# Proliferation

### Fast

#### Prolif is fast

Sturm 9

(Frankie, Fellow with the Truman National Security Project, “Nuclear Weapons: A New Paradigm for the 21st Century” [http://www.ploughshares.org/sites/default/files/resources/20090730\_sturm\_ nuclearweaponsbackgrounder.pdf](http://www.ploughshares.org/sites/default/files/resources/20090730_sturm_%20nuclearweaponsbackgrounder.pdf), SEH)

The prestige and power widely associated ¶ with nuclear weapons drives countries to ¶ pursue them as a means of asserting power ¶ beyond actual security needs. Iran presents ¶ an instructive case. Recent protests illustrate ¶ that the Iranian people have significant ¶ qualms with their government, yet 94% support a nuclear energy program and 52% ¶ support a nuclear weapons program.¶ 16¶ Although Iran is run by a government that ¶ does not command the respect of its people, ¶ Iranians seem to believe their government’s ¶ nuclear program will win the respect of the ¶ world. Hence head of the International ¶ Atomic Energy Agency Mohamed ElBaradei’s description of Iran’s nuclear program as “the road to get…recognition and ¶ power and prestige.”¶ 17 When this desire for prestige becomes intertwined with security concerns, the rationale ¶ for nuclear weapons deepens. As this scenario plays out in Iran and North Korea, ¶ there is a risk that their neighbors – motivated by security concerns – will develop ¶ nuclear weapons of their own. ¶ Increasing the likelihood of nuclear accidents and nuclear terrorism, a nuclear arms ¶ race in the Middle East and/or Asia would ¶ pose a tremendous threat to international ¶ peace and security. ¶ In the Middle East, the combination of unstable states and jihadist networks yields an ¶ unpredictable combination of potential suppliers and determined consumers. Given the ¶ wars that have taken place between Muslim ¶ nations and Israel in the last half-century, ¶ the possibility of nuclear conflict could drastically escalate threats to regional security. ¶ In Asia, North Korea’s nuclear program ¶ and erratic behavior could convince Japan ¶ and South Korea to develop their own nuclear weapons. Japan’s civilian nuclear capacity could be quickly converted into a ¶ weapons program. In a region with longstanding hostilities, especially between ¶ China and Japan, this could add yet another ¶ layer of distrust and insecurity to an already ¶ tense region. ¶ In fact, responding to North Korean missile ¶ and nuclear tests in 2009, politicians in both ¶ Japan and South Korea have begun to call ¶ for the development of nuclear weapons in ¶ their respective countries.¶ 18¶ If North Korea ¶ proceeds on its current trajectory, such calls ¶ are sure to increase. ¶ This plausible chain of events suggests that ¶ a new arms race could be significantly more ¶ dangerous than the U.S.-Soviet arms race of ¶ the 20¶ th¶ century. It is in this realm of guaranteeing the security of our allies—so they ¶ do not pursue nuclear deterrents of their ¶ own—that the U.S. nuclear arsenal still ¶ plays a crucial role. Without extended deterrence – extending our nuclear umbrella to ¶ allies such as Japan and Saudi Arabia – it is ¶ likely that more countries will develop their ¶ own nuclear weapons, increasing the overall ¶ threat of nuclear terrorism and accidents.

# AT States

#### Don’t solve

#### States can’t force DoD policy

#### States don’t have legal authority over military bases- they are enclaves

Tymkovich 12

(Seymour, Circuit Judge, “ALLISON v. BOEING LASER TECHNICAL SERVICES” <http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?xmldoc=In%20FCO%2020120810042.xml&docbase=CSLWAR3-2007-CURR>, SEH)

Under a body of constitutional law applicable to federal enclaves, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 17, state law that is adopted after the creation of the enclave generally does not apply on the enclave. A federal enclave is created when a state cedes jurisdiction over land within its borders to the federal government and Congress accepts that cession. These enclaves include numerous military bases, federal facilities, and even some national forests and parks. Federal enclave doctrine operates as a choice of law doctrine that dictates which law applies to causes of action arising on these lands.¶ It is well-established that after a state has transferred authority over a tract of land creating a federal enclave, the state may no longer impose new state laws on these lands. But state laws enacted before the cession continue to apply unless Congress specifically overrides them. The question here is whether state common law causes of action recognized after the state ceded the enclave to the federal government are available on federal enclaves. This question is governed by a long string of Supreme Court precedent that makes it clear that the law on a federal enclave is the state law that governed the land at the time the federal government established the enclave, not state law enacted thereafter—unless that law was expressly adopted by the enclave's new sovereign, the federal government.

#### DOD key to nuclear

Andres and Breetz 11

(Richard B. Andres is Professor of ¶ national Security Strategy at the ¶ national War College and a Senior fellow and energy and environmental ¶ Security and Policy Chair in the Center ¶ for Strategic research, institute for national Strategic Studies, at the national Defense University. Hanna L. Breetz is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts institute of technology, “Small Nuclear Reactors ¶ for Military Installations:¶ Capabilities, Costs, and ¶ Technological Implications” Institute for National Strategic Studies, <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/strforum/sf-262.pdf>, SEH)

Domestic Nuclear Expertise. From the perspective of larger national security issues, if DOD does not ¶ catalyze the small reactor industry, there is a risk that ¶ expertise in small reactors could become dominated ¶ by foreign companies. A 2008 Defense Intelligence ¶ Agency report warned that the United States will become totally dependent on foreign governments for future commercial nuclear power unless the military acts ¶ as the prime mover to reinvigorate this critical energy ¶ technology with small, distributed power reactors.¶ 38¶ Several of the most prominent small reactor concepts ¶ rely on technologies perfected at Federally funded ¶ laboratories and research programs, including the Hyperion Power Module (Los Alamos National Laboratory), NuScale (DOE-sponsored research at Oregon ¶ State University), IRIS (initiated as a DOE-sponsored ¶ project), Small and Transportable Reactor (Lawrence ¶ Livermore National Laboratory), and Small, Sealed, ¶ Transportable, Autonomous Reactor (developed by a team including the Argonne, Lawrence Livermore, and ¶ Los Alamos National Laboratories). However, there ¶ are scores of competing designs under development ¶ from over a dozen countries. If DOD does not act ¶ early to support the U.S. small reactor industry, there ¶ is a chance that the industry could be dominated by ¶ foreign companies. Along with other negative consequences, the decline ¶ of the U.S. nuclear industry decreases the NRC’s influence on the technology that supplies the world’s rapidly ¶ expanding demand for nuclear energy. Unless U.S. companies begin to retake global market share, in coming ¶ decades France, China, South Korea, and Russia will dictate standards on nuclear reactor reliability, performance, ¶ and proliferation resistance.

# Multiple Condo Bad

#### A. Fairness- No stable 2AC offense can’t game for later in the debate, it’s not reciprocal and it also allows them read opposite positions and use our offense on one against us on the other.

#### B. Education- prevents deep debates, and just has the 2NR go for the argument with the least ink.

#### C. critical thinking- no stable 1NC advocacy, and it’s not real world.

#### D. Rejecting the team is the only way to remedy abuse

**Iranian military threat is overblown- any conflict would be limited**

**Luttwak 07**

An American military strategist and historian who has published works on military strategy, history, and international relations. The Middle of Nowhere”. Edward Nicolae Luttwak. 5/26/07. Prospect Issue 134.)

