## Round Report, elections, Enviro Racism K, Cap K, Heg turn, Terror rhetoric turn, no impact to terror or heg

## Elections top level Obama good

#### Case outweighs

#### -Bioterror disease spread outweighs all your impacts that’s lilliefors ‘12

#### -Prolif outweighs destabilizes hot spots that’s Cimbala ‘08

#### -Heg solves all your impacts that’s Kagan ‘12

**Romney will win- factors**

Morris 9-14

Dick is a former advisor to Bill Clinton and Trent Lott, “Why Romney Will Win,” http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2012/09/14/why\_romney\_will\_win\_115452.html

Now that both conventions are over, the dimensions of the likely Romney triumph are becoming clear. Both through an analysis of the polling and an examination of the rhetoric, the parameters of the victory are emerging.¶ Start with the polling. It appears that **the bulk of the Obama post-convention bounce has been in blue states where his left-oriented convention stirred up the enthusiasm of an already committed group of voters. Among likely voters** identified **in The Washington Post poll** -- taken after the conventions -- **Obama holds a slim one-point edge**. And an analysis of Rasmussen's state-by-state likely voter data indicates a tie in the the battleground states. ¶ But it's not really a tie at all. **All pollsters are using 2008 models of voter turnout**. Some are combining '04 and '08 but skewing their samples to '08 numbers. African Americans cast 11 percent of the national vote in '04, but their participation swelled to 13 percent in '08. These 2 million new black voters backed Obama overwhelmingly. Will they come out in such numbers again? Will college and under 30 voters do so as well? Will Latino turnout be at historic highs? All these questions have to be answered "yes" for the polling samples so widely published to be accurate.¶ For example, **when a poll shows an Obama lead among likely voters of, say 47-45, it is based on an assumption that blacks will cast 13 percent of the vote**. But the lack of enthusiasm among **Obama's base for his candidacy and their doubts about the economy make an 11 percent black turnout more likely. In this event, Romney would actually win in this sample by 46-45**.¶ And then there is the enthusiasm gap. All recent polling suggests that Republican- and GOP-leaning Independents are 13 points more enthusiastic and following the race more closely than their Democratic counterparts. If the grassroots do their job, this will yield a stronger Romney vote.¶ Finally, when **every poll among every sample has Obama below 50 percent of the vote, it is most likely that the undecided have, in fact, decided not to back his re-election**.¶ But to crawl out of the statistical weeds, let's examine the state of the partisan dialogue. Former President Bill **Clinton made a huge blunder when he accepted the Republican challenge and flatly** -- and loudly -- **asserted that we are, in fact, better off than we were four years ago. Polls show that only about 33 percent of voters agree**, while close to half do not see the world that way.¶ Finally, both parties seemed happily to embrace the same formulation of the difference between them. Both agreed that the Republican Party is based on a philosophy of individual responsibility. Obama articulated it as, "You're on your own." Republicans put it differently: "We'll get government off your back." Democrats said theirs was a party that would lend you a hand.¶ Gallup measured these two options, and voters chose "leave me alone" over "lend me a hand" by 54-35.¶ Over the long haul, these are the questions that will dominate voting intentions. The function of the conventions is to formulate and articulate each party's view of the world. The fact that they were so similar and that each was willing to trust its fate to the question of, "Are you better off?" means that the Romney message will have a very strong advantage. The decision of the Democrats to embrace this choice and not to move to the center will make it impossible for them either to re-elect their president or to command a majority in the new Senate.

#### And Obama has already made a budget stance means any voters that would have switch already did.

#### SMRs publically popular – easier to explain safety features.

NEA ‘08

(Nuclear Energy Agency, “Why SMRs are being developed”, Brief 7,)

SMRs seem to respond well to these requirements, because they allow for design simplification and for introduction of new features, such as passive components and processes that avoid the need for early action by the operator in an abnormal situation. The design of some SMRs also makes it possible to set clearer and more precise safety criteria that may be easier for the public to understand, for example the exclusion of any possibility of a radioactive release to the environment. Some experts contend that the engineering principles are more readily explainable to the non-specialist, which should improve public acceptance.

#### Obama has pushed SMR policy not just budget

Kramer ‘12

(David J. Kramer was educated at Tufts University, receiving his B.A. in Soviet Studies and Political Science, and then at Harvard University, receiving his M.A. in Soviet Studies. “Romney, Obama surrogates spell out candidates’ energy policies” September 2012 Accessed online at <http://www.physicstoday.org/resource/1/phtoad/v65/i9/p20_s10>)

The Obama administration’s support for nuclear power is evident from the $7 billion loan guarantee from DOE to back construction of two new reactors at an existing nuclear power plant in Georgia, Reicher noted. “There’s serious money going into small modular reactors and serious policy work going on in how to reform the licensing process” at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to expedite approval.

#### DOD doesn’t Link – Agencies don’t affect agenda

Schoenbrod 94,

Prof., Law, New York Univ [David, Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the People through Delegation, p. 108)

Delegation allows for the president to avoid personal involvement in lawmaking; an appointee adopts the law, and, as discussed earlier, presidents frequently distance themselves from the controversial decisions of their appointees.

#### Voters won’t change their minds- new study proves

Bartles 9-21

Larry is Professor of Political Science at Vanderbilt, “There go the Undecided Voters,” <http://themonkeycage.org/blog/2012/09/21/there-go-the-undecided-voters/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+themonkeycagefeed+%28The+Monkey+Cage%29&utm_content=Google+Reader>

