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#### The exclusion of hemp from discussions of U.S. domestic energy production is an intellectual acquiescence to a targeted campaign of social racism to ensure corporate profitability while simultaneously creating a perpetual for-profit policing tool explicitly aimed at those cultures considered less advanced than white America.

Bramhall 2012

[dr. stuart Jeanne, *adolescent psychiatrist and political refugee in New Zealand,* the politics of hemp, <http://energybulletin.net/stories/2012-02-09/politics-hemp>, feb 9]

For nearly four decades, industrial hemp advocates have extolled the virtues of hemp (cannabis sativa, variety sativa), a plant whose cultivation is still banned in the US, thanks to its scandalous distant cousin, cannabis sativa, variety indica. The latter is the source of the illicit drug marijuana. The former produces good quality fiber and has a tetrahydrocannabinol (THC – the psychoactive ingredient in marijuana) concentration of 1% or less. The latter produces negligible usable fiber and has a THC concentration of 4-20%.¶ Hemp happens to be one of the most versatile plants known to man. Hemp fiber is used in the production of paper, textiles, rope, sails, clothing, plastics, insulation, dry wall, fiber board and other construction materials; while hempseed oil is used as a lubricant and base for paints and varnishes, as well as in cooking and beauty products. The hemp plant, a “bioaccumulator,” is also used in phytoremediation. This is a process that uses living plants to remove nuclear contaminants and toxic chemicals from soil. Massive hemp fields were planted in the Ukraine following the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, to soak up radionucleotides.¶ I recently became interested in the importance of hemp in green technology following the relocation from Ashville North Carolina to New Plymouth (New Zealand) of Hemp Technologies, a construction company that produces low cost, energy efficient hemp homes and construction materials. Up until the 1990s, interest in industrial hemp was limited to the movement seeking to legalize marijuana. However growing public concern about the need to urgently reduce fossil fuel use (both to reduce carbon emissions and to conserve dwindling reserves) has given industrial hemp a major shot in the arm. Because hemp cultivation is still illegal in the US (except for the Pine Ridge Reservation and small “research” plots), the US is the world’s largest importer of . Ironically they import most of it from the their main economic rival, China, which is also the world’s largest producer. This is yet another example of how communities, small businesses and states are leaving behind a short sighted, corporate controlled federal government and forging ahead to save their communities and the planet from economic and ecological collapse.¶ The Fiber Modern Synthetics Replaced¶ In fact hemp-based paper, textiles, rope, construction materials and even plastics are the tried and true low tech alternative to modern synthetics that consume large quantities of fossil fuel during manufacture. Prior to the industrial revolution, the vast majority of textiles, clothing, canvas (the Dutch word for cannabis), rope and paper was made of hemp. It was only with the industrial revolution and the proliferation of machinery run on cheap fossil fuels that more sophisticated alternatives, such as cotton, wood-based paper, and eventually petroleum based plastics became cheaper alternatives. Prior to the invention of the cotton gin in the 1820s, 80% of the world’s textiles, fabrics, and clothing were made of hemp. By 1883, hemp was still the primary source of 75% of the world’s paper. Prior to the crippling hemp tax the US government passed in 1937, most bank notes and archival papers were made of hemp (owing to its greater durability) and most paints and varnishes were made from hempseed oil.¶ Hemp has always been such a vital community resource that a long series of laws, dating back to Henry VIII (1535) required farmers to grow hemp or be fined. In 1619 Jamestown Virginia enacted a law requiring residents to plant hemp. Massachusetts and Connecticut passed similar laws in 1631 and 1632. Betsy Ross’s flag was made of hemp. The Declaration and Independence and Emancipation Proclamation are printed on it.¶ A Better Carbon Sink than Trees¶ A hemp crop takes approximately four months to reach maturity. This contrasts with twenty years for the fastest growing trees. Hemp absorbs four times as much carbon dioxide and produces four times as much raw fiber (per unit weight) as trees. In addition to its low carbon footprint, hemp has a number of other advantages over the synthetic and highly processed products that have replaced it. Paper manufactured from hemp is finer, stronger and lasts longer ). Likewise hemp-based products used in home construction are unparalleled thermal insulators, as well as being non-toxic, waterproof, fireproof and insect and mold resistant.¶ Prior to visiting the Hemp Technologies website, I was under the mistaken impression that hemp was mainly used for home insulation. I was very surprised to learn that hemp (in the form of HemPcrete) can be used in the construction of the outer walls, as wall as a non-toxic replacement for dry wall (Magnum Board). In addition Hempboard (100% hemp) is an inexpensive, non-toxic replacement for fiberboard in interior paneling, countertops, shelving, sheathing and furniture.¶ The Decline of Hemp¶ Hemp first began losing ground in 1850 to cheaper substitutes made of cotton, jute, sisal and petroleum. Prior to the 1920s, hemp had to be processed by hand, involving huge labor costs incompatible with mass commercial production. Henry Ford, one of the first modern conservationists, remained a strong hemp advocate and had his own hemp plantation on his estate in Dearborn Michigan. The body of his 1908 Model T was made of hemp-based plastic, which has far greater tensile strength and durability than steel. After George W Schlicten automated hemp processing in 1917 with a new machine called the hemp decoricator, Ford set up the first biomass fuel production plant in Iron Mountain Michigan. Ford ran the first Model T on corn-based ethanol (alcohol), but was quick to recognize hemp as a cheaper and more efficient fuel source. His engineers in Iron Mountain developed processes to extract not only ethanol from hemp, but charcoal and other industrial chemicals, including tar, ethyl acetate and creosote. The 1919 Prohibition against alcohol, coupled with the growing political power of the oil lobby, derailed Ford’s plans. By 1920 gasoline had replaced ethanol as the auto fuel of choice.¶ The Corporate Conspiracy to End Hemp Cultivation¶ All this was happening at the precise moment that the munitions company DuPont was patenting synthetic fibers (nylon, rayon, Dacron, etc) and plastics derived from petroleum. Schlicten’s hemp decoricator and automated hemp processing, posed a major threat to DuPont’s ability to market their synthetic fibers for products previously made from hemp. DuPont also had a commercial interest in promoting wood-based paper production (they held the patent on the sulfates and sulfites used to produce paper pulp) and gasoline. They also held the patent on tetraethyl lead, which allowed gasoline to burn more smoothly in the engine Ford intended to run on ethanol.¶ The main co-conspirators in the plot to kill hemp included DuPont, William Randolph Hearst (who owned a logging company and paper manufacturing plant in addition to his American newspaper empire) and Andrew Mellon, president of Mellon Bank and DuPont’s major financier. In 1930, Mellon, as US Secretary of the Treasury, created the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and appointed his nephew Henry Anslinger to run it. Between 1935 and 1937, Anslinger and a handful of DuPont’s cronies in Congress secretly wrote a bill to tax hemp production. Meanwhile Anslinger and Hearst orchestrated a massive media campaign demonizing a dangerous new drug called marihuana that supposedly turned Mexicans and black jazz musician into crazed killers. Congress was also deliberately tricked into believing marihuana was a totally new drug. The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was rushed through on a Friday afternoon before any lawmakers had a chance to read it. Only a handful realized marihuana was the same as hemp, which was still viewed as an essential crop and vital to the paint and varnish industry.¶ Between 1941 and 1945 the Marihuana Transfer Tax was waived, after Japan embargoed the sale of hemp, jute and other fibers essential to the war industry. The US government once again encouraged Americans to grow hemp for patriotic reasons. Farmers who planted it were exempted from the draft. Hemp was legally grown in Minnesota as late as 1968. In 1970 the Controlled Substances Act officially equated hemp with the drug marijuana and help cultivation became illegal. This was the same year the 1937 Marihuana Tax Act was declared unconstitutional.

#### And, these historical prohibitions against industrial or energy applications hemp and marijuana are used to extend the racially prejudicial penal system into every street corner and alley, permeating the daily experience of racial minorities with perpetual alienation and criminalization.

Lendman 2012

[Stephen, America’s Racist Drug Laws, Sentencing Project Executive Director, leading expert on sentencing, race, and criminal justice, http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2012/02/06/america-s-racist-drug-laws]

For 25 years, it's "work(ed) for a fair and effective criminal justice system by promoting reforms in sentencing law and practice, and alternatives to incarceration."¶ Criminal injustice is pervasive, especially against people of color. Racial and ethnic minorities comprise over 60% of America's prison population. "For black males in their twenties, 1 in every 8 is in prison or jail on any given day."¶ America's racist war on drugs disproportionately targets people of color and ethnic minorities. They comprise 75% of those in prison on drug related charges.¶ On March 17, 2011, Mauer testified before the US Sentencing Commission regarding proposed federal drug offense sentencing guideline amendments to the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act.¶ He said in 2009, drug offenses accounted for over half (51%) of the federal prison population. Those imprisoned represent a 20-fold increase since 1980. Their numbers exceed those incarcerated in 1980 for all offenses. They're the most significant source of America's 700% federal prison growth.¶ In recent years, state incarcerations stabilized. Federal ones keep rising. Drug related offenses are most responsible. Racial and ethnic minorities are grievously harmed. Reform is urgently needed.¶ Mandatory minimum sentences exacerbate the problem. So do other racist policies, including judicial unfairness, three strikes and you're out, get tough on crime policies, and a guilty unless proved innocent mentality.¶ New York's 1973 Rockefeller drug laws are most pernicious. Anyone convicted of selling two ounces or more of heroin, morphine, "raw or prepared opium," cocaine, or cannabis, or possessing four ounces of the same substances receive mandatory 15-year minimum sentences up a maximum of 25 years to life.¶ In 1979, marijuana possession penalties were reduced from crimes to misdemeanors. However, aggressive pursuit of offenders continues, especially in New York City. More on that below.¶ Nationwide crack cocaine (vs. powder) and marijuana possession penalties are also pernicious. Until revised under the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act, first time offenders convicted of possessing as little as five grams of crack (one ounce = 28 grams) automatically got five years in prison.¶ The new law reduces, but doesn't eliminate, the disparity between crack and powder cocaine. Henceforth, possessing 28 or more grams of crack subjects offenders to penalties up to five years. Mandatory simple possession sentencing ended. In addition, courts may reduce prior sentencing disparities.¶ Nonetheless, pot busts define America's drug war. In 2006, Mauer said primary focus since 1990 shifted to marijuana offenses. As a result, they comprised 82% of the increase in drug arrests. Virtually all of them were for possessing small amounts. Enforcement costs are enormous - $4 billion or more annually for marijuana alone.¶ Under the 1970 federal Controlled Substances Act, cannabis is a Schedule I drug, meaning it's defined as having high potential for abuse. So far, redefinition attempts failed. In 2001, the Supreme Court ruled against medical marijuana use in United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative.¶ In Gonzales v. Raich (2005), the High Court ruled that Congress, under the Constitution's Commerce Clause, may criminalize the production and use of home-grown cannabis, even where states approve it for medicinal purposes. More on that below.¶ A Brief History of Legal Cannabis in America¶ In 1619, Jamestown colonial law required settlers to grow hemp. George Washington grew it as one of his main crops. Its use for rope and fabric was common throughout 18th and 19th century America.¶ Around 1860, cannabis regulations and restrictions were first instituted. After 1906, states began labeling it poisonous. In the 1920, prohibitions began. By the mid-1930s, all states enacted regulations, including 35 under the Uniform State Narcotic Drug Act. Violators were penalized but not imprisoned.¶ In the 1970s, communities began abolishing state laws and local regulations banning cannabis possession. Federal laws remain in place. In the 1990s, local sale for medical purposes began even though doing so conflicts with federal law.¶ Nonetheless, 16 states and the District of Columbia legalized medical marijuana, including Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington.¶ Expect others to follow. Possession amounts and other legal provisions vary by state, but the message is clear. Medicinal marijuana works. As a result, criminalizing it harms those dependent for relief.¶ In addition, it's a growing revenue source for budget-strapped states. It also produces jobs when they're most needed. It's a win-win, regardless of outdated, counterproductive and repressive federal policies.¶ Efficacious substances should be encouraged, not prohibited. In 1850s America, pharmacies carried medicinal cannabis. Around the same time, states began regulating pharmaceutical sales, including penalties for mislabeling and adulterated substances.¶ It became a slippery slope toward criminalizing cannabis. Today's momentum suggests eventual legalization, starting with medicinal use.¶ Racially Biased New York City Marijuana Policies¶ In 2008, the New York published a report titled, "Marijuana Arrest Crusade: Racial Bias and Police Policy in New York City - 1997 - 2007."¶ From 1977 - 1986, 33,000 possession arrests were made. Numbers declined to 30,000 from 1987 - 1996. However, from 1997 - 2006, they exploded to 353,000. Today, outside the report's timeline, they number around 50,000 annually for simple possession of small amounts. More on that below.¶ US Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas once said:¶ "As nightfall does not come all at once, neither does oppression. In both instances, there is a twilight when everything remains seemingly unchanged. And it is in such twilight that we all must be aware of change in the air, however slight, lest we become unwitting victims of the darkness."¶ In New York City, Blacks and Hispanics are Exhibit A. They've been victimized by racist drug enforcement, notably for cannabis possession. From 1997 - 2006, Blacks comprised 52% of arrests, Hispanics another 31%. Whites accounted for 15%.¶ Those arrested and jailed affected 185,000 Blacks, 110,000 Hispanics, but only 53,000 Whites for minor possession offenses. Most were aged 26 or younger. About 91% were males.¶ Under Mayor Rudy Giuliani (January 1994 - December 2001), marijuana possession arrests exploded 10-fold. Under Mayor Michael Bloomberg (January 2002 - present), they're higher than ever. At the same time, New York police provide little information. As a result, few New Yorkers know their city conducts "a historically unprecedented marijuana arrest crusade."¶ Cops involved up to top commanders benefit. Marijuana busts are safe. Involved officers and supervisors accrue overtime pay, and produce numbers showing productivity.¶ In contrast, those arrested are harmed even if not prosecuted. Procedures include handcuffing, fingerprinting, photographing, and potentially obtaining DNA samples. Often people with no criminal records are affected. Henceforth they'll have one and plenty of baggage.¶ Whether or not convicted, employment and educational opportunities, mortgages or other loans, public housing benefits, licenses, travel visas, and good credit standing are at risk.¶ Moreover, arrests and overnight custody alone are humiliating, degrading, alienating and unjust for possessing small amounts of controlled substances, especially marijuana that long ago should have been legalized.¶ Last September, New York Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly responded to public pressure. As a result, he ordered commanders not to arrest people possessing small marijuana amounts unless they're in public view.¶ In 1979, New York state decriminalized amounts of 25 grams or less. Henceforth, displaying it publicly became low-level misdemeanors, subject to ticketing, not arrests or jailing.¶ New York City's stop-and-frisk policy drew widespread criticism. Mostly Black and Hispanic males are targeted. Police routinely confront them, demand their pockets be emptied, and if marijuana is displayed, they're arrested for having it in public view. As a result, around 50,000 annually are criminalized unjustly.¶ At the time, critics called Kelly's action important. Chief Legal Aid Society attorney Steven Banks said it would make a tremendous difference to wrongfully targeted young minorities.¶ Drug Policy Alliance executive director Ethan Nadelmann called the order a significant change in how police deal with minor marijuana possession cases. Hopefully, "gross racial disparity" would be curbed.¶ Kelly's order in part read:¶ "Questions have been raised about the processing of certain marijuana arrests." Henceforth, "(a) crime will not be charged to an individual who is requested or compelled to engage in the behavior that results in the public display of marijuana." Displaying it must be "actively undertaken of the subject's own volition."¶ Queens College sociologist Harry G. Levine said public defenders and legal aid lawyers estimate up to three-fourths of those arrested displayed it on police orders. Those affected don't know they’re illegal, but police are very intimidating.¶ Last year, Brooklyn Democratic assemblyman Hakeem Jeffries and Republican Senator Mark Grisanti sponsored legislation to downgrade small possession public displays from misdemeanors to a lessor violations. Bloomberg opposed them, claiming it would encourage greater use.¶ Despite Kelly's order, marijuana arrests declined slightly but continue. So does NYPD's racist crusade. Bloomberg supports it. So does Kelly tacitly. In 2010, one in every seven city arrests were for displaying marijuana in public view. Illegal police searches and false charges were mostly responsible.¶ Last year, New York's illegal stop-and-frisk policy affected over 600,000 people, overwhelmingly young Black and Hispanic males.

