# 1NC

## T/New Affs

### New Affs

#### Interpretation: When you break a new aff you must disclose the aff and advantages.

#### Vote Negative

#### 1 Fairness- Key to prevent affirmatives from breaking hundres of affs that cannot survive 45 minutes of pre round work.

#### 2 Education- Allows negative to prepare Advantage CP’s and strategies beyond generic agent CP’s.

## 2nd

### Shell

#### Primary energy production means the increase must be a net generation increase

Energici 12 (provides business intelligence and decision support services to companies and investors active in the wind, solar, hydro, geothermal and bioenergy industries. Specializes in providing robust research, analysis and intelligence coverage of trends and developments) February “PRIMARY ENERGY PRODUCTION (MONTHLY)” http://www.energici.com/energy-profiles/by-country/europe-m-z/sweden/49-countries/north-america/usa/usa-geothermal/449-primary-energy-production

Definition : Primary Energy Production is the amount of energy converted from a primary energy source in its natural state, such as coal, gas, wind etc. that has not been subjected to any conversion or transformation process. The U.S. Energy Information Administration includes the following in U.S. primary energy production: coal production, waste coal supplied, and coal refuse recovery; crude oil and lease condensate production; natural gas plant liquids production; dry natural gas—excluding supplemental gaseous fuels—production; nuclear electricity net generation\*, conventional hydroelectricity\* (not hydro pumped storage), geothermal electricity\*, solar thermal and photovoltaic electricity\*, wind electricity\*, wood and wood-derived fuels consumption; biomass waste consumption and biofuels feedstock.

#### Vote Negative

#### 1 Limits- Allows any conversion aff like CTL, CCS, Reprocessing and Refinaries.

#### 2 Ground- Spike links to current energy by saying they make it better.

## 3rd

### Procurement

### Shell

**Purchase Agreements are not financial incentives**

**Czinkota 2009 -** Associate Professor at the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University (Michael, Fundamentals of International Business, p. 69)

**Financial incentives offer special funding for the investor by providing, for example**, land or buildings, **loans, and loan guarantees. Non financial incentives include guaranteed government purchases, special protection** from competition **through tariffs, import quotas**, and local content requirements, **and investments in infrastructure facilities**.

#### Vote Negative

#### 1 Limits- Allows large regulatory programs like FITS and RPS.

#### 2 Ground- Spike solvency claims by guaranteeing a market and allow small agency Procurement which spikes politics..

## 4th

### Security

#### The affirmative’s call to SECURITY only reifies insecurity

Dillon and Reid 2K0

Professor of Politics at the University of Lancaster and lecturer in international relations at Kings College in London, 2000 [Michael and Julian, Alternatives vol. 25, issue 1, spring, EbscoHost]

As a precursor to global governance, governmentality, according to Foucault's initial account, poses the question of order not in terms of the origin of the law and the location of sovereignty, as do traditional accounts of power, but in terms instead of the management of population. The management of population is further refined in terms of specific problematics to which population management may be reduced. These typically include but are not necessarily exhausted by the following topoi of governmental power: economy, health, welfare, poverty, security, sexuality, demographics, resources, skills, culture, and so on. Now, where there is an operation of power there is knowledge, and where there is knowledge there is an operation of power. Here discursive formations emerge and, as Foucault noted, ¶ in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality.[ 34] ¶ More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations.¶ Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. ¶ Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failure—the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35] ¶ Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it.

#### The 1AC cause a violent state that leads to extinction

Agamben 2K2,

[ Professor of Philosophy at the Collège International de Philosophie in Paris, [Giorgio, Theory & Event 5:4, ProjectMuse]

Security as the basic principle of state politics dates back to the birth of the modern state. Hobbes already mentions it as the opposite of the fear which compels human beings to unite and form a society together. But not until the 18th century does the paradigm of security reach its fullest development. In an unpublished lecture at the Collège de France in 1978, Michel Foucault showed how in the political and economic practice of the Physiocrats security opposes discipline and the law as instruments of governance.¶ Neither Turgot and Quesnay nor the Physiocratic officials were primarily concerned with the prevention of famine or the regulation of production, but rather wanted to allow for their development in order to guide and "secure" their consequences. While disciplinary power isolates and closes off territories, measures of security lead to an opening and globalisation; while the law wants to prevent and prescribe, security wants to intervene in ongoing processes to direct them. In a word, discipline wants to produce order, while security wants to guide disorder. Since measures of security can only function within a context of freedom of traffic, trade, and individual initiative, Foucault can show that the development of security coincides with the development of liberal ideology.¶ Today we are facing extreme and most dangerous developments of this paradigm of security. In the course of a gradual neutralisation of politics and the progressive surrender of traditional tasks of the state, security imposes itself as the basic principle of state activity. What used to be one among several decisive measures of public administration until the first half of the twentieth century, now becomes the sole criterion of political legitimation. Security reasoning entails an essential risk. A state which has security as its only task and source of legitimacy is a fragile organism; it can always be provoked by terrorism to turn itself terroristic.¶ We should not forget that the first major organisation of terror after the war, the Organisation de l'Armée Secrète (OAS) was established by a French General who thought of himself as patriotic and who was convinced that terrorism was the only answer to the guerilla phenomenon in Algeria and Indochina. When politics, the way it was understood by theorists of the "Polizeiwissenschaft" in the eighteenth century, reduces itself to police, the difference between state and terrorism threatens to disappear. In the end it may lead to security and terrorism forming a single deadly system in which they mutually justify and legitimate each others' actions.¶ The risk is not merely the development of a clandestine complicity of opponents but that the hunt for security leads to a worldwide civil war which destroys all civil coexistence. In the new situation -- created by the end of the classical form of war between sovereign states -- security finds its end in globalisation: it implies the idea of a new planetary order which is, in fact, the worst of all disorders. But there is yet another danger. Because they require constant reference to a state of exception, measures of security work towards a growing depoliticization of society. In the long run, they are irreconcilable with democracy.¶ Nothing is therefore more important than a revision of the concept of security as the basic principle of state politics. European and American politicians finally have to consider the catastrophic consequences of uncritical use of this figure of thought. It is not that democracies should cease to defend themselves, but the defense of democracy demands today a change of political paradigms and not a world civil war which is just the institutionalization of terror. Maybe the time has come to work towards the prevention of disorder and catastrophe, and not merely towards their control. Today, there are plans for all kinds of emergencies (ecological, medical, military), but there is no politics to prevent them. On the contrary, we can say that politics secretly works towards the production of emergencies. It is the task of democratic politics to prevent the development of conditions which lead to hatred, terror, and destruction -- and not to reduce itself to attempts to control them once they occur.

#### ALTERNATIVE: VOTE NEGATIVE. ONLY TOTALLY ESCHEWING THE LOGIC OF SECURITY SOLVES.

NEOCLEOUS 2K8.

[Mark, Professor of Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University (UK), “Critique of Security.” Pg. 185-186]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether – to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favor of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that cannot be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalizes all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritizing of a mythical security as a political end – as the political end – constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible – that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics, dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more ‘sectors’ to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimizes state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text *Critical Security Studies*, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: there is no hole. The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilized or gendered or humanized or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up re-affirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding ‘more security’ (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitizing of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centered on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipator in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognizing that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognizing that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that ‘securitizing’ an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.

## 5th

### Immigration

#### Immigration will pass

Washington Times 3-28

“Immigration Bill Agreement Very Close; Guest Workers Still a Hurdle for Business, Labor Leaders,” lexis

Members of the "Gang of Eight" tasked with carving out a comprehensive immigration package said Wednesday that they hope to file a bill when they return to Washington from their Easter break, and suggested that they are on the verge of a deal between business and labor leaders on visas for low-skilled workers.¶ The high-profile immigration talks stalled out last week when the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the AFL-CIO failed to agree on the details of a proposed guest-worker program, a snag that has bogged down ongoing negotiations.¶ But after touring the border on Wednesday, Democrats Sens. Charles E. Schumer of New York and Michael F. Bennet of Colorado, as well as Sens. John McCain and Jeff Flake, both Arizona Republicans, sounded optimistic about their chances of filing a bill next month.¶ "Bottom line, we're very close," Mr. Schumer told reporters. "I'd say we're 90 percent there. We have a few little problems, we've been on the phone all day with our four other colleagues."¶

**PC Key**

**Foley 1/15** Elise is a writer @ Huff Post Politics. “Obama Gears Up For Immigration Reform Push In Second Term,” 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/15/obama-immigration-reform\_n\_2463388.html

**Obama** has repeatedly said he **will push hard for immigration reform in his second term**, and administration officials have said that other contentious legislative initiatives -- including **gun control and the debt ceiling -- won't be allowed to get in the way.** At least at first glance, **he seems to have politics on his side**. GOP lawmakers are entering -- or, in some cases, re-entering -- the immigration debate in the wake of disastrous results for their party's presidential nominee with Latino voters, who support reform by large measures. **Based on those new political realities, "it would be a suicidal impulse for Republicans in Congress to continue to block [reform],**" David Axelrod, a longtime adviser to the president, told The Huffington Post.¶ Now **there's the question of how Obama gets there.** While confrontation might work with Republicans on other issues -- the debt ceiling, for example -- the consensus is that the GOP is serious enough about reform that **the president** can, and **must, play the role of broker and statesman to get a deal.¶** It starts with a lesson from his first term. Republicans have demanded that the border be secured first, before other elements of immigration reform. Yet the administration has been by many measures the strictest ever on immigration enforcement, and devotes massive sums to policing the borders. The White House has met many of the desired metrics for border security, although there is always more to be done, but Republicans are still calling for more before they will consider reform. Enforcing the border, but not sufficiently touting its record of doing so, the White House has learned, won't be enough to win over Republicans.¶ In a briefing with The Huffington Post, a senior administration official said the White House believes it has met enforcement goals and must now move to a comprehensive solution. **The administration is highly skeptical of claims from Republicans that immigration reform can or should be done in a piecemeal fashion.** Going down **that road**, the White House worries, **could** result in passage of the less politically complicated pieces, such as an enforcement mechanism and high-skilled worker visas, while **leaving out** more contentious items such as **a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants.**¶ "Enforcement is certainly part of the picture," the official said. "But if you go back and look at the 2006 and 2007 bills, if you go back and look at John McCain's 10-point 'This is what I've got to get done before I'm prepared to talk about immigration,' and then you look at what we're actually doing, it's like 'check, check, check.' We're there. The border is as secure as it's been in a generation or two, so it's really time."¶ **One key in the second term, advocates say, will be convincing skeptics** such as Republican Sen. John Cornyn of Texas that the Obama administration held up its end of the bargain by proving a commitment to enforcement. **The White House also needs to convince GOP lawmakers that there's support from their constituents for immigration reform**, which could be aided by conservative evangelical leaders and members of the business community who are pushing for a bill.¶ Immigrant advocates want more targeted deportations that focus on criminals, while opponents of comprehensive immigration reform say there's too little enforcement and not enough assurances that reform wouldn't be followed by another wave of unauthorized immigration. The Obama administration has made some progress on both fronts, but some advocates worry that the president hasn't done enough to emphasize it. The latest deportation figures were released in the ultimate Friday news dump: mid-afternoon Friday on Dec. 21, a prime travel time four days before Christmas.¶ Last week, the enforcement-is-working argument was bolstered by a report from the nonpartisan Migration Policy Institute, which found that the government is pouring more money into its immigration agencies than the other federal law-enforcement efforts combined. There are some clear metrics to point to on the border in particular, and Doris Meissner, an author of the report and a former commissioner of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, said she hopes putting out more information can add to the immigration debate.¶ "I've been surprised, frankly, that the administration hasn't done more to lay out its record," she said, adding the administration has kept many of its metrics under wraps.¶ There are already lawmakers working on a broad agreement. Eight senators, coined the gang of eight, are working on a bipartisan immigration bill. It's still in its early stages, but nonmembers of the "gang," such as Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) are also talking about reform.¶ It's still unclear what exact role **the president** will play, but sources say he **does plan to lead on the issue.** Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.), the top Democrat on the House immigration subcommittee, said the White House seems sensitive to the fact that **Republicans and Democrats need to work out the issue in Congress** -- no one is expecting a fiscal cliff-style arrangement jammed by leadership -- while keeping the president heavily involved.

#### Even with CCS CTL is political unpopular

Höök and Aleklett ‘10

(Mikael Höök and Kjell Aleklett, Uppsala University, Global Energy Systems, Department of physics and astronomy “A review on coal to liquid fuels and its coal consumption” 2010 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/er.1596>, TSW)

In addition, the social and environmental impacts of large scale development of CTL must be considered. The political challenge of becoming very reliant on such a carbon dioxide-intensive fuel as coal is a major obstacle for many countries where greenhouse gas emissions are an important issue. Even if CCS and/or low emission CTL-technologies are implemented, the vast required coal amounts will create serious environmental impact due to mining. Obtaining public acceptance, and later political acceptance, for CTL might become challenging because of its unavoidable environmental impact.

**Legalization solves the deficit**

**Tucker 10**

Cynthia is a columnist for The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. “We need immigrants to help pay the deficit,” Nov 19, http://blogs.ajc.com/cynthia-tucker/2010/11/19/we-need-immigrants-to-help-pay-the-deficit/

Recommendations for taming the deficit include raising the retirement age, raising the federal gas tax and ending the mortgage interest deduction for homeowners. Ouch!¶ But there is a palliative that would ease the pain: Put 11 million illegal immigrants on a path to legalization. And don’t touch birthright citizenship!¶ Yes, you heard that right: Granting legal residency to illegal immigrants will eventually help **sop up some of the federal budget’s red ink. I know that’s counterintuitive since so many citizens have come to believe that Mexican landscapers and Guatemalan maids are a drain on the treasury. But the fact is that their relative youth is just what the U.S. economy needs.**¶ **The explosion of the long-term deficit is largely the consequence of an aging population, with more retirees depending on taxes from fewer workers**. While the recession, two unfunded wars and Bush-era tax cuts fueled the immediate deficit, a tsunami of long-term red ink will swamp the budget in about ten years, as a massive wave of baby boomers leaves the workplace.¶ So we need as many younger workers as we can find to help support the coming crush of senior citizens. The U.S. is lucky enough to have a higher birthrate than many other Westernized democracies, even among native-born women. Immigrants are an added demographic bonus.¶ “When some people think of immigrants, they think of people coming in and immediately absorbing our resources,” said Emory economist Jeffrey Rosensweig. “**Most immigrants come here to work. They’re young workers, and they’re paying taxes.” Why not add all of them to the federal tax rolls?**

**Long Term Deficit kills hegemony causes nuclear war**

**Khalilzad 11**

Zalmay Khalilzad, the United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United Nations during the presidency of George W. Bush and the director of policy planning at the Defense Department from 1990 to 1992, February 8, 2011, “The Economy and National Security; If we don’t get our economic house in order, we risk a new era of multi-polarity,” online: <http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad>

**Without faster economic growth and actions to reduce deficits**, publicly held national debt is projected to reach dangerous proportions. If interest rates were to rise significantly, annual **interest payments — which already are larger than the defense budget — would crowd out other spendin**g or require substantial tax increases that would undercut economic growth. Even worse, if unanticipated events trigger what economists call a “sudden stop” in credit markets for U.S. debt, the United States would be unable to roll over its outstanding obligations, precipitating a sovereign-**debt crisis that would almost certainly compel a radical retrenchment of the United States internationally.**¶ **Such scenarios would reshape the international order**. It was the economic devastation of Britain and France during World War II, as well as the rise of other powers, that led both countries to relinquish their empires. In the late 1960s, British leaders concluded that they lacked the economic capacity to maintain a presence “east of Suez.” Soviet economic weakness, which crystallized under Gorbachev, contributed to their decisions to withdraw from Afghanistan, abandon Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and allow the Soviet Union to fragment. If the U.S. debt problem goes critical, the United States would be compelled to retrench, reducing its military spending and shedding international commitments.¶ We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China, India, and Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic problems, their economies are growing faster than ours, and this could alter the global distribution of power. These trends could in the long term produce a multi-polar world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. **The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation.**¶ **The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars** among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars.¶ American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, **regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict.** Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions.¶ As rival powers rise, Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition. Beijing’s economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities. China’s strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China’s expansive territorial claims — and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, **the United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression.**

## Coal

**Will approve- draft**

**Business Monitor 3-28**

“Draft Department Report Supports Keystone XL,” lexis

**One of the key determin ants of the US State Department's draft environmental impact assessment of the Keystone XL pipeline** is that Canada's energy-intensive and greenhouse gas emissions-heavy oil sands development **will proceed with or without the construction of Keystone XL**. This assessment, which is based o n the fact that railways and other transportation methods are increasingly being used to move Canadian crude to market, has directly challenged one of the environmental lobby's key arguments a gainst the pipeline ( see our online service , November 20 2012, 'New Railway Line Hopes To Bypass Regulatory Roadblocks To Export Heavy Crude' ) .¶ Indeed, one of the environmental lobby's core arguments has been that, without the Keystone XL pipeline, a significant midstream bottleneck will occur and therefore disincentivize oil sands development. Importantly, the State Department's report also argues that the existence of the pipeline will have little impact on American consumption of heavy crude.¶ In our judgement, **this draft environmental impact assessment ha**s, ceteris paribus , **increased the likelihood that the Keystone XL pipeline will be approved by** the **Obama** administration later this year ( see 'New Interior Secretary To Oversee Major US Energy Policy Debates,' February 7, 2013 ) .

**Coal regulations key to keystone**

**CQ Weekly 2-25**

“Obama Faces Pressure on Keystone XL,”

Supporters argue that the project would create thousands of jobs and ensure a stable oil supply from a friendly neighbor. The Canadians will develop the tar sands anyway, the argument goes, and simply ship the oil off to Asia if the United States doesn’t want it. Obama also faces diplomatic pressure from America’s biggest trading partner.¶ **Obama’s track record suggests he will try to find some way to cut the Gordian knot, possibly by imposing new limits on emissions at existing power plants and oil refineries while also allowing the pipeline**. He already has promised to build on earlier actions, including limits on emissions by new power plants.¶ **Restricting the emissions at existing coal-burning plants tops the regulatory wish list for environmentalists.** The EPA says these plants produced about one-third of all domestic emissions of greenhouse gases in 2011. A court settlement also requires the agency to impose greenhouse gas limits on oil refineries, the third-largest emissions source in 2011, although earlier deadlines have slipped.

