 27¶ Arguably, reactors should be ¶ relatively safe on domestic military installations, certainly ¶ more secure than, for instance, the reactors situated in developing countries or intended for processing tar sands. ¶ Nevertheless, no issue involving nuclear energy is simple. ¶ Institutional and technical uncertainties—such as the security of sealed modules, the potential and unintended ¶ social and environmental consequences, or the design of ¶ reliable safeguards—make dispersing reactors across the ¶ country challenging. Some key issues that require consideration include securing sealed modules, determining how ¶ terrorists might use captured nuclear materials, carefully ¶ considering the social and environmental consequences of ¶ dispersing reactors, and determining whether Permissive ¶ Action Links technology could be used to safeguard them.

#### Bill gives the DHS enforcement powers that’s key to solve

Weitz 11

(Richard, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute; 4/27 “DHS Grapples with Cyber Threats” http://www.sldinfo.com/dhs-grapples-with-cyber-threats/

**The fundamental problem is that, at present, DHS has responsibility to protect all non-defense, public sector and private sector networks from cyber attack but lacks sufficient authority** to accomplish this mission. The department has broad authority within the civilian government space to set requirements for other agencies. **But DHS does not have direct enforcement authority over those departments and agencies**, which has raised issued in particular cases. For example, DHS experienced difficulty in obtaining responses regarding the scope of the Conficker worm attack from different departments and agencies. In addition, **the U.S.-CERT program which is charged with monitoring the security of civilian cyber networks does not have the enforcement authority that it needs to ensure that agencies comply with its recommendations** and mitigation guidance. U.S.-CERT also does not have the authority to compel agencies to deploy technology for determining in real time if a cyber attack is taking place. Sometimes the other agencies cannot meet DHS requirements for valid reasons, such as when they are constrained by their limited resources. But **sometimes the other agencies just ignore DHS since it is a relatively weak department that lacks a means to punish them—such as by withholding funds—for non-compliance**. According to media reports, **the White House has drafted legislation to significantly enhance DHS oversight over all civilian agency computer networks**. the 100-page document is going through interagency review. It reportedly would give DHS many, if not all, of the same authorities for the .gov networks that the Defense Department has for the .mil networks. For example, **DHS would enjoy the same broad hiring authorities as the Defense Department, including the right to make direct hires**, establish compensation rates, and pay additional benefits and incentives. Furthermore, **the draft legislation would give DHS a major role in cybersecurity-related procurements. Given the large volume of cybersecurity software purchased by the federal government, DHS could use this market power to establish and raise de facto standards in the software industry**. **The bill would also authorize the Secretary of DHS to determine what is critical infrastructure, assess audit systems for cyber resilience, and empower third-party accreditors and evaluators to assess the cybersecurity requirements of private sector owners and operators of critical information systems**. A senior accountable official would have to sign and attest that owners and operators of critical infrastructure have developed and implemented effective cybersecurity measures. Third-party evaluators would then review and cross-check these measures.

# Grid

#### There are checks on infrastructure shutdown

Hersh 10

Hersh, Pulitzer prize winning investigative journalist, 11-1-10¶ [Seymour, “The Online Threat,” http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/11/01/101101fa\_fact\_hersh?currentPage=1#ixzz13ce5kOXU,]

The most common cyber-war scare scenarios involve America’s electrical grid. Even the most vigorous privacy advocate would not dispute the need to improve the safety of the power infrastructure, but there is no documented case of an electrical shutdown forced by a cyber attack. And the cartoonish view that a hacker pressing a button could cause the lights to go out across the country is simply wrong. There is no national power grid in the United States. There are more than a hundred publicly and privately owned power companies that operate their own lines, with separate computer systems and separate security arrangements. The companies have formed many regional grids, which means that an electrical supplier that found itself under cyber attack would be able to avail itself of power from nearby systems. Decentralization, which alarms security experts like Clarke and many in the military, can also protect networks.

