### Extinction O/W

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#### Life should be valued as apriori – it precedes the ability to value anything else

Amien Kacou. 2008. WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of “Life”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184

Furthermore, that manner of finding things good that is in pleasure can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,” as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation. Thus, we can see now that, in general, something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself. And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good. However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value. But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

#### Existence precedes the ability to ascribe value [and respect the other]

Paul Wapner. 2003. Associate Prof. and Dir. Global Env’t. Policy Prog. – American U., Dissent, “Leftist criticism of “nature””, Winter, 50:1.

All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions--except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and nonexistence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity. In fact, if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative and, as Jean Francois Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its "incredulity toward meta-narratives." Nonetheless, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept the value of preserving the nonhuman world. The nonhuman is the extreme "other"; it stands in contradistinction to humans as a species. In understanding the constructed quality of human experience and the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of respecting the "other." At the very least, respect must involve ensuring that the "other" actually continues to exist. In our day and age, this requires us to take responsibility for protecting the actuality of the nonhuman. Instead, however, we are running roughshod over the earth's diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems. Postmodern critics should find this particularly disturbing. If they don't, they deny their own intellectual insights and compromise their fundamental moral commitment.

#### Give people the choice to live

Paterson 3 Craig, Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, <http://sce.sagepub.com>

In determining whether a life is worth living or not, **attention should be focused upon an array of ‘interests’ of the person**, and these, for the competent patient at least, are going to vary considerably, since they will be informed by the patient’s underlying dispositions, and, for the incompetent, by a minimal quality threshold. It follows that for competent patients, a broad-ranging assessment of quality of life concerns is the trump card as to whether or not life continues to be worthwhile. Different patients may well decide differently. That is the prerogative of the patient, for the only unpalatable alternative is to force a patient to stay alive. For Harris, life can be judged valuable or not when the person assessing his or her own life determines it to be so. If a person values his or her own life, then that life is valuable**, precisely to the extent that he or she values it**. Without any real capacity to value, there can be no value. As Harris states, ‘. . . the value of our lives is the value we give to our lives’. It follows that the primary injustice done to a person is to deprive the person of a life he or she may think valuable. Objectivity in the value of human life, for Harris, essentially becomes one of negative classification (ruling certain people out of consideration for value), allied positively to a broad range of ‘critical interests’; interests worthy of pursuing — **friendships, family, life goals, etc**. — which are subjected to de facto **self-assessment** for the further determination of meaningful value. Suicide, assisted suicide, and voluntary euthanasia, can therefore be justified, on the grounds that once the competent nature of the person making the decision has been established, the thoroughgoing commensuration between different values, in the form of interests or preferences, is essentially left up to the individual to determine for himself or herself.

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### Must Prohibit 2NC overview

#### The aff must reduce restrictions. It’s not a restriction if it doesn’t prohibit energy production. Extend our Hayden ’05 and Priebe ’99 ev. Restrictions are prohibitions on energy production. The aff reduces regulatory issues that hinder the energy industry—but those are NOT direct restrictions. The brightline test is easy—can an energy producer, if cost were no object, still produce energy with the restriction in place? If so, then it is NOT a restriction. Our interp offers the aff at least 5 to 7 mechanisms for every energy type. Their interp justifies any aff that makes the energy industry more profitable—including streamlining the permitting process, reducing fees charged, or simplifying paperwork

#### Pollution regulations not a restriction on energy production

Cryptodemocrat 12 [Computer programmer and aspiring inventor with math research interests. Sometime leftwing political activist, Op-EdNews.com contributor]

("Equating restrictions on pollution with restrictions on energy production is a mistake." February 18, http://www.democratsagainstunagenda21.com/1/post/2012/01/one-planet-one-vision-one-city-at-a-time.html)

**Equating restrictions on pollution with restrictions on energy production is a mistake. Increased energy production is critical for many reasons, but we can do it without polluting too much** -- ONLY IF-- the public insists that it be done cleanly, through government regulation. The hatred of socialism that lurks behind Rosa K's rhetoric is another mistake, and leads me to suspect that she has fallen victim to the Libertarian deception, which uses rhetoric about Liberty to bait the hook of fascist economics. Starving the Federal government of funds threatens breakup and balkanization of the country. Fetishizing private power to the point of eviscerating government frees the rich to enslave everyone else.

