# Framework

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#### Role of the ballot is political engagement in energy policy—You should evaluate the consequences of the plan and alternative and we should be able to weigh the aff as a disad to their alternative – anything else moots the entire 1AC and makes the debate start over in the 2AC – it’s a voter for fairness and education —reject their nebulous framework—destroys politics and is infinitely regressive which makes predictability and 2AC offense impossible

#### Decisionmaking skills learned from debate over technical energy issues are key to actualizing political change

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(Derek, “Science Education as a Call to Action,” Canadian Journal of Science, Mathematics and Technology Education, Vol. 10, Issue 3, p. 197-206)

\*\*note: SSI = socioscientific issues

The final (fourth) level of sophistication in this issues-based approach is concerned with students findings ways of putting their values and convictions into action, helping them to prepare for and engage in responsible action, and assisting them in developing the skills, attitudes, and values that will enable them to take control of their lives, cooperate with others to bring about change, and work toward a more just and sustainable world in which power, wealth, and resources are more equitably shared. Socially and environmentally responsible behavior will not necessarily follow from knowledge of key concepts and possession of the “right attitudes.” As Curtin (1991) reminded us, it is important to distinguish between caring about and caring for. It is almost always much easier to proclaim that one cares about an issue than to do something about it. Put simply, our values are worth nothing until we live them. Rhetoric and espoused values will not bring about social justice and will not save the planet. We must change our actions. A politicized ethic of care (caring for) entails active involvement in a local manifestation of a particular problem or issue, exploration of the complex sociopolitical contexts in which the problem/issue is located, and attempts to resolve conflicts of interest.¶ FROM STSE RHETORIC TO SOCIOPOLITICAL ACTION¶ Writing from the perspective of environmental education, Jensen (2002) categorized the knowledge that is likely to promote sociopolitical action and encourage pro-environmental behavior into four dimensions: (a) scientific and technological knowledge that informs the issue or problem; (b) knowledge about the underlying social, political, and economic issues, conditions, and structures and how they contribute to creating social and environmental problems; (c) knowledge about how to bring about changes in society through direct or indirect action; and (d) knowledge about the likely outcome or direction of possible actions and the desirability of those outcomes. Although formulated as a model for environmental education, it is reasonable to suppose that Jensen's arguments are applicable to all forms of SSI-oriented action. Little needs to be said about dimensions 1 and 2 in Jensen's framework beyond the discussion earlier in the article. With regard to dimension 3, students need knowledge of actions that are likely to have positive impact and knowledge of how to engage in them. It is essential that they gain robust knowledge of the social, legal, and political system(s) that prevail in the communities in which they live and develop a clear understanding of how decisions are made within local, regional, and national government and within industry, commerce, and the military. Without knowledge of where and with whom power of decision making is located and awareness of the mechanisms by which decisions are reached, intervention is not possible. Thus, the curriculum I propose requires a concurrent program designed to achieve a measure of political literacy, including knowledge of how to engage in collective action with individuals who have different competencies, backgrounds, and attitudes but share a common interest in a particular SSI. Dimension 3 also includes knowledge of likely sympathizers and potential allies and strategies for encouraging cooperative action and group interventions. What Jensen did not mention but would seem to be a part of dimension 3 knowledge is the nature of science-oriented knowledge that would enable students to appraise the statements, reports, and arguments of scientists, politicians, and journalists and to present their own supporting or opposing arguments in a coherent, robust, and convincing way (see Hodson [2009b] for a lengthy discussion of this aspect of science education). Jensen's fourth category includes awareness of how (and why) others have sought to bring about change and entails formulation of a vision of the kind of world in which we (and our families and communities) wish to live. It is important for students to explore and develop their ideas, dreams, and aspirations for themselves, their neighbors and families and for the wider communities at local, regional, national, and global levels—a clear overlap with futures studies/education. An essential step in cultivating the critical scientific and technological literacy on which sociopolitical action depends is the application of a social and political critique capable of challenging the notion of technological determinism. We can control technology and its environmental and social impact. More significantly, we can control the controllers and redirect technology in such a way that adverse environmental impact is substantially reduced (if not entirely eliminated) and issues of freedom, equality, and justice are kept in the forefront of discussion during the establishment of policy.

DEBATE roleplay specifically activates agency

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http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf¶ Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008 ¶ Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish¶ Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of¶ Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have¶ taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the¶ Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab¶ Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant¶ professor.

Thus, debate games require teachers to balance the centripetal/centrifugal forces of gaming and teaching, to be able to reconfigure their discursive authority, and to orchestrate the multiple voices of a dialogical game space in relation to particular goals. These Bakhtinian perspectives provide a valuable analytical framework for describing the discursive interplay between different practices and knowledge aspects when enacting (debate) game scenarios. In addition to this, Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy also offers an explanation of why debate games (and other game types) may be valuable within an educational context. One of the central features of multi-player games is that players are expected to experience a simultaneously real and imagined scenario both in relation to an insider’s (participant) perspective and to an outsider’s (co-participant) perspective. According to Bakhtin, the outsider’s perspective reflects a fundamental aspect of human understanding: In order to understand, it is immensely important for the person who understands to be located outside the object of his or her creative understanding – in time, in space, in culture. For one cannot even really see one's own exterior and comprehend it as a whole, and no mirrors or photographs can help; our real exterior can be seen and understood only by other people, because they are located outside us in space, and because they are others (Bakhtin, 1986: 7). As the quote suggests, every person is influenced by others in an inescapably intertwined way, and consequently no voice can be said to be isolated. Thus, it is in the interaction with other voices that individuals are able to reach understanding and find their own voice. Bakhtin also refers to the ontological process of finding a voice as “ideological becoming”, which represents “the process of selectively assimilating the words of others” (Bakhtin, 1981: 341). Thus, by teaching and playing debate scenarios, it is possible to support students in their process of becoming not only

#### Extend Kacou from the 1AC. You vote the negative

# Political Disaffection

#### Scientific and instrumental argumentation and research is key to motivate legislative fence-sitters. Their critical approach is just preaching to the choir which endangers public and decision-making backlashes which turn the case. Only our interp can generate the public debates necessary to ensure survival.

Brown 2k11

[heath, PhD Political Science, Roanoke, Salem, VA, “narrative strategies used by interest groups during the 2008 presidental transition”, 2011 Pat-Net Conference]

Milbrath argues that interest groups must strategically present information so as to ¶ overcome the “perceptual screen” that shields policy makers from absorbing endless amounts ¶ of information. He suggests that groups use facts (scientific information about policy ¶ outcomes), arguments (normative explanations of justness or rightness of action), and power¶ (typically subtle offers of political support or threats of political retribution) to communicate ¶ their interests and make their case for policy action (or inaction). In a more recent approach, ¶ Esterling (2007, p. 79) makes the case that groups can use [using] “instrumental” – “research or ¶ evidence-based causal” arguments -- or “normative” – “intrinsic desirability” arguments. By ¶ emphasizing one of these approaches, a group is tacitly communicating the way it wants to ¶ persuade the target of the information. By emphasizing power or normative arguments, the ¶ group implies that the policy maker should make decisions based primarily on their political ¶ judgment and political future. Conversely, by emphasizing facts-based or instrumental ¶ arguments, the group implies that the policy maker should base decisions primarily on rational ¶ or scientific considerations. In practice, it is difficult to disentangle these two types of ¶ arguments and many groups will likely combine various ways to present information (Wright ¶ 1996; Rochefort and Cobb 1994). The dichotomy though does help clarify the persuasive or ¶ argumentative tone of the information and advice given by groups to policy makers. 6 ¶ While public perceptions of interest groups might suggest crass self-interest, ¶ manipulation, and deception, groups have an incentive to be forthright in the information they ¶ provide and arguments they make. A group that provides shoddy statistics or misleading ¶ arguments will be discounted in future interactions with the policy maker (Kersh 2009; ¶ Easterling 2007). John E. Chubb (1983, p. 145) writes in regard to energy interest groups: ¶ “information and advice that are solely self-serving threaten the bond of trust that facilitates ¶ the informal play of influence.” In fact, rather than targeting political opponents or fence ¶ sitters, much research suggests that groups prefer or are invited to lobby friends and allies over ¶ adversaries (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999; Hall and Deardorff ¶ 2006; Bauer et al. 1963; Holyoke 2004; McCool 1990). If this is the case, the cost of ¶ misrepresenting or overstating information may be particularly high for those engaged in what ¶ Hall and Deardorff (2006) and others have called “legislative subsidy” (Hall and Deardorff 2006; ¶ Esterling 2007a). From this subsidy perspective, if a policy maker is sub-contracting information ¶ collection and analysis to an allied interest group, it behooves that group to be conscientious, ¶ thorough, and consistent in the information and advice it gives. And in many cases, as Wright ¶ (1996) contends, it is relatively easy for policy makers to check the authenticity of the ¶ information provided to them, sometimes simply through the contradictory information ¶ provided by other groups, thereby curtailing the inclination to blatantly misrepresent the truth. ¶ Furthermore, experimental research shows that factual or instrumental information is ¶ preferred by legislative staff (LaPira 2008) and neutral expert lobbyists have more legislative ¶ access than non-experts (Esterling 2007b). Facts may be useful on their own terms in ¶ formulating legislative decisions but scientific or statistically based arguments also serve as a 7 ¶ cue for policy makers to determine the credibility or reliability of the advice they are given ¶ (Sabatier 1978). ¶ Rather than convince those already in agreement, the approach taken by proactive ¶ theorists suggests that groups seek to convince legislative fence sitters or opponents to adopt ¶ the group’s position, advocate the group’s interests, or simply vote in the group’s way through ¶ the offer of, or refusal to give, political support (Smith 1984; Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; ¶ Wright 1996). Wright (1990) for one finds that groups which distribute campaign contributions ¶ to a wide group of legislators are then able to access a wider group, rather than just political ¶ allies (Wright 1990). Similarly, Heberling (2005) shows that one group, the AFL-CIO, seeks out ¶ legislators with unknown political preferences rather than targeting political allies (Heberling ¶ 2005). The field of interest group research has not yet resolved whether groups typically lobby ¶ friends, adversaries, or some combination of the two (Leech and Baumgartner 1998). This is ¶ likely due to the wide variation of group types and also policy domains in which groups operate. ¶ These inter-organizational and inter-policy differences affect the strategies employed and ¶ therefore the content of information presented during lobbying.

#### Apocalyptic rhetoric affirms life

Fox 85

Michael Allen (Assoc. Prof Phil. @ Queens), “Nuclear War: Philosophical Perspectives,” ed. Fox and Groarke, p. 127

There remains but one choice: we must seek a reduction of world tensions, mutual trust, disarmament, and peace.35 Security is not the absence of fear and anxiety, but a degree of stress and uncertainty with which we can cope and remain mentally healthy. For security, understood in this way, to become a feature of our lives, we must admit our nuclear fear and anxiety and identify the mechanisms that dull or mask our emotional and other responses. It is necessary to realist that we cannot entrust security to ourselves, but, strange as it seems and however difficult to accept, must entrust it to our adversary Just as the safety and security of each of us, as individuals, depends upon the good will of every other, any one of whom could harm us at any moment, so the security of nations finally depends upon the good will of other nations, whether or not we willingly accept this fact. The disease for which we must find the cure also requires that we continually come face to face with the unthinkable in image and thought and recoil from it. 36 In this manner we can break its hold over us and free ourselves to begin new initiatives. As Robert J. Lifton points out, “confronting massive death helps us bring ourselves more in touch with what we care most about in life. We [will then] find ourselves in no way on a death trip, but rather responding to a call for personal and professional actions and commitments on behalf of that wondrous and fragile entity we know as human life.