#### Grid breaks down all the time- means that critical power users have back-ups and we already know how to deal with blackoutsGhosh, Time, 09

(Bobby Ghosh, 4-15-09, Time, “How Vulnerable is the Power Grid?,” http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1891562,00.html)

•The most critical power users — the military, hospitals, the banking system, phone networks, Google's server farms — have multiple contingencies for uninterrupted power supply and backup generation. In the event of a cyberattack on the grid, they would be able to operate for long periods — days, weeks and, in some cases, indefinitely — without much difficulty.¶ •The power grid is far from perfect. On any given day, 500,000 Americans experience an outage, says Arshad Mansoor of the Electric Power Research Institute, which is funded by the utility industry. Why is this a good thing? Because it means the grid deals with breakdowns all the time, and the industry knows how to fix them. The grid has built-in redundancies and manual overrides that allow for restoration of supply. Mansoor is careful to point out that these are "not defenses against cyberattacks, but for dealing with the consequence of such attacks."¶ •The larger point is that in most cases, damage done to the power supply can be undone. "In the banking system, if someone hacks the system and steals information about 500,000 credit cards, it's incredibly tough to undo that damage," says Mansoor. "But if a section of the power grid goes down, we start it up again."

#### No risk of blackout- grid break up

USA Today 8-1

“Similar Blackout is unlikely in the U.S.,” USA Today page 8-1

A massive, countrywide power failure like the one in India is "extremely unlikely" in the United States, energy experts say.¶ The U.S. electricity system is segmented in three parts with safeguards to prevent an outage in one system from tripping a blackout in another, "making blackouts across the country extremely unlikely," Energy Department spokeswoman Keri Fulton said.¶ "We are much, much less at risk for something like that happening here," said Gregory Reed, a professor of electric power engineering at University of Pittsburgh. "Most of our issues have been from natural disasters." The U.S. generates more than enough electricity to meet demand and always has power in reserve, Reed said.¶ Grid operators across the USA analyze power usage and generation in real time, factoring forces such as weather, and can forecast power supply and demand by the hour, said Arshad Mansoor, senior vice president of the Electric Power Research Institute in Washington.¶ "In any large, complex interactive network, the chance of that interconnection breaking up is always there," he said.

#### Even in a shock Military still gains access

Alic ‘12,

former tech and science consultant – Office of Technology Assessment, adjunt professor – Johns Hopkins SAIS, John, “Defense Department Energy Innovation: Three Cases,” in Energy Innovation at the Department of Defense: Assessing the Opportunities, March

In any event, should serious bottlenecks in fuel supplies¶ appear, **the U**nited **S**tates **will be less vulnerable than** many¶ **other countries,** including major allies. The U.S. government¶ can expect to outbid competing customers, beginning with¶ poor countries totally dependent on imported oil and including¶ wealthy economies such as Japan that benefit from the U.S.¶ security umbrella. **So long as there is fuel to buy** (**or commandeer**,¶ in war), **DoD will be better able to afford it than** almost **any other¶ customer.** The armed forces have first claim on the Strategic¶ Petroleum Reserve. Household consumers and airlines have more¶ to fear from supply constrictions and price rises than DoD.

#### No scenario for a cut-off and the SPR solves

Green, resident scholar – AEI, 7/2/’12

(Kenneth P., “End the DoD's green energy fuelishness,” AEI)

Virtually **none of these arguments pass a laugh test.** Yes, when conventional fuels rise in price, military operating costs go up. But in a global fuel market, the market value of any liquid fuel will track with the world price of oil on an energy-content basis. Simply switching to biofuels offers no price protection in a world of fuel-fungibility. Analysts at Rand put it quite succinctly in a recent report. "Alternative liquid fuels do not offer DoD a way to appreciably reduce fuel costs."¶ As to the risk of a supply interruption, **we don't face one**: Rand further observes, while the U.S. military uses a lot of fuel, when looked at in context, it uses a tiny percentage of world, or even North American production. Its consumption is less than one-half of 1 percent of global petroleum demand. The U.S. also produces over 8 million barrels a day. "we can find **no credible scenario** in which the military would be unable to access the 340,000 bpd of fuel it needs to defend the nation," says Rand. And, of course, there's that whole **S**trategic **P**etroleum **R**eserve, which can hold 727 million barrels of oil. Let's see, 727 million divided by 340,000 ... **the SPR could power the military by itself for almost 6 years.**

# China

#### China already sold a bunch of Arms to Africa and has been for a long time

Bachrach 8-28

Judy is a contributing editor for Vanity Fair and a professor of investigative journalism at John Cabot University, “China and the U.S. Repeat History in Africa,” <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/judy-bachrach/china-and-us-repeat-history-africa>