#### Regulations are not restrictions

Indian Supreme Court ‘78

LILLY KURIAN V. SR. LEWINA & ORS [1978] RD-SC 175 (15 September 1978) http://www.rishabhdara.com/sc/view.php?case=6688

The fundamental freedom is to establish and to administer educational institutions : it is a right to establish and administer what are in truth educational institutions, institutions which cater to the educational needs of the citizens, or sections thereof.¶ Regulation made in the true interests of efficiency of instruction, discipline, health, sanitation, morality, public order and the like may undoubtedly be Imposed.¶ Such regulations are not restrictions on the substance of the right which is guaranteed; they secure the proper functioning of the institution, in matters educational." In Rev. Father W. Proost & Ors. v. The State of Bihar & Ors.(1) Hidayatullah C.J. while dealing with Articles 29(1) and 30(1), said :¶ "In our opinion, the width of Article 30(1) cannot be cut down by introducing in it considerations on which Art. 29(1) is based. The latter article is a general protection which is given to minorities to conserve their language, script or culture. The former is a special right to minorities to establish educational institutions of their choice. This choice is not limited to institution, seeking to conserve language, script or culture and the choice is not taken away if the minority community having established an educational institution of its choice also admits members of other communities. That is a circumstance irrelevant for the application of Article 30(1) since no such limitation is expressed and none can be implied, although it is possible that they may meet in a given case." Incidentally, in dealing with the right under Article 30(1) and the extent of the State's power of regulatory control of such right, this Court in State of Kerala v. V.

### 2NC caselist—Solar & Wind

#### Nearly the entire community is reading incentives for solar & wind, cuz that’s where the literature is. All those affs are topical under our interp. Also, siting restrictions for environmental, aesthetic, or distance to people or other structures are all topical affs. Plus, all the affs that says fed authority good by banning state, local, municipal or homeowner association solar array bans. But it has to be a restriction ON production.

#### The Affs interp legits lessening ANY requirement that costs the solar industry money—Master Limit Partnerships, anti-dumping tariffs on solar cells are not topical—these are not restrictions—they are merely policies that indirectly raise the cost of solar power or wind power. AND, the legitimacy of THOSE affs also means the neg has to prepare for lifting any tariffs on steel, cuz that’s what’s wind turbines are made from, tariffs on semiconducters or computer chips, cuz they control solar & wind, etc. The aff interp makes any US policy that indirectly raises the cost to the industry to “produce energy” topical—which forces negs to go for process CPs and politics, AND lose their best incentive based link args.

### 2NC Bright Line

#### Our bright line is that the laws or rules must actually say that energy production is illegal in itself. For example, if you tried to drill for gas in national wildfire preserves, you would be arrested or fined. You need only look at the words of the law.

#### The aff has no bright line, because the restriction only occurs when somebody responds to the plan by reducing energy production.

#### World trade law recognizes this distinction. Export restrictions only restrict production by effect.

Marceau 10 [Counsellor in the Legal Affairs Division of the WTO, and Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law in the University of Geneva]

Gabrielle, in GLOBAL CHALLENGES AT THE INTERSECTION OF TRADE, ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT, ed. Pauwelyn, 2010, Centre for Trade and Economic Integration, p. 33]

**GATT Article XI prohibits export restrictions but does not address production per se.**

**There are no obligations imposed on Members to extract and produce energy**

**resources,** and this is where the difficulties lie, as some Members are trying to guarantee their access to supplies of petroleum, natural gas, coal, and uranium in foreign countries. In fact this is somehow what Members are trying to secure--a guaranteed right to purchase hydrocarbons in particular from other Members. More thinking is needed to find out how to better exploit and share natural resources. Could we change the traditional principle of sovereignty over natural resources by a principle that deems such resources world common resources or common goods? In

any case, energy resources are clearly 'natural resources', and we are already seeing many of the exporters improve their domestic efficiency in use-in line with the requirements of Article XX(g) of the GATT that some members may want to invoke to justify import or export restrictions.

### Must Prohibit 2NC Limits overview

#### This topic is huge. Incentives can be everything from tax credits to loan guarantees to feed-in-tariffs to military procurement. Substantially checks nothing. There are five different fuel types and multiple variants of every one. Energy production is a meaningless phrase that might include pipeline maintenance or grants for building roads out to wind farms. Increase can mean extending future tax credits that haven’t expired yet or creating new programs based on one or two articles. In the United States evidently doesn’t even exclude foreign bases or drones. We MUST give narrow meaning to restrictions to check the size of the topic. AND the best restrictions affs, in keeping with topic literature are still topical in our interp.

