# Round 2 v Wyoming MP

## 1NC

### 1 Off

#### CP text: the 50 States and all relevant Territories should enter into a compact on establishing a producer payment for locally-owned wind power produced for on-site demand in the United States. This payment should be higher than the current Production Tax Credit rate for wind power. The Compact should collect revenue via a Clean Energy Community Finance Initiative.

#### Compacts solve faster than the federal government

Mountjoy ‘01

John is a policy analyst with the council of State Governments, “Interstate Compacts Make a Comeback,” Spring <http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/ncic/Comeback.pdf>

Some may question the need for interstate compacts to address multi-state policy issues. Why ¶ not leave such regulation to the feds? ¶ “Interstate compacts help us maintain state control,” said Gary McConnell, director of the ¶ Georgia Emergency Management Agency. ¶ During his 10 years as GEMA director, McConnell has played an instrumental role in developing ¶ and promoting a successful interstate compact —the Emergency Management Assistance ¶ Compact, or EMAC. EMAC allows state emergency management agencies to cooperate and ¶ share resources in the event of natural and man-made disasters. ¶ “We can go to the federal government for all kinds of help when natural disasters strike, but the ¶ states [cooperating under an interstate compact] can provide specific resources quicker, which ¶ are likely to be problem specific,” McConnell said. “It’s less bureaucratic, and it’s far cheaper. ¶ It’s easier for us under EMAC to obtain resources from surrounding states than it is to use ¶ federal assistance, which we’d end up having to pay more for anyway. I suspect this is the case ¶ with many other interstate compacts as well.” ¶ “States are rediscovering that they have the power to address their own problems better than the ¶ federal government,” said Rick Masters, The Council of State Governments’ legal counsel and ¶ special counsel for interstate compacts. ¶ CSG, which has tracked interstate compacts for more than 40 years, maintains a clearinghouse of ¶ compact information. More recently, CSG helps administer EMAC and is facilitating the update ¶ of the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision and the Interstate Compact on ¶ Juveniles. Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution laid the legal foundation for interstate ¶ compacts: “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep ¶ Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another ¶ State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent ¶ Danger as will not admit of delay.” Compacts actually preceded the Constitution, having been ¶ used in colonial times to resolve boundary disputes between colonies. ¶ Prior to the 1920s, interstate compacts were typically bi-state agreements, addressing boundary ¶ disputes and territorial claims. In fact, only 36 interstate compacts were formed between 1783 ¶ and 1920. It is only in this century that states have turned to interstate compacts to facilitate ¶ cooperative solutions to multi-state problems. ¶ After a lull in the late 1970s and early 1980s, interstate compacts are beginning to enjoy a ¶ resurgence. Since the early 1990s, states have initiated or updated several high-profile compacts. ¶ Examples include EMAC, the Interstate Compact on Industrialized/Modular Buildings and the ¶ Interstate Insurance Receivership Compact. Interstate compacts can set the framework for cooperative solutions to today’s cross-state ¶ challenges, from policing drugs to supplying energy or controlling sprawl. ¶ “Issues within the states are becoming more complex and aren’t confined by state boundaries. As ¶ a result, solutions are becoming multi-state as well. Compacts are the only tool that is truly ¶ adequate for addressing these multi-state issues,” said Bill Voit, senior project director at The ¶ Council of State Governments. ¶ An example is an interstate compact being considered to facilitate taxation of e-commerce. ¶ Opponents of Internet taxation claim that it would be virtually impossible for online vendors to ¶ comply with the complex, often confusing system of state and local sales and use taxes. Since ¶ Internet sales are expected to reach $184 billion annually by 2004, states have a vested interest in ¶ breaking down this and other barriers to taxing online transactions. ¶ Congress currently is considering the Internet Tax Moratorium Equity Act (S. 512) to help states ¶ simplify their sales and use taxes, in part by authorizing states to enter into an Interstate Sales ¶ and Use Tax Compact. The compact would create a “uniform, streamlined sales and use tax ¶ system,” convenient to remote sales. ¶ At least 18 states are considering the model streamlined sales tax legislation in 2001. Kentucky, ¶ South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming already have signed bills into law. ¶ Existing interstate compacts, many drafted in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, are ripe for ¶ amendment and revision. Technology and the Internet now make the sharing of information ¶ seamless and immediate, yet several interstate compacts are plagued by inadequate ¶ administration. ¶ “Not only do we see the development of new compacts, but we are seeing the re-examination of ¶ existing compacts…revising them to keep pace with our changing world,” Masters said. ¶ Developed in 1937, the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers is ¶ one example of a compact in need of update. Adopted by all 50 states, the compact regulates the ¶ movement of parolees and probationers across state lines. The burgeoning offender population ¶ and the ease with which offenders now can travel have created several problems for the compact, ¶ including: frequent violations of compact rules, inability to enforce compliance, difficulty in ¶ creating new rules and slow, unreliable exchange of case information. ¶ The antiquated compact needed a replacement that would provide states the authority, ¶ enforcement tools and resources to adequately track and ensure supervision of parolees and ¶ probationers. ¶ The new interstate compact, the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision, provides ¶ these solutions. The new compact includes mechanisms for enforcement, accountability, resource provision, information sharing and state-to-state cooperation. Currently, the compact ¶ has been introduced in 39 states and enacted in 18. ¶ Just as technology can smooth the operation of interstate compacts, alternative dispute resolution ¶ techniques can increase their self-sufficiency. Enforcement tools within interstate compacts need ¶ to utilize more of the mediation and arbitration services that have proven successful throughout ¶ state government. By developing additional self-contained enforcement mechanisms, compact ¶ members would not need to rely solely on the crowded docket of the U.S. Supreme Court. ¶ States should further utilize interstate compacts to address new problems and create new ¶ methods of interstate cooperation. If not, federal preemption in certain policy areas is a distinct ¶ possibility.

#### State incentives solve for wind

Klaas & Wilson ’12

Alexandra is Professor of Law and Dean of Academic Affairs at the University of Minnesota School of Law and Elizabeth is Associate Professor of Energy and Public Policy at the University of Minnesota, “Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch,” <http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/papers/Klass_Transmission_Article_2_12.pdf>

Several states in the Midwest are leaders in developing both wind energy and regional ¶ transmission to integrate wind energy into the transmission system. While those states ¶ must work within the parameters of the Midwest ISO with regard to access to transmission ¶ lines, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Iowa in particular have developed strong renewable ¶ energy polices and utilities in those states have worked together to obtain multi-state ¶ approval for siting those lines. ¶ With regard to Minnesota, as of March 2011, the state had installed 2,485 megawatts of ¶ wind power,¶ 136¶ resulting in the state generating 9.7% of its electricity from wind for 2010, ¶ and placing it in the top five states for both megawatts of wind installed and percent of total ¶ electricity generated from wind.¶ 137¶ With no coal, natural gas, or oil reserves, Minnesota is ¶ an electricity importer, and developing indigenous wind resources has enjoyed broad ¶ political support.¶ 138¶ In 2007, Minnesota enacted its Renewable Energy Standard (RES),¶ 139 which requires utilities to generate at least 25 percent of their electricity provided to ¶ customers from renewable energy by 2025.¶ 140¶ The RES also allows Minnesota utilities to ¶ meet their statutory obligations by purchasing RECs from outside of the state. Because ¶ Minnesota’s largest area of potential wind development is the Buffalo Ridge in the ¶ southwest corner of the state and the neighboring states of Iowa, North Dakota, and South ¶ Dakota, fulfilling the RES will include siting additional transmission lines to bring wind ¶ energy from those states to Minnesota.¶ 141¶ North Dakota, the “Saudi Arabia of Wind,”¶ 142¶ had 1,424 MW of wind energy online in ¶ March 2011, providing 12% of the electricity generated in the state. North Dakota is ¶ ranked second in the nation in terms of percentage of electricity derived from wind and ¶ ninth for installed wind capacity.¶ 143¶ North Dakota is an electricity exporter, with plentiful ¶ coal and recently developed oil resources as well as plentiful wind resources. Because of ¶ its small population, and limited demand for electricity within the state, transmission lines ¶ are a key component of developing North Dakota’s wind resources. It has a voluntary ¶ renewable portfolio standard of 10% renewables by 2015,¶ 144¶ and a corporate renewable ¶ energy tax credit that provides a refund of up to 15% of the cost of installing a renewable ¶ energy system through 2014.¶ 145¶ Also, commercial wind energy operations of 100 MW or ¶ greater built before 2015 will be taxed at 3% (rather than 10%) of assessed value.¶ 146¶ Wind development in Iowa has also been rapid and steady. As of March 2011, Iowa ¶ had 3,675 MW of wind energy online, placing it second in the nation in installed wind ¶ capacity behind Texas.¶ 147¶ Iowa also ranks first in the nation for percentage of state power ¶ derived from wind, at 15.4%.¶ 148¶ Iowa was the first state to enact a renewable energy ¶ purchase requirement back in 1983, and in a survey conducted July 1, 2011, 85% of state ¶ residents “have a favorable impression of wind energy and wind power companies.”¶ 149 Although Iowa does not have an RPS, wind generators sell RECs to utilities in other ¶ states,¶ 150¶ and Iowa offers a very generous wind production tax credit.¶ 151¶ ¶ Renewable energy development in these three states has been significant and appears to ¶ be a function of individual state policies to encourage renewable energy development by ¶ either setting state mandates (Minnesota), providing generous tax credits (Iowa), or ¶ encouraging development of wind for export (North Dakota). In order to realize such ¶ growth, the states have had to work together on transmission issues. The largest ¶ transmission siting project underway in Minnesota is the CapX2020 project, which 11 ¶ Minnesota utilities jointly proposed to upgrade the state electrical grid.¶ 152¶ Through a Vision ¶ Plan where the utilities sought to determine necessary transmission upgrades to meet the ¶ demand growth of utilities serving Minnesota customers,¶ 153¶ the CapX2020 lines were ¶ identified as the most critical group of lines to address the issues of grid reliability, demand ¶ growth, and renewable energy support.¶ 154¶ CapX2020 primarily consists of three 345-kV ¶ lines spanning nearly 600 miles from Monticello, Minnesota to Fargo, North Dakota; from ¶ Hampton, Minnesota to Brookings County, South Dakota; and from Hampton, Minnesota ¶ to La Crosse, Wisconsin.¶ 155¶ ¶ Many environmental groups, which frequently oppose transmission lines for ¶ environmental reasons, have supported CapX2020 as a way to build the infrastructure ¶ necessary to develop renewable energy.¶ 156¶ After obtaining the Certificate of Need and ¶ Route Permits in Minnesota, the CapX2020 project will have obtained the necessary ¶ approvals to begin construction. The Midwest ISO (MISO) must approve transmission ¶ pricing, however, and the CapX2020 Hampton to Brookings County line is slated for ¶ review as a Multi Value Project (MVP), which will allow costs to be spread (socialized) ¶ among the prioritized MISO regional utilities that benefit from MVP cost allocation.¶ 157¶ As for Iowa, because of the significant amount of wind power online in the state, there ¶ is significant interest by out-of-state companies in developing greater transmission ¶ capability to bring wind from Iowa to larger population centers. One proposal involves ¶ Houston, Texas-based Clean Line Energy Partners, which has taken steps to construct a ¶ 500-mile DC “merchant” transmission project across Iowa, transferring wind energy from ¶ the state to the Chicago area and beyond. The partnership is calling its Iowa project the ¶ “Rock Island Line” because the line would roughly follow the routes of the former Rock ¶ Island Railroad. The proposed $2 billion project was designed to spur development of additional wind turbines in northwest Iowa, northeast Nebraska, and southeast South ¶ Dakota.¶ 158¶ Notably, in this proposal Clean Line Energy Partners is targeting not MISO, but ¶ the PJM (Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland) transmission network farther east that ¶ runs from Ohio to the Atlantic seaboard south of New York.¶ 159¶ Because of the high cost of ¶ DC/AC converters substations, the 600 KV Rock Island Line would not have any “offramps” in Iowa but instead would be an interstate power highway with no interchanges, ¶ shipping energy across and out of the state. It remains to be seen if such a proposal would ¶ be viable. ¶ In addition, MidAmerican Energy is looking to build a project similar to the Rock Island ¶ Line. MidAmerican and its partner, American Electric Power of Columbus, Ohio, want to build ¶ a line from Iowa east to at least Ohio. The venture is working first on the eastern connection ¶ from Ohio west into Illinois.¶ 160¶ The project proposers favor the 2011 FERC order (Order 1000) ¶ because it “gives the various authorities a rationale to assign portions of the costs of such a line ¶ to all the recipients of the electricity, not just the builders who would start the lines somewhere ¶ in the Dakotas, Minnesota or Iowa.”¶ 161¶ However, for that same reason the Coalition for Fair ¶ Transmission Policy, a group of Eastern utilities and state regulators, has stated that “socializing ¶ the costs of transmission lines to access remote renewable resources amounts to an expensive ¶ subsidy for some renewable energy developers that distorts the marketplace, and ultimately ¶ results in higher electricity prices for everyone.”¶ 162¶ Thus, this project shows the potential impact ¶ of FERC Order 1000 on transmission buildout. It also illustrates how those states with ¶ renewable energy resources in the Midwest and the West perceive economic benefits in both the ¶ short-term and the long-term from a wider spreading of costs while those states without such ¶ resources further east are skeptical, if not outright hostile, to that goal. ¶ State policies and progress in the Midwest illustrate that states within a region can work ¶ together to develop wind resources in one state and use them in-state or, in the case of North ¶ Dakota, export them to other states. Utilities in those states as well as developers in other states ¶ have collaborated and invested to create the groundwork for new, interstate transmission lines, ¶ to distribute that power both within the Midwest and to eastern states which, for the most part, ¶ have had much more difficulty siting new transmission lines. In doing so, the states and the ¶ utilities within those states are creating the groundwork for new regional networks to form. If ¶ states reach a comfort level with such regional cooperation, perhaps a transfer of some authority ¶ to a defined regional entity with regard to planning, siting or both, as described in Part III is ¶ politically feasible.

### 2 Off

#### Immigration reform will pass in the status quo – insulated from the fiscal cliff – capital key and key to American economic competitiveness

Kinnari 12/29

Aaron, founder of the Future Forum a platform for educating and engaging young leaders on important global issues, Immigration Reform Would Be the Biggest Gift We Could Get This Year. 12/29/12. http://www.policymic.com/articles/21633/immigration-reform-would-be-the-biggest-gift-we-could-get-this-year.

When it takes session in January, the 113th Congress will have a number of critical issues that demand attention. There will be the potential fallout from the fiscal cliff, a new round of debt ceiling negotiations, and confirmation hearings for new cabinet secretaries, among others. But there is one policy matter that, while complex and long elusive, enjoys broad calls for improvement and immense potential for impact. The greatest gift we could get next year from Washington would be a comprehensive effort to finally fix America’s broken immigration system.¶ President Obama has signaled that immigration reform will be an early priority for his Administration in 2013. He’s not alone in calling for reform. The leading Republican presidential candidates all supported some elements of immigration reform, mostly focused on high-skilled labor and border security. And congressional leaders from both sides of the aisle are also coming together, with a bipartisan group of senators already meeting to discuss the issue.¶ A number of trade groups and research organizations from across industry and ideology have also signaled their support and have outlined the costs of inaction and benefits of reform. The U.S. Travel Association estimates that visa hurdles have resulted in a loss of 78 million foreign visitors over the past decade, resulting in the forfeiture of $606 billion in spending and 500,000 American jobs every year. Tourism and hospitality companies, as well as agricultural businesses, also find it difficult to hire short-term or seasonal workers – positions that Americans are often unable or unwilling to fill. While they depend on these employees to meet consumer demand, businesses often face bureaucratic barriers that can make an application for a temporary H-2B visa take several weeks and cost thousands of dollars.¶ Immigrants play important roles in America’s high-tech sectors as well but face similar obstacles. Researchers at Duke and UC Berkeley found that 25% of technology and engineering companies started between 1995 and 2005 had at least one immigrant key founder and those companies created more than 450,000 jobs. Another report by the American Enterprise Institute and the Partnership for a New American Economy found that every foreign-born STEM graduate that stays in the U.S. creates 2.62 American jobs. But despite their strong track record, the U.S. still lacks a visa for immigrant entrepreneurs, doesn’t grant STEM graduates enough green cards, and doesn’t have an adequate supply of H-1B visas for high-skilled immigrants.¶ And of course, a plan to address undocumented immigrants currently living in the United States must also be part of the fix. A recent poll demonstrates broad support for legalization, with 62% of Americans supporting a path to citizenship. And the Center for American Progress estimates that legalizing the 11 million undocumented immigrants in the U.S. would result in a gain of $1.5 trillion in GDP over 10 years.¶ The benefits are clear and the support for immigration reform is there. The question that remains is what’s the best strategy for Congress to pursue. Some argue for a piecemeal approach that would first address areas where there is broad support and potential for impact, and leave tougher questions for a later time. Given the political climate, this might seem like a practical path. But a comprehensive package might actually be more viable. Addressing challenges in silos would siphon support from those whose issues don’t make the first cut. Therefore, Congress must confront all components together – from a path to legalization to border security to a streamlined process for new immigrants – and leave enough room for the typical bartering that comes with political negotiations.¶ Past administrations and Congresses have tried to pass immigration reform and have failed. But we can no longer afford inaction if America hopes to maintain its status as a global engine for innovation and a destination for hard-working talent from around the world. If Washington can finally deliver a comprehensive package to fix our nation’s broken immigration system, it will be the gift that will keep on giving for generations to come.

#### Top priority and PC is key

Hesson 1/2

Ted, Reporter, ABC News, "Analysis: 6 Things Obama Needs To Do for Immigration Reform", <http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/News/things-president-obama-immigration-reform/story?id=18103115~~%23.UOSdSYnjlJ4>

On Sunday, President Barack Obama said that immigration reform is a "top priority" on his agenda and that he would introduce legislation in his first year.¶ To find out what he needs to do to make reform a reality, we talked to Lynn Tramonte, the deputy director at America's Voice, a group that lobbies for immigration reform, and Muzaffar Chishti, the director of the New York office of the Migration Policy Institute, a think tank. Here's what we came up with.¶ 1. Be a Leader¶ During Obama's first term, bipartisan legislation never got off the ground. The president needs to do a better job leading the charge this time around, according to Chishti. "He has to make it clear that it's a high priority of his," he said. "He has to make it clear that he'll use his bully pulpit and his political muscle to make it happen, and he has to be open to using his veto power." His announcement this weekend is a step in that direction, but he needs to follow through.¶ 2. Clear Space on the Agenda¶ Political priorities aren't always dictated by the folks in D.C., as the tragic Connecticut school shooting shows us. While immigration had inertia after the election, the fiscal cliff and gun violence have been the most talked about issues around the Capitol in recent weeks. The cliff could recede from view now that Congress has passed a bill, but how quickly the president can resolve the other issues on his agenda could determine whether immigration reform is possible this year. "There's only limited oxygen in the room," Chishti said.

#### Even bipartisan energy legislation is massively controversial

McEntee 8/15

Christine is the Executive Director and CEO at the American Geophysical Union. “Science, Politics and Public Opinion,” 2012, <http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/08/finding-the-sweet-spot-biparti.php>

We know that objective scientific knowledge is needed to inform good policy decisions – and that objective knowledge exists – but all too often we are allowing politics and ideology to take precedence over, or be pitted against, science. This not only risks the legitimacy of the science, but also the strength of the policy and its ability to protect the security, health and welfare of the American people, and support a healthy and thriving economy. The current rhetoric on climate change is a perfect example.¶ We also know that the biggest obstacles to passage of energy and environmental legislation are disagreements about the extent to which the federal government can and should regulate business, and reluctance to launch new initiatives that will add to the deficit. The science tells us that small initiatives that require only nominal investments can't begin to address the environmental and energy challenges we face; and legislation big enough to achieve significant results will cost more than Congress is willing to spend.¶ Environmental legislation is also held prisoner to partisan gridlock, with far less bipartisan support than many energy proposals. Even environmental legislation that saves many times its cost in medical and health care savings cannot advance in the current Congress. One recent example is the defeat of legislation to limit the release of airborne particulates proven to adversely affect the respiratory health of children and seniors.¶ Dissonance about the role of federal regulation, its cost-effectiveness, and potential to impose costs on private sector that might adversely impact economic recovery further complicate energy/environmental legislative calculus. For these reasons, it is difficult for Congress to pass new energy and/or environmental initiatives, even where there is wide bipartisan support for a given bill.¶ Lastly, we know that Congress is not likely to make much real progress on either energy or environmental issues until voters demand such action. Research shows that most voters, including Independents in swing states, do not list energy and environmental issues as a major determinant of how they vote, despite their significant impact on local, state and national economies, public health and national security. This needs to change.

#### The loss of economic leadership results in global conflict, withdrawal of global power projection, and escalation of hotspots

Friedberg and Schoenfeld 8

Aaron, professor of politics and international relations at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School, Gabriel, Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, The Dangers of a Diminished America, WSJ, 10/21, Proquest

With the global financial system in serious trouble, is America's geostrategic dominance likely to diminish? If so, what would that mean? One immediate implication of the crisis that began on Wall Street and spread across the world is that the primary instruments of U.S. foreign policy will be crimped. The next president will face an entirely new and adverse fiscal position. Estimates of this year's federal budget deficit already show that it has jumped $237 billion from last year, to $407 billion. With families and businesses hurting, there will be calls for various and expensive domestic relief programs. In the face of this onrushing river of red ink, both Barack Obama and John McCain have been reluctant to lay out what portions of their programmatic wish list they might defer or delete. Only Joe Biden has suggested a possible reduction -- foreign aid. This would be one of the few popular cuts, but in budgetary terms it is a mere grain of sand. Still, Sen. Biden's comment hints at where we may be headed: toward a major reduction in America's world role, and perhaps even a new era of financially-induced isolationism. Pressures to cut defense spending, and to dodge the cost of waging two wars, already intense before this crisis, are likely to mount. Despite the success of the surge, the war in Iraq remains deeply unpopular. Precipitous withdrawal -- attractive to a sizable swath of the electorate before the financial implosion -- might well become even more popular with annual war bills running in the hundreds of billions. Protectionist sentiments are sure to grow stronger as jobs disappear in the coming slowdown. Even before our current woes, calls to save jobs by restricting imports had begun to gather support among many Democrats and some Republicans. In a prolonged recession, gale-force winds of protectionism will blow. Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures. As for our democratic friends, the present crisis comes when many European nations are struggling to deal with decades of anemic growth, sclerotic governance and an impending demographic crisis. Despite its past dynamism, Japan faces similar challenges. India is still in the early stages of its emergence as a world economic and geopolitical power. What does this all mean? There is no substitute for America on the world stage. The choice we have before us is between the potentially disastrous effects of disengagement and the stiff price tag of continued American leadership.

### 3 Off

#### THE AFF’S DEFENSE OF BOGG’S NOTION OF CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT ROMANTIciZES THE WESTERN POLITICAL TRADITION ABANDONING THE VICTIMS OF THE HISTORICAL VIOLENCE OF THE DEMOCRATIC culture WHICH IS THE CAUSE OF DEPOLITICIZION; the plan straight turns their anti-poltics impacts.

CHAPUT 2K2

[CATHERINE, ass. Prof Rhetoric and Politics@ UNR, REVIEW OF CARL BOGGS’ THE END OF POLITICS”, WORKPLACE, 7:1, LOUISVILLE.EDU,]

Before proceeding, it will be helpful to review the major terms of this argument and how Boggs defines these terms. The major terms I find are: public sphere, politics, depoliticization, anti-politics, and corporatization. Boggs understands politics to be a tradition derived from the ancient Greeks and intimately related to individual self-fulfillment. Relying on Aristotle, Boggs argues that "politics constitutes a unique public sphere in which people come together, interact, make decisions, forge citizen bonds, carry out the imperatives of social change, and ultimately search for the good society" (7). More importantly, politics is the "source of broad human governance that is indispensable to the pursuit of meaning, direction, and purpose in life" (7). According to Boggs, "it is precisely this visionary and empowering sense of politics that seems to have vanished from the American landscape" (8). In its place lies a pervasively depoliticized culture. Depoliticization, or the process of corporatization resulting in an anti-political climate, occurs when individual interests and the individual good supercede the collective good. 3. Instead of a politics inspired by public dialogue and a sense of the collective good, Boggs contends that the disengaged public sphere operates under an ethos of anti-politics resulting from feelings of powerlessness, cynicism, and alienation. Within this ethos, political activity is devalued and private activity takes its place. The 1970s roughly mark the transformation from politics to anti-politics. Boggs states that the "precarious social and political space won through hard battles has progressively narrowed since the late 1970s, when the public sphere became increasingly subject to the ravages of corporate colonization" (14). It is at this historical moment that corporate and state power increasingly begin to transfer "public anger and frustration outside the political terrain, toward more immediate micro, psychologically gratifying, and typically privatized modes of resistance" (14). The process whereby this transformation takes place can be best understood as the corporatization of the public sphere. For Boggs, corporatization refers to "'corporations' very growing presence in the economy, their extensive lobbies and influence over legislative activity, their ownership and control of the mass media, their preponderant influence over election campaigns, their capacity to secure relief from myriad regulatory controls, their massive public relations apparatus, their general subsidies to the two major parties and the convention process, and so forth" (9). Corporatization erodes the public sphere by focusing on the individual rather than the social and emphasizing private, corporate interests rather than the general, public good. Thus, corporatization causes the depoliticization of the public sphere because it promotes private consumption, emphasizes individualism, and ignores the social good. Finally, according to Boggs, the public sphere includes electoral activity as well as the space in which diverse social movements form and constitute the terrain of public life; the public sphere is the glue that cements individual and social concerns to administrative regimes like the state or corporations. Corporatization, depoliticization, and anti-politics have thrown the public sphere into deep crisis; it is this crisis that lies at the heart of Boggs's analyses. 4. Yet perhaps Boggs's critique of corporate depoliticization relies on an overly romantic historical narrative of the Western democratic political tradition. He claims that "the special tradition of politics that goes back to the ancient Greeks also embodies much of what is noble, creative, and transformative in the human experience" (95). And further argues that "the Greeks upheld the supreme virtue of a uniquely 'civic' or 'popular' life in which it would be possible to build community and citizenship in a world of evolving shared involvements" (95). His historical narrative moves from Plato and Aristotle through Rousseau and eventually to the United States in political figures such as Alexis de Tocqueville, Thomas Jefferson, and Thomas Paine. Valorizing these figures and the tradition they represent, Boggs argues that "the emergence of the nation-state in the late-eighteenth century produced near universal norms of citizenship, consensual governance, political rights, and national identity" (97). Although late-eighteenth century democracy failed to include women, slaves, and many non-white citizens, he claims that this democratic tradition produced "a further broadening of citizenship as [these] previously excluded groups" gained suffrage and representation (97). According to his narrative, the US was once a space where "civic associations flourished and the sense of citizen obligation, while clearly limited, was taken far more seriously than in most European countries" (42). In other words, there was once a public sphere in which citizens were encouraged to participate and a sense that such participation had meaning. It should be noted, however, that this enthusiastic historical account runs the risk of erasing the concrete connections between the spread of democracy and the expansion of the capitalist marketplace.

#### CALLING ON THE LEFT TO ENGAGE IN A CONTEST TO WREST POWER FROM THE RIGHT ONLY REINSTANTIATES THE ANTI-BLACK SEMIOTIC FIELD OF CIVIL SOCIETY.

