## T

#### A. Increase financial incentives presumes well developed, pre-existing program

Webster’s Dictionary 1998

Increase: to make greater, augment, implies to what is already well grown, or well developed

Financial incentives are direct, indirect are fiscal incentives

Kurtz ‘02

Emile Noel Fellow, Jean Monnet Center for International and Regional Economic Law & Justice, New York University Law School; Lecturer, Law School, The University of Melbourne, Australia

Jurgen 23 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 713

Incentives to attract investors into the host state are often linked to performance requirements by host states. In other words, they act as an economic carrot to sweeten the imposition of the stick. n62 The range of incentives offered by host states is extensive. However, there are broadly two main categories - fiscal incentives (whose objective is often to reduce the tax burden for an investor by, for example, reducing the standard corporate income tax rate) and financial incentives (which normally involve the provision of funds directly to the investor in the form of direct subsidies, loan guarantees, or export credits). n63 Developed states normally favor the use of financial incentives over fiscal ones, in part because fiscal incentives generally require change to domestic legislation and [\*730] hence parliamentary approval. In contrast, developing states tend to prefer the use of fiscal incentives, as they generally lack the resources needed to provide direct financial incentives. n64

“FOR” is a limiting term

Clegg, 95 - J.D., 1981 Yale Law School; the author is vice president and general counsel of the National Legal

Center for the Public Interest. (Roger, “Reclaiming The Text of The Takings Clause,” 46 S.C. L. Rev. 531,

Summer, lexis)

Even if it made no sense to limit the clause to takings "for public use"--and, as discussed below, it might make very good sense--that is the way the clause reads. It is not at all ambiguous. The prepositional phrase simply cannot be read as broadening rather than narrowing the clause's scope. Indeed, a prepositional phrase beginning with "for" appears twice more in the Fifth Amendment, and in both cases there is no doubt that the phrase is narrowing the scope of the Amendment. n20

#### B. FITS is not a direct financial incentive and the program is a creation, not an increase

#### C. Ground. Our interp ensures fair ground for the aff and predictable links for the neg. Direct incentives for energy production means topic literature provided DA and K links

#### Limits. Their interp is practically limitless

Dyson et al, 3 - International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (Megan, Flow: The Essentials of Environmental Flows, p. 67-68)

Understanding of the term ‘incentives’ varies and economists have produced numerous typologies. A brief characterization of incentives is therefore warranted. First, the term is understood by economists as incorporating both positive and negative aspects, for example a tax that leads a consumer to give up an activity that is an incentive, not a disincentive or negative incentive. Second, although incentives are also construed purely in economic terms, incentives refer to more than just financial rewards and penalties. They are the “positive and negative changes in outcomes that individuals perceive as likely to result from particular actions taken within a set of rules in a particular physical and social context.”80 Third, it is possible to distinguish between direct and indirect incentives, with direct incentives referring to financial or other inducements and indirect incentives referring to both variable and enabling incentives.81 Finally, incentives of any kind may be called ‘perverse’ where they work against their purported aims or have significant adverse side effects. ¶ Direct incentives lead people, groups and organisations to take particular action or inaction. In the case of environmental flows these are the same as the net gains and losses that different stakeholders experience. The key challenge is to ensure that the incentives are consistent with the achievement of environmental flows. This implies the need to compensate those that incur additional costs by providing them with the appropriate payment or other compensation. Thus, farmers asked to give up irrigation water to which they have an established property or use right are likely to require a payment for ceding this right. The question, of course, is how to obtain the financing necessary to cover the costs of developing such transactions and the transaction itself. ¶ Variable incentives are policy instruments that affect the relative costs and benefits of different economic activities. As such, they can be manipulated to affect the behaviour of the producer or consumer. For example, a government subsidy on farm inputs will increase the relative profitability of agricultural products, hence probably increasing the demand for irrigation water. Variable incentives therefore have the ability to greatly increase or reduce the demand for out-of-stream, as well as in-stream, uses of water. The number of these incentives within the realm of economic and fiscal policy is practically limitless.

#### D. T is a voter for fairness and education. Extra T dejustifies the resolution and demands a neg ballot.

## Shell

#### Obama will win now- still has a lead in key swing states

Chait 10-11

Jonathan covers politics for New York Magazine, “Lesson’s from Obama’s Debate Scare,” <http://nymag.com/daily/intel/2012/10/lessons-from-obamas-debate-scare.html>

A week after the first presidential debate, Mitt Romney has wiped out President Obama’s lead in the national polls, but still appears to trail in most swing states. Obama, in particular, continues to lead every poll in Ohio, which is developing into his firewall. The apparent split between the national vote and the electoral college has some analysts, like Nate Silver, groping for an explanation, but the answer seems fairly obvious to me: Swing states have been soaked in political information for months, with round-the-clock advertising, campaigning, and local news coverage of candidate love-bombing. The non-swing majority of America hasn’t. New information from the debates is more likely to change your mind if you just tuned in to the Denver debate than if you had been hiding under your sofa while Obama and Romney pounded down your front door.¶ So one way to look at this is that Obama has merely received an October scare. Romney won what was, by public opinion measures at least, the biggest debate victory in presidential campaign history, and yet he still hasn’t gotten over the top.

**FIT unpopular- taxes & divides environmentalists**

**Carus 8-21**

Felicity is a former Guardian Environmental reporter and reports from California on changes in energy policy, “Bill Clinton: fan of solar feed-in-tariffs thinks we should “get” the clean energy tattoo,” <http://www.pvtech.org/editors_blog/bill_clinton_fan_of_solar_feed_in_tariffs_thinks_we_should_get_the_clean_en>

**Feed-in-tariffs are a controversial subject in the US** where the energy industry likes to pretend that free market economics applies to this sector. You might expect clean energy antagonists to baulk: "Let the government set the price for electricity — are you crazy? Let the market decide."¶ But **even clean energy protagonists are divided about the true value of FiTs in sustainable markets: "Set the mandated rate too high and we'll have a Spanish boom** and bust scenario on our hands. We don't want that."¶ **Set it too low, and nobody will want to invest**. Palo Alto's Clean Local Energy Accessible Now (CLEAN) programme still has its full 4MW of capacity available and has extended its deadline.¶ **Added to which, tariffs also sound a bit like the dreaded ‘T’ word — taxe**s. So attempts to introduce them at the distributed commercial level have required a creative rebranding to the dramatically under-descriptive CLEAN programmes designed by the Clean Coalition.¶

**Approval Rating is key, lines up perfectly with reelection
Silver ’11**

Nate directs five thirty eight and is a statistician, “Approval Ratings and Reelection Odds,” <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/approval-ratings-and-re-election-odds/>