**No Keystone collapse U.S.-China Relations**

**Tu, 12** – Carnegie Energy program senior associate

[Kevin, "China Should be Cautious about the Canadian Oil Sands," Carnegie Endowment, 2-10-12, carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/10/china-should-be-cautious-about-canadian-oil-sands, accessed 2-10-13, mss]

On February 7, the Canadian prime minister, Stephen Harper, arrived in Beijing for a five-day visit that focused on expanding trade links between Canada and China. Before Harper’s trip, the Obama administration rejected TransCanada’s initial Keystone XL pipeline application, saying that the "rushed and arbitrary deadline" set by congressional Republicans would prevent a full review of the pipeline’s environmental impacts. The pipeline would eventually have moved about 700 thousand barrels per day of carbon-intensive synthetic crude and diluted bitumen from Alberta’s oil sands deposits to oil refineries along the U.S. Gulf Coast. Given that 99 percent of Canadian oil exports are destined for the U.S. market, the Obama administration’s decision is a big blow to the ambitious oil-sands-development agenda set by the conservative Canadian government. To diversify its oil exports away from the U.S. market, Harper promptly turned to Enbridge's plan for the construction of the Northern Gateway pipeline. That pipeline would move synthetic crude and bitumen from Edmonton in Alberta to the west coast of Canada—and then it could be shipped directly to China. The export of Canadian oil sands output was thus a key issue underlying Harper’s visit to China. Oil sands consist of a naturally occurring mixture of bitumen, sand, clay, or other minerals and water. Alberta's total oil sands reserves amount to the equivalent of 169.3 billion barrels of crude, which means Canada has the third-largest proven oil reserves worldwide, ranking only behind Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Compared to conventional oil extraction, oil sands development is not only technologically more sophisticated but also more energy intensive. Nevertheless, recent spikes in global crude oil prices and technological breakthroughs in oil sands extraction and processing have led to an increase in Canada’s oil sands output from 0.61 million barrels per day in 2000 to 1.47 million barrels per day in 2010. According to the most recent forecast by the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, Canada’s oil sands output could be as high as 3.73 million barrels per day by 2025. Since China first became a net oil importer in 1993, its national oil consumption has grown rapidly at an average of 6.5 percent annually, making the country the world’s second-largest oil consumer after the United States. In comparison, China’s oil output has increased at an average annual rate of only 2 percent during the same period. As a result, China has become increasingly reliant on imported oil, currently depending on imported oil to meet more than half of its oil demand. Furthermore, as China sources most of its oil imports from politically unstable countries in the Middle East and Africa, energy security has become an increasingly imperative policy challenge for Chinese decisionmakers. Considering the complementary nature of the two country’s energy sectors, at first glance Harper’s exporting proposal seems like a win-win initiative for both China and Canada. The Northern Gateway pipeline is designed to provide a crude oil export capacity of 525 thousand barrels per day, which could ultimately be expanded to 850 thousand barrels per day. The completion of the pipeline could not only reduce Canada’s overreliance on the U.S. market, but also help China diversify its oil supply. An additional advantage for China is Canada’s stable political and transparent regulatory environment, which makes large-scale imports from Canadian oil sands attractive to Chinese decisionmakers. However, looking beyond the energy-security perspective, Canadian oil sands exports to China are actually politically troublesome, largely due to three factors: the strain such a move would put on the Sino-U.S. relationship, the detrimental impact the deal would have on China’s international climate change negotiations, and the strong opposition from environmental groups and indigenous communities in Canada. First, Canadian oil sands exports to China could further strain the already turbulent Sino-U.S. relationship. In 2012, a presidential election year, the Obama administration rejected TransCanada’s application to build the Keystone XL pipeline. The move stemmed from strong Democratic and environmentalist opposition to the deal—Obama would have risked losing the pro-environment electorate if he approved the plan. Yet, the Democratic Party has been unable to reach a consensus on this contentious issue, and the U.S. State Department has agreed to allow TransCanada to reapply for a Keystone XL permit once an alternative route that avoids particularly environmentally sensitive sites is selected. By comparison, almost all congressional Republicans strongly support the Keystone XL pipeline. Arguing that turning down the pipeline will harm U.S. energy security, kill U.S. jobs, and unnecessarily benefit China, they have vigorously attacked Obama’s decision. Any renewed support for the Northern Gateway pipeline by Chinese national oil companies would shift the focus of the Keystone XL debate within the United States from the environment to national security—a prevailing fear, especially among congressional Republicans, is that without Keystone, China will beat the United States to Canada’s rich oil reserves. A desire to shift the debate to national security in the United States may even be driving the Canadian government’s public support of the Northern Gateway pipeline. Second, large-scale Chinese imports of output from Canadian oil sands would come with a high price tag for China’s future international climate negotiations. According to the revised national Energy Balance Table, China surpassed the United States to become the world’s largest carbon emitter as early as 2006. In 2009, emissions from Chinese coal combustion alone exceeded total U.S. carbon dioxide emissions. According to the International Energy Agency, China is expected to account for 42 percent of global incremental carbon emissions by 2035. Nevertheless, under the 2011 Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, China has already said it will join a legally binding international climate treaty that will be agreed upon by 2015 and will come into force by 2020. As a result, during future international climate negotiations, China is expected to face increasingly higher pressure from the international community to retard its spiking carbon emissions. According to the Canadian Industrial Energy End-Use Data and Analysis Center, carbon-emission intensities of upstream oil sands production are generally one to four times higher than conventional oil extraction. Although recent “well-to-wheels” studies have found that the life-cycle emissions of oil-sands-based products are only 5 to 15 percent higher than those of conventional oil products, such analyses likely overlook the substantial carbon-emissions potential that is embedded in the large amount of carbon-intensive oil sands byproducts, such as petroleum coke. According to Environment Canada, oil sands development and the transportation sector are the primary drivers underlying the growth of Canada’s greenhouse gas emissions. In order to allow room for the emissions that would result from oil sands development, and to save $14 billion in penalties for not achieving its Kyoto targets, the Canadian government withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol right after the Durban climate conference, without adequate consideration of the criticism it would receive from the international community. Large-scale Chinese imports of Canadian oil sands output would correspond to de facto support of Canada’s environmentally irresponsible climate policy. Not surprisingly, Chinese imports from Canada’s oil sands would not only be criticized by the international environmental community but would also make the work of China’s climate negotiation delegation much more difficult in the future. Finally, strong opposition to the Northern Gateway pipeline from environmental organizations and Canada’s indigenous community is another important issue that China should not ignore. As early as 2005, PetroChina, the listed arm of China’s largest national oil company, signed a cooperation agreement with Enbridge to support the Northern Gateway pipeline. However, after Stephen Harper came into power in 2006, Sino-Canadian relations soon deteriorated. Citing a lack of support from the Canadian federal government, PetroChina withdrew from the pipeline project in 2007 but forgot to mention the other serious impediment to the deal—strong opposition from both environmental organizations and indigenous communities along the pipeline route. Although the Canadian government now seems to be supportive of the pipeline, it will still be unable to address environmental concerns and the indigenous community’s opposition to pipeline construction in the near future. Consequently, Enbridge’s application for the pipeline is expected to be a prolonged process, which will inevitably increase the financial risks of the project. To enhance China’s energy security, Chinese national oil companies have significantly expanded their overseas presence in recent years. But, due to the monopoly status they have long enjoyed domestically, these companies often evaluate overseas projects primarily on the basis of energy security and corporate bottom line. However, many other factors are at play, and such practices have made securing a return on some Chinese overseas investments problematic at most. Importing output from Canadian oil sands is likewise complicated. Chinese leaders should prohibit national oil companies’ involvement in the Northern Gateway pipeline, at least during a U.S. presidential election year, or they risk **stirring up a national security debate** in the United States and **inflaming Sino-U.S. relations**. After the conclusion of the Chinese political power transition by the end of 2012, the new Chinese leadership should not only fundamentally reform China’s energy-oversight mechanism, which has so far failed to adequately regulate Chinese national oil companies, but also significantly improve intergovernmental coordination. This would lead Chinese national oil companies to, in addition to focusing on national energy security and their corporate bottom line, take other important factors such as Sino-U.S. relations, environmental governance, and the host country’s internal politics into consideration when they make future overseas investment decisions.

**Extinction**

**Wittner, 11** -- State University of New York history professor

[Lawrence, "Is a Nuclear War with China Possible," 11-28-11, www.huntingtonnews.net/14446, accessed 2-10-13, mss]

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction. Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars “modernizing” its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade. To avert the enormous disaster of a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are two obvious actions that can be taken. The first is to get rid of nuclear weapons, as the nuclear powers have agreed to do but thus far have resisted doing. The second, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is occurring, is to improve U.S.-China relations. If the American and Chinese people are interested in ensuring their survival and that of the world, they should be working to encourage these policies.

## States

#### CP text: the 50 States and all relevant Territories should enter into a memorandum of understanding with the United States Air Force over procuring coal-to-liquids fuel for its energy production. The Compact should collect revenue via a Clean Energy Community Finance Initiative.

#### Compacts solve faster than the federal government

Mountjoy ‘01

John is a policy analyst with the council of State Governments, “Interstate Compacts Make a Comeback,” Spring <http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/ncic/Comeback.pdf>

Some may question the need for interstate compacts to address multi-state policy issues. Why ¶ not leave such regulation to the feds? ¶ “Interstate compacts help us maintain state control,” said Gary McConnell, director of the ¶ Georgia Emergency Management Agency. ¶ During his 10 years as GEMA director, McConnell has played an instrumental role in developing ¶ and promoting a successful interstate compact —the Emergency Management Assistance ¶ Compact, or EMAC. EMAC allows state emergency management agencies to cooperate and ¶ share resources in the event of natural and man-made disasters. ¶ “We can go to the federal government for all kinds of help when natural disasters strike, but the ¶ states [cooperating under an interstate compact] can provide specific resources quicker, which ¶ are likely to be problem specific,” McConnell said. “It’s less bureaucratic, and it’s far cheaper. ¶ It’s easier for us under EMAC to obtain resources from surrounding states than it is to use ¶ federal assistance, which we’d end up having to pay more for anyway. I suspect this is the case ¶ with many other interstate compacts as well.” ¶ “States are rediscovering that they have the power to address their own problems better than the ¶ federal government,” said Rick Masters, The Council of State Governments’ legal counsel and ¶ special counsel for interstate compacts. ¶ CSG, which has tracked interstate compacts for more than 40 years, maintains a clearinghouse of ¶ compact information. More recently, CSG helps administer EMAC and is facilitating the update ¶ of the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision and the Interstate Compact on ¶ Juveniles. Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution laid the legal foundation for interstate ¶ compacts: “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep ¶ Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another ¶ State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent ¶ Danger as will not admit of delay.” Compacts actually preceded the Constitution, having been ¶ used in colonial times to resolve boundary disputes between colonies. ¶ Prior to the 1920s, interstate compacts were typically bi-state agreements, addressing boundary ¶ disputes and territorial claims. In fact, only 36 interstate compacts were formed between 1783 ¶ and 1920. It is only in this century that states have turned to interstate compacts to facilitate ¶ cooperative solutions to multi-state problems. ¶ After a lull in the late 1970s and early 1980s, interstate compacts are beginning to enjoy a ¶ resurgence. Since the early 1990s, states have initiated or updated several high-profile compacts. ¶ Examples include EMAC, the Interstate Compact on Industrialized/Modular Buildings and the ¶ Interstate Insurance Receivership Compact. Interstate compacts can set the framework for cooperative solutions to today’s cross-state ¶ challenges, from policing drugs to supplying energy or controlling sprawl. ¶ “Issues within the states are becoming more complex and aren’t confined by state boundaries. As ¶ a result, solutions are becoming multi-state as well. Compacts are the only tool that is truly ¶ adequate for addressing these multi-state issues,” said Bill Voit, senior project director at The ¶ Council of State Governments. ¶ An example is an interstate compact being considered to facilitate taxation of e-commerce. ¶ Opponents of Internet taxation claim that it would be virtually impossible for online vendors to ¶ comply with the complex, often confusing system of state and local sales and use taxes. Since ¶ Internet sales are expected to reach $184 billion annually by 2004, states have a vested interest in ¶ breaking down this and other barriers to taxing online transactions. ¶ Congress currently is considering the Internet Tax Moratorium Equity Act (S. 512) to help states ¶ simplify their sales and use taxes, in part by authorizing states to enter into an Interstate Sales ¶ and Use Tax Compact. The compact would create a “uniform, streamlined sales and use tax ¶ system,” convenient to remote sales. ¶ At least 18 states are considering the model streamlined sales tax legislation in 2001. Kentucky, ¶ South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming already have signed bills into law. ¶ Existing interstate compacts, many drafted in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, are ripe for ¶ amendment and revision. Technology and the Internet now make the sharing of information ¶ seamless and immediate, yet several interstate compacts are plagued by inadequate ¶ administration. ¶ “Not only do we see the development of new compacts, but we are seeing the re-examination of ¶ existing compacts…revising them to keep pace with our changing world,” Masters said. ¶ Developed in 1937, the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers is ¶ one example of a compact in need of update. Adopted by all 50 states, the compact regulates the ¶ movement of parolees and probationers across state lines. The burgeoning offender population ¶ and the ease with which offenders now can travel have created several problems for the compact, ¶ including: frequent violations of compact rules, inability to enforce compliance, difficulty in ¶ creating new rules and slow, unreliable exchange of case information. ¶ The antiquated compact needed a replacement that would provide states the authority, ¶ enforcement tools and resources to adequately track and ensure supervision of parolees and ¶ probationers. ¶ The new interstate compact, the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision, provides ¶ these solutions. The new compact includes mechanisms for enforcement, accountability, resource provision, information sharing and state-to-state cooperation. Currently, the compact ¶ has been introduced in 39 states and enacted in 18. ¶ Just as technology can smooth the operation of interstate compacts, alternative dispute resolution ¶ techniques can increase their self-sufficiency. Enforcement tools within interstate compacts need ¶ to utilize more of the mediation and arbitration services that have proven successful throughout ¶ state government. By developing additional self-contained enforcement mechanisms, compact ¶ members would not need to rely solely on the crowded docket of the U.S. Supreme Court. ¶ States should further utilize interstate compacts to address new problems and create new ¶ methods of interstate cooperation. If not, federal preemption in certain policy areas is a distinct ¶ possibility.

## QER

#### The United States federal government should establish a Quadrennial Energy Review. In the Quadrennial Energy Review, the United States federal government should include a recommendation for the United States Air Force over procuring coal-to-liquids fuel for its energy production

#### QER Solves and avoids politics

Moniz 12

Ernest Moniz, Cecil and Ida Green Professor of Physics and Engineering Systems and Director of the Energy Initiative at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Former Clinton Administration Under Secretary of the Department of Energy and as Associate Director for Science in the Office of Science and Technology Policy ; serves on the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, Spring 2012, Stimulating Energy Technology Innovation, Daedalus, Vol. 141, No. 2, Pages 81-93

It should come as no surprise that I do not have the answers for how the government should intersect the latter stages of the innovation process in a general sense. However, PCAST recommended a pragmatic approach to an integrated federal energy policy that would employ all the tools available to the government in a coherent way. Termed **the** Quadrennial Energy Review (**QER**), the process is necessarily complex, but **history suggests** that **anything short of a full multiagency effort is unlikely to provide a robust plan that accounts for the many threads of an energy policy**. Furthermore, a degree of analysis is required that has not been present in previous efforts.¶ Energy policy is derivative of many policies: environment, technology and competitiveness, diplomacy and security, natural resources, and land and food, among many others. Indeed, multiple agencies that are not labeled “energy” have major equities and long-held perspectives on key elements of energy policy. Often, the preferred policies for different agencies’ agendas conflict. Further, states and local governments play a strong role, for example with building codes, and their approaches can vary dramatically in different parts of the country; certainly, California’s energy policies have influenced the national market. The tools available to support innovation are also diverse, ranging from direct support of RD&D to a variety of economic incentives, regulation, standards, and federal procurement, among other instruments. Congress is equally fragmented: in the House of Representatives and Senate, many committees beyond those tasked with energy policy have equities that mirror those of the different executive agencies. **To overcome this fragmentation** of responsibilities and perspectives, and **especially if the goal is a plan that has staying power in advancing adoption and diffusion, PCAST recommended a QER process** to provide a multiyear roadmap that:¶• lays out an integrated view of short-, intermediate-, and long-term objectives for Federal energy policy in the context of economic, environmental, and security priorities;¶ • outlines **legislative proposals** to Congress;¶ • puts forward anticipated Executive actions (programmatic, regulatory, fiscal, and so on) coordinated across multiple agencies;¶ • **identifies resource requirements** for the RD&D programs **and** for innovation **incentive programs**; and, most important,¶ • provides a strong analytical base.14¶ This is a tall order intellectually and organizationally. Several process elements are essential to fostering a chance for success. First, the Executive Office of the President (eop) must use its convening power to ensure effective cooperation among the myriad relevant agencies. However, the capacity to carry out such an exercise and to sustain it does not (and should not) reside in the eop. The doe is the logical home for a substantial Executive Secretariat supporting the eop interagency process that would present decision recommendations to the president. However, the scope of the analytical capability needed does not currently reside at the doe or any other agency. The doe needs to build this capability, presumably supplemented by contractor support to gather data, develop and run models, and carry out analysis, such as independent energy-system engineering and economic analysis. Market trends and prices would be part of the analysis, including international markets and robust analyses of uncertainty. The Energy Information Administration can help with some data gathering and models, but its independence from the policy function needs to be preserved. The national laboratories also lack this range of functions, and tasking them with providing the analytical support to the policy process would be regarded as a conflict of interest; their focus is best directed at research, invention, and technology transfer. Building this analysis capacity is a large job that will take time.¶ For the QER to succeed, the government must seek substantial input from many quarters in a transparent way; certainly, ongoing dialogue with Congress and the energy industry are essential. The good news is that members of Congress have supported the development of the QER as a way to present a coherent **starting point for congressional action across many committees.** A hope is that **Congress could then use the QER as a basis for** a four or five-year **authorization that would provide the private sector with the increased confidence needed to make sound clean energy investment decisions**.¶ Given the magnitude of the task, PCAST recommended in 2011 that the doe carry out a Quadrennial Technology Review (qtr)–a first step centered in a single department and focused on technology. The qtr resulted in a rebalancing of the R&D portfolio toward the oil dependence challenge through advanced vehicle development, particularly transportation electrification. The key now will be to extend the processes developed for the qtr to the multiagency QER, involving the eop in a leadership role. Taking the next steps in 2012 will maintain momentum and establish the capabilities needed for the QER by early 2015, the time frame recommended by PCAST.¶ While some may view 2015 as a frustratingly long time away, the alternative is to rely on wishes rather than analysis while failing to gain multiple perspectives in a fair and open manner. **Rushing the process will result in a poorly done job that will not accomplish** any of the **key** QER **goals**. Certainly, **it will not bring together succeeding administrations and Congresses around a** reasonably **shared vision** and set of objectives **that can accelerate innovation in service of national competitiveness and environmental and security goals. Continuing with fragmented** and economically inefficient **policies, technologies “du jour,” and frequent shifts will complicate private-sector decisions rather than facilitate innovation**. The government unavoidably plays a strong role in the innovation process, even when this is unacknowledged in policy and political debates. The issue now is to present both a set of principles and fact-based analyses supporting coordinated government-wide actions that earn decent buy-in from major stakeholders.¶

[Note: PCAST = President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology]

## Advangtage CP

**Text: The United States federal government should replace the legacy fighter fleets with fourth-generation and fifth-generation fighters and should increase funding for development of future upgrades to the latest U.S. fighter aircraft.**

**The United States federal government should inform North Korea it will launch nuclear weapons on its capital in the event it crosses the DMZ**

**The United Federal government should increase the airforce budget by $1.4 billion.

CP solves air-based deterrence best
Eaglen and Szaszdi 9**(Mackenzie, Research Fellow for National Security Studies @ Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, and Lajos, PhD and Researcher in the Center for Foreign Policy Studies, The Heritage Foundation, “The Growing Air Power Fighter Gap: Implications for U.S. National Security,” July 7th, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/07/The-Growing-Air-Power-Fighter-Gap-Implications-for-US-National-Security>, EMM)

**No foreign nation or new advanced fighter platform poses an immediate threat to America's air power**. Rather, President Barack Obama's fiscal year (FY) 2010 defense budget request is jeopardizing U.S. dominance in the air. The request continues the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program but would end production of the F-22A Raptor at 187 fighters and retire 250 of the oldest fighters.[[4]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/07/The-Growing-Air-Power-Fighter-Gap-Implications-for-US-National-Security%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn4) This would not produce sufficient new fighters to replace the legacy planes as they retire from service. **Inadequate funding to replace the legacy fighter fleets, which have worn out faster than anticipated and are nearing the end of their service lives, constitutes the greatest dilemma for the services.** **Also problematic is the potential lack of funding for research and development for future upgrades of the latest U.S. fighters or for initial development of a sixth-generation fighter.**

## Advantage 1

### A2: Korean War

#### No Korean War- moves all rational

Friedman 3-12

George is the Director of Stratfor, “Will North Korea Resume the Korean War,” <http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2013/03/12/will_north_korea_resume_the_korean_war_100610.html>

On Jan. 29, I wrote a piece that described North Korea's strategy as a combination of ferocious, weak and crazy. In the weeks since then, three events have exemplified each facet of that strategy. Pyongyang showed its ferocity Feb. 12, when it detonated a nuclear device underground. The country's only significant ally, China, voted against Pyongyang in the U.N. Security Council on March 7, demonstrating North Korea's weakness. Finally, Pyongyang announced it would suspend the armistice that ended the Korean War in 1953, implying that that war would resume and that U.S. cities would be turned into "seas of fire." To me, that fulfills the crazy element.¶ My argument was that the three tenets -- ferocity, weakness and insanity -- form a coherent strategy. North Korea's primary goal is regime preservation. Demonstrating ferocity -- appearing to be close to being nuclear capable -- makes other countries cautious. Weakness, such as being completely isolated from the world generally and from China particularly, prevents other countries from taking drastic action if they believe North Korea will soon fall. The pretense of insanity -- threatening to attack the United States, for example -- makes North Korea appear completely unpredictable, forcing everyone to be cautious. The three work together to limit the actions of other nations.¶ Untested Assumptions¶ So far, North Korea is acting well within the parameters of this strategy. It has detonated nuclear devices before. It has appeared to disgust China before, and it has threatened to suspend the cease-fire. Even more severe past actions, such as sinking a South Korean ship in 2010, were not altogether inconsistent with its strategy. As provocative as that incident was, it did not change the strategic balance in any meaningful way.¶ Normally North Korea has a reason for instigating such a crisis. One reason for the current provocation is that it has a new leader, Kim Jong Un. The son of former leader Kim Jong Il and the grandson of North Korea's founder Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Un is only 30 years old, and many outside North Korea doubt his ability to lead (many inside North Korea may doubt his ability, too). One way to announce his presence with authority is to orchestrate an international crisis that draws the United States, Japan, China, Russia and South Korea into negotiations with North Korea -- especially negotiations that Pyongyang can walk away from.¶ The North Korean regime understands the limits of its strategy and has been very sure-footed in exercising it. Moreover, despite the fact that a 30-year-old formally rules the country, the regime is a complex collection of institutions and individuals -- the ruling party and the military -- that presumably has the ability to shape and control the leader's behavior.¶ It follows that little will change. U.S. analysts of North Korea will emphasize the potential ferocity and the need for extreme vigilance. The Chinese will understand that the North Koreans are weak and will signal, as their foreign minister did March 9, that in spite of their vote at the United Nations, they remain committed to North Korea's survival. And most people will disregard Pyongyang's threat to resume the Korean War.¶ Indeed, resuming the Korean War probably is not something that anyone really wants. But because there are some analysts who think that such a resumption is plausible, I think it is worth considering the possibility that Pyongyang does want to restart the war. It is always worth examining an analysis based on the assumption that a given framework will not hold. For the record, I think the framework will hold, but I am simply examining the following hypothetical: This time, North Korea is serious.