Lynn Vavreck has an informative piece on the New York Times Campaign Stops blog today tracing shifts in presidential voting intentions from late 2011 through early September. The data are from the Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project, which interviewed nearly 44,000 people last December and has subsequently been reinterviewing 1,000 per week. (Top monkey John Sides is a collaborator in the CCAP study, and I received access to some of these data for an earlier Campaign Stops post that Vavreck and I wrote together.)¶ Through most of the spring and early summer, more than half of the survey respondents who were undecided last December were still declining to choose a candidate, with the rest breaking slightly for Mitt Romney over Barack Obama. Since around mid-June, more of these previously undecided voters have begun to commit, with Obama gaining and, in the last few weeks, surpassing Romney among those who were originally undecided. According to Vavreck, “These decisions seem largely to have been motivated by party identification.”¶ Meanwhile, both candidates have managed to retain the vast majority of prospective voters who supported them last December. Over the course of 2012, Obama has held 96% of those who supported him in 2011 and added 3% of those who originally said they would vote Republican. For his part, Romney has held 94% of those who intended to vote Republican and added 2% of those who intended to vote for Obama. (Vavreck notes that the 2008 CCAP study found almost as much stability in candidate preferences, with Obama holding 90% of his early supporters and John McCain holding 92% of his.)¶ To readers versed in election studies, these findings will seem very reminiscent of those from the first scholarly analysis of campaign effects: “conversion is, by far, the least frequent result and activation the second most frequent manifest effect of the campaign.” However, whereas Lazarsfeld and his colleagues in 1940 studied 600 prospective voters in Erie County, Ohio, Vavreck and her colleagues in 2012 have 44,000 nationwide. That’s real scientific progress.

**Relations inevitable under Romney – no policy change and co-op outweighs**

**CQ Weekly 9-10**

“U.S.-Russia Reset: From Diplomacy to Reset,”

President Obamaentered office pledging to “reset” America’s troubled relations with Russia. But despite some tangible successes, including a new nuclear arms reduction treaty and increased sanctions on Iran, Democrats on the campaign trail are hardly touting their breakthroughs with Moscow. Indeed, Republicans and their presidential nominee, Mitt Romney, have used relations with Russia as one of their few consistent foreign policy attack lines against the White House.¶ The campaign rhetoric reinforces what has been a reality for months: **The once-celebrated reset is over**, with Vladimir V. Putin’s recoronation as Russia’s president in May the most visible symbol. New **divisions over the Syrian uprising, Russia’s human rights record and missile defense** — combined with shifting political circumstances in both the United States and Russia **— have soured diplomacy between the two nations.**¶ **But overheated rhetoric** out of Moscow and Washington aside, the **two nations still have an incentive to cooperate on critical security and economic issues, including** the **Afghanistan** War **and trade**. Beyond the battle for the White House, how Congress balances collaboration on these issues with complaints about Putin’s heavy-handed policies will help determine just how frigid the relationship becomes. Republicans have promised to take a harder line with Russia if they win control of the Senate and the White House, but **as** GOP Sen. John **McCain** of Arizona **observes, it’s in nobody’s interest to “reignite the Cold War**.”¶ Now that Russia has joined the World Trade Organization, the renewed tension is playing out in the trade arena. Without legislation to normalize trade relations, U.S. companies are unable to take advantage of eased access to Russian markets. Republicans have urged the White House to lean on Democrats to support the necessary changes. House Ways and Means Chairman Dave Camp of Michigan, in announcing a June hearing on Russia’s accession to the WTO, said he wanted to see the “administration’s active engagement on all of the issues” related to U.S. trade with Russia.¶ The White House, however, wants to avoid an awkward public debate. “The House leadership was obviously goading Obama to come out and make more statements in support of the legislation,” says Carroll Colley, a Russia analyst at the Eurasia Group, a political-risk consulting company. However, with Putin at Russia’s helm, no politician “wants to step out and advocate anything vis-à-vis Russia” right now, he says.¶ Andrew Kuchins, director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Russia program, agrees. “Russia’s just kind of a stinker right now,” Kuchins says, pointing to its widely criticized crackdown on the anti-Putin female punk band Pussy Riot and its continued support of strongman Bashar al-Assad’s bloody war against dissidents in Syria.¶ Russia’s recent actions have complicated the push in Congress to normalize trade relations, a high priority for both the U.S. business community and the Obama administration. To do so, Congress must remove Russia from a list of countries facing U.S. trade restrictions under the Jackson-Vanik amendment to a 1974 trade law. The amendment was intended to punish the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc countries for restricting Jewish emigration, an issue long since resolved.¶ On both the right and the left, critics of Russia’s human rights record have insisted that any legislation normalizing trade must include a component to penalize those who have violated human rights in Russia. The enormous anti-Putin political protests last fall and the ensuing government crackdown have only strengthened their hand.¶ To win the support of such critics, pro-trade House and Senate leaders have agreed to add language from a separate bill, named for the Russian lawyer and anti-corruption activist Sergei Magnitsky, who died in police custody in 2009. The bill would establish a freeze on the travel and assets of human rights violators from Russia or, in some versions, anywhere in the world. House leaders told the business community it would hold a vote on the trade normalization bill this week, but it’s not clear whether they have enough votes to win passage. The political sensitivity around anything that looks to be supporting Russia and Putin in the heat of campaign season may force a delay until after the election.¶ ‘Where They Park Their Cash’¶ Russians are eager to gain preferential trade status with the United States, but they’re irate about the language in the Magnitsky bill. The main concern in Moscow, according to Colley, is that Europe might adopt a similar law. “That’s where Russians vacation, and that’s where they park their cash,” he says. “This is a priority for them.”¶ Colley predicts considerable blowback from Moscow if the Magnitsky language becomes law. “It’s unclear how that will manifest itself,” he says, but he could imagine Russia making life difficult for American citizens who seek visas or for U.S. businesses that operate there.¶ The conflict in Syria is also a “big, big variable” in U.S. relations with Russia, Kuchins says. Members of Congress have, through various bills, blasted Russia’s continued support of Assad. For example, both chambers included language in their fiscal 2013 defense authorization bills that would bar funding for additional U.S. military purchases of Russian-made Rosoboronexport helicopters, which are used in Afghanistan, because that arms manufacturer also sells attack helicopters to the Assad regime.¶ One House-passed amendment to the fiscal 2013 Defense appropriations bill would go so far as to prohibit funds for nuclear nonproliferation activities with Russia unless Moscow demonstrates that it has worked to reduce weapons proliferation.¶ And after a short lull, missile defense is raising hackles in both capitals. The Obama administration tamped down a long-running dispute with Moscow on the subject when it announced, in 2009, alterations to U.S. plans for an anti-ballistic missile shield in Eastern Europe. In 2010, NATO kicked off talks with Russia on potential areas of cooperation on missile defense. Those talks, however, have stalled, and Russian saber rattling has increased; in recent months, Kremlin officials have publicly threatened to junk the New START pact and take military action if they don’t get their way.¶ In the United States, Republicans have made clear that missile defense is one of their priorities. The House in July passed an amendment to the defense policy bill that would prohibit funds from being used to share with Russia classified information about missile defense systems. Even if Obama is elected to another term, he may not have much flexibility in dealing with missile defense, given how closely GOP lawmakers are watching the issue. And if Republicans take over the White House, heightened confrontation with Russia on missile defense is a near-certainty.¶ Several Accomplishments¶ Despite the rising tensions, Obama’s approach to Russia “resulted in a number of agreements that served U.S. foreign and national security policy” over the past three years, Kuchins says. These include New START, a pact creating NATO transit corridors to Afghanistan through Russia and Moscow’s acquiescence to a strict new set of United Nations sanctions against Iran.¶ Those sanctions have yet to deter Iran from continuing its nuclear enrichment program. But as part of the “P5 plus one” — the group comprising the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, plus Germany — Russia remains an active player in efforts to resolve the standoff diplomatically.¶ Also, Russia has a major incentive to help stabilize Afghanistan — which is more or less in its backyard — as NATO troops withdraw over the next two years.¶ And even though Republican congressional opposition makes new arms control agreements in the next few years unlikely, **GOP lawmakers have signaled that, should they take control of Congress and the White House, they aren’t particularly interested in curbing existing treaties**. **Under those pacts, Russia and the United States continue to work together to destroy and safeguard nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.**¶ Richard G. Lugar, the Senate’s retiring arms control sage, recently visited Russia, Georgia and Ukraine to observe some of those efforts. He is pushing for the United States and Russia to extend what is known as the “umbrella agreement,” an executive initiative that underpins the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, in which the United States and the former Soviet Republics work together to dismantle excess weapons of mass destruction. (The program is also known as Nunn-Lugar, after the Indiana Republican and his former colleague Sen. Sam Nunn, a Georgia Democrat.)¶ The agreement, which has been extended before, expires in 2013. Lugar says that “a good number of other deadly weapons of mass destruction” — which the United States is ready to help Russia destroy — remains.¶ He worries that the increasingly heated rhetoric between Washington and Moscow could hamper such cooperation. Quoting retired diplomat Thomas R. Pickering, Lugar notes that the two countries have “been sort of kicking each other in the shins” in recent months. “The problem is, if there is too much kicking in the shins and so forth, people become unhappy with each other,” he says.¶ “Taking the perspective of the safety of the American people or the safety of the world, we better move past that,” Lugar adds. “The missiles we saw being cut up are not theoretical.”