**Embracing our fear of death is key to acting responsibly and ethically**

**Kelsang** **99**

[www.tharpa.com/background/fear-of-death.htm](http://www.tharpa.com/background/fear-of-death.htm)

If we ignore death we shall waste our life working for things that we shall only have to leave behind, creating many negative actions in the process, and having to travel on to our next life with nothing but a heavy burden of negative karma. On the other hand, if we base our life on a realistic awareness of our mortality, we shall regard our spiritual development as far more important than the attainments of this world, and we shall view our time in this world principally as an opportunity to cultivate positive minds such as patience, love, compassion, and wisdom. Motivated by these virtuous minds we shall perform many positive actions, thereby creating the cause for future happiness. When the time of our death comes we shall be able to pass away without fear or regret, our mind empowered by the virtuous karma we have created. The [Kadampa](http://www.tharpa.com/background/kadampa-buddhism.htm) Teachers say that there is no use in being afraid when we are on our deathbed and about to die; the time to fear death is while we are young. Most people do the reverse. While they are young they think, "I shall not die", and they live recklessly without concern for death; but when death comes they are terrified. If we develop fear of death right now we shall use our life meaningfully by engaging in virtuous actions and avoiding non-virtuous actions, thus creating the cause to take a fortunate rebirth. When death actually comes we shall feel like a child returning to the home of its parents, and pass away joyfully, without fear.

#### Only the permutation solves --- rigid rejection of “China threat” gets warped into a new orthodoxy and fuels extremism. Recognizing plural interpretations and linkages is more productive.

Callahan 5 (William A., Professor of Politics – University of Manchester, “How to Understand China: The Dangers and Opportunities of Being a Rising Power”, Review of International Studies, 31)

Although ‘China threat theory’ is ascribed to the Cold War thinking of foreigners who suffer from an enemy deprivation syndrome, the use of containment as a response to threats in Chinese texts suggests that Chinese strategists are also seeking to fill the symbolic gap left by the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was the key threat to the PRC after 1960. Refutations of ‘China threat theory’ do not seek to deconstruct the discourse of ‘threat’ as part of critical security studies. Rather they are expressions of a geopolitical identity politics because they refute ‘Chinese’ threats as a way of facilitating the production of an America threat, a Japan threat, an India threat, and so on. Uniting to fight these foreign threats affirms China’s national identity. Unfortunately, by refuting China threat in this bellicose way – that is by generating a new series of threats – the China threat theory texts end up confirming the threat that they seek to deny: Japan, India and Southeast Asia are increasingly threatened by China’s protests of peace.43 Moreover, the estrangement produced and circulated in China threat theory is not just among nation-states. The recent shift in the focus of the discourse from security issues to more economic and cultural issues suggests that China is estranged from the ‘international standards’ of the ‘international community’. After a long process of difficult negotiations, China entered the WTO in December 2001. Joining the WTO was not just an economic or a political event; it was an issue of Chinese identity.44 As Breslin, Shih and Zha describe in their articles in this Forum, this process was painful for China as WTO membership subjects the PRC to binding rules that are not the product of Chinese diplomacy or culture. Thus although China enters international organisations like the WTO based on shared values and rules, China also needs to distinguish itself from the undifferentiated mass of the globalised world. Since 2002, a large proportion of the China threat theory articles have been published in economics, trade, investment, and general business journals – rather than in international politics, area studies and ideological journals as in the 1990s. Hence China threat theory is one way to differentiate China from these international standards, which critics see as neo-colonial.45 Another way is for China to assert ownership over international standards to affirm its national identity through participation in globalisation.46 Lastly, some China threat theory articles go beyond criticising the ignorance and bad intentions of the offending texts to conclude that those who promote China threat must be crazy: ‘There is a consensus within mainland academic circles that there is hardly any reasonable logic to explain the views and practices of the United States toward China in the past few years. It can only be summed up in a word: ‘‘Madness’’ ’.47 Indians likewise are said to suffer from a ‘China threat theory syndrome’.48 This brings us back to Foucault’s logic of ‘rationality’ being constructed through the exclusion of a range of activities that are labelled as ‘madness’. The rationality of the rise of China depends upon distinguishing it from the madness of those who question it. Like Joseph Nye’s concern that warnings of a China threat could become a self-fulfilling prophesy, China threat theory texts vigorously reproduce the dangers of the very threat they seek to deny. Rather than adding to the debate, they end up policing what Chinese and foreigners can rationally say. Conclusion The argument of this essay is not that China is a threat. Rather, it has examined the productive linkages that knit together the image of China as a peacefully rising power and the discourse of China as a threat to the economic and military stability of East Asia. It would be easy to join the chorus of those who denounce ‘China threat theory’ as the misguided product of the Blue Team, as do many in China and the West. But that would be a mistake, because depending on circumstances anything – from rising powers to civilian aircraft – can be interpreted as a threat. The purpose is not to argue that interpretations are false in relation to some reality (such as that China is fundamentally peaceful rather than war-like), but that it is necessary to unpack the political and historical context of each perception of threat. Indeed, ‘China threat’ has never described a unified American understanding of the PRC: it has always been one position among many in debates among academics, public intellectuals and policymakers. Rather than inflate extremist positions (in both the West and China) into irrefutable truth, it is more interesting to examine the debates that produced the threat/opportunity dynamic.

# Metaphysics

### Humans Good/Human Extinction Bad

#### Human life has inherent value – arguing otherwise is a slippery slope to slavery and eugenics

Melinda Penner (Director of Operations – STR, Stand To Reason) 2005 “End of Life Ethics: A Primer”, Stand to Reason, http://www.str.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5223

Intrinsic value is very different. Things with intrinsic value are valued for their own sake. They don’t have to achieve any other goal to be valuable. They are goods in themselves. Beauty, pleasure, and virtue are likely examples. Family and friendship are examples. Something that’s intrinsically valuable might also be instrumentally valuable, but even if it loses its instrumental value, its intrinsic value remains. Intrinsic value is what people mean when they use the phrase "the sanctity of life." Now when someone argues that someone doesn’t have "quality of life" they are arguing that life is only valuable as long as it obtains something else with quality, and when it can’t accomplish this, it’s not worth anything anymore. It's only instrumentally valuable. The problem with this view is that it is entirely subjective and changeable with regards to what might give value to life. Value becomes a completely personal matter, and, as we all know, our personal interests change over time. There is no grounding for objective human value and human rights if it’s not intrinsic value. Our legal system is built on the notion that humans have intrinsic value. The Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that each person is endowed by his Creator with certain unalienable rights...." If human beings only have instrumental value, then slavery can be justified because there is nothing objectively valuable that requires our respect. There is nothing other than intrinsic value that can ground the unalienable equal rights we recognize because there is nothing about all human beings that is universal and equal. Intrinsic human value is what binds our social contract of rights. So if human life is intrinsically valuable, then it remains valuable even when our capacities are limited. Human life is valuable even with tremendous limitations. Human life remains valuable because its value is not derived from being able to talk, or walk, or feed yourself, or even reason at a certain level. Human beings don’t have value only in virtue of states of being (e.g., happiness) they can experience. The "quality of life" view is a poison pill because once we swallow it, we’re led down a logical slippery slope. The exact same principle can be used to take the life of human beings in all kinds of limited conditions because I wouldn't want to live that way. Would you want to live the life of a baby with Down’s Syndrome? No? Then kill her. Would you want to live the life of an infant with cerebral palsy? No? Then kill him. Would you want to live the life of a baby born with a cleft lip? No? Then kill her. (In fact, they did.) Once we accept this principle, it justifies killing every infant born with a condition that we deem a life we don’t want to live. There’s no reason not to kill every handicapped person who can’t speak for himself — because I wouldn’t want to live that way. This, in fact, is what has happened in Holland with the Groningen Protocol. Dutch doctors euthanize severely ill newborns and their society has accepted it.

#### Preventing the extinction of future generations is a moral imperative – human extinction is normatively bad

Cohen and Lee 1986. Avner, Professor of International Law and Practice – Princeton University and Steven, Professor of Philosophy – Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Nuclear Weapons and the Future of Humanity: The Fundamental Questions, p. 332-333

I shall reinforce this conclusion with several arguments for the claim that, while preventing the existence of future generations would not be against their interests, it is nevertheless of the utmost moral importance not to prevent their existence. One such argument appeals to the fact that our lives would be impoverished by the expectation that we will be the final generation. At present our lives are enriched by the assumption that they will be linked in various ways with the lives of future people. We rely on future generations for the furtherance and completion of projects we have begun or taken over from our ancestors; we depend on them to preserve and enrich our culture, and to help fulfill our ideals; and we hope that they will benefit from and appreciate our works, providing us with posthumous recognition. If we were to suppose that there would be no future generations, many of our present activities would be robbed of much of their meaning. These are undoubtedly important reasons for ensuring the existence of future generations. Again, however, if the force of these points is only that it would be worse for existing people if there were to be no future generations, then these points will contribute nothing to the argument against nuclear deterrence that is not already provided by premises 1b and 1c. It is, however, equally plausible to suppose that there is independent value in, say, the evolution of our culture, so that it is important for our culture to continue to develop quite apart from the fact that our lives would be impoverished by the belief that the evolution of our culture were at an end. If this further claim is accepted, we have a reason for ensuring the existence for future generations that is independent of the interests of existing people. Another and perhaps stronger argument for the claim that it is morally important to ensure the existence of future generations also makes no appeal to the interests of existing people. This argument moves from the claim that there is a principle of non-malfeasance that provides a moral reason not to bring a person into existence if his life would be worse than no life at all, or "worth not living," to the claim that there is a principle of beneficence that provides a moral reason to bring a person into existence if his life would, on balance, be worth living. The argument takes as its first premise the claim that it would be wrong, other things being equal, to bring a person into existence if his life would predictably be worth not living. This seems uncontroversial. But how can we best explain why it would be wrong? It is tempting to appeal to side-effects, to the fact that it is normally worse for existing people if a person who is utterly wretched comes to exist. But this explanation is excluded by the ceteris paribus clause. And in any case the appeal to side-effects could provide only a partial explanation of why it would be wrong to bring a miserable person into existence. For it is only contingently true that it is worse for existing people when miserable people come into existence. There could be cases in which this would be better for existing people.