#### No Chance of Korean War- checks

Friedman 3-12

George is the Director of Stratfor, “Will North Korea Resume the Korean War,” <http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2013/03/12/will_north_korea_resume_the_korean_war_100610.html>

I think the risks are too great for this scenario to play out. The North would have to assume that its plans were unknown by Western intelligence agencies. It would also have to assume that South Korea would rather risk severe damage to its capital as it dealt with North Korea once and for all than continue to live under the constant North Korean threat. Moreover, North Korea's artillery could prove ineffective, and it risks entering a war it couldn't win, resulting in total isolation.¶ The scenario laid out is therefore a consideration of what it might mean if the North Koreans were actually wild gamblers, rather than the careful manipulators they have been since 1991. It assumes that the new leader is able to override older and more cautious heads and that he would see this as serving both a strategic and domestic purpose. It would entail North Korea risking it all, and for that to happen, Pyongyang would have to believe that everything was already at risk. Because Pyongyang doesn't believe that, I think this scenario is unlikely.

## Oil Dependence

### A2: Oil Kills Military

#### Even in a shock military still gains access

Alic ‘12,

former tech and science consultant – Office of Technology Assessment, adjunt professor – Johns Hopkins SAIS, John, “Defense Department Energy Innovation: Three Cases,” in Energy Innovation at the Department of Defense: Assessing the Opportunities, March

In any event, should serious bottlenecks in fuel supplies¶ appear, **the U**nited **S**tates **will be less vulnerable than** many¶ **other countries,** including major allies. The U.S. government¶ can expect to outbid competing customers, beginning with¶ poor countries totally dependent on imported oil and including¶ wealthy economies such as Japan that benefit from the U.S.¶ security umbrella. **So long as there is fuel to buy** (**or commandeer**,¶ in war), **DoD will be better able to afford it than** almost **any other**¶ **customer.** The armed forces have first claim on the Strategic¶ Petroleum Reserve. Household consumers and airlines have more¶ to fear from supply constrictions and price rises than DoD.

#### No scenario for a cut-off and the SPR solves

Green, resident scholar – AEI, 7/2/’12

(Kenneth P., “End the DoD's green energy fuelishness,” AEI)

Virtually **none of these arguments pass a laugh test.** Yes, when conventional fuels rise in price, military operating costs go up. But in a global fuel market, the market value of any liquid fuel will track with the world price of oil on an energy-content basis. Simply switching to biofuels offers no price protection in a world of fuel-fungibility. Analysts at Rand put it quite succinctly in a recent report. "Alternative liquid fuels do not offer DoD a way to appreciably reduce fuel costs."¶ As to the risk of a supply interruption, **we don't face one**: Rand further observes, while the U.S. military uses a lot of fuel, when looked at in context, it uses a tiny percentage of world, or even North American production. Its consumption is less than one-half of 1 percent of global petroleum demand. The U.S. also produces over 8 million barrels a day. "we can find **no credible scenario** in which the military would be unable to access the 340,000 bpd of fuel it needs to defend the nation," says Rand. And, of course, there's that whole **S**trategic **P**etroleum **R**eserve, which can hold 727 million barrels of oil. Let's see, 727 million divided by 340,000 ... **the SPR could power the military by itself for almost 6 years.**

### A2- Air Power

#### Airpower can’t solve conflict

Astore 13

(William J, retired Lieutenant Colonel and History Professor, March 25, “The ever-destructive fantasy of air power”, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/World/WOR-01-250313.html)

Despite an unimaginably powerful nuclear deterrent that essentially couldn't be used, the US Air Force had to relearn the hard way that there remained limits to the efficacy of air power, especially when applied to low-intensity, counterinsurgency wars. As in Korea in the 1950s, air power in the 1960s and 1970s failed to provide the winning edge in the Vietnam War, even as it spread wanton destruction throughout the Vietnamese countryside. But it was the arrival of "smart" bombs near that war's end that marked the revival of the fantasies of air power enthusiasts about "precision bombing" as the path to future victory. By the 1990s, laser- and GPS-guided bombs (known collectively as PGMs, for precision guided munitions) were relegating unguided, "dumb" bombs largely to the past. Yet like their predecessors, PGMs proved no panacea. In the opening stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, for example, 50 precision "decapitation strikes" targeting dictator Saddam Hussein's top leadership failed to hit any of their intended targets, while causing "dozens" of civilian deaths. That same year, air power's inability to produce decisive results on the ground after Iraq's descent into chaos, insurrection, and civil war served as a reminder that the vaunted success of the US air campaign in the First Gulf War (1991) was a fluke, not a flowering of air power's maturity. (Saddam Hussein made his traditionally organized military, defenseless against air power, occupy static positions after his invasion of Kuwait.) The recent marriage of PGMs to drones, hailed as the newest "perfect weapon" in the air arsenal, has once again led to the usual fantasies about the arrival - finally, almost 100 years late - of clean, precise, and decisive war. Using drones, a military need not risk even a pilot's life in its attacks. Yet the nature of war - its horrors, its unpredictability, its tendency to outlive its original causes - remains fundamentally unaltered by "precision" drone strikes. War's inherent fog and friction persist. In the case of drones, that fog is often generated by faulty intelligence, the friction by malfunctioning weaponry or innocent civilians appearing just as the Hellfire missiles are unleashed. Rather than clean wars of decision, drone strikes decide nothing. Instead, they produce their share of "collateral damage" that only spawns new enemies seeking revenge. The fantasy of air war as a realm of technical decision, as an exercise in decisively finding, fixing, and dispatching the enemy, appeals to a country like the United States that idolizes technology as a way to quick fixes. As a result, it's hardly surprising that two administrations in Washington have ever more zealously pursued drone wars and aerial global assassination campaigns, already killing 4,700 "terrorists" and bystanders. And this has been just part of our Nobel Peace Prize-winning president's campaign of 20,000 air strikes (only 10% of which were drone strikes) in his first term of office. Yet despite - or perhaps because of - these attacks, our global war against al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and other groups like the Taliban appears no closer to ending. And that is, in part, because the dream of air power remains just that: a fantasy, a capricious and destructive will-o'-the-wisp. It's a fantasy because it denies agency to enemies (and others) who invariably find ways to react, adapt, and strike back. It's a fantasy because, however much such attacks seem both alluringly low-risk and high-reward to the US military, they become a rallying cause for those on the other end of the bombs and missiles. A much-quoted line from the movie Apocalypse Now captured the insanity of the American air war in Vietnam. "I love the smell of napalm in the morning," says an Air Cav commander played by Robert Duvall. "Smelled like ... victory." Updated for drone warfare, this line might read: "I love the sound of drones in the morning. Sounds like ... victory." But will we say the same when armed drones are hovering, not only above our enemies' heads but above ours, too, in fortress America, enforcing security and conformity while smiting citizens judged to be rebellious? Something tells me this is not the dream that airpower enthusiasts had in mind. ¶

## Solvency

### Solvency Timeframe

#### Can’t solve for 9 years

Coil et al ‘12

(David Coil, Erin McKittrick, Bretwood Higman “Coal to Liquids (CTL)” 25th September 2012 <http://www.groundtruthtrekking.org/Issues/AlaskaCoal/CoalToLiquids.html>, TSW)

In addition, because no CTL plant has ever used CCS, there is no precedent for estimating true costs. It can take 8-9 years to build a large-scale CTL facility, during which time price changes in raw materials and pending carbon tax legislation may significantly increase costs. With the high costs of a CCS-equipped CTL facility (not even accounting for a carbon tax), these fuels would only be economically feasible if the price of crude oil rises to more than $86 a barrel (estimated Jan 2009). And even then, it would be feasible only if coal prices do not rise along with oil prices. However, during the 2008 oil price surge, the cost of most types of coal rose steeply as well.

### Solvency

#### Aff has it backwards, no CCS tech means no CTL – their author

Bartis et al ‘08

(James T. – Senior policy researcher at the RAND Corporation, Ph.D. in chemical physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Sc.B. in chemistry, Brown University, Frank Camm – senior economist at the RAND Corporation, Ph.D. and A.M. in economics, University of Chicago; A.B. in economics, Princeton University, David S. Ortiz – Ph.D. in electrical engineering, M.S.E. in aerospace and mechanical engineering, University of Michigan, “Producing Liquid Fuels from Coal Prospects and Policy Issues”, 2008 <http://www.rentechinc.com/pdfs/RAND_MG754.pdf>, TSW)

Large-scale carbon sequestration has not yet been demonstrated in the United States. ¶ U.S. Department of Energy plans for demonstrating large-scale carbon-sequestration ¶ center on the Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnerships. Managed by the National ¶ Energy Technology Laboratory, this partnership program may result in the start-up ¶ of eight or more moderate- to large-scale demonstrations over the next ﬁve years (see ¶ boxed insert). These demonstrations are intended to provide information required for ¶ selecting sequestration sites (including associated federal, state, and local regulation ¶ and permitting activities), assessing permanence of storage, designing injection and ¶ monitoring systems, determining overall economics, and reducing public uncertainties ¶ regarding risks. Once the viability of carbon sequestration is established, CTL production and use should be possible with net greenhouse-gas emissions that are commensurate with or slightly below those of conventional-petroleum products.

#### Not enough sites for CCS – their author

Bartis et al ‘08

(James T. – Senior policy researcher at the RAND Corporation, Ph.D. in chemical physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Sc.B. in chemistry, Brown University, Frank Camm – senior economist at the RAND Corporation, Ph.D. and A.M. in economics, University of Chicago; A.B. in economics, Princeton University, David S. Ortiz – Ph.D. in electrical engineering, M.S.E. in aerospace and mechanical engineering, University of Michigan, “Producing Liquid Fuels from Coal Prospects and Policy Issues”, 2008 <http://www.rentechinc.com/pdfs/RAND_MG754.pdf>, TSW)

Once large-scale carbon sequestration is proven possible, there is still the issue ¶ of whether the geologic formations in the United States are suﬃcient to allow costeﬀective and safe annual sequestration of three or more billion tons of carbon dioxide, ¶ which would be the case if a high level of carbon capture were to be required at CTL ¶ plants and fossil-fuel power plants. It may be that the development of a large domestic ¶ CTL industry is not compatible with growing dependence on coal for electric-power ¶ generation. While the coal resource base appears adequate to provide fuel for both ¶ power generation and signiﬁcant CTL production, the availability of suitable sites for ¶ carbon sequestration may be the limiting factor over the longer term.4¶ 4 The IPPC (2005) carbon dioxide storage-capacity estimate is 675 billion to 900 billion tonnes in depleted oil ¶ and gas reservoirs and at least one trillion tons (and possibly an order of magnitude more) in deep saline formations. These are global estimates. For comparison, current global carbon dioxide emissions are 24 billion tonnes ¶ per year.76 Producing Liquid Fuels from Coal: Prospects and Policy Issues¶ Although the technical development of geologic carbon sequestration would ¶ substantially reduce, if not eliminate, greenhouse-gas emissions, the process of transporting and sequestering carbon dioxide could, if unmitigated, involve adverse environmental impacts. A recent review of the potential environmental eﬀects associated ¶ with carbon sequestration identiﬁed risk factors that could cause moderate to signiﬁ-¶ cant adverse impacts to groundwater resources and human health and safety (NETL, ¶ 2007d).5¶ These impacts appear to be associated with improper site selection or site ¶ preparation. More information on environmental impacts, as well as on prevention and ¶ mitigation measures, should be forthcoming as further technical progress is achieved, ¶ especially during the planning and design of moderate- and large-scale demonstrations, such as those occurring under the Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnerships. ¶ Such planning will involve extensive engineering and safety and environmental studies ¶ needed to obtain required construction and operating permits, address potential legal ¶ liabilities, and comply with the processes and environmental assessments required by ¶ the National Environmental Policy Act.6

#### Would require tons of different CTL tech - can’t use all types of coal

Höök and Aleklett ‘10

(Mikael Höök and Kjell Aleklett, Uppsala University, Global Energy Systems, Department of physics and astronomy “A review on coal to liquid fuels and its coal consumption” 2010 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/er.1596>, TSW)

Other process problems¶ Liquefaction can also be affected by the different properties of the coal feedstock. Different types of coal have different properties, requiring compatibility between CTL-reactor design and coal feedstock.¶ Hydrodynamic problems can be caused by thermal fragmentation of coal, when the coal particles are shattered into smaller grains capable of clogging gas outlets and causing other unwanted disturbances. Drying coal and reducing moisture will lower the probability of thermal fragmentation.¶ Caking occurs due to the plasticity of coal and causes coal particles to meld into larger cakes, leading to pressure drops and channel burning, severely reducing the performance of the CTL-reactor. Mixing high caking coals with low caking coals creates a more manageable overall caking probability.¶ High ash coals will call for a gasification design capable of removing large ash concentrations without loss of performance. Practical CTL-design can be found for all forms of coal [19]. Consequently, suitable designs are essential for obtaining good performance.

#### CTL can’t meet oil production demand

Höök and Aleklett ‘10

(Mikael Höök and Kjell Aleklett, Uppsala University, Global Energy Systems, Department of physics and astronomy “A review on coal to liquid fuels and its coal consumption” 2010 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/er.1596>, TSW)

In order to offset decline in existing oil production for just one year, around 10-40% of the world coal production is required (Table 4). Clearly, this cannot be regarded as feasible in any realistic case. Even if technical efficiencies were achieved, significant shares of world coal would disappear into CTL-plants for a relatively modest contribution to world oil supply. If a 10% share of world coal production could be diverted, it would limit the CTL-production to only a few Mb/d at most. Consequently, it is unrealistic to claim that CTL provides a feasible solution to liquid fuels shortages created by peak oil. For the most part, it can only be a minor contributor and must be combined with other strategies.

#### Conversion is infeasible – efficiency issues Takes a ton of coal to make a barrel of oil

Höök and Aleklett ‘10

(Mikael Höök and Kjell Aleklett, Uppsala University, Global Energy Systems, Department of physics and astronomy “A review on coal to liquid fuels and its coal consumption” 2010 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/er.1596>, TSW)

5. Coal consumption of CTL¶ The consumed amount of coal in CTL is often overlooked or just briefly discussed in many studies. Conceptually, coal is a finite resource and this puts limitations to the amount of fuels that can be produced by liquefying coal. Practical details regarding coal supply, such as accessibility, transportation and production will impact CTL feasibility.¶ Many estimates of coal consumption by CTL have been performed in the literature. Couch [22] and Malhutra [59] state yields of approximately 3 barrels of unrefined syncrude per ton of bituminous coal for DCL, with less efficiency for low rank coal. The Monash Energy CTL project aims to produce liquid fuels, using 1.2 ton lignite per barrel [60]. Milici [61] gives conversion ratios of 1.3-1.8 barrels per ton bituminous coal, also mentioning lower yields for lower coal ranks. National Petroleum Council [8] has compiled other American studies and gives conversion rates ranging from 1-2 barrels/ton of coal. However, liquid yield comparisons are tricky, as yield is dependent on the chosen technical system, the coal type used, system borders and many other factors. Despite differences in methodologies, all estimates of CTL-coal consumption end up at approximately the same figures .Sasol can be used to establish an empirical estimate of the coal consumption of CTL, since they are the world’s leading CTL-producer. The Secunda site consists of two CTL plants with a combined capacity of 150 000 b/d and “more than 40 million tons of coal per year” is consumed [10]. In 2003, the South African synthetic fuel industry consumed 24% of all coal produced in South Africa [62], since Sasol’s CTL facilities are the only producer of synthetic fuels in South Africa, this must also reflect their coal consumption (Figure 2). South African coal production was 238 Mt that year [63], and consequently, the coal consumption of the CTL sector was 57 Mt. All South African coal is classified as bituminous [63]. Using 40 Mt as a lower limit and 57 Mt as an upper limit for Sasol coal consumption, one can compute that one barrel of synthetic fuel consumes 0.73-1.04 tons of bituminous coal, i.e. a conversion ratio of 1-1.4 barrels/ton coal. This agrees with the estimates of other studies, but tends to be in the lower range. Differences between technical and Sasol-derived estimates reflect disparities between theory and practice. Suboptimal conditions, losses, leaks and similar are unavoidable parts of reality, especially when performed on a large industrial scale. Including coal quality issues, refining and further treatment, also makes it reasonable to expect lower yields. Hence, the empirical Sasol conversion ratios are deemed reasonable. Similar conversion efficiencies are also realistic for future large scale CTL-industries, especially since ICL is the more likely future CTL-technology development path.

#### CTL unsustainable Reject their studies they don’t include coal consumption forecasts

Höök and Aleklett ‘10

(Mikael Höök and Kjell Aleklett, Uppsala University, Global Energy Systems, Department of physics and astronomy “A review on coal to liquid fuels and its coal consumption” 2010 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/er.1596>, TSW)

5.1. Coal consumption in various CTL-forecasts¶ Any CTL production forecast must be related to coal consumption. Some CTL forecasts do not mention corresponding coal consumption, while others present estimated consumption volumes. We will use the Sasol-analogy and compare with other studies as a simple “sense check”, to investigate how well estimates agree with practical experience.¶ Outlooks that present CTL as a mitigation or even a solution to the problem of declining conventional oil supply will be closely inspected. For instance, the National Petroleum Council [8] presents a number of production forecasts, where the main message is that peak oil can be partially solved by substantial CTL-development in the USA. We intend to quantify what required coal volumes are needed to offset decline in existing crude oil production. This sheds some new light on the discussion of future CTL potentials and requirements. Furthermore, it is also useful information for policy makers when planning for the future, as the achievability of replacing oil with derivatives of another finite resource on a large scale can be disputed if sustainable development is the ambition.¶ Hirsch et al. [7] assumed annual future construction of 5 CTL-plants, each with a capacity of 100 000 b/d. No coal consumption figures or conversion ratios are given. Using Sasol experience, corresponding increase of annual coal consumption is 133-190 Mt. This is equivalent to ~2.5% the world production of coal for 2007 [64]. This is a significant increase, but probably doable if proper investments are forthcoming.¶ The National Coal Council [64], also mentioned in [8], foresees a production of 2.7 Mb/d by 2025 and presents 430 Mt as the corresponding coal consumption, which equals a conversion ratio of 2.3 barrels/ton coal. Using Sasol experience, coal requirement would be 700-1000 Mt, almost twice as much as the National Coal Council assumes. In conclusion, the National Coal Council's estimate is optimistic when compared to actual experience, and will probably require a dramatic increase in process efficiency and improved technology or use of high quality coals with excellent liquefaction properties.¶ The National Petroleum Council [8] also present a CTL forecast of 5.5 Mb/d by 2030 with corresponding coal consumption of 1439 Mt, originally performed by the Southern States Energy Board [65]. The conversion ratio is 1.4 barrels/ton, in agreement with Sasol experience, but it should be noted that the consumption figure from Southern States Energy Board [65] is leaning toward the optimistic side. Using the Sasol model,¶ 14¶ estimated coal consumption becomes 1466-2100 Mt, which is more than the entire current coal production of the US [63]. In summary, we can conclude that this CTL-forecast is entirely unrealistic, since it is not feasible to divert all coal to new CTL facilities, or to double the US coal output in 20 years [66, 67].¶ The Annual Energy Outlook 2007 (AEO2007) Reference Scenario features a CTL production of 2.4 Mb/d globally and 0.8 Mb/d in the USA [68]. No coal consumption figures are provided for global CTL production, but the USA CTL industry is estimated to consume 112 Mt, which equals conversion ratio of 2.6 barrels/ton coal. It should also be noted that coal consumption for CTL has decreased 50% in AEO2007 compared to AEO2006. Applying the Sasol model, estimated annual coal consumption would be 213-304 Mt, which is twice as much as the EIA assumes. It should be remembered that a significant share of American coal is subbituminous coal, i.e. more low-ranking than the South African coals that Sasol utilize. In essence, the EIA must be assuming that future American CTL-industry will be twice as efficient as Sasol. Given the fact that Sasol is a world leading CTL-enterprise, the EIA assumption seems very optimistic and only vaguely justifiable.¶ The Annual Energy Outlook 2009 (AEO2009) has reduced US CTL production in the Reference Scenario to only 0.26 Mb/d by 2030 [69]. The coal consumption presented is only 24.6 Mt, which would equal a conversion ratio of 2.9 barrels/ton. Corresponding coal usage would be 68-95 Mt, using the Sasol model. Although the expected CTL capacity has been reduced, the conversion ratio has increased compared to earlier estimates and is even further away from the real numbers. We can only conclude that the conversion ratios used by EIA seem extremely high and lack any real counterpart. The EIA seems to be using purely theoretical values, rather than sound numbers derived from practical experience.¶ AEO2007 [68] foresees a global CTL-production of 2.4 Mb/d in the reference case, and this would annually consume 640-912 Mt of coal. This is equivalent to around 12% of the current world production of coal. AEO2009 [69] has lowered the global CTL/GTL-production to only 1.6 Mb/d, without showing individual contributions to this figure. The reduction is justified by concern for CO2 emissions. The global CTL-production in AEO2009 would require something in the range of 400-500 Mt coal annually, using the Sasol model.¶ Annual decline in existing crude oil production is around 4-8%, equivalent to an annual production decrease of 3-7 Mb/d [14]. Such massive volumes are theoretically possible to produce, but would require astronomical investments regardless of the chosen technology. Related coal usage would be 782-2555 Mt, using the Sasol model. Such vast volumes of coal cannot be realistically liquefied just to offset a single years decline in existing world oil production. Consequently, it must be asked whether the investment and the coal itself can be used more efficiently in ways other than CTL and if other mitigation strategies should be preferred.¶ These findings also have repercussions for future climate policies, as several of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) emission scenarios [70], used for projections of temperature increases and anthropogenic emissions, depict significant contribution from CTL in the future. In the dynamic technology scenario group (A1T), liquid fuels from coal are assumed to be readily available at less than US$30/barrel with prices falling even further. The environmentally B2 scenario family sees CTL production¶ 15¶ costs decline from US$43/barrel to US$16/barrel. Details on conversion ratios are not given, nor related coal consumption volumes.¶ As an example, the B2 Message scenario gives a global CTL production of 32 Mb/d (71.8 EJ) in 2100, which is more than the 23.2 Mb/d (52 EJ) derived from oil production in the same year. Equivalent coal consumption would be 8342-11680 Mt, using Sasol conversion ratios, and still very extensive even if better efficiencies were reached in the future. The world coal production is given as 300 EJ in 2100, meaning that 24% goes to CTL. Can so much coal be really produced and diverted to CTL in a realistic case or should some emission scenarios be revised? Either way, more details should be shown regarding assumed conversion rations, technologies and other factors.¶ In summary, we find that many forecasts or scenarios do not discuss CTL coal consumption or conversion ratios in any detail. In some cases, actual numbers are given but they are often very optimistic compared to practical experience or peer-viewed literature. Our “sense check” seems to indicate that several CTL outlooks have poor agreement with practical experience and empirical data. Scenarios and guidelines for future planning should not be use such vaguely justified numbers or assumed conversion ratios.