**Wilderson 2003** Wilderson, PHD Rhetoric, Berkeley, Gramsci’s Black Marx: Whither the Slave in Civil Society?, Social Identities, Volume 9, Number 2, 2003

It is true that Gramsci acknowledges no organic division between political society and civil society. He makes the division for methodological purposes. There is one organism, ‘the modern bourgeois-liberal state’ (Buttigieg, 1995, p. 28), but there are two qualitatively different kinds of apparatuses: on the one hand, the ensemble of so-called private associations and ideological invitations to participate in a wide and varied play of consensus-making strategies (civil society), and on the other hand, a set of enforcement structures which kick in when that ensemble is regressive or can no longer lead (political society). But Gramsci would have us believe not that white positionality emerges and is elaborated on the terrain of civil society and encounters coercion when civil society is not expansive enough to embrace the idea of freedom for all, but that all positionalities emerge and are elaborated on the terrain of civil society. Gramsci does not racialise this birth, elaboration, and stunting, or re-emerg- ence, of human subjectivity — because **civil society, supposedly, elaborates all subjectivity and so there is no need for such speciﬁcity.** Anglo-American Gramscians, like Buttigieg and Sassoon, and **US activists** in the anti-globalisation movement whose unspoken grammar is predicated on Gramsci’s assumptive logic, **continue this tradition of unraced positionality which allows them to posit the valency of Wars of Position for blacks and whites alike. They assume that all subjects are positioned in such a way as to have their consent solicited and to be able to extend their consent ‘spontaneously’**. This is profoundly problematic if only — leaving revolution aside for the moment — at the level of analysis; for it assumes that hegemony with its three constituent elements (inﬂuence, leadership, consent) is the modality which must be either inculcated or breached, if one is to either avoid or incur, respectively, the violence of the state. However, one of the primary claims of this essay is that, **whereas the consent of black people may seem to be called upon, its withdrawal does not precipitate a ‘crisis in authority’. Put another way, the transformation of black people’s acquiescent ‘common sense’ into revolutionary ‘good sense’ is an extenuating circumstance, but not the catalyst, of State violence against black people. State violence against the black body,** as Martinot and Sexton suggest in their introduction, is not contingent, it is structural and, above all, gratuitous. Therefore, Gramscian wisdom cannot imagine the emergence, elaboration, and stunting of a subject by way, not of the contingency of violence resulting in a ‘crisis of authority’, but by way of direct relations of force. This is remarkable, and unfortunate, given the fact that the emergence of the slave, the subject- effect of an ensemble of direct relations of force, marks the emergence of capitalism itself. Let us put a ﬁner point on it: **violence towards the black body is the precondition for the existence of** Gramsci’s single entity **‘the modern bourgeois-state’ with its divided apparatus, political society and civil society**. This is to say **violence against black people is ontological and gratuitous as opposed to merely ideological and contingent**.2 Furthermore, no magical mo- ment (i.e., 1865) transformed paradigmatically the black body’s relation to this entity.3 In this regard, **the hegemonic advances within civil society by the Left hold out no more possibility for black life than the coercive backlash of political society**. What many political theorists have either missed or ignored is that **a crisis of authority that might take place by way of a Left expansion of civil society, further instantiates, rather than dismantles, the authority of whiteness. Black death is the modern bourgeois-state’s recreational pastime, but the hunting season is not confined to the time (and place) of political society; blacks are fair game as a result of a progressively expanding civil society** as well. Civil Death in Civil Society Capital was kick-started by the rape of the African continent. This phenomenon is central to neither Gramsci nor Marx. The theoretical importance of emphasis- ing this in the early twenty-ﬁrst century is two-fold: ﬁrst, ‘the socio-political order of the New World’ (Spillers, 1987, p. 67) was kick-started by approaching a particular body (a black body) with direct relations of force, not by approach- ing a white body with variable capital. Thus, one could say that slavery — the ‘accumulation’ of black bodies regardless of their utility as labourers (Hartman; 230 Frank Wilderson, III Johnson) through an idiom of despotic power (Patterson) — is closer to capital’s primal desire than is waged oppression — the ‘exploitation’ of unraced bodies (Marx, Lenin, Gramsci) that labour through an idiom of rational/symbolic (the wage) power: A relation of terror as opposed to a relation of hegemony.4 Secondly, today, late capital is imposing a renaissance of this original desire, direct relations of force (the prison industrial complex), the despotism of the unwaged relation: and this Renaissance of slavery has, once again, as its structuring image in libidinal economy, and its primary target in political economy, the black body. The value of reintroducing the unthought category of the slave, by way of noting the absence of the black subject, lies in the black subject’s potential for extending the demand placed on state/capital formations because its re-intro- duction into the discourse expands the intensity of the antagonism. In other words, the slave makes a demand, which is in excess of the demand made by the worker. The worker demands that productivity be fair and democratic (Gramsci’s new hegemony, Lenin’s dictatorship of the proletariat), the slave, on the other hand, demands that production stop; stop without recourse to its ultimate democratisation. Work is not an organic principle for the slave. The absence of black subjectivity from the crux of marxist discourse is symptomatic of the discourse’s inability to cope with the possibility that the generative subject of capitalism, the black body of the ﬁfteenth and sixteenth centuries, and the generative subject that resolves late-capital’s over-accumulation crisis, the black (incarcerated) body of the twentieth and twenty-ﬁrst centuries, do not reify the basic categories which structure marxist conﬂict: the categories of work, production, exploitation, historical self-awareness and, above all, hege- mony. If, by way of the black subject, we consider the underlying grammar of the question ‘What does it mean to be free?’ that grammar being the question ‘What does it mean to suffer?’ then we come up against a grammar of suffering not only in excess of any semiotics of exploitation, but a grammar of suffering beyond signiﬁcation itself, a suffering that cannot be spoken because the gratuitous terror of white supremacy is as much contingent upon the irrationality of white fantasies and shared pleasures as it is upon a logic — the logic of capital. It extends beyond texualisation. When talking about this terror, Cornel West uses the term ‘black invisibility and namelessness’ to designate, at the level of ontology, what we are calling a scandal at the level of discourse. He writes: [America’s] unrelenting assault on black humanity produced the funda- mental condition of black culture — that of black invisibility and namelessness. On the crucial existential level relating to black invisibility and namelessness, the ﬁrst difﬁcult challenge and demanding discipline is to ward off madness and discredit suicide as a desirable option. A central preoccupation of black culture is that of confronting candidly the ontological wounds, psychic scars, and existential bruises of black peo- ple while fending off insanity and self-annihilation. This is why the ‘ur-text’ of black culture is neither a word nor a book, not an architectural monument or a legal brief. Instead, it is a guttural cry and a wrenching moan — a cry not so much for help as for home, a moan less out of complaint than for recognition. (1996, pp. 80–81). Thus, **the black subject position in America is an antagonism, a demand that can not be satisﬁed through a transfer of ownership/organisation of existing rubrics;** whereas the Gramscian subject, the worker, represents a demand that can indeed be satisﬁed by way of a successful War of Position, which brings about the end of exploitation. The worker calls into question the legitimacy of productive practices, the slave calls into question the legitimacy of productivity itself. From the positionality of the worker the question, ‘What does it mean to be free?’ is raised. But the question hides the process by which the discourse assumes a hidden grammar which has already posed and answered the question, ‘What does it mean to suffer?’

And that grammar is organised around the categories of exploitation (unfair labour relations or wage slavery). Thus, exploitation (wage slavery) is the only category of oppression which concerns Gramsci: society, Western society, thrives on the exploitation of the Gramscian subject. Full stop. Again, this is inadequate, because it would call white supremacy ‘racism’ and articulate it as a derivative phenomenon of the capitalist matrix, rather than incorporating white supremacy as a matrix constituent to the base, if not the base itself. What I am saying is that **the insatiability of the slave demand upon existing structures means that it cannot ﬁnd its articulation within the modality of hegemony (inﬂuence, leadership, consent) — the black body cannot give its consent because ‘generalised trust’, the precondition for the solicitation of consent, ‘equals racialised whiteness’** (Barrett). Furthermore, as Patterson points out, slavery is natal alienation by way of social death, which is to say that a slave has no symbolic currency or material labour power to exchange: a slave does not enter into a transaction of value (however asymmetrical) but is subsumed by direct relations of force, which is to say that **a slave is an articulation of a despotic irrationality** whereas the worker is an articulation of a symbolic rationality. **White supremacy’s despotic irrationality is** as **foundational to American institutionality** as capitalism’s symbolic rationality because, as West writes, **it dictates the limits of the operation of American democracy — with black folk the indispensable sacriﬁcial lamb vital to its sustenance. Hence black subordination constitutes the necessary condition for the ﬂourishing of American democracy**, **the tragic prerequisite for America itself.** This is, in part, what Richard Wright meant when he noted**, ‘The Negro is America’s metaphor’**. (1996, p. 72) And it is well known **that** a metaphor **comes into being through a violence that kills, rather than merely exploits, the object so that the concept might live**. West’s interventions help us see how marxism can only come to grips with America’s structuring rationality — what it calls capitalism, or political economy; but cannot come to grips with **America’s structuring irrationality: the libidinal economy of white supremacy, and its hyper-discursive violence** that **kills the black subject so that the concept, civil society, may live. In other words, from the incoherence of black death, America generates the coherence of white life**. This is important when considering **the** Gramscian **paradigm** (and its progenitors in the world **of** **US social movements** today**) which is so dependent on the empirical status of hegemony and civil society: struggles over hegemony are seldom, if ever, asignifying — at some point they require coherence, they require categories for the record — which means they contain the seeds of anti-blackness.**

### 4 Off

#### The working class must coalesce in material action against financial exploitation especially in the context of energy planning. The aff’s notion of agency uniquely undermines the materialist anti-capitalist revolutionary knowledge key to survival

Callinicos 2k10

[Alex, Bonfire of Illusions: The Twin Crisis of the Liberal World, Polity, professor of European studies King’s College – London, DPhil – Oxford, p. 139-43]

There are other strong reasons to press for a break with the logic of competitive accumulation. The scientific evi-dence that the emission of greenhouse gases - most notably C02 - caused by human activity is generating profound and irreversible processes of climate change is now beyond dispute. It is also very widely agreed that preventing these processes reaching a disastrous scale requires the rapid adoption and implementation of drastic targets for cutting CO2 emissions. But while the targets, particularly since the eclipse of the Bush gang, have become more ambitious, the actual emissions have continued to rise. The most plausible explanation appeals to the logic of competition. The problem is, yet again, one of collective action. Evi- dently it is in everyone's interest to avoid drastic climate change. But no individual capital or state is willing to shoulder the additional costs involved in moving to a low- carbon economy. In international negotiations, the leading states play a game of pass-the-parcel - the US demanding that India and China adopt tough targets, the latter asking why they should bear the burden of two centuries of industrialization mainly in the North. The EU, despite its pre- tensions to be a master of 'soft power' that has transcended bad old nationalism, is particularly ineffectual. Germany has vocally and largely successfully defended its car firms against what they regarded as excessively tough targets. And the economic crisis has provided many governments with a perfect excuse to go slow in reducing reliance on fossil fuels. The logic of competitive accumulation here threatens the future of the human species.20 The implication is that any sustainable alternative to •capitalism has to be based, not on the market, but on democratic planning. In a democratically planned economy the allocation of resources would be the outcome of a democratic political process that would set overall priori- ties for the economy. There are some models of how this could work. One is Albert's Parecon, or participatory economics. This involves an economy of workers' and consumers' councils in which individuals and enterprises submit proposals for their share of society's resources and a process of gradual adjustments (Albert calls them 'iterations') takes place while technical experts come up with a plan that would give everyone as much as possible of what they want. The main weakness of this model is that it mimics a bit too closely the workings of a market economy, in which claims on resources are driven by individual demands. Albert is an anarchist, and his commitment to decentralization here goes too far. The allocation of society's resources isn't a neutral technical issue. It's a political question that requires some sort of collective and democratic decision-making process to choose between what would often be competing views of the priorities of the society in question. From this perspective, Pat Devine offers a superior model of what he calls negotiated coordination. Here the allocation of resources is largely the outcome of discussion between producers, consumers and other affected groups, but within the framework of overall decisions about economic priorities made democratically at the national and international level.21 Plainly there is much more to be said - and, above all, to be done - about democratic planning. All the same, the importance of the kind of work being done by Albert Devine and others is that they begin to break down the prejudice against planning and to sketch out how an economy that rejected the market could manage to be both democratic and efficient. But any break with capitalism couldn't take the form of an instantaneous leap into a fully planned economy. Marx long ago argued in the 'Critique of the Gotha Programme' that a new workers' state would inherit a society deeply marked by capitalism. Initially, it would have to make compromises with the old order, and gradually move towards a society governed by the communist principle 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!'22 Similarly today a government breaking with capitalism would need to make a decisive shift towards an economy in which priorities were decided democratically rather than left to the anarchy of competition. This would involve critically taking control of the financial markets, nationalizing under workers' control key sectors of the economy, and extending social provision on the basis of a progressive tax system that redistributed wealth and income from rich to poor. These measures, radical though they are, would still leave in place many aspects of a market economy. Large sectors would remain in private hands. Continuous pressure and the introduction of new mea- sures would be necessary to move the economy as a whole towards the principles of democratic planning. One key step would be to weaken the power of the capitalist labour market, which today rules our lives. In my view, the best way to do this would be to intro- duce universal direct income. In other words, every resi- dent of the country would receive, as of right, an income that met their basic needs at a relatively low but neverthe- less decent level. This would serve two goals. First, it would ensure a basic level of welfare for everyone much more efficiently than existing systems of social provision. (People with greater needs because they had children or were disabled or whatever would receive a higher basic income.) Secondly, having a guaranteed basic income would greatly reduce the pressure on individuals to accept whatever job was on offer on the labour market. One of the main presuppositions of capitalism - that workers have no acceptable alternative to wage labour - would be removed. The balance of power between labour and capital would shift towards the workers, irrespective of the nature of their employer.23 More broadly, the question of power is crucial. One obvious challenge to the kind of vision of change I have just sketched out is how to ensure that the direction of change would be towards a democratically planned economy rather than back to market capitalism or maybe to the kind of state capitalism that ended up dominating the Soviet Union. The only guarantee that counts is that levers of political power are in the hands of the workers and the poor themselves. As long as the state takes the form that it does today, of a bureaucratically organized, hierarchical set of apparatuses whose managers' interests are bound up with those of capital, any improvement in society can only be temporary and fragile. This is why the strategy of ignoring the state advocated by Holloway is so badly mistaken. If we are to move towards a democratically planned economy, then the existing state has to be confronted and broken. This task can only be achieved through the development of a different kind of power, one based on the self- organization of workers and other poor people that devel- ops out of their struggles against capital. The great revolutionary movements of the twentieth century offered some glimpses of this power - from the workers' and sol- diers' councils of the Russian Revolution of October 1917 to the workers' shoras during the Iranian Revolution of 1978-9. The self-organization displayed by the Bolivian popular movement during the insurrections of October 2003 and May-June 2005 showed that the contemporary movements against neoliberalism can generate this kind of power as well.24 A democratically planned economy would be the core of a self-managing society, one in which directly elected workplace and neighbourhood councils took responsibil- ity for their own affairs and linked together to make deci- sions for society at large. The key insight that Marx had during the Paris Commune of 1871 was that these forms of organization would develop before the new society was created, in the process of fighting the old society. The same methods of self-organization that would be the basis of a self-managing society are needed by the exploited and oppressed to resist and, ultimately, to overthrow capital itself. The overthrow of capital is itself a process. The dilemma that Albert imagines confronting a workers' cooperative in a market economy would face any society that was beginning to introduce the principles of democratic plan- ning in a world still ruled by capitalism. It was responsible for the corruption and eventual destruction of the Russian Revolution of October 1917. Any breakthrough in one part of the world could only survive by spreading and progressively overturning the logic of capital on a global scale. The globalization of capital has produced a global- ization of resistance. Struggles in different parts of the world contaminate each other. Chiapas and Seattle had global reverberations. The two European countries with the most advanced and combative social movements, France and Greece, have exerted a degree of mutual influ- ence on one another. The movements in Latin America have become a beacon to all those fighting neoliberalism. "We are still a very long way from overturning capitalism even in one country. Indeed, the more one seeks to elabo- rate on the shape of an alternative to capitalism the more one is overawed by the immensity of the task. The biggest immediate obstacle that confronts anyone seeking to address it is the chronic political weakness of the radical anticapitalist left on a global scale. Nevertheless, the present crisis has torn a huge hole in neoliberalism both as an ideology and as a mode of organizing capital- ism. The market no longer seems like a second nature unamenable to change or control. Those who are prepared to seize this moment boldly can help to ensure that the boundaries of the possible really are widened, allowing the billions of victims of capitalism finally to escape.

#### Alternative text: vote negative to reject the 1ac in favor of materialist revolutionary knowledge production against capitalism.

#### Ecological catastrophe necessitates materialist revolutionary dialectics against capitalism’s exploitation to ensure survival.

Foster 2k11

[john bellamy,  professor of sociology at the University of Oregon and also editor of Monthly Review, Since the Great Financial Crisis hit in 2008, Foster has been sought out by academics, activists, the media, and the general public as a result of his earlier prescient writings on the coming crisis. He has given numerous interviews, talks, and invited lectures, as well as written invited commentary, articles, and books on the subject]

In the twenty-first century it is customary to view the rise of planetary ecological problems as a surprising development scarcely conceivable prior to the last few decades. It is here, however, that we have the most to learn from the analysis of nineteenth-century thinkers who played a role in the development of ecology, including both early ecological scientists and classical historical materialists. Science has long warned of the negative, destructive side of the human transformation of the earth—a warning which the system, driven by its own imperatives, has continually sought to downplay. Indeed, what distinguishes our time from earlier centuries is not so much the conservation of catastrophe, which has long been recognized, but rather the accelerated pace at which such destruction is now manifesting itself, i.e., what I am calling the accumulation of catastrophe. The desertification arising in pre-capitalist times, partly through human action, manifested itself over centuries, even millennia. Today changes in the land, the atmosphere, the oceans, indeed the entire life-support system of the earth, are the product of mere decades. If in the past, Darwin was struck that in a mere three centuries after European colonization, the ecology of the island of St. Helena had been destroyed to the point that it was reduced to “desert”—today, in only two generations, we have altered the biogeochemical processes of the entire planet.28The absence of a historical perspective on the conservation, even accumulation, of catastrophe is a major barrier to needed change in our time. Many environmentalists, including some who perceive themselves as being on the left, persist in believing that we can address our immense and growing ecological problems without altering our fundamental social-production relationships. All that is necessary in this view is the combined magic of green technology and green markets. Short-term fixes are presumed to be adequate solutions, while society remains on the same essential course as before. Indeed, the dominant perspective on ecology can be characterized, I believe, as consisting of three successive stages of denial: (1) the denial altogether of the planetary ecological crisis (or its human cause); (2) the denial that the ecological crisis is fundamentally due to the system of production in which we live, namely capitalism; and (3) the denial that capitalism is constitutionally incapable of overcoming this global ecological threat—with capital now being presented instead as the savior of the environment.The first stage of ecological denial is easy to understand. This is the form of denial represented by Exxon-Mobil. Such outright denial of the destructive consequences of their actions is the automatic response of corporations generally when faced with the prospect of environmental regulations, which would negatively affect their bottom lines. It is also the form of absolute denial promoted by climate-change denialists themselves, who categorically reject the reality of human agency in global climate change. The second stage of denial, a retreat from the first, is to admit there is a problem, while dissociating it from the larger socioeconomic system. The famous IPAT formula, i.e. Environmental Impact = Population x Consumption x Technology (which amounts to saying that these are the three factors behind our environmental problems/solutions), has been used by some to suggest that population growth, the consumption habits of most individuals, and inappropriate technology carry the totality of blame for environmental degradation. The answer then is sustainable population, sustainable consumption, and sustainable technology. This approach, though seemingly matter-of-fact, and deceptively radical, derives its acceptability for the vested interests from the fact that it generally serves to disguise the more fundamental reality of the treadmill of capitalist production itself.29 The third stage of denial, a last-ditch defense, and exhibiting a greater level of desperation on the part of the established order, is, I would argue, the most dangerous of all. It admits that the environmental crisis is wrapped up with the existence of capitalism, but argues that what we need is an entirely new kind of capitalism: variously called “sustainable capitalism,” “green capitalism,” “natural capitalism,” and “climate capitalism” by thinkers as various as Al Gore, Paul Hawken, Amory and L. Hunter Lovins, and Jonathon Porritt.30 The argument here varies but usually begins with the old trope that capitalism is the most efficient economic system possible—a form of “spontaneous order” arising from an invisible hand—and that the answer to ecological problems is to make it more efficient still by internalizing costs on the environment previously externalized by the system. Aside from the presumed magic of the market itself, and moral claims as to “the greening of corporations,” this is supposed to be achieved by means of a black box of technological wonders. Implicit in all such views is the notion that capitalism can be made sustainable, without altering its accumulation or economic growth imperative and without breaking with the dominant social relations. The exponential growth of the system ad infinitum is possible, we are told, while simultaneously generating a sustainable relation to the planet. This of course runs up against what Herman Daly has called the Impossibility Theorem: If the whole world were to have an ecological footprint the size of the United States we would need multiple planets.31 The idea that such a development process can persist permanently on a single planet (and indeed that we are not at this point already confronting earthly limits) is of course an exercise in delusion, bordering on belief in the supernatural. “Capitalism,” as the great environmental economist K. William Kapp once wrote, is “an economy of unpaid costs.”32 It can persist and even prosper only insofar as it is able to externalize its costs on the mass of the population and the surrounding environment. Whenever the destruction is too severe the system simply seeks to engineer another spatial fix. Yet, a planetary capitalism is from this standpoint a contradiction in terms: it means that there is nowhere finally to externalize the social and environmental costs of capitalist destruction (we cannot ship our toxic waste into outer space!), and no external resources to draw upon in the face of the enormous squandering of resources inherent to the system (we can’t solve our problems by mining the moon!). Market-based solutions to climate change, such as emissions trading, have been shown to promote profits, and to facilitate economic growth and financial wealth, while increasing carbon emissions. From an environmental standpoint, therefore, they are worse than nothing—since they stand in the way of effective action. Nor are the technologies most acceptable to the system (since not requiring changes in property relations) the answer. So-called “clean coal” or carbon capture and storage technologies are economically unfeasible and ecologically dubious, and serve mainly as an ideological justification for keeping coal-fired plants going. Worse still, are geoengineering schemes like dumping sulfur particles in the atmosphere or iron filings in the ocean (the first in order to deflect the sun’s rays, the second in order to promote algal growth to increase ocean absorption of carbon). These schemes carry with them the potential for even greater ecological disasters: in the first case, this could lead to a reduction of photosynthesis, in the second the expansion of dead zones. Remember the Sorcerer’s Apprentice!33 The potential for the accumulation of catastrophe on a truly planetary level as a result of geoengineering technology is so great that it would be absolute folly to proceed in this way—simply in order to avoid changes in the mode of production, i.e., a fundamental transformation of our way of life, property relations, and metabolism with nature. Science tells us that we are crossing planetary boundaries everywhere we look, from climate change, to ocean acidification, to species destruction, to freshwater shortages, to chemical pollution of air, water, soil, and humans. The latest warning sign is the advent of what is called “extreme weather”—a direct outgrowth of climate change. As Hansen says: “Global warming increases the intensity of droughts and heat waves, and thus the area of forest fires. However, because a warmer atmosphere holds more water vapor, global warming must also increase the intensity of the other extreme of the hydrologic cycle—meaning heavier rains, more extreme floods, and more intense storms driven by latent heat.” Scientists involved in the new area of climate-attribution science, where extreme weather events are examined for their climate signatures, are now arguing that we are rapidly approaching a situation where the proverbial “‘hundred-year’ flood” no longer occurs simply once a century, but every few years. Natural catastrophes are thus likely to become more severe and more frequent occurrences in the lives of all living beings. The hope of some scientists is that this will finally wake up humanity to its true danger.34 How are we to understand the challenge of the enormous accumulation of catastrophe, and the no less massive human action required to address this? In the 1930s John Maynard Keynes wrote an essay entitled “Economic Possibilities of Our Grandchildren,” aimed at defending capitalism in response to revolutionary social challenges then arising. Keynes argued that we should rely for at least a couple more generations on the convenient lie of the Smithian invisible hand—accepting greed as the basis of a spontaneous economic order. We should therefore continue the pretense that “fair is foul and foul is fair” for the sake of the greater accumulation of wealth in society that such an approach would bring. Eventually, in the time of our “grandchildren”—maybe a “hundred years” hence (i.e., by the early 2030s)—Keynes assumed, the added wealth created by these means would be great enough that we could begin to tell the truth: that foul is foul and fair is fair. It would then be necessary for humanity to address the enormous inequalities and injustices produced by the system, engaging in a full-scale redistribution of wealth, and a radical transformation of the ends of production.35 Yet, the continued pursuit of Keynes’s convenient lie over the last eight decades has led to a world far more polarized and beset with contradictions than he could have foreseen. It is a world prey to the enormous unintended consequences of accumulation without limits: namely, global economic stagnation, financial crisis, and planetary ecological destruction. Keynes, though aware of some of the negative economic aspects of capitalist production, had no real understanding of the ecological perils—of which scientists had already long been warning. Today these perils are impossible to overlook. Faced with impending ecological catastrophe, it is more necessary than ever to abandon Keynes’s convenient lie and espouse the truth: that foul is foul and fair is fair. Capitalism, the society of “après moi le déluge!” is a system that fouls its own nest—both the human-social conditions and the wider natural environment on which it depends. The accumulation of capital is at the same time accumulation of catastrophe, not only for a majority of the world’s people, but living species generally. Hence, nothing is fairer—more just, more beautiful, and more necessary—today than the struggle to overthrow the regime of capital and to create a system of substantive equality and sustainable human development; a socialism for the twenty-first century.

### Case

#### Plan kills birds which are keystone species

Sutton and Tomich 5

Victoria Sutton and Nicole Tomich, 2005, Victoria Sutton is Visiting Lecturer (Fall 2004) Yale University, Professor of Law, Texas Tech University, Ph.D. in Environmental Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas and Nicole Tomich has a JD from Texas Tech University School of Law, “Harnessing Wind is Not (by Nature) Environmentally Friendly”, Pace Environmental Law Review, 92.

2.0 THE IMPACT OF WIND FARMS ON THE ENVIRONMENT Any artificial structure, such as a wind turbine, is likely to have a significant negative impact on the surrounding natural en- vironment.19 This reality increases in magnitude when the surrounding environment encompasses threatened or endangered species.20 Studies in Europe have revealed that the public’s perception of bird impacts can be a major factor in deciding whether a wind farm will gain acceptance and receive the proper permitting for a particular location.21 Furthermore, the minimal amount of existing scientific research on the environmental impacts of wind- generated power is considered by some to be developer-driven, and therefore incomplete, biased, and flawed.22 Whether “flawed” or not, there is existing literature on the negative impacts of wind power on the environment, and these impacts are discussed infra. 2.1 Impact of Wind Power on Birds Evidence of negative impacts on birds from interaction with wind generation first arose in the late 1980s.23 Since then, turbine blades have been proven to injure and kill birds-particularly birds of prey, known as raptors, some of which are threatened or endangered.24 These birds, such as the Bald Eagle,25 become victims of the wind turbines, primarily because of the height at which they fly. An early study of just one wind farm site in Al- tamont Pass, California, reported hundreds of raptors being killed yearly.26 Studies from the site, which hosts 6,500 wind turbines on 190 kilometers of property reveal: (1) turbines within 500 feet of canyons, which are typically prey areas, are associated with higher mortality rates; (2) mortality at end turbines is higher, but is just as high within strings of turbines where there are gaps of 35 meters or more between turbines; and (3) the lower the turbine density, the higher the mortality rates.27 The Altamont study was validated in the 1990s when migrating endangered Griffon Vul- tures were dying near Tarifa, Spain from collisions with wind tur- bine rotor blades.28 Bird collisions with wind generators can occur in a number of different ways: (1) a bird may strike the non-moving part of a tur- bine, such as the tower or motor box; (2) a bird may hit the spin- ning rotor blades; or (3) a bird may become caught in the strong pressure wave, or “wake” of a rotor blade.29 Wake collisions can cause a bird to become disoriented, lose control, and collide with the turbine, or be thrown down • onto the ground or into the ocean.30 The speed of revolving rotor blades can also contribute to “motion smear,” which is the degradation of the visibility of rap- idly moving objects, causing birds not to see them and fly straight into them.31 One study estimates that approximately 10,000 to 40,000 birds are killed each year by wind turbines in the United States.32 In comparison, approximately 60 million to 80 million yearly bird deaths result from vehicles, with an additional 40 million to 50 million deaths attributed to communication tower impacts.33 While the second set of figures seem to dwarf the importance of 10,000 to 40,000 birds killed annually by wind turbines, comparison studies are often flawed because they tend to focus on “cumulative impact” data rather than focusing on losses suffered by a particular species.34 Such studies compare the total mortalities from various sources, instead of the risk emanating from each separate source.35 Using the figures above, and factoring in approximately 230 million registered motor vehicles in the United States in the year 2000, the result is a low average of 0.3 bird deaths per vehicle per year.36 Furthermore vehicle deaths are much less likely to affect endangered or threatened raptors. Collisions are not the only threat posed to birds by wind power development. Wind farms can also become a barrier to movement, causing a migrating species to fly around rather than through a particular production site.37 A wind farm may also block daily home-range movements of a particular species, for instance, birds flying to and from preferred feeding and roosting sites.38 A wind farm that intersects a major migration path can cause a species to reroute adding stress and forcing the species to exert extra energy.39 The lighting of turbines may also pose a large threat to birds. Aviation lights that blink or rotate, have long been associated with bird mortality.40 Lighting dangers become amplified during bad weather such as fog, or heavy rain, increasing reflection and refraction, thus increasing mortality.41 Installed wind energy generating capacity increased by an average of 32% annually from 1998-2002;42 this ever-increasing growth rate combined with the various threats discussed supra, creates a unique and rapidly growing threat to bird populations and habitats.