Earlier this month, we posted the simple version of a finding, based on the historical record, that is worth keeping in mind when you read articles about how Barack Obama’s presidency has (or has not been) been revitalized: It’s just too soon for his approval ratings to tell us very much about his re-election prospects for 2012. This is an overdue follow-up to that article — what you might think of as the slightly-more-complicated version. While **it’s true that approval ratings aren’t of much use now, it’s also the case that, by the time we get close to the election, they will have become a very reliable predictor of Mr. Obama’s chances of winning another term**. Based on Gallup polling, here is what I estimate that the incumbent president’s approval rating was on Election Day in almost every election since 1940. (There is no data for 1944 because Gallup went on wartime hiatus.) There are a few tricks I had to employ to derive these numbers; I’d ask you to take them on faith for a few moments, and then we’ll explain everything later on. **At first glance, the relationship seems nearly perfect: every incumbent with an approval rating of 49 percent or higher won re-election, while every candidate with a rating of 48 percent or lower lost.** In practice, things probably don’t work quite that crisply. For example, Harry Truman, whom we estimate had a 50 percent approval rating on Election Day 1948, won by 4.5 points, and 114 electoral votes, over Thomas E. Dewey, which suggests that he had some margin to spare. And candidate quality clearly makes a difference. Although Robert Dole is sometimes considered a weak Republican nominee, Bill Clinton beat him in 1996 by just 8.5 points, despite Mr. Clinton’s 55 percent approval rating. By contrast, in 1972, Richard Nixon, with an approval rating only a couple of points higher (57 percent), trounced a very weak Democratic nominee, George McGovern, by more than 23 points. Still, the approval rating at which an incumbent candidate goes from being an underdog to a favorite for re-election is somewhere in the high 40s. **The reason the threshold is probably slightly below 50 percent rather than right at 50 percent is that in any approval survey, some people (typically 5 to 10 percent) say they are undecided about the president’s performance**. For instance, at this writing, Barack Obama’s Gallup approval rating is 49 percent but his disapproval rating is just 42 percent, a net margin of +7. If those were the figures on Election Day, he would be a favorite to win unless nearly everybody who was undecided about his performance cast their ballots against him, something that is possible in theory but usually doesn’t occur in practice. Now, then, how did we come up with these numbers? As I said, it’s not quite so straightforward. Gallup has approval ratings data going back to 1937. The problem is that, until fairly recently, they had a habit of stopping their approval ratings polling several months before a presidential election. For instance, in 1956, their last poll of Dwight Eisenhower’s public approval was in early August; they did not survey him again until late November, after he had already defeated Adlai Stevenson. However, we can extrapolate what Mr. Eisenhower’s rating would have been on Election Day 1956 by drawing a smoothed regression line — known in the business as a Loess curve — using the data points before and after that date. The one hitch is that incumbent presidents, whether they win, lose, or don’t run at all, almost always receive a “bounce” in their approval rating after the election, as people either rally around a winner or feel sympathy for the lame duck. The average magnitude of this post-election bounce is 4 points. So, before I fitted the curves, I subtracted 4 points from approval rating polls conducted after Election Day. By applying this process of bounce-adjustment and curve-fitting, we are able to estimate an incumbent president’s Gallup approval rating on Election Day itself or on any day before it, as shown in this nifty-looking graphic: I haven’t labeled the curves by the candidate’s name in the chart, because that which create too much clutter. But I have distinguished those who eventually won re-election (blue lines) from those who lost (red). A couple of cases are worth attention. The red line that you see briefly extending above 80 percent is for George H.W. Bush. His approval ratings, which were already pretty good, shot up following the start of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, when American-led forces drove Iraqi troops back from their occupation of Kuwait. Politically, that made Mr. Bush look like an extremely formidable candidate for re-election: Saturday Night Live ran a sketch later that year entitled “Campaign ’92: The Race To Avoid Being The Guy Who Loses To Bush,” with Democratic candidates at a debate all trying to lose so they would not have to run against him. But Mr. Bush’s approval ratings fell precipitously throughout late 1991 and early 1992, and were below 40 percent by Election Day. If Mr. Bush is the precedent that challengers will cite when their campaign seems to be flailing, the opposite example is the original Comeback Kid, Harry Truman. He’s the blue line that you still see down around 40 percent approval with just five months to go before the election of 1948. It’s hard to know exactly where Mr. Truman’s approval numbers were on Election Day. When Gallup surveyed in late June, he had just 39 percent approval; in January, 1949, after he had beaten Thomas E. Dewey, he was up to 69 percent; and then he reverted back to 50 percent just a couple months later. Our Loess curve estimates that Mr. Truman’s approval rating was probably around 50 percent on Election Day, but this is just a guess. What’s clear is that Mr. Truman was at some point an extremely unpopular president, and he nevertheless — to the great surprise of the Chicago Daily Tribune — defeated Mr. Dewey. Another thing to take from the graphic is how the red and blue lines gradually untangle themselves as the relationship between approval ratings and re-election becomes stronger over time. We can see this a bit more clearly by taking the average approval rating for the 8 winning candidates and the 3 losing ones and tracking them over the two years leading up to the election: I would resist the idea that there is any one magical date when approval ratings go from meaningless to meaningful as predictors of re-election. In the chart, the first time the winners and the losers begin to separate themselves is about 19 months before the election — which would correspond roughly to March of the prior year — but the split would have come a bit earlier if not for Mr. Bush’s Gulf War bounce. There’s also increasing differentiation in the period roughly 10 to 5 months before the election, corresponding with primary season. Still, for the most part, the separation occurs gradually. I’ve also tried to play around with various sorts of logistic regression models that attempt to predict a president’s chances at re-election based solely on his Gallup approval rating and the number of days until the election. Don’t take this terribly seriously — it’s hard to do anything very rigorous based on so few data points (just 11 presidents in the sample), and I can imagine better model designs than the one that I’ve used. But it does yield some ballpark estimates of what this data implies. **For example, a year in advance of the election, the model figures that a president with a 60 percent approval rating is about 90 percent likely to win re-election, whereas a 40 percent rating translates into a win probability of a bit below 40 percent**. So by that point the differences have become fairly meaningful: What does this mean for Barack Obama? Right now, we’re still in the period where the most useful number for estimating his re-election chances is not his approval rating but rather the historical track record of incumbent presidents. As I wrote on Wednesday, since the Civil War, 73 percent of incumbent presidents who sought another term won, as have 70 percent since World War II. Plugging Mr. Obama’s current numbers into the regression model that I described above yields a 65 percent likelihood of re-election — but again, this is a really rough guess, based mostly on the high historical batting average for incumbents rather than anything to do with Mr. Obama himself. What we can say is important is the range in which Mr. Obama’s approval ratings have been varying in recent months: between about 45 and about 50 percent. **If Mr. Obama’s approval rating is at the top of that range, 50 percent, on Nov. 6, 2012 — about where it is now — the model figures that his chances of winning re-election will be greater than 80 percent. But if his approval rating is at the bottom of the range instead, at 45 percent, his chances for a second term will be only about one in three,** and he’ll have to hope that the Republican nominee is a weak one. Much will change between now and then, of course. But Mr. Obama would probably win an election held next Tuesday — and that would not have been true a couple of months ago.