#### CTL infeasible – prefer our ev their studies are rigided

Höök and Aleklett ‘10

(Mikael Höök and Kjell Aleklett, Uppsala University, Global Energy Systems, Department of physics and astronomy “A review on coal to liquid fuels and its coal consumption” 2010 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/er.1596>, TSW)

Estimates for coal consumption of coal liquefaction have been presented in many studies [8, 22, 59, 61]. A pragmatic estimate can be derived from the Sasol experience, and used as a complementary approximation in addition to more purely technical assessments. This estimate is further justified by the likelihood of ICL as the primary candidate for future large scale CTL-industries. The differences between coal consumption estimated from Sasol experience and other assessments are small. Generally, CTL conversion ratios are in the order of 1-2 barrels/ton coal.¶ Comparing empirical coal consumption estimates and conversion ratios with various CTL forecasts gives a reasonable agreement, even though EIA [68] and SSEB [65] show significant optimism without more than vague justifications. In general, many future CTL scenarios assume conversion ratios much higher than Sasol, thus resulting in significantly lower coal consumption. This bias might be a case of questionable optimism or perhaps even a result of wishful thinking. Another possible explanation is that certain parts of the process, for instance heating process water and producing process heat, have been omitted.¶ In our compilation and analysis, we find that the coal consumption is a major factor for CTL feasibility. Significant CTL production requires equally significant coal production and resources. We anticipate that only a few countries or regions can realistically develop a large scale CTL industry. Effectively, CTL will be limited to the dominating coal reserve holders that can divert shares of their production to liquefaction.¶ 18¶

#### US coal reserves and industry aren’t sufficient to meet demand

Höök and Aleklett ‘10

(Mikael Höök and Kjell Aleklett, Uppsala University, Global Energy Systems, Department of physics and astronomy “A review on coal to liquid fuels and its coal consumption” 2010 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/er.1596>, TSW)

The US has the world’s largest coal reserves and has been subjected to many CTL feasibility studies and projects. In 1980, Perry [71] pointed out that the construction of a synthetic fuels industry will be very costly and will provide only a small amount of increased energy independence. This situation has obviously not changed as Couch [22] states that replacing only 10% of the US transport fuel consumption with CTL would require over US$70 billion in capital investments and about a 250 Mt of annual coal production increase. Achieving required increases in coal production has been deemed questionable by other studies [66, 67]. Correspondingly, Milici [61] concluded that the US coal industry only could handle liquefaction of 54-64 Mt coal annually without premature depletion of the coal reserves, and states that attempts to replace all oil imports would deplete the national coal reserves by 2100. The resulting volumes of synthetic fuels are insignificant compared to the present and expected demand.

#### Can’t meet emission regs Even with CCS, CTL has huge emissions

Höök and Aleklett ‘10

(Mikael Höök and Kjell Aleklett, Uppsala University, Global Energy Systems, Department of physics and astronomy “A review on coal to liquid fuels and its coal consumption” 2010 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/er.1596>, TSW)

3.8. Emission properties¶ The low sulphur content of CTL products compared to petroleum-derived fuels is a common trait for both DCL and ICL, which comes from the necessity to protect catalysts from poisoning. Aside from this similarity, emissions and combustion characteristics of DCL and ICL fuels differ. Comprehensive analysis of emission characteristics of synthetic and conventional fuels have been compared by others [43, 44].¶ DCL products are typically rich in polycyclic aromatics and heteroatoms [45-48], while ICL has lower aromatics content. High temperature FT-synthesis yields branched products and contains aromatics, whilst these are virtually absent in low temperature FT-synthesis [49]. Recently, environmental regulation trends have moved towards limiting the aromatic content in transportation fuels [30], giving the advantage to ICL-fuels.¶ Toxic trace metals and inorganic compounds, such as cadmium, selenium, arsenic, lead and mercury, can be passed on to the final fuel product in both DCL and ICL-processes. In ICL-systems, removal of mercury and other metals is generally trivial and inexpensive [30]. For DCL, however, it will be more complicated and more costly, but not impossible.¶ Cetane and octane numbers also differ, resulting from the chemical properties of the various products. ICL gives diesel of a high quality, which is mostly due to the dominance of straight-chain products. However, low densities are a problem for ICL products, but this can be mitigated by blending [48]. General differences of final products are summarized in Table 2. Typical properties for specific ICL-distillates can be found in Leckel [48].¶ Both DCL and ICL fuels emit large amounts of carbon dioxide compared to ordinary petroleum-derived fuels. However, there are methods for reducing or even neutralizing emissions without raising production costs drastically. Substantial differences exist between DCL and ICL technologies with regard to the potential and cost of greenhouse gas emission mitigation [30].¶ Vallentin [39] concludes that DCL generates about 90% more CO2 than conventional fuel on a well-to-wheel basis. This is in agreement with other studies, but if reduction measures are implemented, the emissions could be reduced to no more than 30% extra compared to conventional petroleum fuels [30].¶ ICL-technology generates approximately 80-110% more CO2 emissions compared to conventional fuels, if the CO2 is vented [30, 39]. However, there are ICL-system configurations where H2S+CO2 co-capture/co-storage can reduce emissions [30]. Well-to-wheel analysis has shown that even with CCS, CTL production chain emissions are higher than for petroleum-derived fuels, mostly due to emissions from mining [35].¶ In summary, CTL fuels can improve emission characteristics and reduce transportation emissions of sulphur, aromatics, NOx and particles compared to conventional fuels [43]. However, there does not seem to be much potential for CO2 emission reductions if the full supply chain is analysed for either DCL or ICL.

#### CTL transition impossible – costs and would change the economics of coal

Höök and Aleklett ‘10

(Mikael Höök and Kjell Aleklett, Uppsala University, Global Energy Systems, Department of physics and astronomy “A review on coal to liquid fuels and its coal consumption” 2010 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/er.1596>, TSW)

World oil production currently stands at more than 80 Mb/d [63]. The total cost for replacing a significant amount of the world’s oil production by CTL would be astronomical, regardless of the chosen system approach. Necessary investments for a large CTL industry are evidently colossal, but the greatest issue lies perhaps in coal consumption. Coal will account for a large part of the costs, and with the required volumes being vast, accompanying changes in coal price and additional costs of increasing coal feedstock production will greatly affect the future economics of CTL. This is a topic that deserves more attention in future studies.

### Cards pulled from CCS neg to read

#### CCS leaks means it can’t meet emissions standards

Energy Justice ’12

“Fact Sheet: Clean Coal Power Plants,” <http://www.energyjustice.net/files/coal/igcc/factsheet.pdf>

CO2 sequestration differs from “storage” in that it is a more¶ permanent storing of the gas, and must be stored without¶ leaking for thousands of years. We have been unable to¶ safely store solid and liquid radioactive wastes for 50-60¶ years without leakage. **It’s unlikely** that **we’ll be able to¶ store a significant part of the world’s 28 billion metric tons¶ of CO2 gas emitted every year without leakage problems.¶ If stored CO2 leaks out,** the concentrated CO2 can cause¶ suffocation because **it is heavier than air**.30 In 1986, a¶ large release of CO2 from a volcanic crater, Lake Nyos in¶ West Africa, suffocated and killed 1,700 people. A similar¶ event happened at Lake Monoun in Cameroon.¶ Researchers continue to work on degassing the lakes to¶ prevent another tragedy.31 Further research is needed on¶ CO2 migration and seismic shifts from storing large¶ amounts of CO2 underground.¶ Carbon sequestration costs are highly uncertain. The¶ National Energy Technology Laboratory states, “the economics of CO2 recovery are poor in all scenarios….”32¶ A December 2006 DOE Environmental Impact Statement¶ reported that geologic sequestration of CO2 “is not a¶ reasonable option because [**the] technology is not¶ sufficiently mature to be implemented at production scale¶ during the demonstration period for the proposed facility;”¶ and isn’t expected to be “technically practicable” for largescale¶ commercial development within the next 15 years**.33¶ A 2006 presentation on IGCC by Xcel Energy stated that¶ the “wild card” in the IGCC cost equation is CO2 capture.34¶ **The world’s largest CO2 sequestration project is in¶ Sleipner, Norway, where Statoil has been pumping one¶ million tons of CO2/year since** 1996 into a reservoir¶ beneath the North Sea. **It would take 5-10 of these¶ projects to store the CO2 from a single large coal plant.35**

#### No storage makes CCS impossible

Ozzie Zehner, visiting scholar at Berkeley, Energy policy analayst on issues of social, political and economic conditions, PhD, Science and Technology studies, 12 [“Green illusions” Non-Profit book]

Second, **after the industry captures and compresses the carbon dioxide, it must store the liquid or gaseous co2.** Ubiquitous saline aquifers are one storage option, but these are prone to seismic instability and uncertainties of storage life.17 Depleted oil and gas fields are obvious storage sites, but many of these deep underground crypts are structurally compromised after having been drained of their pressurized oil or inundated by multiple well piercings.18 **If the U.S. coal industry captured and liquefied just 60 percent of its annual co2 emissions, the effluent's volume would equal the volume of oil that Americans consume over the same period.**19 **Geologists will be hard pressed to locate favorable storage sites on such a monumental scale.** This may force the industry to risk even less secure formations.

#### CCS won’t scale up

Dr Nils Markusson, researcher sssociate in CO2 storage technology and social learning at the University of Edinburgh, UK, 12 [“Carbon Capture’s days may be limited,” ABC News, July 26 http://www.abc.net.au/environment/articles/2012/07/26/3553255.htm]

Carbon dioxide capture and storage (**CCS) - a technology that promises to reduce atmospheric emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) from power plants and carbon-intensive industries - has been faced with a number of challenges** in recent years. **Several setbacks to planned demonstration projects, protests from local communities and other stakeholders, and a dearth of financing from industry and national governments have meant that the pace of deployment has fallen short of expectations. CCS is thus facing a crisis**, and it is important to consider what its future may be.¶ CCS is a technical system that aims to capture CO2 from large industrial sources and store it deep underground in rock formations for long periods of time. It is the only technology with the potential to clean up CO2 emissions from coal- and gas-fired power plants. The technological components that are needed to develop CCS systems are all known and tested in other industrial applications, but it is still necessary to adapt and integrate them for use in CCS systems. Hence the need to demonstrate the system in operation before it can be routinely deployed.¶ **The technology would allow continued reliance on fossil fuels, whilst simultaneously mitigating CO2 emissions**. **CCS has therefore proven irresistible to policymakers by promising to square the circle of these otherwise apparently irreconcilable objectives**. CCS has risen meteorically on policy agendas over the last decade and is now a lynch pin of the energy and climate policies of many industrialised countries.¶ Until now, policies in support of CCS have been dominated by a technocratic, expert-driven push, moderated by the dominant neo-liberal economic ideology of the last three decades. Reliance on market financing has proven increasingly challenging as CCS is viewed as a risky bet. And policy makers have not appreciated the gravity of public opposition or quite how unpalatable the technology is for investors. **The urgency of climate change mitigation has put the faith in bottom-up processes - where development is left up to private actors - under considerable stress**. Calls are increasing for stronger government involvement to accelerate development through top-down planning.¶ But this policy trend runs counter to simultaneous calls for policy changes from the public protests against CCS - and those against other low-carbon technologies such as wind turbines. Protests have contributed to high profile cancellations of CCS demonstration projects, for example Barendrecht in the Netherlands, and the support of planning regulations hostile to CCS, e.g. in Germany. **Top-down, technocratic policy making on CCS might seem like an shortcut to deployment, but it is a politically brave strategy that in fact may cost politicians many votes. And it is not clear that technology development lets itself be accelerated anyway; technical problem-solving takes time.**¶ **CCS now hangs in the balance. There is progress being made with the first large-scale demonstration plants abating power plant emissions currently being built, but support from both publics and politicians appears to be unreliable.** One possible response to this is to wait and see. Other low-carbon technologies, like wave power, had to 'hibernate' after early progress was made in the 1970s driven by reactions to the oil crises was halted in the 1980s by changes of policy, until the urgency surrounding climate change renewed the interest in the 1990s and 2000s. Perhaps the CCS community has a similar fight for survival ahead of itself.¶ **If so, it may become too late for CCS to contribute significantly to climate change mitigation**. Some critics would say 'we told you so' and argue that the resources should have been spent on renewables instead. Others may point to the difficulty in making any headway with climate change mitigation without CCS, and the threat of sci-fi like geoengineering options to counter global warming - for example, injection of sulphate particles into the atmosphere to reflect solar radiation back into space - looming on the horizon. Ultimately, CCS might not survive a winter of low interest.¶ **Another strategy is to re-think the case for the technology, and see if it can be made to connect with policy agendas other than climate change and become attractive to new social groups**. The position of CCS in relation to key societal agendas, including sustainability, energy security, global governance and democracy itself may therefore have to evolve, to create wider support for the technology. However, it is too early to say in more concrete terms what this would imply. Short of credible policy signals to ensure its development, the next best thing is to keep the conversation going and look out for new social groups engaging with the technology in new ways.

#### CCS won’t happen –cost

Wynn 9/20

(Nuclear phase-out risks carbon emissions increase, Gerard, <http://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/nuclear-phaseout-risks-carbon-emissions-increase-20120920-267nt.html>)

The European Commission said last December that all fossil fuel power plants should be fitted with expensive CCS from around 2030, if the European Union is to slash emissions by the middle of the century. "CCS contributes significantly towards decarbonisation in most scenarios, with the highest penetration in case with nuclear constraints," it said in its "Energy Roadmap 2050". **CCS** is meant to trap carbon emissions from fossil fuel flue gases and pipe them underground, but **is still untested at a commercial scale on power plants partly because it adds at least $1.5 billion to the upfront capital cost per gigawatt of electricity generating capacity**. The alternatives are either to eliminate fossil fuels except as back-up for renewable energy, or else to relax medium-term carbon emissions targets, most of which are only aspirational and therefore politically feasible to downgrade.

#### Regulatory Barriers means no CCS

Dooley Et al 10 (CO2-driven Enhanced Oil Recovery as a Stepping Stone to What? JJ Dooley RT Dahowski CL Davidson July 2010, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, <http://mitei.mit.edu/system/files/110510_EOR_Report_1.pdf> Joint Global Change Research Institute, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory)

This paper draws heavily on the authors’ previously published research to explore the extent to which near term carbon dioxide-driven enhanced oil recovery (CO2-EOR) can be “a stepping stone to a long term sequestration program of a scale to be material in climate change risk mitigation.” **The paper examines the historical evolution** of CO2-EOR in the United States **and concludes** that estimates of **the cost of CO2-EOR production** or the extent of CO2 pipeline networks **based upon this energy security-driven promotion of CO2-EOR do not provide a robust platform for spurring the commercial deployment of** carbon dioxide capture and storage technologies (**CCS**) as a means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The paper notes that **the** evolving **regulatory framework for CCS makes a clear distinction between CO2-EOR and CCS** and the authors examine arguments in the technical literature about the ability for CO2-EOR to generate offsetting revenue to accelerate the commercial deployment of CCS systems in the electric power and industrial sectors of the economy. The authors conclude that the past 35 years of CO2-EOR in the U.S. have been important for boosting domestic oil production and delivering proven system components for future CCS systems. However, though **there** is no reason to suggest that CO2-EOR will cease to deliver these benefits, there **is** also **little to suggest that CO2-EOR is a necessary or significantly beneficial step towards the commercial deployment of CCS** as a means of addressing climate change.

#### Legal issues block CCS

Haszeldine 9 – Scottish Power Professor of Carbon Capture & Storage at the University of Edinburgh School of GeoSciences (R. Stuart, 9/25/09, “Carbon Capture and Storage: How Green Can Black Be?” Science, Volume 325, Number 5948, pp. 1647-1652, <http://www.roberts.cmc.edu/159/2010/2010pdfs/5.%20Feb%204%202010.pdf>)

**On the 10-year time scale, it is not technology, but legal permission, business development, and public opinion that will determine whether CCS experiments and demonstration plants are built sufficiently rapidly for CCS to be deployed in 2020.** On the 20-year time scale, these initial demonstrations must enable a new CCS industry to be born. Low-cost reliable capture at clusters of CCS power plants must emerge, and national pipe networks must be developed, delivering to aquifer storage capacity that must have been validated. **CCS also needs to be built and operated in developing economies with high national but low per capita emissions.** If CCS is difficult to afford now in Western economies, then it is even more so in India and China. Additional payments for CCS demonstrations will accelerate the above-mentioned actions. **Simply pricing carbon in a market is not enough to encourage CCS or to enforce decarbonization. During peak demand, venting of CO2 will be commercially beneficial. If the price of carbon is set very high to avoid such effects, that taxes the whole economy, not just dirty electricity.** Additional policy levers will be needed to enforce CCS operation. Lessons from previous clean-up technologies applied to power plants— such as SOx and NOx removal from flue gases— show that voluntary codes do not work, but clearly signed and enforced rule changes do.

#### No CCS for COAL – regulatory barriers

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Capture **The first step is to capture the CO2 before it leaves the smokestack**. For power plants, **the most prominent technology to accomplish this is integrated gasification combined cycle** (IGCC). This technology is still in the early stages of deployment. There are only two electric power plants in the United States today that use IGCC —the Cinergy/Duke Energy Wabash River Station in Indiana and Tampa Electric’s Polk Station in Florida. Neither is running on coal alone and, in October 2007, Tampa Electric suspended its plan to build a second IGCC plant, citing continued regulatory uncertainty. Several other IGCC plants are in the permitting or planning stages. **Under the Clean Air Act, air pollution control equipment must meet “best available control technology**” (where new source review is applicable) **or “lowest achievable emissions rate”** (where prevention of significant deterioration rules apply). The EPA has not deemed IGCC to be required under these standards. 2 **The developers of several coal-fired power plants have struggled to get the necessary approvals for IGCC**. In November 2007 the Washington State Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council rejected an application for a 793 megawatt plant with IGCC because new state legislation required applications for power plants generating more than a certain level of GHGs to include a “carbon sequestration plan,” and the applicant merely pledged to prepare a plan at some future time when sequestration becomes a proven technology for use by power plants. The council found this did not meet the requirements of the statute. 3

# 2NC

## North Korea

#### No Chance of Korean War- checks

Friedman 3-12

George is the Director of Stratfor, “Will North Korea Resume the Korean War,” <http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2013/03/12/will_north_korea_resume_the_korean_war_100610.html>

I think the risks are too great for this scenario to play out. The North would have to assume that its plans were unknown by Western intelligence agencies. It would also have to assume that South Korea would rather risk severe damage to its capital as it dealt with North Korea once and for all than continue to live under the constant North Korean threat. Moreover, North Korea's artillery could prove ineffective, and it risks entering a war it couldn't win, resulting in total isolation.¶ The scenario laid out is therefore a consideration of what it might mean if the North Koreans were actually wild gamblers, rather than the careful manipulators they have been since 1991. It assumes that the new leader is able to override older and more cautious heads and that he would see this as serving both a strategic and domestic purpose. It would entail North Korea risking it all, and for that to happen, Pyongyang would have to believe that everything was already at risk. Because Pyongyang doesn't believe that, I think this scenario is unlikely.