#### Extinction

Diner 94

[Major David, Judge Advocate General's Corps, 143 Mil. L. Rev. 161, Lexis]

**Biologically diverse ecosystems are characterized by a large number of specialist species, filling narrow ecological niches.** These ecosystems inherently are more stable than less diverse systems. "The more complex the ecosystem, the more successfully it can resist a stress. . . . [l]ike a net, in which each knot is connected to others by several strands, such a fabric can resist collapse better than a simple, unbranched circle of threads -- which if cut anywhere breaks down as a whole." 79 **By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems**. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, **each new animal or plant extinction,** with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, **could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, 80 [HU]mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.**

**Renewables fail – subject to unforeseen market developments – prefer our evidence its by qualified economic advisors**

**Lane 6/19/12** (Charles, Member of the Washington Post Editoral Board, “The U.S. Government’s Bad Bets on Energy Policy”)

U.S. energy subsidies — spending, tax breaks, loan guarantees — increased from $17.9 billion in fiscal 2007 to $37.2 billion in fiscal 2010, according to the Energy Department. Yet fossil fuels' overwhelming market advantages have produced a litany of clean-energy failures, from electric cars to Solyndra. **The subsidies ostensibly address several issues — dependence on foreign oil, job creation, international economic competitiveness and environmental degradation — but without clear priorities, much less rigorous cost-benefit analysis**. Unintended consequences and political influence abound. **The best-laid plans are vulnerable to unforeseen market developments** — **such as the boom in oil and natural gas “fracking” over the past decade,** which Obama has now embraced. To the extent that it's coherent at all, the federal energy “portfolio” represents a return to industrial policy — governmental selection of economic winners — which was fashionable in the 1970s and 1980s, before it collapsed under the weight of its intellectual and practical contradictions. **As such, current clean-energy programs are no likelier to pay off than President Jimmy Carter's Synthetic Fuels Corp**., which blew $9 billion, or President George W. Bush's $1.2 billion program for hydrogen vehicles. This isn't just my opinion or the finding of some right-wing think tank. Rather, **all of the above comes from a new paper by three certifiably centrist Brookings Institution scholars, Adele Morris, Pietro S. Nivola and Charles L. Schultze; Schultze was a senior economic adviser to Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Cart**er. The researchers pick apart clean-energy subsidies rationale by rationale

#### Impossible to scale up wind- best sites already taken

Zycher 8-6

Benjamin is a Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, “The Rathold Eternal,” <http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/08/should-wind-tax-credit-stay-or.php>

- Because of this enormous land requirement, appropriate sites for wind farms are limited, and the best (lowest-cost) ones obviously have been used first. That means that scale economies and learning efficiencies, even if still available, are irrelevant: At the industry level, average production costs must rise as newer sites prove less suitable than earlier ones, and as large additional transmission costs must be incurred to send wind power to consumers. In contrast, conventional power plants, in principle, can be sited virtually anywhere, and fuels can be transported to the plants. That is why wind “capacity factors”---reliability---have decreased monotonically over the last decade, by about 40 percent.

**Life should be valued as apriori – it precedes the ability to value anything else**

Amien **Kacou. 2008**. WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of “Life”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184

Furthermore, that manner of **finding things good** that is in pleasure **can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,”** as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, **pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation**, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation. Thus, we can see now that, in general, **something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself.** And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, **we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living** (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] **and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good.** However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that **the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value.** But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

**Scenario planning is essential to policymaking and break down social hierarchies by promoting policymakers to occupy various subject positions**

Garry D. **Peterson et al. 2003**. Center for Limnology at the U of Wisconsin. “Scenario Planning: a Tool for Conservation in an Uncertain World” Conservation Biology. P 358-366. Vol. 17. No. 2.

**Scenario planning that involves stakeholders can provide¶ a forum for policy creation and evaluation.** Stakeholders¶ who become involved in the scenario-planning¶ process are likely to find that some scenarios represent a¶ future that they would like to inhabit, whereas others¶ are highly undesirable. **This process of reflection can¶ stimulate people to think more broadly about the future¶ and the forces that are creating it and to realize how¶ their own actions can move the system toward a particular¶ kind of future. In this way, scenario planning allows¶ people to step away from entrenched positions and identify¶ positive futures that they can work at creating**. Policy¶ screening often identifies new questions, new variables,¶ and new types of unknowns. **These concerns can stimulate¶ either another iteration of the scenario-planning¶ process or another form of action.¶ A successful scenario-planning effort should enhance¶ the ability of people to cope with and take advantage of¶ future change. Decisions can be made, policies changed,¶ and management plans implemented to steer the system¶ toward a more desirable future.** New research or monitoring¶ activities may be initiated to increase understanding¶ of key uncertainties, and they may stimulate the formation¶ of new coalitions of stakeholder groups.

**Probabilistic evaluation of hypothetical impacts is the only way to grapple with strategic uncertainty**

**Krepinevich 9** (Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. is a defense policy analyst, currently executive director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. His influential book, The Army and Vietnam, contends that the United States could have won the Vietnam War had the Army adopted a small-unit pacification strategy in South Vietnam's villages, rather than conducting search and destroy operations in remote jungles. Today, he criticizes the counterinsurgency approaches being employed in the Iraq War. He is a West Point graduate. 1/27/2009, “7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century”, <http://www.amazon.com/reader/0553805398?_encoding=UTF8&query=so%20are%20we%20building#reader_0553805398>)

While the Pentagon would dearly like to know the answers to these questions, it is simply not possible. Too many factors have a hand in shaping the future. Of course. **Pentagon planners may blithely assume away all uncertainty and essentially bet that the future they fore-cast is the one that will emerge.** In this case **the U.S. military will be very well prepared—for the predicted future**. But history shows that **militaries are often wrong when they put too many eggs in one basket**. In the summer of 1914, as World War I was breaking out, **Europeans felt that the war would be brief** and that the troops might be home "before the leaves fall**." In reality the Allied and Central Powers engaged in over four years of horrific bloodletting**. In World War II the French Army entered the conflict believing it would experience an advanced version of the trench warfare it had encountered in 1914-1918. Instead, France was defeated by the Germans in a lightning campaign lasting less than two months. Finally, in 2003 the Pentagon predicted that the Second Gulf War would play out [with](http://wir.li) a traditional blitzkrieg. Instead, it turned into an irregular war, a "long, hard slog."20 **Militaries seem prone to assuming that the next war will be an "updated" version of the last war rather than something quite different.** Consequently, **they are often accused of preparing for the last war instead of the next**. **This is where rigorous, scenario-based planning comes into play**. **It is designed to take uncertainty explicitly into account by incorporating factors that may change the character of future conflict in significant and perhaps profound ways**. **By presenting a plausible set of paths into the future, scenarios can help senior Pentagon leaders avoid the "default" picture in which tomorrow looks very much like today**. **If the future were entirely uncertain, scenario-based planning would be a waste of time**. **But certain things are predictable or at least highly likely**. **Scenario planners call these things “predetermined elements.**” **While not** quite “**done deals,” they are sufficiently well known that their probability of occurring is quite high.** For example, **we have a very good idea of how many men of military age** (eighteen to thirty-one) **there will be in the United States in 2020**, since all of those males have already been born, and, barring a catastrophic event, the actuarial data on them is quite refined. We know that China has already tested several types of weapons that can disable or destroy satellites. We know that dramatic advances in solid-state lasers have been made in recent years and that more advances are well within the realm of possibility. **These "certainties" should be reflected in all scenarios, while key uncertainties should be reflected in how they play out across the different scenarios**.21 **If scenario-based planning is done well, and if its insights are acted upon promptly, the changes it stimulates in the military may help deter prospective threats, or dissuade enemies from creating threatening new capabilities in the first place.**

**Complexity theory useless for policy making**

**Cairney 10**

(Paul, Chair in Politics and Public Policy¶ BA (Hons), MSc, PhD at Aberdeen University, “Complexity Theory in Public Policy” <http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2010/121_665.pdf>, SEH)

**Why has Complexity Theory Struggled for Attention?¶** The first difficulty with complexity theory is that it is difficult to pin down. While we¶ may find similar discussions in a wide range of texts in the literature, this may be merely¶ because it is vague. Its appeal in the sciences may be because it means different things to¶ different people, suggesting that initial enthusiasm and cross-disciplinary cooperation may be replaced by growing scepticism.¶ The second is that, **when we do pin the meaning of complexity theory down, it seems to¶ present a deterministic argument**. **The danger is that if the complex system is¶ predominantly the causal factor then we lose sight of the role that policymakers play;¶ there may be a tendency to treat the system as a rule-bound structure which leaves¶ minimal room for the role of agency.** It is tempting to contrast this picture with¶ interpretive social science which rejects the assumption of structural constraint. Rather, it¶ explores how agents perceive their decision-making environments; how they reproduce,¶ accept or challenge the structural, institutional and wider systemic constraints that they¶ appear to face when making decisions. Indeed, they may even reject terms such as¶ ‘institution’ and ‘rule’ because they imply a sense of permanence or common¶ understanding that has not been demonstrated (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003; 2006). This is¶ the essence of the study of politics, explaining why different policymakers make different¶ decisions under the same circumstances. Yet, there is perhaps good reason to resist this¶ temptation because, if the aim of complexity theory is to identify a shift in rule-bound¶ behaviour, then it could have something in common with interpretivist accounts which¶ seek to understand how agents interpret, adapt to and influence their decision-making¶ environment. This seems to be Teisman and Klijn’s (2008: 289) point when they focus¶ on agents adapting to the fitness landscape. Further, as Schneider and Bauer (2007: 6)¶ discuss, complexity theory appears to differ from the old functionalist logic of systems¶ theories that has gone out of fashion in political science. A kinder treatment of¶ complexity suggests that, so far, it has been used in public policy more to provide¶ practical advice to public managers than to inform the wider theological debates on¶ structure and agency we find in political science. I return to this theme in the next¶ section. The third is that **it is difficult to identify or define a system and separate it from its¶ environment**. For Mitleton-Kelly (2003: 30) this is not a problem because it is useful to¶ work on the assumption that there is no fixed boundary between the two. Rather, the¶ picture is one of overlapping systems or an ‘intricate web of inter-relationships’,¶ suggesting that systems as a whole engage in ‘co-evolution’. Rather than a system¶ adapting to its environment, we picture organisations influencing and being influenced by¶ the ‘social ecosystem’ which consists of other organisations (2003: 31).¶ This conclusion raises a fourth problem related to scale or perspective in complex¶ systems**. Not only do we not know what a complex system is, but we don’t know at what¶ level we should view it**. **Wider scientific accounts relate the benefit of complexity theory¶ to the ability to step back and see the system as a whole**, in much the same way that we¶ move from looking at molecules to observing the whole being. Yet, **this doesn’t guide us¶ too much, because we could still see systems at different levels, such as a healthcare¶ system or a political system or even an international political system** (plus authors such as¶ Mitleton-Kelly often seem to situate analysis at the organisational level). While this¶ gives us some flexibility, **it could raise a whole host of further theoretical questions (are¶ central policymakers situated within, or treated as external to, the systems they cannot¶ control?** If a country’s political system is made up of a number of other systems, does this suggest that there are super-emergent processes when systems interact with each¶ other?).¶ **The fifth is that it is difficult to know which types of policy issue or area complexity¶ theory applies to.** For example, Klijn (2008: 314) suggests that complexity theory is best¶ suited to ‘wicked problems’, suggesting that it refers primarily to issues of joined-upgovernment¶ and/ or intractable policy problems (what would this exclude?). Bovaird¶ (2008: 325) suggests that complex systems “are less likely to be found in ‘command-andcontrol’¶ environments”. This is confusing for two related reasons. First, the best¶ example in the UK of a command-and-control approach is the English NHS. Yet,¶ Kernick (2006) argues that complexity theory is well suited to explain why the NHS is¶ impervious to central control. Second, perhaps Bovaird is referring not to areas with¶ command-and-control styles, but those conducive to them. If so, there seems to be no¶ way to decide which areas are most relevant. The irony of governance, highlighted by¶ Rhodes (1997), in which successive governments have contributed to their own lack of¶ central control, knows no bounds. Perhaps the point is that the identification of¶ emergence and self-organizing behaviour is most likely in areas where the role of the¶ ‘centre’ is not strong, but this also raises further issues (below). The sixth is that, **although anti-reductionism and whole-systems approaches sound¶ attractive** (almost like a valence issue), **reductionist theories have a strong hold in¶ political science.** Indeed, **rational choice theory may represent complexity theory’s¶ poplar opposite because it seeks parsimonious results based on a reduction of the social¶ world into as few factors as possible.** This is as much a practical as a philosophical issue.¶ **While we may view the world as a complex system, we do not have the ability to study it¶ as one**. The ACF, for example, situates analysis at the level of the subsystem and¶ identifies two main processes: a process of learning within subsystems as advocacy¶ coalitions compete to define the policy problem and account for new information, and an¶ external process which may produce shocks to the system that change how the subsystem¶ operates (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Weible et al, 2009). **The interesting aspect¶ of this framework is that, while from a complex systems perspective we may prefer to¶ study the system as a whole, the ACF may be no worse a way to study the process when¶ we are faced with limited resources and cognitive abilities**.¶ A final problem may be that **complexity theory complicates the study of public policy¶ without offering something new. This point seems strongest when applied to the study¶ of implementation.** For example, one case study in the PMR special issue demonstrates¶ ‘how local governments develop contrasting behaviour on the same national policy¶ impulse due to self-organizing abilities to combine adaptiveness and self referentiality’¶ (Teisman and Klijn, 2008: 296), but Teisman and Klijn do not show how this differs from¶ similar ‘bottom-up’ processes of self-selection in implementation structures (Hjern, 1981;¶ Hjern and Porter, 1982) or street-level bureaucracy (Lipsky, 1980) identified 30 years ago¶ (also compare Buuren and Gerrits’ 2008: 382 line that ‘decisions are neither the starting¶ nor the finishing points of a decision-making process’ with Barret and Fudge’s focus on¶ ‘policy in action’). Similarly, the statement that complexity theory shows us that¶ ‘managers are not the rational beings presented in many managerial handbooks (Teisman and Klijn, 2008: 297) does not seem startlingly original. We are in the very¶ familiar territory of uncertain policy effects and unintended consequences. A¶ sympathetic assessment might suggest that these points are being restated because the¶ lessons from bottom-up studies have been lost or ignored. This seems to be the tone of¶ Butler and Allan’s (2008) argument that there is no one-best-way in the delivery of local¶ services and in Kernick’s (2006: 388) criticism of the assumption of a single¶ organizational solution in the NHS (and promotion of a more meaningful dialogue¶ between those who design and those who deliver and use the service). But is there¶ anything more to complexity theory than this?

#### We’ll answer all the impacts in their O’leary ev- pollution, blackouts, and warming

#### No air pollution impact

Schwartz 6

Joel Schwartz is a visiting fellow at AEI and a Professor of Environmental Epidemiology at Harvard. "Getting Real on Air Pollution and Health," June 14, AEI, <http://www.aei.org/article/energy-and-the-environment/contaminants/air/getting-real-on-air-pollution-and-health/>

The EPA attributes well over 90 percent of the benefits of its clean air programs to improvements in human health. Thus, a key policy question is whether EPA's health-benefit claims are credible. Even as public health authorities and environmental activists become more strident in raising health alarms, evidence continues to mount that air pollution at contemporary low levels is causing little or no harm, even in the most polluted areas of the country.**¶** More sober estimates in the EPA's own technical analyses belie the scary claims it puts out for public consumption. Writing in the journal Environmental Health Perspectives, EPA scientists estimated that going from 2002 ozone levels, which were by far the highest of the past several years, to nationwide compliance with the stringent new federal eight-hour ozone standard would reduce respiratory-related hospital admissions and emergency room visits by no more than a few tenths of a percent.¶ Claims of an air pollution-asthma link by health experts have also been undermined by recent research. While the prevalence of asthma has nearly doubled in America during the past 25 years, air pollution of all kinds has sharply declined around the nation at the same time, making air pollution an implausible culprit.**¶** Government-funded research by scientists from the University of Southern California supports this finding. The authors of the Children's Health Study reported that children who grew up in areas with higher air pollution, including areas with the worst air pollution in the nation by far, had a lower risk of developing asthma. The researchers also found that ozone had no effect on lung development, even though the study included areas that exceeded the federal ozone standard more than 100 days per year. And even in a community with uniquely high soot levels--more than twice the current federal health standard--soot was associated with only a 1 percent to 2 percent decline in lung capacity.¶ The most serious claim about air pollution is that it prematurely kills tens of thousands of Americans each year. This claim is based on small statistical correlations between pollution levels and risk of death. But correlation doesn't necessarily mean causation**,** as demonstrated recently by a number of embarrassing reversals of conventional medical wisdom.¶ The air pollution-mortality claim deserves even greater skepticism. First, it is based on the same unreliable correlation methods that have led medical authorities astray in other areas. Second, even though pollution is weakly correlated with higher premature mortality on average, it seems to protect against death in about one-third of cities. How could pollution kill people in some cities and save them in others? More likely, both results are chance correlations rather than real effects. Third, in laboratory experiments, researchers have been unable to kill animals by exposing them to air pollution at levels many times greater than ever occur in the United States.

**No blackouts and no impact**

**Leger ’12**

(7-31-12 [Donna Leinwand Leger, USA Today, “Energy experts say blackout like India's is unlikely in U.S.,” <http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-07-31/usa-india-power-outage/56622978/1>]

**A massive, countrywide power failure** like the one in India on Tuesday **is "extremely unlikely" in the United States, energy experts say**. In India, three of the country's government-operated power grids failed Tuesday, leaving 620 million people without electricity for several hours. The outage, the second in two days in the country of 1.21 billion people, is the world's biggest blackout on record. **The U.S. electricity system is segmented into three parts with safeguards that prevent an outage in one system from tripping a blackout in another system, "making blackouts across the country extremely unlikely**," Energy Department spokeswoman Keri Fulton said. Early reports from government officials in India say excessive demand knocked the country's power generators offline. Experts say India's industry and economy are growing faster than its electrical systems. Last year, the economy grew 7.8% and pushed energy needs higher, but electricity generation did not keep pace, government records show. "**We are much, much less at risk for something like that happening here, especially from the perspective of demand exceeding supply," said** Gregory **Reed, a professor of electric power engineering at University of Pittsburgh. "We're much more sophisticated in our operations. Most of our issues have been from natural disasters."** **The U.S. generates more than enough electricity to meet demand and always have power in reserve, Reed said. "Fundamentally, it's a different world here," said** Arshad **Mansoor, senior vice president of the Electric Power Research Institute in Washington and an expert on power grids. "It's an order of magnitude more reliable here than in a developing country**." Grid operators across the country analyze power usage and generation, factoring outside factors such as weather, in real time and can forecast power supply and demand hour by hour, Mansoor said. "In any large, complex interactive network, the chance of that interconnection breaking up is always there," Mansoor said. "You cannot take your eye off the ball for a minute." Widespread outages in the U.S. caused by weather are common. But **the U.S. has also had system failures**, said Ellen Vancko, senior energy adviser for the Union of Concerned Scientists, based in Washington. **On Aug. 14, 2003, more than 50 million people in the Northeast and Canada lost power after a major U.S. grid collapsed**. The problem began in Ohio when a transmission wire overheated and sagged into a tree that had grown too close to the line, Vancko said. **That caused other power lines to overheat until so many lines failed that the system shut itself down, she said. "That was less a failure of technology and more a failure of people, a failure of people to follow the rules," Vancko said. "There were a whole bunch of lessons learned." In 2005, in response to an investigation of the blackout, Congress passed a law establishing the** North American Electric Reliability Corporation (**NERC**) **to enforce reliability standards for bulk electricity generation**.

**No impact - threat overestimated and global warming is solved by adaptation and mitigation**

**Mendelsohn 9**

(Robert O. the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of¶ Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and¶ Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/¶ gcwp060web.pdf

The heart of the **debate about climate change comes from** a number of **warnings** from scientists and others that give the impression **that** human induced **climate change is an immediate threat to society** (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006.) Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b) crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20-30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people. (Dasgupta et al. 2009) Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and wellbeing may be at risk (Stern 2006). **These statements are** largely **alarmist and misleading**. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, **society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences**. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear **that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences**. **The severe impacts** predicted **by alarmists require a century** (or two in the Case of Stern 2006) **of no mitigation**. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no **or little adaptation. the net** economic **impacts** from climate change over the next 50 years **will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold** **and** many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because **people will adapt**. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long-run balanced responses.

## 2NC

### Resource Wars

#### No resource wars - prefer our more qualified, empirical evidence

Pinker 11,

Professor @ Harvard University, 11 (An Excerpt from "The Better Angels of our Nature," http://www.globalwarming.org/2011/11/28/steven-pinker-resource-scarcity-doesnt-cause-wars/

Once again it seems to me that the appropriate response is “maybe, but maybe not.” Though climate change can cause plenty of misery… it will not necessarily lead to armed conflict. The political scientists who track war and peace, such as Halvard Buhaug, Idean Salehyan, Ole Theisen, and Nils Gleditsch, are skeptical of the popular idea that people fight wars over scarce resources. Hunger and resource shortages are tragically common in sub-Saharan countries such as Malawi, Zambia, and Tanzania, but wars involving them are not. Hurricanes, floods, droughts, and tsunamis (such as the disastrous one in the Indian Ocean in 2004) do not generally lead to conflict. The American dust bowl in the 1930s, to take another example, caused plenty of deprivation but no civil war. And while temperatures have been rising steadily in Africa during the past fifteen years, civil wars and war deaths have been falling. Pressures on access to land and water can certainly cause local skirmishes, but a genuine war requires that hostile forces be organized and armed, and that depends more on the influence of bad governments, closed economies, and militant ideologies than on the sheer availability of land and water. Certainly any connection to terrorism is in the imagination of the terror warriors: terrorists tend to be underemployed lower-middle-class men, not subsistence farmers. As for genocide, the Sudanese government finds it convenient to blame violence in Darfur on desertification, distracting the world from its own role in tolerating or encouraging the ethnic cleansing. In a regression analysis on armed conflicts from 1980 to 1992, Theisen found that conflict was more likely if a country was poor, populous, politically unstable, and abundant in oil, but not if it had suffered from droughts, water shortages, or mild land degradation. (Severe land degradation did have a small effect.) Reviewing analyses that examined a large number (N) of countries rather than cherry-picking one or toe, he concluded, “Those who foresee doom, because of the relationship between resource scarcity and violent internal conflict, have very little support from the large-N literature.”

### Birds

#### The environment is no longer resilient – the magnitude and rapidity of ecosystem destruction threatens total extinction

Watson 06

(Captain Paul Watson Founder and President of Sea Shepherd Conservation Society “The Politics of Extinction” 2006, www.eco-action.org/dt/beerswil.html)

The facts are clear. More plant and animal species will go through extinction within our generation than have been lost thorough natural causes over the past two hundred million years. Our single human generation, that is, all people born between 1930 and 2010 will witness the complete obliteration of one third to one half of all the Earth's life forms, each and every one of them the product of more than two billion years of evolution. This is biological meltdown, and what this really means is the end to vertebrate evolution on planet Earth.¶ Nature is under siege on a global scale. Biotopes, i.e., environmentally distinct regions, from tropical and temperate rainforests to coral reefs and coastal estuaries, are disintegrating in the wake of human onslaught.¶ The destruction of forests and the proliferation of human activity will remove more than 20 percent of all terrestrial plant species over the next fifty years. Because plants form the foundation for entire biotic communities, their demise will carry with it the extinction of an exponentially greater number of animal species -- perhaps ten times as many faunal species for each type of plant eliminated.¶ Sixty-five million years ago, a natural cataclysmic event resulted in extinction of the dinosaurs. Even with a plant foundation intact, it took more than 100,000 years for faunal biological diversity to re-establish itself. More importantly, the resurrection of biological diversity assumes an intact zone of tropical forests to provide for new speciation after extinction. Today, the tropical rain forests are disappearing more rapidly than any other bio-region, ensuring that after the age of humans, the Earth will remain a biological, if not a literal desert for eons to come. The present course of civilization points to ecocide -- the death of nature.

### Predictions

**Predictions are accurate enough and should be used as a basis for political action**

**Chernoff 2009**. Fred, Prof. IR and Dir. IR – Colgate U., European Journal of International Relations, “Conventionalism as an Adequate Basis for Policy-Relevant IR Theory”, 15:1

For these and other reasons, many social theorists and social scientists have come to the conclusion that prediction is impossible. Well-known IR reflexivists like Rick Ashley, Robert Cox, Rob Walker and Alex Wendt have attacked naturalism by emphasizing the interpretive nature of social theory. Ashley is explicit in his critique of prediction, as is Cox, who says quite simply, ‘It is impossible to predict the future’ (Ashley, 1986: 283; Cox, 1987: 139, cf. also 1987: 393). More recently, Heikki Patomäki has argued that **‘qualitative changes and emergence are possible, but predictions are not’ defective** and that the latter two presuppose an unjustifiably narrow notion of ‘prediction’.14 **A determined prediction sceptic may continue to hold that there is too great a degree of complexity of social relationships** (which comprise ‘open systems’) **to allow any prediction whatsoever.** Two very **simple examples may circumscribe and help to refute a radical variety of scepticism**. First, **we all make reliable social predictions and do so with great frequency**. We can predict with high probability that a spouse, child or parent will react to certain well-known stimuli that we might supply, based on extensive past experience. More to the point of IR prediction – scepticism, we can imagine a young child in the UK who (perhaps at the cinema) (1) picks up a bit of 19th-century British imperial lore thus gaining a sense of the power of the crown, without knowing anything of current balances of power, (2) hears some stories about the US–UK invasion of Iraq in the context of the aim of advancing democracy, and (3) hears a bit about communist China and democratic Taiwan. Although the specific term ‘preventative strike’ might not enter into her lexicon, it is possible to imagine the child, whose knowledge is thus limited, thinking that if democratic Taiwan were threatened by China, the UK would (possibly or probably) launch a strike on China to protect it, much as the UK had done to help democracy in Iraq. In contrast to the child, readers of this journal and scholars who study the world more thoroughly have factual information (e.g. about the relative military and economic capabilities of the UK and China) and hold some cause-and-effect principles (such as that states do not usually initiate actions that leaders understand will have an extremely high probability of undercutting their power with almost no chances of success). Anyone who has adequate knowledge of world politics would predict that the UK will not launch a preventive attack against China. In the real world, China knows that for the next decade and well beyond the UK will not intervene militarily in its affairs. While Chinese leaders have to plan for many likely — and even a few somewhat unlikely — future possibilities, they do not have to plan for various implausible contingencies: they do not have to structure forces geared to defend against specifically UK forces and do not have to conduct diplomacy with the UK in a way that would be required if such an attack were a real possibility. Any rational decision-maker in China may use some cause-and-effect (probabilistic) principles along with knowledge of specific facts relating to the Sino-British relationship to predict (P2) that the UK will not land its forces on Chinese territory — even in the event of a war over Taiwan (that is, the probability is very close to zero). The statement P2 qualifies as a prediction based on DEF above and counts as knowledge for Chinese political and military decision-makers. A Chinese diplomat or military planner who would deny that theory-based prediction would have no basis to rule out extremely implausible predictions like P2 and would thus have to prepare for such unlikely contingencies as UK action against China. A reflexivist theorist sceptical of ‘prediction’ in IR might argue that the China example distorts the notion by using a trivial prediction and treating it as a meaningful one. But the critic’s temptation to dismiss its value stems precisely from the fact that it is so obviously true. The value to China of knowing that the UK is not a military threat is significant. The fact that, under current conditions, any plausible cause-and-effect understanding of IR that one might adopt would yield P2, that the ‘UK will not attack China’, does not diminish the value to China of knowing the UK does not pose a military threat. A critic might also argue that DEF and the China example allow non-scientific claims to count as predictions. But we note that while physics and chemistry offer precise ‘point predictions’, other natural sciences, such as seismology, genetics or meteorology, produce predictions that are often much less specific; that is, they describe the predicted ‘events’ in broader time frame and typically in probabilistic terms. We often find predictions about the probability, for example, of a seismic event in the form ‘some time in the next three years’ rather than ‘two years from next Monday at 11:17 am’. DEF includes approximate and probabilistic propositions as predictions and is thus able to catagorize as a prediction the former sort of statement, which is of a type that is often of great value to policy-makers. **With the help of these ‘non-point predictions’ coming from the natural and the social sciences, leaders are able to choose the courses of action** (e.g. more stringent earthquake-safety building codes, or procuring an additional carrier battle group) **that are most likely to accomplish the leaders’ desired ends. So while ‘point predictions’ are not what political leaders require in most decision-making situations, critics of IR predictiveness often attack the predictive capacity of IR theory for its inability to deliver them. The critics thus commit the straw man fallacy by requiring a sort of prediction in IR (1) that few, if any, theorists claim to be able to offer, (2) that are not required by policy-makers for theory-based predictions to be valuable, and (3) that are not possible even in some natural sciences.**15 The range of theorists included in ‘reflexivists’ here is very wide and it is possible to dissent from some of the general descriptions. From the point of view of the central argument of this article, there are two important features that should be rendered accurately. One is that reflexivists reject explanation–prediction symmetry, which allows them to pursue causal (or constitutive) explanation without any commitment to prediction. The second is that almost all share clear opposition to predictive social science.16 The reflexivist commitment to both of these conclusions should be evident from the foregoing discussion.