#### Humans are unique – innovation is innate to humans

Murray Bookchin, 1995. philosophy – Institute for Social Ecology.

http://lamiae.meccahosting.com/~a0004f7f/StudiesInAnti-Capitalism/Documents\_TWO\_files/SocialAnarchismOrLifestyleAnarchism.pdf)

What is of crucial importance is that the regression to primitivism among lifestyle anarchists denies the most salient attributes of humanity as a species and the potentially emancipatory aspects of Euro-American civilization. Humans are vastly different from other animals in that they do more than merely adapt to the world around them; they innovate and create a new world, not only to discover their own powers as human beings but to make the world around them more suitable for their own development, both as individuals and as a species. Warped as this capacity is by the present irrational society, the ability to change the world is a natural endowment, the product of human biological evolution -- not simply a product of technology, rationality, and civilization. That people who call themselves anarchists should advance a primitivism that verges on the animalistic, with its barely concealed message of adaptiveness and passivity, sullies centuries of revolutionary thought, ideals, and practice, indeed defames the memorable efforts of humanity to free itself from parochialism, mysticism, and superstition and change the world.

Anthropocentric values are the only way to think about life on earth. – thinking about the beauty of the cosmos fails to account for life.

Grey 93 — William Grey, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Queensland, 1993 (“Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” *Australiasian Journal of Philosophy*, Volume 71, Number 4, Available Online at http://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/anthropocentrism.html, Accessed 07-27-2011)

This passage is revealing. Note the characterization of the Age of Mammals as "richer" than the Age of Reptiles. As mammal chauvinists we might agree, but it is not clear on what grounds Callicott can justify the claim. It is also easy to agree that our demise, and the demise of the ecosystem which currently supports us, would be a matter of regret. But clearly it would be regrettable because of a decidedly anthropocentric set of values, interests and perceptions—if Callicott really eschews such concerns entirely, the grounds on which his regret is based are deprived of any foundation. There are various levels of description for any natural system, and the level which we adopt is inevitably interest relative. From a perspective which ascribes special value to living systems, Venus and Mars are pretty disappointing planets. However from a purely physical point of view it may be that they are, like Earth, complex equilibrium systems with energy cycles operating through the energy flux of our local star. The reason that the purely physical descriptions are unhelpful for characterizing what makes this planet better than the others in some important respects is that it is the wrong level of organization for explaining what conditions <473> are conducive to the flourishing of creatures like us. It is, once again, interest relative. Conceivably a silicon-based life form would find the temperature and atmosphere of Venus congenial, and of Earth execrable. As carbon chauvinists we should feel free to dissent from that judgement.

#### Even if they win we just cause human death it still outweighs and turns their impact—human moral evolution will inevitably lead to an end to speciesism—If humans survive, we can ensure that animals and the earth survive

J. G. Matheny, Ph. D. candidate, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, December 6, 2007, “Ought we worry about human extinction?,” online: http://jgmatheny.org/extinctionethics.htm

Moral philosophers have not written much about human extinction. This may be because they underestimate the potential benefits of human survival and/or the risks of human extinction. If we survive the next few centuries, humanity could allow Earth-originating life to survive a trillion years or more. If we do not survive, Earth-originating life will probably perish within a billion years. If prolonging the survival of Earth-originating life is morally important, then there may be nothing more important than reducing the near-term risks of human extinction. Keywords: extinction, population ethics, intergenerational justice, catastrophic risk, existential risk, risk analysis, animal welfare, environmental ethics Word count: 3,400 Introduction

It was only in the last century, with the invention of nuclear weapons, that the probability of human extinction could be appreciably affected by human action. Ever since, human extinction has generally been considered a terrible possibility. It’s surprising, then, that a search of JSTOR and the Philosopher’s Index suggests contemporary philosophers have written little about the ethics of human extinction. In fact, they seem to have written more about the extinction of other animals. Maybe this is because they consider human extinction impossible or inevitable; or maybe human extinction seems inconsequential compared to other moral issues.

In this paper I argue that the possibility of human extinction deserves more attention. While extinction events may be very improbable, their consequences are grave. Human extinction would not only condemn to non-existence all future human generations, it would also cut short the existence of all animal life, as natural events will eventually make Earth uninhabitable.The value of future lives. Leslie (1996) suggests philosophers’ nonchalance toward human extinction is due in large part to disagreements in population ethics. Some people suppose it does not matter if the number of lives lived in the future is small -- at its limit, zero.[2] In contrast, I assume here that moral value is a function of both the quality and number of lives in a history.[3] This view is consistent with most people’s intuition about extinction (that it’s bad) and with moral theories under which life is considered a benefit to those who have it, or under which life is a necessary condition for producing things of value (Broome, 2004; Hare, 1993; Holtug 2001, Ng, 1989; Parfit 1984; Sikora, 1978). For instance, some moral theories value things like experiences, satisfied preferences, achievements, friendships, or virtuous acts, which take place only in lives. On this view, an early death is bad (at least in part) because it cuts short the number of these valuable things. Similarly, on this view, an early extinction is bad (at least in part) because it cuts short the number of these valuable things. I think this view is plausible and think our best reasons for believing an early death is bad are our best reasons for believing an early extinction is bad. But such a view is controversial and I will not settle the controversy here.

I start from the premise that we ought to increase moral value by increasing both the quality and number of lives throughout history. I also take it, following Singer (2002), this maxim applies to all sentient beings capable of positive subjective feelings.

Life’s prospectsThe human population is now 6 billion (6 x 109). There are perhaps another trillion (1012) sentient animals on Earth, maybe a few orders more, depending on where sentience begins and ends in the animal kingdom (Gaston, Blackburn, and Goldewijk, 2003; Gaston and Evans, 2004). Animal life has existed on Earth for around 500 million years. Barring a dramatic intervention, all animal life on Earth will die in the next several billion years. Earth is located in a field of thousands of asteroids and comets. 65 million years ago, an asteroid 10 kilometers in size hit the Yucatan , creating clouds of dust and smoke that blocked sunlight for months, probably causing the extinction of 90% of animals, including dinosaurs. A 100 km impact, capable of extinguishing all animal life on Earth, is probable within a billion years (Morrison et al., 2002). If an asteroid does not extinguish all animal life, the Sun will. In one billion years, the Sun will begin its Red Giant stage, increasing in size and temperature. Within six billion years, the Sun will have evaporated all of Earth’s water, and terrestrial temperatures will reach 1000 degrees -- much too hot for amino acid-based life to persist. If, somehow, life were to survive these changes, it will die in 7 billion years when the Sun forms a planetary nebula that irradiates Earth (Sackmann, Boothroyd, Kraemer, 1993; Ward and Brownlee, 2002). Earth is a dangerous place and animal life here has dim prospects. If there are 1012 sentient animals on Earth, only 1021 life-years remain. The only hope for terrestrial sentience surviving well beyond this limit is that some force will deflect large asteroids before they collide with Earth, giving sentients another billion or more years of life (Gritzner and Kahle, 2004); and/or terrestrial sentients will colonize other solar systems, giving sentients up to another 100 trillion years of life until all stars begin to stop shining (Adams and Laughlin, 1997). Life might survive even longer if it exploits non-stellar energy sources. But it is hard to imagine how life could survive beyond the decay of nuclear matter expected in 1032 to 1041 years (Adams and Laughlin, 1997). This may be the upper limit on the future of sentience.[4] Deflecting asteroids and colonizing space could delay the extinction of Earth-originating sentience from 109 to 1041 years. Assuming an average population of one trillion sentients is maintained (which is a conservative assumption under colonization[5]), these interventions would create between 1021 and 1053[billion] life-years. At present on Earth, only a human civilization would be remotely capable of carrying out such projects. If humanity survives the next few centuries, it’s likely we will develop technologies needed for at least one of these projects. We may already possess the technologies needed to deflect asteroids (Gritzner and Kahle, 2004; Urias et al., 1996). And in the next few centuries, we’re likely to develop technologies that allow colonization. We will be strongly motivated by self-interest to colonize space, as asteroids and planets have valuable resources to mine, and as our survival ultimately requires relocating to another solar system (Kargel, 1994; Lewis, 1996). Extinction risks Being capable of preserving sentient life for another 1041 years makes human survival important. There may be nothing more important. If the human species is extinguished, all known sentience and certainly all Earth-originating sentience will be extinguished within a few billion years. We ought then pay more attention to what Bostrom (2002) has called “existential risks” -- risks “where an adverse outcome would either annihilate Earth-originating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential.” Such risks include: an asteroid or comet strikes Earth, creating enough debris to shut down photosynthesis for months; a supervolcano erupts, creating enough debris to shut down photosynthesis; a nearby supernova unleashes deadly radiation that reaches Earth; greenhouse gasses cause a radical change in climate; a nuclear holocaust creates enough debris to cause a “nuclear winter,” shutting down photosynthesis; a genetically engineered microbe is unleashed, by accident or design, killing most or all of humanity; or a high-energy physics experiment goes awry, creating a “true” vacuum or strangelets, destroying the Earth (Bostrom 2002; Bostrom and Cirkovic 2006; Leslie 1996, Posner 2004, Rees 2003). To me, most of these risks seem very unlikely. But dishearteningly, in their catalogs of these risks, Britain ’s Astronomer Royal, Sir Martin Rees (2003), gives humanity 50-50 odds of surviving the next few centuries, and philosophers John Leslie (1996) and Nick Bostrom (2002) put our chances at 70% and 75%, respectively.

Estimating the probabilities of unprecedented events is subjective, so we should treat these numbers skeptically. Still, even if the probabilities are orders lower, because the stakes are high, it could be justified to invest in extinction countermeasures. Matheny (2007) found that, even with traditional social discounting, investing in asteroid detection and mitigation is justified under standard cost-effectiveness analysis.Ought humanity be saved? Even accepting that future lives have value and that extinction risks can be cost-effectively reduced, there could still be reasons not to worry about human extinction. For instance, human lives might have negative moral value, in which case human extinction could be a good thing. This might have been Bertrand Russell’s sentiment when he wrote, “Although it is a gloomy view to suppose that life will die out, sometimes when I contemplate the things that people do with their lives I think it is almost a consolation.”[6] In the 20th century, more people, in absolute numbers, died of war, famine, and pestilence than ever before. But in the same century, more people did not die of war, famine, and pestilence than ever before. So even if we're especially pessimistic about average human welfare during the last century compared to others, it would be hard to argue that total welfare decreased. As long as average welfare was greater than zero – that is, the average life was preferable to suicide – then the century was a success for humanity. We will be capable of even greater moral nightmares in this century than in the last, but we will also be capable of securing greater welfare for a larger fraction of humanity. I suspect in this century, the average life will again be worth living, assuming we survive the century to judge. We should be more pessimistic when we review how nonhuman animals have fared in the last century. At present around 50 billion animals are raised and killed each year to feed humanity. (Many million animals are used for clothing, product testing, research, and entertainment, but their numbers are insignificant by comparison.) Since World War 2, with the invention of "factory farming," farm animals’ welfare has significantly deteriorated, as they now live in conditions that frustrate their most basic instincts (Singer, 2002, chapter 3). At the same time, we’re probably the only animal on Earth that routinely demonstrates compassion for other species. Such compassion is nearly universal in developed countries but we usually know too little, too late, for deeply ingrained habits, such as diets, to change. If improvements in other public morals were possible without any significant biological change in human nature, then the same should be true for our treatment of nonhuman animals, though it will take some time.