## Solvency

#### CTL can’t meet oil production demand

Höök and Aleklett ‘10

(Mikael Höök and Kjell Aleklett, Uppsala University, Global Energy Systems, Department of physics and astronomy “A review on coal to liquid fuels and its coal consumption” 2010 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/er.1596>, TSW)

In order to offset decline in existing oil production for just one year, around 10-40% of the world coal production is required (Table 4). Clearly, this cannot be regarded as feasible in any realistic case. Even if technical efficiencies were achieved, significant shares of world coal would disappear into CTL-plants for a relatively modest contribution to world oil supply. If a 10% share of world coal production could be diverted, it would limit the CTL-production to only a few Mb/d at most. Consequently, it is unrealistic to claim that CTL provides a feasible solution to liquid fuels shortages created by peak oil. For the most part, it can only be a minor contributor and must be combined with other strategies.

#### Conversion is infeasible – efficiency issues Takes a ton of coal to make a barrel of oil

Höök and Aleklett ‘10

(Mikael Höök and Kjell Aleklett, Uppsala University, Global Energy Systems, Department of physics and astronomy “A review on coal to liquid fuels and its coal consumption” 2010 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/er.1596>, TSW)

5. Coal consumption of CTL¶ The consumed amount of coal in CTL is often overlooked or just briefly discussed in many studies. Conceptually, coal is a finite resource and this puts limitations to the amount of fuels that can be produced by liquefying coal. Practical details regarding coal supply, such as accessibility, transportation and production will impact CTL feasibility.¶ Many estimates of coal consumption by CTL have been performed in the literature. Couch [22] and Malhutra [59] state yields of approximately 3 barrels of unrefined syncrude per ton of bituminous coal for DCL, with less efficiency for low rank coal. The Monash Energy CTL project aims to produce liquid fuels, using 1.2 ton lignite per barrel [60]. Milici [61] gives conversion ratios of 1.3-1.8 barrels per ton bituminous coal, also mentioning lower yields for lower coal ranks. National Petroleum Council [8] has compiled other American studies and gives conversion rates ranging from 1-2 barrels/ton of coal. However, liquid yield comparisons are tricky, as yield is dependent on the chosen technical system, the coal type used, system borders and many other factors. Despite differences in methodologies, all estimates of CTL-coal consumption end up at approximately the same figures .Sasol can be used to establish an empirical estimate of the coal consumption of CTL, since they are the world’s leading CTL-producer. The Secunda site consists of two CTL plants with a combined capacity of 150 000 b/d and “more than 40 million tons of coal per year” is consumed [10]. In 2003, the South African synthetic fuel industry consumed 24% of all coal produced in South Africa [62], since Sasol’s CTL facilities are the only producer of synthetic fuels in South Africa, this must also reflect their coal consumption (Figure 2). South African coal production was 238 Mt that year [63], and consequently, the coal consumption of the CTL sector was 57 Mt. All South African coal is classified as bituminous [63]. Using 40 Mt as a lower limit and 57 Mt as an upper limit for Sasol coal consumption, one can compute that one barrel of synthetic fuel consumes 0.73-1.04 tons of bituminous coal, i.e. a conversion ratio of 1-1.4 barrels/ton coal. This agrees with the estimates of other studies, but tends to be in the lower range. Differences between technical and Sasol-derived estimates reflect disparities between theory and practice. Suboptimal conditions, losses, leaks and similar are unavoidable parts of reality, especially when performed on a large industrial scale. Including coal quality issues, refining and further treatment, also makes it reasonable to expect lower yields. Hence, the empirical Sasol conversion ratios are deemed reasonable. Similar conversion efficiencies are also realistic for future large scale CTL-industries, especially since ICL is the more likely future CTL-technology development path.

#### CTL unsustainable Reject their studies they don’t include coal consumption forecasts

Höök and Aleklett ‘10

(Mikael Höök and Kjell Aleklett, Uppsala University, Global Energy Systems, Department of physics and astronomy “A review on coal to liquid fuels and its coal consumption” 2010 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/er.1596>, TSW)

5.1. Coal consumption in various CTL-forecasts¶ Any CTL production forecast must be related to coal consumption. Some CTL forecasts do not mention corresponding coal consumption, while others present estimated consumption volumes. We will use the Sasol-analogy and compare with other studies as a simple “sense check”, to investigate how well estimates agree with practical experience.¶ Outlooks that present CTL as a mitigation or even a solution to the problem of declining conventional oil supply will be closely inspected. For instance, the National Petroleum Council [8] presents a number of production forecasts, where the main message is that peak oil can be partially solved by substantial CTL-development in the USA. We intend to quantify what required coal volumes are needed to offset decline in existing crude oil production. This sheds some new light on the discussion of future CTL potentials and requirements. Furthermore, it is also useful information for policy makers when planning for the future, as the achievability of replacing oil with derivatives of another finite resource on a large scale can be disputed if sustainable development is the ambition.¶ Hirsch et al. [7] assumed annual future construction of 5 CTL-plants, each with a capacity of 100 000 b/d. No coal consumption figures or conversion ratios are given. Using Sasol experience, corresponding increase of annual coal consumption is 133-190 Mt. This is equivalent to ~2.5% the world production of coal for 2007 [64]. This is a significant increase, but probably doable if proper investments are forthcoming.¶ The National Coal Council [64], also mentioned in [8], foresees a production of 2.7 Mb/d by 2025 and presents 430 Mt as the corresponding coal consumption, which equals a conversion ratio of 2.3 barrels/ton coal. Using Sasol experience, coal requirement would be 700-1000 Mt, almost twice as much as the National Coal Council assumes. In conclusion, the National Coal Council's estimate is optimistic when compared to actual experience, and will probably require a dramatic increase in process efficiency and improved technology or use of high quality coals with excellent liquefaction properties.¶ The National Petroleum Council [8] also present a CTL forecast of 5.5 Mb/d by 2030 with corresponding coal consumption of 1439 Mt, originally performed by the Southern States Energy Board [65]. The conversion ratio is 1.4 barrels/ton, in agreement with Sasol experience, but it should be noted that the consumption figure from Southern States Energy Board [65] is leaning toward the optimistic side. Using the Sasol model,¶ 14¶ estimated coal consumption becomes 1466-2100 Mt, which is more than the entire current coal production of the US [63]. In summary, we can conclude that this CTL-forecast is entirely unrealistic, since it is not feasible to divert all coal to new CTL facilities, or to double the US coal output in 20 years [66, 67].¶ The Annual Energy Outlook 2007 (AEO2007) Reference Scenario features a CTL production of 2.4 Mb/d globally and 0.8 Mb/d in the USA [68]. No coal consumption figures are provided for global CTL production, but the USA CTL industry is estimated to consume 112 Mt, which equals conversion ratio of 2.6 barrels/ton coal. It should also be noted that coal consumption for CTL has decreased 50% in AEO2007 compared to AEO2006. Applying the Sasol model, estimated annual coal consumption would be 213-304 Mt, which is twice as much as the EIA assumes. It should be remembered that a significant share of American coal is subbituminous coal, i.e. more low-ranking than the South African coals that Sasol utilize. In essence, the EIA must be assuming that future American CTL-industry will be twice as efficient as Sasol. Given the fact that Sasol is a world leading CTL-enterprise, the EIA assumption seems very optimistic and only vaguely justifiable.¶ The Annual Energy Outlook 2009 (AEO2009) has reduced US CTL production in the Reference Scenario to only 0.26 Mb/d by 2030 [69]. The coal consumption presented is only 24.6 Mt, which would equal a conversion ratio of 2.9 barrels/ton. Corresponding coal usage would be 68-95 Mt, using the Sasol model. Although the expected CTL capacity has been reduced, the conversion ratio has increased compared to earlier estimates and is even further away from the real numbers. We can only conclude that the conversion ratios used by EIA seem extremely high and lack any real counterpart. The EIA seems to be using purely theoretical values, rather than sound numbers derived from practical experience.¶ AEO2007 [68] foresees a global CTL-production of 2.4 Mb/d in the reference case, and this would annually consume 640-912 Mt of coal. This is equivalent to around 12% of the current world production of coal. AEO2009 [69] has lowered the global CTL/GTL-production to only 1.6 Mb/d, without showing individual contributions to this figure. The reduction is justified by concern for CO2 emissions. The global CTL-production in AEO2009 would require something in the range of 400-500 Mt coal annually, using the Sasol model.¶ Annual decline in existing crude oil production is around 4-8%, equivalent to an annual production decrease of 3-7 Mb/d [14]. Such massive volumes are theoretically possible to produce, but would require astronomical investments regardless of the chosen technology. Related coal usage would be 782-2555 Mt, using the Sasol model. Such vast volumes of coal cannot be realistically liquefied just to offset a single years decline in existing world oil production. Consequently, it must be asked whether the investment and the coal itself can be used more efficiently in ways other than CTL and if other mitigation strategies should be preferred.¶ These findings also have repercussions for future climate policies, as several of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) emission scenarios [70], used for projections of temperature increases and anthropogenic emissions, depict significant contribution from CTL in the future. In the dynamic technology scenario group (A1T), liquid fuels from coal are assumed to be readily available at less than US$30/barrel with prices falling even further. The environmentally B2 scenario family sees CTL production¶ 15¶ costs decline from US$43/barrel to US$16/barrel. Details on conversion ratios are not given, nor related coal consumption volumes.¶ As an example, the B2 Message scenario gives a global CTL production of 32 Mb/d (71.8 EJ) in 2100, which is more than the 23.2 Mb/d (52 EJ) derived from oil production in the same year. Equivalent coal consumption would be 8342-11680 Mt, using Sasol conversion ratios, and still very extensive even if better efficiencies were reached in the future. The world coal production is given as 300 EJ in 2100, meaning that 24% goes to CTL. Can so much coal be really produced and diverted to CTL in a realistic case or should some emission scenarios be revised? Either way, more details should be shown regarding assumed conversion rations, technologies and other factors.¶ In summary, we find that many forecasts or scenarios do not discuss CTL coal consumption or conversion ratios in any detail. In some cases, actual numbers are given but they are often very optimistic compared to practical experience or peer-viewed literature. Our “sense check” seems to indicate that several CTL outlooks have poor agreement with practical experience and empirical data. Scenarios and guidelines for future planning should not be use such vaguely justified numbers or assumed conversion ratios.

#### CTL infeasible – prefer our ev their studies are rigided

Höök and Aleklett ‘10

(Mikael Höök and Kjell Aleklett, Uppsala University, Global Energy Systems, Department of physics and astronomy “A review on coal to liquid fuels and its coal consumption” 2010 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/er.1596>, TSW)

Estimates for coal consumption of coal liquefaction have been presented in many studies [8, 22, 59, 61]. A pragmatic estimate can be derived from the Sasol experience, and used as a complementary approximation in addition to more purely technical assessments. This estimate is further justified by the likelihood of ICL as the primary candidate for future large scale CTL-industries. The differences between coal consumption estimated from Sasol experience and other assessments are small. Generally, CTL conversion ratios are in the order of 1-2 barrels/ton coal.¶ Comparing empirical coal consumption estimates and conversion ratios with various CTL forecasts gives a reasonable agreement, even though EIA [68] and SSEB [65] show significant optimism without more than vague justifications. In general, many future CTL scenarios assume conversion ratios much higher than Sasol, thus resulting in significantly lower coal consumption. This bias might be a case of questionable optimism or perhaps even a result of wishful thinking. Another possible explanation is that certain parts of the process, for instance heating process water and producing process heat, have been omitted.¶ In our compilation and analysis, we find that the coal consumption is a major factor for CTL feasibility. Significant CTL production requires equally significant coal production and resources. We anticipate that only a few countries or regions can realistically develop a large scale CTL industry. Effectively, CTL will be limited to the dominating coal reserve holders that can divert shares of their production to liquefaction.¶ 18¶

#### US coal reserves and industry aren’t sufficient to meet demand

Höök and Aleklett ‘10

(Mikael Höök and Kjell Aleklett, Uppsala University, Global Energy Systems, Department of physics and astronomy “A review on coal to liquid fuels and its coal consumption” 2010 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/er.1596>, TSW)

The US has the world’s largest coal reserves and has been subjected to many CTL feasibility studies and projects. In 1980, Perry [71] pointed out that the construction of a synthetic fuels industry will be very costly and will provide only a small amount of increased energy independence. This situation has obviously not changed as Couch [22] states that replacing only 10% of the US transport fuel consumption with CTL would require over US$70 billion in capital investments and about a 250 Mt of annual coal production increase. Achieving required increases in coal production has been deemed questionable by other studies [66, 67]. Correspondingly, Milici [61] concluded that the US coal industry only could handle liquefaction of 54-64 Mt coal annually without premature depletion of the coal reserves, and states that attempts to replace all oil imports would deplete the national coal reserves by 2100. The resulting volumes of synthetic fuels are insignificant compared to the present and expected demand.

#### Can’t meet emission regs Even with CCS, CTL has huge emissions

Höök and Aleklett ‘10

(Mikael Höök and Kjell Aleklett, Uppsala University, Global Energy Systems, Department of physics and astronomy “A review on coal to liquid fuels and its coal consumption” 2010 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/er.1596>, TSW)

3.8. Emission properties¶ The low sulphur content of CTL products compared to petroleum-derived fuels is a common trait for both DCL and ICL, which comes from the necessity to protect catalysts from poisoning. Aside from this similarity, emissions and combustion characteristics of DCL and ICL fuels differ. Comprehensive analysis of emission characteristics of synthetic and conventional fuels have been compared by others [43, 44].¶ DCL products are typically rich in polycyclic aromatics and heteroatoms [45-48], while ICL has lower aromatics content. High temperature FT-synthesis yields branched products and contains aromatics, whilst these are virtually absent in low temperature FT-synthesis [49]. Recently, environmental regulation trends have moved towards limiting the aromatic content in transportation fuels [30], giving the advantage to ICL-fuels.¶ Toxic trace metals and inorganic compounds, such as cadmium, selenium, arsenic, lead and mercury, can be passed on to the final fuel product in both DCL and ICL-processes. In ICL-systems, removal of mercury and other metals is generally trivial and inexpensive [30]. For DCL, however, it will be more complicated and more costly, but not impossible.¶ Cetane and octane numbers also differ, resulting from the chemical properties of the various products. ICL gives diesel of a high quality, which is mostly due to the dominance of straight-chain products. However, low densities are a problem for ICL products, but this can be mitigated by blending [48]. General differences of final products are summarized in Table 2. Typical properties for specific ICL-distillates can be found in Leckel [48].¶ Both DCL and ICL fuels emit large amounts of carbon dioxide compared to ordinary petroleum-derived fuels. However, there are methods for reducing or even neutralizing emissions without raising production costs drastically. Substantial differences exist between DCL and ICL technologies with regard to the potential and cost of greenhouse gas emission mitigation [30].¶ Vallentin [39] concludes that DCL generates about 90% more CO2 than conventional fuel on a well-to-wheel basis. This is in agreement with other studies, but if reduction measures are implemented, the emissions could be reduced to no more than 30% extra compared to conventional petroleum fuels [30].¶ ICL-technology generates approximately 80-110% more CO2 emissions compared to conventional fuels, if the CO2 is vented [30, 39]. However, there are ICL-system configurations where H2S+CO2 co-capture/co-storage can reduce emissions [30]. Well-to-wheel analysis has shown that even with CCS, CTL production chain emissions are higher than for petroleum-derived fuels, mostly due to emissions from mining [35].¶ In summary, CTL fuels can improve emission characteristics and reduce transportation emissions of sulphur, aromatics, NOx and particles compared to conventional fuels [43]. However, there does not seem to be much potential for CO2 emission reductions if the full supply chain is analysed for either DCL or ICL.

#### CTL transition impossible – costs and would change the economics of coal

Höök and Aleklett ‘10

(Mikael Höök and Kjell Aleklett, Uppsala University, Global Energy Systems, Department of physics and astronomy “A review on coal to liquid fuels and its coal consumption” 2010 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/er.1596>, TSW)

World oil production currently stands at more than 80 Mb/d [63]. The total cost for replacing a significant amount of the world’s oil production by CTL would be astronomical, regardless of the chosen system approach. Necessary investments for a large CTL industry are evidently colossal, but the greatest issue lies perhaps in coal consumption. Coal will account for a large part of the costs, and with the required volumes being vast, accompanying changes in coal price and additional costs of increasing coal feedstock production will greatly affect the future economics of CTL. This is a topic that deserves more attention in future studies.

## Politics

**2NC**

**1NC Tucker says it’s key to hegemony because it solves deficit concerns which prevents extinction that’s khalilzahd.**

**Reform’s key to heg**

**Nye 12** Joseph S. Nye, a former US assistant secretary of defense and chairman of the US National Intelligence Council, is University Professor at Harvard University. “Immigration and American Power,” December 10, Project Syndicate, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/obama-needs-immigration-reform-to-maintain-america-s-strength-by-joseph-s--nye

CAMBRIDGE – The United States is a nation of immigrants. Except for a small number of Native Americans, everyone is originally from somewhere else, and even recent immigrants can rise to top economic and political roles. President Franklin Roosevelt once famously addressed the Daughters of the American Revolution – a group that prided itself on the early arrival of its ancestors – as “fellow immigrants.”¶ In recent years, however, US politics has had a strong anti-immigration slant, and the issue played an important role in the Republican Party’s presidential nomination battle in 2012. But Barack Obama’s re-election demonstrated the electoral power of Latino voters, who rejected Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney by a 3-1 majority, as did Asian-Americans.¶ As a result, several prominent Republican politicians are now urging their party to reconsider its anti-immigration policies, and plans for immigration reform will be on the agenda at the beginning of Obama’s second term. **Successful reform will be an important step in preventing the decline of American power.**¶ Fears about the impact of immigration on national values and on a coherent sense of American identity are not new. The nineteenth-century “Know Nothing” movement was built on opposition to immigrants, particularly the Irish. Chinese were singled out for exclusion from 1882 onward, and, with the more restrictive Immigration Act of 1924, immigration in general slowed for the next four decades.¶ During the twentieth century, the US recorded its highest percentage of foreign-born residents, 14.7%, in 1910. A century later, according to the 2010 census, 13% of the American population is foreign born. But, despite being a nation of immigrants, more Americans are skeptical about immigration than are sympathetic to it. Various opinion polls show either a plurality or a majority favoring less immigration. The recession exacerbated such views: in 2009, one-half of the US public favored allowing fewer immigrants, up from 39% in 2008.¶ Both the number of immigrants and their origin have caused concerns about immigration’s effects on American culture. Demographers portray a country in 2050 in which non-Hispanic whites will be only a slim majority. Hispanics will comprise 25% of the population, with African- and Asian-Americans making up 14% and 8%, respectively.¶ But mass communications and market forces produce powerful incentives to master the English language and accept a degree of assimilation. Modern media help new immigrants to learn more about their new country beforehand than immigrants did a century ago. Indeed, most of the evidence suggests that the latest immigrants are assimilating at least as quickly as their predecessors.¶ While too rapid a rate of immigration can cause social problems, over the long term, immigration strengthens US power. It is estimated that at least 83 countries and territories currently have fertility rates that are below the level needed to keep their population constant. Whereas most developed countries will experience a shortage of people as the century progresses, America is one of the few that may avoid demographic decline and maintain its share of world population.¶ For example, to maintain its current population size, Japan would have to accept 350,000 newcomers annually for the next 50 years, which is difficult for a culture that has historically been hostile to immigration. In contrast, the Census Bureau projects that the US population will grow by 49% over the next four decades.¶ Today, the US is the world’s third most populous country; 50 years from now it is still likely to be third (after only China and India). This is highly relevant to **economic power**: whereas nearly all other developed countries will face a growing burden of providing for the older generation**, immigration could help to attenuate the policy problem for the US.**¶ In addition, though studies suggest that the short-term economic benefits of immigration are relatively small, and that unskilled workers may suffer from competition**, skilled immigrants can be important to** particular sectors – and to **long-term growth**. There is a strong correlation between the number of visas for skilled applicants and patents filed in the US. At the beginning of this century, Chinese- and Indian-born engineers were running one-quarter of Silicon Valley’s technology businesses, which accounted for $17.8 billion in sales; and, in 2005, immigrants had helped to start one-quarter of all US technology start-ups during the previous decade. Immigrants or children of immigrants founded roughly 40% of the 2010 Fortune 500 companies.¶ Equally important are immigration’s benefits for America’s **soft power.** The fact that people want to come to the US enhances its appeal, and immigrants’ upward mobility is attractive to people in other countries. **The US is a magnet**, and many people can envisage themselves as Americans, in part because so many successful Americans look like them. Moreover, connections between immigrants and their families and friends back home help to convey accurate and positive information about the US.¶ Likewise, because the presence of many cultures creates avenues of connection with other countries, it helps to broaden Americans’ attitudes and views of the world in an era of globalization. Rather than diluting **hard and soft power, immigration enhances both**.¶ Singapore’s former leader, Lee Kwan Yew, an astute observer of both the US and China, argues that China will not surpass the US as the leading power of the twenty-first century, precisely **because the US attracts the best and brightest** from the rest of the world and melds them into a diverse culture of creativity. China has a larger population to recruit from domestically, but, in Lee’s view, its Sino-centric culture will make it less creative than the US.¶ That is a view that Americans should take to heart. If Obama succeeds in enacting **immigration reform** in his second term, he **will** have gone a long way toward fulfilling his promise to **maintain the strength of the US.**

**Key to Military Primacy solves hegemony**

**Paarlberg 04**

[Prof. of Poli. Sci. at Wellesley, and Assoc.at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard Science, Military Dominance, and U.S. Security, Robert L. Paarlberg, International Security 29.1 (2004) 122-151]

Military primacy today rests on scientific primacy, and the scientific primacy ofthe United States rests on a remarkably durable foundation. Rather than threatening U.S. primacy in science, globalization has strengthened it. Yet science-based military primacy on the battlefield is clearly not a guarantee of security. Determined adversaries can innovate increasingly asymmetric tactics against an endless list of soft targets, and the more domination and resentment they feel under U.S. conventional military hegemony, the more incentive they will have to move toward these unconventional responses. Conventional victories that make new enemies may encourage a dangerous shift toward asymmetry, and if the United States then responds by indiscriminately denying foreigners access to the homeland, U.S. primacy in science could itself be critically weakened. The war against international terror should be fought with science, rather than at the expense of science. The homeland security strategy of the United States should include much larger science investments in disciplines such as chemistry, physics, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and information technology, where promising new counterterror applications are sure to be found. Smart societies can develop not only smart new weapons for conventional use abroad, but also smart new capabilities for threat detection and soft target protection [End Page 150] at home. For example, nanofabrication may hold the key to a timely detection system for some terror bombing threats. Silicon polymer nanowires 2,000 times thinner than a human hair can cheaply detect traces of TNT and piric acid in both water and air, and might someday be developed and deployed into "smart" cargo containers, to protect against terrorist bombs. New information technologies using powerhouse terascale computing capabilities may soon be able to help in tracking and anticipating the behavior of terror networks.90 New systems capable of detecting dangerous amounts of radiation are increasingly affordable and unobtrusive, and the Department of Homeland Security has proposed development of a fully networked national sensor system to monitor the air continuously for pathogens, dangerous chemicals, and other public hazards. One line of defense already in place in thirty cities is a Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory-designed system for monitoring the air for biological attack.