### Linearity

**Linearity might not be true but complexity isn’t 100% true either**

Dr. Sebastian L. V. **Gorka et al 12**, Director of the Homeland Defense Fellows Program at the College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University, teaches Irregular Warfare and US National Security at NDU and Georgetown, et al., Spring 2012, “The Complexity Trap,” Parameters, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/Articles/2012spring/Gallagher_Geltzer_Gorka.pdf>

These competing views of America’s national security concerns indicate an important and distinctive characteristic of today’s global landscape: **prioritization is simultaneously** very **difficult and very important** for the United States. **Each of these threats and potential threats**—**al Qaeda, China, nuclear proliferation, climate change, global disease, and so on**—**can conjure up a worstcase scenario that is immensely intimidating.** Given the difficulty of combining estimates of probabilities with the levels of risk associated with these threats, **it is challenging to establish priorities.** Such **choices and trade-offs are** **difficult, but not impossible**. 30 In fact, **they are the stock-in-trade of the strategist and planner**. **If the U**nited **S**tates **is going to respond proactively and effectively to today’s international environment,** **prioritization is the key first step**—**and** **precisely the opposite reaction** **to the** **complacency and undifferentiated fear that the** **notion of unprecedented complexity encourages**. **Complexity suggests a maximization of flexibility and** **minimization of commitment**; **but prioritization** **demands wise allotment of resources** **and attention in a way that** **commits American power and effort** **most effectively and efficiently**. Phrased differently, **complexity induces deciding not to decide**; **prioritization encourages deciding which decisions matter most.** **Today’s world** **of** **diverse threats** characterized by uncertain probabilities and unclear risks **will** **overwhelm us** **if the specter of complexity seduces us into** either **paralysis or paranoia**. Some **priorities need to be set** if the United States is to find the resources to confront what threatens it most. 31 As Michael Doran recently argued in reference to the Arab Spring, “the United States must train itself to see a large dune as something more formidable than just endless grains of sand.”32¶ **This is not to deny the possibility of** **nonlinear phenomena, butterfly effects, self-organizing systems** that exhibit patterns in the absence of centralized authority, **or emergent properties**. 33 If anything, **these hallmarks of complexity theory remind strategists of the importance of revisiting key assumptions in light of new data and** allowing for **tactical flexibility** in case of unintended consequences. **Sound strategy requires hard choices and commitments,** **but it need not be inflexible**. **We can prioritize without being procrustean.** **But a model in which everything is potentially relevant is a model in which** **nothing is**.

**Evaluate Impacts**

**The goal of complexity theorists is still risk avoidance via resiliency – the disads are examples of how the plan could go wrong**

**Ogilvy 11**

Facing The Fold: Essays on scenario planning¶ Jay is a cofounder of GBN and dean and chief academic officer at the Presidio School of Management in San Francisco. His own research and work have focused primarily on the role that human values and changing motivations play in business decision-making and strategy, with a particular focus on health care, education, and sustainability. He has pursued these interests in collaboration with Peter Schwartz since 1979, when he joined SRI International, and from 1988-2008 with GBN, where he led dozens of scenario projects for public and private sector clients in health care and life sciences and led GBN’s scenario training courses. While at SRI, Jay split his time between developing future scenarios for strategic planning and serving as director of research for the Values and Lifestyles (VALS) Program, a consumer segmentation system used in market research. He also authored monographs on social, political, and demographic trends affecting the values of American consumers. Jay's work builds on his background as a philosopher. He taught at the University of Texas, Williams College, and for seven years at Yale, where he received his PhD in 1968. He is the author of Facing The Fold: Essays on Scenario Planning (2011), Creating Better Futures: Scenario Planning as a Tool for a Better Tomorrow (2002), Living Without a Goal (1995), Many Dimensional Man (1977); co-author of China' Futures (2001) and Seven Tomorrows (1980); and editor of Self and World (1971, 1980), and Revisioning Philosophy (1991). He is currently at work on a book on emergent systems, e.g. consciousness, leadership, and wealth.

**But what if we measure scenario planning against the standards of a different kind of science? What kind? Consider complexity theory and the ideas of Stuart Kauffman. In his Investigations. Kauffman reflects on the fact that in an evolving universe where new forms of order emerge from complex concatenations of already complex molecules, it is not only impossible to predict the future; we cannot even anticipate the parameters of the configuration space. Not only can we not calculate the measure of the future: we cannot even anticipate the correct measuring rods to use. Kauffman is not shy about drawing appropriately radical conclusions about the nature of science itself. Once again: "Our inability to prestate the configuration space of a biosphere foretells a deepening of science, a search for story and historical contingency, yet a place for natural laws."8 I think Kauffman is right to deduce the need for story from our inability to prestate the configuration space of the biosphere, but there are some premises missing from his deduction. What is it about story that makes it essential to his new kind of science? What is it about narrative that makes it so important to complexity theory? In order to answer this question, we need to look elsewhere. But before we do so. it's worth recalling that scenarios are stories—narrativ es of alternative futures. If stories are essential to Kauffman's new kind of science, and scenarios are stories, then scenario planning might be far more compatible with this new kind of science than with the science of LaPlace and the positiv ists. We seem to be getting closer to an understanding of scenario planning as not just art. but also part of science. But before we get there, we still need to know just what it is about story or narrative that makes it essential to this new kind of science. Despite the rash of recent interest in narrative and the growing fascination with story-telling in organizations,91 find it necessary to go all the way back to Hegel to find an account of narrative sufficiently profound to serve Kauffman's needs. Since Hegel's prose is obscure to the point of being unintelligible to those not steeped in the language of German philosophy, it will be helpful to borrow from one of his modern interpreters. Hayden White, a formulation of his insights more lucid than Hegel's own. White interprets Hegel as saving, "The reality that lends itself to narrative representation is the conflict between desire and the law."10 I think Hayden White and Hegel are on to something very important here, something that completes Stuart Kauffman's argument in ways that not even he may have anticipated. Put Hegel and Kauffman together (with Hayden White's help), and you get a science that not only covers the force of necessity; you get a science that also accommodates the power of desire—not only what must be. but also what we want to be; not only a degree of determinism, but also some room for freedom. We get the kind of science we need for shaping the future as well as we can without falling into the paradox of a scientifically predictable fate defeating the efficacy of good intentions. In short, there is reason for hope.**

**Not Useful for Policy**

**Complexity theory useless for policy making**

**Cairney 10**

(Paul, Chair in Politics and Public Policy¶ BA (Hons), MSc, PhD at Aberdeen University, “Complexity Theory in Public Policy” <http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2010/121_665.pdf>, SEH)

**Why has Complexity Theory Struggled for Attention?¶** The first difficulty with complexity theory is that it is difficult to pin down. While we¶ may find similar discussions in a wide range of texts in the literature, this may be merely¶ because it is vague. Its appeal in the sciences may be because it means different things to¶ different people, suggesting that initial enthusiasm and cross-disciplinary cooperation may be replaced by growing scepticism.¶ The second is that, **when we do pin the meaning of complexity theory down, it seems to¶ present a deterministic argument**. **The danger is that if the complex system is¶ predominantly the causal factor then we lose sight of the role that policymakers play;¶ there may be a tendency to treat the system as a rule-bound structure which leaves¶ minimal room for the role of agency.** It is tempting to contrast this picture with¶ interpretive social science which rejects the assumption of structural constraint. Rather, it¶ explores how agents perceive their decision-making environments; how they reproduce,¶ accept or challenge the structural, institutional and wider systemic constraints that they¶ appear to face when making decisions. Indeed, they may even reject terms such as¶ ‘institution’ and ‘rule’ because they imply a sense of permanence or common¶ understanding that has not been demonstrated (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003; 2006). This is¶ the essence of the study of politics, explaining why different policymakers make different¶ decisions under the same circumstances. Yet, there is perhaps good reason to resist this¶ temptation because, if the aim of complexity theory is to identify a shift in rule-bound¶ behaviour, then it could have something in common with interpretivist accounts which¶ seek to understand how agents interpret, adapt to and influence their decision-making¶ environment. This seems to be Teisman and Klijn’s (2008: 289) point when they focus¶ on agents adapting to the fitness landscape. Further, as Schneider and Bauer (2007: 6)¶ discuss, complexity theory appears to differ from the old functionalist logic of systems¶ theories that has gone out of fashion in political science. A kinder treatment of¶ complexity suggests that, so far, it has been used in public policy more to provide¶ practical advice to public managers than to inform the wider theological debates on¶ structure and agency we find in political science. I return to this theme in the next¶ section. The third is that **it is difficult to identify or define a system and separate it from its¶ environment**. For Mitleton-Kelly (2003: 30) this is not a problem because it is useful to¶ work on the assumption that there is no fixed boundary between the two. Rather, the¶ picture is one of overlapping systems or an ‘intricate web of inter-relationships’,¶ suggesting that systems as a whole engage in ‘co-evolution’. Rather than a system¶ adapting to its environment, we picture organisations influencing and being influenced by¶ the ‘social ecosystem’ which consists of other organisations (2003: 31).¶ This conclusion raises a fourth problem related to scale or perspective in complex¶ systems**. Not only do we not know what a complex system is, but we don’t know at what¶ level we should view it**. **Wider scientific accounts relate the benefit of complexity theory¶ to the ability to step back and see the system as a whole**, in much the same way that we¶ move from looking at molecules to observing the whole being. Yet, **this doesn’t guide us¶ too much, because we could still see systems at different levels, such as a healthcare¶ system or a political system or even an international political system** (plus authors such as¶ Mitleton-Kelly often seem to situate analysis at the organisational level). While this¶ gives us some flexibility, **it could raise a whole host of further theoretical questions (are¶ central policymakers situated within, or treated as external to, the systems they cannot¶ control?** If a country’s political system is made up of a number of other systems, does this suggest that there are super-emergent processes when systems interact with each¶ other?).¶ **The fifth is that it is difficult to know which types of policy issue or area complexity¶ theory applies to.** For example, Klijn (2008: 314) suggests that complexity theory is best¶ suited to ‘wicked problems’, suggesting that it refers primarily to issues of joined-upgovernment¶ and/ or intractable policy problems (what would this exclude?). Bovaird¶ (2008: 325) suggests that complex systems “are less likely to be found in ‘command-andcontrol’¶ environments”. This is confusing for two related reasons. First, the best¶ example in the UK of a command-and-control approach is the English NHS. Yet,¶ Kernick (2006) argues that complexity theory is well suited to explain why the NHS is¶ impervious to central control. Second, perhaps Bovaird is referring not to areas with¶ command-and-control styles, but those conducive to them. If so, there seems to be no¶ way to decide which areas are most relevant. The irony of governance, highlighted by¶ Rhodes (1997), in which successive governments have contributed to their own lack of¶ central control, knows no bounds. Perhaps the point is that the identification of¶ emergence and self-organizing behaviour is most likely in areas where the role of the¶ ‘centre’ is not strong, but this also raises further issues (below). The sixth is that, **although anti-reductionism and whole-systems approaches sound¶ attractive** (almost like a valence issue), **reductionist theories have a strong hold in¶ political science.** Indeed, **rational choice theory may represent complexity theory’s¶ poplar opposite because it seeks parsimonious results based on a reduction of the social¶ world into as few factors as possible.** This is as much a practical as a philosophical issue.¶ **While we may view the world as a complex system, we do not have the ability to study it¶ as one**. The ACF, for example, situates analysis at the level of the subsystem and¶ identifies two main processes: a process of learning within subsystems as advocacy¶ coalitions compete to define the policy problem and account for new information, and an¶ external process which may produce shocks to the system that change how the subsystem¶ operates (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Weible et al, 2009). **The interesting aspect¶ of this framework is that, while from a complex systems perspective we may prefer to¶ study the system as a whole, the ACF may be no worse a way to study the process when¶ we are faced with limited resources and cognitive abilities**.¶ A final problem may be that **complexity theory complicates the study of public policy¶ without offering something new. This point seems strongest when applied to the study¶ of implementation.** For example, one case study in the PMR special issue demonstrates¶ ‘how local governments develop contrasting behaviour on the same national policy¶ impulse due to self-organizing abilities to combine adaptiveness and self referentiality’¶ (Teisman and Klijn, 2008: 296), but Teisman and Klijn do not show how this differs from¶ similar ‘bottom-up’ processes of self-selection in implementation structures (Hjern, 1981;¶ Hjern and Porter, 1982) or street-level bureaucracy (Lipsky, 1980) identified 30 years ago¶ (also compare Buuren and Gerrits’ 2008: 382 line that ‘decisions are neither the starting¶ nor the finishing points of a decision-making process’ with Barret and Fudge’s focus on¶ ‘policy in action’). Similarly, the statement that complexity theory shows us that¶ ‘managers are not the rational beings presented in many managerial handbooks (Teisman and Klijn, 2008: 297) does not seem startlingly original. We are in the very¶ familiar territory of uncertain policy effects and unintended consequences. A¶ sympathetic assessment might suggest that these points are being restated because the¶ lessons from bottom-up studies have been lost or ignored. This seems to be the tone of¶ Butler and Allan’s (2008) argument that there is no one-best-way in the delivery of local¶ services and in Kernick’s (2006: 388) criticism of the assumption of a single¶ organizational solution in the NHS (and promotion of a more meaningful dialogue¶ between those who design and those who deliver and use the service). But is there¶ anything more to complexity theory than this?

**Doesn’t Lead to Policy Change**

**Complexity doesn’t lead to policy change**

**Cairney 10**

(Paul, Chair in Politics and Public Policy¶ BA (Hons), MSc, PhD at Aberdeen University, “Complexity Theory in Public Policy” <http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2010/121_665.pdf>, SEH)

Conclusion: The End or the Beginning for Complexity Theory?¶ Overall, we have an interesting practical problem with complexity theory in public policy. On the one hand,it is a distinct way to look at the world, as a whole system which¶ is different from the sum of its parts (Jervis, 1998: 12). On the other, empirical studies¶ and examples of processes within complex systems necessarily focus on those parts¶ rather than the system as a whole (and there is not enough of them to see what the body¶ of evidence will look like – Klijn, 2008: 306). It is also tempting to be dismissive of the¶ results, because **complexity theory may provides us with a new language to view the¶ world but not to study it**. Teisman and Klijn (2008) often appear to describe the scope for¶ discretion in the public sector when policies are implemented, while Mitleton-Kelly¶ (2003: 42; 44) describes rather commonplace examples of individual and team-based¶ innovation and the learning that takes place between and within organisations.¶ **Recommendations that arise from complexity theory – which can be abstract** (encourage¶ systemic emergence; encourage co-evolution with the social ecosystem; shift from¶ strategic planning to strategic management) or specific (support the production of new¶ ideas and ways of working in complex systems; encourage ‘subsystems’ within¶ organisations to communicate with each other; give delivery organisations the freedom to¶ manage) – **may seem either meaningless or banal to academics or public managers.¶** **Complexity theory tells us that policy outcomes are difficult to predict and control¶ because there are too many people involved and too many simultaneous processes to¶ consider and seek to influence** (Klijn, 2008: 291), **but didn’t we know this already?**¶ Many accounts also seem to downplay the planned or centralised context in which¶ emergent behaviour takes place, and perhaps the issue of power in general, without¶ giving a convincing reason to do so. The discussion so far may lead us to suggest that complexity theory has little to add to the¶ public policy literature. The themes are discussed already in a variety of guises and the¶ conclusions reached in these discussions may be less problematic. So what is the value¶ of complexity theory in this context? The main advantage of this approach is that it helps¶ us to take the links between the social and natural sciences seriously. To put it briefly¶ and perhaps rather simplistically, the main debates on subjects such as behaviouralism¶ and rational choice theory related to how (in)appropriate it is to import scientific methods¶ from the natural sciences. With complexity theory there is much more scope for a¶ conversation between types of science rather than the importation of one from the other.¶ Indeed, the trend in the physical sciences appears to be to look to the social sciences for¶ the next big breakthrough in theory. Quite how this will arise is the million dollar¶ question. However, at the very least, this is a subject or framework that has the potential¶ to foster a meaningful degree of interdisciplinary collaboration. The hook is that since¶ the identification of complex system behaviour is more problematic in politics than in¶ nature, there is a two-way dialogue taking place. Complexity theory applied from the¶ natural to the social sciences may aid our understanding of the policy process but also¶ yield insights into our overall understanding of complex systems. I explore the¶ implications of this collaboration in the companion paper ‘Bridging the Methodological¶ Gap Between the Physical and Social Sciences: Complexity Theory and Mixed Methods’

### AT Thumpers – Top Level

#### Prefer insiders

ADAM CLARK ESTES 1/2/13, http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2013/01/obamas-push-immigration-reform-starts-now/60525/

Everybody knew that Obama was going to tackle immigration reform in his second term. We just didn't know how soon. Well, the word is out, and it's good news for anybody eager for lawmakers to tackle an issue that's troubled the country for years. Obama will take on immigration reform this month. A fresh report from The Huffington Post's Elise Foley and Sam Stein quotes anonymous administration officials and Democratic aides in explaining that the president is going to move fast on immigration reform, as well as gun control, and advocates couldn't be happier. None of this is a tremendous surprise, though the expedited timeline is sort of curious. Obama's been talking about sweeping immigration since he took office and, at least until 2009, has left many guessing if and when that's going to happen. He made progress last year when he kept 800,000 young people who had been brought to the United States illegally as children from being deported, making a DREAM Act-like policy initiative as the DREAM Act itself floundered in Congress. Immigration remained an issue through the election, and almost as soon as Obama won his second term, whispers of a renewed push for immigration reform started, though the White House vowed to deal with the fiscal cliff first. Obama then reiterated his commitment to tackle immigration soon on his Meet the Press appearance last weekend.

#### Issues don’t cost capital until they are up

Drum ‘10

Kevin is a Columnist for Mother Jones, “Immigration Coming Off the Backburner,” <http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2010/03/immigration-coming-back-burner>

There's been plenty of overheated rhetoric and creative paranoia on display this year, but nativism has been, to me, the dog that didn't bark. The Tea Parties haven't been very focused on immigration, and while abortion and socialism both became major issues during health-care reform, fears that the bill would cover illegal immigrants (it won't, incidentally) never became a marquee issue.¶ Not to pick on Ezra or anything, but this attitude betrays a surprisingly common misconception about political issues in general. The fact is that political dogs never bark until an issue becomes an active one. Opposition to Social Security privatization was pretty mild until 2005, when George Bush turned it into an active issue. Opposition to healthcare reform was mild until 2009, when Barack Obama turned it into an active issue. Etc.¶ I only bring this up because we often take a look at polls and think they tell us what the public thinks about something. But for the most part, they don't.1 That is, they don't until the issue in question is squarely on the table and both sides have spent a couple of months filling the airwaves with their best agitprop. Polling data about gays in the military, for example, hasn't changed a lot over the past year or two, but once Congress takes up the issue in earnest and the Focus on the Family newsletters go out, the push polling starts, Rush Limbaugh picks it up, and Fox News creates an incendiary graphic to go with its saturation coverage — well, that's when the polling will tell you something. And it will probably tell you something different from what it tells you now.¶ Immigration was bubbling along as sort of a background issue during the Bush administration too until 2007, when he tried to move an actual bill. Then all hell broke loose. The same thing will happen this time, and without even a John McCain to act as a conservative point man for a moderate solution. The political environment is worse now than it was in 2007, and I'll be very surprised if it's possible to make any serious progress on immigration reform. "Love 'em or hate 'em," says Ezra, illegal immigrants "aren't at the forefront of people's minds." Maybe not. But they will be soon.¶ POSTSCRIPT: And keep in mind that one of the reasons the tea parties haven't (yet) taken up the immigration fight is very specific to the agenda of Dick Armey and FreedomWorks. I doubt that Armey will win this battle in the long run, though.¶ 1Granted, polls do give us a general idea of where we're starting from. If immigration reform were polling at 80%, for example, I'd feel pretty good about it since that number could deteriorate 20 points and it would still have a lot of support. But if it's polling at around 50-60% — which it is — that's dangerous territory. Once the yelling starts you can expect that number to go down a bunch, and suddenly it won't be a popular issue to tackle during an election year.

#### CIR will pass despite debt ceiling debates.

Rick Moran 1/3/13, American Thinker, http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2013/01/despite\_looming\_debt\_ceiling\_fight\_gun\_control\_immigration\_reform\_on\_obamas\_agenda.html

Apparently, the president isn't going to let his agenda get bogged down in fights over the debt ceiling and sequestration that hang over the heads of congressmen the first quarter of the year: The timeframe is likely to be cheered by Democrats and immigration reform advocates alike, who have privately expressed fears that Obama's second term will be drowned out in seemingly unending showdowns between parties. The just-completed fiscal cliff deal is giving way to a two-month deadline to resolve delayed sequestration cuts, an expiring continuing resolution to fund the government and a debt ceiling that will soon be hit. With those bitter battles ahead, the possibility of passing other complicated legislation would seem diminished. "The negative effect of this fiscal cliff fiasco is that every time we become engaged in one of these fights, there's no oxygen for anything else," said a Senate Democratic aide, who asked for anonymity to speak candidly. "It's not like you can be multi-tasking -- with something like this, Congress just comes to a complete standstill." It remains unclear what type of immigration policies the White House plans to push in January, but turning them into law could be a long process. Aides expect it will take about two months to write a bipartisan bill, then another few months before it goes up for a vote, possibly in June. A bipartisan group of senators are already working on a deal, although they are still in the early stages. Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.) will likely lead on the Democratic side in the House. While many Republicans have expressed interest in piecemeal reform, it's still unclear which of them plan to join the push. Lofgren expressed hope that immigration reform would be able to get past partisan gridlock, arguing that the election was seen as something of a mandate for fixing the immigration system and Republicans won't be able to forget their post-election promises to work on a bill. "In the end, immigration reform is going to depend very much on whether Speaker [John] Boehner wants to do it or not," Lofgren said. Boehner will be in a much weakened position given the temper of the GOP caucus. He may have little to say about immigration reform, or gun control for that matter. For tactical reasons, he may wish to bring one or both of those pieces of legislation to the floor - especially if they would be doomed to go down to defeat. Neither measure would be popular with the voters and a GOP stance against them wouldn't hurt - and might help them - at the polls.

### Wind Links

#### Plan requires lots of capital – Congressional engagement key to Obama’s renewable agenda

Businessweek, 9/6 (“Renewable Energy Is Obama Goal for Next Term, Aide Says”, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-09-06/renewable-energy-is-obama-goal-for-next-term-aide-says)

President Barack Obama’s effort to develop renewable power sources and persuade Congress to adopt a long-term energy policy will be priorities should he win a second term, his top climate and energy aide said. Clean-energy programs and efficiency initiatives will be a focus for the president if he’s re-elected in November, Heather Zichal, Obama’s deputy assistant for energy and climate change, told reporters today in Washington. “The big issue will remain engagement with Congress,” she said. “The president has talked continuously about the need for a long-term energy policy, and I think that will be something that he will obviously remain focused on in the second term.” As a candidate in 2008, Obama pledged to create 5 million green jobs over 10 years by investing in renewable sources such as solar and wind power. He promoted alternatives to fossil fuels as a way to cut U.S. dependence on imported fuel. The 2009 economic-stimulus plan spent a record $90 billion on clean energy, creating 225,000 green jobs after one year, according to the White House. Republicans have used U.S. support for Solyndra LLC, the solar-panel maker that collapsed two years after getting a $535 million U.S. loan guarantee, to depict Obama’s policies as a failure by meddling in the free market. Mitt Romney, the Republican presidential nominee, said federal regulation of oil and gas limit U.S. energy development.

#### Wind saps capital – it’ll get caught up in broader election-year battles – answers their bipart warrant

Geman, 12 (Ben, “Obama presses Congress to extend energy tax incentives”, The Hill, May 8, http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/226021-obama-presses-congress-to-extend-energy-tax-incentives)

President Obama is urging Congress to extend tax breaks for wind power projects that are slated to expire at year’s end and expand stimulus-law tax incentives for manufacturing green energy components. The energy credits are among a wider jobs “to do” list — which even comes with its own logo — that Obama will call on Congress to act upon at an appearance in upstate New York later Tuesday. “Congress needs to help put America in control of its energy future by passing legislation that will extend the Production Tax Credit to support American jobs and manufacturing alongside an expansion of the 30 percent tax credit to investments in clean energy manufacturing (48C Advanced Energy Manufacturing Tax Credit),” the White House said. The wind industy is lobbying heavily for renewal of the Production Tax Credit, which is vital to helping finance new power projects. New wind installations have dropped off significantly when the credit has been allowed to lapse, which last occurred in 2004. The American Wind Energy Association, a trade group, warned in April that with the expiration looming, “the supply chain is feeling the uncertainty, and layoffs have now begun.” While wind power has bipartisan support — Midwest and Great Plains Republicans are particular fans — extension of the credit this year is uncertain amid election-season political battles over green energy and other factors.

### Yes PC

**Obama public approval high**

**The Huffington Post, 1/2**

[Chris Weigant, “Obama Poll Watch -- December, 2012” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/chris-weigant/obama-approval-rating\_b\_2398994.html]

Obama's job approval has risen almost four points in the last two months. That's a pretty impressive trend, but it's one that is likely going to top out soon. Currently, Obama is polling (in individual polls) up to six percent better than the percentage of people who voted for him. That's the "honeymoon effect" of many Americans deciding to give Obama the benefit of the doubt, just after a close-fought election.¶ Which is where a note of caution is indicated. Virtually every president -- whether or not they win re-election -- gets a bounce in job approval polling at the end of their first term. Even one-term presidents such as Gerald R. Ford and George H.W. Bush got similar bumps upwards, in fact. So nobody should read too much into Obama's numbers at this particular moment. It all may be illusory, and may be just the public's relief that the election season is finally over. If so, it will fade quickly, and Obama's numbers may sink back down considerably, early next year. Or maybe not. It's a tough month to predict trends for the future, because nobody really knows if the honeymoon numbers will persist or melt away, at this point.¶ Even with all those caveats in place, things are looking extremely good for Obama. No polling has been done since the fiscal cliff deal was agreed upon, but Obama held his high rankings throughout the December bargaining period. This could indicate that the public already approved of his position, in which case Obama's numbers should hold steady throughout at least January.

