#### ( ) Turn – Transition wars – Alternative causes them.

Aligica ’03

(Paul Aligica, Fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University and Adjunct Fellow at the Hudson Institute, “The Great Transition and the Social Limits to Growth: Herman Kahn on Social Change and Global Economic Development”, April 21, http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication\_details&id=2827)

Stopping things would mean if not to engage in an experiment to change the human nature, at least in an equally difficult experiment in altering powerful cultural forces: "We firmly believe that despite the arguments put forward by people who would like to 'stop the earth and get off,' it is simply impractical to do so. Propensity to change may not be inherent in human nature, but it is firmly embedded in most contemporary cultures. People have almost everywhere become curious, future oriented, and dissatisfied with their conditions. They want more material goods and covet higher status and greater control of nature. Despite much propaganda to the contrary, they believe in progress and future" (Kahn, 1976, 164). As regarding the critics of growth that stressed the issue of the gap between rich and poor countries and the issue of redistribution, Kahn noted that what most people everywhere want was visible, rapid improvement in their economic status and living standards, and not a closing of the gap (Kahn, 1976, 165). The people from poor countries have as a basic goal the transition from poor to middle class. The other implications of social change are secondary for them. Thus a crucial factor to be taken into account is that while the zero-growth advocates and their followers may be satisfied to stop at the present point, most others are not. Any serious attempt to frustrate these expectations or desires of that majority is likely to **fail and/or create disastrous counter reactions.** Kahn was convinced that "any concerted attempt to stop or even slow 'progress' appreciably (that is, to be satisfied with the moment) **is catastrophe-prone**". At the minimum, "it would probably require the creation of extraordinarily repressive governments or movements-and probably a repressive international system" (Kahn, 1976, 165; 1979, 140-153). The pressures of overpopulation, national security challenges and poverty as well as the revolution of rising expectations could be **solved only in a continuing growth environment**. Kahn rejected the idea that continuous growth would generate political repression and absolute poverty. On the contrary, it is the limits-to-growth position "which creates low morale, destroys assurance, undermines the legitimacy of governments everywhere, erodes personal and group commitment to constructive activities and encourages obstructiveness to reasonable policies and hopes". Hence this position "increases enormously the costs of creating the resources needed for expansion, makes more likely misleading debate and misformulation of the issues, and make less likely constructive and creative lives". Ultimately "it is precisely this position the one that increases the potential for the kinds of disasters which most at its advocates are trying to avoid" (Kahn, 1976, 210; 1984).

#### The alt is the fantasy of pure commodity that reinforces capitalist ideology

Brett Levinson. 2004. Professor and Chair, Comparative Literature at Binghamton U. Market and thought: mediations on the political and biopolitical. 262-3

The commodity, in essence, is fantasized as a secret password. (But we should note that all secrets must be shareable, else they fail to be secrets.) On the one hand, it is exposed, available for endless viewing, hence seductive and unconcealable. On the other, it is overexposed, stripped, and therefore, as noted in chapter 11, resistant to interpretation: hence its "secret" worth. It displays my value, granting me eternal access to other values, which I can thus appropriate. Yet it withdraws from those other values, those other meanings, and cannot itself be accessed or appropriated—except, at least in the fantasy, by the I. The commodity-subject-fantasy is the password into the market or Symbolic Order, a means to all values, that itself (given its overexposure) is asymbolic, a signifier without a signified but with an absolute or invaluable referent—I—irreducible to "mere other values." One merely needs to consider this password in terms of ideology to imagine its function in the market. Ideology, as Althusser argues, throughout "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," operates by offering a space outside ideology. For example, intellectuals of both the Left and the Right will seek the site, term, or discourse that "escapes" ideology. Yet, since no such ideal discourse or term exists, every intellectual's assertion—the signifiers of that assertion— to "go beyond" ideology only inserts that individual into the scene of ideology as the "missing piece," the I, that sustains it. "Freed" from ideology, intellectuals are able to create or imagine thought outside ideology, a password to the outside. The capacity to do so bears witness to their liberty; yet they only reaffirm the power of ideology through this very claim. In "going beyond," they unwittingly take the empty spaces within the order of things that this order extends to them as a way of preserving itself. Their "theory" is but the fantasy of the pure commodity, the absolute value. Hence, as Althusser insists over and over, no project is more ideological than the one that "breaks" from ideology; and none is more marketable than the one that betters—beats out—the market. The exceptional password out turns out to be the "regular" and regulating word in.