**2NC Econ**

**Immigration key to economy- boosts all sectors**

**Klein 1-29**

Ezra is a Bloomberg and Washington Post Columnist, “To Fix the U.S. Economy, Fix Immigration,” <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-29/to-fix-the-u-s-economy-fix-immigration.html>

¶ Washington tends to have a narrow view of what counts as “economic policy.” Anything we do to the tax code is in. So is any stimulus we pass, or any deficit reduction we try. Most of this mistakes the federal budget for the economy.¶ The truth is, **the most important piece of economic policy we pass -- or don’t pass -- in 2013 may be** something we don’t think of as economic policy at all: **immigration reform.**¶ ¶ Congress certainly doesn’t consider it economic policy, at least not officially. Immigration laws go through the House and Senate judiciary committees. But consider a few facts about immigrants in the American economy: About a tenth of the U.S. population is foreign-born. **More than a quarter of U.S. technology and engineering businesses started from 1995 to 2005 had a foreign-born owne**r. In Silicon Valley, half of all tech startups had a foreign-born founder.¶ Immigrants begin businesses and file patents at a much higher rate than their native-born counterparts, and while there are disputes about the effect immigrants have on the wages of low-income Americans, **there’s little dispute about their effect on wages overall: They lift them**.¶ The economic case for immigration is best made by way of analogy. Everyone agrees that aging economies with low birth rates are in trouble; this, for example, is a thoroughly conventional view of Japan. It’s even conventional wisdom about the U.S. **The retirement of the baby boomers is correctly understood as an economic challenge**. The ratio of working Americans to retirees will fall from 5-to-1 today to 3-to-1 in 2050. Fewer workers and more retirees is tough on any economy.¶ Importing Workers¶ There’s nothing controversial about that analysis. But if that’s not controversial, then immigration shouldn’t be, either. Immigration is essentially the importation of new workers. It’s akin to raising the birth rate, only easier, because most of the newcomers are old enough to work. And because living in the U.S. is considered such a blessing that even very skilled, very industrious workers are willing to leave their home countries and come to ours, the U.S. has an unusual amount to gain from immigration. **When it comes to the global draft for talent, we almost always get the first-round picks** -- at least, if we want them, and if we make it relatively easy for them to come here.¶ From the vantage of naked self-interest, the wonder isn’t that we might fix our broken immigration system in 2013. It’s that we might not.¶ **Few economic problems wouldn’t be improved by more immigration**. If you’re wo**rried about deficits, more young, healthy workers paying into Social Security and Medicare are an obvious boon**. **If you’re concerned about the slowdown in new company formation and its attendant effects on economic growth, more immigrant entrepreneurs should cheer you**. If you’re worried about the dearth of science and engineering majors in our universities, an influx of foreign-born students is the most obvious solution you’ll find.

¶ Politicians of both parties recognize this. “Our goal is to advance policies that make a difference in peoples’ lives, and that means we want to advance pro-growth reforms that are good for the economy,” Republican Representative Paul Ryan said at a recent Wall Street Journal breakfast. The first pro-growth reform he named? Immigration.¶ Many immigration opponents object to “amnesty” -- allowing people who broke the law to reap the benefits of legal status. That’s a moral question, and while I prefer not to stand on principle when we have 11 million people already living in the shadows in the U.S., it’s beyond the scope of this column. The main economic concern about allowing more immigration or legalizing the status of those who are already here is that immigrants will undermine the wages of the least-skilled Americans. In reality, it’s not clear that will happen.¶ Complementary Skills¶ In addition to growing the size of the national pie, unskilled immigrants tend to have what economists call complementary skills to U.S. workers. If one worker speaks English and another doesn’t, for example, they generally don’t pursue the same job.¶ In that way, it’s useful again to compare immigration with native birth rates. Increasing the number of native-born workers leads to more direct competition, because two native-born workers are probably more similar than an immigrant and a native worker. Yet most everyone cheers if they hear that the U.S. birth rate has ticked up.¶ Some workers are hurt by immigration, but they are typically already struggling. The best way to help them is with more training, better health care, a more generous earned income tax credit and so on. Those benefits are easier to provide in a growing economy with more young workers than in a sluggish one with chronic budget deficits. Immigration isn’t what really ails them, and it isn’t what stands in the way of aiding them.¶ Will immigrants use those same social services, as some immigration opponents contend, adding to the cost of the nation’s welfare state? Yes, but not as often as they’ll pay into it. In 2007, the Congressional Budget Office analyzed the issue while assessing President George W. Bush’s proposed immigration reforms. It found that **legalizing undocumented immigrants would increase federal revenue by $48 billio**n while costing only $23 billion in increased public services -- and that’s before accounting for the broader economic benefits of immigration.¶ There are few free lunches in public policy. But taking advantage of our unique position as a country where the world’s best, brightest and hardest-working desperately want to live is surely one. In the end, **economies aren’t mainly about budgets and tax cod**es, though Congress occasionally pretends otherwise. **They’re about workers and business owners. Immigration reform is a way to get more of both.**

**Decline causes war**

**Kemp 10**

Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East, p. 233-4

The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. **The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates**, further weakening the global economy. As a result, **energy demand falls** and the price of fossil fuels plummets, **leading to a financial crisis** for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to **political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups**, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The **internal stability of some countries is challenged**, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the **collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran**, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and **weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation** in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and **the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack** in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states **may lead to a further devastating collapse** of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, **major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.**

### Links

#### CTL unpopular – Obama backed off and Montana failure proves

BROWN ‘11

(MATTHEW BROWN AP “Mont. tribe's $7B coal project stalls, draws suit” May 19, 2011 Thursday 11:57 PM GMT lexis, TSW)

A Montana tribe's plan to build a $7 billion coal-to-liquids plant has stalled after it failed to attract sufficient financing, leading to a courtroom dispute between the tribe and its partner in the proposal.¶ A federal judge in Delaware has scheduled a hearing next week on a request by a Texas-based investment group that accuses the Crow tribe of backing out of their 2009 development agreement.¶ According to a lawsuit filed this week by Australian-American Energy Co., the Crow Tribe claims the company has failed to make minimum annual expenditures called for under the agreement.¶ The company says it has spent more than $10 million toward the project but that "circumstances beyond the parties' control" have slowed its progress.¶ Construction originally was anticipated to begin next year but already had been pushed back by tribal officials to 2013 at the earliest.¶ "The collapse of the global equity markets, the unanticipated development in the United States of vast resources of shale gas and regulatory uncertainty regarding support of coal to liquid projects have materially and adversely affected the economic feasibility of the project," Australian-American Energy declared in a Wednesday court filing.¶ The company also said conditions needed to support its continued investment, including the tribe's execution of a water rights lease, have not been met, and that the tribe had no grounds to send a termination notice.¶ It wants a temporary injunction until an arbitrator is appointed.¶ Crow leaders warned last year the proposed project could founder without more federal support. A tribal representative said the tribe still intends to pursue the project.¶ But tribal attorney Roger Renville said Thursday he could not talk about the lawsuit. "Because it's in litigation, we cannot make a statement about the dispute," he said.¶ The Crow have other energy projects in the works, including a hydropower plant on the Bighorn River downstream of Yellowtail Dam and a wind turbine project. Companies working with the tribe already produce natural gas from the southeastern Montana reservation.¶ But coal is at the center of the impoverished tribe's economic development ambitions. The reservation sits atop an estimated 9 billion tons of the fuel enough to meet the electricity demands of the U.S. for about four years.¶ Plans called for a plant on the reservation that would initially consume 14 million tons of coal annually, producing 50,000 barrels a day of diesel, jet fuel, fertilizer or other products. Carbon dioxide produced as part of the conversion process would be captured and stored or sold for industrial purposes.¶ The United States has no operating coal-to-liquids plants. But they have been proposed in Wyoming, Ohio and elsewhere. Plant developers in West Virginia broke ground on an 18,000-barrel-per-day project earlier this month, although how it will be financed remains uncertain.¶ Industry representatives have long sought Congressional backing for increased coal-to-liquid energy production as a way to prime the industry's growth, including a bill offered in 2007 by then-Sen. Barack Obama that would have provided incentives for research and plant construction.¶ No such legislation has passed, and Obama has since backed off his strong support for the fuel.¶ Critics have questioned whether coal-to-liquids is financially viable without government support, and environmentalists have vowed to fight in court any plant that moves toward construction.

#### Congress has rejected in past

Bunning ‘10

(The office of Sen Jim Bunning, R-Ky “¶ SEN. BUNNING'S SPRING NEWSLETTER” June 16, 2010 Wednesday 6:06 PM EST Lexis,TSW)

Clean Coal¶ I have always been proud to be from a coal state. Half of the United States' electricity comes from coal. Energy from coal is cheap and affordable, lowering America's electric bills and allowing us to have extra money in our pockets during this tough economic time. The future of coal lies in clean coal. With the advancement of new technologies, the process of converting coal to energy not only becomes cleaner and keeps Americans' utility bills affordable, but also creates jobs at the same time.¶ Last week, the Senate debated the "endangerment finding" by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in regards to greenhouse gas emissions. In December 2009, the EPA declared that greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide, are pollutants dangerous to the public's health. This ruling by the EPA is no more than a backdoor attempt to enforce a national energy policy that would be a job killer. A resolution I cosponsored, Senate Joint Resolution 26, introduced by Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) earlier this year, is a formal resolution of disapproval to stop the EPA from regulating greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act. Unfortunately, the other side prevailed last week in their opposition and voted against proceeding with the resolution.¶ In addition, I recently offered an amendment to restore the coal-to-liquids portion of the alternative fuel tax credit. This is the only portion in the alternative fuel credit that requires reduced emissions. Despite this, the leadership in the House of Representatives stripped it from the package of extensions of expired provisions that Congress is currently debating. My amendment, cosponsored by Senator Rockefeller (D-WV), provides a significant incentive for developing clean coal technology that the United States needs for a secure energy supply and does not cost any taxpayer dollars.

**Immigration passes- Washington Times 3-28 says labor and business nearly have a deal on low-skilled and that the Gang of eight is nearly done.**

**More Reasons it passes:**

**A Obama pushing but passage isn’t guaranteed**

**CT POST 3/28/13** Connecticut Post http://www.ctpost.com/local/article/Immigration-reform-gaining-support-in-Congress-4393187.php

A Republican Party in desperate search for relevance to Latino voters. An expanded Democratic advantage in the Senate. A second-term President with his legacy on the line.¶ Does all that add up to enough to break decades of impasse and produce comprehensive immigration reform? As expectations -- and tensions -- rise, **the answer won't be long in coming.**¶ A bipartisan bill could be filed in the Senate as early as next week, followed in relatively short order by a House bill, also crafted by a bipartisan group, aiming at a compromise on the key issue of citizenship.¶ The efforts are being applauded by President Barack Obama, who **is using every ounce of his political clout to try to get comprehensive reform.¶** Obama said the time has come "to work up the political courage to do what's required to be done."¶ "I expect a bill to be put forward. I expect a debate to begin next month. I want to sign that bill into law as soon as possible," Obama said at a White House naturalization ceremony.¶ In addition to the issue of eventual citizenship for 11 million undocumented immigrants, Congress is expected to address the need for temporary or guest worker programs.¶ Congress last passed comprehensive bipartisan reform legislation in 1986, when President Ronald Reagan signed a law that granted citizenship to several million undocumented immigrants and created a guest worker program.¶ Up until now, Republicans have opposed citizenship programs as an "amnesty" for lawbreakers who entered the country illegally, and labor has chafed at guest worker programs.¶ But Republican losses in the 2012 elections and increased public support for reform have many in the GOP talking compromise.¶ "If there is one issue that the two parties could produce something meaningful on in this Congress, it would be immigration," said Stephen Hess, a political expert at The Brookings Institution.¶ Hess said an eventual bill "will have lots of provisos, and it will go back and forth, but it would be hard not to produce something given the general feeling that something has to be produced."¶ More and more Republicans are moving toward immigration-reform measures as the party seeks to reach out to Latinos, the nation's largest -- and growing -- minority voting bloc.¶ Public opinion is behind them.¶ A recent poll showed 63 percent of Americans supported a path to citizenship for undocumented workers provided they meet certain requirements, according to a survey by the Public Religion Research Institute.¶ Notable Republicans who have recently spoken in favor of compromise on citizenship proposals include Sen. Rand Paul, R-Ky.; former Mississippi Gov. Haley Barbour; and Rep. Paul Ryan, R-Wis.¶ And a March report by the National Republican Committee, considered a "post mortem" on the 2012 elections, recommended the GOP embrace comprehensive immigration reform to shore up its shaky standing with minorities -- Latinos, in particular.¶ Roy Beck, executive director of Numbers USA, which advocates lower numerical numbers on immigration, predicted a majority of Republican senators would oppose citizenship.¶ Groups like Numbers USA are working to hold GOP senators in line. They sent 13,000 emails to Kentucky voters that claimed Paul's position was "more radical and pro-immigration than anything proposed by President Obama."¶ The group has targeted Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., one of the "Gang of Eight" senators writing the Senate bipartisan bill, as a lawmaker who favors foreign workers over unemployed South Carolinians.¶ Democrats from conservative-leaning states could also feel political heat.¶ Beck said if five to 10 Democrats in the Senate oppose a bill, proponents would need 10 to 15 Republicans to reach the 60 votes needed to cut off debate and vote on legislation.¶ "You do the math," Beck said.¶ In 2007, an effort to cut off debate on a Senate immigration reform bill died on a 46-53 vote.¶ But immigrant reform proponents, such as America's Voice, say there is a "tectonic shift" in the GOP, and the Democrats also have expanded their Senate majority to 53-45, plus two independents who caucus with them. They predict the Senate will muster the votes necessary to pass a reform bill.¶ **Still, it won't be easy.**

**A Last Time**

**Khimm 3-19**

Suzy is a Budget and Economy reporter for the Washington Post, “Five Reasons Why Immigration Reform is Moving Forward,” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/03/19/five-reasons-why-immigration-reform-is-moving-forward/>

**We’ve been through this before**. The 2006-07 immigration reform talks fell apart, but **the passage of time** seems to have **allowed** various **stakeholders to cool off** and come back to the table to work out a deal. **Democrats are more united and** relatively **less suspicious of the temporary worker programs** that raised their hackles the last time around (then-Sen. Obama was among those who voted for an amendment phasing out a guest-worker program**), and more prominent Republicans have come around to a path to citizenship**.¶ “The immigration issue in a lot of ways I think is maturing in a way that simply takes time,” says Mary Giovagnoli, director of the Immigration Policy Center, who was a staffer for Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) during the 2006-07 debate. “**There seems to be a much greater level of trust and cordiality**. [The last time] the two sides were dragged kicking and screaming together.” **A similar dynamic was at play with health-care reform—another major effort that had suffered from a spectacular defeat in Congress before finally passing**. “Any major, **major** piece of **social change is a long process**,” Giovagnoli concludes.

**B Interests**

**Khimm 3-19**

Suzy is a Budget and Economy reporter for the Washington Post, “Five Reasons Why Immigration Reform is Moving Forward,” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/03/19/five-reasons-why-immigration-reform-is-moving-forward/>

4) **Powerful interest groups are trying to help** the process along. **The labor vs. business fight** over temporary guest-workers was **one of the biggest impasses of the Bush**-era **immigration fight**. **Now the AFL-CIO and** the **Chamber** of Commerce **are sitting down** to iron out their own differences, at the behest of the Senate. They are still struggling to come to a final agreement, but **it’s a good faith effort that could help such contentious issues from tearing apart the negotiations** on Capitol Hill.¶ 5) There’s a big grassroots movement in support of the issue. Congress’s last attempt at immigration reform died in 2007, but activists and advocates haven’t just been sitting in the wings over the last six years. **Immigrant activists,** together with their **allies in evangelical churches, Latino groups**, universities, **and others, have mobilized** around the record number of deportations by the Obama administration and the dramatic anti-immigration laws passed by Arizona and other GOP-governed states. Undocumented students from the DREAM movement have come forward into the spotlight.¶ **All this has helped keep the momentum for immigration reform going on the ground even as Congress and the White House dallied on the issue. And that’s helped drive public support for a comprehensive overhaul.** ”A movement doesn’t really become a vital political entity that can drive legislation until you move from people who are most passionate and directly concerned to the average American says, ‘Oh this affects me,’ or ‘I don’t like what this says about the country,’” says Giovagnoli.

**C Vote Count**

**Simendinger 3-26**

Alexis Covers the White House for Real Clear Politics, “Obama Expects April Senate Debate on Immigration,” <http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/03/26/obama_expects_april_senate_debate_on_immigration_117644.html>

“We haven’t set a firm date,” Celcia Muñoz, the director of the White House Domestic Policy Council, told ABC/Univision following a Washington luncheon last week, responding to a question about when a measure would get introduced. “The good news is that the Gang of Eight seems to be making progress. We are engaged with them. We are encouraged by their progress.”¶ Some **reform advocates have sounded increasingly upbeat that 60 votes, or** perhaps **more, will turn up in the Senate** for immigration changes that create a set pathway to citizenship, or a green card, within a chamber composed of 53 Democrats, 45 Republicans, and two independents who vote with the majority.

**A2: Citizenship**

**Deal on citizenship**

**CNN 3-27**

“Immigration Tops Agenda as Senators Tour Border,” lexis

Democrats and Republicans have been bogged down for years over the question of how best to secure the country's border while resolving the status of roughly 11 million undocumented immigrants. A rare political window appeared to open after last November's presidential election, when GOP presidential nominee Mitt Romney performed dismally among Hispanic voters.¶ Despite strong conservative resistance to a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, Republican leaders recognize their party's need to appeal more strongly to America's fastest growing minority group. For his part, Obama is hoping to lock in a major second term legislative victory.¶ A source familiar with the congressional negotiations has told CNN that the eight senators have tentatively reached agreement on some of the thorniest issues, such as a path to citizenship and metrics for securing the border.¶ The groups is also working on a revamped guest worker program, the source noted.¶ More specifically, one of the big outstanding issues appears to be around the future flow of low-skilled guest workers who would come to the United States to be maids, waiters, hotel workers or home-care workers. Negotiators are discussing how much they would be paid, and how many workers would be allowed into the country each year.¶ Labor unions influencing the talks are arguing for higher pay and fewer workers per year, since they are concerned about the effect guest workers would have on American workers. Groups such as the Chamber of Commerce, however, are pushing senators for lower pay and high numbers of guest workers per year, since that will help businesses' bottom lines.¶ On the issue of permanent legal status, the source told CNN the senators have essentially agreed to a 13 year path to citizenship. According to the tentative agreement, it would take 10 years for illegal workers to get a green card to work legally in the U.S. and then an additional three years to move towards citizenship.¶ Illegal workers would have to pay a fine, back taxes, and have no criminal record.¶ The senators, according to the source, have agreed that no illegal worker will be eligible for citizenship until the border is considered secure. Figuring out how to measure that has been a major part of the talks.

**A2: Piecemeal**

**Gang of eight agrees**

**AP 3-28**

“Senators tour border, say immigration bill near,” <http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2013-03-28/senators-tour-border-say-immigration-bill-near>

The senators stressed only comprehensive immigration reform, not piecemeal solutions, had any hope of passing both chambers of Congress.¶ "We are not going to slice it up," McCain said.