### AT Dickinson

#### Dickinson concludes neg

Dickinson 9

(Matthew, professor of political science at Middlebury College. He taught previously at Harvard University, where he also received his Ph.D., working under the supervision of presidential scholar Richard Neustadt, We All Want a Revolution: Neustadt, New Institutionalism, and the Future of Presidency Research, Presidential Studies Quarterly 39 no4 736-70 D 2009)

Small wonder, then, that initial efforts to find evidence of presidential power centered on explaining legislative outcomes in Congress. Because scholars found it difficult to directly and systematically measure presidential influence or "skill," however, they often tried to estimate it indirectly, after first establishing a baseline model that explained these outcomes on other factors, including party strength in Congress, members of Congress's ideology, the president's electoral support and/or popular approval, and various control variables related to time in office and political and economic context. With the baseline established, one could then presumably see how much of the unexplained variance might be attributed to presidents, and whether individual presidents did better or worse than the model predicted. Despite differences in modeling assumptions and measurements, however, these studies came to remarkably similar conclusions: individual presidents did not seem to matter very much in explaining legislators' voting behavior or lawmaking outcomes (but see Lockerbie and Borrelli 1989, 97-106). As Richard Fleisher, Jon Bond, and B. Dan Wood summarized, "[S]tudies that compare presidential success to some baseline fail to find evidence that perceptions of skill have systematic effects" (2008, 197; see also Bond, Fleisher, and Krutz 1996, 127; Edwards 1989, 212). To some scholars, these results indicate that Neustadt's "president-centered" perspective is incorrect (Bond and Fleisher 1990, 221-23). In fact, the aggregate results reinforce Neustadt's recurring refrain that presidents are weak and that, when dealing with Congress, a president's power is "comparably limited" (Neustadt 1990, 184). The misinterpretation of the findings as they relate to PP stems in part from scholars' difficulty in defining and operationalizing presidential influence (Cameron 2000b; Dietz 2002, 105-6; Edwards 2000, 12; Shull and Shaw 1999). But it is also that case that scholars often misconstrue Neustadt's analytic perspective; his description of what presidents must do to influence policy making does not mean that he believes presidents are the dominant influence on that process. Neustadt writes from the president's perspective, but without adopting a president-centered explanation of power. Nonetheless, if Neustadt clearly recognizes that a president's influence in Congress is exercised mostly, as George Edwards (1989) puts it, "at the margins," his case studies in PP also suggest that, within this limited bound, presidents do strive to influence legislative outcomes. But how? Scholars often argue that a president's most direct means of influence is to directly lobby certain members of Congress, often through quid pro quo exchanges, at critical junctures during the lawmaking sequence. Spatial models of legislative voting suggest that these lobbying efforts are most effective when presidents target the median, veto, and filibuster "pivots" within Congress. This logic finds empirical support in vote-switching studies that indicate that presidents do direct lobbying efforts at these pivotal voters, and with positive legislative results. Keith Krehbiel analyzes successive votes by legislators in the context of a presidential veto an d finds "modest support for the sometimes doubted stylized fact of presidential power as persuasion" (1998,153-54). Similarly, David Brady and Craig Volden look at vote switching by members of Congress in successive Congresses on nearly identical legislation and also conclude that presidents *do influence* the votes of at least some legislators (1998, 125-36). In his study of presidential lobbying on key votes on important domestic legislation during the 83rd (1953-54) through 108th (2003-04) Congresses, MatthewBeckman shows that in addition to these pivotal voters, presidents also lobby leaders in both congressional parties in order to control what legislative alternatives make it onto the congressional agenda (more on this later). These lobbying efforts are correlated with a greater likelihood that a president's legislative preferences will come to a vote (Beckmann 2008, n.d.). In one of the most concerted efforts to model how bargaining takes place at the individual level, Terry Sullivan examines presidential archives containing administrative headcounts to identify instances in which members of Congress switched positions during legislative debate, from initially opposing the president to supporting him in the final roll call (Sullivan 1988,1990,1991). Sullivan shows that in a bargaining game with incomplete information regarding the preferences of the president and members of Congress, there are a number of possible bargaining outcomes for a given distribution of legislative and presidential policy preferences. These outcomes depend in part on legislators' success in bartering their potential support for the president's policy for additional concessions from the president. In threatening to withhold support, however, members of Congress run the risk that the president will call their bluff and turn elsewhere for the necessary votes. By capitalizing on members' uncertainty regarding whether their support is necessary to form a winning coalition, Sullivan theorizes that presidents can reduce members of Congress's penchant for strategic bluffing and increase the likelihood of a legislative outcome closer to the president's preference. "Hence, the skill to bargain successfully becomes a foundation for presidential power even within the context of electorally determined opportunities," Sullivan concludes (1991, 1188). Most of these studies infer presidential influence, rather than measuring it directly (Bond, Fleisher, and Krutz 1996,128-29; see also Edwards 1991). Interestingly, however, although the vote "buying" approach is certainly consistent with Neustadt's bargaining model, none of his case studies in PP show presidents employing this tactic. The reason may be that Neustadt concentrates his analysis on the strategic level: "Strategically the question is not how he masters Congress in a peculiar instance, but what he does to boost his mastery in any instance" (Neustadt 1990, 4). For Neustadt, whether a president's lobbying efforts bear fruit in any particular circumstance depends in large part on the broader pattern created by a president's prior actions when dealing with members of Congress (and "Washingtonians" more generally). These previous interactions determine a president's professional reputation--the "residual impressions of [a president's] tenacity and skill" that accumulate in Washingtonians' minds, helping to "heighten or diminish" a president's bargaining advantages. "Reputation, of itself, does not persuade, but it can make persuasions easier, or harder, or impossible" (Neustadt 1990, 54).

### AT Decline Inevitable

**Heg is sustainable- challengers can’t make up the power differential, and trends point toward continued unipolarity**

**Beckley ‘12**

(Michael, PhD candidate at the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at Columbia, The Unipolar Era: Why American Power Persists and China’s Rise Is Limited, Dissertation found on google scholar)

More important, the gap in defense spending likely understates the true military gap because U.S. economic superiority literally gives the United States “more bang for the buck” – each dollar it spends on the military produces more force than each dollar China spends. In a separate study, I found that developing countries systematically fail at warfare, regardless of the size of their defense budgets, because they lack the economic capacity to maintain, modernize, and integrate individual technologies into cohesive military systems.206 Multivariate regressions suggest that military effectiveness is determined by a country’s level of economic development, as measured by per capita income, even after controlling for numerous material, social, and political factors. As noted earlier, China’s per capita income has declined relative to that of the United States. China’s defense industry has also fallen further behind: in 2008, the U.S. share of the world conventional arms market surged to 68 percent while China’s share dropped below 1.5 percent. If history is any guide, this growing economic gap is also a growing military gap. The PLA may look increasingly respectable on paper, but its performance in battle against the United States would not necessarily be much better than that of, say, Iraq circa 1991. Indeed, **an independent task force of more than thirty experts recently found “no evidence to support the notion that China will become a peer military competitor of the United States.…The military balance today and for the foreseeable future strongly favors the United States** and its allies.”207 Figure 3.20: Share of World Arms Transfer Agreements, 1993-­‐2008 Source: Congressional Research Service, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2001-­‐2008, p. 71; Ibid., Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1993-­‐2000, p. 73. None of this should be cause for chest-­‐thumping. China can “pose problems without catching up,” compensating for its technological and organizational inferiority by utilizing asymmetric strategies, local knowledge, and a greater willingness to bear costs.208 In particular, some experts believe China’s “anti-area-­‐denial” capabilities are outpacing U.S. efforts to counter them.209 There are reasons to doubt this claim – the Pentagon is developing sophisticated countermeasures and Chinese writings may purposefully exaggerate PLA capabilities.210 There is also reason to doubt the strategic importance of China’s capabilities because the United States may be able to launch effective attacks from positions beyond the reach of Chinese missiles and submarines.211 It is certainly true, however, that the U.S. military has vulnerabilities, especially in littorals and low-­‐altitudes close to enemy territory. But this has always been the case. From 1961 to 1968 North Vietnamese and Vietcong units brought down 1,700 U.S. helicopters and aircraft with simple antiaircraft artillery and no early warning radar.212 Sixty years ago, China projected a huge army into Korea and killed tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers. **Yes, weak adversaries can impose significant costs, but evidence of American vulnerability is not the same as evidence of American decline.** Conclusion Change is inevitable, but it is often incremental and nonlinear. **In the coming decades, China may surge out of its unimpressive condition and close the gap with the United States. Or China might continue to rise in place – steadily improving its capabilities in absolute terms while stagnating, or even declining, relative to the United States**. The best that can be done is to make plans for the future on the basis of present trends. And **what the trends suggest is that America’s economic, technological, and military lead over China will be an enduring feature of international relations, not a passing moment in time, but a deeply embedded material condition that will persist for the foreseeable future.**

### CBA Good- For CP

#### Picking least bad practical option key

**Finnis, ‘80**

John Finnis, deontologist, teaches jurisprudence and constitutional Law. He has been Professor of Law & Legal Philosophy since 1989,1980, Natural Law and Natural Rights, pg. 111-2

**The sixth requirement** has obvious connections with the fifth, but introduces a new range of problems for practical reason, problems which go to the heart of ‘morality’. For this **is** the requirement **that one bring about good in the world** (in one’s own life and the lives of others) **by actions that are efficient** for their (reasonable) purpose (s). **One must not waste** one’s **opportunities by using inefficient methods**. One’s **actions should be judged by their effectiveness**, by their fitness for their purpose, by their utility, **their consequences… There is a wide range of contexts in which it is possible and only reasonable to calculate, measure, compare, weigh, and assess the consequences of alternative decisions**. Where a choice must be made it is reasonable to prefer human good to the good of animals. Where a choice must be made it is reasonable to prefer basic human goods (such as life) to merely instru­mental goods (such as property). **Where damage is inevitable, it is reasonable to prefer** stunning to wounding, wounding to maiming, maiming to death: i.e. **lesser rather than greater damage** to one-and-the-same basic good in one-and-the-same instantiation. **Where one way of participating in a human good includes** both **all the good** aspects and **effects of its alternative, and more, it is reasonable to prefer that way: a remedy that both relieves pain and heals is to be preferred to the one that merely relieves pain**. Where a person or a society has created a personal or social hierarchy of practical norms and orienta­tions, through reasonable choice of commitments, **one can** in many cases **reasonably measure the benefits and disadvantages of alternatives**. (Consider a man who ha decided to become a scholar, or a society that has decided to go to war.) Where one ~is considering objects or activities in which there is reasonably a market, the market provides a common de­nominator (currency) and enables a comparison to be made of prices, costs, and profits. Where there are alternative techniques or facilities for achieving definite, objectives, cost— benefit analysis will make possible a certain range of reasonable comparisons between techniques or facilities. Over a wide range of preferences and wants, it is reasonable for an individual or society to seek o maximize the satisfaction of those preferences or wants.

### A2: Do Both

#### 2. Perm links more- Energy lobbies will lobby Congress to not preempt compacts

Every Vote Equal ’11

Every Vote Equal is a policy book advocating for a compact to create a national popular vote for President with chapters on the history of interstate compacts and written by 15 judges and U.S. Representatives, “Background on Interstate Compacts,” <http://www.every-vote-equal.com/pdf/EVECh5new_web.pdf>

Economic interest groups often encourage the establishment of regulatory compacts. Such groups typically lobby Congress not to exercise¶ its preemption powers in a particular area by arguing that coordinated¶ action by the states, by means of an interstate compact, is sufficient to¶ solve a problem.¶

### Solves K Aff

#### States better for individual engagement – national politics are beholden to fossil fuel lobbies and disregard INDIVIDUALS. We’re a better platform for ADVOCACY

Byrne, 8

Byrne, et al., 2008.

In Peter Droege eds. Urban Energy Transition: From Fossil Fuels to Renewable Power.

Oxford, UK: Elsevier Pps.27-53.

Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Established in 1980 at the University of Delaware, the Center is a leading institution for interdisciplinary graduate education, research, and advocacy in energy and environmental policy. CEEP is led by Dr. John Byrne, Distinguished Professor of Energy & Climate Policy at the University. For his contributions to Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) since 1992, he shares the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize with the Panel's authors and review editors.

The political momentum built in US cities, states and regions to initiate climate mitigation and related efforts is to be contrasted with inaction by the US national government in addressing the climate challenge. Support for climate protection can be found in polling of Americans which points to 83% support among the country's citizens for greater national leadership in addressing climate change, and even deeper support for state and community action to address climate concerns (Opinion Research Corporation 2006). If the American people appear to support such initiatives, the question becomes why are states, cities and regions leading the way, rather than the national government? US national politics has for decades exhibited a troubling amenability to the interests of fossil fuel and automaker lobbies (Leggett 2001; Public Citizen 2005; NRDC 2001). A recent example of this influence can be found in the history of the National Energy Policy Development Group, which took input 'principally' from actors associated with such interests (US General Accounting Office (GAO) 2003). At the same time, the national administration has been noted for the presence of individuals with backgrounds in the auto, mining, natural gas, electric, and oil industries, in positions at the White House, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Departments, respectively, of Energy, Commerce, and the Interior (Bogardus, 2004; Drew and Oppel Jr 2004; NRDC, 2001). State-level politics may be able to obviate this influence through their efforts to allow a more direct citizen influence upon decision making. For example, 23 states permit citizens to petition for a direct vote (Initiative and Referendum Institute 2007), a strategy that has helped ensure the advancement of environmentally minded initiatives within states in recent years, such as the State of Washington's enactment by ballot of an RPS proposal in 2006 (Initiative and Referendum Institute 2007).

**State action is better than the fed**

**Pursley and Wiseman 11** (Garrick, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law, and Hannah, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law, “Local Energy”, Emory Law Journal, 60 Emory L.J. 877)

The familiar idea that empowering subnational governments allows for a greater influence of state or local preferences in policy and enhances the democratic responsiveness of the federal system is also relevant here. 325 In federalism scholarship, it is commonly claimed that state governments are "closer**"** - that is, more accessible and accountable - to citizens than the federal government. 326 The characteristics of state governments that support this claim - their smaller electorates, greater transparency and access to elected officials, and greater opportunities for citizen participation in governance - suggest that local governments are closest to the people. 327 Local "elected officials tend to be more responsive to voter demands because it is easier ... to monitor politicians and it is easier for new politicians to challenge unpopular incumbents[,] ... smaller political units allow for more deliberation and consensus building among members," and "politics on a small scale ... enables less affluent grassroots organizations to promote their interests through marches, speeches, and creative forms of activism that would not work on a national or regional scale." 328 In the distributed renewables area, this means that yet another argument against primarily federal-level action is that people in different locations may have different ideas about how much and what kind of renewable energy they want, and, as far as our broad energy [\*939] transition goals and the need to encourage citizens to do their part will allow, we should do what we can to honor those preferences. 329

## 1NR

### 2nc script

and, THE AFF has it backwards - to cede the radical in favor of their notion of the civil site of the poltiical is the true failure. straights turns the whole arg. vote neg independently here.

GRANDPRE 2K10

[lawrence, contributor to leaders of a beautiful struggle, debate coach for towson university, http://lbsbaltimore.org/the-politics-of-singin%e2%80%99-and-swingin%e2%80%99-the-revolt-and-revolution-in-the-age-of-obama-and-the-war-on-dissent/, oct 17]

As much as those on the left despise the message and ideology of the Tea Party, they could learn something from the methods some of these groups have adopted (the real grass roots ones, not the “Astroturf” movements supported by corporate money and private donors). They have established networks, organized at a local level, and affirmed their political ideals, even at the cost of supporting candidates considered “unelectable” by the mainstream political establishment. A small group of dedicated ideologies have fundamentally shifted the political discourse of the country, presenting an interesting political lesson. A popular criticism of more radical leftist positions is that by rejecting the current political system, they leave the power of the government to the conservatives with potentially devastating consequences (see first term of the Bush administration).While many fret over this “ceding of the political”, the rise of the Tea Party proves an important political lesson that is easy to forget, it is often the radical voices that configure and shape the agenda and the focus of the political establishment and as such, have a powerful and tangible political effect. After all, the current crisis of the Left was NOT caused by the left “ceding the political”. Quite the opposite, more than ever they have focused on pragmatic, centrist politics, making concession of stimulus and health care only to have the right continue their utter obstructionism regardless. Thus, the real problem of the left is not “ceding the political” but “ceding the radical”, failing to pressure the political leviathan from the outside with unflinching criticism and resistance. Thus, the utter impossibility of achieving progressive political within the current political discourse means the only truly pragmatic option is to change the coordinates of the political discourse. In this era of uncertainty, one thing about Malcom’s call, whatever you think about it, seems to be true. Singing in the midst of political destruction is not a political strategy that those who wish to achieve social justice should affirm. Like the (in)famous emperor Nero who supposedly played the fiddle while Rome burned, we risk playing meaningless political games while America’s ghettos continue to burn.

### 2nc anti-blackness extension

#### And, Radical black positionality must refuse the logic of coherence and intellectual and social ordering. This is an impact turn to their entire “cede the political” link thesis.

Wilderson 03Frank B. Wilderson III, “The Prison Slave as Hegemony’s (Silent) Scandal,” *Social Justice* 30:2 (2003)

**Black liberation, as a prospect, makes radicalism more dangerous to the U.S. his is not because it raises the specter of an alternative polity** (such as socialism, or community control of existing resources), **but because its condition of possibility and gesture of resistance function as a negative dialectic: a politics of refusal and a refusal to affirm, a "program of complete disorder." One must embrace its disorder, its incoherence, and allow oneself to be elaborated by it, if indeed one's politics are to be underwritten by a desire to take down this country**. If this is not the desire that underwrites one's politics, then through what strategy of legitimation is the word "prison" being linked to the word "abolition"? What are this movement's lines of political accountability? **There is nothing foreign, frightening, or even unpracticed about the embrace of disorder and incoherence. The desire to be embraced, and elaborated, by disorder and incoherence is not anathema in and of itself.** **No one**, for example, **has ever been known to say "gee-whiz, if only my orgasms would end a little sooner, or maybe not come at all**." Yet few so-called radicals desire to be embraced, and elaborated, by the disorder and incoherence of Blackness - and **the state of political movements in the U.S. today is marked by this very Negrophobogenisis: "gee-whiz, if only Black rage could be more coherent, or maybe not come at all.**" Perhaps there is something more terrifying about the joy of Black than there is in the joy of sex (unless one is talking sex with a Negro). Perhaps **coalitions today prefer to remain in-orgasmic in the face of civil society** --- **with hegemony as a handy prophylactic, just in case.** **If, through this stasis or paralysis they try to do the work of prison abolition, that work will fail, for it is always work from a position of coherence (i.e., the worker) on behalf of a position of incoherence of the Black subject, or prison slave. In this way, social formations on the Left remain blind to the contradictions of coalitions between workers and slaves.** **They remain coalitions operating within the logic of civil society and function less as revolutionary promises than as crowding out scenarios of Black antagonisms, simply feeding our frustration.** Whereas the positionality of the worker (whether a factory worker demanding a monetary wage, an immigrant, or a white woman demanding a social wage) gestures toward the reconfiguration of civil society, **the positionality of the Black subject** (whether a prison-slave or a prison-slave-in-waiting) **gestures toward the disconfiguration of civil society. From the coherence of civil society, the Black subject beckons with the incoherence of civil war, a war that reclaims Blackness not as a positive value, but as a politically enabling site**, to quote Fanon, of "absolute dereliction." It is a "scandal" that rends civil society asunder. **Civil war, then, becomes the unthought, but never forgotten, understudy of hegemony. It is a Black specter waiting in the wings, an endless antagonism that cannot be satisfied (via reform or reparation), but must nonetheless be pursued to the death.**

#### You should vote negative to reject the affirmative’s grammar of discursive work in civil society. Only the positionality of the slave ruptures the grammar of work that underpins white civil society’s absolute destruction and objectification of the black body.

 **Wilderson 2003** Wilderson, PHD Rhetoric, Berkeley, Gramsci’s Black Marx: Whither the Slave in Civil Society?, Social Identities, Volume 9, Number 2, 2003

Just as the KhoiSan presented the Discourse of the Cape with an anthropological scandal, so **the black subject in the United States, the slave, presents** both marxism and **American social movement practice with a historical scandal. Every group provides American discourse with acceptable categories for the record (a play of signiﬁers, points of articulation) except black Americans**. How is black incoherence in the face of the Historical Axis germane to the black experience as ‘a phenomenon without analog’? A sample list of codes mapped out by an American subject’s Historical Axis include the following. (1) Rights or Entitlements: here even Native Americans provide categories for the record when one thinks of how the Iroquois constitution, for example, becomes the American constitution. (2) Sovereignty: whether that state be one the subject left behind, or one, once again as in the case of American Indians, which was taken by force and dint of broken treaties. White supremacy has made good use of the Indian subject’s positionality: a positionality which fortiﬁes and extends the interlocutory life of America as a coherent (albeit genocidal) idea, because treaties are forms of articulation, discussions brokered between two groups presumed to possess the same kind of historical currency: sovereignty. The code of sovereignty can have both a past and future history, if you’ll excuse the oxymoron, when one considers that there are 150 Native American tribes with applications in at the B.I.A. for federal recognition, that they might qualify for funds harvested from land stolen from them.5 In other words, the curse of being able to generate cate- gories for the record manifests itself in Indians’ ‘ability’ to be named by white supremacy that they might receive a small cash advance on funds (land) which white people stole from them. (3) Immigration: another code which maps the subject onto the American Historical Axis — narratives of arrival based on collective volition and premeditated desire. Chicano/a subject positions can fortify and extend the interlocutory life of America as an idea because racial conﬂict can be articulated across the various contestations over the legitimacy of arrival, immigration, or of sovereignty, i.e., the Mexican-American War. In this way, whites and Chicano/as both generate data for this category. **Slavery is the great leveller of the black subject’s positionality. The black American subject does not generate historical categories of Entitlement, Sovereignty, and/or Immigration for the record. We are off the record**. To the data generating demands of the historical axis we present a virtual blank, much like the KhoiSan’s virtual blank presented to the data generating demands of the anthropological axis. The work of Hortense Spillers on black female sexuality corroborates these ﬁndings. Spillers’ conclusions regarding the black female subject and the discourse of sexuality are in tandem with ours regarding the black ungendered subject and the question of hegemony and, in addition, unveil the ontological elements which black women and men share: a scandal in the face of New World hegemony. [T]he black female [is] the veritable nemesis of degree and difference [empha- sis mine]. Having encountered what they understand as chaos, the empowered need not name further, since chaos is sufﬁcient naming within itself. I am not addressing the black female in her historical apprenticeship as inferior being, but, rather, the paradox of non-being [emphasis mine]. Under the sign of this particular historical order, black female and black male are absolutely equal. (Spillers, 1984 p. 77) **In the socio-political order of the New World the black body is a ‘captive body’ marked and branded from one generation to the next. A body on which any hint or suggestion of a dimension of ethics, of relatedness between human personality and its anatomical features, between one human personality and another, between human personality and cultural institutions [is lost]. To that extent, the procedures adopted for the captive ﬂesh demarcate a total objectiﬁcation, as the entire captive community becomes a living laboratory**. (emphasis mine, p. 68) **The gratuitous violence begun in slavery, hand in hand with the absence of data for the New World Historical Axis** (Rights/Entitlement, Sovereignty, Immi- gration) **as a result of slavery, position black subjects in excess of** Gramsci’s fundamental categories, i.e. labour, exploitation, historical self-awareness; for these **processes of subjectiﬁcation** are **assumed by those with a semiotics of analogy already in hand — the currency of exchange through which ‘a dimension … of relatedness between one human personality and another, between human personality and cultural institutions’ can be established.** Thus, **the black subject** imposes a radical incoherence upon the assumptive logic of Gramscian discourse. S/he **implies a scandal: ‘total objectiﬁcation’ in contradistinction to human possibility**, however slim, as in the case of working class hegemony, that human possibility appears. **It is this scandal which places black subjectivity in a structurally impossible position, outside of the ‘natural’ articulations of hegemony; but it also places hegemony in a structurally impossible position because our presence works back upon the grammar of hegemony and threatens it with incoherence**. If every subject — even the most massacred subjects, Indians — are required to have analogues within the nation’s structuring narrative, and one very large signiﬁcant subject, the subject upon which the nation’s drama of value is built, is a subject whose experience is without analogue then, by that subject’s very presence all other analogues are destabilised. Lest we think of the black body as captive only until the mid-nineteenth century, Spillers reminds us that the marking and branding, **the total objectiﬁcation are as much a part of the present as they were of the past. Even though the captive ﬂesh/body has been ‘liberated’, and no one need pretend that even the quotation marks do not matter, dominant symbolic activity, the ruling episteme that releases the dynamics of naming and valuation, remains grounded in the originating metaphors of captivity and mutilation so that it is as if neither time nor history, nor historiography and its topics, shows movement, as the human subject is ‘murdered’ over and over again by the passions of a bloodless and anonymous archaism, showing itself in endless disguise**. (1987, p. 68) Herein, the concept of civil war takes on a comprehensive and structural, as opposed to merely eventful, connotation. Conclusion Civil society is the terrain where hegemony is produced, contested, mapped. And the invitation to participate in hegemony’s gestures of inﬂuence, leader- ship, and consent is not extended to the black subject. We live in the world, but exist outside of civil society. This structurally impossible position is a paradox because the black subject, the slave, is vital to civil society’s political economy: s/he kick-starts capital at its genesis and rescues it from its over-accumulation crisis at its end — black death is its condition of possibility. Civil society’s subaltern, the worker, is coded as waged, and wages are white. But marxism has no account of this phenomenal birth and life-saving role played by the black subject: in Gramsci we have consistent silence. **The black body in the US is that constant reminder that not only can work not be reformed but it cannot be transformed to accommodate all subjects: work is a white category. The fact that millions upon millions of black people work misses the point. The point is we were never meant to be workers; in other words, capital/white supremacy’s dream did not envision us as being incorporated or incorporative. From the very beginning, we were meant to be accumulated and die. Work** (i.e. the French shipbuilding industry and bour- geois civil society which ﬁnally extended its progressive hegemony to workers and peasants to topple the aristocracy) **was what grew up all around us — 20 to 60 million seeds planted at the bottom of the Atlantic, 5 million seeds planted in Dixie.** Work sometimes registers as a historical component of blackness, but where whiteness is concerned, work registers as a constituent element. And **the black body must be processed through a kind of civil death for this constituent element of whiteness to gain coherence. Today,** at the end of the twentieth century, **we are still not meant to be workers. We are meant to be warehoused and die. The U.S. carceral network kills … more blacks than any other ethnic group** … **[and] constitute[s] an ‘outside’ in U.S. political life. In fact, our society displays waves of concentric outside circles with increasing distances from bourgeois self-policing**. The state routinely polices the unassimilable in the hell of lockdown, deprivation tanks, control units, and holes for political prisoners. (James, 1996, p. 34) **Work** (i.e. jobs for guards in the prison industrial complex and the shot in the arm it gives to faltering white communities — **its positive reterritorialisation of White Space and its simultaneous deterritorialisation of Black Space) is what grows up around our dead bodies once again. The chief difference today, compared to several hundred years ago, is that today our bodies are desired, accumulated, and warehoused** — like the cows. Again, the chief constant to the dream is that, whereas desire for black labour power is often a historical component to the institutionality of white supremacy, it is not a constituent element. This paradox is not to be found at the crux of Gramsci’s intellectual pessimism or his optimistic will. His concern is with subjects in a white(ned) enough subject position that they are confronted by, or threatened with the removal of, a wage, be it monetary or social. But **black subjectivity itself disarticulates the Gramscian dream as a ubiquitous emancipatory strategy, because Gramsci (like most US social movements) has no theory of, or solidarity with, the slave. Whereas the positionality of the worker enables the reconﬁguration of civil society, the positionality of the slave exists as a destabilising force within civil society because civil society gains its coherence, the very tabula raza upon which workers and industrialists struggle for hegemony, through the violence of black erasure. From the coherence of civil society the black subject beckons with the incoherence of civil war. Civil war, then, becomes that unthought but never forgotten spectre waiting in the wings** — the understudy of Gramsci’s hegemony.

#### Permutation attempts to account for black identity but remains caught up in the discourse of work and hegemony – this discounts the positionality of idleness, replicating violence against the black subject.

**Wilderson 03** Frank B. Wilderson III, “The Prison Slave as Hegemony’s (Silent) Scandal,” *Social Justice* 30:2 (2003)

**Any serious musing on** the question of **antagonistic identity formation** --- **a formation, the mass mobilization of which can precipitate a crisis in the instituions and assumptive logic that undergird the United State of America** --- **must come to grips with the contradictions between the political demands of radical social movements**, such as the large prison abolition movement, which seeks to abolish the prison-industrial complex, **and the ideological structure that under-writes its political desire**. I contend that **the positionality of Black subjectivity is at the heart of those contradictions and that this unspoken desire is bound up with the political limitations of several naturalized and uncritically accepted categories** that have their genesis mainly in the works of Antonio Gramsci, **namely, work or labor, the wage, exploitation, hegemony, and civil society**. I wish to theorize the symptoms of **rage and resignation** I hear in the words of George Jackson, when he **boils reform down to a single word, "fascism,"** or in Assata's brief declaration, "i hated it," as well as in the Manichean delirium of Fanon, Martinot, and Sexton. Today, **the failure of radical social movements to embrace symptoms of all three gestures is tantamount to the reproduction of an anti-Black politics that nonetheless represents itself as being in the service of the emancipation of the Black prison slave**. By examining the strategy and structure of the Black subject's absence in, and incommensurability with, the key categories of Gramscian theory, we come face to face with three unsettling consequences: (1) **The Black American subject imposes a radical incoherence upon the assumptive logic of** Gramscian discourse and on **today's coalition politics.** In other words, s/he implies a scandal. (2) **The Black subject reveals the inability of social movements** grounded in Gramscian discourse **to think of white supremacy** (rather than capitalism) **as the base** **and thereby calls into question their claim to elaborate a comprehensive and decisive antagonism**. Stated another way, Gramscian discourse and **coalition politics are indeed able to imagine the subject that transforms itself into a mass of antagonistic identity formations, formations that can precipitate a crisis in wage slavery, exploitation, and hegemony, but they are asleep at the wheel when asked to provide enabling antagonisms toward unwaged slavery, despotism, and terror**. (3) We begin to see how Marxism suffers from a kind of conceptual anxiety. There is a desire for socialism on the other side of crisis, a society that does away not with the category of worker, but with the imposition workers suffer under the approach of variable capital. In other words, **the mark of its conceptual anxiety is in its desire to democratize work and thus help to keep in place and insure the coherence of Reformation and Enlightenment foundational values of productivity and progress.** **This scenario crowds out other postrevolutionary possibilities, i.e., idlenes**s. **The scandal, with which the Black subject position "threatens" Gramscian and coalition discourse, is manifest in the Black subject's incommensurability with, or disarticulation of, Gramscian categories: work, progress, production, exploitation, hegemony, and historical self-awareness.** Through what strategies does the o Black subject destabilize ? emerge as the unthought, and thus the scandal of? historical materialism? How does the Black subject function within the "American desiring machine" differently than the quintessential Gramscian subaltern, the worker?