#### Rejection of globalization doesn’t cause paradigm shifts; we must work within globalization

Jasso 08

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What are the results of a new philosophy**? I do not anticipate paradigm shifts**, but I do forecast a clearer dialogue among thinkers who connect with the world through commerce and ideas. **This global connection is not going away, and, therefore, a new philosophy has the potential to strengthen the future for a worldwide community to remain positively engaged, productive, healthy, prosperous, and, most importantly, understood**. In its simplest form, the new philosophy can be confined to the common theme of this paper where global reach is not simply characterized by the need to grow and gather wealth, but rather **global reach is in fact part of the human aspiration to discover and use resources to move humanity forward**. **A sedentary population**, like most animal behavior, **never flourishes**. A population that has a global reach through commerce can thrive, provide, and grow. This paper examines the motives, consequences, and ethics of this philosophical approach to globalization--a concept that many characterize as an ensuingtrend, but I will affirm as the reality of the world's wellbeing.

#### Romney will win- history at cycle

Cost 9-21

Dr. Jay is a Political Writer for the Weekly Standard and received his Ph. D in Political Science in Political Science from Deleware, “Historically, Obama Isn’t in Strong Shape,” <http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/morning-jay-historically-speaking-obama-isnt-strong-shape_652813.html>

Conservatives are growing worried, and Democrats gleeful, about Obama’s lead in the polls, basically for the same reason: it is late in the season (or so it seems), and the incumbent president has a lead. That is a good thing for Obama.¶ Perhaps, but three fundamental points need to be kept in mind.¶ First, Obama is weaker than previous incumbents who went on to victory. When we are looking through history, the only poll we can really utilize is Gallup if we want an apples-to-apples comparison. For better or worse, Gallup is the only polling organization consistently doing polling of registered voters since 1952. Even media outlets that have been polling a long time have changed pollsters over the years, so Gallup is the only game in town when we are investigating history.¶ Here is where Gallup has found incumbent presidents at this point, i.e. roughly mid-September, since 1956.¶ Through 2004 every incumbent who was above 50 percent at this point won, and every incumbent who was under 50 percent at this point lost. As of today, Obama is under 50 percent.

¶

#### Obama loses

Hibbs 7/27

(Douglas A., retired professor of economics & political science, author/co-author of five books & dozens of journal articles, & active consultant; July 27, 2012, “Obama’s Re-election Prospects Under ‘Bread and Peace’ Voting in the 2012 US Presidential Election,” PS: Political Science & Politics, forthcoming – Kurr)

The Situation So Far¶ During the first thirteen full quarters of President Obama’s term, 2009:q2 through¶ 2012:q2, which at time of this writing (July 27 2012) covers the most recent quarter for¶ which we have BEA data on the National Income and Product Accounts, the annualized,¶ weighted-average quarterly growth rate of per capita real disposable personal income was¶ only 0.1%; way below the post-1948 average of 1.8%. Over the same period US Fatalities in¶ Afghanistan totaled 1355, amounting to 4.4 per millions of population. Poor real income¶ growth performance all by itself means that Obama is in deep trouble: the Bread and Peace¶ equation estimates in table 1 imply that over-the-term weighted-average real growth must¶ be at least 1.2% for the incumbent’s expected two-party vote share to cross 50%.18¶ Election Day Projections¶ To project Obama’s 2012 vote I’ll make the plausible assumption that American military¶ fatalities in Afghanistan continue running at the (politically relatively low) average¶ quarterly rate of the past year: 95 or 0.3 per millions of population. At Election Day¶ cumulative Fatalities then would amount to approximately 1500 or 4.8 per millions of¶ population, which would depress Obama’s expected two-party vote share by less than a¶ quarter of a percentage point (). Baring a really big escalation in the¶ aggressiveness of fighters resisting US military presence in Afghanistan, plausible¶ alternative assumptions about the flow of American body bags during the next four months¶ would only negligibly affect my projections of Obama’s re-election prospects.¶ Consequently, growth rates of per capita real disposable personal income over the¶ remainder of the term will be the decisive as yet unrealized fundamental factor in the 2012¶ presidential election.¶ Calculations in the table 3 show that according to the Bread and Peace model per capita¶ real income growth rates must average out at nearly 6 percent after 2012:q2 for Obama to¶ have a decent chance of re-election. If the US economy experiences an unanticipated¶ reversal of fortune with growth surging to rates not uncommon in the initial robust phase¶ of recoveries from deep contractions, Obama could squeak out a win, as implied by the last¶ column of table 3. However the pace of recovery from the 2008 Great Recession remains¶ sluggish, and the famous 2009 book This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly¶ by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff documents how recoveries from contractions¶ originating with the bursting of speculative financial bubbles are not V-shaped as in¶ garden-variety recessions, but instead are typically prolonged U-shaped affairs lasting 5 to¶ 6 years. The univariate statistical properties of postwar per capita real disposable personal¶ incomes indicate that the chances of weighted-average growth on the order of 6% over the¶ one and one-third quarters remaining until Election Day 2012 are no better than 1/10.¶ The protocol of the PS Election Forecast Symposium obliges me to make a specific¶ prediction of the 2012 aggregate voting result. My reading of the tea leaves (statistical¶ forecasts of income and output growth from formal econometric models have proven to be¶ useless) leads me to posit that quarterly, annualized per capita real income growth rates¶ will fall in the interval [1,2%] during the remainder of President Obama’s term. That¶ supposition, along with my assumption that fatalities in Afghanistan will not escalate¶ dramatically, yields a projected Obama two-party vote share centered at 47.5%, as¶ indicated by boldface entries in table 3.19 Figure 3, which combines the Bread and Peace¶ factors to one dimension, illustrates the same prediction in perspective of actual and fitted¶ values of incumbent vote shares at all postwar presidential elections 1952-2008.