**Arab-Israeli catastrophism is wrong** twice over, first because **the conflict is contained within rather narrow boundaries**, and second because the Levant is just not that important any more. **The second** repeated **mistake is the Mussolini syndrome**. Contemporary documents prove beyond any doubt what is now hard to credit: serious people, including British and French military chiefs, accepted Mussolini’s claims to great power status because they believed that he had serious armed forces at his command. His army divisions, battleships and air squadrons were dutifully counted to assess Italian military power, making some allowance for their lack of the most modern weapons but not for their more fundamental refusal to fight in earnest. Having conceded Ethiopia to win over Mussolini, only to lose him to Hitler as soon as the fighting started, the British discovered that the Italian forces quickly crumbled in combat. It could not be otherwise, because most Italian soldiers were unwilling conscripts from the one-mule peasantry of the south or the almost equally miserable sharecropping villages of the north. Exactly the same mistake keeps being made by the fraternity of **middle east experts.** They **persistently attribute** real **military strength to** backward **societies who**sepopulations **can sustain** excellent **insurgencies but not modern military forces. In the 1960s, it was Nasser’s Egypt that was mistaken for a real military power** just because it had received many aircraft, tanks and guns from the Soviet Union, and had many army divisions and air squadrons. In May 1967, on the eve of war, many agreed with the prediction of Field Marshal Montgomery, then revisiting the El Alamein battlefield, that the Egyptians would defeat the Israelis forthwith; even the more cautious never anticipated that the former would be utterly defeated by the latter in just a few days. In 1973, with much more drama, it still took only three weeks to reach the same outcome. **In 1990 it was the turn of Iraq to be hugely overestimated as a military power**. Saddam Hussein had more equipment than Nasser ever accumulated, and could boast of having defeated much more populous Iran after eight years of war. In the months before the Gulf war, there was much anxious speculation about the size of the Iraqi army—again, the divisions and regiments were dutifully counted as if they were German divisions on the eve of D-day, with a separate count of the “elite” Republican Guards, not to mention the “super-elite” Special Republican Guards—and it was feared that Iraq’s bombproof aircraft shelters and deep bunkers would survive any air attack. **Now the Mussolini syndrome is at work over Iran.** All the symptomsarepresent, including tabulated lists of **Iran’s warships,** despite the fact that most **are over 30 years old;** of **combat aircraft**, many of which (F-4s, Mirages, F-5s, F-14s**) have not flown in years for lack of** spare **parts**; **and of divisions** and brigades that **are so only in name**. There are awed descriptions of the Pasdaran revolutionary guards, inevitably described as “elite,” who do indeed strut around as if they have won many a war, but who have actually fought only one—against Iraq, which they lost. As for Iran’s claim to have defeated Israel by Hizbullah proxy in last year’s affray, the publicity was excellent but the substance went the other way, with roughly 25 per cent of the best-trained men dead, which explains the tomb-like silence and immobility of the once rumbustious Hizbullah ever since the ceasefire. It is true enough that if Iran’s nuclear installations are bombed in some overnight raid, there is likely to be some retaliation, but we live in fortunate times in which **we** **have only the irritant of terrorism instead of world wars to worry about**—and **Iran’s** added **contribution is not likely to leave much of an impression**. There may be good reasons for not attacking Iran’s nuclear sites—including the very slow and uncertain progress of its uranium enrichment effort—but its ability to strike back is not one of them. Even the seemingly fragile tanker traffic down the Gulf and through the straits of Hormuz is not as vulnerable as it seems—Iran and Iraq have both tried to attack it many times without much success, and this time the US navy stands ready to destroy any airstrip or jetty from which attacks are launched.

# Elections

### Romney Wins - Bread and Peace Model

#### Obama loses

Hibbs 7/27

(Douglas A., retired professor of economics & political science, author/co-author of five books & dozens of journal articles, & active consultant; July 27, 2012, “Obama’s Re-election Prospects Under ‘Bread and Peace’ Voting in the 2012 US Presidential Election,” PS: Political Science & Politics, forthcoming – Kurr)

The Situation So Far¶ During the first thirteen full quarters of President Obama’s term, 2009:q2 through¶ 2012:q2, which at time of this writing (July 27 2012) covers the most recent quarter for¶ which we have BEA data on the National Income and Product Accounts, the annualized,¶ weighted-average quarterly growth rate of per capita real disposable personal income was¶ only 0.1%; way below the post-1948 average of 1.8%. Over the same period US Fatalities in¶ Afghanistan totaled 1355, amounting to 4.4 per millions of population. Poor real income¶ growth performance all by itself means that Obama is in deep trouble: the Bread and Peace¶ equation estimates in table 1 imply that over-the-term weighted-average real growth must¶ be at least 1.2% for the incumbent’s expected two-party vote share to cross 50%.18¶ Election Day Projections¶ To project Obama’s 2012 vote I’ll make the plausible assumption that American military¶ fatalities in Afghanistan continue running at the (politically relatively low) average¶ quarterly rate of the past year: 95 or 0.3 per millions of population. At Election Day¶ cumulative Fatalities then would amount to approximately 1500 or 4.8 per millions of¶ population, which would depress Obama’s expected two-party vote share by less than a¶ quarter of a percentage point (). Baring a really big escalation in the¶ aggressiveness of fighters resisting US military presence in Afghanistan, plausible¶ alternative assumptions about the flow of American body bags during the next four months¶ would only negligibly affect my projections of Obama’s re-election prospects.¶ Consequently, growth rates of per capita real disposable personal income over the¶ remainder of the term will be the decisive as yet unrealized fundamental factor in the 2012¶ presidential election.¶ Calculations in the table 3 show that according to the Bread and Peace model per capita¶ real income growth rates must average out at nearly 6 percent after 2012:q2 for Obama to¶ have a decent chance of re-election. If the US economy experiences an unanticipated¶ reversal of fortune with growth surging to rates not uncommon in the initial robust phase¶ of recoveries from deep contractions, Obama could squeak out a win, as implied by the last¶ column of table 3. However the pace of recovery from the 2008 Great Recession remains¶ sluggish, and the famous 2009 book This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly¶ by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff documents how recoveries from contractions¶ originating with the bursting of speculative financial bubbles are not V-shaped as in¶ garden-variety recessions, but instead are typically prolonged U-shaped affairs lasting 5 to¶ 6 years. The univariate statistical properties of postwar per capita real disposable personal¶ incomes indicate that the chances of weighted-average growth on the order of 6% over the¶ one and one-third quarters remaining until Election Day 2012 are no better than 1/10.¶ The protocol of the PS Election Forecast Symposium obliges me to make a specific¶ prediction of the 2012 aggregate voting result. My reading of the tea leaves (statistical¶ forecasts of income and output growth from formal econometric models have proven to be¶ useless) leads me to posit that quarterly, annualized per capita real income growth rates¶ will fall in the interval [1,2%] during the remainder of President Obama’s term. That¶ supposition, along with my assumption that fatalities in Afghanistan will not escalate¶ dramatically, yields a projected Obama two-party vote share centered at 47.5%, as¶ indicated by boldface entries in table 3.19 Figure 3, which combines the Bread and Peace¶ factors to one dimension, illustrates the same prediction in perspective of actual and fitted¶ values of incumbent vote shares at all postwar presidential elections 1952-2008.

#### Hibbs model best

Enten ’11

Harry is a graduate of Hanover, NH. I graduated with adegree in government summa cum laude with a concentration in statistics and elections. I have previously interned at the NBC Political Unit in Washington D.C. (Spring 2009) & Pollster.com (spring and summer 2010), “The Hibbs Model Does Work at Predicting and Explaining Elections,” <http://poughies.blogspot.com/2011/06/hibbs-model-does-work-at-predicting-and.html>