# Round 4 v UCO DV

## 1NC

### 1NC - Econ

#### Immigration reform will pass in the status quo – insulated from the fiscal cliff – capital key and key to American economic competitiveness

Kinnari 12/29

Aaron, founder of the Future Forum a platform for educating and engaging young leaders on important global issues, Immigration Reform Would Be the Biggest Gift We Could Get This Year. 12/29/12. http://www.policymic.com/articles/21633/immigration-reform-would-be-the-biggest-gift-we-could-get-this-year.

When it takes session in January, the 113th Congress will have a number of critical issues that demand attention. There will be the potential fallout from the fiscal cliff, a new round of debt ceiling negotiations, and confirmation hearings for new cabinet secretaries, among others. But there is one policy matter that, while complex and long elusive, enjoys broad calls for improvement and immense potential for impact. The greatest gift we could get next year from Washington would be a comprehensive effort to finally fix America’s broken immigration system.¶ President Obama has signaled that immigration reform will be an early priority for his Administration in 2013. He’s not alone in calling for reform. The leading Republican presidential candidates all supported some elements of immigration reform, mostly focused on high-skilled labor and border security. And congressional leaders from both sides of the aisle are also coming together, with a bipartisan group of senators already meeting to discuss the issue.¶ A number of trade groups and research organizations from across industry and ideology have also signaled their support and have outlined the costs of inaction and benefits of reform. The U.S. Travel Association estimates that visa hurdles have resulted in a loss of 78 million foreign visitors over the past decade, resulting in the forfeiture of $606 billion in spending and 500,000 American jobs every year. Tourism and hospitality companies, as well as agricultural businesses, also find it difficult to hire short-term or seasonal workers – positions that Americans are often unable or unwilling to fill. While they depend on these employees to meet consumer demand, businesses often face bureaucratic barriers that can make an application for a temporary H-2B visa take several weeks and cost thousands of dollars.¶ Immigrants play important roles in America’s high-tech sectors as well but face similar obstacles. Researchers at Duke and UC Berkeley found that 25% of technology and engineering companies started between 1995 and 2005 had at least one immigrant key founder and those companies created more than 450,000 jobs. Another report by the American Enterprise Institute and the Partnership for a New American Economy found that every foreign-born STEM graduate that stays in the U.S. creates 2.62 American jobs. But despite their strong track record, the U.S. still lacks a visa for immigrant entrepreneurs, doesn’t grant STEM graduates enough green cards, and doesn’t have an adequate supply of H-1B visas for high-skilled immigrants.¶ And of course, a plan to address undocumented immigrants currently living in the United States must also be part of the fix. A recent poll demonstrates broad support for legalization, with 62% of Americans supporting a path to citizenship. And the Center for American Progress estimates that legalizing the 11 million undocumented immigrants in the U.S. would result in a gain of $1.5 trillion in GDP over 10 years.¶ The benefits are clear and the support for immigration reform is there. The question that remains is what’s the best strategy for Congress to pursue. Some argue for a piecemeal approach that would first address areas where there is broad support and potential for impact, and leave tougher questions for a later time. Given the political climate, this might seem like a practical path. But a comprehensive package might actually be more viable. Addressing challenges in silos would siphon support from those whose issues don’t make the first cut. Therefore, Congress must confront all components together – from a path to legalization to border security to a streamlined process for new immigrants – and leave enough room for the typical bartering that comes with political negotiations.¶ Past administrations and Congresses have tried to pass immigration reform and have failed. But we can no longer afford inaction if America hopes to maintain its status as a global engine for innovation and a destination for hard-working talent from around the world. If Washington can finally deliver a comprehensive package to fix our nation’s broken immigration system, it will be the gift that will keep on giving for generations to come.

#### Top priority and PC is key

Hesson 1/2

Ted, Reporter, ABC News, "Analysis: 6 Things Obama Needs To Do for Immigration Reform", <http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/News/things-president-obama-immigration-reform/story?id=18103115~~%23.UOSdSYnjlJ4>

On Sunday, President Barack Obama said that immigration reform is a "top priority" on his agenda and that he would introduce legislation in his first year.¶ To find out what he needs to do to make reform a reality, we talked to Lynn Tramonte, the deputy director at America's Voice, a group that lobbies for immigration reform, and Muzaffar Chishti, the director of the New York office of the Migration Policy Institute, a think tank. Here's what we came up with.¶ 1. Be a Leader¶ During Obama's first term, bipartisan legislation never got off the ground. The president needs to do a better job leading the charge this time around, according to Chishti. "He has to make it clear that it's a high priority of his," he said. "He has to make it clear that he'll use his bully pulpit and his political muscle to make it happen, and he has to be open to using his veto power." His announcement this weekend is a step in that direction, but he needs to follow through.¶ 2. Clear Space on the Agenda¶ Political priorities aren't always dictated by the folks in D.C., as the tragic Connecticut school shooting shows us. While immigration had inertia after the election, the fiscal cliff and gun violence have been the most talked about issues around the Capitol in recent weeks. The cliff could recede from view now that Congress has passed a bill, but how quickly the president can resolve the other issues on his agenda could determine whether immigration reform is possible this year. "There's only limited oxygen in the room," Chishti said.

#### Plan requires lots of capital – Congressional engagement key to Obama’s renewable agenda

Businessweek, 9/6 (“Renewable Energy Is Obama Goal for Next Term, Aide Says”, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-09-06/renewable-energy-is-obama-goal-for-next-term-aide-says)

President Barack Obama’s effort to develop renewable power sources and persuade Congress to adopt a long-term energy policy will be priorities should he win a second term, his top climate and energy aide said. Clean-energy programs and efficiency initiatives will be a focus for the president if he’s re-elected in November, Heather Zichal, Obama’s deputy assistant for energy and climate change, told reporters today in Washington. “The big issue will remain engagement with Congress,” she said. “The president has talked continuously about the need for a long-term energy policy, and I think that will be something that he will obviously remain focused on in the second term.” As a candidate in 2008, Obama pledged to create 5 million green jobs over 10 years by investing in renewable sources such as solar and wind power. He promoted alternatives to fossil fuels as a way to cut U.S. dependence on imported fuel. The 2009 economic-stimulus plan spent a record $90 billion on clean energy, creating 225,000 green jobs after one year, according to the White House. Republicans have used U.S. support for Solyndra LLC, the solar-panel maker that collapsed two years after getting a $535 million U.S. loan guarantee, to depict Obama’s policies as a failure by meddling in the free market. Mitt Romney, the Republican presidential nominee, said federal regulation of oil and gas limit U.S. energy development.

#### The loss of economic leadership results in global conflict, withdrawal of global power projection, and escalation of hotspots

Friedberg and Schoenfeld 8

Aaron, professor of politics and international relations at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School, Gabriel, Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, The Dangers of a Diminished America, WSJ, 10/21, Proquest

With the global financial system in serious trouble, is America's geostrategic dominance likely to diminish? If so, what would that mean? One immediate implication of the crisis that began on Wall Street and spread across the world is that the primary instruments of U.S. foreign policy will be crimped. The next president will face an entirely new and adverse fiscal position. Estimates of this year's federal budget deficit already show that it has jumped $237 billion from last year, to $407 billion. With families and businesses hurting, there will be calls for various and expensive domestic relief programs. In the face of this onrushing river of red ink, both Barack Obama and John McCain have been reluctant to lay out what portions of their programmatic wish list they might defer or delete. Only Joe Biden has suggested a possible reduction -- foreign aid. This would be one of the few popular cuts, but in budgetary terms it is a mere grain of sand. Still, Sen. Biden's comment hints at where we may be headed: toward a major reduction in America's world role, and perhaps even a new era of financially-induced isolationism. Pressures to cut defense spending, and to dodge the cost of waging two wars, already intense before this crisis, are likely to mount. Despite the success of the surge, the war in Iraq remains deeply unpopular. Precipitous withdrawal -- attractive to a sizable swath of the electorate before the financial implosion -- might well become even more popular with annual war bills running in the hundreds of billions. Protectionist sentiments are sure to grow stronger as jobs disappear in the coming slowdown. Even before our current woes, calls to save jobs by restricting imports had begun to gather support among many Democrats and some Republicans. In a prolonged recession, gale-force winds of protectionism will blow. Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures. As for our democratic friends, the present crisis comes when many European nations are struggling to deal with decades of anemic growth, sclerotic governance and an impending demographic crisis. Despite its past dynamism, Japan faces similar challenges. India is still in the early stages of its emergence as a world economic and geopolitical power. What does this all mean? There is no substitute for America on the world stage. The choice we have before us is between the potentially disastrous effects of disengagement and the stiff price tag of continued American leadership.

### 1NC Framework

#### 1. Interpretation: The ballot is to determine if the enactment of a topical plan is better than the status quo or a competitive option

#### 2. Violation:

#### A) “Resolved” implies a policy or legislative decision – means they must be resolved about a future federal government policy

Parcher 1

Jeff Parcher, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001 http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution.

#### B) USFG is the national government in DC

Encarta Online Encyclopedia, 2k

(http://encarta.msn.com)

“The federal government **of the U**nited **S**tates **is centered in** Washington **DC”**

#### C) Should means there is a practical reason for action

WordNet in ‘97

Princeton University, 1.6

**Should** v 1 : be expected to: “Parties should be fun” 2 : **expresses an** emotional**, practical,** or other **reason for doing something:** “You had better put on warm clothes”; “You should call your mother-in-law”; *“The State ought to repair bridges*”[syn**:** had better, ought]

#### 3. Vote Negative:

#### A) Decisionmaking - a limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to decision-making and advocacy skills

Steinberg & Freeley 8

\*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Decisionmaking skills based on specific energy policy proposals are key to motivate legislative fence-sitters – the aff’s strategy is doomed to the status quo

Brown 11

[heath, PhD Political Science, Roanoke, Salem, VA, “narrative strategies used by interest groups during the 2008 presidental transition”, 2011 Pat-Net Conference]

Milbrath argues that interest groups must strategically present information so as to ¶ overcome the “perceptual screen” that shields policy makers from absorbing endless amounts ¶ of information. He suggests that groups use facts (scientific information about policy ¶ outcomes), arguments (normative explanations of justness or rightness of action), and power¶ (typically subtle offers of political support or threats of political retribution) to communicate ¶ their interests and make their case for policy action (or inaction). In a more recent approach, ¶ Esterling (2007, p. 79) makes the case that groups can use [using] “instrumental” – “research or ¶ evidence-based causal” arguments -- or “normative” – “intrinsic desirability” arguments. By ¶ emphasizing one of these approaches, a group is tacitly communicating the way it wants to ¶ persuade the target of the information. By emphasizing power or normative arguments, the ¶ group implies that the policy maker should make decisions based primarily on their political ¶ judgment and political future. Conversely, by emphasizing facts-based or instrumental ¶ arguments, the group implies that the policy maker should base decisions primarily on rational ¶ or scientific considerations. In practice, it is difficult to disentangle these two types of ¶ arguments and many groups will likely combine various ways to present information (Wright ¶ 1996; Rochefort and Cobb 1994). The dichotomy though does help clarify the persuasive or ¶ argumentative tone of the information and advice given by groups to policy makers. 6 ¶ While public perceptions of interest groups might suggest crass self-interest, ¶ manipulation, and deception, groups have an incentive to be forthright in the information they ¶ provide and arguments they make. A group that provides shoddy statistics or misleading ¶ arguments will be discounted in future interactions with the policy maker (Kersh 2009; ¶ Easterling 2007). John E. Chubb (1983, p. 145) writes in regard to energy interest groups: ¶ “information and advice that are solely self-serving threaten the bond of trust that facilitates ¶ the informal play of influence.” In fact, rather than targeting political opponents or fence ¶ sitters, much research suggests that groups prefer or are invited to lobby friends and allies over ¶ adversaries (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999; Hall and Deardorff ¶ 2006; Bauer et al. 1963; Holyoke 2004; McCool 1990). If this is the case, the cost of ¶ misrepresenting or overstating information may be particularly high for those engaged in what ¶ Hall and Deardorff (2006) and others have called “legislative subsidy” (Hall and Deardorff 2006; ¶ Esterling 2007a). From this subsidy perspective, if a policy maker is sub-contracting information ¶ collection and analysis to an allied interest group, it behooves that group to be conscientious, ¶ thorough, and consistent in the information and advice it gives. And in many cases, as Wright ¶ (1996) contends, it is relatively easy for policy makers to check the authenticity of the ¶ information provided to them, sometimes simply through the contradictory information ¶ provided by other groups, thereby curtailing the inclination to blatantly misrepresent the truth. ¶ Furthermore, experimental research shows that factual or instrumental information is ¶ preferred by legislative staff (LaPira 2008) and neutral expert lobbyists have more legislative ¶ access than non-experts (Esterling 2007b). Facts may be useful on their own terms in ¶ formulating legislative decisions but scientific or statistically based arguments also serve as a 7 ¶ cue for policy makers to determine the credibility or reliability of the advice they are given ¶ (Sabatier 1978). ¶ Rather than convince those already in agreement, the approach taken by proactive ¶ theorists suggests that groups seek to convince legislative fence sitters or opponents to adopt ¶ the group’s position, advocate the group’s interests, or simply vote in the group’s way through ¶ the offer of, or refusal to give, political support (Smith 1984; Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; ¶ Wright 1996). Wright (1990) for one finds that groups which distribute campaign contributions ¶ to a wide group of legislators are then able to access a wider group, rather than just political ¶ allies (Wright 1990). Similarly, Heberling (2005) shows that one group, the AFL-CIO, seeks out ¶ legislators with unknown political preferences rather than targeting political allies (Heberling ¶ 2005). The field of interest group research has not yet resolved whether groups typically lobby ¶ friends, adversaries, or some combination of the two (Leech and Baumgartner 1998). This is ¶ likely due to the wide variation of group types and also policy domains in which groups operate. ¶ These inter-organizational and inter-policy differences affect the strategies employed and ¶ therefore the content of information presented during lobbying.

#### B) Dialogue – it’s critical to affirming any value—shutting down deliberation devolves into totalitarianism and reinscribes oppression

Morson 4

http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331

Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel); and his favorite writers -- Chekhov, Gogol, and, above all, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is especially interested in the relation of literature to philosophy.

 Bakhtin viewed the whole process of “ideological” (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic) development as an endless dialogue. As teachers, we find it difficult to avoid **a voice of authority,** however much we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice, because our rebelliousness against society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture.We speak the language and thoughts of **academic educators**, even when we imagine we are speaking in no jargon at all, and that jargon, inaudible to us, sounds with all the overtones of authority to our students. We are so prone to think of ourselves as **fighting oppression** that it takes some work to realize that we ourselves may be felt as oppressive and **overbearing,** and that our own voice may provoke the same reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree. So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image: helpful, but often painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on “The Theme of the Rebel” and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors. There is a famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox opponents. Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isn’t that itself often the root cause? We know from Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who escaped to Poland, that Ivan saw himself as someone who had been oppressed by noblemen as a child and pictured himself as the great rebel against traditional authority when he killed masses of people or destroyed whole towns. There is something in the nature of maximal rebellion against authority that produces ever greater intolerance, unless one is very careful. For **the skills of** fighting or **refuting an oppressive power are not** those of **openness, self-skepticism, or real dialogue**. In preparing for my course, I remember my dismay at reading **Hitler’s** Mein Kampf and discovering that his self-consciousness was **precisely** that of the rebel speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that much of his amazing appeal – otherwise so inexplicable – was to the German sense that they were rebelling victims. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic exploited much the same appeal. Bakhtin surely knew that Communist totalitarianism, **the Gulag,** and the unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power. His favorite writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that the worst oppression comes from those who, with the rebellious psychology of “the insulted and humiliated,” have seized power – **unless they have somehow cultivated the value of dialogue**, as Lenin surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had. Rebels often make the worst tyrants because their word, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has borrowed something crucial from the authoritative word it opposed, and perhaps exaggerated it: the aura of righteous authority. If one’s ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth, one is likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority; and rebels of the next generation may proceed in much the same way, **in an ongoing spiral of intolerance**.

### 1NC Shell

#### Transformative learning annihilates whole ways of living and fosters a rootless individualism that makes challenging the root causes of ecological degredation impossible. Their epistemology guarantees planetary destruction.

Bowers 2k5

[Professor of Environmental Studies @ University of Oregon[C. A., Ph. D. from the University of California in educational studies with an emphasis on education and social thought “Is transformative learning the trojan horse of western globalization?,” Journal of Transformative Education, 3 (2), pg. 116-125 [www.cabowers.net/pdf/ Transformative%20theorist- Commons.pdf](http://www.cabowers.net/pdf/Transformative%20theorist-Commons.pdf), 9-15]

It is important to acknowledge that the rise of liberal/Enlightenment ideas in the late 18th and 19th century led to basic improvements in the lives of the people of Western Europe who had been oppressed by feudal ideas and institutions—and by the authoritarian political systems that were equally resistant to change. The emphasis on the authority and power of critical reflection to overturn unjust traditions, the idea that change can lead to social progress, the view of the individual as having the power of self-determination, and the idea that new forms of knowledge will mitigate the ravages of the illness and the stultifying nature of work, led to important advances. But it also needs to be kept in mind that the widespread acceptance in the West of these ideas also coincided with the rise of the Industrial Revolution. And more importantly, these liberal ideas had no self-limiting principle. That is, the dominant motivation has been to achieve more and faster progress, more reliance on critical reflection (increasingly by experts promoting the development of new technologies and markets), more labor saving technologies (and now the elimination of the need for workers), newer drugs (and the control of the American Congress to ensure the growing dominance of the drug industry), and more self-determination—including self-determination in the construction of knowledge and values. The lack of any self-limiting principles, which made these liberal ideas even more problematic when they were merged with the market liberalism of John Locke, Adam Smith, and, later, Herbert Spencer, becomes especially evident when we consider the current drive to turn every aspect of the environmental and cultural commons into market opportunities—and to convert the entire world to a survival of the fittest business mentality. To reiterate a point that I have been making in the earlier part of my critique, in basing their interpretations of transformative learning on these liberal assumptions Freire, Dewey, Gadotti, and the current group of critical pedagogy fundamentalists not only reproduce the contradictions that arise when relying on abstract ideas for reforming a culturally diverse world, but they also reproduce in their interpretations of transformative learning the silences that characterized the earlier phase of liberal/Enlightenment thinking. These silences in the writings of the earlier liberal/Enlightenment thinkers led to ignoring the differences in cultural ways of knowing. In reality, it was not really a case of ignoring these differences. Rather, in the early phase of liberal thinking it was a matter of viewing other cultures as primitive, uncivilized, and as heathens that needed to be turned into Christians. The deficit model of culture has in more recent times been revised so that they are now viewed a pre-literate, pre-scientific, economically and technologically undeveloped, limited by a spectator approach to knowledge, and locked into a semi-intransitive state of consciousness. What earlier and present liberal theorists have overlooked is that many of these non-Western culture have developed in ways that have a smaller ecological footprint, and many of them place more emphasis on the forms of knowledge and relationships that sustain the commons in ways that reduce the dependence upon consumerism. The reductionism ways in which various traditions of liberal thinking have categorized non-Western cultures, as well as marginalized cultures in the West, have led to ignoring the need for an in-depth understanding of their approaches to knowledge and intergenerational renewal. This reductionist way of thinking, as I have been arguing, is part of the reason for the imperialist orientation of transformative learning theorists such as Freire and Dewey, and the professors of education who are now promoting transformative learning in 29 non-Western countries. More importantly, this bias which shows up in the messianic nature of transformative learning theorists should also be understand as one of the reasons that, when theorists such as Gadotti, O’Sullivan, and McLaren do address environmental issues, their panacea is to promote the global acceptance of an even more culturally uninformed interpretations of liberal ideals. That is, their response to the industrial culture that is accelerating the rate of change in the Earth’s natural system, and in making the people of the world more dependent upon consumerism, is to promote more change through an approach to education that fosters a rootless form of individualism.¶ But they add to the crisis of the commons that is spreading around the world in other ways. Their uncritical embrace of various explanations --current versions of Social Darwinism, the oppressive (banking) nature of all cultural models of learning other than their own, the messianic drive to share (impose) our highest ideals on other cultures, the effort to enable other cultures to achieve a Western interpretation of what constitutes the fullest expression of their humanity, and so forth—all add up to a thinking of other cultures as fundamentally deficient—and thus, as Derek Rasmussen points out, as in need of being rescued (Bowers, Apffel-Marglin, pp. 115-131). This way of thinking does not take account of the fact that there are still nearly 6000 languages still spoken in the world today—with a third of them in danger of becoming extinct in the near future. Conserving this diversity in language/knowledge systems is directly related to conserving biological diversity, as these languages encode knowledge accumulated over many generations of living in one place and from observing the interdependent relationships that make up the natural and cultural ecology. Unfortunately, transformative learning theorists have not become a voice for educational reforms that support linguistic and, by extension, biological diversity. As long as they maintain their core ideas about learning being only a transformative, emancipatory experience, any references to the importance of cultural divfersity is simply empty rhetoric that has as its real purpose the need to represent themselves as being on the politically correct side of the social justice and environmental debate. In effect, Freire and the other transformative learning theorists should be understood as having accepted themselves as being subjects of the banking process of education that they reject for others. That is, their professors imposed upon them a restricted political language that neither they nor their professors have thought critically about. And one of the primary characteristic of this political language, which I have earlier identified with classical liberalism (sans Adams Smith’s emphasis on the progressive nature of a market economy) is that it lacks a vocabulary for naming those aspects of culture that are now the only real source of resistance to the imperialism of market liberalism. It is especially noteworthy that the word “commons” is not part of the emancipatory liberal discourse. The problem with the language of liberalism can be seen in Gadotti’s way of addressing the ecological crisis. Globalizing the romantic idea of a planetary consciousness emerging from the grand journey into the individual’s subjective universe simply does not address the genuine sources of resistance to economic globalization and its impact on natural systems. What from the beginning of human history has been understood as the commons, and which exists today in various state of viability in the diverse cultures of the world, is the only alternative to the way in which the West’s industrial culture is creating greater dependence upon Western style consumerism and technologies. The nature of the commons varies from culture to culture, and from bioregion to bioregion. What they have in common is that much of the culture’s symbolic patterns as well as the natural systems of the bioregion are available to the members of the community on a non-monetary basis. That is, they have not been enclosed—that is, privatized, commodified, monetized, incorporated into an industrial process, and so forth. This general account of the commons does not mean that all of the culturally diverse commons where entirely free of political systems that gave certain groups special advantages—including the right to restrict the commons to the bare essentials for sustaining life, such as access to water, soil for growing small crops, animals, traditions of ceremonies, patterns of reciprocity, intergenerational knowledge of how to use medical plants, preparing food, and so forth. To make the point more directly, the commons should not be understood as always free of status systems and the unequal use of power. On the other hand, many of the cultural commons have been and still are characterized by local decision-making—an important phenomena that is now being undermined by the World Trade Organization and capitalistic forms of enclosure where decision about the use of the commons is now made by corporations and private owners who are unaffected by their decisions. The enclosure (privatization) of municipal water systems, as well as the corporate ownership and sale of supposedly “pure” bottled water, are examples of how the process of enclosing the commons also undermines local democracy.

#### THEIR CRITICAL PEDEGOGY CREATES A DISAVOWAL OF AMERICAN NEOLIBERAL VIOLENCE THAT RENDERS COLONIZATION INEVITABLE AND ETHICALLY TOLERABLE.

Bowers 2k5

[Professor of Environmental Studies @ University of Oregon[C. A., Ph. D. from the University of California in educational studies with an emphasis on education and social thought “Is transformative learning the trojan horse of western globalization?,” Journal of Transformative Education, 3 (2), pg. 116-125 [www.cabowers.net/pdf/ Transformative%20theorist- Commons.pdf](http://www.cabowers.net/pdf/Transformative%20theorist-Commons.pdf), 9-15]

They also ignore that critical reflection is not the only legitimate approach to intergenerational renewal, and that many aspects of the cultural construction of everyday reality are sources empowerment and the basis of moral reciprocity. The implications of their collective silences and reductionist thinking is that they have nothing to say about the need to re-direct curriculum reform in ways that help students recognize the different aspects of the commons that they take-for-granted. In not being given the language for naming the commons they take-for-granted, they are unable to recognize and thus challenge politically when the commons are being further enclosed. That is, in addition to not understanding their rights within the commons, as well as their responsibility to future generations for ensuring that a commons are not further diminished by corporate capitalism, their present form of education (which will become even more limited as transformative learning becomes more widespread) now leaves them largely ignorant of the non-monetized face-to-face alternatives to consumerism within their communities. The other irony is that the use of the restrictive liberal political vocabulary that the transformative learning theorists reinforce in teacher education classes, which in turn is reinforced in public schools, is that a significant number of Americans call themselves conservatives while supporting the imperialistic assumptions and practices of market liberals. This has the effect of social and eco-justice advocates not wanting to identify themselves with the word conservatism. The result is that both the faux conservatives such as President George W. Bush and the transformative learning theorists support each other in avoiding the question that now needs to be ask in this era of economic and cultural colonization: namely, what do we need to conserve in order to resist the forces that are increasing poverty around the world and putting future generations at greater risk of an environment that is too contaminated to support a healthy and fulfilling life. The challenge will be for the current generation of transformative learning theorists to recognize how they have been indoctrinated by liberal ideologues who failed to renew what was viable in the earlier formulations of liberal ideas in ways that address issues related to the diversity of the world’s cultural commons and the environmental changes that these earlier liberal theorists were unaware of.

#### You must reject social justice liberalism. Its knowledge claims create a slippery slope to an ecological decay

Bowers 2K8

[Professor of Environmental Studies @ University of Oregon, C. A., Ph. D. from the University of California in educational studies with an emphasis on education and social thought, Transitions: Educational Reforms that Promote Ecological Intelligence or the Assumptions Underlying Modernity?, pg. 150-4]

Yet there continue to be differences between how liberals understand the nature of progress. A useful way of identifying these differences is to identify liberals working to alleviate poverty and various forms of exploitation as social justice liberals. Liberals who use critical inquiry to develop new technologies and to exploit new markets should be labeled as market liberals. The former were and continue to be critical of the exploitive nature of the free enterprise system, while the latter were and still are willing to let the “invisible hand” supposedly operating in the free market system distribute the benefits to the deserving—which usually means those who are already privileged. Given these differences, and they are hugely important, the two groups of liberals nevertheless share a common set of silences and prejudices. Already mentioned is their shared prejudice of the knowledge systems of other cultures—particularly indigenous cultures. They also share a very narrow and thus basic misunderstanding of the nature and importance of cultural traditions. In effect, they both fail to recognize the misconceptions of the Enlightenment thinkers who only identified oppressive traditions, and did not understand the intergenerational knowledge and skills that enabled communities to be more self-sufficient and to have complex symbolic lives. And both social justice and market liberals fail to understand that language is not simply a conduit in a sender/receiver process of communication, but instead is metaphorically layered in ways that reproduce past misconceptions in today’s taken-for-granted patterns of thinking. This latter oversight accounts for how both social justice and market liberals are continually embracing whatever is represented as a progressive step forward—and not asking about which traditions vital to the well-being of community and to a sustainable future are being lost.¶ 150There are many unrecognized assumptions that are shared by students on university campuses who identify themselves as conservatives and the professors whom they regard as subverting the American way of life. Again, the failure to recognize the shared assumptions and silences can, in part, be traced to the failure of universities to engage students in a discussion of the writings of the early political theorists whose influence continues to today. The misunderstandings resulting from this lack of historical knowledge are particularly evident when the beliefs and values of the self-identified conservative students are compared with the market liberal agenda promoted by the CATO and American Enterprise Institutes. Indeed, they turn out to be nearly identical—though some of these students balk at the idea of open debate as advocated by the American Enterprise Institute. As most university faculty embrace social justice liberalism they see no reason to introduce students to the thinking of philosophical conservatives or to the ideas of classical liberal thinkers. And the few social justice faculty who are introducing their students to the writings of environmental writers such as Rachel Carson, Aldo Leopold, Wendell Berry, and Vandana Shiva fail to clarify for students that these are essentially conservative environmental thinkers. By not engaging students in discussions of the different forms of conservatism, including the faux conservatism of President George W. Bush and his religious, corporate, and military base of support, students are more likely to accept without question Lakoff’s designation of environmentalists as liberal progressive activists. And they will continue to perpetuate the silences and prejudices that have been an aspect of liberal thinking since the time of the Enlightenment—which will keep them from recognizing that revitalizing the diversity of the world’s cultural commons will be a necessary part of achieving a sustainable future. The reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Control, which reflect the consensus thinking of 600 scientists from more than 100 countries on the nature and causes of global warming, brings into focus another aspect of the slippery slope that both the market and social justice liberals are greasing. As the melting of the permafrost in the northern latitudes release the vast quantity of methane gas that is an even greater contributor to global warming than carbon dioxide, as the glaciers that are the source of fresh water for hundreds of millions of people disappear, as the temperature of the world’s oceans rise and as the oceans absorb more CO2 that contribute to their increased acidity, as droughts and changes in weather patterns forces the migration of plants, animals, and people, and as more of the world’s major fisheries near collapse, the convergence of the slippery slope leading to environmental catastrophe with the slippery slope leading to a fascist form of government become a more likely possibility. What is not usually recognized is that the emergence of fascism between the two world wars resulted when democratic institutions became so weakened that they were no longer able to address the sources of economic and social unrest. People have demonstrated time and again that they prefer order over chaos, and they have often embraced the strong political leader who, as the supreme “decider”, does away with the seemingly endless debates which are at the center of the democratic process. The convergence of economic unrest resulting from the globalization of the market liberal agenda with the deepening ecological crises could easily lead to a repeat of this earlier history.¶Both market and social justice liberals carry forward the silences and prejudices that have been part of the legacy of Enlightenment thinkers—indeed some of these silences and prejudices can be traced back to the thinking of Plato who invented the idea of pure thinking that supposedly is free the of cultural influences carried forward through narratives. These include the intergenerational knowledge, skills, and activities that enable members of communities to live more self-sufficient and thus less money and consumer dependent lives. Working to conserve the diversity of the world’s languages and thus the diversity of knowledge of local ecosystems is yet another critical area of concern that is not being given adequate attention by social justice liberals who, unlike Krugman, refuse to consider anything that is associated with the word conservatism—partly because they lack knowledge of the many forms of conserving that are an inescapable part of daily life-- and partly because the word conservatism is now associated with authoritarian politics and the pursuit of economic self-interest.