Ed Forchion first explains his own experiences with law enforcement when he wrote in ‘99 “I, because I am a minority male I have known of this racial profiling or "DWB" ( Driving While Black) for years to be true. I cannot count the amount of time's I've had my car stopped, searched, then to justify the illegal act they write bogus tickets.” http://www.njweedman.com/trooper\_thornton.htm

#### In 2001, Forchion explained that the energy-based exclusion of hemp and the social prohibition on marijuana work in tandem to create a racialized penal system tantamount to mass slavery by criminalizing cultural difference and coercing assimilation through forced detention.

[Edward “njweedman”, 414575 Riverfront State Prison Camden, N.J. 08101, The Re-incarceration of Jim Crow: In regards to Amerikkkas racist war on drugs: the controlled substance act of 1970”]

Police officers, lawyers, Judges, politicans both black and white now use the racist “WAR ON DRUGS” to further their careers, and line their pockets. The re-incarcerated JIM CROW sits back and enjoys it all. None of the above have any more morals or respect for lindividual liberty than German Gestopo agents did during World War 2. They are capitalizing off the misery created by the CSA. The CSA inspired “War on Drugs” has become big business to a segment of the population.¶ Prisons now have taken the place of plantations, wardens instead of “masters”. The prison industrial complex has replaced the plantation system. At the end of slavery there were 4 million Africans released, here at the beginning of the 21st century there are 4 million Africans enslaved again. 1 Million in Prison and 3.3 million on some sort of involuntary servitude or detention (Parole-probation). There are more African men enslaved than are in college, thanks to the CSA’s intended purpose!¶ The CSA makes some AFRICAN based RELIGIONS illegal¶ One of the discriminatory ways the CSA utilized, was to ban and outlaw substaneces used by people of color, or controlled by people of color. In the past the Government was successful with this tactic with the HARRISON ACT . After the civil rights acts of the 1960’s restored the RIGHTS of AFRICAN-AMERICANS the CSA was designed to subvert portion of those new found freedoms, one of those “Freedoms” was RELIGION.¶ Marijuana is a highly regarded benifical herb in many AFRICAN-RELIGIONS. Marijuana has been used a food medicine and spiritual sacrament for at least 5000 years in the non-caucsian world. At face value again the CSA appears to be neutral and only targeting drugs but when you examine the fact that non-causians thru-out the world use marijuana as a sacrament it can-not be argued that when the results are very, very high numbers of non-africans being arrested as violators it was unintended. (i.e. use cheese to catch a mouse, a worm to catch a fish and marijuana to catch a NIGGER) As the African-American community moves further and further away from the slave era, many are rejecting the Christian faith which was forced onto us thru the institution of slavery. (SEE FORCED CHRISTIANIZATION)¶ In the year 1457, the Christian Council of Cardinals met in Holland and sanctioned, as a RIGHTEOUS and progressive idea, the enslavement of Africans for the purpose of their conversion to the Christian faith (civilization). "One of the reasons cited was their supposedly "devilish" use of the “witches-weed". Cannabis/hash is still widely smoked in the middle-east and Africa, while Christian politicians still enforce this ridiculous ban. This amounts to nothing more than a "RACIST" inspired religious (Christian) Superstition!! The Superstitions that fueled the witch-hunts of Europe also caused similar horrors here in America. The Salem witch trials were started over Caribbean-slave who used "HERBS" and was said to be in contact with the devil. Slaves were forced to abandon their native religions¶ The African continent is probably the zone showing the widest prevalence of "marijuana use". When white men first went to Africa, marijuana was part of the native way of life. Africa was a continent of marijuana cultures where marijuana was an integral part of religious ceremony. The Africans were observed inhaling the smoke from piles of smoldering hemp. Some of these piles had been placed upon altars. The Africans also utilized pipes. The African Dagga (marijuana) cults believed that Holy Cannabis was brought to earth by the gods. (Throughout the ancient world Ethiopia was considered the home of the gods.)¶ In south central Africa, marijuana is held to be sacred and is connected with many religious and social customs. Marijuana is regarded by some sects as a magic plant possessing universal protection against all injury to life, and is symbolic of peace and friendship. Certain tribes consider hemp use a duty. The earliest evidence for cannabis smoking in Africa outside of Egypt comes from fourteenth century Ethiopia, where two ceramic smoking-pipes bowls containing traces of excavation. In many parts of East Africa, especially near Lake Victoria (the source for the Nile), hemp smoking and hashish snuffing cults still exist.¶ Those seeking out AFRICAN based faith more inline with our roots in Subsaharan Western AFRICA have discovered that because the sacrament of these faiths have been outlawed they’d be criminals if they follow and practice these faiths, YORBA, VOO DO, SANTERIA, RASTAFARI as well as lesser known African faiths. This goes directly against the prinicipal and intents of the very first right protected in the U.S. “Bill of Rights” , the Right to RELIGIOUS FREEDOM. But again the U.S. Supreme Court in DRED SCOT Vs SANFORD said, “No whiteman is bound to respect the rights of a nigger”, so you see the politicans still don’t in their legislative actions.

#### THE US PRISON REGIME REMAINS CENTRAL TO AMERICAN WORLD ORDERING THAT USES MATERIAL AND DISCURSIVE REPRESSION TO PAVE THE WAY FOR WHITE SUPRMACY and NEOLIBERALism IS THE CAUSE OF AMERICAN GLOBALITY AND ENSURES DOMINATION, GENOCIDE, WAR, RACISM, AND BIOPOLITICAL CONTROL

Dylan Rodriguez, Professer University of California Riverside, November 2007

Kritika Kultura “AMERICAN GLOBALITY AND THE U. S. PRISON REGIME: STATE VIOLENCE AND WHITE SUPREMACY FROM ABU GHRAIB TO STOCKTON TO BAGONG DIWA”

Available online at http://www.ateneo.edu/ateneo/www/UserFiles/121/docs/KK09.pdf)

In this meditation **I am concerned with the integral role of the U.S. prison regime in** the material/cultural **production of “American globality**.” In using this phrase I am suggesting **a process and module of state power that works, moves, and deploys** in ways distinct from (though fundamentally **in concert with) American (global) “hegemony,” and inaugurates a geography of biopolitical power** more focused than common scholarly cartographies of American “empire.” For my purposes, **American globality refers to the** postmodern **production of U.S. state and state-sanctioned technologies of human and ecological domination**—most frequently **formed** through overlapping and interacting **regimes of profound bodily violence, including** genocidal and protogenocidal **violence, warmaking, racist and white supremacist state violence, and mass-scaled imprisonment—and the capacity of these** forms of domination **to be mobilized** across political geographies **all over the world,** including by governments and states that are nominally autonomous of the United States. **American globality is** simultaneously **a vernacular of institutional power,** **an active and accessible iteration of violent human domination as the cohering of sociality (and civil society)** writ large, and a grammar of pragmatic immediacy (in fact, urgency) that orders and influences statecraft across various geographies of jurisdiction and influence. It is in this sense of globality as (common) vernacular, (dynamic, present tense) iteration, and (disciplining) grammar that the current formation of global order is constituted (obviously) by the direct interventions of the U.S. state and (not as obviously) by the lexicon (as in the principles governing the organization of a vocabulary) of U.S. statecraft. American globality infers how the U.S. state conceptualizes its own power, as well as how these conceptualizations of power and American state formation become immediately useful to—and frequently, structurally and politically overbearing on—other state formations and hegemonies. **The prison regime**, in other words, **is indisputably organic to the lexicon of the U.S. state, and is thus productive of American globality, not a by-product or reified outcome of it**. In the remainder of this essay, I raise the possibility that **the U.S. conceptualization of the prison** **as a** peculiar **mobilization of power and domination is, in the historical present, central to how** states, governments, and **social orderings** all over the world **are formulating their own responses to the political, ecological, and social crises of neoliberalism, warfare, and global white supremacy**.

#### Our stand against prisons is a call for a broader movement connecting a critique of racism, sexism, heterosexism, classism and other oppressions. Moreover, it is possible to create a system that provides actual alternatives to imprisonment and domination. Therefore this presentation represents the affirmation of an interrogation of, and position against the American prison system and all social relations that support its permanence

Social Justice Movements '06

http://socialjustice.ccnmtl.columbia.edu/index.php/Abolish\_Prisons

Given that over two million people are currently imprisoned in US facilities and 20% of the world�s incarcerated population lives in the United States, it is incredulous that the situation remains invisible and only continues to worsen. However, this only highlights the entrenched character of the system and the public dialogue framed both in its language and proposed solutions within the narrow confines of this system that many seemingly accept. Today, **prison** is considered an inevitable and permanent structure of our social lives. However, as we know from the historical origins of prisons, we understand that they **were not a superior form of punishment** fit for all time**, but rather**, without taking its complexity lightly, **what made sense at a particular point in history of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Slavery, lynching, and segregation are all examples of social institutions once considered to be just as much an eternal fixture** in life. **We need to** create a new imagination that **call**s **for a world that is completely different**. Angela Davis emphasizes that with the prison system so entrenched in U.S. economic, political, and ideological life, the reality behind the prison-industrial complex is not a simple conglomeration of bodies and interests, but instead **the relationships** between all of those groups. **Abolishing the prison system is** truly **about abolishing those relationships and proposing alternatives** that pull them apart. The approach to decarceration needs to envision a popular discourse on a spectrum of alternatives to prisons, not just one answer. **Davis cites education, demilitarization of schools, adequate housing, physical and mental health care for all, additional public resources and services, and a justice system based on reparation and reconciliation** rather than retribution and vengeance, as **critical components to structuring alternatives**. Fundamentally, **our thinking and actions need to radically transform the underlying racism, sexism, heterosexism, classism, and other structures of dominance and oppression**, in order to make the abolition of prisons feasible. Our focus must not be only on the prison system as an isolated institution but also towards all social relations that support its permanence. Our language and our aims need to shift away from simple adjustments of the current prison system, and instead link the prison reform initiative to a larger movement - one with a clear goal of prison abolition.