#### China label kills relations and the economy

Roach 8-28

Stephen is a lecturer at Yale University’s School of Management and Jackson Institute for International Affairs. He is also a Senior executive with Morgan Stanley, “How Romney Could go Wrong from Day 1,” <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c74802de-f0f9-11e1-89b2-00144feabdc0.html#axzz25ue916Yz>

True to his word as a candidate, a few hours after taking office as US president on January 20, 2013, Mitt Romney issued his first executive order, declaring China guilty of currency manipulation. In accordance with the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, President Romney’s act triggered immediate negotiations between US and Chinese officials. But the negotiations stalled and both parties blamed the other in press releases.¶ In early February, in his first State of the Union address, Mr Romney said: “Enough is enough. It is high time for China to play by our rules.” Congress roared its approval and within a week, overwhelming bipartisan majorities of both houses passed the Defend America Trade Act of 2013. Modelled on the currency manipulation “remedies” of countervailing tariffs first proposed in 2005, DATA was signed into law on President’s Day, February 18 2013. China was quickly deemed to be in violation of the new statute.¶ More¶ At that point negotiations took on a new urgency. But the new leaders in both countries were in no mood for compromise and the talks failed. In accordance with the provisions of DATA, Washington slapped immediate tariffs of 20 per cent on all Chinese products entering the US.¶ As plants shut down across China, Beijing declared this to be an act of economic war and filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization. Li Keqiang, newly installed as premier, announced after the National People’s Congress in March that China had no patience to endure a WTO dispute process that could take anywhere from two to five years to run its course.¶ China’s Ministry of Commerce then announced retaliatory tariffs of 20 per cent on all US exports to China. This hit growth-starved America right between the eyes. With $104bn of American-made goods sold in Chinese markets in 2011, China had become the US’s third-largest and its fastest-growing export market. To add insult to injury, China-dependent Walmart announced average price increases of 5 per cent. Other retailers followed suit. Talk of stagflation was in the air and hard-pressed American consumers hunkered down further.¶ US financial markets swooned. The stock market was hit by pressures on profit margins, growth and inflation. The bond market was also unnerved by the realisation that the Federal Reserve was seriously behind the curve. With good reason. After its meeting in June 2013, the Fed reaffirmed its ever-extending commitment to keep its benchmark policy rate near zero through 2015, and even dangled the possibility of yet another round of quantitative easing, QE4. Yields on 10-year Treasuries moved back above 4 per cent and stocks fell sharply further.¶ Feeling the heat from financial markets, Washington turned up the heat on China. Mr Romney called Congress back from its Independence Day holiday into a special session. By unanimous consent, Congress passed an amendment to DATA – upping the tariffs on China by another 10 percentage points.¶ At that point an indignant China turned to its own version of the big bazooka. The biggest foreign buyer of US debt was nowhere to be seen at the Treasury’s August 2013 auction. Long-term interest rates spiked and within weeks yields on 10-year Treasuries hit 7 per cent. The dollar plunged and the US stock market went into free fall.¶ Just like that, the so-called exorbitant privilege of the haven asset vanished. When asked at a press conference why China would willingly engage in actions that would undermine the value of more than $2tn in Treasuries and other dollar-based holdings, Zhou Xiaochuan, retiring governor of the People’s Bank of China, said: “This is not about risk-adjusted portfolio returns. We are defending our people against an act of economic war.”¶ By the autumn of 2013 there was little doubt of the severity of renewed recession in the US. Trade sanctions on China had backfired. Beleaguered American workers paid the highest price of all, as the unemployment rate shot back up above 10 per cent. A horrific policy blunder had confirmed that there was no bilateral fix for the multilateral trade imbalance of a savings-starved US economy.¶ In China, growth had slipped below the dreaded 6 per cent threshold and the new leadership was rolling out yet another investment stimulus for a still unbalanced and unstable Chinese economy. As the global economy slipped back into recession, the Great Crisis of 2008-09 suddenly looked like child’s play. Globalisation itself hung in the balance.¶ History warns us never to say never. We need only look at the legacy of US Senator Reed Smoot and Representative Willis Hawley, who sponsored the infamous Tariff Act of 1930 – America’s worst economic policy blunder. Bad dreams can – and have – become reality.

## States

#### CP text: the 50 States and all relevant Territories should enter into a compact implementing a feed in tariffs system for solar projects with a project size cap of 500 kilowatts, a program cap of 375 megawatts by 2020 at a "regular annual pace" with a term minimum of 20 years. The Compact should collect revenue via a Clean Energy Community Finance Initiative if necessary. The United States federal government should not preempt the state efforts described in this text.

#### CP solve faster than the federal government

Mountjoy ‘01

John is a policy analyst with the council of State Governments, “Interstate Compacts Make a Comeback,” Spring <http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/ncic/Comeback.pdf>