**Give Russia war zero probability – politics, military superiority, economic concerns, and nuclear security**

**Graham ‘07**

(Thomas, Russia in Global Affairs, "The dialectics of strength and weakness", <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1129.html>, WEA)

An astute historian of Russia, Martin Malia, wrote several years ago that “Russia has at different times been demonized or divinized by Western opinion less because of her real role in Europe than because of the fears and frustrations, or hopes and aspirations, generated within European society by its own domestic problems.” Such is the case today. To be sure, mounting Western concerns about Russia are a consequence of Russian policies that appear to undermine Western interests, but they are also a reflection of declining confidence in our own abilities and the efficacy of our own policies. Ironically, this growing fear and distrust of Russia come at a time when **Russia is arguably less threatening to the West, and the United States in particular, than it has been at any time since the end of the Second World War. Russia does not champion a totalitarian ideology intent on our destruction, its military poses no threat to sweep across Europe, its economic growth depends on constructive commercial relations with Europe, and its strategic arsenal – while still capable of annihilating the United States – is under more reliable control than it has been in the past fifteen years and the threat of a strategic strike approaches zero probability.** Political gridlock in key Western countries, however, precludes the creativity, risk-taking, and subtlety needed to advance our interests on issues over which we are at odds with Russia while laying the basis for more constructive long-term relations with Russia.

### A2: K

#### Case outweighs and is a disad to the K –

**a) Cyber attacks are the number one threat to US security – extend ABC News ‘11 – only the plan will sponsor the provision of small nuclear reactors to prevent cyber attacks. Two impacts:**

**1) Cyber attacks will eventually draw the US into conflicts. That’s Gelinas ’10.**

**2) Stopping blackouts is necessary to prevent the grid from being vulnerable to terrorist attacks that will escalate to extinction due to bioweapons and retaliation. Extend Defense Science Board ‘8, Blair ‘12, Lilliefors ‘12, and National Strategy for Biosurveillance ‘12.**

**b) Without SMRs, the US loses its status as the leader in nuclear technology. Extend Loudermilk. US leadership is key to prevent nuclear proliferation. The impact is extinction as a result of great power wars and the escalation of regional conflicts.. Extend Cimbala ‘8, Kroenig ’12, and Kroenig ‘9.**

#### Perm: do both.

#### Perm: do the affirmative and the alternative in all other instances.

#### The alt causes backlash and transition wars

Anderson 1984. professor of sociology – UCLA, ’84 (Perry, In the tracks of historical materialism, p. 102-103)

That background also indicates, however, what is essentially missing from his work. How are we to get from where we are today to where he point us to tomorrow? There is no answer to this question in Nove. His halting discussion of “transition” tails away into apprehensive admonitions to moderation to the British Labor Party, and pleas for proper compensation to capitalist owners of major industries, if these are to be nationalized. Nowhere is there any sense of what a titanic political change would have to occur, with what fierceness of social struggle, for the economic model of socialism he advocates ever to materialize. Between the radicalism of the future end-state he envisages, and the conservatism of the present measures he is prepared to countenance, there is an unbridgeable abyss. How could private ownership of the means of production ever be abolished by policies less disrespectful of capital than those of Allende or a Benn, which he reproves? What has disappeared from the pages of The Economics of Feasible Socialism is virtually all attention to the historical dynamics of any serious conflict over the control of the means of production, as the record of the 20th century demonstrates them. If capital could visit such destruction on even so poor and small an outlying province of its empire in Vietnam, to prevent its loss, is it likely that it would suffer its extinction meekly in its own homeland? The lessons of the past sixty-five years or so are in this respect without ambiguity or exception, there is no case, from Russia to China, from Vietnam to Cuba, from Chile to Nicaragua, where the existence of capitalism has been challenged, and the furies of intervention, blockade and civil strife have not descended in response. Any viable transition to socialism in the West must seek to curtail that pattern: but to shrink from or to ignore it is to depart from the world of the possible altogether. In the same way, to construct an economic model of socialism in one advanced country is a legitimate exercise: but to extract it from any computable relationship with a surrounding, and necessarily opposing, capitalist environment—as this work does—is to locate it in thin air.