What is the only thing every history professor believes in common? That history doesn’t repeat itself. Which is about the biggest higher education whopper of them all—just a fraction ahead of chemistry-will-actually-be-useful-to-you-someday.¶ Of course history repeats itself—constantly. Only, every once in a while the players change. Then these players, the big boys of history you might say, do exactly what their antecedents (many of them old enemies) used to do, or still do, or would like to do more of.¶ Take, for example, the front-page story from Sunday’s Washington Post indicating that China is “using its clout within the Security Council” to sell, without retribution, lots of arms to Africa. This is basically nothing new. For years now, China has been selling arms to tyrants in Zimbabwe and the Sudan and, naturally, the US is very upset about the whole thing because (a) those happen to be the tyrants the US doesn’t support and (b) why should China have all the luck?¶ However, Africa has always been the playing field—trampling ground is actually more appropriate—for the world’s big powers. During the Cold War days, it was the US and the Soviet Union that battled for supremacy: it was a fight ignited as far back as 1955 when Nikita Khrushchev, two years after succeeding Stalin, decided that an arms transfer to Nasser’s Egypt might be considered an endearing move by the Egyptian leader. (It was.)

#### Have to have 123 agreement

**Export.gov 10**

(List of government rules on exports, “123 Agreements”, <http://export.gov/civilnuclear/eg_main_022093.asp>, SEH)

**For significant nuclear exports,** **the country must have a 123 Agreement for** peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. In order for a country to enter into such an Agreement with the United States, that country must commit itself to adhering to U.S.- mandated nuclear nonproliferation norms.¶ **Significant nuclear exports include power reactors, research reactors, source and special nuclear materials** (for use as reactor fuel), **and four major components of reactors** (pressure vessels, fuel charging and discharging machines, complete control rod drive units, and primary coolant pumps).

**African conflict won’t draw in others**

**Taire ‘4**

(Morenike, April 9, Vanguard (Nigeria), Global News Wire – Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, p. Lexis)

Defining our role may not have to be as difficult as it might first seem. In the first instance, **in spite of Libya feat in WMD technology,** borrowed and invented, and despite the feat of others who, like Libya, has flirted and romanced with terrorism in the past, **it is unlikely that Africa would be in a position to involve itself in any conflicts with** any **States outside its own shores. She does not have the technology, and might have trouble summoning the collective will.** And so while America grapples with impending energy troubles or rumours of it and Europe battles with the European Union, **Africa** battles with hunger, and pretty much everything else that **has ceased to be of any significance to anyone in the first world.** It was Sting, appropriately enough, who’d coined the lyrics and sang the song: “We have just one world, but we live in different ones”. Indeed, we do. Unfortunately, we live, also, in perpetual danger of being sucked into the faster, more complicated vortex of the worlds of others. We can no longer be calm, cool and collected.

#### No Asian conflict

**Kato ‘8**

(Yoichi, bureau chief of the American General Bureau of the Asahi Shimbun, “Return from 9/11 PTSD to Global Leader,” Washington Quarterly, Fall 2008, lexis)

**The challenges that** the **Asia** Pacific **will face** in the foreseeable future **will not** likely **require the** actual **use of force** **or will** likely **be low intensity if they do. Both major** potential **flashpoints--**North Korea and the Taiwan Strait--**are showing a decline in tension.** North Korea has recently provided a report of its nuclear facilities, although the contents have turned out to be far from satisfactory to other members of the six-party talks and the path to final denuclearization is not yet clear. Taiwan has elected a new president, Ma Ying-jeou, who has demonstrated more willingness for and flexibility in working with mainland China; and as a result, **cross-strait tension has substantially declined.** Chinahas been continuing its military buildup and has engaged in some provocative actions, such as its January 2007 antisatellite test, but it has not shown any intention to challenge U.S. supremacy openly in the immediate future. For the time being, especially with the Beijing Olympic Games this year and the Shanghai World Exposition in 2010, it is widely speculated that **China will concentrate on** the **peaceful growth** of its economy **while avoiding** any **military adventurism** against the United States.

**Takes years after development to export SMR’s**

Kessides & Kuznetov 8-14

Ioannis is with the Development Group at the World Bank and Vladimir is a Consultant with the World Bank, “Small Modular Reactors for Enhancing Energy Security in Developing Countries,” <http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/4/8/1806/htm>

The generally acknowledged challenge for SMRs is to provide levelized unit electricity cost that is competitive with comparable base-load electricity generation sources in a user country. However, aside from this important economic challenge, SMRs may face other deployment challenges in developing countries. These potential issues include:¶ • Proven technology requirements by developing countries suggest that several units of the plant should have a proven operating experience of 3-5 years. All current SMRs designs are expected to be deployed first in their countries of origin or in another developed technology holder country. Such plants would need to operate for several years before they are offered for export to developing countries.