### AT Reasonability

#### 1. Our standards prove the affirmative is not reasonable.

#### 2. Subjective—forces the judge to intervene based on personal bias. Even if intervention is inevitable, we should minimize it.

#### 3. Reasonability isn’t a system of evaluation: it will inevitably revert to competing interpretations.

#### 4. This allows all cases that might be reasonable: voting on reasonability doesn’t just allow this aff, it allows the sum total of affs that could be presented as reasonable and that unlimits.

#### 5. Competing interpretations is a better standard

#### A. Creates a clear caselist of topical plans by making teams defend the best interpretation of the resolution.

#### B. Easiest to implement. All other arguments in debate are weighed in competition with each other which means it is easiest to treat topicality the same way.

## Politics

They link—their Bosworth ev talks about how they are stifling energy production now

The knowledge produced through a federal Environmental Assessment is important because it delineates many of the requirements for building a wind power project. The EA must be publically submitted for approval and adhere to strict guidelines. The kinds of knowledge that get produced are quite clearly a function of power. For example, hard data like wind speeds are allowed, while “spiritual” claims or values are often disregarded (see Deloria 1999, Wainwright

### Calculations Good

#### Worst-case scenarios calculate for the sake of responsibility – mobilization is key to effective to political movements that prevent the worst forms of their impact

Michael Williams, Professor of International Politics – U. Wales, Aberystwyth**, ‘5**

(*The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations* p. 165-7)

Moreover, the links between sceptical realism and prevalent post-modern themes go more deeply than this, particularly as they apply to attempts by post-structural thinking to reopen questions of responsibility and ethics.80 In part, the goals of post-structural approaches can be usefully charactised, to borrow Stephen White’s illuminating contrast, as expressions of ‘responsibility to otherness’ which question and challenge modernist equations of responsibility with a ‘responsibility to act’. A responsibility to otherness seeks to reveal and open the constitutive processes and claims of subjects and subjectivities that a foundational modernism has effaced in its narrow identification of responsibility with a ‘responsibility to act’.81 Deconstruction can from this perspective be seen as a principled stance unwilling to succeumb to modernist essentialism which in the name of responsibility assumes and reifies subjects and structures, obscures forms of power and violence which are constitutive of them, and at the same time forecloses a consideration of alternative possibilities and practices. Yet it is my claim that the willful Realist tradition does not lack understanding of the contingency of practice or a vision of responsibility to otherness. On the contrary, its strategy of objectification is precisely an attempt to bring together a responsibility to otherness and a responsibility to act within a wilfully liberal vision. The construction of a realm of objectivity and calculation is not just a consequence of a need to act – the framing of an epistemic context for successful calculation. It is a form of responsibility to otherness, an attempt to allow for diversity and irreconcilability precisely by – at least initially – reducing the self and the other to a structure of material calculation in order to allow a structure of mutual intelligibility, mediation, and stability. It is, in short, a strategy of *limitation*: a wilful attempt to construct a subject and a social world limited – both epistemically and politically – in the name of a politics of toleration: a liberal strategy that John Gray has recently characterized as one of *modus vivendi*.82 If this is the case, then the deconstructive move that gains some of its weight by contrasting itself to a non- or apolitical objectivism must engage with the more complex contrast to a sceptical Realist tradition that is itself a constructed, ethical practice. This issue becomes even more acute if one considers Iver Neumann’s incisive questions concerning postmodern constructions of identity, action, and responsibility.83 As Neumann points out, the insight that identities are inescapably contingent and relationally constructed, and even the claim that identities are inescapably *indebted* to otherness, do not in themselves provide a foundation for practice, particularly in situations where identities are ‘sedimented’ and conflictually defined. In these cases, deconstruction alone will not suffice unless it can demonstrate a capacity to counter in practice and not just in philosophic practice the essentialist dynamics it confronts.84 Here, a responsibility to act must go **beyond** **deconstruction** to consider viable alternatives and counter-practices. To take this critique seriously is not necessarily to be subject yet again to the straightforward ‘blackmail of the Englightenment and a narrow ‘modernist’ vision of responsibility.85 While an unwillingness to move beyond a deconstructive ethic of responsibility to otherness for fear that an essentialist stance is the only (or most likely) alternative expresses a legitimate concern, it should not license a retreat from such questions or their practical demands. Rather, such situations demand also an evaluation of the structures (of identity and institutions) that might viably be mobilized in order to offset the worst implications of violently exclusionary identities. It requires, as Neumann nicely puts it, the generation of compelling ‘as if’ stories around which counter-subjectivities and political practices can coalesce. Wilful Realism, I submit, arises out of an appreciation of these issues, and comprises an attempt to craft precisely such ‘stories’ within a broader intellectual and sociological analysis of their conditions of production, possibilities of success, and likely consequences. The question is, to what extent are these limits capable of success, and to what extent might they be limits upon their own aspirations toward responsibility? These are crucial questions, but they will not be addressed by retreating yet again into further reversals of the same old dicohotomies.