#### That causes extinction

Kothari 1982

Kothari, profrssor of political science – University of Delhi, ‘82

(Rajni, Towards a Just Social Order, Alternatives, p. 571)

Attempts at global economic reform could also lead to a world racked by increasing turbulence, a greater sense of insecurity among the major centres of power -- and hence to a further tightening of the structures of domination and domestic repression – producing in their wake an intensification ofthe old arms race and militarization of regimes, encouraging regional conflagrations and setting the stage for eventual global holocaust.

#### Threats are not socially constructed- decision makers use the most objective, rational, and accurate assessments possible- there are no bureaucratic or ideological motivations to invent threats.

Ravenal ‘9

[Earl C. Ravenal, distinguished senior fellow in foreign policy studies @ Cato, is professor emeritus of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. He is an expert on NATO, defense strategy, and the defense budget. He is the author of *Designing Defense for a New World Order.* What's Empire Got to Do with It? The Derivation of America's Foreign Policy.” *Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society* 21.1 (2009) 21-75]

Quite expectedly, the more doctrinaire of the non-interventionists take pains to deny any straightforward, and therefore legitimate, security motive in American foreign and military policy. In fact, this denial leads to a more sweeping rejection of any recognizably rational basis for American foreign policy, and, even, sometimes (among the more theoretical of the non-interventionists), a preference for non-rational accounts, or “models,” of virtually any nation’s foreign policy-making.4 One could call this tendency among anti-imperialists “motive displacement.” More specifically, in the cases under review here, one notes a receptivity to any reworking of history, and any current analysis of geopolitics, that denigrates “the threat”; and, along with this, a positing of “imperialism” (the almost self-referential and primitive impulse) as a sufficient explanation for the often strenuous and risky actions of great powers such as the United States. Thus, not only is “empire” taken to be a sufficient and, in some cases, a necessary condition in bringing about foreign “threats”; but, by minimizing the extent and seriousness of these threats, the anti-imperialists put themselves into the position of lacking a rational explanation for the derivation of the (pointless at best, counter-productive at worst) policies that they designate as imperialistic. A pungent example of this threat denigration and motive displacement is Eland’s account of American intervention in the Korean and Vietnam wars:

After North Korea invaded, the Truman administration intervened merely for the purpose of a demonstration to friends and foes alike. Likewise, according to eminent cold war historians, the United States did not inter- vene in Vietnam because it feared communism, which was fragmented, or the Soviet Union, which wanted détente with the West, or China, which was weak, but because it did not want to appear timid to the world. The behavior of the United States in both Korea and Vietnam is typical of imperial powers, which are always concerned about their reputation, pres- tige, and perceived resolve. (Eland 2004, 64)

Of course, the motive of “reputation,” to the extent that it exists in any particular instance, is a part of the complex of motives that characterize a great power that is drawn toward the role of hegemon (not the same thing as “empire”). Reputation is also a component of the power projec- tion that is designed to serve the interest of national security. Rummaging through the concomitants of “imperialism,” Eland (2004, 65) discovers the thesis of “threat inflation” (in this case, virtual threat invention): Obviously, much higher spending for the military, homeland security, and foreign aid are required for a policy of global intervention than for a policy of merely defending the republic. For example, after the cold war, the security bureaucracies began looking for new enemies to justify keeping defense and intelligence budgets high. Similarly, Eland (ibid., 183), in a section entitled “Imperial Wars Spike Corporate Welfare,” attributes a large portion of the U.S. defense budget—particularly the procurement of major weapons systems, such as “Virginia-class submarines . . . aircraft carriers . . . F-22 fighters . . . [and] Osprey tilt-rotor transport aircraft”—not to the systemically derived requirement for certain kinds of military capabilities, but, rather, to the imperatives of corporate pork. He opines that such weapons have no stra- tegic or operational justification; that “the American empire, militarily more dominant than any empire in world history, can fight brushfire wars against terrorists and their ‘rogue’ state sponsors without those gold- plated white elephants.”

The underlying notion of “the security bureaucracies . . . looking for new enemies” is a threadbare concept that has somehow taken hold across the political spectrum, from the radical left (viz. Michael Klare [1981], who refers to a “threat bank”), to the liberal center (viz. Robert H. Johnson [1997], who dismisses most alleged “threats” as “improbable dangers”), to libertarians (viz. Ted Galen Carpenter [1992], Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy of the Cato Institute, who wrote a book entitled A Search for Enemies). What is missing from most analysts’ claims of “threat inflation,” however, is a convincing theory of why, say, the American government significantly (not merely in excusable rhetoric) might magnify and even invent threats (and, more seriously, act on such inflated threat estimates). In a few places, Eland (2004, 185) suggests that such behavior might stem from military or national security bureaucrats’ attempts to enhance their personal status and organizational budgets, or even from the influence and dominance of “the military-industrial complex”; viz.: “Maintaining the empire and retaliating for the blowback from that empire keeps what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex fat and happy.” Or, in the same section:

In the nation’s capital, vested interests, such as the law enforcement bureaucracies . . . routinely take advantage of “crises”to satisfy parochial desires. Similarly, many corporations use crises to get pet projects— a.k.a. pork—funded by the government. And national security crises, because of people’s fears, are especially ripe opportunities to grab largesse. (Ibid., 182)

Thus, “bureaucratic-politics” theory, which once made several reputa- tions (such as those of Richard Neustadt, Morton Halperin, and Graham Allison) in defense-intellectual circles, and spawned an entire sub-industry within the field of international relations,5 is put into the service of dismissing putative security threats as imaginary. So, too, can a surprisingly cognate theory, “public choice,”6 which can be considered the right-wing analog of the “bureaucratic-politics” model, and is a preferred interpretation of governmental decision- making among libertarian observers. As Eland (2004, 203) summarizes:

Public-choice theory argues [that] the government itself can develop sepa- rate interests from its citizens. The government reflects the interests of powerful pressure groups and the interests of the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats in them. Although this problem occurs in both foreign and domestic policy, it may be more severe in foreign policy because citizens pay less attention to policies that affect them less directly.