Presidential elections are all about the economy, or are they? Those who have followed my writing know that, at least at this point in the election cycle (far away from the actual 2012 general election), I am big fan of utilizing fundamental models. I stand by this belief.¶ One of my favorite models is the Douglas Hibbs' fundamental Presidential economic model.¶ By using just two simple variables (growth in real disposable income per capita over the 16 quarters of a presidential term and military fatailities in unprovoked foreign conflicts), the model explains 87% of the difference incumbent party's share of the two-party Presidential vote from 1952-2008.¶ Recently, the model came under attack.¶ The New York Times' Nate Silver ran through a bunch of exercises that seemingly proved that the model was not nearly as accurate at predicting out-of-dataset results for the 1992-2008 elections as its in-dataset (i.e. those data that help build the model) confidence interval would lead you to believe. The model was far worst when fitted to elections prior to 1952.¶ I appreciated Nate's post because I think we should always be re-evaluating forecasters' claims and theories. I, myself, had previously noted that Hibbs' model would do a poor job at predicting the 1948 election. There can also be little doubt that in-dataset confidence intervals almost always undersell actual uncertainty in estimates.¶ Yet, I must admit that I think Nate's post misses on a number of points.¶ Let's first cover the out-of-dataset forecasts for those elections that Hibbs' model has actually been used to predict (i.e. 1992 and onward).¶ My own amended Hibbs' model (with terms added for congressional control and term of the party in the White House) performs better than the original Hibbs' model with an absolute mean error for out-of-dataset forecasts of 2.09% instead of 2.6% of the original.¶ ¶ With the (big) exception of the 2000 outlier, all of the 92 and onward out-of-forecast errors fell within each year's in-dataset 95% confidence interval (which should be, as noted, too confident).¶ Personally, I think that is pretty good. We were able to use only a few data-points in each year and no polling data to get a pretty gosh darn good idea of what would occur in these 5 elections.¶ Of course, in forecasting, we judge a prognostication not only on its ability to predict the final outcome, but on how well it completes this task relative to other predictions. In that spirit, I have decided to dredge up final weekend polling from 1992-2008.¶ Final weekend polling should be fantastically accurate. Almost all the campaigning is done; almost all the voters have made up their minds; and, all of the polling is of likely, not registered, voters.¶ Amazingly, in these five elections, the final polling mean is only on average 0.98% more accurate in predicting the final outcome than my amended Hibbs' model. In fact, the amended Hibbs estimate was actually more accurate in two elections (1992 and 1996), and, unlike the polling average, always correctly projected the popular vote winner.¶ I should point out that polling is far less accurate the further we recede from the election to the point of having no predictive value 300 days out. (We are currently more 500 days away from the 2012 election).¶ The Hibbs' models, on the other hand, have the potential to produce solid estimates on who will win far from the election. These days we can suppliment known economic data with economic forecasts to produce reasonable estimations of the vote even, I believe, at this point.¶ But what about Nate's point that the Hibbs' model widely misses on elections prior to 1952?¶ There are a number reasons not to input data prior to 1952 into the model. Some of those (including how voters viewed the role of government differently prior this party era) are outlined by Seth Masket.¶ One other point that I have not heard brought up is simply that prior to 1952 elections lacked any true television campaigning. It's difficult to underestimate the effect of how television nationalized elections.¶ I think these factors that apply to 1952 and afterward make these elections fundamentally different to those prior. It's not surprising that 5 out of the 7 out-of-dataset errors Nate found prior to 1952 are approximately 2 times or more greater than any of those from 1992-2008.¶ Indeed, political scientists have known elections prior to WWII and afterward seemed to respond differently to the fundamentals.¶ For example, esteemed political scientist James Campbell noted that there was a difference between presidential coattails pre and post-WWII and actually mapped out different equations for pre and post-WWII.¶ Some scientists have tried to fit pre and post-1952 data into one model. During the 2010 midterm election, for instance, we saw many fundamental models (i.e. no polling data) of this design, but not a single one correctly projected the Republicans winning control\*.¶ In fact, the only fundamental that saw the House turnover was Hibbs' midterm House model, which uses real disposable income growth data post-1948 like the Presidential model.¶ So

### 2AC Uniqueness Slayer

#### Link is non unique - Obama already pushed for SMR’s

New York Times 11

(Matthew L. Wald, “Administration to Push for Small ‘Modular’ Reactors” <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/13/science/earth/13nuke.html?_r=3>, SEH)

The Obama administration’s 2012 budget proposal will include a request for money to help develop small “modular” reactors that would be owned by a utility and would supply electricity to a government lab, people involved in the effort say. The department is hoping for $500 million over five years, half of the estimated cost to complete two designs and secure the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s approval. The reactors would be built almost entirely in a factory and trucked to a site like modular homes.¶ In promoting the reactor, the administration’s immediate goal is to help the Energy Department meet a federal target for reducing its carbon dioxide emissions by relying more on clean energy and less on gas and coal. Like other federal agencies, the department is required by an executive order to reduce its carbon footprint by 28 percent by 2020.

### Romney Supports

#### Romney has supported Nuclear Power- there’s no reason he’d oppose the plan.

**No: Romney Strike Iran**

**Romney’s stance on Iran is same as the status quo – no aggression**

**CNN ’12**

(Tom Cohen, 7/30/2012, “Romney talks tough but differs little from Obama on Iran”, <http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/30/politics/romney-iran/index.html>)

Mitt **Romney** seeks to assure Israel and Iran, as well as Jewish voters in the United States, that he will be tougher against Iran's nuclear ambitions than President Barack Obama.¶ So far, though, the **main differences on the issue** between the presumptive Republican nominee and the president he hopes to defeat in the November **election involve tone and nuance more than substance**.¶ In two high-profile speeches in the past week, **Romney has tried to position himself as a better friend to Israel than Obama** **by pledging full support** for any steps necessary to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear state.¶ Calling the issue America's "highest national security priority," the former Massachusetts governor said Sunday in Jerusalem that "we recognize Israel's right to defend itself, and that it is right for America to stand with you."¶ [Romney walks a wary line](http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/30/opinion/jerusalem-postcard/index.html)**¶ Meanwhile, a top Romney adviser on foreign policy** told reporters Sunday that Romney would respect a decision by Israel to "take action on its own in order to stop Iran" from developing nuclear capability -- code for a possible Israeli military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities.¶ The adviser, Dan Senor**, said Romney was not advocating war with Iran, only making clear what the options were should diplomacy fail**. He later sought to clarify his comment by noting Romney hoped diplomatic efforts would succeed.¶ **Romney's stance is "almost identical" to Obama's position**, which seeks increased international pressure on Iran while keeping a military option "on the table," noted Martin Indyk, a former U.S. ambassador to Israel during the Clinton administration who now is foreign policy director at the Brookings Institution.¶ **"It's hard to see what the difference is, since Gov. Romney and his spokesman make it clear that sanctions and negotiations would be tried and force should be kept on the table as a last resort,**" Indyk told CNN on Monday.¶ **Even Romney seemed to recognize the similarity,** telling CNN in an interview broadcast Monday that "**our president has said and I have said that it is unacceptable for Iran to become nuclear."¶ "And that would mean that if all other options were to fail -- and they have not all been exercise**d**, they've not all been executed at their most extreme level -- but if all other options -- diplomatic, political, economic** -- fail, then a military option is one which would be available to the president of the United States," Romney told CNN's Wolf Blitzer.¶ Romney's three-nation trip to key U.S. allies Great Britain, Israel and Poland has shifted the election campaign spotlight to foreign policy, with particular focus on thorny issues such as the Middle East conflict and Iran.¶ While he directly criticized Obama in last week's speech to American war veterans, Romney has avoided similar attacks against the president while on foreign soil. At the same time, he sought to distinguish himself from Obama on some specific issues.¶ For example, **Romney** made a point of calling Jerusalem the capital of Israel, though he **conceded in the interview with CNN that the issue must be resolved through negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians -- the position of Obama and previous presidents**.¶ Romney also made a point in both speeches of calling for a halt of all nuclear enrichment by Iran, aligning himself with Israel's insistence that Iran must have no nuclear capability.¶ To Indyk, that kind of pronouncement was something a candidate can say on the campaign trail that doesn't easily adapt to the realities of complex international negotiations.¶ He noted the United States and its negotiating partners in the so-called P5-plus-1 talks with Iran seek implementation of U.N. Security Council resolutions that call for Iran to cease its enrichment program.¶ While some form of limited enrichment could emerge from negotiations, **the stated policy of the Obama administration for now is the same as what Romney declared, Indyk said.¶ "The view is different from the Oval Office than on the campaign trail," said Indyk,** one of three authors of the recent book "Bending History: Barack Obama's Foreign Policy."¶ "If you're actually trying to negotiate an agreement which secures the bottom line -- that is to say that you put meaningful curbs on Iran's nuclear program such as they cannot procure nuclear weapons -- then you're going to have find some way to get to that," he added.¶ [Panetta begins Middle East tour](http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/29/politics/panetta-middle-east-tour/index.html)¶ Another issue of contention between the campaigns has been whether the diplomatic efforts that include U.N. and other sanctions have made any progress.¶ Romney's team insists the negotiations and sanctions have proven fruitless and allowed Iran to continue to develop its enrichment capability in recent years.¶ Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu bolstered that argument by saying Sunday that "all the sanctions and diplomacy so far have not set back the Iranian program by one iota."¶ "That's why I believe that we need a strong and credible military threat coupled with the sanctions to have a chance to change that situation," he added.¶ Netanyahu is a longtime friend and former work colleague of Romney, but his relationship with Obama has been rocky. The Obama administration, while maintaining strong support for Israel's military and security, has adopted a more mediating role in the Middle East peace process that has chafed at times.¶ Defense Minister Ehud Barak noted the dynamic in an interview with CNN that was broadcast Monday.¶ "This administration under President Obama is doing in regard to our security more than anything that I can remember in the past," Barak said, later adding "it doesn't mean that we agree on everything."¶ Administration officials argue the president has built the foundation for an international coalition that is increasing pressure on Iran through sanctions.¶ Russia and China have supported Security Council measures against Iran, which was "not an insignificant development," noted Josh Earnest, the principal White House deputy press secretary.¶ Now, Earnest told reporters Monday, the Iranian regime is acknowledging the toll of sanctions and "starting to exhibit some signs of dissent within the ranks."¶ Indyk said Romney can make the point that Iran has made progress on nuclear enrichment despite Obama's diplomatic efforts, "but Obama has made progress against Iran, which I don't think is convenient for the Romney campaign to admit to."¶ He cited European oil sanctions on Iran, something Indyk said would have been "inconceivable" under the past two presidents.¶ Michele Flournoy, a former U.S. Defense Department official who co-chairs the Obama campaign's national security advisory committee, said last week that Pentagon planning for a possible military option in Iran is "incredibly robust."¶ "You look at our force posture in the region -- you know, it is very strong and well positioned," Flournoy told a Brookings Institution event on the candidates' foreign policy positions. "So, the military option is real. The president's judgment is that now is not yet the time, because there is still a chance, with further sanctions biting, for Iran to change its calculus."¶ **Asked how much longer before a military strike might be necessary to prevent Iran from being able to enrich weapons-grade material, Flournoy said the intelligence community believes it will be "a year or more at a minimum**."¶ At the same event, however, Romney's senior adviser for foreign and defense policy said the Obama administration offered "no credible threat of force."¶ "No one in Tehran or in the region feels that the Obama administration will use force," said Rich Williamson, a former ambassador and top official in several Republican administrations.¶ In the Jerusalem speech, **Romney defended a hard-line stance on Iran as a deterrent to war, rather than a desire to start one.¶ "It is sometimes said that those who are the most committed to stopping the Iranian regime from securing nuclear weapons are reckless and provocative and inviting war," he said. "The opposite is true. We are the true peacemakers. History teaches with force and clarity that when the world's most despotic regimes secure the world's most destructive weapons, peace often gives way to oppression, to violence, or to devastating war."**