Some may question the need for interstate compacts to address multi-state policy issues. Why ¶ not leave such regulation to the feds? ¶ “Interstate compacts help us maintain state control,” said Gary McConnell, director of the ¶ Georgia Emergency Management Agency. ¶ During his 10 years as GEMA director, McConnell has played an instrumental role in developing ¶ and promoting a successful interstate compact —the Emergency Management Assistance ¶ Compact, or EMAC. EMAC allows state emergency management agencies to cooperate and ¶ share resources in the event of natural and man-made disasters. ¶ “We can go to the federal government for all kinds of help when natural disasters strike, but the ¶ states [cooperating under an interstate compact] can provide specific resources quicker, which ¶ are likely to be problem specific,” McConnell said. “It’s less bureaucratic, and it’s far cheaper. ¶ It’s easier for us under EMAC to obtain resources from surrounding states than it is to use ¶ federal assistance, which we’d end up having to pay more for anyway. I suspect this is the case ¶ with many other interstate compacts as well.” ¶ “States are rediscovering that they have the power to address their own problems better than the ¶ federal government,” said Rick Masters, The Council of State Governments’ legal counsel and ¶ special counsel for interstate compacts. ¶ CSG, which has tracked interstate compacts for more than 40 years, maintains a clearinghouse of ¶ compact information. More recently, CSG helps administer EMAC and is facilitating the update ¶ of the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision and the Interstate Compact on ¶ Juveniles. Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution laid the legal foundation for interstate ¶ compacts: “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep ¶ Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another ¶ State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent ¶ Danger as will not admit of delay.” Compacts actually preceded the Constitution, having been ¶ used in colonial times to resolve boundary disputes between colonies. ¶ Prior to the 1920s, interstate compacts were typically bi-state agreements, addressing boundary ¶ disputes and territorial claims. In fact, only 36 interstate compacts were formed between 1783 ¶ and 1920. It is only in this century that states have turned to interstate compacts to facilitate ¶ cooperative solutions to multi-state problems. ¶ After a lull in the late 1970s and early 1980s, interstate compacts are beginning to enjoy a ¶ resurgence. Since the early 1990s, states have initiated or updated several high-profile compacts. ¶ Examples include EMAC, the Interstate Compact on Industrialized/Modular Buildings and the ¶ Interstate Insurance Receivership Compact. Interstate compacts can set the framework for cooperative solutions to today’s cross-state ¶ challenges, from policing drugs to supplying energy or controlling sprawl. ¶ “Issues within the states are becoming more complex and aren’t confined by state boundaries. As ¶ a result, solutions are becoming multi-state as well. Compacts are the only tool that is truly ¶ adequate for addressing these multi-state issues,” said Bill Voit, senior project director at The ¶ Council of State Governments. ¶ An example is an interstate compact being considered to facilitate taxation of e-commerce. ¶ Opponents of Internet taxation claim that it would be virtually impossible for online vendors to ¶ comply with the complex, often confusing system of state and local sales and use taxes. Since ¶ Internet sales are expected to reach $184 billion annually by 2004, states have a vested interest in ¶ breaking down this and other barriers to taxing online transactions. ¶ Congress currently is considering the Internet Tax Moratorium Equity Act (S. 512) to help states ¶ simplify their sales and use taxes, in part by authorizing states to enter into an Interstate Sales ¶ and Use Tax Compact. The compact would create a “uniform, streamlined sales and use tax ¶ system,” convenient to remote sales. ¶ At least 18 states are considering the model streamlined sales tax legislation in 2001. Kentucky, ¶ South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming already have signed bills into law. ¶ Existing interstate compacts, many drafted in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, are ripe for ¶ amendment and revision. Technology and the Internet now make the sharing of information ¶ seamless and immediate, yet several interstate compacts are plagued by inadequate ¶ administration. ¶ “Not only do we see the development of new compacts, but we are seeing the re-examination of ¶ existing compacts…revising them to keep pace with our changing world,” Masters said. ¶ Developed in 1937, the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers is ¶ one example of a compact in need of update. Adopted by all 50 states, the compact regulates the ¶ movement of parolees and probationers across state lines. The burgeoning offender population ¶ and the ease with which offenders now can travel have created several problems for the compact, ¶ including: frequent violations of compact rules, inability to enforce compliance, difficulty in ¶ creating new rules and slow, unreliable exchange of case information. ¶ The antiquated compact needed a replacement that would provide states the authority, ¶ enforcement tools and resources to adequately track and ensure supervision of parolees and ¶ probationers. ¶ The new interstate compact, the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision, provides ¶ these solutions. The new compact includes mechanisms for enforcement, accountability, resource provision, information sharing and state-to-state cooperation. Currently, the compact ¶ has been introduced in 39 states and enacted in 18. ¶ Just as technology can smooth the operation of interstate compacts, alternative dispute resolution ¶ techniques can increase their self-sufficiency. Enforcement tools within interstate compacts need ¶ to utilize more of the mediation and arbitration services that have proven successful throughout ¶ state government. By developing additional self-contained enforcement mechanisms, compact ¶ members would not need to rely solely on the crowded docket of the U.S. Supreme Court. ¶ States should further utilize interstate compacts to address new problems and create new ¶ methods of interstate cooperation. If not, federal preemption in certain policy areas is a distinct ¶ possibility.

#### No preemption: California proves states will get away with it – even if there is a statute

#### Dorsi, 12

(Fellow, Phillips & Cohen LLP & JD-Harvard Law School, “Clean Energy Pricing and Federalism: Legal Obstacles and Options for Feed-in Tariffs,” Spring, 35 Environs Envtl. L. & Pol'y J. 173)

The FERC clarification provides an opportunity for states to implement some feed-in tariff policies in the absence of new legislation. California indicated an interest in applying energy efficiency standards as part of a feed-in tariff regime, and FERC accepted this as possible. n141 Although the exact contours are not yet defined, FERC indicated a willingness to accept other key components of California's design, namely different rates for different resources and a broader [\*200] definition of avoided cost. n142 The authorization for the California feed-in tariff has a 20 megawatt cap, matching the FERC rule. n143 Given the time necessary for policy development and implementation, states ought to focus on working within FERC's clarification rather than fighting FERC in court.

## ENERGY SHELL

#### THEIR PORTRAYAL OF NATURE AS AN ENERGY RESERVE FROM WHICH WE MUST DRAW OUR FUTURE ENSURES THE REDUCTION OF EVERYTHING TO STANDING RESERVE.

Stoekle 2k7

[allen, “bataille’s peak: energy, waste, and postsustainability” p. 131]

Nature has lost what we might call its autonomy; its model is no longer the bringing-forth of the flower bud, or the energy of the windmill (which “does not unlock energy from the wind currents in order to store it” [14]), but the violent, commandeering, ordering, and stockpiling of energy by the human as challenging-forth. The human, now revealed as a sort of martial monster, is opposed, in its actions, to the bringing-forth that best characterized poeisis (a causal model in which the human plays only a part). And, Heidegger makes clear in another essay, “The Age of the World Picture,” reality itself in and through technology can only be grasped as a standing reserve, ripe for quantification, stockpiling, use, and disposal, if it is isolated in an objective “picture,” a coherent, passive, inert totality whose only aspect is that it can be brought-forth, by man, violently, in techned. “To represent” objectively (as the Rhine is represented by those who would harness its energy) is “to set out before oneself and to set forth in relation to oneself” (Heidegger 1977, 132). “That the world becomes picture is one and the same even with the event of man’s becoming suiectum in the midst of that which is” (132). The rise of subjectivity, of the isolated, active self, conquering nature, storing its energy, is inseparable from the appearance of an “anthropology” through which “observation and teaching about the world change into a doctrine of man” (133). Or, we might say, observation and teaching about the world become observation and teaching about man: the measurement of nature’s resources and their stockpiling—and wanton expenditure—are inseparable from the stockpiling and wastage of the human in techno-scientific methods. Man the subject for whom the objective world exists as a resource is quickly reversed and becomes man the object who, under the right conditions, is examined, marshaled, and then releases a specific amount of energy before he himself is definitively depleted. Although Heidegger does not stress this point in “The Age of the World Picture,” he does make this point elsewhere, noting what for him is the inevitable link between the transformation of the world into a giant energy reserve and the transformation of man into a resource to be exploited in, for example, concentration camps.8

#### THIS OBJECTIFICAITON TREATS ALL BEINGS AS STANDING RESERVE JUSTIFYING THE UTTER DESTRUCTION OF LIFE IN MASS GENOCIDE AND INSTRUMENTALIZATION.