There is, in this statement of public-choice theory, a certain ambiguity, and a certain degree of contradiction: Bureaucrats are supposedly, at the same time, subservient to societal interest groups and autonomous from society in general.

This journal has pioneered the argument that state autonomy is a likely consequence of the public’s ignorance of most areas of state activity (e.g., Somin 1998; DeCanio 2000a, 2000b, 2006, 2007; Ravenal 2000a). But state autonomy does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats substitute their own interests for those of what could be called the “national society” that they ostensibly serve. I have argued (Ravenal 2000a) that, precisely because of the public-ignorance and elite-expertise factors, and especially because the opportunities—at least for bureaucrats (a few notable post-government lobbyist cases nonwithstanding)—for lucrative self-dealing are stringently fewer in the defense and diplomatic areas of government than they are in some of the contract-dispensing and more under-the-radar-screen agencies of government, the “public-choice” imputation of self-dealing, rather than working toward the national interest (which, however may not be synonymous with the interests, perceived or expressed, of citizens!) is less likely to hold. In short, state autonomy is likely to mean, in the derivation of foreign policy, that “state elites” are using rational judgment, in insulation from self-promoting interest groups—about what strategies, forces, and weapons are required for national defense.

Ironically, “public choice”—not even a species of economics, but rather a kind of political interpretation—is not even about “public” choice, since, like the bureaucratic-politics model, it repudiates the very notion that bureaucrats make truly “public” choices; rather, they are held, axiomatically, to exhibit “rent-seeking” behavior, wherein they abuse their public positions in order to amass private gains, or at least to build personal empires within their ostensibly official niches. Such sub- rational models actually explain very little of what they purport to observe. Of course, there is some truth in them, regarding the “behavior” of some people, at some times, in some circumstances, under some conditions of incentive and motivation. But the factors that they posit operate mostly as constraints on the otherwise rational optimization of objectives that, if for no other reason than the playing out of official roles, transcends merely personal or parochial imperatives.

My treatment of “role” differs from that of the bureaucratic-politics theorists, whose model of the derivation of foreign policy depends heavily, and acknowledgedly, on a narrow and specific identification of the role- playing of organizationally situated individuals in a partly conflictual “pulling and hauling” process that “results in” some policy outcome. Even here, bureaucratic-politics theorists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999, 311) allow that “some players are not able to articulate [sic] the governmental politics game because their conception of their job does not legitimate such activity.” This is a crucial admission, and one that points— empirically—to the need for a broader and generic treatment of role.

Roles (all theorists state) give rise to “expectations” of performance. My point is that virtually every governmental role, and especially national-security roles, and particularly the roles of the uniformed mili- tary, embody expectations of devotion to the “national interest”; rational- ity in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and objectivity in the treatment of parameters, especially external parameters such as “threats” and the power and capabilities of other nations.

Sub-rational models (such as “public choice”) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to the “national” interest (or even the possibility that the national interest may be honestly misconceived in more paro- chial terms). In contrast, an official’s role connects the individual to the (state-level) process, and moderates the (perhaps otherwise) self-seeking impulses of the individual. Role-derived behavior tends to be formalized and codified; relatively transparent and at least peer-reviewed, so as to be consistent with expectations; surviving the particular individual and trans- mitted to successors and ancillaries; measured against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function and therefore derived from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious aggrandizement are conspicuously discouraged.

My own direct observation suggests that defense decision-makers attempt to “frame” the structure of the problems that they try to solve on the basis of the most accurate intelligence. They make it their business to know where the threats come from. Thus, threats are not “socially constructed” (even though, of course, some values are).

A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much security planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circum- stances that offer scope for idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and reviewed organizational frameworks. Non-rationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend to get filtered out. People are fired for presenting skewed analysis and for making bad predictions. This is because something important is riding on the causal analysis and the contingent prediction. For these reasons, “public choice” does not have the “feel” of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decision-making. In that structure, obvious, and even not-so-obvious, “rent-seeking” would not only be shameful; it would present a severe risk of career termination. And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place for truly talented rent-seekers to operate, compared to opportunities for personal profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrat’s very self-placement in these reaches of government testi- fies either to a sincere commitment to the national interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.

#### Total rejection of capitalism fragments resistance

Gibson-Graham 96

(JK, feminist economists, End of Capitalism)