**Piecemeal always fails capital keeps deal**

**Helderman and Nakamura 1/25**, Rosalind S. Helderman covers Congress and politics for the Washington Post, staff writer for The Washington Post “Senators nearing agreement on broad immigration reform proposal,” 1/25, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senators-nearing-agreement-on-broad-immigration-reform-proposal/2013/01/25/950fb78a-6642-11e2-9e1b-07db1d2ccd5b\_story.html

But **obstacles abound**. For instance, Rubio has said he thinks immigrants who came to the country illegally should be able to earn a work permit but should be required to seek citizenship through existing avenues after those who have come here legally. Many Democrats and immigration advocates fear Rubio’s approach would result in wait-times stretching for decades, creating a class of permanent legal residents for whom the benefits of citizenship appear unattainable. They have pushed to create new pathways to citizenship specifically available to those who achieve legal residency as part of a reform effort. It is not yet clear whether the Senate group will endorse a mechanism allowing such people to eventually become citizens — something Obama is expected to champion. Schumer said it would be “relatively detailed” but would not “get down into the weeds.” A source close to Rubio said he joined the group in December at the request of other members only after they agreed their effort would line up with his own principles for reform. As a possible 2016 presidential contender widely trusted on the right, Rubio could be key to moving the bipartisan effort. Rubio and other Republicans have said they would prefer to split up a comprehensive immigration proposal into smaller bills that would be voted on separately, but the White House will pursue comprehensive legislation that seeks to reform the process in a single bill. “I doubt if there will be a macro, comprehensive bill,” said Sen. Johnny Isakson (R-Ga.), who supported the 2007 effort. “Anytime a bill’s more than 500 pages, people start getting suspicious. If it’s 2,000 pages, they go berserk.” But Schumer said Friday that **a single package will be key for passage**. “**We’ll not get it done in pieces**,” he said. “**Every time you do a piece, everyone says what about my piece, and you get more people opposing it.”** Eliseo Medina, secretary treasurer of the Service Employees International Union, which spent millions recruiting Hispanic voters last year, said immigration advocates **expect Obama to be out front on the issue.** “**The president needs to lead** and then the Republicans have a choice,” Medina said. “The best way to share the credit is for them to step up and engage and act together with the president.”

**Has to be comprehensive to pass- dems**

**ABC News 2-7**

“Senate Democrats Dig in on Immigration,” <http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/Politics/senate-democrats-demand-path-citizenship-comprehensive-immigration-bill/story?id=18431903>

Senate Democrats on Thursday pushed back against Republican opposition to key elements of comprehensive immigration reform plans presented by President Barack Obama and a bipartisan group of senators.They also provided a key new detail about a plan being drafted by the Senate group.¶ **Democrats told** a group of Hispanic **media outlets they would insist that immigration reform be accomplished in one comprehensive bill** rather than a series of legislative pieces. **They also made it clear they would not support a bill that does not contain a pathway to citizenship**, a provision opposed by some key House Republicans. Democrats emphasized for the first time that as much as a decade could pass before undocumented immigrants can apply for permanent legal status.

**PC Key to Immigration**

**Capital is key 1NC Foley says it is necessary to forge a deal with the GOP.**

**PC is key motivates democrats and key republicans**

**Shifter 12/27/12 (Michael, President of the Inter-American Dialogue, “Will Obama Kick the Can Down the Road?”)**

Not surprisingly, Obama has been explicit that reforming the US’s shameful and broken immigration system will be a top priority in his second term. **There is every indication that he intends to use some of his precious political capital** – especially in the first year – to push for serious change. The biggest lesson of the last election was that the “Latino vote” was decisive. No one doubts that it will be even more so in future elections. During the campaign, many Republicans -- inexplicably -- frightened immigrants with offensive rhetoric. But the day after the election, there was talk, in both parties, of comprehensive immigration reform. Despite the sudden optimism about immigration reform**, there is, of course, no guarantee that it will happen**. **It will require a lot of negotiation and deal-making**. Obama will have to invest a lot of his time and political capital -- twisting some arms, even in his own party. Resistance will not disappear. There is also a chance that something unexpected could happen that would put off consideration of immigration reform. Following the horrific massacre at a Connecticut elementary school on December 14, for example, public pressure understandably mounted for gun control, at least the ban of assault weapons. But a decision to pursue that measure -- though desperately needed -- would take away energy and time from other priorities like immigration.

**PC key.**

**The Atlantic 2/21/13** [There's Reason to Be Optimistic About Congress—Seriously, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/02/theres-reason-to-be-optimistic-about-congress-seriously/273393/]

Nevertheless, this is a new congressional session, and Boren's pessimism might possibly be proved wrong. For the first time in a decade, if not longer, **conditions are aligned for bipartisan deal-making**, raising hopes that Congress might actually do something and satisfy the wishes of millions of Americans hungry for action. "I am pleased with the signs I see in Congress today to try to make deals," said Lee Hamilton, who was a veteran Democratic House member from Indiana. "There are threads of it -- it's not a fabric yet -- but there are threads, and that's encouraging."

In today's context, defining success is important -- and requires a healthy dose of both skepticism and pragmatism. There's little hope that this Congress can reverse the -- exacerbated by, among other things, powerful special interests and partisan media -- that has gripped Washington. The forces that drove Rep. Boren out of Congress remain potent, and the legislative atmosphere on Capitol Hill is still toxic.

Instead of a long-term course correction, the question is whether Republican leaders in the House, President Obama, and Senate Democrats can facilitate a reprieve -- if only to show the public that the institution is still functional. Cutting a deal with the broad backing of both parties isn't a question so much of relieving those pressures as of learning to pass laws in spite of them.

Favorable Conditions

The makeup of the 113th Congress and the occupant of the White House make conditions riper for bipartisan legislation than at any time since President George W. Bush's first years in office. Since then, Washington has been in the grip of one of two dynamics: Either one party has held Congress and the presidency, or one party, possessing limited power, has had little interest in passing consequential legislation.

The latter was the case last session, when Republicans controlled only the House. In most cases, they used this chamber to approve legislation, such as Rep. Paul Ryan's eponymous budget, that helped define the party's agenda but had no chance of gaining approval in the Senate (much less withstanding a veto from the White House). They were trying to wait out a president whom they believed would be sent packing in 2013.

Democrats were in a similar position from 2007 to 2009, when they controlled Congress but wanted to wait out Bush's tenure. The lack of bipartisanship, of course, didn't prevent major legislation from becoming law over the past 10 years. But when Democrats controlled Washington and passed the Affordable Care Act in 2010, or similarly empowered Republicans approved Medicare Part D in 2003, they didn't need the backing of the other party -- and by and large didn't get it.

This session is different. Neither party has unilateral control, and yet there is an appetite, in the first year of Obama's second term, to make a serious attempt to legislate. The last time Capitol Hill saw something similar came in 2001 and 2002. Republicans suddenly lost the Senate when Sen. Jim Jeffords of Vermont defected from the GOP in the early summer, but Congress still overwhelmingly approved the No Child Left Behind Act months later (although the first round of Bush's tax cuts passed with only a dozen or so Democrats on board in each chamber). Later, the parties worked together to approve a slew of national security issues after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.

But drawing comparisons to that period is difficult because of 9/11; and, besides, most of Bush's term is hardly associated with bipartisan comity. The better parallel -- and the experience current optimists point to -- is 1996 and 1997, which bridges the end of President Clinton's first term and the beginning of his second. That two-year span saw agreements on a series of important issues, ranging from two big-ticket items (welfare reform and a balanced-budget agreement) to lesser-known achievements (such as raising the minimum wage).

The similarity between that period and now extends beyond the split control of government. Only a year earlier, Republicans had ridden the "revolution" of 1994 into control of Congress, when they promised to push their agenda whether Clinton approved or not. But the party ultimately dealt with political setbacks, none more damaging than the government shutdown of 1996. The public blamed Republicans, and afterward Clinton never again trailed GOP presidential nominee Bob Dole (who was Senate majority leader at the time of the shutdown) in a head-to-head matchup, according to preelection polls.

Boehner's Challenge

Public opinion might once again be pulling against Republicans, burnt as they were by Obama's reelection and their unexpected losses in the Senate. In a January poll by The Wall Street Journal and NBC News, 49 percent of adults disapproved of the GOP -- and only 26 percent approved. It was the worst rating for Republicans since 2008. Just as the Republicans in Clinton's time decided their political survival depended on coming to the table, the GOP of today might do the same. "Republicans overplayed the government shutdown, and President Clinton won that battle," said Dan Glickman, a former House member who was Clinton's Agriculture secretary. "And, with that, he effectively used the bully pulpit to control the agenda. He gave a lot of cover for people to vote for him. It's not the only factor, but members of Congress are much [more] likely to support a president when the people at home are inclined to support the president."

How much Obama's broad popularity matters to most GOP House members is debatable. With many of the president's supporters packed into heavily Democratic urban districts, most Republicans represent safely red districts. (In November, Mitt Romney won 227 congressional districts, a majority, despite losing by 4 percentage points in the national vote.)

**But Obama's standing could weigh** more heavily on House Speaker John Boehner and Majority Leader Eric Cantor than on their followers; Cantor has recently attempted to rebrand the party with a softer image. While their charges' interests are more parochial, they have the national party's image to worry about. **Popular opinion** could prod the two leaders to reach agreements with Obama, **especially on emotional issues** such as gun control and **immigration**. Or, at the very least, public pressure could work to ease the disagreements that make even basic government action difficult -- a factor that might have been at work when House Republicans engineered a three-month delay of the debt ceiling. "They're hearing the message outside the Beltway that 'we elected you people to make things work,'" said John Breaux, the former longtime Democratic senator from Louisiana.

The onus falls particularly hard on Boehner, whose struggles to control his conference are well documented. More than any other player in Washington, he will determine whether anything gets done this year. How he decides to proceed could rest on how frequently he's willing to leave conservative colleagues out in the cold and, consequently, how far he's willing to risk his speakership.

The good of the party, and not his seat of power, propelled Boehner's decision to bring the superstorm Sandy relief bill to a vote earlier this year, when it passed with just a minority of support from Republicans. That combination -- Democrats and the moderate wing of the House GOP -- is the pathway to enacting a sweeping set of bipartisan agreements.

A week after the storm vote, a large bipartisan majority passed a three-month extension of the debt ceiling. "It is hard to see this Congress being viewed as a bipartisan one, but we have seen a glimmer of light on the recent bipartisan vote to extend the debt ceiling," said Ron Bonjean, a onetime aide to the Republican leadership.

Obama's Duty

Maintaining that **momentum in the House won't be easy, and it could require Obama's personal leadership.** Getting Boehner to take such a perilous route could depend in large part **on successful cajoling from the president**. And on this subject -- the relationships among Washington's top leaders -- discussion of a deal being cut becomes sharply pessimistic.

**A2: Budget**

**Everyone’s budget is irrelevant they’ll do a CR**

**Bazinet 3-26**

Kenneth is associate editor of government and politics for Kiplinger, “Obama, Congress Still Miles Apart on U.S. Budget,” <http://www.kiplinger.com/article/taxes/T043-C012-S001-obama-congress-still-miles-apart-on-u-s-budget.html>

Since the House and Senate passed separate budget bills last week, they've already met the supposedly onerous requirements of the pay law, even though the likelihood of having a budget in place is something close to zero. There are just too many differences between the two bills to find common ground in a few short weeks.¶ The Republican-controlled House's bill, crafted by Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan (R-WI), is designed to balance the federal budget in 10 years through deep spending cuts and reforms to Medicare and Medicaid. The Democratic-led Senate's version, steered by Budget Committee Chairman Patty Murray (D-WA), calls for about $1 trillion in new tax revenues.¶ Each bill will die in the other chamber. **Senate Democrats won't swallow deep cuts in government spending or** put entitlement programs on the table without any offsetting revenue, and **House Republicans will balk at tax increases**.¶ President **Obama will introduce his budget** blueprint in early April, but **don't expect a compromise measure** that borrows from the Ryan and Murray plans. The president's offering will be just as partisan as the other two. And, just like the House and Senate versions, **Obama's budget will be declared dead on arrival**.¶ After the artificial April 15 deadline passes, a budget deal likely will remain out of reach. It's a matter of timing. If a budget accord isn't reached by August, it's probably not going to happen. With Congress away for much of August and the fiscal year starting on October 1, **lawmakers will instead resort to a continuing resolution** to keep the government running for a few months.

**Budget discussion happens this Summer**

**Fournier 3-21**

Ron is Editorial Director for the National Journal, “Debunking 2 Myths: GOP Won’t Raise Taxes and Budget Deal is Dead,” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/debunking-2-myths-the-gop-won-t-raise-taxes-and-budget-deal-is-dead-20130321>

**The best time for a deal** to occur **is this summer when the debt ceiling is approaching**. We might see House Republicans break the ice by offering a package of entitlement cuts that include much of what Obama has proposed – plus some they know he would reject. It would be interesting to see which bait Obama takes: Would he embrace the reasonable reforms and move toward a deal? Or condemn the onerous provisions and walk away?¶ A few months ago, Obama missed a historic opportunity to deal with Republicans from a position of strength. After a decisive election victory, he squeezed a $600 billion tax increase out of the House but could not strike a so-called grand bargain with Boehner, a fact that both sides blame on the other.¶ Now he’s a bit weaker but a bargain is still in reach. **Entitlement reform and $300 billion or more in new revenue**– coupled with the 2012 tax hikes and some measure of the sequestration cuts -- **could be a rare moment of pride and accomplishment for Washington**.

**Immigration First**

**Obama focused on immigration**

**USA Today 3-24**

“Obama Returns to Immigration Issue,” <http://www.usatoday.com/story/theoval/2013/03/24/obama-immigration-republicans-napolitano/2014581/>

Fresh off his Middle East trip, President **Obama returns to domestic issues** this week, **starting with immigration.**¶ Obama is scheduled to speak Monday at a naturalization ceremony for active-duty servicemembers and civilians at the White House.¶ **The president**, who returned to the White House on Saturday night from a journey to Israel and Jordan, **is expected to** again **advocate** what he calls "**c**omprehensive **i**mmigration **r**eform."¶ It would combine tighter border enforcement with a pathway to citizenship for illegal immigrants who are already in the United States.

### Generic

**DoD energy leadership causes Congressional battles**

**Cardwell 12**

Diane Cardwell, NYTimes, 8/27/12, Military SPending on Biofuels Draws Fire, www.nytimes.com/2012/08/28/business/military-spending-on-biofuels-draws-fire.html?pagewanted=all

And that has made them a **flash point in a larger political battle** over government financing for new energy technologies.

“**You’re not the secretary of energy**,” Representative Randy Forbes, a Republican from Virginia, told Mr. Mabus as he criticized the biofuels program at a hearing in February. “You’re the secretary of the Navy.”

The House, controlled by Republicans, has already approved measures that would all but kill Pentagon spending on purchasing or investing in biofuels. A committee in the Senate, led by Democrats, has voted to save the program. The fight will heat up again when Congress takes up the Defense Department’s budget again in the fall.

The naval demonstration — known as the Great Green Fleet — was part of a $510 million three-year, multiagency program to help the military develop alternatives to conventional fuel. It is a drop in the ocean of the Pentagon’s nearly $650 billion annual budget.

But with the Defense Department facing $259 billion in budget cuts over the next five years, some lawmakers argue that **the military should not be spending millions on developing new** fuel **markets** when it is buying less equipment and considering cutting salaries.

### Procurement

**New Procurement is unpopular**

**Murdock & Sayler 3-19**

Dr. Clark is Director of the CSIS Defense and National Security Group and Kelley is an author at the CSIS, “Preparing for the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review,” <http://csis.org/files/publication/130319_Murdock_Preparing2014QDR_Web.pdf>

Defense procurement accounts have historically borne the brunt of reductions in the defense ¶ budget (as, for example, in the post-Cold War drawdown). And given the reluctance of both ¶ Congress and DoD to stop the growth of pay and benefits for uniformed personnel, there will be ¶ continued – and increasing – pressure on these accounts that could ultimately result in the inability to equip the force. Furthermore, heavy reductions in the procurement accounts could ¶ threaten the near-term health of the defense industrial base. ¶ Gordon Adams noted that pressure on procurement has already resulted in a decline in acquisitions ¶ dollars from the FY2010 peak. This trend should be expected to continue as the drawdown progresses. ¶ Indeed, David Berteau projected that failure to control internal cost growth could result in a 20 percent ¶ budget share for procurement, R&D, MILCON, and family housing. “There is no historical example of a ¶ nation able to sustain expeditionary global capability if it’s only investing 20 percent of its resources in ¶ procurement, R&D, and its investment accounts,” he observed. ¶ Peter Singer noted an additional challenge impacting procurement during a defense drawdown: “The ¶ old is privileged by current contracts, current program offices, current internal tribes and bureaucratic ¶ constituencies who see their careers as linked to these current programs, and current factories in ¶ current congressional districts with current lobbyists working for them.” As a result of these vested¶ interests, legacy systems are often protected at the expense of new technologies that may be better ¶ suited to current strategy. ¶ Finally, Mr. Berteau addressed the impact of reductions on the defense industrial base: “The second ¶ and third tiers have much less robustness [than the primes] in being able to sustain and survive ¶ this…and where you’re particularly going to see the impact is in services contracts because the deferral ¶ of contracts that comes from sequestration and beyond doesn’t have an immediate impact on the ¶ hardware side but will have a very immediate and near-term impact on the services side.” Defense ¶ planners should be mindful of these effects as they conduct the 2014 QDR, he concluded.

### A2: Congress Doesn’t Care

**Obama would have to get involved to overcome McCain blocking appropriations**

**Rogin ‘12**

Josh writes the Cable Blog, “McCain Moves to Shutdown Pentagon’s Power to reprogram funds,” <http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/13/mccain_moves_to_shut_down_pentagon_s_power_to_reprogram_funds>, march

Sen. **John McCain** (R-AZ**) is moving to reassert Congressional control over billions of dollars in defense spendi**ng that he says the Pentagon has been abusing for years. **McCain**, the ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee**, declared** Tuesday that **he will no longer approve any of the Pentagon's reprogramming requests because, he says, the Defense Department has been abusing that mechanism to fund new programs without Congressional approval** or oversight. The Defense Department reprogrammed between $12 and $15 billion in fiscal 2011, according to McCain, and that has to stop. "T**he reprogramming process that allows only eight members of Congress to approve funding** for new, unauthorized programs **violates the traditional authorization and appropriation process**," McCain wrote today [**in a letter**](http://www.scribd.com/doc/85200972/McCain-Letter-to-SECDEF-Re-Reprogramming) to Defense Secretary **Leon Panetta**. "I will not support any further reprogramming requests for new, unauthorized programs except for emergency requirements." The eight lawmakers who have the power to approve or disapprove Pentagon reprogramming requests are the chairman and ranking members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and their counterparts on the corresponding appropriations defense subcommittees. McCain is not just halting approval of unauthorized new programs. **He is also pledging to reject all non-emergency reprogramming requests until the Pentagon gives him a full accounting of every reprogramming action** in the Defense Department **for 2010 and 2011**, including a list of all new programs begun through reprogramming. **That's going to be a tall order for the Pentagon, which hasn't completed a financial audit in 40 years**. "I will not approve any further reprogramming requests until I am provided this information," McCain wrote. The defense authorization bill provides the Defense Department with authority to reprogram about $8 billion per year, pending congressional approval, so McCain is saying that this authority has been abused. But he is also arguing that the Pentagon has been usurping power from Congress by using a power that is supposed to be reserved for unplanned contingencies to fund programs it can't get through Capitol Hill. A McCain staffer told *The Cable* that Congress has seen the reprogramming process abuse getting worse recently. The committee has received requests for $850 million in reprogramming in only the last two months, $144 million of which is for "new" programs not authorized by Congress. "It was a trend we were seeing in the last 6 months in which we were seeing it getting away from actually emergencies," the staffer said. "The goal for Sen. McCain is to ensure that any money for new programs is vetted through the appropriate Congressional processes." Of course, Congress bears some of the blame for this problem. The appropriations process has been a mess for years, with funding bills coming late or not at all, creating havoc for Pentagon planners and financial officials. The entire federal government is often run on continuing resolutions due to Congress's failure to pass budgets, which makes starting new programs through the regular process more difficult. And the use of omnibus appropriations bills to eventually fund the government takes away individual lawmakers power to strike specific programs through amendments.. McCain's committee is supposed to authorize funding in its defense policy bill each year before the appropriations committee doles out that funding. But the authorization bills are also perennially late, passed after the fiscal year has started, so the Armed Services committees have less influence over defense funds than they should. McCain's effort today is also a way to try to redress that imbalance. McCain has outright rejected at least two Pentagon reprogramming requests this year already. He re jected the Pentagon's request to increase the budget of the Navy's research and development arm by $29.2 million to bolster U.S.-European cooperation in forecasting ocean patterns, asking the Pentagon to explain why that was more important than other military needs. McCain also denied a $38 million reprogramming request from the Army's research and development shop that the Army wanted to spend on studying ways to combat emerging threats posed by new radio communications technologies. That issue will be debated in Congress as part of this years authorization bill. A Pentagon spokesman didn't immediate respond to a request for comment.