### 2AC- Agencies Don’t Link

#### Agencies avoid politics – empirically proven

Shane 95

Dean and Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh (Peter, “Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking”, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 161, 1995)

Such was the regulatory oversight system dedicated most faithfully to a categorical separation of powers philosophy that, in turn, was touted as advancing the cause of accountability. But even without careful parsing, the record suggests obvious accountability issues. First, it was the conclusion of the most extensive journalistic study of the Council that it intervened in "dozens of unpublicized controversies over important federal regulations, leaving what vice presidential aides call "no fingerprints' on the results of its interventions." 58 The White House's efforts to avoid public disclosure of its oversight activity took multiple forms: resisting FOIA disclosure of documents belonging to President Reagan's Task Force on Regulatory Relief on the ground that the Task Force (and, by implication, the Council) was not a covered "agency"; 59 resisting Congressional access to information about the Council beyond published fact sheets and the testimony of individuals who did not participate in Council deliberations; 60 keeping decisions at staff level to shield them from the greater publicity that would likely follow cabinet level involvement. 61 Intriguingly, only one Council decision - pressuring EPA on pollution permit modifications - ever escalated to actual presidential involvement; 62 the usual, albeit tacit, rule was to avoid appeals to the President wherever possible. 63 It would not seem unrealistic that behind this approach lay a desire to buffer the President from criticism for Council policies, especially given a campaign promise to be the "environmental president." 64 That would, of course, be the opposite of accountability

###  2AC Link Turn

#### New Military Base Spending is popular

**Bloomberg 9/4**

(Danielle Ivory, “Virginia Leads Swing States at Risk Over Cliff: BGOV Barometer” <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-04/virginia-leads-swing-states-at-risk-over-cliff-bgov-barometer.html>, SHE)

For some swing-state voters, the presidential election may come down to who they want holding the net if their economies go over the fiscal cliff.¶ The BGOV Barometer shows that the battlegrounds of Virginia, Colorado and Pennsylvania are among 19 states and the District of Columbia that depended on U.S. government contracts for more than 3 percent of their 2011 gross domestic product. The states are vulnerable to $1.2 trillion in automatic 10-year budget reductions, called sequestration, that will begin in January if Congress and the White House fail to agree on a deficit-reduction plan. ¶ President Barack Obama and his Republican challenger, Mitt Romney , need the 42 electoral votes represented by Virginia, Colorado and Pennsylvania as they compete for the 270 it takes to win. Their lines of attack on the automatic cuts, which along with tax increases make up the fiscal cliff, may help determine the outcome in those swing states.¶ “It’s going to increasingly become an issue in this election,” said Todd Harrison , a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington. “Both sides want to run against sequestration.¶ “Maybe that’s what this boils down to,” Harrison said in an interview. “Whose approach do you prefer for avoiding sequestration?”¶ The government spent more than $500 billion on federal contracts in 2011. Agencies awarded $58.9 billion in orders that year for work performed in Virginia.¶ ‘Tentacles Everywhere’¶ Federal awards represented 14 percent of the economy in the state, home to the Pentagon and headquarters of top federal contractors such as McLean-based SAIC Inc. (SAI) The company was the top recipient of awards in Virginia, receiving $3 billion for work in the state. SAIC performs computer and engineering services for agencies including the Department of Defense .¶ Federal awards support economies outside the state, so a contract in Virginia might have implications for a lawyer or consultant in Ohio or Texas, Ric Brown, the state’s finance secretary, said in an interview. “It has tentacles everywhere,” he said.¶ Contractors performing work in Colorado won $10.2 billion in U.S. awards last year, which represented 3.8 percent of the state’s economy. Lockheed Martin Corp. (LMT), based in Bethesda, Maryland , won the most in contracts, $2.41 billion, for work in the state. The company is the No. 1 U.S. defense contractor.¶ ‘Held Hostage’¶ Agencies last year awarded $17.7 billion in contracts for work in Pennsylvania. The state relied on the awards for 3.1 percent of its economy. Bechtel Group, based in San Francisco , was the top recipient of contracts in the state with $1.99 billion in awards.¶ The three swing states also have direct federal employees and military bases that require additional government funding. Nevada, Florida, Wisconsin, Ohio and Iowa -- swing states with 69 electoral votes -- may be less vulnerable because they derived less than 3 percent of their economy from federal contracts.

**Top Political Scientists Agree the infusion of spending is popular**

**Krinner & Reeves ’12**

Douglas is Associate Professor of Political Science at Boston University and Andrew is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Boston University, “The Influence of Federal Spending on Presidential Elections,” <http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2FPSR%2FPSR106_02%2FS0003055412000159a.pdf&code=1c7ae66018f9fe746798fcc5c0bfb3b2>

This research thus suggests two ways in which the uneven distribution of grant spending across the country¶ might inﬂuence presidential voting patterns. First, r**esidents of counties that receive an infusion of election year grant spending may be more likely to perceive**¶ **direct personal beneﬁts from federal spend**ing than¶ residents of counties that did not receive increased¶ grant spending. Such voters might judge the administration more responsive to their needs, evaluate its¶ performance more favorably, and become increasingly¶ likely to vote for the incumbent party. Second, **past**¶ 350American Political Science Review Vol. 106, No. 2¶ **research suggests that voters need not personally receive federal beneﬁts to be inﬂuenced by increased**¶ **federal spending in their community**. Rather, **through**¶ **personal networks of family and friends, as well as local**¶ **news coverage of the impact of recent federal spending**¶ **in their communities, voters in high-spending communities may perceive the incumbent administration in a**¶ **more favorable light**. Thus, **regardless of whether voters actually hold the president functionally responsible**¶ **for such increased beneﬁts** (to themselves or their communities) or whether voters are simply retrospective,¶ **for many Americans increased grant spending in their**¶ **home county may increase their likelihood of voting**¶ **for the incumbent party’s candidate in the upcoming**¶ **election.**