Even without any change in public morals, it seems unlikely we will continue to use animals for very long – at least, nowhere near 50 billion per year. Our most brutal use of animals results not from sadism but from old appetites now satisfied with **inefficient technologies** that have not fundamentally changed in 10,000 years. Ours is the first century where newer technologies -- plant or in vitro meats, or meat from brainless animals -- could satisfy human appetites for meat more efficiently and safely (Edelman et al, 2005). As these technologies mature and become cheaper, they will likely replace conventional meat. If the use of sentient animals survives much beyond this century, we should be very surprised. This thought is a cure for misanthropy. As long as most humans in the future don't use sentient animals, the vast number of good lives we can create would outweigh any sins humanity has committed or is likely to commit. Even if it takes a century for animal farming to be replaced by vegetarianism (or in vitro meats or brainless farm animals), the century of factory farming would represent around 1012 miserable life-years. That is one-billionth of the 1021 animal life-years humanity could save by protecting Earth from asteroids for a billion years. The century of industrialized animal use would thus be the equivalent of a terrible pain that lasts one second in an otherwise happy 100-year life. To accept human extinction now would be like committing suicide to end an unpleasant itch. If human life is extinguished, all known animal life will be extinguished when the Sun enters its Red Giant phase, if not earlier. Despite its current mistreatment of other animals, humanity is the animal kingdom’s best long-term hope for survival.

### Nuclear War O/W

#### Nuclear winter causes the destruction of the earth

Stephen H. Schneider, Melvin and Joan Lane Professor for Interdisciplinary Environmental Studies at Stanford University, 1988, “Whatever Happened to Nuclear Winter? An Editorial,” Climatic Change, Vol. 12, p. 217

What then is the current status of nuclear winter research? The single most important conclusion, I believe, from the work that has been conducted in the five years since the q-TAPS article, is the widespread consensus that has developed that the environmental and societal 'indirect' effects of a nuclear war are likely to be extremely serious, probably more threatening for the earth as a whole than the direct blasts or radioactivity in the target zones. Detailed international studies of the vulnerability of social and ecological systems (e.g., by Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985) followed up and confirmed earlier suggestions of Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1972), and Schneider and Mesirow, pp. 203-4, (1976) that societal chaos could ensue in non-combatant nations following a NATO/Warsaw Pact war. More recently, calculations made by Ghan and MacCracken at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and here at NCAR suggest that summer temperature depressions of several degrees C could be felt one or two years after a nuclear war was fought. Perhaps more significantly, precipitation decreases in the subtropics could lead to substantial soil moisture reductions in the summer monsoon belts of the north latitudes. (However, some moisture increases were noted in midlatitudes by Thompson even though temperature declines were observed, because the decrease in evaporation exceeded that of the decrease in precipitation.) Nevertheless, these results suggest that 'chronic' (a term coined by a SCOPE study - Pittock et al., 1985) effects could be substantially more serious than had been initially thought.

### Alt Fails

#### Rejecting anthropocentrism prevents the environmental movement from effectuating political change

Martin W. Lewis, 1992. Associate Research Professor of Geography, Duke University. Green Delusions: An Environmentalist Critique of Radical Environmentalism, 22]

It is widely accepted that environmental thinkers can be divided into two camps: those who favor the preservation of nature for nature's sake, and those who wish only to maintain the environment as the necessary habitat of humankind (see Pepper 1989; O'Riordan 1989; W. Fox 1990). In the first group stand the green radicals, while the second supposedly consists of environmental reformers, also labeled "shallow ecologists." Radicals often pull no punches in assailing the members of the latter camp for their anthropocentrism, managerialism, and gutless accommodationism--to some, "shallow ecology" is "just a more efficient form of exploitation and oppression" (quoted in Nash 1989:202). While this dichotomy may accurately depict some of the major approaches of the past, it is remarkably unhelpful for devising the kind of framework required for a truly effective environmental movement. It incorrectly assumes that those who adopt an anti-anthropocentric view (that is, one that accords intrinsic worth to nonhuman beings) will also embrace the larger political programs of radical environmentalism. Similarly, it portrays those who favor reforms within the political and economic structures of representative democracies as thereby excluding all nonhumans from the realm of moral consideration. Yet no convincing reasons are ever provided to show why these beliefs should necessarily be aligned in such a manner. (For an instructive discussion of the pitfalls of the anthropocentric versus nonanthropocentric dichotomy, see Norton 1987, chapter II.)

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# Risk

### Conditionality Bad

#### A. Fairness- No stable 2AC offense can’t game for later in the debate, it’s not reciprocal and it also allows them read opposite positions and use our offense on one against us on the other.

#### B. Education- prevents deep debates, and just has the 2NR go for the argument with the least ink.

#### C. critical thinking- no stable 1NC advocacy, and it’s not real world.

#### D. Rejecting the team is the only way to remedy abuse

### Permutation

#### Perm do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative

#### Perm: do both. If the alternative solves then it can solve any residual links to the perm.

#### Perm: do the affirmative and the alternative in all other instances.

#### Combining interpretative approach and complexity key

Cairney 10

(Paul, Chair in Politics and Public Policy¶ BA (Hons), MSc, PhD at Aberdeen University, “Bridging the Methodological Gap Between the Physical and Social Sciences: Complexity¶ Theory and Mixed Methods” <http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2010/121_496.pdf>, SEH)

Although the structure/ agency discussion is not unproblematic, it at least suggests that there¶ are people thinking seriously about how to overcome the wider philosophical issues regarding¶ how we characterise and observe complex social systems. It also opens the door to mixed¶ methods and projects which seek to produce lessons between them. The debate on the¶ relationship between structures, rules, institutions and agency is central to the key questions¶ in political science regarding who or what exercises power and why policy changes. It is also¶ inextricably linked to the methods that we use to answer those questions. For example, when¶ using complex systems theory and mathematical modelling to explain policy dynamics we¶ may focus on the explanatory power of rules and norms that bind behaviour. When using an¶ interpretive approach and qualitative methods we may focus on the links between meaning¶ and individual action; the extent to which rules are understood differently and not followed¶ uniformly. A mixed methods approach is therefore crucial to not only establish but also¶ qualify the value of complexity theory in political science. The divide between quantitative¶ and qualitative research in the social sciences has been compared to a religious or cultural¶ divide that often undermines serious collaboration (Mahoney and Goertz, 2006: 227). It¶ remains to be seen if the decision itself to collaborate negates much of this divide and if both¶ ‘sides’ can combine methods while remaining reflective about possible differences in¶ philosophical assumptions.

### Linear Predictions Good

#### Linear models can be useful for effective decisionmaking

Robyn M. Dawes. 1957. U of Oregon. The Robust Beauty of Improper Linear Models in Decision Making.American Psychologist. July.

The linear model cannot replace the expert in¶ deciding such things as "what to look for," but it¶ is precisely this knowledge of what to look for in¶ reaching the decision that is the special expertise¶ people have. Even in as complicated a judgment¶ as making a chess move, it is the ability to code¶ the board in an appropriate way to "see" the¶ proper moves that distinguishes the grand master¶ from the expert from the novice (deGroot, 1965;¶ Simon & Chase, 1973). It is not in the ability¶ to integrate information that people excel (Slovic,¶ Note 2). Again, the chess grand master considers¶ no more moves than does the expert; he just¶ knows which ones to look at. The distinction between¶ knowing what to look for and the ability¶ to integrate information is perhaps best illustrated¶ in a study by Einhorn (1972). Expert doctors¶ coded biopsies of patients with Hodgkin's disease¶ and then made an overall rating of the severity of¶ the process. The overall rating did not predict¶ survival time of the 193 patients, all of whom died. (The correlations of rating with survival¶ time were all virtually 0, some in the wrong direction.)¶ The variables that the doctors coded did,¶ however, predict survival time when they were¶ used in a multiple regression model.¶ In summary, proper linear models work for a¶ very simple reason. People are good at picking¶ out the right predictor variables and at coding¶ them in such a way that they have a conditionally¶ monotone relationship with the criterion. People¶ are bad at integrating information from diverse¶ and incomparable sources. Proper linear models¶ are good at such integration when the predictions¶ have a conditionally monotone relationship to the¶ criterion.

### Scenario-Planning Good

#### Even if predictions aren’t always accurate planning and modeling can be important tools for resilience. And, demands for linear theories inevitable.

Snyder and Schwab. 2012. Neil Snyder-National Renewable Energy Laboratory and Amy Schwab-National Renewable Energy Laboratory APPROACHES FOR PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING SUSTAINABLE ENERGY GROWTH IN A COMPLEX WORLD This work was supported by the U.S. Department of Energy under Contract No. DE-AC36-08-G028308 with the National Renewable Energy Laboratory.

[www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/54506.pdf](http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/54506.pdf)] Snyder 5

Building on the broad agreement of the need to move ¶ toward more sustainable energy systems, leaders and decision-makers will continue to request more sophisticated ¶ theories, models, and tools to guide their plans. Although ¶ decision-makers want comfort and predictability, in a ¶ changing world, they most need the perspectives, skills, and ¶ tools for gaining insight into the dynamics of shifting ¶ systems. New tools enable them to explore complex¶ interactions of possible scenarios and to acknowledge that ¶ risk is a feature of the world. This cultivates rapid awareness ¶ and quick reaction time to unpredictable events.¶ In the complex and shifting world of global energy systems, ¶ modelers’ and planners’ roles must shift from attempting to¶ predict the unpredictable to helping decision-makers cope ¶ successfully with the uncertainties of a globally ¶ interconnected world. Planning and modeling become even ¶ more important tools for building resilience and agility to ¶ adapt to emerging challenges and seize opportunities within¶ emerging global energy systems.