#### Prefer specific scenarios – even if we invoke some security logic, the fact that others will securitize means that we have to make worst-case assessments to avoid escalation

Ole Waever, Senior Research Fellow – Copenhagen Peace Research Inst., 2K

(I. R. Theory & the Politics of European Integration, ed Kelstrup/Williams p. 282-285)

The other main possibility is to stress responsibility. Particularly in a field like security one has to make choices and deal with the challenges and risks that one confronts – and not shy away into long-range or principled transformations. The meta-political line risks (despite the theoretical commitment to the concrete other) implying that politics can be contained within large ‘systemic’ questions. In line with the classical revolutionary tradition, after the change (now no longer the revolution but the meta-physical transformation), there will be no more problems whereas in our situation (until the change) we should not deal with the ‘small questions’ of politics, only with the large one (cf. Rorty 1996). However, the ethical demand in post-structuralism (e.g. Derrida’s ‘justice’) is of a kind that can never be instantiated in any concrete political order – it is an experience of the undecidable that exceeds any concrete solution and re-inserts politics. Therefore, politics can never be reduced to meta-questions; there is no way to erase the small, particular, banal conflicts and controversies. In contrast to the quasi-institutionalist formula of radical democracy which one finds in the ‘opening’ oriented version of deconstruction, we could with Derrida stress the singularity of the event. To take a position, take part, and ‘produce events’ (Derrida 1994: 89) means to get involved in specific struggles. Politics takes place ‘in the singular event of engagement’ (Derrida 1996: 83). Derrida’s politics is focused on the calls that demand response/responsibility in words like justice, Europe and emancipation. Should we treat security in this manner? No, security is not that kind of call. ‘Security’ is not a way to open (or keep open) an ethical horizon. Security is a much more situational concept oriented to the handling of specifics. It belongs to the sphere of how to handle challenges – and avoid ‘the worst’ (Derrida 1991). Here enters again the possible pessimism hich for the security analyst might be occupational or structural. The infinitude of responsibility (Derrida 1996: 86) or the tragic nature of politics (Morgenthau 1946, Chapter 7) means that one can never feel reassured that by some ‘good deed’, ‘I have assumed my responsibilities’ (Derrida 1996: 86). If I conduct myself particularly well with regard to someone, I know that it is to the detriment of an other; of one nation to the detriment of another nation, of one family to the detriment of another family, of my friends to the detriment of other friends or non-friends, etc. This is the infinitude that inscribes itself within responsibility; otherwise there would be no ethical problems or decisions. (ibid.; and parallel argumentation in Morgenthau 1946; Chapters 6 and 7) Because of this there will remain conflicts and risks – and the question of how to handle them. Should developments be securitized (and if so, in what terms)? Often our reply will be to aim for de-securitization and then politics meet meta-politics; but occasionally the underlying pessimism regarding the prospects for orderliness and compatibility among human aspirations will point to scenarios sufficiently worrisome that responsibility will entail securitization in order to block the worst. As a security/securitization analyst, this means accepting the task of trying to manage and avoid spirals and accelerating security concerns, to try to assist in shaping the continent in a way that creates the least insecurity and violence – even if this occasionally means invoking/producing ‘structures’ or even using the dubious instrument of securitization. In the case of current European configuration, the above analysis suggests the use of securitization at the level of European scenarios with the aim of preempting and avoiding numerous instances of local securitization that could lead to security dilemmas and escalations, violence and mutual vilification.

#### War fuels structural violence, not the other way around

Goldstein 2001. IR professor at American University (Joshua, War and Gender, p. 412, Google Books)

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps. among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.9 So, “if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.