Stoekle 2k7

[allen, “bataille’s peak: energy, waste, and postsustainability” p. 131-3]

Subject/object; this is the infernal duo that, for Heidegger, characterizes modernity. The world is quantified in order to be exploited by “man,” but man himself is a consequence of this mode of expenditure. The man who hoards, who works to preserve his individual existence and protect it from all threats, is inseparable from a natural world completely transformed and rendered “monstrous” by a kind of instrumental mania. Man himself becomes a resource to be scientifically investigated, frilly known, perfected, made fully human (with an identity and consciousness) and put to use.9 This brief excursion through Heidegger on technology is useful, I think, to put the work of ideologists of suburbia and car culture, like Lomasky and Brooks, in perspective. We could argue, following Heidegger, that their version of car culture inevitably entails a subjectivity; one that, as in Heidegger, is both produced by their model and in turn produces it. The illusion “Man” derives his “freedom” from the quantification and commodification of natural resources: oil, to be sure, but also the steel, plastics, and other materials that go to make up the “autonomist” lifestyle. Utility as the autonomists conceive it is inseparable from a freedom that wastes, though they are notably reticent when it comes to discussing the consumption of resources on which their favorite lifestyle depends. Heidegger, although he does not explicitly pose the question of waste, certainly implies it: the Rhine, ruined by all those who exploit it, is a “resource” that has been squandered for the self-satisfied pleasures of domestic life and tourism. I have discussed the analyses of Lomasky and Brooks at such length because they are the most articulate and coherent defenders of the current culture in which we (attempt to) live. These proponents of the ideology of the current American fossil fuel regime valorize a lavish and ruinous wastage but do so in a way that masks it, invoking as they do utility: the squandering of vast amounts of wealth is necessary, indeed is a given, because we are challenged in developing to the fullest our nature as autonomous, free, individuals. As those free individuals we are the highest being on the earth (as Aristotle would remind us), the most developed. And as such we can be expected to reject any calls to conservation or sustainability. Heidegger, however, would note that our being, our subjectivity, is a quantifiable term that is a function of the very same movement, the very same bringing forth as techné that renders the world a quantifiable mass ripe for exploitation. And such a subject, immediately transformed into an object, a stàñding reserve, warehoused in an institution (concentration camp, prison, army, hospital, school, freeway, suburb), is itself ripe for use and disposal.

#### AND, THE ALTERNATIVE BEGINS BY REFUSING THE AFFIRMATIVES DESCRIPTION OF THE FUTURE IN FAVOR OF THE PRODUCTION OF NON-KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE ENERGY REGIMES IN WHICH WE ARE ENMESHED.

Stoekle 2k7
[allen, “bataille’s peak: energy, waste, and postsustainability” p. 205]

I would argue that while cheap energy is not the sole cause of the fablous increase in population and wealth that the world has seen in the last century and a half, it is nevertheless inseparable from it. Bataille, in *The Accursed Share,* has indicated, correctly I think, the centrality of energy and its “uses” (or wastage) to the establishment and maintenance of any cultural formation. Likewise, the depletion of cheap energy will be inseparable from a return to a “sensation of time,” to bodily expenditure (not least as “work”), and a charged, insubordinate matter. But at the same time it is the very “cursedness,” the unknowability, of this matter that prevents its incorporation in a simple reverse dialectic. We cannot simply flip over the dialectic and predict a decline where previously there had been an advance. Our right hands don’t know. The death of Man, of the certainties of Law and hierarchy, the atheism of God himself, the known finitude of “useful” energy, indicate that the unknowable future will not be conceivable as the simple downside of a bell curve, the simple disarticulation of a social dialectic, moving us backward from globalization to monopoly capital, from there to robber baron exploitation, from there to feudalism, centrally organized agriculture (employing slaves), and then maybe even back ftirther, to a hunter-gatherer society. We cannot assume that we will be forced into any given social regime by any given energy regime. The moment of depletion is the fall of knowledge, of utility, of meaning “built up” through successive certainties. It will not necessarily entail a fundamentalist unity of God and creation (as I have tried to show), or a rationalist governance in which every “tendency to expend” is analyzed, known, and controlled for the benefit of Man. What separates the downside of the bell curve from the upside, then, is not only the refusal of any easy prediction, but also the fact of knowledge. Non-knowledge is not simple ignorance, but the following-through of the consequences of attained knowledge; in our case, this implies a full understanding of the energy regime of modernity, the benefits and pitfalls of rationalism and humanism. Reason, as applied to the understanding and governance of society, will not simply be forgotten. As we saw in *The Accursed Share,* the highest knowledge of society is the consequence of following through a reasoned analysis and understanding of societal drives, both rational and profoundly irrational, to their end. By the same token, however, non-knowledge means the impossibility of predicting a practical future whose sole beneficiary or victim is iVian. A society that recognizes that the ultimate signified (God, Man) is heterogeneous in the most basic sense of the term is one that recognizes that its own impulses are both inescapable and profoundly gratuitous. Following Bataille, we can argue that the future, the fall into the void of certainties (God, Man, quantifiable and usable energy) may lead to another kind of spending, “on the scale of the universe,” which, in spite of itself, would entail what I have called postsustainability. We do not know; what is clear is that one kind of matter, one energy, one plenitude, is dying; another, monstrous, already here, already burning, announces itself. Hub- bert’s peak announces it, yet betrays it, for Hubbert envisaged only one version of energy. Up until now the development of thought, of philosophy, has been inseparable from the fossil fuel—powered growth curve, from “civilization.” The downside of the bell curve is non-knowledge because the event of the decline of knowledge, the disengagement of philosophy from economic and social growth, cannot be thought from within the space of knowledge growth (the perfection of modern truth) or its concomitant absence. We are in unknowable, unthinkable territory—an era of disproportion, as Pascal might call it. The era of Bataille’s peak. “I love the ignorance concerning the future,” wrote Nietzsche, and Bataille seconded him. For Bataille, any assurances concerning the future, either good or bad, were beside the point, even silly; instead, there was the play of chance, the affirmation of what has happened, what will happen. -The left hand in gay blindness as well as science, and the future is affirmed, in the night of non-knowledge.36 [STOKELE, ENERGY ALT]¶ Does this mean that we should despair, and use this “ignorance” as an excuse to do nothing? Not at all; we know the difference between sustain- ability and catastrophic destruction; we know the difference between global warming and a chance for some, even limited, species survival. But we also recognize, with Bataille, the inseparability of knowledge and non-knowledge, the tipping point at which, rather than cowering in fear, we throw ourselves into the future, accepting whatever happens, embracing everything, laughing at and with death. We will a return of recalcitrant bodily and celestial energy, of the sacrifice of the logic of the standing reserve; we bet against the vain effort to will an endless autonomist freedom. We know that sustainability if such a thing ever were to come about, would be inseparable not from simple calculation and planning but from the blowback of the movement of an embrace of the transgressed limit, the intimacy of the world willed to ritual consummation, the embrace of death-bound bodies: post-sustainability. 37 In other words, after Bataille, we refuse to take the downside of the bell curve is a simple and inevitable decline into feudalism, fundamentalism, extinction. We understand all that depletion implies and we embrace it, affirming the movement of expenditure at its Varda-esque heart.38 Who is this “we”? Not the self-satisfied “we” of a closed community or multitude, jealous of its rights and serene in its self-reflection. Rather, a not-we, emptied of meaning, unjustified—a community of those with nothing in common (Lingis 1994).