#### Predictions are accurate enough and should be used as a basis for political action

Chernoff 2009. Fred, Prof. IR and Dir. IR – Colgate U., European Journal of International Relations, “Conventionalism as an Adequate Basis for Policy-Relevant IR Theory”, 15:1

For these and other reasons, many social theorists and social scientists have come to the conclusion that prediction is impossible. Well-known IR reflexivists like Rick Ashley, Robert Cox, Rob Walker and Alex Wendt have attacked naturalism by emphasizing the interpretive nature of social theory. Ashley is explicit in his critique of prediction, as is Cox, who says quite simply, ‘It is impossible to predict the future’ (Ashley, 1986: 283; Cox, 1987: 139, cf. also 1987: 393). More recently, Heikki Patomäki has argued that ‘qualitative changes and emergence are possible, but predictions are not’ defective and that the latter two presuppose an unjustifiably narrow notion of ‘prediction’.14 A determined prediction sceptic may continue to hold that there is too great a degree of complexity of social relationships (which comprise ‘open systems’) to allow any prediction whatsoever. Two very simple examples may circumscribe and help to refute a radical variety of scepticism. First, we all make reliable social predictions and do so with great frequency. We can predict with high probability that a spouse, child or parent will react to certain well-known stimuli that we might supply, based on extensive past experience. More to the point of IR prediction – scepticism, we can imagine a young child in the UK who (perhaps at the cinema) (1) picks up a bit of 19th-century British imperial lore thus gaining a sense of the power of the crown, without knowing anything of current balances of power, (2) hears some stories about the US–UK invasion of Iraq in the context of the aim of advancing democracy, and (3) hears a bit about communist China and democratic Taiwan. Although the specific term ‘preventative strike’ might not enter into her lexicon, it is possible to imagine the child, whose knowledge is thus limited, thinking that if democratic Taiwan were threatened by China, the UK would (possibly or probably) launch a strike on China to protect it, much as the UK had done to help democracy in Iraq. In contrast to the child, readers of this journal and scholars who study the world more thoroughly have factual information (e.g. about the relative military and economic capabilities of the UK and China) and hold some cause-and-effect principles (such as that states do not usually initiate actions that leaders understand will have an extremely high probability of undercutting their power with almost no chances of success). Anyone who has adequate knowledge of world politics would predict that the UK will not launch a preventive attack against China. In the real world, China knows that for the next decade and well beyond the UK will not intervene militarily in its affairs. While Chinese leaders have to plan for many likely — and even a few somewhat unlikely — future possibilities, they do not have to plan for various implausible contingencies: they do not have to structure forces geared to defend against specifically UK forces and do not have to conduct diplomacy with the UK in a way that would be required if such an attack were a real possibility. Any rational decision-maker in China may use some cause-and-effect (probabilistic) principles along with knowledge of specific facts relating to the Sino-British relationship to predict (P2) that the UK will not land its forces on Chinese territory — even in the event of a war over Taiwan (that is, the probability is very close to zero). The statement P2 qualifies as a prediction based on DEF above and counts as knowledge for Chinese political and military decision-makers. A Chinese diplomat or military planner who would deny that theory-based prediction would have no basis to rule out extremely implausible predictions like P2 and would thus have to prepare for such unlikely contingencies as UK action against China. A reflexivist theorist sceptical of ‘prediction’ in IR might argue that the China example distorts the notion by using a trivial prediction and treating it as a meaningful one. But the critic’s temptation to dismiss its value stems precisely from the fact that it is so obviously true. The value to China of knowing that the UK is not a military threat is significant. The fact that, under current conditions, any plausible cause-and-effect understanding of IR that one might adopt would yield P2, that the ‘UK will not attack China’, does not diminish the value to China of knowing the UK does not pose a military threat. A critic might also argue that DEF and the China example allow non-scientific claims to count as predictions. But we note that while physics and chemistry offer precise ‘point predictions’, other natural sciences, such as seismology, genetics or meteorology, produce predictions that are often much less specific; that is, they describe the predicted ‘events’ in broader time frame and typically in probabilistic terms. We often find predictions about the probability, for example, of a seismic event in the form ‘some time in the next three years’ rather than ‘two years from next Monday at 11:17 am’. DEF includes approximate and probabilistic propositions as predictions and is thus able to catagorize as a prediction the former sort of statement, which is of a type that is often of great value to policy-makers. With the help of these ‘non-point predictions’ coming from the natural and the social sciences, leaders are able to choose the courses of action (e.g. more stringent earthquake-safety building codes, or procuring an additional carrier battle group) that are most likely to accomplish the leaders’ desired ends. So while ‘point predictions’ are not what political leaders require in most decision-making situations, critics of IR predictiveness often attack the predictive capacity of IR theory for its inability to deliver them. The critics thus commit the straw man fallacy by requiring a sort of prediction in IR (1) that few, if any, theorists claim to be able to offer, (2) that are not required by policy-makers for theory-based predictions to be valuable, and (3) that are not possible even in some natural sciences.15 The range of theorists included in ‘reflexivists’ here is very wide and it is possible to dissent from some of the general descriptions. From the point of view of the central argument of this article, there are two important features that should be rendered accurately. One is that reflexivists reject explanation–prediction symmetry, which allows them to pursue causal (or constitutive) explanation without any commitment to prediction. The second is that almost all share clear opposition to predictive social science.16 The reflexivist commitment to both of these conclusions should be evident from the foregoing discussion.

### IR Predictions Possible

#### IR predictions are possible

HARVEY, 97Frank Harvey, associate professor of Political Science, Dalhouse University, The Future’s Back: Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, And Crisis Stability After The Cold War, 1997, p. 139

Finally, the lack of purity and precision, another consequence of linguistic relativism, does not necessarily imply irrelevance of purpose or approach. The study of [IR] international relations may not be exact, given limitations noted by Wittgenstein and others, but precision is a practical research problem, not an insurmountable barrier to progress. In fact, most observers who point to the context-dependent nature of language are critical not so much of the social sciences but of the incorrect application of scientific techniques to derive overly precise measurement of weakly developed concepts. Clearly, our understanding of the causes of international conflict—and most notably war—has improved considerably as a consequence of applying sound scientific methods and valid operationalizations. The alternative approach, implicit in much of the postmodern literature, is to fully accept the inadequacy of positivism, throw one’s hands up in failure, given the complexity of the subject, and repudiate the entire enterprise. The most relevant question is whether we would know more or less about international relations if we pursued that strategy.

### Scenario-planning inevitable

#### Scenario planning is inevitable and essential to survival

Mats Lindgren and Hans Bandhold. 2003. Scenario Planning: The Link Between Future and Strategy. P 1.

We chose to call this book Scenario Planning: The Link Between¶ Future and Strategy because scenario planning is what we do as¶ human beings all the time. The healthy brain is constantly writing¶ scenarios, interpreting signals in the environment and reframing¶ them into meaningful images of and trajectories into the future.¶ Healthy organizations do this too. We often spend the summers cruising the Swedish archipelago. In¶ July the narrow sounds are crowded with Swedish, Finnish, Danish,¶ German, Dutch and even British boats, and the winds in the inner¶ parts of the archipelago are hard to predict. The numerous islands¶ cause constant wind shifts, both in direction and speed. As a sailor¶ you have to be very alert so as not to lose the wind.¶ Amazingly there are very few accidents at sea. After almost 20 years¶ sailing we have not yet seen any collision. The reason for this is the¶ brain’s extreme capacity to interpret huge amounts of information¶ intuitively, to calculate the speed and direction of other boats, keep¶ track of one’s own direction and the position of surrounding banks,¶ rocks and buoys, and at the same time prepare for alternative actions¶ if an oncoming boat changes direction earlier than expected. All this¶ is managed instinctively, and as a sailor I can keep an eye on dozens¶ of boats simultaneously.¶ Through experience, sailors improve their ability to interpret¶ external signals. Their brains become better and better at generating ‘sailing scenarios’, just as the football player over time becomes¶ better at football scenario generation.¶ Without the ability to draw scenarios, and from those scenarios¶ alternative strategies, we would not live very long. We would not be¶ able to catch a ball, beat through a narrow sound or manage a journey on a bike. All these activities depend on our ability to observe¶ and interpret external signals and to develop coping strategies.

### Empiricism Good

#### Rejecting strategic predictions of threats makes them inevitable—decisionmakers will rely on preconceived conceptions over qualified analysts

Fitzsimmons, 07 (Michael, “The Problem of Uncertainty in Strategic Planning”, Survival, Winter 06/07)

But handling even this weaker form of uncertainty is still quite challeng- ing. **If not sufficiently bounded, a high degree of variability in planning factors can exact a significant price on planning. The complexity presented by great variability strains the cognitive abilities of even the most sophisticated decision- makers**.15 And even a robust decision-making process sensitive to cognitive limitations necessarily sacrifices depth of analysis for breadth as variability and complexity grows. It should follow, then, that in planning under conditions of risk, **variability in strategic calculation should be carefully tailored to available analytic and decision processes**. Why is this important? What harm can an imbalance between complexity and cognitive or analytic capacity in strategic planning bring? Stated simply, **where analysis is silent or inadequate, the personal beliefs of decision-makers fill the void**. As political scientist Richard Betts found in a study of strategic sur- prise, **in ‘an environment that lacks clarity, abounds with conflicting data, and allows no time for rigorous assessment of sources and validity, ambiguity allows intuition or wishfulness to drive interpretation ... The greater the ambiguity, the greater the impact of preconception**s.’16 The decision-making environment that Betts describes here is one of political-military crisis, not long-term strategic planning. But **a strategist who sees uncertainty as the central fact** of his environ- ment **brings upon** himself some of **the pathologies of crisis decision-making**. He invites ambiguity, takes conflicting data for granted and substitutes a priori scepticism about the validity of prediction for time pressure **as a rationale for discounting the importance of analytic rigour**. It is important not to exaggerate the extent to which data and ‘rigorous assessment’ can illuminate strategic choices. Ambiguity is a fact of life, and scepticism of analysis is necessary. Accordingly, the intuition and judgement of decision-makers will always be vital to strategy, and attempting to subordinate those factors to some formulaic, deterministic decision-making model would be both undesirable and unrealistic. All the same, there is danger in the opposite extreme as well. **Without careful analysis of what is relatively likely and what is relatively unlikely**, what will be the possible bases for strategic choices? **A decision-maker with no faith in prediction is left with little more than** a set of worst-case scenarios and his **existing beliefs about the world** to confront the choices before him. **Those beliefs may be more or less well founded, but if they are not made explicit and subject to analysis and debate regarding their application to particular strategic contexts, they remain only beliefs and premises**, **rather than rational judgements**. **Even at their best, such decisions are likely to be poorly understood by the organisations charged with their implementation.** At their worst, such decisions may be poorly understood by the decision-makers themselves.

### Alternative

#### Double bind – either the alternative does the aff which makes it a floating PIC – that moots all 1ac and 2AC offense and make it impossible to be aff – it’s a voter for fairness and education – OR it doesn’t do the aff which means case is a disad

#### Complexity theory useless for policy making

Cairney 10

(Paul, Chair in Politics and Public Policy¶ BA (Hons), MSc, PhD at Aberdeen University, “Complexity Theory in Public Policy” <http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2010/121_665.pdf>, SEH)