### Case

#### Plan kills birds which are keystone species

Sutton and Tomich 5

Victoria Sutton and Nicole Tomich, 2005, Victoria Sutton is Visiting Lecturer (Fall 2004) Yale University, Professor of Law, Texas Tech University, Ph.D. in Environmental Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas and Nicole Tomich has a JD from Texas Tech University School of Law, “Harnessing Wind is Not (by Nature) Environmentally Friendly”, Pace Environmental Law Review, 92.

2.0 THE IMPACT OF WIND FARMS ON THE ENVIRONMENT Any artificial structure, such as a wind turbine, is likely to have a significant negative impact on the surrounding natural en- vironment.19 This reality increases in magnitude when the surrounding environment encompasses threatened or endangered species.20 Studies in Europe have revealed that the public’s perception of bird impacts can be a major factor in deciding whether a wind farm will gain acceptance and receive the proper permitting for a particular location.21 Furthermore, the minimal amount of existing scientific research on the environmental impacts of wind- generated power is considered by some to be developer-driven, and therefore incomplete, biased, and flawed.22 Whether “flawed” or not, there is existing literature on the negative impacts of wind power on the environment, and these impacts are discussed infra. 2.1 Impact of Wind Power on Birds Evidence of negative impacts on birds from interaction with wind generation first arose in the late 1980s.23 Since then, turbine blades have been proven to injure and kill birds-particularly birds of prey, known as raptors, some of which are threatened or endangered.24 These birds, such as the Bald Eagle,25 become victims of the wind turbines, primarily because of the height at which they fly. An early study of just one wind farm site in Al- tamont Pass, California, reported hundreds of raptors being killed yearly.26 Studies from the site, which hosts 6,500 wind turbines on 190 kilometers of property reveal: (1) turbines within 500 feet of canyons, which are typically prey areas, are associated with higher mortality rates; (2) mortality at end turbines is higher, but is just as high within strings of turbines where there are gaps of 35 meters or more between turbines; and (3) the lower the turbine density, the higher the mortality rates.27 The Altamont study was validated in the 1990s when migrating endangered Griffon Vul- tures were dying near Tarifa, Spain from collisions with wind tur- bine rotor blades.28 Bird collisions with wind generators can occur in a number of different ways: (1) a bird may strike the non-moving part of a tur- bine, such as the tower or motor box; (2) a bird may hit the spin- ning rotor blades; or (3) a bird may become caught in the strong pressure wave, or “wake” of a rotor blade.29 Wake collisions can cause a bird to become disoriented, lose control, and collide with the turbine, or be thrown down • onto the ground or into the ocean.30 The speed of revolving rotor blades can also contribute to “motion smear,” which is the degradation of the visibility of rap- idly moving objects, causing birds not to see them and fly straight into them.31 One study estimates that approximately 10,000 to 40,000 birds are killed each year by wind turbines in the United States.32 In comparison, approximately 60 million to 80 million yearly bird deaths result from vehicles, with an additional 40 million to 50 million deaths attributed to communication tower impacts.33 While the second set of figures seem to dwarf the importance of 10,000 to 40,000 birds killed annually by wind turbines, comparison studies are often flawed because they tend to focus on “cumulative impact” data rather than focusing on losses suffered by a particular species.34 Such studies compare the total mortalities from various sources, instead of the risk emanating from each separate source.35 Using the figures above, and factoring in approximately 230 million registered motor vehicles in the United States in the year 2000, the result is a low average of 0.3 bird deaths per vehicle per year.36 Furthermore vehicle deaths are much less likely to affect endangered or threatened raptors. Collisions are not the only threat posed to birds by wind power development. Wind farms can also become a barrier to movement, causing a migrating species to fly around rather than through a particular production site.37 A wind farm may also block daily home-range movements of a particular species, for instance, birds flying to and from preferred feeding and roosting sites.38 A wind farm that intersects a major migration path can cause a species to reroute adding stress and forcing the species to exert extra energy.39 The lighting of turbines may also pose a large threat to birds. Aviation lights that blink or rotate, have long been associated with bird mortality.40 Lighting dangers become amplified during bad weather such as fog, or heavy rain, increasing reflection and refraction, thus increasing mortality.41 Installed wind energy generating capacity increased by an average of 32% annually from 1998-2002;42 this ever-increasing growth rate combined with the various threats discussed supra, creates a unique and rapidly growing threat to bird populations and habitats.

#### Extinction

Diner 94

[Major David, Judge Advocate General's Corps, 143 Mil. L. Rev. 161, Lexis]

**Biologically diverse ecosystems are characterized by a large number of specialist species, filling narrow ecological niches.** These ecosystems inherently are more stable than less diverse systems. "The more complex the ecosystem, the more successfully it can resist a stress. . . . [l]ike a net, in which each knot is connected to others by several strands, such a fabric can resist collapse better than a simple, unbranched circle of threads -- which if cut anywhere breaks down as a whole." 79 **By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems**. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, **each new animal or plant extinction,** with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, **could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, 80 [HU]mankind may be edging closer to the abyss.**

**THEIR CLAIMS ABOUT NEOLIBERALISM ARE JUST CONJECTURE; THERE IS NO SHARED academic UNDERSTANDING OF NEOLIBERALISM NOR ACCUMULATION OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE SO THERE IS NO EPISTEMOLOGICAL BASIS FOR THEIR CLAIMS.**

**BOAS AND MORSE 2K9**

[taylor and Jordan, neoliberalism: from new liberal philosophies, professor of political science uc Berkeley,

Despite its prevalence, **scholars’ use of the term neoliberalism presents a puzzle**. Neoliberalism shares many attributes with “essentially contested” concepts such as democracy, whose multidimensional nature, strong normative connotations, and openness to modification over time tend to generate substantial debate over their meaning and proper application (Gallie 1956). In stark contrast to such concepts, the meaning of neoliberalism has attracted little scholarly attention**. In a review of 148 articles on neoliberalism** published in the top comparative politics, development, and Latin American studies journals **between 1990 and 2004, we did not find a single article focused on the definition and usage of neoliberalism, nor are we aware of one published elsewhere**. In this article, we analyze contemporary scholars’ unusual use of neoliberalism in the study of political economy and offer an explanation for why this situation has come about. Based on a content analysis of journal articles, the first section of the article documents three key characteristics of this use. First, **neoliberalism is employed asymmetrically across ideological divides: it is used frequently by those who are critical of free markets, but rarely by those who view marketization more positively**. In part, proponents avoid the term because neoliberalism has come to signify a radical form of market fundamentalism with which no one wants to be associated. Second, **neoliberalism is often left undefined in empirical research, even by those who employ it as a key independent or dependent variable.** Third, **the term is effectively used in many different ways, such that its appearance in any given article offers little clue as to what it actually means**. The contemporary use of **neoliberalism is even more striking because scholars once employed the term nearly the opposite of how it is commonly used today**. As we demonstrate in the second section, the term neoliberalism was first coined by the Freiberg School of German economists to denote a philosophy that was explicitly moderate in comparison to classical liberalism, both in its rejection of laissez-faire policies and its emphasis on humanistic values. These characteristics imbued neoliberalism with a common substantive meaning and a positive normative valence: it denoted a “new liberalism” that would improve upon its classical predecessor in specific ways. Only once the term had migrated to Latin America, and Chilean intellectuals starting using it to refer to radical economic reforms under the Pinochet dictatorship, did neoliberalism acquire negative normative connotations and cease to be used by market proponents. We argue that the patterns of asymmetric use emerging out of this historical transformation contribute to current scholars’ tendency to apply the term neoliberalism broadly, yet offer few precise definitions. In developing this explanation, the third section of the article expands upon Gallie’s (1956) framework for analyzing essentially contested concepts, arguing that there are multiple levels of contestation. Scholars may contest not only the meaning and application of a concept, but also its normative valence and the term used to denote it. **In the case of neoliberalism, the contested normative valence of the free market-related concepts to which the term refers, combined with terminological contestation over how to label these concepts, has led scholars with divergent normative assessments of the free market to adopt different terminology. When the use of language expresses only one side of a politically charged argument, choice of terminology takes the place of a direct confrontation of ideas, and meaningful debate suffers**

#### DEBATE NEUTRALIZES ANY EFFICACY OF COUNTER-HEGEMONIC STRATEGIES BY PASSIFYING RESISTANCE IN THE SIMULATION OF SOCIAL DEATH. THERE IS NO HOPE FOR OVERCOMING THE INEVITABLE CO-OPTION OF OPPOSITIONAL POLITICS IN THE CONTEXT OF DEBATE.

Occupied UC Berkeley 2k9
[http://anticapitalprojects.wordpress.com/2009/11/19/the-necrosocial/, the necrosocial: civic life, social death, and the UC, nov. 19,]

Yes, very much a cemetery.  Only here there are no dirges, no prayers, only the repeated testing of our threshold for anxiety, humiliation, and debt. **The classroom just like the workplace just like the university just like the state just like the economy manages our social death, translating what we once knew from high school, from work, from our family life into academic parlance, into acceptable forms of social conflict. Who knew that behind so much civic life** (electoral campaigns, student body representatives, bureaucratic administrators, public relations officials, Peace and Conflict Studies, ad nauseam) **was so much social death? What postures we maintain to claim representation, what limits we assume, what desires we dismiss**? ¶ And in this moment of crisis they ask us to twist ourselves in a way that they can hear. Petitions to Sacramento, phone calls to Congressmen—**even the chancellor** patronizingly **congratulates** **our** September 24th **student strike,** shaping the meaning and the force of the movement as a movement against the policies of Sacramento. **He expands his institutional authority to encompass the movement.** When students begin to hold libraries over night, beginning to take our first baby step as an autonomous movement he reins us in by serendipitously announcing library money. **He manages movement, he kills movement by funneling it into the electoral process. He manages our social death. He looks forward to these battles on his terrain, to eulogize a proposition, to win this or that—he and his look forward to exhausting us**. ¶ **He and his look forward to a reproduction of the logic of representative governance, the release valve of the university plunges us into an abyss where ideas are wisps of ether**—that is, **meaning is ripped from action. Let’s talk about the fight endlessly, but always only in its managed form: to perpetually deliberate, the endless fleshing-out-of. When we push the boundaries of this form they are quick to reconfigure themselves to contain us:** the chancellor’s congratulations, the reopening of the libraries, the managed general assembly—**there is no fight against the administration here, only its own extension. ¶ Each day passes in this way, the administration on the look out to shape student discourse—it happens without pause, we don’t notice nor do we care to. It becomes banal, thoughtless. So much so that we see we are accumulating days: one semester, two, how close to being this or that, how far? This accumulation is our shared history.** This **accumulation**—**every once in a while interrupted, violated by a riot, a wild protest, unforgettable fucking, the overwhelming joy of love, life shattering heartbreak—is a muted, but desirous life.  A dead but restless and desirous life.**

#### UNIVERSITY-CONTAINED DISCOURSE ON THE EXPLOITATIVE FUNCTION OF POWER MERELY SUSTAINS POWER’S ABILITY TO CONSTRAIN ANY TYPE OF RESISTANCE BY TURNING THOSE VICTIMS OF POWER INTO GHOSTS, BANISHED BY OUR ACADEMIC ENGAGEMENT WITH OF THEORIES OF POWER. THIS CREATES THE ACADEMY AS A GRAVEYARD WHICH SUSPENDS ANY POTENTIAL ACTION WHILE FURTHER MASKING POWER, ESPECIALLY IN ACADEMIC SUBCULTURES AND ACTIVITES LIKE DEBATE. TURNS THE CASE.

Occupied UC Berkeley 2k9
[http://anticapitalprojects.wordpress.com/2009/11/19/the-necrosocial/, the necrosocial: civic life, social death, and the UC, nov. 19,]

**Totally managed death. A machine for administering death, for the proliferation of technologies of death. As elsewhere, things rule. Dead objects rule**. In this sense, **it matters little what face one puts on the university**—whether that of Yudof or some other lackey. **These are merely the personifications of the rule of the dead, the pools of investments, the buildings, the flows of materials into and out of the physical space of the university—each one the product of some exploitation**—which seek to absorb more of our work, more tuition, more energy. **The university is a machine which wants to grow, to accumulate, to expand, to absorb more and more of the living into its peculiar and perverse machinery**: high-tech research centers, new stadiums and office complexes. And at this critical juncture the only way it can continue to grow is by more intense exploitation, higher tuition, austerity measures for the departments that fail to pass the test of ‘relevancy.’ ¶ **But the ‘irrelevant’ departments also have their place. With their ‘pure’ motives of knowledge for its own sake, they perpetuate the blind inertia of meaning ostensibly detached from its social context. As the university cultivates its cozy relationship with capital, war and power, these discourses and research programs play their own role, co-opting and containing radical potential**. And so **we attend lecture after lecture about how ‘discourse’ produces ‘subjects,’ ignoring the most obvious fact that we ourselves are produced by this discourse about discourse which leaves us believing that it is only words which matter, words about words which matter. The university gladly permits precautionary lectures on biopower; on the production of race and gender**; on the reification and the fetishization of commodities. A taste of the poison serves well to inoculate us against any confrontational radicalism. And **all the while power weaves the invisible nets which contain and neutralize all thought and action, that bind revolution inside books, lecture halls. There is no need to speak truth to power when power already speaks the truth.** **The university is a graveyard**–así es. **The graveyard of liberal good intentions, of meritocracy, opportunity, equality, democracy. Here the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. We graft our flesh, our labor, our debt to the skeletons of this or that social cliché. In seminars and lectures and essays, we pay tribute to the university’s ghosts,** the ghosts **of all those it has excluded**— the immiserated, the incarcerated, the just-plain-fucked. **They are summoned forth and banished by a few well-meaning phrases and research programs, given their book titles, their citations.** //This is our gothic— we are so morbidly aware, we are so practiced at stomaching horror that the horror is thoughtless. ¶ **In this graveyard our actions will never touch, will never become the conduits of a movement, if we remain permanently barricaded within prescribed identity categories—our force will be dependent on the limited spaces of recognition built between us. Here we are at odds with one another socially, each of us: students, faculty, staff,** homebums, **activists**, police, chancellors, administrators, **bureaucrats**, investors, **politicians**. That is, we are **students**, or **students of color, or queer students of color**, or faculty, **or Philosophy Faculty, or Gender and Women Studies faculty, or we are custodians, or we are shift leaders—each with our own office, place, time, and given meaning.  We form teams, clubs**, fraternities, majors, **departments**, schools, **unions**, **ideologies**, **identities**, **and subcultures**—and thankfully **each group gets its own designated burial plot.  Who doesn’t participate in this graveyard?**

**Market expansion solves war and the aff causes it – historical evidence and studies prove**

**Tures ‘3 – Associate Professor of Political Science @ LaGrange College**

John A. Tures, Associate Professor of Political Science at LaGrange College, 2003, “ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND CONFLICT REDUCTION: EVIDENCE FROM THE 1970S, 1980S, AND 1990S”, Cato Journal, Vol. 22, No. 3. http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj22n3/cj22n3-9.pdf

**The last three decades have witnessed an unprecedented expansion of market-based reforms and the profusion of economic freedom in the international system**. This shift in economic policy has sparked a debate about whether free markets are superior to state controls. Numerous studies have compared the neoliberal and statist policies on issues of production capacity, economic growth, commercial vol- umes, and egalitarianism. An overlooked research agenda, however, is the relationship between levels of economic freedom and violence within countries. Proponents of the statist approach might note that a strong gov- ernment can bend the market to its will, directing activity toward policies necessary to achieve greater levels of gross domestic product and growth. By extracting more resources for the economy, a pow- erful state can redistribute benefits to keep the populace happy. Higher taxes can also pay for an army and police force that intimidate people. Such governments range from command economies of totali- tarian systems to autocratic dictators and military juntas. Other eco- nomically unfree systems include some of the authoritarian “Asian tigers.” **A combination of historical evidence, modern theorists, and statis- tical findings, however, has indicated that a reduced role for the state in regulating economic transactions is associated with a decrease in internal conflicts. Countries where the government dominates the commercial realm experience an increase in the level of domestic violence. Scholars have traced the history of revolutions to explain the relationship between statism and internal upheavals. Contemporary authors also posit a relationship between economic liberty and peace. Statistical tests show a strong connection between economic freedom and conflict reduction during the past three decades**.

**Market globalization inevitable and movements are getting smothered out of existence—no alternative economic system**

**Jones 11**

Owen, Masters at Oxford, named one of the Daily Telegraph's 'Top 100 Most Influential People on the Left' for 2011, author of "Chavs: The Demonization of the Working Class", The Independent, UK, "Owen Jones: Protest without politics will change nothing", 2011, [www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/owen-jones-protest-without-politics-will-change-nothing-2373612.html](http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/owen-jones-protest-without-politics-will-change-nothing-2373612.html)

My first experience of police kettling was aged 16. It was May Day 2001, and the anti-globalisation movement was at its peak. The turn-of-the-century anti-capitalist movement feels largely forgotten today, but it was a big deal at the time. To a left-wing teenager growing up in an age of unchallenged neo-liberal triumphalism, just to have "anti-capitalism" flash up in the headlines was thrilling. Thousands of apparently unstoppable protesters chased the world's rulers from IMF to World Bank summits – from Seattle to Prague to Genoa – and the authorities were rattled. **Today, as protesters in nearly a thousand cities across the world follow the example set by** the **Occupy** Wall Street protests, **it's worth pondering what happened to the anti-globalisation movement**. Its **activists did not lack passion or determination. But they did lack a coherent alternative to the neo-liberal project.** **With no clear political direction, the movement was easily swept away by** the **jingoism and turmoil that followed 9/11,** just two months after Genoa. Don't get me wrong: the Occupy movement is a glimmer of sanity amid today's economic madness. By descending on the West's financial epicentres, it reminds us of how a crisis caused by the banks (a sentence that needs to be repeated until it becomes a cliché) has been cynically transformed into a crisis of public spending. The founding statement of Occupy London puts it succinctly: "We refuse to pay for the banks' crisis." The Occupiers direct their fire at the top 1 per cent, and rightly so – as US billionaire Warren Buffett confessed: "There's class warfare, all right, but it's my class, the rich class, that's making war, and we're winning."¶ The Occupy movement has provoked fury from senior US Republicans such as Presidential contender Herman Cain who – predictably – labelled it "anti-American". They're right to be worried: those camping outside banks threaten to refocus attention on the real villains, and to act as a catalyst for wider dissent. **But a coherent alternative to the tottering global economic order remains, it seems, as distant as ever. Neo-liberalism crashes around, half-dead, with no-one to administer the killer blow.** There's always a presumption that a crisis of capitalism is good news for the left. Yet in the Great Depression, fascism consumed much of Europe. The economic crisis of the 1970s did lead to a resurgence of radicalism on both left and right. But, spearheaded by Thatcherism and Reaganism, the New Right definitively crushed its opposition in the 1980s.**This time round, there doesn't even seem to be an alternative for the right to defeat**. That's not the fault of the protesters. In truth, **the left has never recovered from being virtually smothered out of existence**. **It was the victim of a perfect storm: the rise of the New Right; neo-liberal globalisation; and the** repeated **defeats suffered by the trade union movement.** ¶ But, above all, it was the aftermath of the collapse of Communism that did for the left**. As US neo-conservative** Midge **Decter triumphantly put it: "It's time to say: We've won. Goodbye**." From the British Labour Party to the African National Congress, left-wing movements across the world hurtled to the right in an almost synchronised fashion. **It was as though the left wing of the global political spectrum had been sliced off. That's why**, **although we live in an age of revolt, there remains no left to give it direction and purpose.**

**Santos ignores historical causality and replicates the smallscale modeling he critiques**

Jan Nederveen **Pieterse. 2001**.,Associate Professor of Sociology at the Institute of Social Studies at The Hague, , “Emancipation and Regulation: Twin Pillars of Modernity?” European Journal of Social Theory 4(3): 281–290, p.

The findings **Santos** arrives at concerning the shortcomings of neoclassical economics are not as noteworthy as the way he arrives at them. His **treatment suffers from problems of scale and perspective and at times comes across as too coarse-grained**. For instance, what is ‘mainstream economics’? Neoclassical economics, rational choice, new institutional economics, institutional analysis? As to ‘modern science’, what about new science such as quantum physics and chaos theory? That is, **this critique of small-scale modelling in science itself uses smallscale models of economics and science to the extent that several insights are too general to be penetrating.** This critique of representation comes with two other arguments – a discussion of regulation and emancipation, and a plea for a new common sense, although there is no necessary connection between them. **Regulation and emancipation are presented as the ‘twin pillars of modernity’, as capabilities and forms of knowledge**. This is a sequel to Santos’s Toward a New Common Sense (1995). This too opened with the idea that modernity is ‘based on two pillars, the pillar of regulation and the pillar of emancipation’. So here we enter modernity by passing between two pillars. Let us pause right away. What kind of space do we enter by passing between two pillars? A temple – and variations such as a courthouse, church, library – a demarcated, sanctified space. The nearest reference to two pillars in the literature is the Temple of Solomon with its twin pillars Jachin and Boaz. This metaphor has been used over and over again, from the Qabala to Freemasonry and alchemy to Goethe (‘zwei Seelen’). In other words, this is a classical, premodern metaphor for modernity. Accordingly, **modernity is marked off as an imaginary space, a building, and set apart from detail and intricacy, from the rumour of agents, voices, dreams and projects, in a word, a small-scale model abstracted from history. This means taking a normative view of modernity, as against,** for instance, **an institutional view** (the nation state, capitalism, etc.) **or a historical view**. Other normative angles are also absent (Parsons’s universalism, Habermas’s Enlightenment, etc.). Which episodes, movements, transformations would exemplify this? History is only cursorily present in this argument (e.g. capitalism, colonialism). **Without ‘examples’ the argument remains ungrounded, untestable, hovering outside time and space**. This is a plea not for empiricism but for effective communication (the reader thinks this is about A but the author thinks of B). The representation in terms of duality is fundamentally static. From Heraclitus to Hegel, along with other folks, the common epistemological device has been dialectics, so where is dialectics in this argument – i.e. regulation prompting emancipation, emancipation turning into regulation, and so forth? Then, what is now presented as a problem (‘the regulation that does not emancipate does not even regulate’, etc.) is not a problem at all, but rather a solution. A depiction in which not merely two principles are privileged, but only two remain is not a felicitous representation of modernity. This is small-scale sociology at its most extreme. It gives us very little to work with. The treatment is schematic, not occasionally so but as a matter of style and method. **All the problems discussed in the critique of small-scale representation recur in this argument on regulation and emancipation – vagueness (‘neglecting details and contrast’), false contemporaneity, exclusion of other knowledges**. Thus, **a probing critique of small-scale economics** (i.e. modelling devoid of detail) **comes with an exercise in small-scale sociology and the very epistemological blinders that are so patiently laid bare in relation to economics are, in the same breath, applied with abandon in sociology**.

## 2NC

### 2NC Overview

#### Nuclear war turns environment

[UCLA International Institute](http://www.international.ucla.edu) ‘6

([UCLA News](http://www.newsroom.ucla.edu/page.asp?relnum=7553) releas, “Nuclear War Can't Be 'Regional,'” 12-11, UCLA International Institute, <http://www.isop.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=59428>)

Even a small-scale, regional nuclear war could produce as many direct fatalities as occurred during all of World War II and disrupt the global climate for a decade or more, impacting nearly everyone on Earth. These conclusions are reported by a team of scientists from UCLA, the University of Colorado at Boulder and Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey in two research articles posted online in the journal Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics Discussions and at a press conference today at the American Geophysical Union's annual meeting in San Francisco. The new results represent the first comprehensive quantitative assessment of the consequences of a nuclear conflict between small or emerging nuclear states, said Richard Turco, professor in the UCLA Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences and a member and founding director of UCLA's Institute of the Environment. The team of scientists reviewed the current status of nuclear weapons development, analyzed data on modern megacities and applied a state-of-the-science climate model. They calculated the local effects of individual "small," Hiroshima-size (15-kiloton) nuclear detonations in urban centers, including potential casualties from the blast and radioactive fallout, Turco said. Even the smallest nuclear powers today and in the near future may have as many as 50 or more Hiroshima-size weapons in their arsenals, according to the scientists. Moreover, about 40 countries possess enough plutonium and uranium to construct substantial nuclear arsenals. "Considering the relatively small number and sizes of the weapons — perhaps less than one megaton in total yield — the potential devastation would be catastrophic and long-term," Toon said. "A single low-yield nuclear detonation in an urban center could lead to more fatalities, in some cases by orders of magnitude, than occurred in major historical wars." Megacities attacked with nuclear devices, through war or terrorism, would likely be abandoned indefinitely, inducing mass migration and long-term economic decline, Turco said.  Turco in the 1980s headed a group — whose members included Owen "Brian" Toon, a co-author on the current research, and the late Carl Sagan — that originally defined the "nuclear winter" phenomenon, a phrase that Turco coined. For a regional-scale nuclear conflict, fatality estimates range from 2.6 million to 16.7 million, Turco said. The scientists estimated the quantities of soot — the highly absorbing component of smoke — that would be generated in urban firestorms ignited by nuclear detonations. This effort was led by Toon, professor and chair of the department of atmospheric and oceanic sciences at the University of Colorado at Boulder, together with Turco and University of Colorado student Charles Bardeen. At Rutgers, Alan Robock, professor of environmental sciences and associate director of the Center for Environmental Prediction at Rutgers' Cook College, professor Georgiy Stenchikov and postdoctoral associate Luke Oman (now at Johns Hopkins University) employed a coupled atmosphere-ocean climate model to simulate the effects of the putative smoke emissions in perturbing the global climate system and causing regional climatic anomalies. The amount of soot emitted by firestorms was found to exceed 5 million metric tons in many cases. Because so many people live in megacities, the quantity of black smoke generated per kiloton of explosive yield could be more than 100 times larger than previously estimated for a full-scale superpower nuclear exchange involving thousands of megatons, according to one of the journal papers. While a regional nuclear confrontation among emerging nuclear powers might be geographically constrained, the environmental impacts could spread worldwide, Robock and his colleagues conclude. "We examined the climatic effects of the smoke produced in a regional conflict in the subtropics between two opposing nations, each using 50 Hiroshima-size nuclear weapons to attack the other's most populated urban areas," Robock said. The post-war climate simulations used soot emissions provided by Toon, Turco and Bardeen. As had been suggested in earlier nuclear winter studies, and more recently by observations of large wildfire smoke plumes, Robock's calculations indicate that a large fraction of the nuclear soot could linger in the upper atmosphere for up to a decade, producing significant cooling and reduced precipitation, with the greatest changes occurring over land. The implications for global food supplies appear grim. "A cooling of several degrees would occur over large areas of North America and Eurasia, including most of the grain-growing regions," Robock said. "As was the case with earlier nuclear winter calculations, large climatic effects would occur in regions far removed from the target areas or the countries involved in the conflict." When Robock and his team calibrated their climate model against the recorded response to the 1912 eruptions of Katmai volcano in Alaska, they found that observed temperature anomalies were accurately reproduced. On a grander scale, the 1815 eruption of Tambora in Indonesia, the largest in the last 500 years, was followed by killing frosts throughout New England in 1816 during what has become known as "the year without a summer." The weather in Europe was reported to be so cold and wet that the harvest failed and starvation stalked most of the continent. This historical event, according to Robock, perhaps foreshadows the kind of climate disruptions that would follow a regional nuclear conflict. The researchers emphasized that known climatic anomalies associated with major volcanic eruptions such as Tambora typically last for a year or so because volcanic particles tend to fall out of the atmosphere relatively quickly. By contrast, nuclear-generated soot particles may remain suspended in the upper troposphere and stratosphere for up to a decade as a result of the strong interactions between solar heat absorption by the smoke and wind patterns in the upper atmosphere. Consequently, the climatic effects can be significantly greater and longer lasting than those associated with any historical volcanic eruption. "With the exchange of 100 15-kiloton weapons as posed in our baseline scenario, the estimated quantities of smoke could lead to global climate anomalies exceeding any experienced in recorded history," Robock said. "And that's just 0.03 percent of the total explosive power of the current world nuclear arsenal." In related research, researcher Michael Mills of the University of Colorado at Boulder led a broad team, including Toon and Turco, in defining the impacts of a regional nuclear conflict on the stratospheric ozone layer. Mills' results, based on detailed simulations with a two-dimensional global chemical-transport model, reveal average column ozone losses exceeding 20 percent worldwide and persisting for at least three to four years, with mid-latitude losses as large as 30 to 40 percent and polar reductions up to 70 percent. Such ozone depletions would be unprecedented in human history and imply serious ecological and human consequences, Turco said. The primary effects on ozone are due to accelerated catalytic chemical cycles, which are caused by the heating of the stratosphere as injected soot absorbs sunlight, and to severely perturbed dynamics of the region, again owing to the soot heating. Previous studies, carried out in the 1980s with less sophisticated models, had indicated comparable or smaller ozone losses for a full superpower nuclear exchange, Mills noted. Turco said that a small nuclear state is likely to direct its weapons against population centers to maximize damage and achieve the greatest advantage, thus making such outcomes more plausible. The research team concludes that the confluence of nuclear proliferation, political instability and urban demographics forms perhaps the greatest danger to the stability of human society since the dawn of civilization.