One of our goals as Marxists has been to produce a knowledge of capitalism. Yet as “that which is known,” **Capitalism has become the intimate enemy. We have uncloaked the ideologically-clothed, obscure monster, but we have installed a naked and visible monster in its place. In return for our labors of creation, the monster has robbed us of all force**. We hear – and find it easy to believe – that the left is in disarray. Part of what produces the disarray of the left is the vision of what the left is arrayed against. **When capitalism is represented as a unified system coextensive with the nation or even the world, when it is portrayed as crowding out all other economic forms, when it is allowed to define entire societies, it becomes something that can only be defeated and replaced by a mass collective movement** (or by a process of systemic dissolution that such a movement might assist**). The revolutionary task of replacing capitalism now seems outmoded and unrealistic, yet we do not seem to have an alternative conception of class transformation to take its place**. The old political economic “systems” and “structures” that call forth a vision of revolution as systemic replacement still seem to be dominant in the Marxist political imagination. The New World Order is often represented as political fragmentation founded upon economic unification. In this vision the economy appears as the last stronghold of unity and singularity in a world of diversity and plurality. But why can’t the economy be fragmented too? If we theorized it as fragmented in the United States, we could being to see a huge state sector (incorporating a variety of forms of appropriation of surplus labor), a very large sector of self-employed and family-based producers (most noncapitalist), a huge household sector (again, quite various in terms of forms of exploitation, with some households moving towards communal or collective appropriation and others operating in a traditional mode in which one adult appropriates surplus labor from another). None of these things is easy to see. If capitalism takes up the available social space, there’s no room for anything else. **If capitalism cannot coexist, there’s no possibility of anything else. If capitalism functions as a unity, it cannot be partially or locally replaced. My intent is to help create the discursive conception under which socialist or other noncapitalist construction becomes “realistic” present activity rather than a ludicrous or utopian goal. To achieve this I must smash Capitalism and see it in a thousand pieces.** I must make its unity a fantasy, visible as a denial of diversity and change

#### The reductiveness of environmental justice movements precludes a broader effort to end social and racial injustice.

Shellenberger 8 (Michael, environmental strategist, March/April, Utne Reader, “Complete Interview: The Temperature Transcends Race”, p. 1-2, http://www.utne.com/2008-03-01/Environment/Complete-Interview-The-Temperature-Transcends-Race.aspx)

What started out as an effort to make environmentalism more expansive ended up making it even more narrow. The challenges facing poor communities of color go way beyond air and water pollution. They have far less access to healthy food; they have less health care security, less child care security. They’ve got crappier schools. There’s more stress and disempowerment. So to create a politics that’s centrally focused on toxic contamination or diesel bus pollution is reductive and speaks to a set of things that are very low priorities in comparison to the much bigger factors driving health and life outcomes. Are you saying that low income communities, particularly communities of color, don’t bear a larger burden of environmental degradation? No. We say very clearly that poor communities of color do bear a heavier burden in terms of pollution and environmental impact. The point that we make is that what gets defined by environmental justice advocates as environmental impacts are not the most serious factors determining health outcomes. In other words, smoking, diet, probably even things like stress related to living in an environment that’s high in violence and insecurity. Those are much more powerful factors shaping life and health outcomes and an expansive movement would deal with all of those problems simultaneously, not just with the ones that are defined as “environmental.”

### 2AC: CONDO BAD

#### Conditionality is bad and should lose them the debate.

#### 1. Reciprocal Burdens: The aff doesn’t get conditional advantages or a conditional plan text neither should the neg. This type of debate overly biases the negative.

#### 2. Strat Skew: Conditionality splits the 2AC. Read impact turns and they’ll kick it ; read add ons and they’ll solve them with the counterplan. This creates unfair structural advantages for the negative.

#### 3. Risk free offense: If we straight turn an argument we have to go for it, they can straight turn the case and always get out of that debate by going for the counterplan.

#### 4. One conditional advocacy solves their offense.

#### Disease can wipe out species – newest study proves

Viegas ‘12

(Jennifer Viegas of Discovery News. “Christmas Island Rats Wiped Out by Disease” Nov. 5, 2008 accessed online August 26, 2012 at http://dsc.discovery.com/news/2008/11/05/rat-extinct-disease-print.html)

Disease can wipe out an entire species, reveals a new study on rats native to Australia's Christmas Island, which fell prey to "hyperdisease conditions" caused by a pathogen that led to the rodents' extinction.¶ The study, published in the latest issue of the journal PLoS One, presents the first evidence for extinction of an animal entirely because of disease.¶ The researchers say it's possible for any animal species, including humans, to die a out in a similar fashion, although a complete eradication of Homo sapiens would be unlikely.¶ "I can certainly imagine local population or even citywide 'extinction,' or population crashes due to introduced pathogens under a condition where you have a pathogen that can spread like the flu and has the pathogenicity of the 1918 flu or Ebola viruses," co-author Alex Greenwood, assistant professor of biological sciences at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Va., told Discovery ¶

#### There is always a risk they could develop bioweapons – easy access to pathogens and concealed research labs

Lilliefors ‘12

(James Lilliefors is a longtime journalist and writer, Lilliefors has written frequently for the Washington Post, the Miami Herald, The Boston Globe and the Baltimore Sun. He started his journalism career as a writer and editor for Runner's World magazine and worked for many years as a newspaper editor and reporter, in Maryland and in Florida, winning a number of reporting awards. He also has extensively explored the issue of biological weapons research in his novel Viral. “Bio-weapons 40 years later: Are we any safer?” APRIL 10, 2012 accessed online August 25, 2012 at http://www.sohopress.com/bio-weapons-40-years-later-are-we-any-safer/442/)

Dramatic advances in the life sciences have resulted in more widespread access to deadly pathogens—and to the enabling technologies that can turn those pathogens into weapons. Most biological research today is “dual use,” meaning it can be used to improve human health or to cause harm. And unlike nuclear weapons programs, biological research is easily concealed, making adherence to the 1972 treaty almost impossible to verify. The most striking example of this was the case of the former Soviet Union. While the United States destroyed all of its biological weapons prior to signing the BTWC treaty 40 years ago, the Soviets secretly maintained an illicit bio-weapons program known as Biopreparat, which employed tens of thousands of scientists at some 100 facilities. One of the most chilling projects in the program was carried out at its massive Stepnogorsk facility, which produced 300 tons of weaponized anthrax a year, more than enough to kill the entire United States population. It was only after a leading Soviet biologist, Vladimir Pasechnik, defected to the West in November 1989 that the scope and details of the program began to come out.