Why has Complexity Theory Struggled for Attention?¶ The first difficulty with complexity theory is that it is difficult to pin down. While we¶ may find similar discussions in a wide range of texts in the literature, this may be merely¶ because it is vague. Its appeal in the sciences may be because it means different things to¶ different people, suggesting that initial enthusiasm and cross-disciplinary cooperation may be replaced by growing scepticism.¶ The second is that, when we do pin the meaning of complexity theory down, it seems to¶ present a deterministic argument. The danger is that if the complex system is¶ predominantly the causal factor then we lose sight of the role that policymakers play;¶ there may be a tendency to treat the system as a rule-bound structure which leaves¶ minimal room for the role of agency. It is tempting to contrast this picture with¶ interpretive social science which rejects the assumption of structural constraint. Rather, it¶ explores how agents perceive their decision-making environments; how they reproduce,¶ accept or challenge the structural, institutional and wider systemic constraints that they¶ appear to face when making decisions. Indeed, they may even reject terms such as¶ ‘institution’ and ‘rule’ because they imply a sense of permanence or common¶ understanding that has not been demonstrated (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003; 2006). This is¶ the essence of the study of politics, explaining why different policymakers make different¶ decisions under the same circumstances. Yet, there is perhaps good reason to resist this¶ temptation because, if the aim of complexity theory is to identify a shift in rule-bound¶ behaviour, then it could have something in common with interpretivist accounts which¶ seek to understand how agents interpret, adapt to and influence their decision-making¶ environment. This seems to be Teisman and Klijn’s (2008: 289) point when they focus¶ on agents adapting to the fitness landscape. Further, as Schneider and Bauer (2007: 6)¶ discuss, complexity theory appears to differ from the old functionalist logic of systems¶ theories that has gone out of fashion in political science. A kinder treatment of¶ complexity suggests that, so far, it has been used in public policy more to provide¶ practical advice to public managers than to inform the wider theological debates on¶ structure and agency we find in political science. I return to this theme in the next¶ section. The third is that it is difficult to identify or define a system and separate it from its¶ environment. For Mitleton-Kelly (2003: 30) this is not a problem because it is useful to¶ work on the assumption that there is no fixed boundary between the two. Rather, the¶ picture is one of overlapping systems or an ‘intricate web of inter-relationships’,¶ suggesting that systems as a whole engage in ‘co-evolution’. Rather than a system¶ adapting to its environment, we picture organisations influencing and being influenced by¶ the ‘social ecosystem’ which consists of other organisations (2003: 31).¶ This conclusion raises a fourth problem related to scale or perspective in complex¶ systems. Not only do we not know what a complex system is, but we don’t know at what¶ level we should view it. Wider scientific accounts relate the benefit of complexity theory¶ to the ability to step back and see the system as a whole, in much the same way that we¶ move from looking at molecules to observing the whole being. Yet, this doesn’t guide us¶ too much, because we could still see systems at different levels, such as a healthcare¶ system or a political system or even an international political system (plus authors such as¶ Mitleton-Kelly often seem to situate analysis at the organisational level). While this¶ gives us some flexibility, it could raise a whole host of further theoretical questions (are¶ central policymakers situated within, or treated as external to, the systems they cannot¶ control? If a country’s political system is made up of a number of other systems, does this suggest that there are super-emergent processes when systems interact with each¶ other?).¶ The fifth is that it is difficult to know which types of policy issue or area complexity¶ theory applies to. For example, Klijn (2008: 314) suggests that complexity theory is best¶ suited to ‘wicked problems’, suggesting that it refers primarily to issues of joined-upgovernment¶ and/ or intractable policy problems (what would this exclude?). Bovaird¶ (2008: 325) suggests that complex systems “are less likely to be found in ‘command-andcontrol’¶ environments”. This is confusing for two related reasons. First, the best¶ example in the UK of a command-and-control approach is the English NHS. Yet,¶ Kernick (2006) argues that complexity theory is well suited to explain why the NHS is¶ impervious to central control. Second, perhaps Bovaird is referring not to areas with¶ command-and-control styles, but those conducive to them. If so, there seems to be no¶ way to decide which areas are most relevant. The irony of governance, highlighted by¶ Rhodes (1997), in which successive governments have contributed to their own lack of¶ central control, knows no bounds. Perhaps the point is that the identification of¶ emergence and self-organizing behaviour is most likely in areas where the role of the¶ ‘centre’ is not strong, but this also raises further issues (below). The sixth is that, although anti-reductionism and whole-systems approaches sound¶ attractive (almost like a valence issue), reductionist theories have a strong hold in¶ political science. Indeed, rational choice theory may represent complexity theory’s¶ poplar opposite because it seeks parsimonious results based on a reduction of the social¶ world into as few factors as possible. This is as much a practical as a philosophical issue.¶ While we may view the world as a complex system, we do not have the ability to study it¶ as one. The ACF, for example, situates analysis at the level of the subsystem and¶ identifies two main processes: a process of learning within subsystems as advocacy¶ coalitions compete to define the policy problem and account for new information, and an¶ external process which may produce shocks to the system that change how the subsystem¶ operates (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Weible et al, 2009). The interesting aspect¶ of this framework is that, while from a complex systems perspective we may prefer to¶ study the system as a whole, the ACF may be no worse a way to study the process when¶ we are faced with limited resources and cognitive abilities.¶ A final problem may be that complexity theory complicates the study of public policy¶ without offering something new. This point seems strongest when applied to the study¶ of implementation. For example, one case study in the PMR special issue demonstrates¶ ‘how local governments develop contrasting behaviour on the same national policy¶ impulse due to self-organizing abilities to combine adaptiveness and self referentiality’¶ (Teisman and Klijn, 2008: 296), but Teisman and Klijn do not show how this differs from¶ similar ‘bottom-up’ processes of self-selection in implementation structures (Hjern, 1981;¶ Hjern and Porter, 1982) or street-level bureaucracy (Lipsky, 1980) identified 30 years ago¶ (also compare Buuren and Gerrits’ 2008: 382 line that ‘decisions are neither the starting¶ nor the finishing points of a decision-making process’ with Barret and Fudge’s focus on¶ ‘policy in action’). Similarly, the statement that complexity theory shows us that¶ ‘managers are not the rational beings presented in many managerial handbooks (Teisman and Klijn, 2008: 297) does not seem startlingly original. We are in the very¶ familiar territory of uncertain policy effects and unintended consequences. A¶ sympathetic assessment might suggest that these points are being restated because the¶ lessons from bottom-up studies have been lost or ignored. This seems to be the tone of¶ Butler and Allan’s (2008) argument that there is no one-best-way in the delivery of local¶ services and in Kernick’s (2006: 388) criticism of the assumption of a single¶ organizational solution in the NHS (and promotion of a more meaningful dialogue¶ between those who design and those who deliver and use the service). But is there¶ anything more to complexity theory than this?

### Threats real

#### Threats are not socially constructed- decision makers use the most objective, rational, and accurate assessments possible- there are no bureaucratic or ideological motivations to invent threats.

Ravenal ‘9

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Quite expectedly, the more doctrinaire of the non-interventionists take pains to deny any straightforward, and therefore legitimate, security motive in American foreign and military policy. In fact, this denial leads to a more sweeping rejection of any recognizably rational basis for American foreign policy, and, even, sometimes (among the more theoretical of the non-interventionists), a preference for non-rational accounts, or “models,” of virtually any nation’s foreign policy-making.4 One could call this tendency among anti-imperialists “motive displacement.” More specifically, in the cases under review here, one notes a receptivity to any reworking of history, and any current analysis of geopolitics, that denigrates “the threat”; and, along with this, a positing of “imperialism” (the almost self-referential and primitive impulse) as a sufficient explanation for the often strenuous and risky actions of great powers such as the United States. Thus, not only is “empire” taken to be a sufficient and, in some cases, a necessary condition in bringing about foreign “threats”; but, by minimizing the extent and seriousness of these threats, the anti-imperialists put themselves into the position of lacking a rational explanation for the derivation of the (pointless at best, counter-productive at worst) policies that they designate as imperialistic. A pungent example of this threat denigration and motive displacement is Eland’s account of American intervention in the Korean and Vietnam wars:¶ After North Korea invaded, the Truman administration intervened merely for the purpose of a demonstration to friends and foes alike. Likewise, according to eminent cold war historians, the United States did not inter- vene in Vietnam because it feared communism, which was fragmented, or the Soviet Union, which wanted détente with the West, or China, which was weak, but because it did not want to appear timid to the world. The behavior of the United States in both Korea and Vietnam is typical of imperial powers, which are always concerned about their reputation, pres- tige, and perceived resolve. (Eland 2004, 64)¶ Of course, the motive of “reputation,” to the extent that it exists in any particular instance, is a part of the complex of motives that characterize a great power that is drawn toward the role of hegemon (not the same thing as “empire”). Reputation is also a component of the power projec- tion that is designed to serve the interest of national security. Rummaging through the concomitants of “imperialism,” Eland (2004, 65) discovers the thesis of “threat inflation” (in this case, virtual threat invention): Obviously, much higher spending for the military, homeland security, and foreign aid are required for a policy of global intervention than for a policy of merely defending the republic. For example, after the cold war, the security bureaucracies began looking for new enemies to justify keeping defense and intelligence budgets high. Similarly, Eland (ibid., 183), in a section entitled “Imperial Wars Spike Corporate Welfare,” attributes a large portion of the U.S. defense budget—particularly the procurement of major weapons systems, such as “Virginia-class submarines . . . aircraft carriers . . . F-22 fighters . . . [and] Osprey tilt-rotor transport aircraft”—not to the systemically derived requirement for certain kinds of military capabilities, but, rather, to the imperatives of corporate pork. He opines that such weapons have no stra- tegic or operational justification; that “the American empire, militarily more dominant than any empire in world history, can fight brushfire wars against terrorists and their ‘rogue’ state sponsors without those gold- plated white elephants.”¶ The underlying notion of “the security bureaucracies . . . looking for new enemies” is a threadbare concept that has somehow taken hold across the political spectrum, from the radical left (viz. Michael Klare [1981], who refers to a “threat bank”), to the liberal center (viz. Robert H. Johnson [1997], who dismisses most alleged “threats” as “improbable dangers”), to libertarians (viz. Ted Galen Carpenter [1992], Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy of the Cato Institute, who wrote a book entitled A Search for Enemies). What is missing from most analysts’ claims of “threat inflation,” however, is a convincing theory of why, say, the American government significantly (not merely in excusable rhetoric) might magnify and even invent threats (and, more seriously, act on such inflated threat estimates). In a few places, Eland (2004, 185) suggests that such behavior might stem from military or national security bureaucrats’ attempts to enhance their personal status and organizational budgets, or even from the influence and dominance of “the military-industrial complex”; viz.: “Maintaining the empire and retaliating for the blowback from that empire keeps what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex fat and happy.” Or, in the same section:¶ In the nation’s capital, vested interests, such as the law enforcement bureaucracies . . . routinely take advantage of “crises”to satisfy parochial desires. Similarly, many corporations use crises to get pet projects— a.k.a. pork—funded by the government. And national security crises, because of people’s fears, are especially ripe opportunities to grab largesse. (Ibid., 182)¶ Thus, “bureaucratic-politics” theory, which once made several reputa- tions (such as those of Richard Neustadt, Morton Halperin, and Graham Allison) in defense-intellectual circles, and spawned an entire sub-industry within the field of international relations,5 is put into the service of dismissing putative security threats as imaginary. So, too, can a surprisingly cognate theory, “public choice,”6 which can be considered the right-wing analog of the “bureaucratic-politics” model, and is a preferred interpretation of governmental decision- making among libertarian observers. As Eland (2004, 203) summarizes:¶ Public-choice theory argues [that] the government itself can develop sepa- rate interests from its citizens. The government reflects the interests of powerful pressure groups and the interests of the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats in them. Although this problem occurs in both foreign and domestic policy, it may be more severe in foreign policy because citizens pay less attention to policies that affect them less directly.¶ There is, in this statement of public-choice theory, a certain ambiguity, and a certain degree of contradiction: Bureaucrats are supposedly, at the same time, subservient to societal interest groups and autonomous from society in general.¶ This journal has pioneered the argument that state autonomy is a likely consequence of the public’s ignorance of most areas of state activity (e.g., Somin 1998; DeCanio 2000a, 2000b, 2006, 2007; Ravenal 2000a). But state autonomy does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats substitute their own interests for those of what could be called the “national society” that they ostensibly serve. I have argued (Ravenal 2000a) that, precisely because of the public-ignorance and elite-expertise factors, and especially because the opportunities—at least for bureaucrats (a few notable post-government lobbyist cases nonwithstanding)—for lucrative self-dealing are stringently fewer in the defense and diplomatic areas of government than they are in some of the contract-dispensing and more under-the-radar-screen agencies of government, the “public-choice” imputation of self-dealing, rather than working toward the national interest (which, however may not be synonymous with the interests, perceived or expressed, of citizens!) is less likely to hold. In short, state autonomy is likely to mean, in the derivation of foreign policy, that “state elites” are using rational judgment, in insulation from self-promoting interest groups—about what strategies, forces, and weapons are required for national defense.¶ Ironically, “public choice”—not even a species of economics, but rather a kind of political interpretation—is not even about “public” choice, since, like the bureaucratic-politics model, it repudiates the very notion that bureaucrats make truly “public” choices; rather, they are held, axiomatically, to exhibit “rent-seeking” behavior, wherein they abuse their public positions in order to amass private gains, or at least to build personal empires within their ostensibly official niches. Such sub- rational models actually explain very little of what they purport to observe. Of course, there is some truth in them, regarding the “behavior” of some people, at some times, in some circumstances, under some conditions of incentive and motivation. But the factors that they posit operate mostly as constraints on the otherwise rational optimization of objectives that, if for no other reason than the playing out of official roles, transcends merely personal or parochial imperatives.¶ My treatment of “role” differs from that of the bureaucratic-politics theorists, whose model of the derivation of foreign policy depends heavily, and acknowledgedly, on a narrow and specific identification of the role- playing of organizationally situated individuals in a partly conflictual “pulling and hauling” process that “results in” some policy outcome. Even here, bureaucratic-politics theorists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999, 311) allow that “some players are not able to articulate [sic] the governmental politics game because their conception of their job does not legitimate such activity.” This is a crucial admission, and one that points— empirically—to the need for a broader and generic treatment of role.¶ Roles (all theorists state) give rise to “expectations” of performance. My point is that virtually every governmental role, and especially national-security roles, and particularly the roles of the uniformed mili- tary, embody expectations of devotion to the “national interest”; rational- ity in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and objectivity in the treatment of parameters, especially external parameters such as “threats” and the power and capabilities of other nations.¶ Sub-rational models (such as “public choice”) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to the “national” interest (or even the possibility that the national interest may be honestly misconceived in more paro- chial terms). In contrast, an official’s role connects the individual to the (state-level) process, and moderates the (perhaps otherwise) self-seeking impulses of the individual. Role-derived behavior tends to be formalized and codified; relatively transparent and at least peer-reviewed, so as to be consistent with expectations; surviving the particular individual and trans- mitted to successors and ancillaries; measured against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function and therefore derived from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious aggrandizement are conspicuously discouraged.¶ My own direct observation suggests that defense decision-makers attempt to “frame” the structure of the problems that they try to solve on the basis of the most accurate intelligence. They make it their business to know where the threats come from. Thus, threats are not “socially constructed” (even though, of course, some values are).¶ A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much security planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circum- stances that offer scope for idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and reviewed organizational frameworks. Non-rationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend to get filtered out. People are fired for presenting skewed analysis and for making bad predictions. This is because something important is riding on the causal analysis and the contingent prediction. For these reasons, “public choice” does not have the “feel” of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decision-making. In that structure, obvious, and even not-so-obvious, “rent-seeking” would not only be shameful; it would present a severe risk of career termination. And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place for truly talented rent-seekers to operate, compared to opportunities for personal profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrat’s very self-placement in these reaches of government testi- fies either to a sincere commitment to the national interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.