## Econ

#### FITS fail and decreases jobs- Spain proves

IER ’12

Institute for Energy Research, “Spain Halts Feed in Tariffs for Renewable Energy,” <http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2012/04/09/spain-halts-feed-in-tariffs-for-renewable-energy/>

A couple years ago, President Obama hailed Spain’s promotion of wind and solar energy through massive subsidies as a way to grow the economy and create jobs. At the time, Dr. Gabriel Calzada explained that the Spanish success was a mirage and that Spain’s “success” was actually costing jobs and creating a huge financial liability. Now, the reality of Spain’s disastrous policies is clear to the Spanish government. Hopefully, the unsustainable nature of subsidies will become clear to the promoters of wind and solar as well.¶ Beginning next year, Spain will halt new feed-in-tariff (FIT) contracts for renewable energy. Feed-in-tariffs are used to accelerate renewable investment by providing long-term contracts that pay the owners of these projects above-market rates for the electricity produced. Because renewable technologies generally cost more than conventional fossil fuel technologies, the government guarantees that renewable firms get the higher cost for their technologies. Consequently, utilities or consumers or both pay more for electricity. Similar policies have been proposed in the United States.¶ Spain is changing its position on renewable energy FIT contracts due to fiscal challenges and lower credit ratings. The electricity system deficit due to the higher cost of electricity is over 24 billion Euros and that amount is growing. To put this in context, this is $520 per Spaniard.¶ Because most renewable energy is not economic compared to coal, natural gas, or hydroelectric power, government hand-outs are needed to compete with conventional generating technologies. These hand-outs are increasing Spain’s national debt. Spain’s announcement halting new FIT contracts affects 4,500 megawatts of pending wind capacity and 550 megawatts of pending solar capacity, along with other uneconomic technologies.[i]¶ Spain’s Electricity System Deficit¶ Spain does not allow its electric utilities to pass on the increased cost of electricity produced from wind and solar to ratepayers and this includes the above market rates the FIT entails. Over the past decade, the utilities have been forced to pay above-market rates to the producers of wind and solar through the feed-in tariff, but they have been unable to charge the cost of the feed-in tariff to ratepayers. As a result, the electricity system deficit has increased over time.¶ Spain began deregulating its electricity market in 1997 when it supposedly allowed generators to compete among themselves. However, Spain also decided to control rates to consumers to avoid unpredictable market variations in electricity prices. The result on electricity prices can be seen in the following graph that compares Spain’s consumer price index, and real and nominal electricity prices, indexed to 1996–before Spain deregulated its generating sector.¶ Instead of allowing utilities to increase rates, the government allowed utilities to maintain a deferral account that allowed them to recover shortfalls in any individual year from revenues generated in subsequent years. The following shortfall in the financial statements of its utilities was created that resulted in a growing electricity system deficit because revenues from future electricity sales were insufficient to pay for the cost of the electricity generated. Contributing to this shortfall and stemming from unemployment above 20 percent is lower electricity demand that declined 2.6 percent from its peak in 2008 resulting in excess generating capacity.¶ According to E3 Analytics, an energy consultancy:¶ “In order to cover this gap, utilities in Spain started auctioning off the debt; however, in 2009, the Spanish government was forced to step in and provide sovereign backing for this debt. Predictably, this has generated two further problems for the government: first, assuming responsibility for the deficit effectively increases its net debt; and second, these debt auctions directly compete with Spain’s own bond issuance.”[ii]¶ Spain’s Renewable Energy¶ Renewable energy growth in the Spanish electricity market began after 1998 with the wind industry. Solar photovoltaics (PV) began to be developed with Spain’s 2004 reforms and biomass and biogas technologies, after its 2007 reforms. The annual additions to Spain’s renewable energy capacity between 2005 and 2010 are shown below:¶ The following graph depicts the share of each renewable energy source projected for 2013 compared to the premium payments that will be received by that technology in that year. While wind power will remain the largest source of renewable generation (65 percent), it will represent less than a third of total premiums paid (30 percent). In contrast, both solar PV and concentrating solar power (CSP) have a larger proportional share of the total renewable payments due to their higher costs.¶ Outcome Not Unexpected¶ In 2009, the Institute for Energy Research sponsored a report on the Spanish renewable energy industry and its associated programs that identified a number of issues. Gabriel Calzada of King Juan Carlos University, who led the study, found that the “green jobs” agenda that the Spanish Government instituted resulted in job losses elsewhere in the country’s economy. For each “green” megawatt installed, 5.28 jobs on average were lost in the Spanish economy as an opportunity cost. For solar technologies, that number is 3 times more than for wind technologies. For each megawatt of wind energy installed, 4.27 jobs were lost, and for each megawatt of solar energy installed, 12.7 jobs were lost.[iii]¶ Although solar energy employs many workers during a plant’s construction, it consumes a great amount of capital that could have created many more jobs in other parts of the economy. The Spanish Government began to realize these issues and in 2009, it slashed subsidies to solar power, subsidizing just 500 megawatts of solar projects, down from 2,400 megawatts in 2008.[iv] Thus, it is not unexpected that Spain has had to take further action regarding renewable energy even though it must meet renewable targets set by the European Union by 2020.¶ Conclusion¶ The United States needs to make sure it doesn’t continue to follow in Spain’s footsteps. Between the loan guarantees issued by the Department of Energy, the rebates from the 1603 treasury program that expired last year, the production tax credits to wind technology that will expire this year without government intervention, and investment tax credits available to solar technologies, the United States has increased its deficit only to find that wind and solar energy remain at just one percent of the country’s energy supply and that several of the companies that it backed have failed wasting American taxpayers’ hard-earned dollars. Proposals mandating utilities to buy more expensive alternative energy simply stick consumers with higher bills and transfer their money to “green” energy companies. Spain’s recent policy decision confirms what is becoming clearer every day: alternative energy in its present form is expensive and governments, utilities and consumers cannot absorb the costs for very long. Eventually, the chickens come home to roost.