### 2AC No I/L

#### Energy not key

#### Voters won’t change their minds- new study proves

Bartles 9-21

Larry is Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt, “There go the Undecided Voters,” <http://themonkeycage.org/blog/2012/09/21/there-go-the-undecided-voters/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+themonkeycagefeed+%28The+Monkey+Cage%29&utm_content=Google+Reader>

Lynn Vavreck has an informative piece on the New York Times Campaign Stops blog today tracing shifts in presidential voting intentions from late 2011 through early September. The data are from the Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project, which interviewed nearly 44,000 people last December and has subsequently been reinterviewing 1,000 per week. (Top monkey John Sides is a collaborator in the CCAP study, and I received access to some of these data for an earlier Campaign Stops post that Vavreck and I wrote together.)¶ Through most of the spring and early summer, more than half of the survey respondents who were undecided last December were still declining to choose a candidate, with the rest breaking slightly for Mitt Romney over Barack Obama. Since around mid-June, more of these previously undecided voters have begun to commit, with Obama gaining and, in the last few weeks, surpassing Romney among those who were originally undecided. According to Vavreck, “These decisions seem largely to have been motivated by party identification.”¶ Meanwhile, both candidates have managed to retain the vast majority of prospective voters who supported them last December. Over the course of 2012, Obama has held 96% of those who supported him in 2011 and added 3% of those who originally said they would vote Republican. For his part, Romney has held 94% of those who intended to vote Republican and added 2% of those who intended to vote for Obama. (Vavreck notes that the 2008 CCAP study found almost as much stability in candidate preferences, with Obama holding 90% of his early supporters and John McCain holding 92% of his.)¶ To readers versed in election studies, these findings will seem very reminiscent of those from the first scholarly analysis of campaign effects: “conversion is, by far, the least frequent result and activation the second most frequent manifest effect of the campaign.” However, whereas Lazarsfeld and his colleagues in 1940 studied 600 prospective voters in Erie County, Ohio, Vavreck and her colleagues in 2012 have 44,000 nationwide. That’s real scientific progress.

# AT Heidegger

### Framework

#### Framework: the affirmative must defend a topical plan, the negative must defend the status quo or a competing policy option.

#### a) Best for real world education – our fw most closely resembles how policymakers decide on advocacy.

#### b) Fairness – our interp provides a clear way to compare two advocacies by weighing impacts which is essential to fairness. Their fw makes opportunity cost impossible and invites judge intervention.

#### c) Predictability – our fw ensures predictable aff ground because we predict args based upon our aff literature.

#### d) Infinitely regressive – there are an infinite number of philosophical perspectives from which they can argue

#### Life should be valued as apriori – it precedes the ability to value anything else

Amien Kacou. 2008. WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of “Life”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184

Furthermore, that manner of finding things good that is in pleasure can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,” as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation. Thus, we can see now that, in general, something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself. And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good. However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value. But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

### Permutation

#### Perm: do both.

#### Only by combining methods can we avoid fragmentation and facilitate real political change to prevent planetary extinction – even if the perm risks cooption the apocalyptic imagery of the aff is rejuvenating to ecocriticism

JL Schatz. 2012. Professor of English and Feminist Evolutionary Studies & Director of Debate at Binghamton University. The Importance of Apocalypse: The Value of End-Of-The-World Politics While Advancing Ecocriticism. Journal of Ecocriticism: A New Journal of Nature, Society and Literature. 4(2)

There are three things ecocriticism must keep in mind to retain its effectiveness in the poststructuralist era. First and foremost ecocritics must not allow their infighting over tactics and academic maneuvers to become debilitating. Ecocritics have enough on their plate fighting dominant political institutions. To never directly take up arms against ecologically destructive practices will merely cede potential avenues of resistance while we fight amongst ourselves. We must take from those ecocritics we partially disagree with what we can and then operate from a different platform so as to always be spectral in our resistance. Adopting varied tactics enables an ecological coalition centered on the connectedness that arises from the belief that we all have a shared stake in the planet. Awakening to our collective stake in the environment can overcome the illusionary boundaries of the nation-­‐state, species, or even sentience. Every molecule of the Earth’s ecology is interconnected. When one part dies we all stand on the brink of extinction. For ecocriticism to embrace this interconnection it must not erect borders between different approaches so long as the foundation of the struggle is premised upon the commons of our universe. Unfortunately, “what characterizes much campus left discourse is a substitution of moral rhetoric about evil policies[, leaving] ... absent ... a sober reckoning with the preoccupations and opinions of the vast majority of Americans ... who do not believe that the discourse of ‘anti-­‐imperialism’ speaks to their lives” (Isaac). As a result, there is a need for ecocritics to not just speak to the choir that mostly already agrees with them. They must also speak to the populations who don’t intuitively see the link between imperialism, technology, and capitalism with environmental destruction. Apocalyptic rhetoric can do precisely that because of its underlying tenant of self-­preservation. The above point is absolutely crucial because ecocriticism cannot be effective if its focus never goes beyond the individual alone. No single person is the entire ecology so no individual can save it. While each individual undoubtedly impacts the environment and can cause change, no large scale transformation can take place if we never inspire collective action. In evolutionary terms, ideas, thoughts, and actions must be passed on in order to survive. For that to happen it takes a combined effort, even though it can start by a single mutation. Luke reminds us that the typical consumer does not control the critical aspects of his or her existence[.] ... The absurd claim that average consumers only need to shop, bicycle, or garden their way to an ecological future merely moves most of the responsibility and much of the blame away from the institutional centers of power whose decisions actually maintain the wasteful, careless ways of material exchange[. It also] ... ignores how corporate capital, big government, and professional experts pushed the practices of ... affluent society ... as a political strategy to sustain economic growth, forestall mass discontent, and empower scientific authority. People did choose to live this way, but their choices were made from a very narrow array of alternatives presented to them as rigidly structured, prepackaged menus of very limited options. (Luke, 1997: 127-­‐128) In turn, ecocritics must not displace the blame away from current hegemonic structures by calling on individuals to act alone. Instead ecocriticism must articulate its arguments to influence change in both institutions of power and the very people whose mindsets make up the current collective. Many environmental groups have been able to do precisely that. For instance, “NGOs and social movements active in global civil society have ... introduce[ed] ... dystopian scenarios ... as rhetorical devices that act as ‘wake-­up calls’... to jolt citizens out of their complacency and ... foster ... public deliberation about the potential cataclysms facing humankind” (Kurasawa 464). Ecocritics must not cut down such NGOs for adopting end-­of-­the-­world tactics even though their rhetoric might get co-opted when specific policies get enacted. Secondly, ecocriticism must never forget that what they do is politics. There are two implications to this. On the one hand it means that activists who directly lobby the government should not denounce the academically-oriented ecocritic for struggling within the academy. On the other hand it means that those who denounce the managerial tendencies that come along with governmental policies shouldn’t condemn activists who operate within the system. Instead of attacking one another, ecocritics should understand opposing discourses and ontologies as part of a spectral strategy that works against the environmental imperialism of the status-quo. We should take each opportunity for its fullest even in the face of failure. Once we acknowledge the virtual inevitability of co-optation the emphasis should be on creating successive struggles from a variety of standpoints. Captain Paul Watson, for instance, does not merely pack up his flagship the Steve Irwin and head home after the Japanese whaling season ends. He goes on to fight for seals, dolphins, and a number of other animals all the while participating within a larger discourse surrounding planetary ecology. Not all of Watson’s tactics have been successful. Neither has anyone else’s. However, that doesn’t mean we should give up. Quite the opposite. For example, just because revolutionaries like Che Guevara have been turned into trendy t-­‐shirts, fueling the industries of capitalism, doesn’t mean he shouldn’t have fought against imperialism in the first place. In the same way, just because environmental activists are inevitably going to fall victim to constructing an image of the planet on the brink of extinction, it doesn’t mean that we should discount their battles against such destruction. Their counter constructions enable a contestation over what it means to be human in relationship to the rest of the world. Absent these counter narratives only a singular construction of anthropocentric managerial domination would exist. A consequence to this second point is that the willingness to continually deploy different tactics is more powerful for ecocriticism than coming up with the perfect strategy. That way even when we become co-opted in one place we are already struggling from somewhere else. In turn, ecocriticism should focus on the underlying motivations that compel others to act in order to determine which ecocritics to be allies with. Through this way human beings can repair the willed manipulation inherent in calculative thinking and realize a patient equanimity toward Life. It is only in the context of this reawakened sense of the unity of life that revolutionary action gains an authentic basis. It is the engagement with “the Other” that shows the ELF actions are truly about defense of plant and animal life, and they demonstrate genuine liberation concerns that typically are trapped within Enframing. That is to say, ELF (and similar) actions, show themselves as part of a ... profound solidarity ... [that] serves as a general basis for a post-­‐Enframing, post-­‐capitalist order, an ecological, not a capitalist society. (Best and Nocella 83) This shift allows ecocriticism to formulate ever-­‐greater coalitions while at the same time preventing a descent into moral relativism. We can still utilize political action by eco-activists and NGOs such as PETA and Greenpeace productively, even if they result in reformist managerialism, so long as the sole focus doesn’t fall upon a singular tactic. Only a profound orientation of solidarity will ever have the hopes of succeeding. Everything we do is deeply political and we must understand that in acting or in thinking we necessarily impact the world. Uniting behind images of planetary omnicide holds the potential to collectively bring us together by awakening humanity to its shared stake in the global environment. Third, and most importantly, ecocritics must adopt tactics that can most effectively influence other people without proscribing end goals. By this I mean that ecocritics must use those tools that can appeal to the masses while simultaneously making their appeals in such a way as not to force a choice upon them. Apocalyptic imagery is ideal for this task. It appeals to notions of shared planetary concerns that serve as motivation for others to act, even without fully knowing how the apocalypse can truly be averted. By creating a compelling urge to do something that arises out of the image of planetary annihilation ecocriticism can influence a variety of people to take up arms through a multitude of techniques. Society as a whole will never mobilize to halt the very practices that threaten life without such compelling inspiration. When ecocriticism helps other people see how certain actions risk their very survival it will enable our planet to evolve differently. So long as ecocriticism never gives up on the struggle, even if this different direction may bring new scenarios of apocalypse, humanity as a species can continually evolve its patterns and behaviors to advert extinction. This is not to say we will live forever. Rather it is to say that as a species we can continue to exist in harmony with the lives all around us and give our deaths meaning. Ultimately, it is through imagining the end of the world that we will be able to envision how to save it.