### Epistemology Focus Bad – Paradigm Wars

#### Epistemology focus causes endless paradigm wars.

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As a community, we in the academic study of international politics spend too much time worrying about the kind of issues addressed in this essay. The central point of IR scholarship is to increase our knowledge of how the world works, not to worry about how (or whether) we can know how the world works. What matters for IR is ontology, not epistemology. This doesn’t mean that there are no interesting epistemological questions in IR, and even less does it mean that there are no important political or sociological aspects to those questions. Indeed there are, as I have suggested above, and as a discipline IR should have more awareness of these aspects. At the same time, however, these are questions best addressed by philosophers and sociologists of knowledge, not political scientists. Let’s face it: most IR scholars, including this one, have little or no proper training in epistemology, and as such the attempt to solve epistemological problems anyway will inevitably lead to confusion (after all, after 2000 years, even the specialists are still having a hard time). Moreover, as long as we let our research be driven in an open-minded fashion by substantive questions and problems rather than by epistemologies and methods, there is little need to answer epistemological questions either. It is simply not the case that we have to undertake an epistemological analysis of how we can know something before we can know it, a fact amply attested to by the success of the natural sciences, whose practitioners are only rarely forced by the results of their inquiries to consider epistemological questions. In important respects we do know how international politics works, and it doesn’t much matter how we came to that knowledge. In that light, going into the epistemology business will distract us from the real business of IR, which is international politics. Our great debates should be about first-order issues of substance, like the ‘first debate’ between Realists and Idealists, not second-order issues of method. Unfortunately, it is no longer a simple matter for IR scholars to ‘just say no’ to epistemological discourse. The problem is that this discourse has already contaminated our thinking about international politics, helping to polarize the discipline into ‘paradigm wars’. Although the resurgence of these wars in the 1980s and 90s is due in large part to the rise of post-positivism, its roots lie in the epistemological anxiety of positivists, who since the 1950s have been very concerned to establish the authority of their work as Science. This is an important goal, one that I share, but its implementation has been marred by an overly narrow conception of science as being concerned only with causal questions that can be answered using the methods of natural science. The effect has been to marginalize historical and interpretive work that does not fit this mould, and to encourage scholars interested in that kind of work to see themselves as somehow not engaged in science. One has to wonder whether the two sides should be happy with the result. Do positivists really mean to suggest that it is not part of science to ask questions about how things are constituted, questions which if those things happen to be made of ideas might only be answerable by interpretive methods? If so, then they seem to be saying that the double-helix model of DNA, and perhaps much of rational choice theory, is not science. And do post-positivists really mean to suggest that students of social life should not ask causal questions or attempt to test their claims against empirical evidence? If so, then it is not clear by what criteria their work should be judged, or how it differs from art or revelation. On both sides, in other words, the result of the Third Debate’s sparring over epistemology is often one-sided, intolerant caricatures of science.

# Egyptianism

#### The aff’s relationship to death is one of up-front recognition and humility. By banishing the specter of death, they just make the sarcophagus invisible, turning confrontation into obsession

Dollimore, Sociology – U Sussex, ’98

(Jonathan, **Death, Desire and Loss in Western Culture**, pg. 221)

Jean Baudrillard presents the argument for the existence of a denial of death in its most extreme form. For him, this denial is not only deeply symptomatic of contemporary reality, but represents an insidious and pervasive form of ideological control. His account depends heavily upon a familiar critique of the Enlightenment's intellectual, cultural and political legacy. This critique has become influential in recent cultural theory, though Baudrillard's version of it is characteristically uncompromising and sweeping, and more reductive than most. The main claim is that Enlightenment rationality is an instrument not of freedom and democratic empowerment but, on the contrary, of repression and violence. Likewise with the Enlightenment's secular emphasis upon a common humanity; for Baudrillard this resulted in what he calls 'the cancer of the Human' - far from being an inclusive category of emancipation, the idea of a universal humanity made possible the demonizing of difference and the repressive privileging of the normal: the 'Human' is from the outset the institution of its structural double, the 'Inhuman\*. This is all it is: the progress of Humanity and Culture are simply the chain of discriminations with which to brand 'Others' with inhumanity, and therefore with nullity, {p. 125) Baudrillard acknowledges here the influence of Michel Foucault, but goes on to identify something more fundamental and determining than anything identified by Foucault: at the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture, however, is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death, (p. 12.6) So total is this exclusion that, 'today, it is not normal to be dead, and this is new. To be dead is an unthinkable anomaly; nothing else is as offensive as this. Death is a delinquency, and an incurable deviancy' (p. 126). He insists that the attempt to abolish death (especially through capitalist accumulation), to separate it from life, leads only to a culture permeated by death - 'quite simply, ours is a culture of death' (p. 127). Moreover, it is the repression of death which facilitates 'the repressive socialization of life'; all existing agencies of repression and control take root in the disastrous separation of death from life (p. 130). And, as if that were not enough, our very concept of reality has its origin in the same separation or disjunction (pp. 130-33). Modern culture is contrasted with that of the primitive and the savage, in which, allegedly, life and death were not separated; also with that of the Middle Ages, where, allegedly, there was still a collectivist, 'folkloric and joyous' conception of death. This and many other aspects of the argument are questionable, but perhaps the main objection to Baudrillard's case is his view of culture as a macro-conspiracy conducted by an insidious ideological prime-mover whose agency is always invisibly at work (rather like God). Thus (from just one page), the political economy supposedly ^intends\* to eliminate death through accumulation; and 'our whole culture is just one huge effort to dissociate life and death' {p. 147; my emphases). What those like Baudrillard find interesting about death is not the old conception of it as a pre-cultural constant which diminishes the significance of all cultural achievement, but, on the contrary, its function as a culturally relative - which is to say culturally formative - construct. And, if cultural relativism is on the one hand about relinquishing the comfort of the absolute, for those like Baudrillard it is also about the new strategies of intellectual mastery made possible by the very disappearance of the absolute. Such modern accounts of how death is allegedly denied, of how death is the supreme ideological fix, entail a new intensity and complexity of interpretation and decipherment, a kind of hermeneutics of death. To reinterpret death as a deep effect of ideology, even to the extent of regarding it as the most fundamental ideological adhesive of modern political repression and social control, is simultaneously to denounce it as in some sense a deception or an illusion, and to bring it within the domain of knowledge and analysis as never before. Death, for so long regarded as the ultimate reality - that which disempowers the human and obliterates all human achievement, including the achievements of knowledge - now becomes the object of a hugely empowering knowledge. Like omniscient seers, intellectuals like Baudrillard and Bauman relentlessly anatomize and diagnose the modern (or post-modern) human condition in relation to an ideology of death which becomes the key with which to unlock the secret workings of Western culture in all its insidiousness. Baudrillard in particular applies his theory relentlessly, steamrollering across the cultural significance of the quotidian and the contingent. His is an imperialist, omniscient analytic, a perpetual act of reductive generalization, a self-empowering intellectual performance which proceeds without qualification and without any sense that something might be mysterious or inexplicable. As such it constitutes a kind of interpretative, theoretical violence, an extreme but still representative instance of how the relentless anatomizing and diagnosis of death in the modern world has become a struggle for empowerment through masterful -i.e. reductive - critique. Occasionally one wonders if the advocates of the denial-of-death argument are not themselves in denial. They speak about death endlessly yet indirectly, analysing not death so much as our culture's attitude towards it. To that extent it is not the truth of death but the truth of our culture that they seek. But, even as they make death signify in this indirect way, it is still death that is compelling them to speak. And those like Baudrillard and Bauman speak urgently, performing intellectually a desperate mimicry of the omniscience which death denies. One senses that the entire modern enterprise of relativizing death, of understanding it culturally and socially, may be an attempt to disavow it in the very act of analysing and demystifying it. Ironically then, for all its rejection of the Enlightenment's arrogant belief in the power of rationality, this analysis of death remains indebted to a fundamental Enlightenment aspiration to mastery through knowledge. Nothing could be more 'Enlightenment', in the pejorative sense that Baudrillard describes, than his own almost megalomaniac wish to penetrate the truth of death, and the masterful controlling intellectual subject which that attempt presupposes. And this may be true to an extent for all of us more or less involved in the anthropological or quasi-anthropological accounts of death which assume that, by looking at how a culture handles death, we disclose things about a culture which it does not know about itself. So what has been said of sex in the nineteenth century may also be true of death in the twentieth: it has not been repressed so much as resignified in new, complex and productive ways which then legitimate a never-ending analysis of it. It is questionable whether the denial of death has ever really figured in our culture in the way that Baudrillard and Bauman suggest. Of course, the ways of dealing with and speaking about death have changed hugely, and have in some respects involved something like denial. But in philosophical and literary terms there has never been a denial of death.2 Moreover, however understood, the pre-modern period can hardly be said to have been characterized by the 'healthy\* attitude that advocates of the denial argument often claim, imply or assume. In fact it could be said that we can begin to understand the vital role of death in Western culture only when we accept death as profoundly, compellingly and irreducibly traumatic.