#### Feed in Tariff Impossible- can’t set national mandate

National Journal ‘9

“What, exactly is a Feed-In Tariff,” page 28

Draft energy legislation in the U.S. House does not contain a feed-in tariff, and obstacles in the United States might make it hard to include one. In the U.S., because state authorities and not the federal government set electricity rates, there can't be a nationwide mandate. It also isn't clear that Washington could legally force utilities to pay a premium for renewable energy. Monopolistic utilities, meanwhile, often have great influence over rate-setting and have no interest in competition from multiple small suppliers that will eat into their market share and profits.

## Energy Bills

#### FITS increases electricity prices: Germany proves

Real Clear Energy’12 8/6, “Solar Subsidies Raise Electric Prices in Germany”, http://www.realclearenergy.org/charticles/2012/08/06/solar\_subsidies\_raise\_prices\_106641.html

**"Feed-in tariffs" is a fancy name for price supports** - the kind that have produced agricultural surpluses and large wealth transfers to farmers in the US for almost a century. Europe got into feed-in tariffs early. **As far back as 1990, Germany enacted a feed-in tariff that guaranteed providers of solar electricity a price well above market level. Consequently, it has been very easy for solar producers to make a profit.** The idea was to foster domestic industries but much of transfer has ended up going to Chinese firms. The less obvious downside, however, is that consumers end up paying more for electricity. The high solar prices are averaged in with all other sources and consumers end up paying the bill, both as taxpayers and consumers. In the graph above, the **Institute for Energy Research has charted the comparative impact of feed-in tariffs in the** [**United States**](http://realclearworld.com/topic/around_the_world/united_states/?utm_source=rcw&utm_medium=link&utm_campaign=rcwautolink) **and Germany. The blue bar is the feed-in tariff and the red bar is the overall price of electricity in cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh), with the scale on the left. The United States pays an average of 11 c/kWh and has no national feed-in tariff, although California, Florida, Hawaii, Maine, New York, Oregon and Vermont all have state variations. Germans pay 35 c/kWh for their electricity and a 25 c/kWh feed-in tariff for solar. As IER notes, Germans pay more on the feed-in tariff than American pay for electricity. Although IER does not say it outright, the suggestion that the Germans pay high electrical prices *because* of the feed-in tariff.** They support this by noting that the only country that pays more for electricity is Denmark, which has splurged even more on feed-in tariffs for wind. Several comments on the IER website, however, argue that solar's contribution is too small to have such an impact. **Germany did report that that it is got 26 percent of its electricity from renewables in the first quarter and solar was 21 percent of that, making it 5 percent of all electricity. IER argues that the German solar industry is about to suffer now that Germany has found it too expensive to maintain the feed-in tariffs. They say** [**Spain**](http://realclearworld.com/topic/around_the_world/spain/?utm_source=rcw&utm_medium=link&utm_campaign=rcwautolink) **has had a worse experience, with $50 billion in wind and solar-related debt now floating around the country. Spain's solar bubble, which soon popped, has played a large role in its overall debt crisis as well.**

#### Australia’s analysis proves – FITs affect electricity prices across the board

IPART 2012, “Solar feed-in tariffs”,

Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=16&cad=rja&ved=0CEoQFjAFOAo&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ipart.nsw.gov.au%2Ffiles%2F81824c4b-8b4b-475f-8e28-a01400f5d55e%2FFinal\_Report\_-\_Solar\_feed-in\_tariffs\_-\_March\_2012.pdf&ei=zztaUMvXM4KCyAG0oIBI&usg=AFQjCNE2ync-v3nwKCDo560lxAmVgnuCGQ&sig2=VHpQYFs5dYSIvmrlujykpQ

Similarly, any new source of generation in the wholesale electricity market may contribute to a reduction in wholesale spot prices. However the generator who contributes to this price reduction does not receive any payment to reflect a wider market benefit. Likewise, a customer who consumes electricity by switching on an appliance and thereby increasing the market demand for electricity and electricity prices for all customers is not required to compensate the other customers for these higher prices. These are just normal outcomes of a competitive market. Not only would including a value from the merit order effect in a fair and reasonable feed-in tariff be contrary to outcomes in a competitive market it would also require government intervention in the wholesale electricity market to effectively subsidise PV system owners. This subsidy would need to be funded either through higher electricity prices for non-PV customers or directly from the government. As discussed in section 8.1, this is contrary to our terms of reference. While outside the scope of this review, arguments for government intervention in markets are made on a number of different grounds. However, the analysis required to support such intervention would be much broader than just considering the value from the merit order effect in isolation. It would require a more holistic view of the market and take into account wider costs and benefits to society. For example, a holistic view of the market would bear in mind that on the one hand, PV generation contributes to different **wholesale electricity prices** than they otherwise might have been. But on the other hand, the high costs of government subsidies that have supported the strong uptake of PV systems have contributed to an increase in **retail electricity prices** in NSW.98 The Australian Solar Roundtable put forward an argument for why PV generators should be rewarded for the merit order effect (while other generators are not). They suggest that there is inequity in the electricity market as fossil fuel generators benefit from high prices in the NEM, whereas PV generators can’t.99 However, our wholesale market value approach outlined in Chapter 6 values the energy from PV systems as if they were like any other generator in the NEM. The value that was estimated under this approach specifically accounts for the times when PV is exported in the NEM and the spot prices **at these times**. Therefore to the extent that PV systems generate during high price events, the benefit is captured in the value that we estimated. While we have not recommended any value from the merit order effect be included in a fair and reasonable feed-in tariff, any benefit would still be shared by all customers through the competitive market. This view is also shared by ESCOSA as outlined in their recent final determination of solar feed-in tariff premiums.100 Further, setting aside the difficulty associated with quantifying and allocating the value of these benefits to PV customers, reallocating the benefit from all customers to just PV customers would increase electricity prices for non-PV customers. This would be contrary to our terms of reference for this review.