#### Our advocacy should thus be understood as part of an intellectual struggle against the racialized practices that justify colonialism, imperialism, and fascism, and hence allow for the existence of the prison system. A failure to confront contemporary displays of the state’s history of sovereign domination threatens the entire world.

NIKHIL SINGH 2006, Professor of History at the University of Washington, South Atlantic Quarterly “The Afterlife of fascism”

The philosopher Giorgio Agamben has most fully recognized and elucidated the relationship between the production of humanity as ‘‘bare life’’ and the exercise of sovereign political power. As I will elaborate later, Agamben, building on the work of Carl Schmitt, defines sovereignty as the power to suspend normal legality and identifies this with the power of decision over life itself. Hominis sacres are those lives that are included in the law only through their exclusion—lives ‘‘stripped of every right’’ and ‘‘exposed to an unconditional threat of death’’ insofar as they can be killed without the commission of a homicide.21We can supplement these insights with Michel Foucault’s observation that racism emerges as an institutionalized practice Within modern states as a ‘‘way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die.’’ Racism has been an indispensable means of legitimating the ‘‘murderous function of the State’’ even as modern governmental powers have been defined primarily in terms of normalizing and securing the general conditions of social and economic life. By introducing a ‘‘biological-type caesura within a population,’’ racism becomes the means by which an older form of sovereignty, in the form of the sovereign right to kill, is reasserted within a social and political field defined by overriding imperatives of conforming human equivalence, and ‘‘biopolitical’’ regulation (‘‘the power to guarantee life’’).22 It is important to situate these general frameworks within a sufficiently dense field of historical reference and strategic analysis. U.S. traditions of racial nationalism in this field represent an irreducible ideological kernel of U.S. imperial sovereignty and the empire’s emerging war prison.23 Thus, when the Bush administration declares that it will use ‘‘the great liberating tradition of America’’ in the service of ‘‘the expansion of freedom in all the world,’’ we should not be surprised that in its train has come a renewal of ascriptive discourses, coupled with the deployment of arbitrary police and military power.24 Though marketed and advanced on the grounds of ‘‘securing our freedoms,’’ the essence of contemporary U.S. imperialism has been the renovation of imaginations of and modes for containing alleged civil incapacity and civil threat that find their legal and cultural precedence in histories of racial slavery, settler colonialism, and fascism.25 This is not to say either that the figures of historical racism exhaust all possible meanings of U.S. nationalism, or that racial, colonial, or fascist genealogies are without their own breaks, contradictions, and structuring dilemmas. At the same time, the failure to interrogate and effectively confront the way that contemporary displays of U.S. state power both enjoin old and fabricate new murderous divisions within humanity has today placed the entire world in danger.

#### Our focus on a critique of the American imperial prison system is key to ending the practices that manage and enslave people of color all over the world

Dylan Rodriguez, Professer University of California Riverside, November 2007

Kritika Kultura “AMERICAN GLOBALITY AND THE U. S. PRISON REGIME: STATE VIOLENCE AND WHITE SUPREMACY FROM ABU GHRAIB TO STOCKTON TO BAGONG DIWA” Available online at http://www.ateneo.edu/ateneo/www/UserFiles/121/docs/KK09.pdf)

**Variable, overlapping, and mutually constituting white supremacist regimes have in fact been fundamental to the formation and movements of the United States, from racial chattel slavery and frontier genocide to recent and current modes of neoliberal land displacement and (domestic-to-global) warfare**. Without exception, these regimes have been differently entangled with the state’s changing paradigms, strategies, and technologies of human incarceration and punishment (to follow the prior examples: the plantation, the reservation, the neoliberal sweatshop, and the domestic-to-global prison). **The historical nature of these entanglements is widely acknowledged, although explanations of the structuring relations of force tend to either isolate or historically compartmentalize the complexities of historical white supremacy**. For the theoretical purposes of this essay, **white supremacy may be understood as a logic of social organization that produces regimented, institutionalized, and militarized conceptions of hierarchized “human” difference, enforced through coercions and violences that are structured by genocidal possibility** (including physical extermination and curtailment of people’s collective capacities to socially, culturally, or biologically reproduce). As a historical vernacular and philosophical apparatus of domination, **white supremacy is simultaneously premised on and consistently innovating universalized conceptions of the white** (European and euroamerican) “**human” vis-à-vis the rigorous production, penal discipline, and frequent social, political, and biological neutralization or extermination of the (non-white) sub- or non-human. To consider white supremacy as essential to American social formation** (rather than a freakish or extremist deviation from it) facilitates a discussion of the modalities through which this material logic of violence overdetermines the social, political, economic, and cultural structures that compose American globality and constitute the common sense that is organic to its ordering.

**Rejections of whiteness only serve to alienate those who coincidentally live this experience from participation in anti-racist struggle like critique of the American prisons system.**

Shannon **Sullivan**.Penn State University Charles S. Peirce Society. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society. Buffalo: 20**08**. Vol. 44, Iss. 2; pg. 236, 27 pgs

It is commonly acknowledged today, at least in academic circles, that racial essences do not exist. Racial categories, including whiteness, are historical and political products of human activity, and for that reason the human racial landscape has changed over time and likely will continue to change in the future. In the wake of this acknowledgement, critical race theorists and philosophers of race debate whether whiteness must be eliminated for racial oppression to be ended. Given whiteness's history as a category of violent racial exclusion, eliminativists and "new abolitionists" have argued that it must be abolished. If "whiteness is one pole of an unequal relationship, which can no more exist without oppression than slavery could exist without slaves," then as long as whiteness endures, so does racial oppression.2 In contrast, critical conservationists have claimed even though it has an oppressive past, whiteness could entail something other than racism and oppression. Moreover, since lived existential categories like whiteness cannot be merely or quickly eliminated, white people should work to transform whiteness into an anti-racist category.

I count myself as a critical conservationist, but I also acknowledge the force of eliminativist arguments. If whiteness necessarily involves racist oppression, then attempting to transform whiteness into an antiracist category would be a fool's game at best, and a covert continuance of white supremacy at worst. My goal here is not to rehearse the disagreement between new abolitionists and critical conservationists; excellent work explaining the details of their positions already exists.3 I instead approach that disagreement by asking the pragmatic question of whether a rehabilitated version of whiteness can be worked out concretely. What would a non-oppressive, anti-racist whiteness look like? What difference would or could it make to the lives of white and nonwhite people? If the question of how to transform whiteness cannot be answered in some practical detail-if it's not a difference that makes a difference-then critical conservatism would amount to a hopeful, but ultimately harmful abstraction that makes no difference in lived experience and that damages anti-racist movements. In that case, abolitionism would appear to be the only alternative to ongoing white supremacy and privilege.

I propose turning to Josiah Royce for help with these issues, more specifically to his essay on "Provincialism."4 This turn is not as surprising as it might initially seem given that Royce wrote explicitly about race in "Race Questions and Prejudices."5 In that essay, Royce issued an antiracist, anti-essentialist challenge to then-current scientific studies of race, especially anthropology and ethnology, which claim to prove the superiority of white people, and he even briefly but explicitly names whiteness a possible threat to the future of humanity. 6 I focus here on "Provincialism," however, because even though the essay never explicitly discusses race, it can help explain the ongoing need for the category of whiteness and implicitly offers a wealth of useful suggestions for how to transform it. "Provincialism" is an exercise in critical conservation of the concept of provincialism, and while not identical,

provincialism and whiteness share enough in common that "wise" provincialism can serve as a model for developing "wise" whiteness.7 Royce's essay thus can be of great help to critical philosophers of race wrestling with questions of whether and how to transformatively conserve whiteness. Exploring similarities and differences between wise provincialism and wise whiteness, I use Royce's analyses of provincialism to shed light on why whiteness should be rehabilitated rather than discarded and how white people today might begin living whiteness as an anti-racist category. Comparing Provincialism and Whiteness Race Traitor is a contemporary journal with the motto "Treason to whiteness is loyalty to humanity," and its editor, Noel Ignatiev, makes a scathing case against the critical conservation of whiteness.8 Ignatiev argues that there is no valid white culture to transform. Nor is there any biological rationale for whiteness. In his view, whiteness merely concerns status, privilege, and exclusion and thus cannot form a legitimate, antiracist identity. To suggest that it can, as critical conservationists do, is to encourage white supremacists by giving their worldview intellectual support. Even if critical conservationists do not intend to provide this support, the effect of arguing for the conservation of whiteness is still extremely dangerous. In addition to unintentionally validating white supremacy movements, it tends to divert the energies of well-intentioned white people away from political struggle for racial justice to whiteindulgent racial sensitivity and diversity workshops. According to Ignatiev, what anti-racist movements need is not a white identity that well-intentioned white people can feel good about, but race traitors who are willing to defect from whiteness. The only way for white people to be loyal to the human race is for them to be disloyal to their racial identity.

Like critical conservationists regarding whiteness, Royce knows that he faces an uphill battle in convincing many of his interlocutors of the value of provincialism. Put positively, provincialism tends to connote a healthy fondness for and pride in local traditions, interests, and customs. More negatively, it means being restricted and limited, sticking to the narrow ideas of a given region or group and being indifferent, perhaps even violently hostile to the ways of outsiders. What connects these different meanings is their sense of being rooted in a particular cultural-geographical place. In Royce's definition, which emphasizes conscious awareness of this rootedness (an important point to which I will return), a province is a domain that is "sufficiently unified to have a true consciousness of its own unity, to feel a pride in its own ideals and customs, and to possess a sense of its distinction from other[s]." And correspondingly, provincialism is, first, the tendency for a group "to possess its own customs and ideals; secondly, the totality of these customs and ideals themselves; and thirdly the love and pride which leads the inhabitants of a province to cherish as their own these traditions, beliefs and aspirations" (61).

Emphasizing unity, love, and pride, Royce's definitions steer away from the negative connotations of provincialism. But in Royce's day- and not much has changed in this regard-it was the negative, or "false," form of provincialism that most often came to people's minds when they thought about the value and effects of the concept. As Royce was writing in 1902, the false provincialism, or "sectionalism," of the United States' Civil War was a recent memory for many of his readers. In the Civil War, stubborn commitment to one portion of the nation violently opposed it to another portion and threatened to tear the nation apart. Provincialism, which appealed to regional values to disunite, had to be condemned in the name of patriotism, which united in the name of a higher good. Royce's rhetorical strategy is to take the challenge of defending provincialism head-on: "My main intention is to define the right form and the true office of provincialism-to portray what, if you please, we may call the Higher Provincialism, -to portray it, and then to defend it, to extol it, and to counsel you to further just such provincialism" (65). Royce readily acknowledges that "against the evil forms of sectionalism we shall always have to contend" (64). But he denies that provincialism must always be evil. Going against the grain of most post-Civil War thinking about provincialism, Royce urges that the present state of civilization, both in the world at large, and with us, in America, is such as to define a new social mission which the province alone, but not the nation, is able to fulfil [sic] . . . .[T]he modern world has reached a point where it needs, more than ever before, the vigorous development of a highly organized provincial life. Such a life, if wisely guided, will not mean disloyalty to the nation. (64)

Wisely developed, provincialism need not conflict with national loyalty. The two commitments can-and must, Royce insists-flourish together.

Likewise, whiteness need not conflict with membership in humanity as a whole. The two identities can-and must-flourish together. The relationship between provincialism and nationalism, as discussed by Royce, serves as a fruitful model for the relationship of whiteness and humanity, and critical conservationists of whiteness should follow Royce's lead by taking head-on the challenge of critically defending whiteness. Like embracing provincialism, embracing whiteness might seem to be a step backward for the modern world-toward limitation and insularity that breed ignorance, prejudice, and hostility toward others who are different from oneself. Like having a national rather than provincial worldview, seeing oneself as a member of humanity rather than of the white race seems to embody an expansive, outward orientation that is open to others. But there is a "new social mission" with respect to racial justice that whiteness, and not humanity as a whole, can fulfill. Race relations, especially in the United States, have reached a point where humanity needs a "highly organized" anti-racist whiteness, that is, an anti-racist whiteness that is consciously developed and embraced. How then can we (white people, in particular) wisely guide the development of such whiteness so that it does not result in disloyalty to other races and humanity as a whole?