#### Perm: do the affirmative and the alternative in all other instances.

### Regular Case Ext

#### Case outweighs and is a disad to the K –

#### a) Cyber attacks are the number one threat to US security – extend ABC News ‘11 – only treating the energy grid as a security issue and opting for the plan will sponsor the provision of small nuclear reactors to prevent cyber attacks. Two impacts:

#### 1) Cyber attacks will eventually draw the US into conflicts. That’s Gelinas ’10.

#### 2) Stopping blackouts is necessary to prevent the grid from being vulnerable to terrorist attacks that will escalate to extinction due to bioweapons and retaliation. Extend Defense Science Board ‘8, Blair ‘12, Ochs ‘2, Pena ‘2, and Conley 03.

#### b) Without SMRs, the US loses its status as the leader in nuclear technology. Extend Loudermilk. US leadership is key to prevent nuclear proliferation. The impact is extinction as a result of great power wars and the escalation of regional conflicts.. Extend Cimbala ‘8, Kroenig ’12, and Kroenig ‘9.

### Managerialism/Enviro Securitization Good

#### Managerialism is necessary to prevent global extinction –processes of environmental destruction are unstoppable without intervention

Dr Neil Levy 1999. Fellow of the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at Charles Sturt University. “Discourses of the Environment” p. 215

If the ‘technological fix’ is unlikely to be more successful than strategies of limitation of our uses of resources, we are nevertheless unable to simply leave the environment as it is. There is a real and pressing need for more, and more accurate, technical and scientific information about the non-human world. For we are faced with a situation in which the processes we have already set in train will continue to impact upon that world, and therefore us, for centuries. It is therefore necessary, not only to stop cutting down the rain forests, but to develop real, concrete proposals for action, to reverse, or at least limit, the effects of our previous interventions. More over, there is another reason why our behaviour towards the non-human cannot simply be a matter of leaving it as it is, at least in so far as our goals are not only environmental but also involve social justice. For if we simply preserve what remains to us of wilderness, of the countryside and of park land, we also preserve patterns of very unequal access to their resources and their consolations (Soper 1995: 207). In fact, we risk exacerbating these inequalities. It is no us, but the poor of Brazil, who will bear the brunt of the misery which would result form a strictly enforced policy of leaving the Amazonian rain forest untouched, in the absence of alternative means of providing for their livelihood. It is the development of policies to provide such ecologically sustainable alternative which we require, as well as the development of technical means for replacing our current greenhouse gas-emitting sources of energy. Such policies and proposals for concrete action must be formulated by ecologists, environmentalist, people with expertise concerning the functioning of ecosystems and the impacts which our actions have upon them. Such proposals are, therefore, very much the province for Foucault’s specific intellectual, the one who works ‘within specific sectors, at the precise points where their won conditions of life or work situate them’ (Foucault 1980g: 126). For who could be more fittingly described as ‘the strategists of life and death’ than these environmentalists? After the end of the Cold War, it is in this sphere, more than any other, that man’s ‘politics places his existence as a living being in question’ (Foucault 1976: 143). For it is in facing the consequences of our intervention in the non-human world that the fate of our species, and of those with whom we share this planet, will be decided.

#### ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITIZATION KEY TO HUMAN SURVIVAL AND INCENTIVIZE CONSERVATION.

CHALECKI 2K7 [Elizabeth, “environmental security: a case study of climate change”, pacific institute for studies in development, environment and safety, Asst. Professor in the International Studies Program at Boston College<http://www.pacinst.org/reports/environment_and_security/env_security_and_climate_change.pdf>]

The security of individuals, communities, nations, and the entire global community is increasingly jeopardized by unpremeditated, non-military environmental threats. These threats are self-generated: we perpetrate them on ourselves, by fouling our air and water, and overharvesting our land. These threats are not felt equally around the world. Southern countries face severe problems from desertification, while northern industrial countries deal with acid rain, and polar regions see large depositions of persistent organic chemical pollutants. Climate change will cause uneven effects over the entire globe for the next fifty to 100 years, with some countries benefiting and others suffering. Despite these omnipresent connections, environmental issues are still not high on the national security agenda. Those who study environmental problems such as deforestation, loss of biodiversity, and climate change generally don’t see the connection through to its higher-order effects, and those who study security problems such as non-proliferation, terrorism, and civil conflict often don’t recognize the environmental roots and effects of these problems. So why is this such a hard gap to bridge? Thinking in this multidisciplinary way is not traditional for either environmentalists or security specialists, the majority of whom have defined their fields in specific ways. Consequently the nexus of environmental security is seen neither as a security issue nor an environmental issue. However, environmental issues are often security concerns because even without directly causing open conflict, they have the potential to destabilize regimes, displace populations, and lead to state collapse. The environment is the planetary support system on which all other human enterprises depend. If political, social, cultural, religious, and most importantly economic systems are to remain secure and viable, the environment must also remain secure and viable. This makes global environmental conditions a legitimate national security concern for all countries.

#### Securitizing energy production is key to solve climate change

Guri Bang. 2010. Center for International Climate and Environmental Research in Norway. Energy security and climate change concerns: Triggers for energy policy change in the United States? Energy Policy. 38: 1645-1653.