#### Alt causes keep prices high

**Bastasch ‘9-21** (Report: More than 200 coal-fired generators slated for shutdown Published: 11:29 PM 09/21/2012 By Michael Bastasch, daily caller staff writer, political analyst,

Within the next three to five years, **more than 200 coal-fired electric generating units will be shut down across 25 states due to EPA regulations and factors including cheap natural gas, according to a new report** by the American Coalition for Clean Coal Electricity (ACCCE). “This is further evidence that **EPA is waging a war on coal, and a war on affordable electricity prices** and jobs. EPA continues to ignore the damage that its new regulations are causing to the U.S. economy and to states that depend on coal for jobs and affordable electricity,” said Mike Duncan, president and CEO of ACCCE, in a statement. However, ACCCE notes that EPA policies may have played a role more than 4,800 megawatts of announced closures not included on in their report which would bring total shutdowns to 241 coal generator in 30 states — more than 36,000 MW of electric generation or 11 percent of the U.S. coal fleet. The most affected states include Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Virginia, and North Carolina, which will see a combined 103 coal-fired generators shut down. “Actually **our utility rates are higher** and the impact is such that it’s going to interfere with the quality of life that a lot of individuals have in my community,” said John McNeil, mayor of Red Springs, N.C., in an ACCCE video — one of the heavily affected states.

#### Intermittency means the aff doesn’t solve

**Loudermilk 11** Micah J. Loudermilk, Research Associate for the Energy & Environmental Security Policy program with the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University, 5/31/11, Small Nuclear Reactors and US Energy Security: Concepts, Capabilities, and Costs, www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=314:small-nuclear-reactors-and-us-energy-security-concepts-capabilities-and-costs&catid=116:content0411&Itemid=375

#### When discussing the energy security contributions offered by small nuclear reactors, it is not enough to simply compare them with existing nuclear technology, but also to examine how they measure up against other electricity generation alternatives—renewable energy technologies and fossil fuels. Coal, natural gas, and oil currently account for 45%, 23% and 1% respectively of US electricity generation sources. Hydroelectric power accounts for 7%, and other renewable power sources for 4%. These ratios are critical to remember because idealistic visions of providing for US energy security are not as useful as realistic ones balancing the role played by fossil fuels, nuclear power, and renewable energy sources. Limitations of renewables Renewable energy technologies have made great strides forward during the last decade. In an increasingly carbon emissions and greenhouse gas (GHG) aware global commons, the appeal of solar, wind, and other alternative energy sources is strong, and many countries are moving to increase their renewable electricity generation. However, despite massive expansion on this front, renewable sources struggle to keep pace with increasing demand, to say nothing of decreasing the amount of energy obtained from other sources. The continual problem with solar and wind power is that, lacking efficient energy storage mechanisms, it is difficult to contribute to baseload power demands. Due to the intermittent nature of their energy production, which often does not line up with peak demand usage, electricity grids can only handle a limited amount of renewable energy sources—a situation which Germany is now encountering. Simply put, **nuclear** power **provides virtually carbon-free baseload power generation, and renewable options are unable to replicate this, especially not on the scale required by expanding global energy demands**. Small nuclear reactors, however, like renewable sources, can provide enhanced, distributed, and localized power generation. As the US moves towards embracing smart grid technologies, power production at this level becomes a critical piece of the puzzle. Especially since renewable sources, due to sprawl, are of limited utility near crowded population centers, small reactors may in fact prove instrumental to enabling the smart grid to become a reality.

#### ( ) There are a ton of alternate causalities to your advantage.

Toronto Star 2k5 March 4

It is timely that the U.S. State Department released its annual report on human rights abuses in other countries right after its president preached across Europe about freedom. Perhaps the United States **should flip the coin and take a look at the other side**. Is it a coincidence that many nations criticized in the report are those who don't necessarily agree with U.S. President George Bush's methods and priorities for achieving freedom? Canada certainly doesn't have a perfect human rights record - Amnesty International's accusations against our federal government are valid, but so are their accusations against the United States. On Wednesday, Amnesty International accused the U.S. of failing to lead the fight against global human rights abuses and placed it in the same "**shameful death penalty league**" as China, Iran and Saudi Arabia. The human rights agency accused the U.S. of ignoring violations in its own backyard. While the U.S. is accusing Canada of **police brutality**, Amnesty U.S.A. is releasing reports pushing for the elimination of **racial profiling and Taser usage** in America. More irony lies in the fact that in Tuesday's Toronto Star, the United States was quoted as "pressing" its close allies in its annual report by highlighting problems in countries such as Saudi Arabia - but as business partners with that country, how is it pressing them to stop committing such violations? In terms of trafficking people - a trend Canada was also criticized on - the 2005 Human Rights Watch World Report says that in the U.S., non-citizens face violations of their right to seek asylum, to be free from arbitrary detention and to be given fair deportation hearings. Perhaps the U.S. should consider what conclusions other reports are drawing about its own human rights violations before it accuses other countries of failing. As a world superpower or "parent" nation, maybe the United States should stop scolding and start setting the right example for the rest of its children

#### ( ) No solvency – the US will always backslide and be ambivalent about human rights.

Forsythe, Political Science Professor – Nebraska, 2000 Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy, ed. Forsythe, ciaonet

It is persuasive for moralists to argue that, in the twenty-first century, an age of rights should demand at a minimum that there be no mass murder and no mass starvation. Insofar as the 1990s are concerned, when we review US foreign policy in places such as Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda, we are forced to conclude that one cannot rely on US foreign policy consistently to help ensure this minimal respect for international human rights. Some countries, like Rwanda, seem beyond the scope of American humanitarian concern. Others, like Bosnia, seem not worth the candle — too costly in terms of American vested interests. A third problem, evident in places such as Turkey and China, is that American economic and security interests **dictate a lower priority to human rights**. 54 **This record cannot help but detract from a more positive US record**, at least for civil and political rights, in some countries like Guatemala and Burma. The most fundamental problem blocking a consistently progressive stand on international human rights issues **stems from a lack of political will at home** to pay the necessary price to see even American, much less international, **rights principles realized abroad.** The real problem is the danger not of moral crusade but of **moral abnegation**. In this sense the American self-image of a nation standing for individual freedom for all is at considerable variance with international reality. The world is still a large and imperfect place, but states can set priorities and distinguish between gross and more minor violations of human rights. Extensive rhetoric about universal human rights, however, generates its own pressures over time to close the gap between rhetoric and reality.