Before addressing this question, let me point out two important differences between whiteness and provincialism as described by Royce. First, while Royce calls for the development of a wise form of provincialism, he is able to appeal to existing "wholesome" forms of provincialism in his defense of the concept. He addresses himself "in the most explicit terms, to men and women who, as I hope and presuppose, are and wish to be, in the wholesome sense, provincial," and his demand that "the man of the future . . . love his province more than he does to-day" recognizes a nugget of wise provincialism on which to build (65, 67). The development of wise provincialism does not have to be from scratch. In contrast, it is more difficult to pinpoint a nugget of "wholesome" whiteness to use as a starting point for its transformation. Instances of white people who helped slaves and resisted slavery in the United States, for example, certainly can be found-the infamous John Brown is only one such example-but such people often are seen as white race traitors who represent the abolition, not the transformation of whiteness.9 The task of critically conserving whiteness probably will be more difficult than that of critically conserving provincialism since there is not a straightforward or obvious "right form and true office" of whiteness to extol.

Second, true to his idealism, Royce describes both provincialism and its development as explicitly conscious phenomena. Royce notes the elasticity of the term "province"-it can designate a small geographical area in contrast with the nation, or it can designate a large geographical, rural area in contrast with a city (57-58)-but it always includes consciousness of the province's unity and particular identity as this place and not another. Put another way, probably every space, regardless of its size, is distinctive in some way or another. What gives members of a space a provincial attitude is their conscious awareness of, and resulting pride in, that space as the distinctive place that it is. On Royce's model, someone who is provincial knows that she is, at least in some loose way. The task of developing her provincialism, then, is to develop her rudimentary conscious awareness of her province, to become "more and not less selfconscious, well-established, and earnest" in her provincial outlook (67).

In contrast-and here lies the largest difference between provincialism and whiteness-many white people today do not consciously think of themselves as members of this (white) race and not another, not even loosely. Excepting members of white militant groups such as the Ku Klux Klan or the Creativity Movement, contemporary white people do not tend to have a conscious sense of unity as fellow white people, nor do they consciously invoke or share special ideals, customs, or common memories as white people. They often are perceived and perceive themselves as raceless, as members of the human species at large rather than members of a particular racial group. This does not eliminate their whiteness or their membership in a fairly unified group. Just the opposite: such "racelessness" is one of the marks and privileges of membership in whiteness, especially middle and upper class forms of whiteness. White people can feel a pride in the ideals and customs of whiteness and possess a sense of distinction from people of other races without much, if any conscious awareness of their whiteness and without consciously identifying those ideals and customs as white. To take one brief example, styles and customs of communication in classrooms tend to be raced (as well as classed and gendered), and white styles of discussion, hand-raising, and turn-taking tend to be treated as appropriate while black styles are seen as inappropriate.10 White students often learn to feel proud and validated by their teachers as good students when they participate in these styles, and this almost always happens without either students or teachers consciously identifying their style (or themselves) as white. Such students appear to belong and experience themselves as belonging merely to a group of smart, orderly, responsible students, not to a racialized group.

In the United States and Western world more broadly, unconscious habits of whiteness and white privilege have tended to increase after the end of de jure racism.11 Unlike provincialism as described by Royce, whiteness tends to operate more sub- and unconsciously than consciously. But I do not think that this fact spoils wise provincialism as a fruitful model for wise whiteness. First, and reflecting a basic philosophical disagreement that I have with Royce's idealism, I doubt that provincialism always functions as consciously as Royce suggests it does. The unity, pride, and love that are the hallmarks of provincialism could easily function in the form of unreflective beliefs, habits, preferences, and even bodily comportment. In fact I would argue that many aspects of our provincial loyalties-whatever type of province is at issue-operate on sub- or unconscious levels. In that case, provincialism and whiteness would not be as dissimilar in their operation as Royce's description implies.

Second, even if provincialism tends to consciously unify people while whiteness does not, Royce's advice that people should attempt to become more, rather than less self-conscious in their provincialism still applies to white people with respect to their whiteness. Given whiteness's history as a racial category of violent exclusion and oppression, one might think that white people need to focus less on their whiteness, to distance themselves from it. But just the opposite is the case. Given that distance from racial identification tends to be the covert modus operandi for contemporary forms of white privilege, white people who wish to fight racism need to become more intimately acquainted with their whiteness. Rather than ignore their whiteness, which allows unconscious habits of white privilege to proliferate unchecked, white people need to bring their whiteness to as much conscious awareness as possible (while also realizing that complete self-transparency is never achievable) so that they can try to change what it means.But why focus on increased awareness of whiteness simpliciter? I mentioned briefly above that raced styles of communication also tend to be gendered and classed, and even more accurate would be to say that race, gender, class, sexuality, and other significant axes of lived experience transactionally co-constitute one another. Race, including whiteness, is never lived in isolation from these other axes. In the United States, the way that a white person experiences and is impacted by her whiteness likely will vary depending on his/her ethnicity, gender and class in particular, and across the globe, national differences can give whiteness a very different meaning.12 For these reasons, one might wonder why I do not urge white people's increased consciousness of, for example, their Irish-American-whiteness, Southern-woman-whiteness, or lesbian-working-class-whiteness. Such forms of hyphenated whiteness might seem more likely to be sources of consciously felt unity, shared customs, and memory than would generic whiteness. In that case, "wise whiteness" should be read as mere shorthand for an indefinite number of forms of anti-racist whiteness.

I agree that one of the functions of the term wise whiteness is to serve as an umbrella for the infinitely rich and complicated ways that white people embody their whiteness. But I think it is important that the term not be understood merely as a bit of convenient shorthand that could be discarded without loss. It has a more substantial function than that of an umbrella, and treating it as mere shorthand risks letting white privilege and white supremacy off the hook too easily. Especially in the case of white ethnicities, insisting that whiteness always be considered in connection with other axes of identity can collapse race into ethnicity and work to deflect attention away white domination and oppression. Whiteness does mean different things for, e.g., Irish-American-whites and Italian-American-whites, and these two groups of white people have different racial histories and therefore at least somewhat different racial presents. But its full meaning is not contained in those different ethnicities. There is something to being white that being contemporarily Irish or Italian alone does not capture. So while whiteness is always transactionally constituted in and through other categories of lived experience, a functional separation of race from those other categories can be and sometimes needs to be made. In practice there is no such thing as whiteness by itself, and yet for particular purposes and because of the tendency of its erasure, it can be useful to focus on whiteness in abstraction from other lived categories. In that pragmatic sense, with the term "wise whiteness" I speak not only of the rehabilitation of a collection of hyphenated forms of whiteness, but also for a rehabilitated whiteness simpliciter. Royce's eloquent pleas on the behalf of provincialism speak to my point about bringing whiteness to as much conscious awareness as possible. As Royce appeals to his readers, he urges, "I hope and believe that you all intend to have your community live its own life, and not the life of any other community, nor yet the life of a mere abstraction called humanity in general" (67). On the same theme, he later compares the problem of wise provincialism with the problem of any individual activity, which admittedly can become narrow and self-centered. Acknowledging this problem, Royce counters,

But on the other hand, philanthropy that is not founded upon a personal loyalty of the individual to his own family and to his own personal duties is notoriously a worthless abstraction. We love the world better when we cherish our own friends the more faithfully. We do not grow in grace by forgetting individual duties in behalf of remote social enterprises. Precisely so, the province will not serve the nation best by forgetting itself, but by loyally emphasizing its own duty to the nation . . . . (98)

The disappearance of the individual does not well serve larger social enterprises. Those enterprises thrive only if the personal, passionate energies of individuals are poured into them. Large enterprises and institutions tend to become anemic abstractions if they are not rooted in felt individual commitments. Likewise, properly understood, the nation need not be in a competitive relationship with the various communities that it shelters. Loyalty to and love for one's more local connections can be a powerful source of meaningful loyalty to and love for one's nation. In both cases, the same pattern can be detected: rich ties to the smaller entity-the individual or the community-are what sustain meaningful connections to the larger entity-the philanthropic cause or the nation. The two are not necessarily in conflict, as is often thought, and in fact the larger entity would suffer if ties to the smaller entity were cut off.

It is useful to anti-racist struggle to think of a similar relationship holding between particular races, including the white race, and humanity at large. While it might initially seem paradoxical, the larger entity of humanity can best be served by people's ties to smaller, more local entities such as their racial groups. A person's racial group is not the only smaller entity that provides the rich existential ties of which Royce speaks-he rightly mentions family, and we could add entities such as one's neighborhood, one's church, mosque or synagogue, and even groups based on one's gender or sexual orientation. But race also belongs in this list of sites of intimate connection that can and often do sustain individual lives and that can support rather than undermine the well being of humanity. Forgetting one's duty to one's particular race in the name of working for racial justice, for example, tends to turn that goal into a remote abstraction. "You cannot be loyal to merely an impersonal abstraction," Royce reminds us.13 Effectively serving the goal of racial justice is more likely to occur if one concretely explores how racial justice could emerge out of loyalty to one's particular race.

This claim might not seem objectionable when considering racial groups that are not white. Loyalty to other members of their race has been an important way for African Americans, for example, to further the larger cause of racial justice. Black slaves who helped each other escape their white masters fought against slavery and thus helped humanity as a whole. But the history of whiteness suggests that white people's loyalty to their race not only would not help, but in fact would undermine struggles for racial justice. How could white people serve the larger interests of the human race by being loyal to a race that has oppressed, colonized, and brutalized other races? What possible duties or obligations to their race could white people have, responsibilities that must be remembered if racial justice is to be a concrete, lived goal for white people to work toward?

On the one hand, these questions can seem outrageous, even dangerous. Talk of duty to the white race smacks of militarist white supremacist movements, and indeed the first of the Creativity Movement's sixteen commandments in their "White Man's Bible" is that "it is the avowed duty and holy responsibility of each generation to assure and secure for all time the existence of the White Race upon the face of this planet," and the sixth is that "your first loyalty belongs to the White Race."14 Noel Ignatiev's concern about the scholarly validation of white supremacy through the critical conservation of whiteness could not be better placed than here. Temporarily setting aside the dangerous aspect of these questions, they also can seem nonsensical if they do not refer to the goals of white supremacist movements. What antiracist duties, we might ask with some sarcasm, do white people have that must not be forgotten? African Americans and other non-white people might be able to combine loyalty to their racial group with loyalty to humanity, but white people cannot. Their situations are too different to treat their relationships to their races as similar. Those relationships are asymmetrical, which means that white people's loyalty to the human race, including racial justice for all its members, conflicts with loyalty to whiteness. Loyalty to humanity would seem to require white people to be race traitors.

On the other hand, these questions present a needed challenge to white people who care about racial justice. Rather than rhetorically or sarcastically, the questions can be asked in the spirit of Royce's call for each "community [to] live its own life, and not the life of any other community, nor yet the life of a mere abstraction called humanity in general" (67). For white people to fight white supremacy and white privilege does not mean for them to attempt to shed their whiteness and become members of the human species at large. Attempting to become raceless by living the life of an abstraction called humanity merely cultivates a white person's ignorance of how race, including whiteness, and racism inform her habits, beliefs, desires, antipathies, and other aspects of her life. It does not magically eliminate her white privilege for even if she succeeds in thinking of herself as a raceless member of humanity, she likely will continue to be identified and treated as white, even if unreflectively or unconsciously, by others. By allowing her white privilege to go unchecked in this way, a white person's living the life of abstract humanity actually tends to increase, not reduce her racial privilege. To increase the chances of reducing her racial privilege, she must resist the temptation to see herself as raceless and instead figure out what it could mean for her to live her own life as a racialized person.

Living as a racialized, rather than abstract person does not mean attempting to take on a different race. Attempting to take on a different race implicitly acknowledges that whiteness is problematic, and it can seem to be an expression of respect for non-white people. But it often is no better a response to white privilege than attempting to shed one's whiteness. This is because a white person's taking on the habits, culture, and other aspects of another race often is an expression of ontological expansiveness, which is a habit of white privileged people to treat all spaces-whether geographical, existential, linguistic, cultural, or other-as available for them to inhabit at their choosing.15 Appropriating another race in this way thus is closer to imperialist colonialism than a gesture of respect. For this reason, white people need to stop trying to flee the responsibilities and duties that come with being white and figure out how to live their own racialized life, not the life of another race. Once they no longer ignore or attempt to flee their whiteness, they can then ask how work for racial justice fits with their duties and responsibilities as a white person and how they might live their own anti-racist white life. Three "Evils" Eliminated by Wise Whiteness Royce lists three specific problems in modern American life that cannot be solved without wise provincialism. His discussion of these "evils," as Royce calls them, also illuminates "evils" that a wise form of whiteness could help meliorate. The first evil is the neglect of and disruption to a community when people are only loosely associated with it and do not invest in, care about, or have a significant history with it. Royce argues that this problem is growing in frequency and significance as people are increasingly mobile, changing their residency multiple times over their lifetime and often moving great distances from where they were born and raised. This means that communities are increasingly dealing with a large number of newcomers who do not (yet) have an intimate, caring connection to the new place they inhabit. This is "a source of social danger, because the community needs well-knit organization" (73). Provincialism helps these newcomers care for their new home, and a wise provincialism does so without generating any hostility toward either other provincial communities or larger social bodies such as the nation.In a similar fashion, when white people who care about racial justice have virtually no conscious or deliberate affiliation with their whiteness, the meaning and effect of whiteness is left to happenstance or, more likely, is determined by white supremacist groups. Royce's primary concern is the dissolution of communities through neglect, and if well intentioned white people do not care about, invest in, or acknowledge a significant history with their whiteness, then whiteness will be neglected. But unlike provincial communities, whiteness does not necessarily unravel or wither away because of simple neglect by anti-racist white people. Its neglect by anti-racists whites instead leaves it wide open for racist white groups to develop. Like a garden, whiteness can easily grow tough weeds of white supremacy if it is not wisely cultivated. The evil of abandoning whiteness, allowing white supremacists to make of it whatever they will, can be mitigated by a wise form of whiteness.