### A2- Overstretch

#### US is not overstretched and predominance is not cost prohibitive

Kagan ‘12

[Robert Kagan is a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution and a columnist for The Washington Post. “Not fade away: the myth of American decline.” http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-power-declinism?page=0,0&passthru=ZDkyNzQzZTk3YWY3YzE0OWM5MGRiZmIwNGQwNDBiZmI ETB]

AGAIN, THESE common assumptions require some examination. For one thing, how “overstretched” is the United States? The answer, in historical terms, is not nearly as much as people imagine. Consider the straightforward matter of the number of troops that the United States deploys overseas. To listen to the debate today, one might imagine there were more American troops committed abroad than ever before. But that is not remotely the case. In 1953, the United States had almost one million troops deployed overseas—325,000 in combat in Korea and more than 600,000 stationed in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. In 1968, it had over one million troops on foreign soil—537,000 in Vietnam and another half million stationed elsewhere. By contrast, in the summer of 2011, at the height of America’s deployments in its two wars, there were about 200,000 troops deployed in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan combined, and another roughly 160,000 troops stationed in Europe and East Asia. Altogether, and including other forces stationed around the world, there were about 500,000 troops deployed overseas. This was lower even than the peacetime deployments of the Cold War. In 1957, for instance, there were over 750,000 troops deployed overseas. Only in the decade between the breakup of the Soviet empire and the attacks of September 11 was the number of deployed forces overseas lower than it is today. The comparison is even more striking if one takes into account the growth of the American population. When the United States had one million troops deployed overseas in 1953, the total American population was only 160 million. Today, when there are half a million troops deployed overseas, the American population is 313 million. The country is twice as large, with half as many troops deployed as fifty years ago. What about the financial expense? Many seem to believe that the cost of these deployments, and of the armed forces generally, is a major contributor to the soaring fiscal deficits that threaten the solvency of the national economy. But this is not the case, either. As the former budget czar Alice Rivlin has observed, the scary projections of future deficits are not “caused by rising defense spending,” much less by spending on foreign assistance. The runaway deficits projected for the coming years are mostly the result of ballooning entitlement spending. Even the most draconian cuts in the defense budget would produce annual savings of only $50 billion to $100 billion, a small fraction—between 4 and 8 percent—of the $1.5 trillion in annual deficits the United States is facing. In 2002, when Paul Kennedy was marveling at America’s ability to remain “the world’s single superpower on the cheap,” the United States was spending about 3.4 percent of GDP on defense. Today it is spending a little under 4 percent, and in years to come, that is likely to head lower again—still “cheap” by historical standards. The cost of remaining the world’s predominant power is not prohibitive.

#### Offshoring balancing fails -- causes war.

Schake ’10
research fellow at the Hoover Institution and an associate professor of international security studies at the United States Military Academy (10/13/10, Kori, Foreign Policy, “Limits of offshore balancing”, <http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/10/13/limits_of_offshore_balancing>)

The New America Foundation convened a conference this week to showcase the work of Robert Pape, in the hopes that his policy prescriptions will be picked up as an alternative to our current strategy in Afghanistan. This would be a terrible idea. Pape's research shows that the majority of suicide bomb attacks occur in places occupied by U.S. military forces; from this he concludes that we should adopt a strategy of "offshore balancing." By which he means to remove U.S. forces and rely on military strikes into the countries, along with more effective political and economic engagement. Neither the research nor the prescriptions are sound bases for policy. To say that attacks occur where U.S. forces are deployed is to say no more than Willy Sutton, who robbed banks because "that's where the money is." Pape's approach ignores the context in which deployment and stationing of U.S. forces occurs. We send troops to advance our interests, protect our allies, and contest the political and geographic space that groups like al Qaeda and the Taliban are operating in. Of course the attacks will stop if we cede those political objectives. But the troops are not the point, the political objectives are the point. The second important context Pape glosses over is that suicide attacks do not occur wherever in the world U.S. troops are deployed. Troops stationed in Germany, Japan, or South Korea are not at risk of suicide attacks from the people of those countries. This is not just about U.S. troops, but also about the societies we are operating in. It is about a radical and violent interpretation of Islam that we are using military force to contest. The policy prescriptions Pape advances are also problematic. An offshore balancing approach means that we will not be engaged with military forces on the ground, and yet what we have learned in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan is that we achieve our objectives most fully when indigenous forces are partnered with us and made able to take over the work of U.S. forces in the fight. They have greater legitimacy, local knowledge, and make the outcome most durable. That was the Bush administration's strategy in Iraq, and it is the purported approach of the Obama administration in Afghanistan. Pape's policies have no way to achieve that improvement in the capacity of partner forces. An offshore balancing approach is also inherently retaliatory and has been shown to increase the resistance of affected populations to supporting our objectives. We threaten to use force from the safe confines of distance; that use of force may have pinpoint accuracy but will often be less precise and cause more civilian casualties than forces on the ground, which will again feed into public attitudes about whether to support U.S. goals. Instead of working with the people most affected and helping build their capacity to protect themselves, offshore balancing does little to change the problem in positive ways. Except for the "improved" political and economic activity. How that will be undertaken in a deteriorating security environment is mysterious. Moreover, if we could do any better at the provision of political and economic engagement, we'd already be doing that. Convincing allies the U.S. will commit itself to fight unless we have troops stationed where we expect the fight to occur has always been difficult. The history of the Cold War is replete with transatlantic discussion of extended deterrence: would the United States really send the boys back over if Germany were attacked? Would the United States really use nuclear weapons when our own homeland would be at risk of retaliation? It seems unlikely those concerns would be attenuated in societies we are less politically and culturally similar to than we are to Europeans. In short, Robert Pape's "offshore balancing" approach would reduce violence by giving our enemies what they want: our disengagement, the ability to terrorize with impunity the people of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other places where the battle of ideas about Muslim modernity is engaged.

#### US is at the height of its power

Kagan ‘12

[Robert Kagan is a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution and a columnist for The Washington Post. “Not fade away: the myth of American decline.” http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-power-declinism?page=0,0&passthru=ZDkyNzQzZTk3YWY3YzE0OWM5MGRiZmIwNGQwNDBiZmI ETB]

By these military and economic measures, at least, the United States today is not remotely like Britain circa 1900, when that empire’s relative decline began to become apparent. It is more like Britain circa 1870, when the empire was at the height of its power. It is possible to imagine a time when this might no longer be the case, but that moment has not yet arrived.