These examples of debates in Congress show that in a situation with increased public concerns about both energy security and climate change, energy policy is a field that potentially can include a bipartisan agenda where compromise can be found. It provides a new framing of the climate change issue that can attract support from a new set of actors involved in the decision making process, including both politicians and interest groups. However, if energy security policy is considered without taking carbon emissions into account the result will not necessarily be a more environmentally sustainable policy. By allowing emission intensive policy alternatives onto the agenda, the established energy policy majority can avoid problem redefinition, and continue to promote their preferred policy solutions. For instance, if gasoline is replaced with CTL fuel from coal plants without installed sequestration technology, that would result in less dependence on imported oil but increased GHG emissions. Still, energy security concerns could potentially lead to focus on policy solutions that would have a second-order effect for mitigating climate change. Efforts to get cost-effective renewable energy technologies to the market, or to develop carbon sequestration technologies, or build nuclear power plants that can replace fossil fuels like coal, will lead to fewer GHG emissions. But reduced emissions will not necessarily be the most important rationale behind the policy change. Rather, the rationale will be to heighten energy security and avoid high energy costs, and if that also affects emissions and climate policy then it can be used as a political benefit. Having a second-order rationale can in some cases make a vote in favor of new policy solutions easier to endure or survive for politicians. In other words, the effects for reducing GHG emissions can be used by politicians to underscore the importance of policy change, to secure support from the part of the public concerned about global warming, and from environ- mental NGOs and other interest groups that support emission cuts. If that part of the public is not very large, such rationalizing will be less important and the choice of policy solution can be affected. The potential for finding a policy compromise to change energy policy radically in a less fossil fuels based direction is, therefore, limited because high energy security concerns will not be enough by itself to redefine the perceived need for a major energy policy change away from fossil fuels. Without the inclusion on the policy agenda of concerns about climate change, proponents of new, environmentally sustainable policy solutions may not be able to attract enough support to overturn the political majority opposed to change, and therefore policy changes will not necessarily come about as direct renewal of federal climate policy but rather as incremental energy policy change that would at best not increase GHG emissions.

#### Warming risks global extinction

Deibel 2007 (Terry L, Professor of IR @ National War College, “Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft”, Conclusion: American Foreign Affairs Strategy Today)

Finally, there is one major existential threat to American security (as well as prosperity) of a nonviolent nature, which, though far in the future, demands urgent action. It is the threat of global warming to the stability of the climate upon which all earthly life depends. Scientists worldwide have been observing the gathering of this threat for three decades now, and what was once a mere possibility has passed through probability to near certainty. Indeed not one of more than 900 articles on climate change published in refereed scientific journals from 1993 to 2003 doubted that anthropogenic warming is occurring. “In legitimate scientific circles,” writes Elizabeth Kolbert, “it is virtually impossible to find evidence of disagreement over the fundamentals of global warming.” Evidence from a vast international scientific monitoring effort accumulates almost weekly, as this sample of newspaper reports shows: an international panel predicts “brutal droughts, floods and violent storms across the planet over the next century”; climate change could “literally alter ocean currents, wipe away huge portions of Alpine Snowcaps and aid the spread of cholera and malaria”; “glaciers in the Antarctic and in Greenland are melting much faster than expected, and…worldwide, plants are blooming several days earlier than a decade ago”; “rising sea temperatures have been accompanied by a significant global increase in the most destructive hurricanes”; “NASA scientists have concluded from direct temperature measurements that 2005 was the hottest year on record, with 1998 a close second”; “Earth’s warming climate is estimated to contribute to more than 150,000 deaths and 5 million illnesses each year” as disease spreads; “widespread bleaching from Texas to Trinidad…killed broad swaths of corals” due to a 2-degree rise in sea temperatures. “The world is slowly disintegrating,” concluded Inuit hunter Noah Metuq, who lives 30 miles from the Arctic Circle. “They call it climate change…but we just call it breaking up.” From the founding of the first cities some 6,000 years ago until the beginning of the industrial revolution, carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere remained relatively constant at about 280 parts per million (ppm). At present they are accelerating toward 400 ppm, and by 2050 they will reach 500 ppm, about double pre-industrial levels. Unfortunately, atmospheric CO2 lasts about a century, so there is no way immediately to reduce levels, only to slow their increase, we are thus in for significant global warming; the only debate is how much and how serious the effects will be. As the newspaper stories quoted above show, we are already experiencing the effects of 1-2 degree warming in more violent storms, spread of disease, mass die offs of plants and animals, species extinction, and threatened inundation of low-lying countries like the Pacific nation of Kiribati and the Netherlands at a warming of 5 degrees or less the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets could disintegrate, leading to a sea level of rise of 20 feet that would cover North Carolina’s outer banks, swamp the southern third of Florida, and inundate Manhattan up to the middle of Greenwich Village. Another catastrophic effect would be the collapse of the Atlantic thermohaline circulation that keeps the winter weather in Europe far warmer than its latitude would otherwise allow. Economist William Cline once estimated the damage to the United States alone from moderate levels of warming at 1-6 percent of GDP annually; severe warming could cost 13-26 percent of GDP. But the most frightening scenario is runaway greenhouse warming, based on positive feedback from the buildup of water vapor in the atmosphere that is both caused by and causes hotter surface temperatures. Past ice age transitions, associated with only 5-10 degree changes in average global temperatures, took place in just decades, even though no one was then pouring ever-increasing amounts of carbon into the atmosphere. Faced with this specter, the best one can conclude is that “humankind’s continuing enhancement of the natural greenhouse effect is akin to playing Russian roulette with the earth’s climate and humanity’s life support system. At worst, says physics professor Marty Hoffert of New York University, “we’re just going to burn everything up; we’re going to heat the atmosphere to the temperature it was in the Cretaceous when there were crocodiles at the poles, and then everything will collapse.” During the Cold War, astronomer Carl Sagan popularized a theory of nuclear winter to describe how a thermonuclear war between the Untied States and the Soviet Union would not only destroy both countries but possibly end life on this planet. Global warming is the post-Cold War era’s equivalent of nuclear winter at least as serious and considerably better supported scientifically. Over the long run it puts dangers from terrorism and traditional military challenges to shame. It is a threat not only to the security and prosperity to the United States, but potentially to the continued existence of life on this planet.

### Enviro Securitization Inev

#### AND, ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITIZATION IS INEVITABLE – GLOBAL WARMING MAKES PEOPLE REACT TO RESOURCE SCARCITY CONCERNS, NO MATTER HOW EPISTEMOLOGICALLY FLAWED, THE ALT CAN’T CHANGE PERCEPTION.

CHALECKI 2K7

[Elizabeth, “environmental security: a case study of climate change”, pacific institute for studies in development, environment and safety, Asst. Professor in the International Studies Program at Boston College<http://www.pacinst.org/reports/environment_and_security/env_security_and_climate_change.pdf>]

Climate change will mean more natural disasters as a result of shifting weather and precipitation patterns. The Midwest will face a greater risk of tornadoes and riverine floods, the Gulf Coast and other shorelines will face a greater risk of high seas and hurricanes, and (due to changes in amount and timing of precipitation) the West will face greater risk of wildfires. These disasters will change the readiness of the military by forcing the reallocation of troops away from combat operations toward disaster relief. In addition, countries less able to cope with natural disasters will likely face large numbers of refugees, either internally or from nearby countries. As they compete with the local population for scarce resources, civil and ethnic unrest may require peacekeeping troops.

### Ontology Focus Bad

#### Debates about ontology are irrelevant to real world policy debates – pragmatism is more effective at facilitating social change

David McClean. 2001. philosopher, writer and business consultant, conducted graduate work in philosophy at NYU. “The cultural left and the limits of social hope” http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm

There is a lot of philosophical prose on the general subject of social justice. Some of this is quite good, and some of it is quite bad. What distinguishes the good from the bad is not merely the level of erudition. Displays of high erudition are gratuitously reflected in much of the writing by those, for example, still clinging to Marxian ontology and is often just a useful smokescreen which shrouds a near total disconnect from empirical reality. This kind of political writing likes to make a lot of references to other obscure, jargon-laden essays and tedious books written by other true believers - the crowd that takes the fusion of Marxian and Freudian private fantasies seriously. Nor is it the lack of scholarship that makes this prose bad. Much of it is well "supported" by footnotes referencing a lode of other works, some of which are actually quite good. Rather, what makes this prose bad is its utter lack of relevance to extant and critical policy debates, the passage of actual laws, and the amendment of existing regulations that might actually do some good for someone else. The writers of this bad prose are too interested in our arrival at some social place wherein we will finally emerge from our "inauthentic" state into something called "reality." Most of this stuff, of course, comes from those steeped in the Continental tradition (particularly post-Kant). While that tradition has much to offer and has helped shape my own philosophical sensibilities, it is anything but useful when it comes to truly relevant philosophical analysis, and no self-respecting Pragmatist can really take seriously the strong poetry of formations like "authenticity looming on the ever remote horizons of fetishization." What Pragmatists see instead is the hope that we can fix some of the social ills that face us if we treat policy and reform as more important than Spirit and Utopia.