In practice, this means that white people who care about racial justice need to educate newcomers to whiteness-namely, white children-to be loyal to and care about their race. While Royce's comments about the problem of newcomers due to increased geographical mobility do not apply directly to whiteness,16 white children can be thought of as newcomers to the community of whiteness who do not (yet) have an intimate connection to their race or know how to cultivate and care for it. Here again is an instance in which white supremacists have been allowed to corner the market on whiteness: almost all explicit reflection and writing on how to raise white children as white has been undertaken by groups such as the Ku Klux Klan, World Church of the Creator, and Stormfront.17

The association is so tight that the mere suggestion of educating white children in their whiteness is alarming to many people. But educating white children about their whiteness need and should not mean educating them to be white supremacists. A wise form of whiteness would help train the developing racial habits of white children in anti-racist ways. 18Royce calls the second problem addressed by provincialism that of "the leveling tendency of recent civilization" (74), but more accurate, I think, would be to characterize the problem as one of monotonous sameness. Royce is concerned that the increase of mass communication means that people all over the nation, indeed the globe, are reading the same news stories, sharing the same ideas, fashions, and trends, and more and more imitating one another. The rich diversity of humankind, the independence of the small manufacturer, and distinctiveness of the individual are being absorbed into a vast, impersonal social order. A wise provincialism is not wholly opposed to these tendencies. There is great value in large groups of people coming to understand each other across their differences. But, Royce argues, there often also is great value to be found in their differences, and those differences ought to be allowed to thrive. A wise provincialism helps protect the variety of different places and communities so that they are not forced to be identical with each other.

In a similar way, wise whiteness helps preserve racial differences without treating people of various races as wholly alien to each other and thus incapable of understanding each other across their differences. As Lucius Outlaw asks, "Why is it, after thousands of years, that human beings are not all 'light khaki' instead of exhibiting the variety of skin tones (and other features) more or less characteristic of various populations called races?"19 The answer, according to Outlaw, is not merely that racism and invidious ethnocentrism have worked to establish inviolable boundaries between white and non-white races. It also is that different races are "the result of bio-cultural group attachments and practices that are conducive to human survival and well-being."20With W.E.B. Du Bois, Outlaw argues that racial differences can enrich everyone and that even if racism disappeared tomorrow, we should want discernibly distinct races to continue to exist.21 The baby need not be thrown out with the bathwater. The rich variety of human racial and ethnic cultures need not be eliminated to eliminate racism and invidious ethnocentrism.

A wise whiteness also would caution, however, that white people's appreciation for racial diversity and variety also can be an insidious form of whiteness in disguise. Too often, celebrations of multiculturalism and racial diversity function as a smorgasbord of racial difference offered up for (middle-to-upper class) white people's consumption and enjoyment. They do this by acknowledging some differences while simultaneously concealing others. It is very easy for white people to recognize and even celebrate racial difference in the form of different food, dress, and cultural customs. It tends to be much more difficult for them to recognize racial difference in the form of economic,

educational, and political inequalities. Royce's criticism of the leveling tendencies of modern culture does not explicitly depoliticize the issue, and he does mention that variety is needed particularly to counter "the purely mechanical carrying-power of certain ruling social influences," an example of which is the hegemony of white culture (76). But given the tendency of white (middle-to-upper class, in particular) people to see whiteness as cultureless and boring and thus want to spice it up by dabbling in other, "exotic" cultures, care must be taken that appreciation of diversity is not sanitized through an avoidance of the history and present of white privilege. When that happens, appreciation of plurality and diversity tend to become a covert vehicle for white ontological expansiveness. In contrast, a wise whiteness values and thus transactionally conserves different races, as Outlaw does, without depoliticizing the meaning of those differences.

The third evil discussed by Royce, the mob spirit, occurs when all individual judgment has been given up and a person becomes totally absorbed in a large social mass. Without discriminating individuals, the crowd or mob is psychologically vulnerable to a strong leader, idea, or even a song that enflames emotions and leads people to act in ways they ordinarily would not act. This danger is closely related to the one of sameness for behind the two dangers lay the same phenomenon: that of wide, inclusive human sympathy (92-93). Openness to and sharing in the lives and the feelings of others is not always a positive event, Royce cautions us. Undiscriminating sympathy can lend support to base absurdities as easily as to noble kindness, and as such sympathy is more of a neutral base for psychological development than an automatic good to be ubiquitously cultivated. Under certain conditions-conditions that Royce thinks are increasingly present in the modern world-wide, inclusive sympathy for others can become not only monotonous, but also dangerous (95). Loss of the small-the particular, the local, the individual-as it is absorbed into the large is something to resist, and a wise provincialism helps prevent that loss

Royce's concern about the mob spirit does not directly speak to problems faced by a wise whiteness.22 But in this concern we can see the streak of organic individualism that runs through Royce's work, which can tell us something important about the relationships of white individuals to their race. Royce's legendary concern for community does not sacrifice or dissolve the individual into the larger whole. Just as false forms of provincialism set up a false opposition between provincialism and nationalism, false forms of individualism set up a false opposition between individualism and community or social causes. That kind of individualism fails because of its "failure to comprehend what it is that the ethical individual needs," which is a cause greater than the individual that she can passionately serve (38). Here is where Royce's individualism is distinctive: it insists that real individuality is found through personal choice of a larger cause that one loyally serves, not through endless insistence that one is a single individual with personal initiative. This insistence is empty if never acted upon, leaving the so-called autonomous individual lost and floundering. "Be an individual," Royce urges exasperatedly, "[b]ut for Heaven's sake, set about the task."23To be a real individual, a person needs something larger than herself to be a part of. And as communities of meaning, racial groups historically have developed as one of those things. In Lucius Outlaw's words, racial and ethnic identification in part "develop[ed] as responses to the need for life-sustaining and meaningful acceptable order of various kinds (conceptual, social, political)."24 Human beings need to create conceptual, social, political and other structures, including individual and social identities, to give their lives meaning and purpose. While Outlaw talks about this need in terms of order and Royce speaks of it in terms of a cause to devote one's self to, both point to an existential need that racial identity, including whiteness, can serve and historically has served. And they both suggest that **a theory of racial justice that ignores this need will *not be effective in practice*.**

#### IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO BE NEUTRAL ON A MOVING TRAIN – THE U.S. RACIAL PENAL REGIME IS BEING GLOBALIZED INSTALLING WHITE SUPREMACY ACROSS THE GLOBE. ONLY THE 1AC’S THEORIZATION OF THIS FOUNDATIONAL RACIAL VIOLENCE THROUGH THE LENS OF THE U.S. PRISON SYSTEM CAN CREATE AN OVERLAP OF SCHOLARLY PRAXIS AND ACTIVIST MOBILIZATION.

Dylan Rodriguez, Professer University of California Riverside, November 2007

Kritika Kultura “AMERICAN GLOBALITY AND THE U. S. PRISON REGIME:

STATE VIOLENCE AND WHITE SUPREMACY FROM ABU GHRAIB TO STOCKTON

TO BAGONG DIWA” Available online at http://www.ateneo.edu/ateneo/www/UserFiles/121/docs/KK09.pdf)

I am suggesting a conception of **the prison regime** that focuses on what cultural and political theorist Allen Feldman calls a “formation of violence,” which **anchors the contemporary articulation of white supremacy as a global technology of coercion and hegemony**. Feldman writes, The growing autonomy of violence as a self-legitimating sphere of social discourse and transaction points to the inability of any sphere of social practice to totalize society. Violence itself both reflects and accelerates the experience of society as an incomplete project, as something to be made. (5)

As a formation of violence that self-perpetuates a peculiar social project through the discursive structures of warfare, the U.S. prison regime composes an acute formation of racial and white supremacist violence, and thus houses the capacity for mobilization of an epochal (and peculiar) white supremacist global logic. This contention should not be confused with the sometimes parochial (if not politically chauvinistic) proposition that American state and state-sanctioned regimes of bodily violence and human immobilization are somehow self-contained “domestic” productions that are exceptional to the United States of America, and that other “global” sites simply “import,” imitate, or reenact these institutionalizations of power. In fact, I am suggesting the opposite: the U.S. prison regime exceeds as it enmeshes the ensemble of social relations that cohere U.S. civil society, and is fundamental to the geographic transformations, institutional vicissitudes, and militarized/economic mobilizations of “globalization” generally. To assert this, however, is to also argue that the constituting violence of the U.S. prison regime has remained somewhat undertheorized and objectified in the overlapping realms of public discourse, activist mobilization, and (grassroots as well as professional) scholarly praxis.

#### The affirmative should win the debate if our intellectual critique is found superior to the SQ or the negative’s competitive alternative.

**INTELLECTUAL RESISTANCE IS KEY TO UNWORKING THE HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIPS OF TRUTH AND POWER THAT ENSURE DOMINATION.**

Roger Alan Deacon. 2003. Political Science Researcher w/a Doctorate from U of Natal – Durban. Fabricating Foucault: Rationalising the Management of Individuals. P 272-5