#### Material in SMR easily becomes weapons grade

Bourget 11

(Remy, Brown University student majoring in Middle Eastern Studies and International Relations, with a focus on Global Security. Intern at Center for Advanced Defense Studies, “Small Modular Reactors: Opportunity for Global Leadership and Innovation” Center for Advanced Defense Studies, 7/1/11, <http://www.c4ads.org/global-security-monitor/small-modular-reactors-opportunity-global-leadership-and-innovation>, SEH)

Proliferation is another important security concern, and there are two opposing views in the SMR debate. Some claim that because thorium is not a fissile material and there is only low-grade uranium used to start the fission reaction, the Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactor model will avoid many of the security and proliferation concerns associated with traditional reactors. Ninety percent enriched uranium is needed for weapons, but only 20% (at most) would be used in the thorium reactions. Other scientists dispute this claim, saying that it is relatively easy to enrich uranium from 20% to 90%, which is weapons-grade.

**East Asian Hegemony Impossible- Counterbalancing**

**Green ’12**

Michael is an associate professor of international relations at Georgetown University. He is also a senior adviser and holds the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “China Periphery: Implications for U.S. Policy and Interests,” Foreign Policy Research Institution

**In recent years scholars and policy planners have asserted three possible ¶ scenarios for the future of Asian regional order. The first,** which was common ¶ in the mid-1990s but has largely disappeared, **is the idea of enduring U.S.¶ unipolarity.** For Asia, the high water mark of this brief post-Cold War unipolar ¶ moment was the ’97-’98 financial crisis, when the Clinton administration and the ¶ International Monetary Fund (IMF) tried to impose the so-called “Washington ¶ Standard” of strict market-based conditionality on the emergency economic ¶ stabilization packages to Indonesia, Thailand and Korea. In response, **leading ¶ officials and scholars within Japan, China, Korea and the Association of Southeast ¶ Asian Nations (ASEAN) began challenging the universality of “Western” economic ¶ principles and posited a competing development model based on “Asian values**.” ¶ I Instructively for Beijing today, ASEAN reached out to Tokyo and Beijing to impose ¶ an influence cost on the United States, something we now see member states doing ¶ to China as Beijing overplays its hand. T**he blowback from the clash over economic ¶ ideology in the ’97-98 financial crisis continues to this day, manifest in the Chiang ¶ Mai Initiative, the ASEAN Plus Three free tr**ade talks, and other regional forums ¶ that were deliberately conceived as a counterbalance to U.S. economic ideological ¶ hegemony. **Fifteen years later, of course, the dynamic within the region is very ¶ different, and while the regional reaction to a sudden shift in the distribution of ¶ power after the Cold War was instructive, few expect a return of American ¶ unipolarity, even if it was only a matter of perceptions in the first place.**

#### U.S. influence in Asia is high now- Japan and

**Green ’12**

Michael is an associate professor of international relations at Georgetown University. He is also a senior adviser and holds the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “China Periphery: Implications for U.S. Policy and Interests,” Foreign Policy Research Institution

Much as the United States suffered setbacks in the wake of the 1997-98 ¶ financial crisis, **Beijing is now reaping the rewards for its unilateralism, but in ways ¶ that pull the United States in to Asia**, rather than limiting China’s engagement. **The ¶ Japanese government**, after briefly flirting with moving closer to Beijing to counter ¶ U.S. influence under the loopy and hapless first Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) ¶ government of Yukio Hatoyama, has **now moved the U.S.-Japan alliance squarely ¶ back to the center of its Asia strategy. ASEAN has as well, welcoming** President ¶ **Obama to his first East Asia Summit** in November 2011, **while the Philippines, ¶ Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam expand security ties with the United States. South ¶ Korea has expanded Naval and Marine Corps exercises** with the United States in the ¶ West Sea, **and Australia is ready to accept a new U.S. Marine Corps base near ¶ Darwin**. To be sure, **China’s missteps have created opportunities for expanded ¶ engagement**, captured in Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s description of a U.S. ¶ “pivot” to Asia.9