### PIKs Are Bad

#### 1. Steals 1AC offense

#### 2. Moots topic education

### No Impact to Ontology

#### World War II proves that attempting to predict the impact of a particular ontology is futile – it cannot explain why modernity produced varying responses to the conflict within the same population from genocidal nationalist militarism to pacificsm.

#### Ontology has no political impact

Srnicek 09 [Nick, Ph.D Candidate in International Relations @ the London School of Economics, “Notes on Ontology and Politics,” http://accursedshare.blogspot.com/2009/01/some-notes-on-ontology-and-politics.html]

It seems to me that one of the most contentious and unremarked upon effects of speculative realism has to do with its attack on a piece of continental dogma – namely the presupposition that ontology is necessarily political. This idea is seen in any number of continental works, from Deleuze’s constructivism, to Derrida’s deconstructions of presence, to the social constructivists, gender and identity theorists, among others. The basic idea being that ontology is always constructed through a political battle, a conflict over what exists. In this regards, the contribution of continental work was to undermine the notion that what exists can be definitively determined in an essential way. The problem was that they went too far with this line of thought and tended (I say tended, because there are almost always exceptions) to deny the independence of ontology from politics. In many cases, ontology even became passé, a mere relic of classical philosophy. These ideas, unsurprisingly, came along necessarily with the general acceptance of correlationism – if we can’t speak or know of anything independent of its manifestation to us, then every thing is necessarily already wrapped up in our political relations. With speculative realism, however, this situation changes. The turn towards objects, towards the absolute, and towards the real as indifferent, all imply that ontology must be independent of politics. We can see this most clearly in Brassier’s work, I believe (although it is implicit in all of them). The relative absence of politics in Nihil Unbound stems partly from the belief that we can study ontology without having to be concerned about its political effects. The results of such a study, as in Brassier’s work, can be rather disconcerting for politics – what if there is no such thing as agency? – but this alone fails to discredit the arguments for such a position. So what does the separation of politics and ontology entail? A few hesitant and suggestive remarks might begin to make clear what precisely is at stake for any speculative realist politics... The separation entails, first of all, that an ontology cannot be validated in terms of its political effects. Part of Badiou’s greatness is undoubtedly to have rejuvenated the concept of the subject, but when judging his ontology, we have to do so while bracketing these political effects. Similarly, when studying the results of neuroscience and their political implications, we must be careful not to reject them simply because they don't accord with our fundamental beliefs about ourselves. If it turns out that we are no more than patterns of neurons firing, this is a reality whose effective truth holds sway regardless of our political desires. (As an aside, I think that such an idea needs to reject Levi's 'Principle of Irreduction', as there are scientific examples of entities being reduced to other entities. The basic argument against such a principle being that we can be mistaken about how the difference an entity makes, makes that difference.) The second effect is that we can no longer construct an ontology in order to achieve some political goal. We may wish to privilege difference as a counter to constricting identity formations, but we cannot justify this privileging with political arguments. Rather, properly philosophical arguments need to be marshaled in support of these ideas. (This raises the important question of whether philosophy can ever be distinguished from politics completely, but the linguistic intermingling of the two need not entail their necessary correlation outside of language.) A third and similar point is that an ontology cannot dictate a political program. Difference may be privileged, for example, but this can be taken in the direction of a capitalist individualism or the direction of undermining traditional power relations - a realist ontology will allow for a multitude of political projects to be spawned from it, without necessarily being liberating or progressive (or constraining or conservative). The fourth effect is a little more radical, I think. This is a renunciation of the tendency among continental theorists to place their political arguments in terms of ontology – I’m thinking here of things like Badiou and the uncounted, Rancière and the people, Deleuze and the minor, etc. The common thread being that the collective agency for political change is always determined in terms of its ontological status – what is inexistent, or uncounted, or unactualized. But political change need not require that something fundamentally new come into being. There can be real political progress made without having to generate ontological novelty. (I’ll also mention too that the faith in the New tends to be another continental political dogma. As though the New was necessarily progressive. While the New may be considered an ontological category, its political content is entirely underdetermined by ontological reasoning.)

**Iranian military threat is overblown- any conflict would be limited**

**Luttwak 07**

An American military strategist and historian who has published works on military strategy, history, and international relations. The Middle of Nowhere”. Edward Nicolae Luttwak. 5/26/07. Prospect Issue 134.)

**Arab-Israeli catastrophism is wrong** twice over, first because **the conflict is contained within rather narrow boundaries**, and second because the Levant is just not that important any more. **The second** repeated **mistake is the Mussolini syndrome**. Contemporary documents prove beyond any doubt what is now hard to credit: serious people, including British and French military chiefs, accepted Mussolini’s claims to great power status because they believed that he had serious armed forces at his command. His army divisions, battleships and air squadrons were dutifully counted to assess Italian military power, making some allowance for their lack of the most modern weapons but not for their more fundamental refusal to fight in earnest. Having conceded Ethiopia to win over Mussolini, only to lose him to Hitler as soon as the fighting started, the British discovered that the Italian forces quickly crumbled in combat. It could not be otherwise, because most Italian soldiers were unwilling conscripts from the one-mule peasantry of the south or the almost equally miserable sharecropping villages of the north. Exactly the same mistake keeps being made by the fraternity of **middle east experts.** They **persistently attribute** real **military strength to** backward **societies who**sepopulations **can sustain** excellent **insurgencies but not modern military forces. In the 1960s, it was Nasser’s Egypt that was mistaken for a real military power** just because it had received many aircraft, tanks and guns from the Soviet Union, and had many army divisions and air squadrons. In May 1967, on the eve of war, many agreed with the prediction of Field Marshal Montgomery, then revisiting the El Alamein battlefield, that the Egyptians would defeat the Israelis forthwith; even the more cautious never anticipated that the former would be utterly defeated by the latter in just a few days. In 1973, with much more drama, it still took only three weeks to reach the same outcome. **In 1990 it was the turn of Iraq to be hugely overestimated as a military power**. Saddam Hussein had more equipment than Nasser ever accumulated, and could boast of having defeated much more populous Iran after eight years of war. In the months before the Gulf war, there was much anxious speculation about the size of the Iraqi army—again, the divisions and regiments were dutifully counted as if they were German divisions on the eve of D-day, with a separate count of the “elite” Republican Guards, not to mention the “super-elite” Special Republican Guards—and it was feared that Iraq’s bombproof aircraft shelters and deep bunkers would survive any air attack. **Now the Mussolini syndrome is at work over Iran.** All the symptomsarepresent, including tabulated lists of **Iran’s warships,** despite the fact that most **are over 30 years old;** of **combat aircraft**, many of which (F-4s, Mirages, F-5s, F-14s**) have not flown in years for lack of** spare **parts**; **and of divisions** and brigades that **are so only in name**. There are awed descriptions of the Pasdaran revolutionary guards, inevitably described as “elite,” who do indeed strut around as if they have won many a war, but who have actually fought only one—against Iraq, which they lost. As for Iran’s claim to have defeated Israel by Hizbullah proxy in last year’s affray, the publicity was excellent but the substance went the other way, with roughly 25 per cent of the best-trained men dead, which explains the tomb-like silence and immobility of the once rumbustious Hizbullah ever since the ceasefire. It is true enough that if Iran’s nuclear installations are bombed in some overnight raid, there is likely to be some retaliation, but we live in fortunate times in which **we** **have only the irritant of terrorism instead of world wars to worry about**—and **Iran’s** added **contribution is not likely to leave much of an impression**. There may be good reasons for not attacking Iran’s nuclear sites—including the very slow and uncertain progress of its uranium enrichment effort—but its ability to strike back is not one of them. Even the seemingly fragile tanker traffic down the Gulf and through the straits of Hormuz is not as vulnerable as it seems—Iran and Iraq have both tried to attack it many times without much success, and this time the US navy stands ready to destroy any airstrip or jetty from which attacks are launched.