To problematize the Enlightenment is to pose questions about current conceptions of theory, politics and human subjects. It is to suggest that Enlightenment has been bought at the huge, but not ‘unreasonable’, price of the free participation of all modern individuals (from patients, paupers and pupils to consumers and deviants) in their objectiﬁcation and subjection to powerful, knowledgeable, and usually institutionally legitimated, others. Such a genealogical examination of the modern “rationalization of the management of the individual”, of the interplay between that which orders human conduct—strategies of government and resistance—and that which rationalises (both justifying and making more efﬁcient) such conduct—forms of knowledge and technological reﬁnements—would make it possible to deﬁne what Foucault called a new kind of ‘political spiritualité’, to rethink issues of social (and self) transformation which are always bound up with issues of truth and power. The recognition of how we have historically constituted ourselves— our unique conﬁguration of scientiﬁcally sanctioned styles of soothsaying and subjection—is thus the ﬁrst step towards experimenting with the possibility of no longer being, doing or thinking what we are, do or think. Entirely warranted as it may be, that “the essential thing in a condemnation is not the quality of the evidence but the force of the one who presents the evidence” (Foucault 1989: 182), it cannot be forgotten that the force of the presentation is accentuated by the rigour of the investigation. Indispensable for genealogy as much as for any modern science is thus a studious examination of speciﬁc contemporary experiences (not only socially marginal ones like madness or transgression, or particular ones like sexuality, but especially our supposedly natural subjectivities and even the experience of freedom itself), in relation to each other as well as historically, for, as Bernstein notes with reference to the work of Rorty, MacIntyre and Kuhn, an appeal to history is not anecdotal but critical (Bernstein 1991: 23). Historical analysis as genealogy will no longer simply rationalise the present, but will be a weapon with which to challenge the modes by which human beings have been and are being made into known and knowing, governed and governing, and ‘moralised and moralising’, subjects. Through his historical reinterpretations of how we moderns have constituted ourselves in the realms of reason, health, law, science, sexuality and subjectivity, Foucault deliberately aimed to ‘fabricate’ the present, to play its interpretive violence against itself so that, on the assumption that different descriptions distort differently, he would be able to inscribe effects of truth in the present and upon the real (as opposed to revealing the past or expressing a truth). This is this book’s second conclusion: Foucault’s ‘truth-fabricating’ and ‘reality-constituting’ approach has major implications for the nature, object and purpose of theory. Theory becomes a practice in its own right, problematizing as much as enlightening, and dependent on the very social forces with which it concerns itself; its object, reality, is reconﬁgured as a terrain which coalesces under the impact of strategic maps, or theoretical practices, such that the object (things, others and their contexts) is always the object for theory, forged or fabricated; and its purpose is not to produce a programme for action but to mount a constructive challenge. A Foucauldian approach is one which seeks to deploy familiar images in a way which subverts their recognisability, by going along with a familiar manoeuvre in order to extend it beyond itself or play it at its own game; which does not so much reveal truths or assume solid individual identities as reveal their fabrication; and which substitutes for the penetrating but blinkered scientiﬁc gaze an oblique and informing glance. Thus, what we do with the Enlightenment depends to a large extent on what the Enlightenment has done with us. This ‘we’ has several references: it is simultaneously the all-inclusive ‘we’ of humanity, the exclusive ‘we’ of the Enlightened West, and the very speciﬁc ‘we’ of those who have arrogated to themselves the task of reﬂecting upon who ‘we’ are—the intellectuals. We who monopolise the use of the analytical tools bequeathed to us by the Enlightenment have also been accustomed to legislating how Enlightenment is to be cultivated. The third conclusion is that, once the nature, object and purpose of theory is rethought in this way, the traditional prophesying role of intellectuals, as well as their hope of arriving at complete and deﬁnitive knowledge of ourselves and our history, must of necessity be abandoned. Nonetheless, under these circumstances social transformation becomes simultaneously problematic, vital and possible. Alongside, rather than in the vanguard of, struggles by particular groups of the disaggregated masses, and in terms of their own speciﬁc practices, concrete problems and particular locales, intellectuals can question the self-evidence of modern political rationalities and assist in dismantling the coordinates of experience which constitute modern subjects, as much as they struggle within and against the relations of power (predominantly institutionalised in universities) that transform them into objects of and instruments for the production of knowledge. Merely to pose the question of the possibility of transforming our modern forms of subjectivity is to bring into stark relief the power relations which compose the price we are paying for our freedom, our capacity for technological development and our ability to reason in the manner laid down by the Enlightenment. To problematize the Enlightenment, then, requires a reconceptualisation of power relations. For genealogical purposes, however, conventional theories of power, and most particularly Marxist theories, which focus on individual or collective but always sovereign agents and how their possession of or suppression by power differentially affects their knowledge and their autonomy, are inadequate. While not denying the particular signiﬁcance of the modern state in regulating relations of power, or of social classes, elites, governments, political parties and constitutions as forms in which power relations customarily manifest themselves, Foucault argued that to insist upon their salience is to neglect the complexity, multiplicity and speciﬁc effects of local power relations which, operating independently of and at a certain distance from these customary forms, often sustain, enlarge and maximise their effectiveness. Yet because notions of power as sovereignty prevail in modern society (mainly because they disguise, justify and normalise, and help regulate and energise, more ubiquitous relations of power), in order to avoid simply reproducing them Foucault sought instead to develop an ‘analytics’, as opposed to a ‘theory’, of power, by not saying what power is but instead showing how it operates, concretely and historically, in the form of strategic relations aimed at governing subjects. In short, what is required is an historical analysis of the broad ‘body politic’, from global political rationalities through local relations of power to individual human subjects.

#### The 1ac’s contextualization of the war on drugs and the racism inherent to the American penal system completely undermines the division between global and local sites of politics – policing is neither of these - it is instead ,a tool of social ordering which ought to be resisted.

Dylan Rodriguez, Professer University of California Riverside, November 2007

Kritika Kultura “AMERICAN GLOBALITY AND THE U. S. PRISON REGIME: STATE VIOLENCE AND WHITE SUPREMACY FROM ABU GHRAIB TO STOCKTON TO BAGONG DIWA” Available online at http://www.ateneo.edu/ateneo/www/UserFiles/121/docs/KK09.pdf)

**To consider the U.S. prison as a global practice of dominance, we might begin with** the now-indelible photo exhibition of captive brown men manipulated, expired, and rendered bare in the tombs of the U.S.-commandeered Abu Ghraib prison: here, I am concerned less with the idiosyncrasies of the carceral spectacle (who did what, administrative responsibilities, tedium of military corruption and incompetence, etc.) than I am with its inscription of the where in which the worst of U.S. prison/state violence incurs. As the bodies of tortured prisoners in this somewhere else, that is, beyond and outside the formal national domain of the United States, have become the hyper-visible and accessible raw material for a global critique of the U.S. state—with Abu Ghraib often serving as the signifier for a generalized mobilization of sentiment against the American occupation—the intimate and

proximate bodies of **those locally and intimately imprisoned within the localities of the United States** constantly threaten to disappear from the political and moral registers of U.S. civil society, its resident U.S. Establishment Left, and perhaps most if not all elements of the global Establishment Left, which includes NGOs, political parties, and sectarian organizations. I contend in this essay that a new theoretical framing is required to critically address (and correct) the artificial delineation of the statecraft of Abu Ghraib prison, and other U.S. formed and/or mediated carceral sites across the global landscape, as somehow unique and exceptional to places outside the U.S. proper. In other words, **a genealogy and social theory of U.S. state violence specific to the regime of the prison needs to be delicately situated within the ensemble of institutional relations, political intercourses, and historical conjunctures that** precede, **produce, and sustain places like the Abu Ghraib** prison, **and can** therefore **only be adequately articulated as a genealogy and theory of the allegedly “domestic” U.S. prison regime’s “globality**” (I will clarify my use of this concept in the next part of this introduction). Further, in offering this initial attempt at such a framing, I am suggesting **a genealogy of U.S. state violence that can more sufficiently conceptualize the logical continuities and material articulations between a) the ongoing projects of domestic warfare organic to the white supremacist U.S. racial state, and b) the array of “global**” (or extra-domestic) **technologies of violence** that form the premises of possibility for those social formations and hegemonies integral to the contemporary moment of U.S. global dominance. In this sense, I am amplifying the capacity of the U.S. prison to inaugurate technologies of power that exceed its nominal relegation to the domain of the criminal-juridical**. Consider imprisonment**, then**, as a practice of social ordering and geopolitical power, rather than as a self-contained or foreclosed jurisprudential practice**: therein, it is possible to reconceptualize the significance of the Abu Ghraib spectacle as only one signification of a regime of dominance that is neither (simply) local nor (erratically) exceptional, but is simultaneously mobilized, proliferating, and global.

# 2AC

## Case

### 2AC case analytic extension

#### Our Bramhall 2012 ev. is a genealogical analysis of the connection between social racism, corporate profit, and the policing system

#### Lendman 2012 explains how hemp restrictions and marijuana policing are used to expand the racist policies of the prison industrial complex

#### Ed Forchion explained how these structures create a racialized penal system tantamount to mass slavery

#### Kendall’s explanation of our own experiences with these policies and our acknowledgement of white privilege socially positions us as ready to transform whiteness into an anti-racist category

#### Our first Rodroguez ’07 card explains that the prison system our aff critiques is THE cause of American globality. Which ensures domination, genocide and biopolitical control

#### Our Social Justice Movements '06 is the ultimate perm solvency and positions our aff as an invitation to all critiques of dominant SQ hierarchies

#### AND it helps explain our advocacy as the affirmation of an interrogation of, and position against the American prison system and all social relations that support its permanence

#### Our Singh ’06 evidence argues that our aff is pre-requisite to any alt the neg. presents AND a failure to include the aff ensures SQ domination

#### The second Rodriguez ’07 card is argues the AFF allows an understanding of the ways difference is produced and regulated across the entire reach of the united states. This is key to ending the practices that manage and enslave people of color all over the world

#### Extend Sullivan. We can’t reject whiteness, we have to transform it. Failure to do so allows whiteness to recombine itself and maintain its power. ONLY TRANFORMING it as per the aff can “solve” anything

#### THE ROLE OF THE BALLOT IS TO ENDORSE A DESIRABLE INTELLECTUAL STRATEGY FOR CHALLENGING DOMINANT HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIPS OF POWER.

### Why vote aff Sam 2AC

#### Our Deacon ev. explains why the historical and political investigation of the government’s restrictions of Cannibis Sativa L are a strike against the system of neocolonial prisons that make up American globality-which, if unchecked, leads to physical, ethical, and psychological extinction of the planet and its inhabitants

#### In this particular debate, an affirmative ballot from Parker is a marker of Baylor presenting a better intellectual investigation of the intersection of energy policy, the prison industrial complex, and American globality. It also means that Parker finds our advocacy is a productive interrogation of, and positioning against the American prison system and all social relations that support its permanence—that’s our Social Justice Movements '06 ev.

#### An Aff ballot also means that for this round, Parker agrees that our investigation is a productive intellectual struggle against the racialized practices that justify colonialism, imperialism, and fascism, and hence allow for the existence of the prison system. A failure to confront contemporary displays of the state’s history of sovereign domination threatens the entire world.

#### Last arg here, An aff ballot is necessary to sustain this aff as an on-going project to transform whiteness from a racialized regime of oppression to an anti-racist ethic.—that’s Sullivan

## K

### A2 Wilderson You don’t center your analysis on the black body

#### The neg has misread what “centering the black body” means: the entirety of the 1AC centers its analysis about the black body and an interrogation of civil society’s construction as anti-blackness. Even our “transform whiteness” arguments are centered about how to divest and ourself from the privilege that colonizes the black body

#### AND Wilderson says you’re wrong

**Wilderson, 03** professor of African American Studies at University of California, Irvine, 2003 (Frank, A. B. Dartmouth College (Government/Philosophy); MFA Columbia University (Fiction Writing); Ph.D. University of California, Berkeley (Rhetoric/Film Studies), “The Prison Slave as Hegemony's (Silent) Scandal”, Social Justice, Vol. 30 Issue 2, p18-27)

Decolonization, which sets out to change the order of the world, is, obviously, a program of complete disorder."12 If we take him at his word, then we must accept that no other body functions in the Imaginary, the Symbolic, or the Real so completely as a repository of complete disorder as the black body. **Blackness is the site of absolute dereliction** at the level of the Real, for in its magnetizing of bullets **the black body functions as the map of gra­tuitous violence, through which civil society is possible**— namely, those bodies for which violence is, or can be, contingent. Blackness is the site of absolute dereliction at the level of the Symbolic, for blackness in America generates no categories for the chromosome of history and no data for the categories of im­migration or sovereignty. It is an experience without analog—a past without a heritage. Blackness is the site of absolute dereliction at the level of the Imaginary, for "**whoever says 'rape' says Black"** (Fanon), **whoever says "prison" says black** (Sexton), and whoever says "aids" says black—t**he "Negro is a phobogenic object**."13 Indeed, it means all those things: a phobogenic object, a past without a heritage, the map of gratuitous violence, and a program of complete disorder. Whereas this realization is, and should be, cause for alarm, it should not be cause for lament or, worse, disavowal—not at least, for a true revolutionary or for a truly revolutionary movement such as prison abolition. If a social move­ment is to be neither social-democratic nor Marxist in terms of structure of political desire, then it should grasp the invitation to assume the positionality of subjects of social death. If we are to be honest with ourselves, we must admit that the "Negro" has been inviting whites, as well as civil society's junior part­ners, to the dance of social death for hundreds of years, but few have wanted to learn the steps. They have been, and remain today—even in the most antiracist movements, such as the prison abolition movement—invested elsewhere. This is not to say that all oppositional political desire today is pro-white, but it is usually antiblack, meaning that it will not dance with death. Black liberation, as a prospect, makes radicalism more dangerous to the United States. This is not because it raises the specter of an alternative polity (such as socialism or community control of existing resources), but because its condition of possibility and gesture of resistance function as a negative dialec­tic: a politics of refusal and a refusal to affirm, a "program of complete disorder." One must embrace its disorder, its incoherence, and allow oneself to be elabo­rated by it if, indeed, ones politics are to be underwritten by a desire to take down this country. If this is not the desire that underwrites ones politics, then through what strategy of legitimation is the word "prison" being linked to the word "abolition"? What are this movements lines of political accountability? There is nothing foreign, frightening, or even unpracticed about the embrace of disorder and incoherence. The desire to be embraced, and elaborated, by dis­order and incoherence is not anathema in and of itself. No one, for example, has ever been known to say, "Gee-whiz, if only my orgasms would end a little sooner, or maybe not come at all." Yet few so-called radicals desire to be em­braced, and elaborated, by the disorder and incoherence of blackness—and the state of political movements in the United States today is marked by this very Negrophobogenisis: "Gee-whiz, if only black rage could be more coherent, or maybe not come at all." Perhaps there is something more terrifying about the foy of black than there is in the joy of sex (unless one is talking sex with a Negro). Perhaps coalitions today prefer to remain in-orgasmic in the face of civil society—with hegemony as a handy prophylactic, just in case. If through this stasis or paralysis they try to do the work of prison abolition, the work will fail, for it is always work from a position of coherence (i.e., the worker) on behalf of a position of incoherence of the black subject, or prison slave. In this way, social formations on the left remain blind to the contradictions of coalitions between workers and slaves. They remain coalitions operating within the logic of civil society and function less as revolutionary promises than as crowding y out scenarios of black antagonisms, simply feeding our frustration. Whereas the positionality of the worker (whether a factory worker demand­ing a monetary wage, an immigrant, or a white woman demanding a social wage) gestures toward the reconfiguration of civil society, the positionality of the black subject (whether a prison slave or a prison slave-in-waiting) gestures toward the disconfiguration of civil society. From the coherence of civil so­ciety, the black subject beckons with the incoherence of civil war, a war that re­claims blackness not as a positive value but as a politically enabling site, to quote Fanon, of "absolute dereliction." It is a "scandal" that rends civil society asun­der. Civil war, then, becomes the unthought, but never forgotten, understudy of hegemony. It is a black specter waiting in the wings, an endless antagonism that cannot be satisfied (via reform or reparation) but that must, nonetheless, be pursued to the death.