**Chinese Prolif leadership is good- they follow norms and don’t give sensitive tech away**

**Boutin ’11**

J.D. Kenneth is a lecturer in international relations at the School of International and Political Studies at Deakin University in Geelong, Victoria, Australia, “Changing the Guard? China and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation,” Asian Politics & Policy Volume 3, Issue 3, pages 349–364, July 2011

China has had a difficult relationship with the nuclear nonproliferation regime. This has been due in part to generally negative Chinese attitudes toward multilateralism in the past. China was a relatively late recruit to multilateralism. It only gradually broadened its participation in multilateral processes after it took up a seat in the United Nations in 1971, and for some time was not a constructive contributor. China's leaders long displayed a marked preference for unilateral and bilateral foreign policy approaches, and even now often prefer directly engaging other major powers where important policy issues are concerned. China's approach to multilateralism has been characterized as “conditional” as a result of these features (Yuan, 1997, p. 81). China's perspective on multilateralism was conditioned by negative experiences in dealing with the international community from the time of its abrupt introduction into the Eurocentric world order in the mid-19th century until well after the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, and by the perception that multilateral mechanisms were dominated by states hostile to China's interests. This has left a legacy of distrust of international institutions and a heightened sensitivity over sovereignty, which has been manifest in China's sustained support for the principle of nonintervention in the international system (Medeiros, 2009, p. 254).¶ China was particularly reluctant to engage in multilateralism where security issues were involved. This wariness extended to nonproliferation. China's leaders were quite dismissive of multilateral nonproliferation initiatives, though they did not eschew them altogether. While China acknowledged the importance of and expressed strong support for the principle of nonproliferation, particularly in regard to WMDs, it simultaneously voiced strong concerns over what it regarded as the lack of objectivity of nonproliferation mechanisms (Chu & Rong, 2008, p. 178). Chinese authorities had particular reservations regarding transparency and intrusive verification measures such as on-site inspections (OSIs). Transparency, for example, has been seen in China as a useful instrument for helping to build trust between states, but which should not reveal information that was unavailable (Yuan, 1997, pp. 93–95). China began to participate in the multilateral nonproliferation processes in the late 1970s but provided little support for existing initiatives, preferring instead to offer proposals of its own that it made little effort to develop (Yuan, 2008, p. 56). China was itself the subject of considerable nonproliferation concern for many years due to its apparent willingness to export arms in violation of generally agreed-upon embargoes to conflict zones and on particular types of arms. China served as a “supplier of last resort” to a number of “pariah” states and was suspected of transferring nuclear weapons technologies to Pakistan. China constituted one of the targets of Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control technology controls during the Cold War as a result. Concern over Chinese assistance to horizontal nuclear proliferation now centers around the role of Chinese firms rather than the Chinese government (see, e.g., British Broadcasting Corporation, 2010).¶ The transformation of China's position with respect to multilateralism has been gradual but substantial (Kuik, 2008, pp. 113–119). Chinese authorities have adopted a much more positive view of the contribution of international institutions to Chinese security. Not only have they demonstrated a strong interest in working within the existing framework of the international system, but **China has emerged as a strong supporter of established multilateral processes at the regional and global levels. Chinese authorities** have embraced the “spirit” of multilateralism as they **have deepened** China's **participation in multilateral processes and now are far more accepting of the norms involved** (see Dobson, 2008, p. 193).¶ **China's approach to multilateralism in the area of nonproliferation has mirrored this general trend**, even if it has developed more slowly. Since the 1990s, **China has expanded both the range and the degree of its participation in multilateral nuclear nonproliferation mechanisms. China joined the NPT in 1992, signed the CTBT in 1996, joined the Zangger Committee (also known as the NPT Exporters Committee) in 1997, and became a member of the NSG in 2004**. In addition, **China engages and informally adheres in part to the export guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime** and Wassenaar Arrangement, without having formally joined them (see Yuan, 2006, pp. 41–43; Yuan, 2008, pp. 57–59, for useful overviews of the evolution of China's engagement of multilateral nonproliferation processes). **Also noteworthy is China's contribution to the** work of the International Atomic Energy Agency **(IAEA),** which oversees the implementation of the NPT, including through seconding personnel to it. **China also** contributed personnel to United Nations Special Commission inspections of Iraq following the Gulf War of 1990–1991 and **has played a crucial role in the Six-Party Talks process designed to address the nuclear weapons program of the DPRK,** though