#### 5. Multiple worlds: instead of one advocacy, the status quo, and the plan, the negative forces the aff to debate in multiple contradictory positions. This skews 2ac/1ar strategy and time, as well as encouraging bad debating by the negative.

### A2: Slow Prolif

#### Their ev is about the squo our ev is predictive Scientific America 3/27 says China and Russia taking over the market now, US leadership key to enforce standards that’s loudermilk ‘11

### A2: Waste

#### SMRs solve waste – uses it

Szondy ‘12

(David Szondy is a freelance writer based in Monroe, Washington. An award-winning playwright, he has contributed to Charged and iQ magazine and is the author of the website Tales of Future Past. “Feature: Small modular nuclear reactors - the future of energy?” February 16, 2012 accessed online August 22, 2012 at http://www.gizmag.com/small-modular-nuclear-reactors/20860/)

SMRs can help with proliferation, nuclear waste and fuel supply issues because, while some modular reactors are based on conventional pressurized water reactors and burn enhanced uranium, others use less conventional fuels. Some, for example, can generate power from what is now regarded as "waste", burning depleted uranium and plutonium left over from conventional reactors. Depleted uranium is basically U-238 from which the fissible U-235 has been consumed. It's also much more abundant in nature than U-235, which has the potential of providing the world with energy for thousands of years. Other reactor designs don't even use uranium. Instead, they use thorium. This fuel is also incredibly abundant, is easy to process for use as fuel and has the added bonus of being utterly useless for making weapons, so it can provide power even to areas where security concerns have been raised.

### A2: Backup Power solves

#### Backup generators fail

Stockton ‘11

(Paul, Assistant Secretary of Defense ¶ Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs ¶ Department of Defense, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power ¶ The Committee on Energy and Commerce ¶ United States House of Representatives ¶ May 31, 2011, <http://republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/Media/file/Hearings/Energy/053111/Stockton.pdf>, SEH)

The Department of Defense has limited back-up power. On-site back-up ¶ diesel generators are often used to support installation and facility continuity ¶ during short-term outages, but these generators are typically not designed to ¶ operate for extended periods. The average diesel generator and on-site fuel ¶ reserves are designed to sustain basic installation functions and critical missions ¶ for 3-7 days using fuel stored on-site. During small-scale power outages, military ¶ installations are able to manage fuel resupply through existing contingency plans – ¶ although most fuel pumping assets rely on electric power and will not operate ¶ during a power outage. However, the Department is just as reliant on diesel fuel ¶ generators as the civilian sector is and will face similar reliability and fuel issues.

#### Mutimer concedes that nuclear proliferation is a real threat that needs solutions

Frank P. Harvey.2001. Professor of Political Science at Dalhousie University. National Missile Defense Revisited – A Response to David Mutimer.International Journal. Vol. 56. No. 2.

Before any argument supporting NMD can be taken seriously, therefore, we must accept that a "rogue state threat" exists' (p 340). I couldn't agree more. But this is perhaps the most fascinating of all of Mutimer’s assertions because he himself acknowledges the 'facts' of the rogue state threat - and I thought only proponents shared the burden of proving the case for NMD. Consider the following quotes: • The rogue state needs, therefore, to be seen for what it was: the creation of the United States military to justify its claim on resources ... The rogue state, however, is a myth. [It] is not mythical in the sense that it is not real but rather in the sense that it has been vested with a totemic importance by the United States' (p 344) (emphasis added). • 'Rogues are the enemies that make high levels of military spending legitimate. They are not a lie told by knowing capitalists in an instrumental fashion to hoodwink Congress into passing over-inflated budgets (p 345, n 24) (emphasis added). • 'I am not arguing that the United States fabricated evidence, but rather that it produced a particular frame within which to interpret that evidence' (p 345) (emphasis added). • 'The imagined nature of threats does not mean that there is no real danger or that nothing need ever be done about risks' (p 345). • 'The issue, therefore, is not the evidence but rather how the "facts" are "evidence" of a particular form of threat labelled "proliferation" by actors labelled "rogue"' (p 344, n22). • 'There is, therefore, no need for me to engage in a discussion of the evidence of proliferation assembled, for example, in the Rumsfeld Report to bolster the case for NMD. At issue are not "the facts" but the ways in which those facts are assembled and the interpretation that is given to them' (p 344, n 22). Mutimer s honesty is refreshing but not surprising. Ballistic missile proliferation is difficult to deny. It is a 'real' security threat, driven by technological progress, the spread of scientific knowledge related to these weapons systems, diminishing costs, ongoing regional security threats in the Middle East and Asia, and, most importantly, time. Critics who are unconvinced should at least engage the evidence in the Rumsfeld Report or any other American or European intelligence esti-mates of evolving proliferation threats. The best (and perhaps only) way to establish the 'fabricated rogue-state' thesis is to challenge the specific evidence in these reports rather than to claim that all of the information is one big lie. Mutimer's position on proliferation is far more sophisticated than the 'big lie' thesis. He develops a very interesting theory to explain why United States political and military leaders make conscious choices about who and what constitutes a 'threat.' He concludes that some (if not most) of the blame for creating the 'rogue' problem rests with the United States. The threat, in other words, is a perfect example of a self-fulfilling prophecy tied to efforts by the American defence communi-ty to fill the 'threat blank' after the cold war. Understanding the condi-tions under which certain threats (and enemies) are in and which are out - and a complex combination of political, military, and economic factors influence these decisions - is an important area of research; indeed, Mutimer is doing some excellent work in applying this frame-work to both proliferation and NATO expansion. But a debate about the 'origins' of the current security crisis is a separate issue - the key facts regarding contemporary and evolving ballistic missile threats are not in dispute, as Mutimer himself argues. Once you make that fundamental concession, much of the NMD debate is essentially over. This is precisely the position in which the Russian president finds himself because he conceded the rogue threat during the 2000 summit with the former American president, Bill Clinton. As a result, the current debate has shifted to comparing the relative utilities of land-based NMD versus ABM compliant, sea-based (boost-phase) TMDs, versus full-blown space-based Strategic Defense