#### We must seek to understand imprisonment as a practice of social ordering that creates the conditions underwhich exceptional examples of US domination can occur

Dylan Rodriguez, Professer University of California Riverside, November 2007

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proximate bodies of **those locally and intimately imprisoned within the localities of the United States** constantly threaten to disappear from the political and moral registers of U.S. civil society, its resident U.S. Establishment Left, and perhaps most if not all elements of the global Establishment Left, which includes NGOs, political parties, and sectarian organizations. I contend in this essay that a new theoretical framing is required to critically address (and correct) the artificial delineation of the statecraft of Abu Ghraib prison, and other U.S. formed and/or mediated carceral sites across the global landscape, as somehow unique and exceptional to places outside the U.S. proper. In other words, **a genealogy and social theory of U.S. state violence specific to the regime of the prison needs to be delicately situated within the ensemble of institutional relations, political intercourses, and historical conjunctures that** precede, **produce, and sustain places like the Abu Ghraib** prison, **and can** therefore **only be adequately articulated as a genealogy and theory of the allegedly “domestic” U.S. prison regime’s “globality**” (I will clarify my use of this concept in the next part of this introduction). Further, in offering this initial attempt at such a framing, I am suggesting **a genealogy of U.S. state violence that can more sufficiently conceptualize the logical continuities and material articulations between a) the ongoing projects of domestic warfare organic to the white supremacist U.S. racial state, and b) the array of “global**” (or extra-domestic) **technologies of violence** that form the premises of possibility for those social formations and hegemonies integral to the contemporary moment of U.S. global dominance. In this sense, I am amplifying the capacity of the U.S. prison to inaugurate technologies of power that exceed its nominal relegation to the domain of the criminal-juridical**. Consider imprisonment**, then**, as a practice of social ordering and geopolitical power, rather than as a self-contained or foreclosed jurisprudential practice**: therein, it is possible to reconceptualize the significance of the Abu Ghraib spectacle as only one signification of a regime of dominance that is neither (simply) local nor (erratically) exceptional, but is simultaneously mobilized, proliferating, and global.

### 2AC – WHITENESS - PERM SOLVENCY

#### ONLY THE PERM IS CAPABLE OF CONSILIENCE BY RECOGNIZING THAT AMERICA IS BOTH THE CAUSE OF AND REMEDY TO RACIAL VIOLENCE.

Frank 2005From Frank and McPhail’s collaborative 2k5 R&PA, David A. Frank is Professor of Rhetoric in the Robert D.Clark Honors College at the University of Oregon, Eugene. Mark Lawrence McPhail is Professor of Interdisciplinary Studies in the Western College Program at Miami University in Oxford, Ohio, Rhetoric & Public Affairs Vol. 8, No. 4, 2005, pp. 571-594

Accordingly,Kim Forde-Mazrui argues with great force that **the traditional moral claim for reparations**, which the Sharpton’s speech represents, **must be recast.**30She marshals evidence that **opponents and supporters of affirmative action and reparations can be bridged by rooting the issues in conservative moral terms:** “a constructive discourse . . . [which] draw[s] upon principles that are either accepted by opponents of affirmative action or are widely accepted by American society as relevant to questions ofattributing collective responsibility for the harmful effects ofwrongful conduct.”31 **These principles would draw from universal values and set forth a language of justice that transcends race**. First, she identifies the need to emphasize corrective justice as a principle, one that applies to all those who have experienced historical injus- tice. Second, she argues that **society and the American nation should be the agent identified as both the cause of the injustice and the source of rectification**. Forde-Mazrui’s impulse to seize conservative values and use them to ground arguments in favor of reparations and affirmative action represents a constructive alternative to Sharpton’s rehearsal. Using an approach similar to that of Forde-Mazrui, **Obama’s speech drew from his multiracial background to craft a speech designed to bridge the divides between and among ethnic groups.** He writes in his moving autobiography, Dreams from My Father, “I learned to slip back and forth between my black and white worlds, understanding that each possessed its own language and customs and structures of meaning, convinced that with a bit of translation on my part the two worlds would eventually cohere.”32 **Coherence,** Obama writes, **is a function of translation and the capacity to move between and among worlds.** He was repulsed by whites who used racist language,and could not use the phrase “white folks” as a synonym for bigot as it was undercut by the memories of the love and nonracist impulses of his white mother and grandfather.33 His speech at the convention reflects, as McPhail notes, **an ability to integrate competing visions of reality**. Obama did so **by using a rhetorical strategy ofconsilience, where understanding results through translation, mediation, and an embrace of different languages, values, and traditions.** This embrace **was intended to inspire a “jumping together”to common principles. His political success in Illinois is due to the use of consilience in search of coherence:** **Obama devised a narrative approach that acknowledged the traumas experienced by nonblacks, doing so without diminishing the need to address African American exigences.** In the process, **he enacts consilience, beginning with the multiple traumas affecting the broader community and bridging them to the transcendent value of justice.** In his extended New Republicprofile, Noam Scheiber observes: Whereas many working-class voters are wary of African American candidates, whom they think will promote black interests at the expense of their own, they simply don’t see Obama in these terms. This allows him to appeal to white voters on traditional Democratic issues like jobs, health care, and education—just like a white candidate would.34 Obama, by all reports, appeals to audiences of mixed racial and economic backgrounds. A close reading of his speech to the Democratic convention reveals his use of consilienceto achieve coherence. Obama refers to Lincoln in the beginning and celebrates Jefferson’s notion in the Declaration of Independence that “We hold these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights . . .”By using Jefferson as a touch- stone, one observer noted,“Obama also broke the mold; African-American politicians have not cited those words without sarcasm and qualification for many years ...”35The choice to feature the value of equality, of course, begins with Jefferson in the eighteenth century, is redefined by Lincoln in the nineteenth to include blacks, and is made urgent by King in the twentieth century. Here, **Obama calls for a reaffirmation of American values of equality and liberty, all the while indicating that such precepts have not been fulfilled, and that the country has not lived up to this creed. His use of consilience is in evidence when he includes issues of class, civil liberties, and race in his argument, appealing to a composite audience including Arab Americans, gays, and other identity groups to make use of their shared American values in making their claim**s.

### 1AR – PERM SOLVENCY / A2: VIEW FROM NOWHERE

#### THE PERM ALLOWS BOTH TEAMS TO APPROACH RACIAL VIOLENCE THROUGH CONTRADICTORY SOCIAL LOCATIONS –

Frank and McPhail 2005From Frank and McPhail’s collaborative 2k5 R&PA, David A. Frank is Professor of Rhetoric in the Robert D.Clark Honors College at the University of Oregon, Eugene. Mark Lawrence McPhail is Professor of Interdisciplinary Studies in the Western College Program at Miami University in Oxford, Ohio, Rhetoric & Public Affairs Vol. 8, No. 4, 2005, pp. 571-594

We approach these two reasonable responses to Obama’s speech as an experiment in rhetorical criticism, David A. Frank as a white American of Jewish and Quaker heritage, and Mark Lawrence McPhail as an African American influenced by Eastern spiritual philosophies. As **rhetorical scholars** we **share** both **an interest in collaboration and a willingness to weave together voices that have different interpretations** of Obama’s address **into a narrative that results in** what Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca call **a “contact of minds.”**14 **We acknowledge that our judgments** of the Obama address **are influenced by our ethnic and cultural backgrounds, and accordingly we “write together separately.”**15Ultimately, **we see our effort as both a problematic and a potentially fruitful endeavor to address** rhetorical theory and **public discourse as they deal with issues of race. While we disagree on many points**  about Obama’s speech, **we nonetheless agree on the importance of, and need for, racial reconciliation.**

#### THIS SHIELDS US FROM BOTH THEIR CO-OPTION AND THEIR VIEW FROM NOWHERE LINKS - EVEN IF INITIALLY THE WHITE LIBERAL SUBJECT WAS CONCEIVED OF AS OUTSIDE OF HISTORY, THE PERM RE-HISTORICIZES THAT SUBJECT THROUGH THE ACT OF RECONCILIATION - SHOWING HOW SUBJECTS CAN SEEK RACIAL RECONCILIATION WITHOUT ERASING RACIAL DIFFERENCE ITSELF.

### a2 social location/ext. methodology

Our performance in this debate space interrogates both privilege and whiteness in an effort to transform politics through our social location.

Rowe 2005 ("Be Longing:Toward a Feminist Politics of Relation." NWSA Journal 17.2 (2005) 15-46. Dr. Aimee Carrillo Rowe is Associate Professor of Rhetoric and Gender, Women’s and Sexuality Studies and is the Executive Director of Project on Rhetoric of Inquiry at the University of Iowa. She is the author of two books on movements, identities, alliances, and social location. )

Differential belonging calls us to reckon with the ways in which we are oppressed and privileged so that we may place ourselves where we can have an impact and where we can share experience. The key to differential belonging is that you do not have to be someone, in terms defined by identity politics, in order to do the political work that differential belonging entails. The conflation between identity and politics is unnecessarily limiting. For instance, some of my white female students, when we read brilliant woman-of-color theorists, worry that they cannot produce such theory because they are not as oppressed. They worry about their privilege. But good theory does not arise naturally from dark skin. It arises not merely from experiences of oppression but from grappling with those experiences and their larger social and political connections. Interrogating the politics of our belonging is something that anyone can do and all of us should do, regardless of the degree to which we are privileged. Good critical/feminist theory emerges from placing ourselves in community with visions of social justice. Placing ourselves there with a certain openness and the intention of being transformed. When we place ourselves with people aware of their oppression, we begin to see how we are implicated, to wrangle with the connections between privilege and oppression, not as abstract concepts but as constituting "our" lives. As we engage in differential belonging and the consciousness that arises from it, women of privilege can build a more radical feminist vision through their belonging in communities of difference.For instance, Ann Russo, who identifies as an antiracist white feminist, recounts that "for many years as an active feminist I thought issues of race and class were important to deal with in the women's movement. Yet until I began to work and hang out with women of color, I did not fully understand the enormous ramifications of multiracial groups of women developing feminist theory and working together for social change" (Russo 1991, 297). Ruth Frankenberg, whose work is largely responsible for ushering in the current wave of critical whiteness studies, echoes Russo's account: "by going where Estée went, meeting who she met, part of the [End Page 35] time living [in her community] . . . —my worldview, my sense of self and other, of history, identity, race, class, culture, were remade" (1996, 12). In alliances across power lines such transformations become possible. Russo and Frankenberg describe their shifts as not merely intellectual but also affective, palpable, and experiential. The meanings we make along side of those we love, particularly across lines of difference, allow us to remake our assumptions and widen our vision of the political field By rendering visible the conditions and effects—both oppressive and libratory, and more often both—of belonging, the multiple sites and communities to which we belong or don't belong become apparent. This awareness pushes us to consider the political, social, and spiritual effects of our choices to belong. This is not to suggest that belonging is merely free-floating and that we are free to choose our belongings outside of the bounds of power. As Kamala Visweswaran warns, "Not all identities are equally hybrid, for some have little choice about political processes determining their hybridization" (132). Likewise our belongings are conditioned by our bodies and where they are placed on the globe. And yet, the point of "differential belonging" is to call attention to the multiple paths we may travel in our circles of belonging, and to consider the implications for each on the other. It is not to be bound by the regulatory practices of any particular group nor by the need to remain consistent or "pure," but rather to take a risk and move in the direction of multiple others. As in "becoming-other."