#### Turn – the law and social institutions should not be abandoned as they facilitate struggle and the affirmation of life while preventing slavishness

Lawrence J. Hatab. 2002. Louis I. Jaffe Professor of Philosophy and University Professor at Old Dominion University “Prospects For A Democratic Agon: Why We Can Still Be Nietzscheans” The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 24 (2002) 132-147 Project Muse

Those who take Nietzsche to be diagnosing social institutions as descendants of slave morality should take note of GM II,11, where Nietzsche offers some interesting reflections on justice and law. He indicates that the global economy of nature is surely not a function of justice; yet workable conceptions of justice and injustice are established by the historical force of human law. Nietzsche does not indict such forces as slavish infirmities. Legal arrangements are "exceptional conditions" that modulate natural forces of power in [End Page 136] social directions, and that are not an elimination of conflict but an instrument in channeling the continuing conflict of different power complexes. Surprisingly, Nietzsche attributes the historical emergence of law not to reactive resentment but to active, worldly forces that check and redirect the "senseless raging of revenge," and that are able to reconfigure offenses as more "impersonal" violations of legal provisions rather than sheer personal injuries. Here Nietzsche analyzes the law in a way analogous to his account of the Greek agon and its healthy sublimation of natural impulses for destruction. A legal system is a life-promoting cultural force that refashions natural energies in less savage and more productive directions. Finally, those who read Nietzsche as an anti-institutional transgressor and creator should heed TI ("Skirmishes of an Untimely Man," 39), where Nietzsche clearly diagnoses a repudiation of institutions as a form of decadence. Because of our modern faith in a foundational individual freedom, we no longer have the instincts for forming and sustaining the traditions and modes of authority that healthy institutions require. The whole of the West no longer possesses the instincts out of which institutions grow, out of which a future grows: perhaps nothing antagonizes its "modern spirit" so much. One lives for the day, one lives very fast, one lives very irresponsibly: precisely this is called "freedom." That which makes an institution an institution is despised, hated, repudiated: one fears the danger of a new slavery the moment the word "authority" is even spoken out loud. That is how far decadence has advanced in the value-instincts of our politicians, of our political parties: instinctively they prefer what disintegrates, what hastens the end. In the light of these remarks, a Nietzschean emphasis on power and agonistics offers significant advantages for political philosophy. In some respects we are freed from the modern project of "justifying" the force of social institutions because of a stipulated freedom from constraint in the "state of nature." With a primal conception of power(s), we can retrieve an Aristotelian take on social institutions as fitting and productive of human existence. Forces of law need not be seen as alien to the self, but as modulations of a ubiquitous array of forces within which human beings can locate relative spheres of freedom. And an agonistic conception of political activity need not be taken as a corruption or degradation of an idealized order of political principles or social virtues. Our own tradition of the separation of powers and an adversarial legal system can be taken as a baseline conception of the nature, function, and proper operation of government offices and judicial practice. The founders of the Constitution inherited from Montesquieu the idea that a division of powers is the best check on tyranny. In other words, tyranny is avoided not by some project of harmony, but by multiplying the number of power sites in a government and affirming their competition through mutual self-assertion [End Page 137] and mistrust. 16 Our common law tradition is agonistic in both conception and practice. Most procedural rules are built around the idea of coequal competition in open court before a jury who will decide the outcome, where the judge in most respects plays the role of an impartial referee. And the presumption of innocence is fundamentally meant to contest the government's power to prosecute and punish. 17 I think that both notions of separation of powers and legal adversarialism are compatible with Nietzsche's analysis of the law noted previously—that a legal order is not a means of preventing struggle, but "a means in the struggle between power-complexes" (GM II,11).

### At: Law/Democracy Links

#### Democratic legal institutions preserve struggle necessary to affirm life

Hatab 2002 (professor at Old Dominion University, The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 24 (2002) 132-147, Prospects For A Democratic Agon: Why We Can Still Be Nietzscheans, Project Muse)

How can we begin to apply the notion of agonistics to politics in general and democracy in particular? First of all, **contestation and competition can be seen as fundamental to self-development and as an intrinsically social phenomenon.** Agonistics helps us articulate the social and political ramifications of Nietzsche's concept of will to power. As Nietzsche put it in an 1887 note, "**will to power can manifest itself only against resistances; it seeks that which resists it**" (KSA 12, p.424). **Power,** therefore, is not simply an individual possession or a goal of action; it **is more a global**, interactive **conception.** For Nietzsche, every advance in life is an overcoming of some obstacle or counterforce, so that conflict is a mutual co-constitution of contending forces. [End Page 134] Opposition generates development. The human self is not formed in some internal sphere and then secondarily exposed to external relations and conflicts. The self is constituted in and through what it opposes and what opposes it; in other words, **the self is formed through agonistic relations**. Therefore, any annulment of one's Other would be an annulment of one's self in this sense. **Competition can be understood as** a shared activity for the sake of fostering high achievement and self-development, and therefore as **an intrinsically social activity.** 10 In the light of Nietzsche's appropriation of the two forms of Eris, it is necessary to distinguish between agonistic conflict and sheer violence. A radical agonistics rules out violence, because **violence is** actually **an impulse to eliminate conflict** by annihilating or incapacitating an opponent, **bringing the agon to an end**. 11 In a later work Nietzsche discusses the "spiritualization of hostility (Feindschaft)," wherein **one must affirm both the presence and the power of one's opponents as implicated in one's own posture** (TI "Morality as Antinature," 3). And in this passage Nietzsche specifically applies such a notion to the political realm.What this implies is that the category of the social need not be confined to something like peace or harmony. **Agonistic relations**, therefore, do not connote a deterioration of a social disposition and **can** thus **be extended to political relations.** How can democracy in general terms be understood as an agonistic activity? Allow me to quote from my previous work. **Political judgments are not preordained or dictated;** outcomes depend upon a contest of speeches where one view wins and other views lose in a tabulation of votes; sincethe results are binding and backed by the coercive power of the government, **democratic elections and procedures establish temporary control and subordination—which,** however**, can always be altered** or reversed **because of the succession of periodic political contests. . .** . Democratic elections allow for, and depend upon, peaceful exchanges and transitions of power. . . . **[L]anguage is the weapon in democratic contests.** The binding results, however, produce tangible effects of gain and loss that make political exchanges more than just talk or a game. . . . **The urgency of such political contests is that losers must yield to,** and live under, **the policies of the winner; we notice**, therefore, **specific configurations of power**, of domination and submission **in democratic politics.** 12

### At: Transcendence Links – Rejection Bad

#### Total rejection of transcendental claims forecloses dialogue and in their place fosters secular civilizing missions.

Mustapha Kamal Pasha. 2011. Professor at the U of Aberdeen, UK. “Western Nihilism and Dialogue: Prelude to an Uncanny Encounter in International Relations” Journal of International Studies. 39:683-699

Viewed from the vantage point of ‘communities of belief’, the erasure of transcendental claims negates the possibility of dialogue. Paradoxically, though, in encounters with Otherness, erasure of these claims does not dampen secularism’s own fundamentalism. The void produced by the absence of faith is readily filled up with mission civilisatrice and its attendant projects. Ambivalence and conviction intermingle. Schemes to align society to the demands of Reason (understood quite narrowly in its instrumental form), to separate faith from the political, to privilege science and technology against the confining horizons of religion embody few misgivings. For the ‘mandarins of the future’,62 the fate of human society rests on social engineering, banishing alternative conceptions of the purposes and meanings of life from statecraft. Statolatry easily replaces Transcendence. Conceived in part to limit the arbitrary power of Divine Right, the Leviathan assumes divine status, recognising no competitors, earthy or celestial. A ‘moral crisis’ at home need not produce paralysis in engagements with Others. Perhaps, it is the displacement of this crisis that gives birth to civilising campaigns to civilise, bearing apathy towards human life. The temptation to regard nihilism as an ontological global state, but with no exits anywhere, makes politics become meaningless in all its instantiations. Nothingness has no particular location.63 The loss of truth and meaning – the essence of nihilism – would increasingly acquire a ubiquitous character. As a global condition, nihilism would surely afflict all dreamworlds: ‘The age of complete nihilism’.66 In that context, no alternative projects can emerge. Within frames of global nihilistic capture, nothing is or can be of value.67 On balance, IR’s uncanny encounters with nihilism are not so readily pervasive. To the degree that IR embraces a modernist sensibility,68 IR repudiates Transcendence, but principally elsewhere. In rationalising its practices, IR’s own transcendental commitments seem to persist. Recent appeals to religious metaphors and biblical references to legitimate the so-called ‘war on terror’ divulge ambivalent attitudes towards both modernity and religion.69 On the one hand, modernity’s reworking of the theme of Salvation requires no celestial support; all projects originate and end with the human. With the purported exhaustion and demise of the subject of modernity, ethics itself becomes an artefact. Against this background, the ambivalence in IR assumes intelligibility. Encounters with religious others reflect this ambivalence. Neither pure nihilism nor pure Transcendence provides a reliable index of late modernity’s discontents. The Immanentist ground prepared by sovereignty complicates the sustainability of transcendental orders and their realisation. On the other side, transcendental currents show remarkable resilience, notwithstanding pronouncements of the ‘death of God’, and now the modern subject. These aporias are less hospitable to easy capture or understanding in IR (as both theory and practice). Revisiting these aporias can be an onerous undertaking, but it is indispensable for dialogue.

# Satire

Cross apply that apocalyptic rhetoric is good—nuclear especially

Meltdowns are bad. They are going to default to the analysis of our experts

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Waste is near everyone we solve

# Metaphysics