**P.C. True**

**Capital Key and Finite - studies prove**

**Beckmann & Kumar ’11**

Matthew and Vimal are in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine, “How Presidents Push: Win Presidents Win: A Model of Presidential Power in U.S. Lawmaking,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 23:1

Fortunately for contemporary presidents, today’s White House affords its occupants an¶ unrivaled supply of persuasive carrots and sticks. Beyond the ofﬁce’s unique visibility¶ and prestige, among both citizens and their representatives in Congress, **presidents may¶ also sway lawmakers by using their discretion in budgeting** and/or **rulemaking**, unique¶ **fundraising and campaigning capacity, control over** executive and judicial n**ominations**,¶ veto power, or numerous other options under the chief executive’s control. Plainly, when¶ it comes to the arm-twisting, brow-beating, **and horse-trading** that so often characterizes¶ legislative battles, **modern** presidents are uniquely well equippedfor the ﬁght. In the following we employ the omnibus concept of ‘**presidential** political capital’ to¶ capture this conception of presidents’ positive power as persuasive bargaining.¶ 1¶ Speciﬁ-¶ cally, we deﬁne presidents’ political capital as the class of tactics White House ofﬁcials¶ employ to induce changes in lawmakers’ behavior.¶ 2¶ Importantly, this conception of presidents’ positive power as persuasive bargaining not only meshes with previous scholarship¶ on lobbying (see, e.g., Austen-Smith and Wright (1994), Groseclose and Snyder (1996),¶ Krehbiel (1998: ch. 7), and Snyder (1991)), but also presidential practice.¶ 3¶ For example, Goodwin recounts how President Lyndon Johnson routinely allocated ‘rewards’ to¶ ‘cooperative’ members:¶ The rewards themselves (and the withholding of rewards) . . . might be something as unobtrusive as receiving an invitation to join the President in a walk around the White House¶ grounds, knowing that pictures of the event would be sent to hometown newspapers . . . [or¶ something as pointed as] public works projects, military bases, educational research grants,¶ poverty projects, appointments of local men to national commissions, the granting of pardons,¶ and more. (Goodwin, 1991: 237)¶ Of course, **presidential** political capital is a scarce commodity w**ith a ﬂoating value.¶** Even **a favorably situated president enjoys only a ﬁnite supply of political capital; he¶ can only promise or pressure so much**. What is more, this **capital ebbs and ﬂows as¶ realities and/or perceptions change**. So, similarly to Edwards (1989), we believe presidents’ bargaining resources cannot fundamentally alter legislators’ predispositions, but¶ rather operate ‘at the margins’ of US lawmaking, however important those margins may¶ be (see also Bond and Fleisher (1990), Peterson (1990), Kingdon (1989), Jones (1994),¶ and Rudalevige (2002)). Indeed, our aim is to explicate those margins and show how¶ presidents may systematically inﬂuence them.

**P.C. Key**

**Dickerson 3-7**

John is CBS News’ Political Director and a Slate Columnist, “Welcome to the White House,” <http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2013/03/barack_obama_s_invites_republicans_to_the_white_house_the_president_s_effort.single.html>

President Obama is reaching out to Republicans. He had dinner with GOP senators Wednesday night and he had lunch with his former rival House Budget Chairman Paul Ryan Thursday afternoon. For the moment, Friday breakfast is open, but perhaps Dick Cheney is free. Next week he will visit Republicans in the House and Senate.¶ How a president works with Congress and persuades lawmakers to do his will is key to the office. With President Obama it is a particularly fascinating topic because he came to office promising a special magic in forging new arrangements with his opponents and he set high expectations about his power to motivate the public if those inside-Washington arrangements didn’t flower. Many of the evaluations of Obama’s leadership seem flawed though, because they focus on whether Obama has or has not reached out sufficiently to Republicans. Embedded in the question is the idea that if you reach out, you will be successful. Nothing could be less true. It isn’t that Obama is reaching out to Republicans for the first time. It’s just that his past attempts at doing so haven’t panned out. That’s because whether a president succeeds in working with his political opponents depends on the timing, the target, and topic, not whether he is trying at all. ¶ The aloof president is reaching out. That was the media’s first gloss on the president’s new robust effort at networking. He had finally embraced a Truth of Washington: **You must engage your opponents and work with them**. Finally he’s showing leadership. Hooray!¶ This view is too reductionist. It’s clear that President Obama is pivoting, but the question is whether he’s doing so to take advantage of a new landscape or if he is finally embracing a simple truth of presidential leadership he long ignored. The answer is somewhere in between and it’s still evolving, but to get a clear understanding requires a sharper definition of what it means to lead when it comes to working with the opposition in Congress.¶ The first step in stripping away some of the fetishism about cooperation is that reaching out to your opponents is not necessarily synonymous with leadership. If it were, Republicans who are praising Obama now would not have attacked him for making promises to engage the leadership of Iran. And if you talk to your opponents when they refuse to listen or when other strategies would bear more fruit, you’re being ineffective, which is not showing good leadership at all. So it doesn’t just matter who a president meets with but also whether the environment is ripe.

# 1NR

**Condo Good**

**1 Interpretation- We Get 1 Conditional CP and 1 Conditional K.**

**2 Key to Neg Flex- Have to test the aff from multiple angles or the 2AC will sit on a position making it impossible to generate offense.**

**3 Education- Only 7 or 8 arguments are relevant to most competing proposals, 1 CP and K allows that many answers to be made, while hearing a variety of potential worlds.**

**4 Real World- Advocacies have to deal with discussions from multiple sides at the same time and carve out reasons their option is best, healthcare proves.**

**5 Alterantive is worse- Neg’s will read a bunch of terrible procedurals or force every debate into an impact turn killing topic education.**

**6 Community Fracture- People will only debate policy or critical options, fragments the community and is a better internal link to people leaving then my 2AC was hard.**

**7 Err Negative on theory- No uniqueness to DA’s means policy neg’s need more questionable fiat mechanisms to stay even and the aff chooses the discussion area and speaks first and last.**

‘

## T Energy Production

### Shell

#### Primary energy production means the increase must be a net generation increase

Energici 12 (provides business intelligence and decision support services to companies and investors active in the wind, solar, hydro, geothermal and bioenergy industries. Specializes in providing robust research, analysis and intelligence coverage of trends and developments) February “PRIMARY ENERGY PRODUCTION (MONTHLY)” http://www.energici.com/energy-profiles/by-country/europe-m-z/sweden/49-countries/north-america/usa/usa-geothermal/449-primary-energy-production

Definition : Primary Energy Production is the amount of energy converted from a primary energy source in its natural state, such as coal, gas, wind etc. that has not been subjected to any conversion or transformation process. The U.S. Energy Information Administration includes the following in U.S. primary energy production: coal production, waste coal supplied, and coal refuse recovery; crude oil and lease condensate production; natural gas plant liquids production; dry natural gas—excluding supplemental gaseous fuels—production; nuclear electricity net generation\*, conventional hydroelectricity\* (not hydro pumped storage), geothermal electricity\*, solar thermal and photovoltaic electricity\*, wind electricity\*, wood and wood-derived fuels consumption; biomass waste consumption and biofuels feedstock.

### Energy Production

#### Primary energy production is the first stage of energy from resources

United Nations No Date

(“Primary Energy Productions, Cyber School Bus Definitions, <http://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/infonation/labelDefs/primaryenergypr.html>, SEH)

Primary Energy Production ¶ How much energy is converted from a primary energy source, such as coal, gas, etc. The unit of measure is the equivalent of a metric ton of oil. ¶ Primary energy production refers to the first stage of production of various forms of energy, converted into a common unit (metric ton of oil equivalent). This series is from the energy statistics database of the Statistics Division of the United Nations Secretariat and is published in the United Nations Statistical Yearbook.

### 2NC Your Conversion

#### There is a distinction between conversion and production

Sagar et al 05 [Ambuj, senior research associate in the Science, Technology, and Public Policy program at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Honyan He Oliver is a research fellow in the Science, Technology, and Public Policy program at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Ananth Chikkatur is a research fellow in the Science, Technology, and Public Policy program at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. “Climate Change, Energy, and Developing Countries” Vermont Journal of Environmental Law Journal 2005-2006]

1. The energy sector encompasses activities relating to the production, conversion, and use of energy. Energy production includes the extraction of primary energy forms such as coal, oil, and natural gas, or growing biomass for energy uses. Energy conversion pertains to the transformation of energy into more useful forms: this includes the refining of petroleum to yield products such as gasoline and diesel; the combustion of coal in power plants to yield electricity; the production of alcohol from biomass, etc. Energy end-use encompasses the final use of energy forms in industrial, residential, commercial, transportation and other end-uses.

### LNG terminals Wreck Everything

#### FERC agrees – LNG terminals and production are distinct and terminals won’t even necessarily lead to increased production

Foster Report 8/3/2012

(Foster Natural Gas/Oil Report; August 3, 2012 “Sierra Club Fails To Gain Traction With Broader Agenda Unveiled in its Opposition to the Sabine Pass Natural Gas Liquefaction Project Designed to Facilitate Exports; FERC Defines "Controversy",” SECTION: NEPA, ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEWS AT FERC; Pg. 21; Lexis – Kurr)

The April 16 order agreed with the EA's conclusion that, with a number of conditions, the Liquefaction Project would result in no significant impacts on the quality of the human environment, and that therefore, no Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was required. At the time, Commission rejected Sierra Club's assertion that the Liquefaction Project will induce the production of additional gas resources found in shale formations throughout the U.S., thus requiring the Commission to consider the environmental impacts of such additional production. According to FERC, any potential impacts associated with additional production are not reasonably foreseeable as contemplated by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations implementing the national environmental policy act, NEPA, and therefore were not considered in the EA.¶ In its rehearing petition, the Sierra Club argued that FERC failed to consider the Liquefaction Project's reasonably foreseeable indirect effect of inducing additional shale natural gas production and the associated environmental impacts; failed to prepare an EIS that comprehensively considered project impacts to air quality, land and water resources, and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, as well as a more thorough analysis of alternatives and mitigation; and erroneously concluded, without adequate environmental analysis, that the project is not inconsistent with the public interest. Sierra Club also sought a stay of construction pending Commission and judicial review in this proceeding, as noted. (FR No. 2901, pp33-36)¶ FERC this time could find no cause to revisit the matter in great detail, and suggested that Sierra Club misstates the findings set forth in the April 16 order. The Commission stated that it did not conclude that it was not "reasonably foreseeable" that the Liquefaction Project would induce increased natural gas production; rather, the order stated that it is virtually impossible to estimate how much, if any, of the export volumes associated with the project will come from existing or new shale gas production. Moreover, while it may be the case that additional shale gas development will result from the Liquefaction Project, the amount, timing and location of such development activity is simply unknowable at this time.¶ The Commission noted that the pipeline interconnects that will provide natural gas to the Liquefaction Project cross both shale and conventional gas fields. Specifically, Sabine Pass will receive natural gas at its interconnection with the Creole Trail Pipeline, which interconnects with other pipelines in the interstate grid. These interconnecting pipeline systems span from Texas to Illinois to Pennsylvania and New Jersey. In addition, each of these interconnecting pipeline systems has a developed network of interconnects with other gas transmission pipeline companies that may traverse additional gas plays.¶ The Commission also noted that the Liquefaction Project does not depend on additional shale gas production which may occur for reasons unrelated to the project, and over which the Commission has no control because it has no jurisdiction over the permitting, siting, construction or operation of natural gas wells.

### Standards

#### B. Topic education – Precisely defining energy production is crucial

Gene Whitney (Section Research Manager at the Congressional Research Service), Carl E. Behrens (Specialist in Energy Policy at the CRS) and Carol Glover (Information Research Specialist at the CRS) November 2010 “U.S. Fossil Fuel Resources:

Terminology, Reporting, and Summary” http://epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.view&FileStore\_id=04212e22-c1b3-41f2-b0ba-0da5eaead952

Terminology A search for energy statistics in the literature quickly reveals a large number of terms used to describe amounts of fossil fuels. Most of these terms have precise and legitimate definitions, and even a careful comparison of statistics for diverse forms of fossil fuels can become quite difficult to reconcile or understand. Not only do oil, natural gas, and coal occur in many diverse geologic environments, but each commodity may occur in different modes or in different geologic settings that impose vastly different economics on their recovery and delivery to market. A vocabulary of terms has developed over the decades to capture the nature of deposits in terms of their likelihood of being developed and their stage of development.

#### Second, predictable limits – They confuse conversion with production – this justifies any use of natural gas.

Sagar et al 05 [Ambuj, senior research associate in the Science, Technology, and Public Policy program at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Honyan He Oliver is a research fellow in the Science, Technology, and Public Policy program at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Ananth Chikkatur is a research fellow in the Science, Technology, and Public Policy program at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. “Climate Change, Energy, and Developing Countries” Vermont Journal of Environmental Law Journal 2005-2006]

1. The energy sector encompasses activities relating to the production, conversion, and use of energy. Energy production includes the extraction of primary energy forms such as coal, oil, and natural gas, or growing biomass for energy uses. Energy conversion pertains to the transformation of energy into more useful forms: this includes the refining of petroleum to yield products such as gasoline and diesel; the combustion of coal in power plants to yield electricity; the production of alcohol from biomass, etc. Energy end-use encompasses the final use of energy forms in industrial, residential, commercial, transportation and other end-uses.

#### Explodes the topic – there are an infinite number of uses and possible conversions of natural gas.

Natural Gas.Org 11 [Uses of Natural Gas, http://www.naturalgas.org/overview/uses.asp]

For hundreds of years, natural gas has been known as a very useful substance. The Chinese discovered a very long time ago that the energy in natural gas could be harnessed, and used to heat water. In the early days of the natural gas industry, the gas was mainly used to light streetlamps, and the occasional house. However, with much improved distribution channels and technological advancements, natural gas is being used in ways never thought possible. There are so many different applications for this fossil fuel that it is hard to provide an exhaustive list of everything it is used for. And no doubt, new uses are being discovered all the time. To learn more about technological advancements in the natural gas industry, click here. Natural gas has many applications, commercially, in your home, in industry, and even in the transportation sector! While the uses described here are not exhaustive, they may help to show just how many things natural gas can do. According to the Energy Information Administration, energy from natural gas accounts for 24 percent of total energy consumed in the United States, making it a vital component of the nation's energy supply. For more detailed information on the demand for and supply of energy, and natural gas, including forecasts and outlooks, click here. Natural gas is used across all sectors, in varying amounts. The graph below gives an idea of the proportion of natural gas use per sector. The industrial sector accounts for the greatest proportion of natural gas use in the United States, with the residential sector consuming the second greatest quantity of natural gas.

# 2NR

#### Pass now: business and labor agreement boosts chances

AP 3-30 <lexis>

Business and labor close in on deal on low-skilled worker program for immigration bill

WASHINGTON (AP) Prospects for a Senate deal on an ambitious rewrite of the nation's immigration laws improved markedly as business and labor appeared ready to set aside their differences over a new low-skilled worker program holding up the agreement.¶ The AFL-CIO and U.S. Chamber of Commerce had been fighting over wages for tens of thousands of low-skilled workers who would be brought in under the new program to fill jobs in construction, hotels and resorts, nursing homes and restaurants, and other industries. But on Friday, officials from both sides said there was basic agreement on the wage issue, and Sen. Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., said a final deal on the low-wage worker dispute was very close.¶ That likely would clear the way for Schumer and seven other senators in a bipartisan group to unveil legislation the week of April 8 to overhaul the U.S. immigration system, strengthening the border, cracking down on employers, allowing in tens of thousands of new high- and low-skilled workers and providing a path to citizenship for the estimated 11 million illegal immigrants already in the country.¶ "We're feeling very optimistic on immigration: Aspiring Americans will receive the road map to citizenship they deserve and we can modernize `future flow' without reducing wages for any local workers, regardless of what papers they carry," AFL-CIO spokesman Jeff Hauser said in a statement. "Future flow" refers to future arrivals of legal immigrants.¶ Under the emerging agreement between business and labor, a new "W" visa program would bring tens of thousands of lower-skilled workers a year to the country. The program would be capped at 200,000 a year, but the number of visas would fluctuate, depending on unemployment rates, job openings, employer demand and data collected by a new federal bureau pushed by the labor movement as an objective monitor of the market.

**A Last Time**

**Khimm 3-19**

Suzy is a Budget and Economy reporter for the Washington Post, “Five Reasons Why Immigration Reform is Moving Forward,” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/03/19/five-reasons-why-immigration-reform-is-moving-forward/>

**We’ve been through this before**. The 2006-07 immigration reform talks fell apart, but **the passage of time** seems to have **allowed** various **stakeholders to cool off** and come back to the table to work out a deal. **Democrats are more united and** relatively **less suspicious of the temporary worker programs** that raised their hackles the last time around (then-Sen. Obama was among those who voted for an amendment phasing out a guest-worker program**), and more prominent Republicans have come around to a path to citizenship**.¶ “The immigration issue in a lot of ways I think is maturing in a way that simply takes time,” says Mary Giovagnoli, director of the Immigration Policy Center, who was a staffer for Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) during the 2006-07 debate. “**There seems to be a much greater level of trust and cordiality**. [The last time] the two sides were dragged kicking and screaming together.” **A similar dynamic was at play with health-care reform—another major effort that had suffered from a spectacular defeat in Congress before finally passing**. “Any major, **major** piece of **social change is a long process**,” Giovagnoli concludes.

**B Interests**

**Khimm 3-19**

Suzy is a Budget and Economy reporter for the Washington Post, “Five Reasons Why Immigration Reform is Moving Forward,” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/03/19/five-reasons-why-immigration-reform-is-moving-forward/>

4) **Powerful interest groups are trying to help** the process along. **The labor vs. business fight** over temporary guest-workers was **one of the biggest impasses of the Bush**-era **immigration fight**. **Now the AFL-CIO and** the **Chamber** of Commerce **are sitting down** to iron out their own differences, at the behest of the Senate. They are still struggling to come to a final agreement, but **it’s a good faith effort that could help such contentious issues from tearing apart the negotiations** on Capitol Hill.¶ 5) There’s a big grassroots movement in support of the issue. Congress’s last attempt at immigration reform died in 2007, but activists and advocates haven’t just been sitting in the wings over the last six years. **Immigrant activists,** together with their **allies in evangelical churches, Latino groups**, universities, **and others, have mobilized** around the record number of deportations by the Obama administration and the dramatic anti-immigration laws passed by Arizona and other GOP-governed states. Undocumented students from the DREAM movement have come forward into the spotlight.¶ **All this has helped keep the momentum for immigration reform going on the ground even as Congress and the White House dallied on the issue. And that’s helped drive public support for a comprehensive overhaul.** ”A movement doesn’t really become a vital political entity that can drive legislation until you move from people who are most passionate and directly concerned to the average American says, ‘Oh this affects me,’ or ‘I don’t like what this says about the country,’” says Giovagnoli.

**C Vote Count**

**Simendinger 3-26**

Alexis Covers the White House for Real Clear Politics, “Obama Expects April Senate Debate on Immigration,” <http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/03/26/obama_expects_april_senate_debate_on_immigration_117644.html>

“We haven’t set a firm date,” Celcia Muñoz, the director of the White House Domestic Policy Council, told ABC/Univision following a Washington luncheon last week, responding to a question about when a measure would get introduced. “The good news is that the Gang of Eight seems to be making progress. We are engaged with them. We are encouraged by their progress.”¶ Some **reform advocates have sounded increasingly upbeat that 60 votes, or** perhaps **more, will turn up in the Senate** for immigration changes that create a set pathway to citizenship, or a green card, within a chamber composed of 53 Democrats, 45 Republicans, and two independents who vote with the majority.

**Obama’s focusing on immigration**

**Politico 3-27**

“Obama Renews Push on Immigration Reform,” <http://www.politico.com/politico44/2013/03/obama-renews-push-on-immigration-reform-160372.html?hp=r3>

President **Obama sought to refocus the political conversation on immigration reform** Wednesday in interviews with two Spanish-language networks that come after weeks of news cycles dominated by discussions of guns, sequestration and same-sex marriage.¶ In interviews with Telemundo and Univision conducted Wednesday at the White House, **the president stayed firm on the immigration reform timeline he set earlier** this year and voiced confidence in the bipartisan group of eight senators who are negotiating a bill.¶ “I think we’ve seen enormous progress over the last month and a half,” Obama said in an interview with Telemundo. “I think both sides, Democrats and Republicans, have been very serious about the negotiations. **I’m actually very optimistic that when they return in early April … we’ll see a bill ready to move through the process**.”¶ "We're seeing right now a good, bipartisan spirit. I want to encourage that," he added on Univision. "Hopefully we'll be able to get it done."

#### Obama involved in negotiations

AP 3-27

“Obama Back at the Forefront of Immigration Debate,” lexis

The president made little progress in overhauling the nation's fractured immigration laws in his first term, but he redoubled his efforts after winning re-election. The November contest also spurred some Republicans to drop their opposition to immigration reform, given that Hispanics overwhelmingly backed Obama.¶ In an effort to keep Republicans at the negotiation table, Obama has publicly taken a backseat on one of his top second-term priorities. He rolled out his immigration principles during a January rally in Las Vegas and made an impassioned call for overhauling the nation's laws during his early February State of the Union address, then purposely handed off the effort to lawmakers.¶ The president has, however, privately called members of the Senate working group, and the administration is providing technical support to the lawmakers. The Gang of Eight is expected to unveil its draft bill when Congress returns from a two-week recess the week of April 8.