**Romney won’t change Russian policy**

**NYT 7/28**

(New York Times, Peter Baker, “Romney and Obama Strain to Show Gap on Foreign Policy”, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/29/us/politics/obama-and-romney-strain-to-assert-foreign-policy-differences.html?pagewanted=all)

Mr. **Romney has called Russia “our No. 1 geopolitical foe” and declared** Mr. **Obama’s effort to improve relations a failure.** Mr. Romney promises to challenge Mr. Putin’s authoritarianism. **But he has not suggested cutting off cooperation between the countries’ space programs or counterterrorism agencies, nor shutting down the Afghanistan supply route** through Russia negotiated by Mr. Obama. **He supports Mr. Obama’s drive to normalize trade relations, though with a human rights amendment** the president initially resisted.¶ Mr. **Romney’s visit to Poland is intended to highlight what he called** Mr. **Obama’s “sudden abandonment o**f friends in Poland” under Russian pressure by canceling Mr. Bush’s missile defense program partly based there. **But** Mr. **Obama did not abandon missile defense altogether;** he substituted a reconfigured system devised by Mr. Bush’s last defense secretary.

#### Relations are resilient – common interests check disagreements

Schwenninger, 8

Sherle R. Schwenninger, New America Foundation, The Nation, 10-6-2008, “Ten National Security Myths”

First, Russia’s foreign policy has not been anti-American. Moscow has cooperated with Washington on a number of important international issues, from assisting NATO against the Taliban in Afghanistan and supporting Washington’s counterterrorism efforts, to joining the coalition to curb Iran’s nuclear enrichment program. Second, what McCain sees as a pattern of intimidation to re-establish the Russian empire more objective analysts see as a great power protecting its legitimate interests in the face of US provocations. These provocations started during the Clinton administration and have increased under Bush, with the expansion of NATO to Russia’s border and abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. They have continued with the promise of NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine and the decision to deploy a missile defense system in Central Europe. Yet Moscow has responded for the most part in a measured and defensive way, its most forceful move being the recent military actions in Georgia to protect South Ossetia. When the Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili, sent forces into South Ossetia in violation of an earlier agreement, Russia responded much as the United States did when it intervened in 1999 against Serbia over Kosovo. Russian military actions in Georgia may have been disproportionate, but not as disproportionate as Washington’s extensive bombing of Serbia proper. Despite the souring of the earlier cooperative relationship with the Bush administration, Russia has made it clear that it would still prefer a strategic partnership that would reduce nuclear weapons, contain Islamist extremism, and expand the world’s oil and gas supplies. But it has also made it clear that this partnership must be based on mutual interests and compromise, not simply on Russian acquiescence in American dictates.