this is more multinational than multilateral. As one study notes, **China “shifted from being ‘part of the problem’ to ‘part of the solution’** ” to the problem of proliferation (Chu & Rong, 2008, p. 177).1¶ **The seriousness of China's commitment to nuclear nonproliferation has been demonstrated by** its instituting the domestic regulatory measures necessary to support its multilateral commitments. This involves the development of a **national safeguards system for its nuclear facilities and material to verify that there has been no diversion of civil nuclear resources to the development or production of nuclear weapons** or other nuclear explosive devices, as required of all states' parties by Article III.1 of the NPT, **and establishing a national export control regime for sensitive nuclear equipment, materials, and technologies to ensure that it does not contribute to horizontal nuclear proliferation** (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2005).¶ The progressive development of the national basis of support for the nuclear nonproliferation regime by China is significant in another crucial respect. The transformation of China's approach to aspects of the nuclear nonproliferation regime that formerly were viewed with some concern demonstrates that it is embracing the norms as well as the practices of multilateralism in this issue area, which, like all those that impact security, remain sensitive to Chinese authorities. In fact, **China has demonstrated the depth of its commitment to and support for the nuclear nonproliferation** regime **by subjecting itself to a far higher level of verification than it is required to under the NPT.** China did this by signing the IAEA's Additional Protocol in 2002 (Yuan, 2008, p. 59). This complement to a comprehensive safeguards agreement commits China to a far more extensive verification regime intended to address the issue of undeclared as well as declared nuclear activities and materials (IAEA, n.d.).¶ It is noteworthy that China's commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation regime continued to deepen despite the negative environment engendered by a number of American policies pursued under President George W. Bush. The American approach to multilateralism during his term in office was of great concern to Chinese authorities (Kent, 2008, pp. 65–66). The actions of the United States that were poorly received in China included the American withdrawal from the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (commonly referred to as the ABM Treaty) in 2002, its withdrawal of formal support for the CTBT, and the negotiating of the United States-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative–Bilateral Agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation (Chu & Rong, 2008, p. 179). These concerns have been reinforced by the American National Missile Defense program, which as well as being widely regarded in China as directed against it, has considerable potential to encourage further horizontal nuclear proliferation (Graham & LaVera, 2002, pp. 240–241). The Chinese government stated in 2008 that this “global missile defense program will . . . have a negative impact on the process of nuclear disarmament” (Zhang, 2010, p. 149). The adoption of a more positive approach to nonproliferation multilateralism under President Obama will help to assuage Chinese concerns, but some aspects of American nonproliferation policy remain questionable from a Chinese perspective.¶ While a number of issues—such as perceived general American efforts to dominate and circumvent multilateral nonproliferation mechanisms, the American emphasis on counter-proliferation, and its missile defense program—had and in some cases still have considerable potential to reinforce established Chinese suspicions of multilateralism, this has not resulted in a reversion to China's former approach to the nonproliferation regime. Chinese authorities continue to harbor some reservations about the regime where issues of objectivity and the rules of engagement of suspected or confirmed proliferators are concerned, and they send mixed signals on nonproliferation on occasion as a result. China remains a less enthusiastic supporter of the imposition of sanctions on actual or suspected proliferators than many other states, but in a remarkable policy transformation, China emerged as a supporter of the nuclear nonproliferation regime in the face of considerable internal threats to its integrity and effectiveness. This demonstrates the importance of multilateral nonproliferation instruments to the Chinese government and the depth of its commitment to this approach.

# Solvency

#### Decade before solvency

St. Louis Post-Dispatch ‘12

[Jeffrey Tomich, <http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/business/2012/05/10/small-problem.html> ETB]

For all the hype, small reactors are still at least a decade away. And that’s if design, licensing and commercial development go at the pace hoped for by the nuclear industry.¶ And even then, the potential for small reactors hinges on how they compete in the energy marketplace. More than concerns about nuclear safety in the wake of the Fukushima disaster in Japan or the problem of where to dispose of highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel, the technology’s future will be dictated by economics.¶ Jackson said Westinghouse aspires to make small reactors whose costs are equal to or less than full-size reactors.¶ For now, there’s no cost data for small reactors and no firm evidence they will produce electricity at a lower price than larger plants.¶ “It’s too early to determine that,” Klein said. “We’re going to have to see some built.”