### at: apolitical/university doesn’t solve

#### The university space is point of intersection of power-effects - Academics shape regimes of truth and intermediate strategies of racism, sexism and capitalism - problematization of modes of knowledge formation instead of prophesying action within the realm of mundane politics is the best role for intellectuals

Roger Alan Deacon. 2003. Political Science Researcher w/a Doctorate from U of Natal – Durban. Fabricating Foucault: Rationalising the Management of Individuals. P 102-105

And in The Order of Things he suggested that the disciplines of psychoanalysis and ethnology, seemingly privileged but mythologising ‘counter-sciences’ which call into question the more established human sciences and their object of ‘Man’, were inherently particularistic and as such perhaps most conducive to the emergence of the speciﬁc intellectual (OT: 376). The category of the speciﬁc intellectual brings together the erstwhile universal intellectual—Voltaire’s just ‘man of letters’—with those who once were merely “competent instances in the service of the State or Capital—technicians, magistrates, teachers” (Foucault 1980a: 127; emphasis in the original). In this respect, there is little difference between Foucault’s ‘speciﬁc intellectual’ and Gramsci’s “new type of [modern] intellectual” (Gramsci 1971: 9-10). As a result of the massive expansion of the white-collar and service sectors, it is possible for psychiatrists, social workers, lawyers, doctors, judges, academics or engineers to both do their jobs and also carry out ‘intellectual’ or ‘critical’ work once reserved for the writer (Foucault 1988a: 107). Whereas biology and physics (Darwin and Oppenheimer) were the privileged zones of formation of the speciﬁc intellectual (Foucault 1980a: 129), today the university and the academic have emerged, if not as principal elements, at least as ‘exchangers’, privileged points of intersection. If the universities and education have become politically ultrasensitive areas, this is no doubt the reason why. And what is called the crisis of the universities should not be interpreted as a loss of power, but on the contrary as a multiplication and reinforcement of their power-effects as centres in a polymorphous ensemble of intellectuals who virtually all pass through and relate themselves to the academic system (Foucault 1980a: 127; see also Gramsci 1971: 10-11). In this context, the work of the intellectual—for perhaps one ought no longer to speak of the task or the role of the intellectual—is no longer to prophesy, to legislate, to “shape others’ political will”, but to isolate, “in their power of constraint but also in the contingency of their historical formation”, the systems of thought that we take for granted (Foucault 1989: 282); it is, through the analyses he carries out in his own ﬁeld, to question over and over again what is postulated as self-evident, to disturb people’s mental habits, the way they do and think things, to dissipate what is familiar and accepted, to reexamine rules and institutions and on the basis of this reproblematization (in which he carries out his speciﬁc task as an intellectual) to participate in the formation of a political will (in which he has his role as citizen to play) (Foucault 1988a: 265). This “reproblematization” of what we take for granted is aimed at dismantling the existing coordinates of experience in order to change the self and, consequently, the selves of others: reproblematization § Marked 14:32 § is “an experience in which one risks oneself in the sense that one emerge from it transformed not only in what and how one thinks, but thereby in how one is or might possibly be” (Burchell 1993: 277). The function of the intellectual no longer has as its object the conscientisation of the masses, though it deeply concerns them, nor can it claim to avoid the blandishments of the state or capital. However, speciﬁc intellectuals occupy strategic positions, and the extent to which they propagate scientiﬁc ideologies is secondary to their capacity to ‘produce effects proper to true discourses’ (Foucault 1980a: 131). There are, of course, many dangers associated with this new conception of the intellectual, of being unable to move beyond the local and the particular, to generate outside support, to develop a global strategy or to avoid being manipulated by local networks of power (Foucault 1980a: 130; 1984a: 46-7).

Foucault was well aware that purely partial and local criticisms and struggles could leave us defenceless and bewildered in the face of global structures of domination. ‘Hardly feeling capable’ of doing more than merely “contribut[ing] to changing certain things in people’s ways of perceiving and doing things” (Foucault 1981f: 12), he was under no illusion about the difﬁculties inherent in this process, accepting that “we have to give up hope of ever acceding to a point of view that could give us access to any complete and deﬁnitive knowledge of what may constitute our historical limits” (Foucault 1984a: 47) and realising “how much all this can remain precarious, how easily it can all lapse back into somnolence” (Foucault 1981f: 12). Nevertheless, Foucault rejected what he referred to as “this whole intimidation with the bogy of reform” (Foucault 1980a: 145), that criticisms and struggles which are speciﬁc and localised will tend to be superﬁcial and recuperable, rather than fundamental and transcendent as associated with the universal intellectual. Such criticisms, he suggested, are “linked to the lack of a strategic analysis appropriate to political struggle” which ignores the fact that any balance of forces depends upon intermediate strategies and tactics (Foucault 1980a: 145); that is, that even global forms of domination like racism, capitalism and patriarchy are precariously grounded upon multiple and constantly shifting local relations of power (see Chapter Four). He also argued that the apparent dangers of abandoning a prophetic intellectual function are outweighed by its advantages, since, on the basis of the speciﬁcity of the politics of truth, combined with mutual support and politicisation, the position of the speciﬁc intellectual “can take on a general signiﬁcance and ... his local, speciﬁc struggle can have effects and implications which are not simply professional or sectoral”, but which can engage with the battle for or around the regime of truth, namely, “the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated and speciﬁc effects of power attached to the true” (Foucault 1980a: 132). Here Foucault’s work links up with that of Bourdieu, who argued that the greater intellectuals’ independence from mundane politics due to their speciﬁc locations, the greater their inclination to assert this independence and the greater their symbolic effectiveness (Bourdieu 1989: 100).

### A2 you're white guys, vote neg

#### Must transform whiteness to solve, performances like our aff are vital to prevent white anti-racism from simply being assimilationism

Graves '11

(Jen Graves—The Stranger’s visual arts writer—writes about things you mostly, but not strictly, approach with your eyeballs. Her writing has been in Art in America, The Believer, and ArtNews, and the Warhol Foundation has given her some money to get lost in land art. She also digs teaching, especially at Cornish College of the Arts in Seattle. Jen has lived and written about art in the Pacific Northwest for 11 years. ) Jen <http://www.thestranger.com/seattle/deeply-embarrassed-white-people-talk-awkwardly-about-race/Content?oid=9747101>

Every conversation about race is tortured—palpably awkward, loaded with triggers, marked by the blind spots of perception and presumption—but that doesn't mean you're doing it wrong or should stop doing it, says Scott Winn. That means you have to keep on. "Once I realized I was racist, it was, well, what am I going to do about it?" says Winn, a mild-mannered white guy in his 30s. "That shifts the defensiveness." Ten years ago, Winn cofounded CARW (you say "Car W"), or the Coalition of Anti-Racist Whites. For him, getting involved in antiracism "ultimately was not a moral shift but a strategic one." He already knew the world was racially fucked. He just had to figure out what to do next, and he began by examining whiteness as the invisible structure that defines everything—that needs to be explored and then exploded. "Whiteness is the center that goes unnamed and unstudied, which is one way that keeps us as white folks centered, normal, that which everything else is compared to—like the way we name race only when we're talking about a person of color," Winn says. "We can name how some acts hurt people of color, but it's harder to talk about how they privilege white folks." CARW holds an open meeting every month at the downtown Y, one of those early-20th-century brick buildings whose architecture is especially, absurdly on this occasion, Anglo. More than 20 people show up usually, sometimes up to 50. They're young and old, male and female, straight and gay. The only thing that would tip you off from the outside that this isn't, like, a giant poker tournament is that participants ask each other to share which gender pronoun they prefer during introductions. There's plenty of overlap between antiracist and LGBT activists in Seattle—Others know from Othering—and the message of these intros is simply that people are not necessarily what you think they are, whatever that is. The radical thing about CARW is that its purpose is to force awkwardness into the open. It could just as well be called Deeply Embarrassed White People Talk Awkwardly About Privilege. The first half of every meeting is devoted to group discussion of a theme. The second half is spent in committees, each attached to a separate racial-justice organization run by people of color. CARW is fueled by the philosophy that white people need to follow the lead of people of color on matters of race. (It sounds simple; what's surprising is how seldom it occurs.) One concrete result of that idea is that CARW members volunteer as support staff—waiters, babysitters, whatever—for the activities and events of groups in the Duwamish, African American, Latino, and Filipino communities. How have I lived in Seattle for more than five years and never heard of CARW until a year ago? After the first meeting I go to, I describe to CARW member Esther Handy my sense that this is a conversion experience, that everything around me has begun in recent years to look different, with a totality that feels spiritual—waking up to white privilege. (For me, embarrassingly, the real awakening began late, with a 2008 story about transracial adoptees that I wrote in The Stranger, and it continues, propelled selfishly by the fact that I am marrying into a family of color. I come late, and I mean to come humbly.) Gently bringing me down to earth and shifting the focus away from me, Handy says, "Our coming around to figuring out that we should be thinking about and talking about and doing work around racial justice is great and it can be spiritual, as you mentioned. But it is in service and in honor to the awesome organizations and leaders of people of color who have been doing this work for decades... The truth is that communities of color are thinking about racial justice all the time. They're living it and breathing it, and there's a group of white folks supporting that work, but it's only a small fraction of the white community at this point." I ask her how to talk about racism with people who don't want to see it. I'm not talking about Tea Partyers; I'm talking about people like some of my friends and family, lefties who care, people who are on my team. Attempts to bring up race in editorial meetings at The Stranger have been as klutzy as anywhere. Even for perfectly decent, well-meaning, progressive people, it can be hard to see the connection between unintended acts of racism and actual racial injustice. "I start with the facts," Handy says. "It's clear these injustices exist. I say I'm trying to understand the systems that create these inequities, and what's my role in working to change things. Reaching out and sharing these concepts with families and friends is absolutely part of the work, it's just not all of the work. Getting our racist uncle to stop saying bigoted things is not going to change the system. But we're not going to change the system without talking to our friends and family about it. While it benefits us not to talk about race, let's look at these disparities that just don't seem right." I ask how often she encounters resistance to conversations about race among white people in Seattle who consider themselves progressive. "I'd say every day," she says. "We're confused about it and we've been taught to be defensive about it. I don't think we should be too surprised about that." Winn says, "Exposure is often the key thing that trips people into awareness." The old "black friend" routine. Yes, it helps to seek out friends who are racial minorities if you want to understand racial injustice. Yes, this is weird. But so is the history of judging people based on something as arbitrary as skin color; we have to work with what we've got. "After that, I think many white people are integrationists in that 'beloved community' way, but integration usually means assimilation," Winn says. "As in, you've gotta act like us for this to work. So exposure on the terms of people of color is important. At CARW, we create a space that's not a PC space. If you say something that's not cool, we say here's why language matters. That talking about it is a skill." At the two CARW meetings I attend, nobody tells anybody that anything's not cool. But people vary in how much experience they have in talking and thinking about race. A very experienced turquoise-eyed lady who lives on Beacon Hill tells a story from her neighborhood: She'd been looking forward to meeting her nonwhite neighbors at a block party, but only the white neighbors showed up, talking about how they wished a Trader Joe's would move in. "Not a Trader Joe's!" she gasped as she told the story, laughing. "That is the definition of gentrification in Stuff White People Like." There's a quiet, older woman at the meeting who comes across as a little more awkward, endearingly so. She mentions a cousin who went on a medical tourism trip to Costa Rica and returned with some choice racist remarks written in a family e-mail. She's struggling to find a way to talk to him about it, and this isn't the first time. "I tend to start out a little soft," she says, gently, "and it never goes anywhere. I just need some opening lines." Other CARW members help her figure out how to begin. "The test of how racist you are is not how many people of color you can count as friends," I recall someone telling me—I can't remember who now. "It's how many white people you're willing to talk to about racism."

### A2 Must reject whiteness/Sullivan Ext.

**ALT CAN’T OVERCOME DEEPLY ENGRAINED WHITENESS- THEY ONLY MASK IT BY PRETENDING TO REJECT IT - THERE’S NOTHING INTRINSICALLY BAD WITH WHITENESS AND SAYING THERE IS ONLY REIFIES IT.**Sullivan 8 – Shannon Sullivan, Head of Philosophy and Professor of Philosophy, Women's Studies, and African and African American Studies at Pennsylvania State University, Spring 2008, “Whiteness as Wise Provincialism: Royce and the Rehabilitation of a Racial Category,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy, Vol. 44, No. 2

While much more can and needs to be said about how to develop a wise form of whiteness, the answer to the main question with which I began this essay is “yes”: the racial category of **whiteness can be concretely transformed into wise whiteness, which means that efforts to critically conserve whiteness need not inadvertently fuel white domination.** Efforts to rehabilitate the racial category of whiteness admittedly will be politically and existentially dangerous. When words such as “loyalty” are used in the context of whiteness, for example, there is an inevitable and significant risk that they will be heard and/or used as endorsements of white supremacy. But I think **this risk should** be taken—indeed, that it **must be taken—because even though there is nothing ahistorically essential about whiteness, it is not likely to disappear any time soon**.[53](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.baylor.edu/journals/transactions_of_the_charles_s_peirce_society/v044/44.2.sullivan.html" \l "f53) **Rejecting racial essentialism**, as Royce did and most contemporary philosophers do, **does not mean that problems associated with whiteness simply evaporate. White people do not have sole control over their whiteness; other racial groups have contributed and will continue to contribute to the meaning of whiteness.**[54](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.baylor.edu/journals/transactions_of_the_charles_s_peirce_society/v044/44.2.sullivan.html" \l "f54) **But white people are uniquely responsible for their whiteness. The question for them thus is how will they take up that responsibility.** And Royce’s essay on provincialism can help them begin to figure out an answer.