### AT No Defend

#### B) “Should” is immediate and mandatory.

SUMMER ‘94

(Justice, Oklahoma City Supreme Court, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CIteID= 20287#marker3fn14)

The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word “should” 13 in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.14 The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;15 it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, “and the same hereby is”,(1) makes it an in futuro ruling – i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage – or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge’s intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.16 Nisi prius orders should be so construed as to give effect to every words and ever part of the text, with a view to carrying out the evident intent of the judge’s direction. 17 The order’s language ought not to be considered abstractly. The actual meaning intended by the document’s signatory should be derived from the context in which the phrase to be interpreted is used. 18 When applied to the May 18 memorial, these told canons impel my conclusion that the judge doubtless intended his ruling as an in praesenti resolution of Dollarsaver’s quest for judgment n.o.v. Approval of all counsel plainly appears on the face of the critical May 18 entry which is [885 P.2d 1358] signed by the judge. 19 True minutes20 of a court neither call for nor bear the approval of the parties’ counsel nor the judge’s signature. To reject out of hand the view that in this context “should” is impliedly followed by the customary, “and the same hereby is”, makes the court once again revert to medieval notions of ritualistic formalism now so thoroughly condemned in national jurisprudence and long abandoned by the statutory policy of this State. IV Conclusion Nisi prius judgments and orders should be construed in the manner which gives effect and meaning to the complete substance of the memorial. When a judge-signed direction is capable of two interpretations, one of which would make it a valid part of the record proper and the other would render it a meaningless exercise in futility, the adoption of the former interpretation is this court’s due. A rule – that on direct appeal views as fatal to the order’s efficacy the mere omission from the journal entry of a long and customarily implied phrase, i.e., “and the same hereby is” – is soon likely to drift into the body of principles which govern the facial validity of judgments. This development would make judicial acts acutely vulnerable to collateral attack for the most trivial reasons and tend to undermine the stability of titles or other adjudicated rights. It is obvious the trial judge intended his May 18 memorial to be an in praesenti order overruling Dollarsaver’s motion for judgment n.o.v. It is hence that memorial, and not the later June 2 entry, which triggered appeal time in this case. Because the petition in errir was not filed within 20 days of May 18, the appeal it untimely. I would hence sustain the appellee’s motion to dismiss.21 Footnotes: 1 The pertinent terms of the memorial of May 18, 1993 are: IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BRYAN COUNTRY, STATE OF OKLAHOMA COURT MINUTE /18/93 No. C-91-223 After having heard and considered arguments of counsel in support of and in opposition to the motions of the Defendant for judgement N.O.V. and a new trial, the Court finds that the motions should be overruled. Approved as to form: /s/ Ken Rainbolt /s/ Austin R. Deaton, Jr. /s/ Don Michael Haggerty /s/ Rocky L. Powers Judge 2 The turgid phrase – “should be and the same hereby is” – is a tautological absurdity. This is so because “should” is synonymous with ought or must and is in itself sufficient to effect an inpraesenti ruling – one that is couched in “a present indicative synonymous with ought.” See infra note 15.3 Carter v. Carter, Okl., 783 P.2d 969, 970 (1989); Horizons, Inc. v. Keo Leasing Co., Okl., 681 P.2d 757, 759 (1984); Amarex, Inc. v. Baker, Okl., 655 P.2d 1040, 1043 (1983); Knell v. Burnes, Okl., 645 P.2d 471, 473 (1982); Prock v. District Court of Pittsburgh County, Okl., 630 P.2d 772, 775 (1981); Harry v. Hertzler, 185 Okl., 151, P.2d 656, 659 (1939); Ginn v. Knight, 106 Okl. 4, 232 P. 936, 937 (1925). 4 “Recordable” means that by force of 12 O.S. 1991 24 an instrument meeting that section’s criteria must be entered on or “recorded” in the court’s journal. The clerk may “enter” only that which in “on file.” The pertinent terms of 12 O.S. 1991 24 are: “Upon the journal record required to be kept by the clerk of the district court in civil cases…shall be termed copies of the following instruments on file” 1. All items of process by which the court acquired jurisdiction of the person of each defendant in the case; and 2. All instruments filed in the case that bear the signature of the end judge and specify clearly the relief granted or order made.” [Emphasis added.] 5 See 12 O.S. 1991 1116 which states in pertinent part: “Every direction of a court of judge made or entered in writing, and not included in a judgment is an order.” [Emphasis added.] 6 The pertinent terms of 12 O.S. 1993 696 3, effective October 1, 1993, are: “A. Judgments, decrees and appealable orders that are filed with the clerk of the court shall contain: 1. A caption setting forth the name of the court, the names and designation of the parties, the file number of the case and the title of the instrument; 2. A statement of the disposition of the action, proceeding, or motion, including a statement of the relief awarded to a party or parties and the liabilities and obligations imposed on the other party or parties; 3. The signature and title of the court;…”7 The court holds that the May 18 memorial’s recital that “the Court finds that the motions should be overruled” is a “finding” and not a ruling. In its pure form, a finding is generally not effective as an order or judgment. See, e.g., Tillman v. Tillman, 199 Okl. 130, 184 P.2d 784 (1947), cited in the court’s opinion. 8 When ruling upon a motion for judgment n.o.v. the court must take into account all the evidence favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed and disregard all conflicting evidence favorable to the movant. If the court should concluded that the motion is sustainable, it must hold, as a matter of law, that there is an entire absence of proof tending to show a right to recover. See Austin v. Wilkerson, Inc., Okl., 519 P.2d 899, 903 (1974). 9 See Bullard v. Grisham Const. Co., Okl., 660 P.2d 1045, 1047 (1983), where this court reviewed a trial judge’s “findings of fact”, perceived as a basis for his ruling on a motion for judgment in n.o.v. (in the face of a defendant’s reliance on plaintiff’s contributory negligence). These judicial findings were held impermissible as an invasion of the providence of the jury proscribed by OKLA. CONST. ART, 23 6 Id. At 1048. 10 Everyday courthouse parlance does not always distinguish between a judge’s “finding”, which denotes nisi prius resolution of face issues, and “ruling” or “conclusion of law”. The latter resolves disputed issues of law. In practice usage members of the bench and bar often confuse what the judge “finds” with what the official “concludes”, i.e., resolves as a legal matter. 11 See Fowler v. Thomsen, 68 Neb. 578, 94 N.W. 810, 811-12 (1903), where the court determined a ruling that “[1] find from the bill of particulars that there is due the plantiff the sum of…” was a judgment and not a finding. In reaching its conclusion the court reasoned that “[e]ffect must be given to the entire in the docket according to the manifest intention of the justice in making them.” Id., 94 N.W. at 811. 12 When the language of a judgment is susceptible of two interpretations, that which makes it correct and valid is preferred to one that would render it erroneous. Hale v. Independent Powder Co., 46 Okl. 135, 148 P. 715, 716 (1915); Sharp v. McColm, 79 Kan. 772, 101 P. 659, 662 (1909); Clay v. Hildebrand, 34 Kan. 694, 9 P. 466, 470 (1886); see also 1 A.C. FREEMAN LAW OF JUDGMENTS 76 (5th ed. 1925). 13 “Should” not only is used as a “present indicative” synonymous with ought but also is the past tense of “shall” with various shades of meaning not always to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall 9, Judgments 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143,144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term “should” as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-1081 (jury instructions stating that jurors “should” reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an obligation and to be more than advisory; Carrrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, 802 P.2d 813 (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party “should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee and expenses” was interpreted to mean that a party under an obligation to included the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) (“should” would mean the same as “shall” or “must” when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they “should disregard false testimony”). 14 In praesenti means literally “at the present time.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

### Politics is tight

#### Evaluating political costs and understanding tradeoffs key to prevent genocide

Lanz 8

 (David, Mediation Support Project for Swisspeace, “Conflict Management and Opportunity Cost: the International Response to the Darfur Crisis”)

There are no simple solutions for the contradictions outlined above – they represent complicated dilemmas and tricky trade-offs. It would be naïve to call for more coordination among external actors in Darfur, as the difference of their approaches is structural and refl ects their respective interests and contexts. There are, however, two lessons that we can learn. The fi rst is that resources are scarce and effective confl ict management requires priorities. It is not possible to simultaneously run a humanitarian operation, deploy peacekeepers, try the Sudanese President in an international court, negotiate a peace agreement, and foster the democratic transition of Sudan. We need to think about what is most important and concentrate our resources – money, political capital, personnel – to achieve this objective. The second lesson is that actors working in or on confl ict, whatever approach they take, must be aware that their decisions and actions have opportunity costs and that they can “do harm.” As David Kennedy writes, “the darker sides can swamp the benefi ts of humanitarian work, and well-intentioned people can fi nd themselves unwittingly entrenching the very things they have sought voice to denounce.”30 Also, those involved in the grand scheme of managing confl ict Darfur must realise that they are in essence projecting their morals and a Western political agenda and that, consequently, their good intentions may not be perceived as such, especially in the Arab world. Indeed, moving from selfcentred and self-righteous dogmatism to a pragmatic assessment of causes and consequences would be a big step, and it would certainly improve our ability to manage conflicts in Darfur and elsewhere.

#### You should evaluate our politics DA. Their dogmatic refusal to consider political process implications is grounded in the same destructive blindness the aff criticizes.

David **Chandler**, Centre for the Study of Democracy - University of Westminster, **‘3**

(British Journal of Politics and International Relations 5.3, “Rhetoric without responsibility”)

The attention to the articulation of a political mission, beyond the petty partisanship of left and right, through foreign policy activism abroad has been an important resource of authority and credibility for western political leaders. The ability to project or symbolise unifying ‘values’ has become a core leadership attribute. George W. Bush’s shaky start to the US presidency was transformed by his speech to Congress in the wake of the World Trade Centre and Pentagon attacks, in which he staked out his claim to represent and protect America’s ethical values against the terrorist ‘heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century’ (Bush 2001). Similarly, Tony Blair was at his most presidential in the wake of the attacks, arguing that values were what distinguished the two sides of the coming conflict: ‘We are democratic. They are not. We have respect for human life. They do not. We hold essentially liberal values. They do not’ (The Guardian, 27 March 1999). Peter Hain, minister of state at the UK Foreign Office, also focused on the ‘values that the terrorists attacked’ in his call for political unity around ‘tough action’ (The Guardian, 24 September 2001). By association with the cause of the victims of international conflicts, western governments can easily gain a moral authority that cannot be secured through the domestic political process. Even general election victories, the defining point of the domestic political process, no longer bring authority or legitimacy. This was clear in the contested victory of George W. Bush in the 2000 elections, which turned on the problem of the ‘hanging’ chad in Florida. However, the problem of deriving legitimacy from elections is a much broader one, with declining voter turnouts. In the British elections in 2001 Tony Blair achieved a landslide second term mandate, but there was little sense of euphoria—this was a hollow victory on a 50 per cent turnout which meant only one in four of the electorate voted for New Labour. The demise of the framework of traditional party politics, the source of western governments’ domestic malaise, is directly associated with the search for an external source of legitimacy. This process is illustrated in Michael Ignatieff’s quote from the writings of British war reporter Don McCullin: But what are my politics? I certainly take the side of the underprivileged. I could never say I was politically neutral. But whether I’m of the right or the left—I can’t say ... I feel, in my guts, at one with the victims. And I find there’s integrity in that stance (Ignatieff 1998, 22–23). Ignatieff suggests that the external projection of legitimacy or moral mission stems from the collapse of the left/right political framework, stating that ‘there are no good causes left—only victims of bad causes’ (ibid., 23). Governments, like many gap-year students, seek to define and find themselves through their engagement with the problems experienced by those in far-off countries. This search for a moral grounding through solidarity with the ‘victims of bad causes’ has led to an increasingly moralised ‘black and white’ or ‘good versus evil’ view of crisis situations in the non-western world.10 The jet-setting UK prime minister, Tony Blair, has been much criticised for appearing to deprioritise the domestic agenda in the wake of September 11, yet even his critics admit that his ‘moral mission’ in the international sphere has been crucial to enhancing his domestic standing. The search for ethical or moral approaches emphasising the government’s moral authority has inexorably led to a domestic shift in priorities making international policy-making increasingly high profile in relation to other policy areas. The emphasis on ethical foreign policy commitments enables western governments to declare an **unequivocal** moral stance, which helps to **mitigate** **awkward** **questions** of government mission and **political** **coherence** in the domestic sphere. The contrast between the moral certainty possible in selected areas of foreign policy and the uncertainties of domestic policy-making was unintentionally highlighted when President George Bush congratulated Tony Blair on his willingness to take a stand over Afghanistan and Iraq: ‘The thing I admire about this prime minister is that he doesn’t need a poll or a focus group to convince him of the difference between right and wrong’ (UKGovernment 2002). Tony Blair, like Bush himself, of course relies heavily on polls and focus groups for every domestic initiative. It is only in the sphere of foreign policy that it appears there are opportunities for western leaders to project a self-image of purpose, mission and political clarity. This is because it is easier to promote a position which can be claimed to be based on clear ethical values, rather than the vagaries of compromise and political pragmatism, in foreign policy than it is in domestic policy. There are three big advantages: first, the object of policy activism, and criticism, is a foreign government; second, the British or American government is not so accountable for matching rhetoric to international actions; and third, credit can be claimed for any positive outcome of international policy, while any negative outcome can be blamed on the actions or inaction of the government or population of the country concerned. The following sections highlight that the lack of connection between rhetorical demands and accountability for policy-making or **policy** **outcomes** has made selected high-profile examples of ethical foreign policy-making a **strong card** for western governments, under pressure to consolidate their standing and authority at home.

### AT Not Living

**Economic freedom improves real standards of living- only capitalism can solve**

**Kim 08**

Anthony B. Kim is a Policy Analyst in the Center for International Trade and Economics at The Heritage Foundation 2K8

<http://www.heritage.org/research/africa/wm1992.cfm>

Economic freedom is about empowering people. **Greater economic freedom tends to generate more opportunities for people and creates lasting prosperity. By reducing barriers to economic activities, economic freedom forges a framework through which people can fulfill their dreams of success.** Such assertions are substantiated by the data found in the Index of Economic Freedom, an annual study of economic freedom around the world by The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal. **Identifying strong interconnectivity between the 10 key ingredients of economic freedom—which include openness to the global commerce, transparency, and the rule of law—the Index measures a country's degree of economic freedom between 0 and 100, scores that reflect the ability of ordinary citizens to make economic decisions on their own. Empirical findings of the Index reveal that there is a strong positive relationship between the level of a nation's economic freedom and the prosperity its people**. Incomes per head in the top 20 percent freest economies are more than double those in the next fifth and about seven times those at the bottom quintile. **Economies with higher levels of economic freedom also have lower unemployment and inflation rates**. **More importantly, there is another noticeable dimension to the relationship between economic freedom and prosperity: the evolution of economic freedom and standard of living over time.** **Measured by 10-year compound averages, countries' improvements in their Index scores and their growth rates of real per capita GDP are positively related to each other. In other words, countries moving toward greater economic freedom tend to achieve higher growth rates of per capita GDP over time.**[9] The AGOA eligible countries, as a group, have moved toward increased economic freedom over the past decade, with the average country's economic freedom score improving about 5 percent.[10] However, this progress has stagnated in recent years. **According to the 2008 Index, only six countries (Mauritius, Botswana, Uganda, South Africa, Madagascar, and Namibia) stand in the "free," "mostly free," and "moderately free" groups, while about half the world's "mostly unfree" economies and nine of the "repressed" economies are in Africa.****[11] Property rights, freedom from corruption, and investment freedom are three areas that require the most reform efforts.**

**Life should be valued as apriori – it precedes the ability to value anything else**

Amien **Kacou. 2008**. WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of “Life”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184

Furthermore, that manner of **finding things good** that is in pleasure **can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,”** as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, **pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation**, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation. Thus, we can see now that, in general, **something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself.** And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, **we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living** (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] **and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good.** However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that **the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value.** But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

### 2NC Overview

#### The 2AC has read a ton of impact cards without a link to any of those – we don’t preclude the the discussion of neoliberalism – topical version of the aff is to incentivize energy on different cites, or decentralized renewables which allow for community control, or tax the rich to lead to energy in communities and inner cities – effective decisionmaking allows these to be effective

Hager 92

Hager, professor of political science – Bryn Mawr College, ‘92

(Carol J., “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” Polity, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70)

¶ What is the role of the citizen in the modern technological state? As political decisions increasingly involve complex technological choices, does a citizen's ability to participate in decision making diminish? These questions, long a part of theoretical discourse, gained new salience with the rise of grassroots environmental protest in advanced industrial states. In West Germany, where a strong environmental movement arose in the 1970s, protest has centered as much on questions of democracy as it has on public policy. Grassroots groups challenged not only the construction of large technological projects, especially power plants, but also the legitimacy of the bureaucratic institutions which produced those projects.¶ Policy studies generally ignore the legitimation aspects of public policy making.2 A discussion of both dimensions, however, is crucial for understanding the significance of grassroots protest for West German political development in the technological age and for assessing the likely direction of citizen politics in united Germany.¶ In the field of energy politics, West German citizen initiative groups tried to politicize and ultimately to democratize policy making.3 The technicality of the issue was not a barrier to their participation. On the contrary, grassroots groups proved to be able participants in technical energy debate, often proposing innovative solutions to technological problems. Ultimately, however, they wanted not to become an elite of "counterexperts," but to create a political discourse between policy makers and citizens through which the goals of energy policy could be recast and its legitimacy restored. Only a deliberative, expressly democratic form of policy making, they argued, could enjoy the support of the populace. To this end, protest groups developed new, grassroots democratic forms of decision making within their own organizations, which they then tried to transfer to the political system at large. The legacy of grassroots energy protest in West Germany is twofold.¶ First, it produced major substantive changes in public policy. Informed citizen pressure was largely responsible for the introduction of new plant and pollution control technologies. Second, grassroots protest undermined the legitimacy of bureaucratic experts. Yet, an acceptable forum for a broadened political discussion of energy issues has not been found; the energy debate has taken place largely outside the established political institutions. Thus, the legitimation issue remains unresolved. It is likely to reemerge as Germany deals with the problems of the former German Democratic Republic. Nevertheless, an evolving ideology of citizen participationa vision of "technological democracy"-is an important outcome of grassroots action.

### SSD Good

#### Switch-side is key to making those decisionmaking skills effective – EPA debates prove

Mitchell 10

(Gordon R., Associate Professor, Director of Graduate Studies, and Director of the William Pitt Debating Union at the University of Pittsburgh; Spring, “Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 1 – Kurr)

The preceding analysis of U.S. intelligence community debating initiatives highlighted how analysts are challenged to navigate discursively the heteroglossia of vast amounts of different kinds of data flowing through intelligence streams. Public policy planners are tested in like manner when they attempt to stitch together institutional arguments from various and sundry inputs ranging from expert testimony, to historical precedent, to public comment. Just as intelligence managers find that algorithmic, formal methods of analysis often don't work when it comes to the task of interpreting and synthesizing copious amounts of disparate data, public-policy planners encounter similar challenges. In fact, the argumentative turn in public-policy planning elaborates an approach to public-policy analysis that foregrounds deliberative interchange and critical thinking as alternatives to "decisionism," the formulaic application of "objective" decision algorithms to the public policy process. Stating the matter plainly, Majone suggests, "whether in written or oral form, argument is central in all stages of the policy process." Accordingly, he notes, "we miss a great deal if we try to understand policy-making solely in terms of power, influence, and bargaining, to the exclusion of debate and argument."51 One can see similar rationales driving Goodwin and Davis's EPA debating project, where debaters are invited to conduct on-site public debates covering resolutions crafted to reflect key points of stasis in the EPA decision-making process. For example, in the 2008 Water Wars debates held at EPA headquarters in Washington, D.C., resolutions were crafted to focus attention on the topic of water pollution, with one resolution focusing on downstream states' authority to control upstream states' discharges and sources of pollutants, and a second resolution exploring the policy merits of bottled water and toilet paper taxes as revenue sources to fund water infrastructure projects. In the first debate on interstate river pollution, the team of Seth Gannon and Seungwon Chung from Wake Forest University argued in favor of downstream state control, with the Michigan State University team of Carly Wunderlich and Garrett Abelkop providing opposition. In the second debate on taxation policy, Kevin Kallmyer and Matthew Struth from University of Mary Washington defended taxes on bottled water and toilet paper, while their opponents from Howard University, Dominique Scott and Jarred McKee, argued against this proposal. Reflecting on the project, Goodwin noted how the intercollegiate [End Page 106] debaters' ability to act as "honest brokers" in the policy arguments contributed positively to internal EPA deliberation on both issues.52 Davis observed that since the invited debaters "didn't have a dog in the fight," they were able to give voice to previously buried arguments that some EPA subject matter experts felt reticent to elucidate because of their institutional affiliations.53 Such findings are consistent with the views of policy analysts advocating the argumentative turn in policy planning. As Majone claims, "Dialectical confrontation between generalists and experts often succeeds in bringing out unstated assumptions, conflicting interpretations of the facts, and the risks posed by new projects."54 Frank Fischer goes even further in this context, explicitly appropriating rhetorical scholar Charles Willard's concept of argumentative "epistemics" to flesh out his vision for policy studies: Uncovering the epistemic dynamics of public controversies would allow for a more enlightened understanding of what is at stake in a particular dispute, making possible a sophisticated evaluation of the various viewpoints and merits of different policy options. In so doing, the differing, often tacitly held contextual perspectives and values could be juxtaposed; the viewpoints and demands of experts, special interest groups, and the wider public could be directly compared; and the dynamics among the participants could be scrutizined. This would by no means sideline or even exclude scientific assessment; it would only situate it within the framework of a more comprehensive evaluation.55 As Davis notes, institutional constraints present within the EPA communicative milieu can complicate efforts to provide a full airing of all relevant arguments pertaining to a given regulatory issue. Thus, intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might otherwise remain sedimented in the policy process. The dynamics entailed in this symbiotic relationship are underscored by deliberative planner John Forester, who observes, "If planners and public administrators are to make democratic political debate and argument possible, they will need strategically located allies to avoid being fully thwarted by the characteristic self-protecting behaviors of the planning organizations and bureaucracies within which they work."56 Here, an institution's need for "strategically located allies" to support deliberative practice constitutes the demand for rhetorically informed expertise, setting up what can be considered a demand-driven rhetoric of science. As an instance of rhetoric of science scholarship, this type of "switch-side public [End Page 107] debate"57 differs both from insular contest tournament debating, where the main focus is on the pedagogical benefit for student participants, and first-generation rhetoric of science scholarship, where critics concentrated on unmasking the rhetoricity of scientific artifacts circulating in what many perceived to be purely technical spheres of knowledge production.58 As a form of demand-driven rhetoric of science, switch-side debating connects directly with the communication field's performative tradition of argumentative engagement in public controversy—a different route of theoretical grounding than rhetorical criticism's tendency to locate its foundations in the English field's tradition of literary criticism and textual analysis.59 Given this genealogy, it is not surprising to learn how Davis's response to the EPA's institutional need for rhetorical expertise took the form of a public debate proposal, shaped by Davis's dual background as a practitioner and historian of intercollegiate debate. Davis competed as an undergraduate policy debater for Howard University in the 1970s, and then went on to enjoy substantial success as coach of the Howard team in the new millennium. In an essay reviewing the broad sweep of debating history, Davis notes, "Academic debate began at least 2,400 years ago when the scholar Protagoras of Abdera (481–411 BC), known as the father of debate, conducted debates among his students in Athens."60 As John Poulakos points out, "older" Sophists such as Protagoras taught Greek students the value of dissoi logoi, or pulling apart complex questions by debating two sides of an issue.61 The few surviving fragments of Protagoras's work suggest that his notion of dissoi logoi stood for the principle that "two accounts [logoi] are present about every 'thing,' opposed to each other," and further, that humans could "measure" the relative soundness of knowledge claims by engaging in give-and-take where parties would make the "weaker argument stronger" to activate the generative aspect of rhetorical practice, a key element of the Sophistical tradition.62 Following in Protagoras's wake, Isocrates would complement this centrifugal push with the pull of synerchésthé, a centripetal exercise of "coming together" deliberatively to listen, respond, and form common social bonds.63 Isocrates incorporated Protagorean dissoi logoi into synerchésthé, a broader concept that he used flexibly to express interlocking senses of (1) inquiry, as in groups convening to search for answers to common questions through discussion;64 (2) deliberation, with interlocutors gathering in a political setting to deliberate about proposed courses of action;65 and (3) alliance formation, a form of collective action typical at festivals,66 or in the exchange of pledges that deepen social ties.67 [End Page 108] Returning once again to the Kettering-informed sharp distinction between debate and deliberation, one sees in Isocratic synerchésthé, as well as in the EPA debating initiative, a fusion of debate with deliberative functions. Echoing a theme raised in this essay's earlier discussion of intelligence tradecraft, such a fusion troubles categorical attempts to classify debate and deliberation as fundamentally opposed activities. The significance of such a finding is amplified by the frequency of attempts in the deliberative democracy literature to insist on the theoretical bifurcation of debate and deliberation as an article of theoretical faith. Tandem analysis of the EPA and intelligence community debating initiatives also brings to light dimensions of contrast at the third level of Isocratic synerchésthé, alliance formation. The intelligence community's Analytic Outreach initiative invites largely one-way communication flowing from outside experts into the black box of classified intelligence analysis. On the contrary, the EPA debating program gestures toward a more expansive project of deliberative alliance building. In this vein, Howard University's participation in the 2008 EPA Water Wars debates can be seen as the harbinger of a trend by historically black colleges and universities (HBCUS) to catalyze their debate programs in a strategy that evinces Davis's dual-focus vision. On the one hand, Davis aims to recuperate Wiley College's tradition of competitive excellence in intercollegiate debate, depicted so powerfully in the feature film The Great Debaters, by starting a wave of new debate programs housed in HBCUS across the nation.68 On the other hand, Davis sees potential for these new programs to complement their competitive debate programming with participation in the EPA's public debating initiative. This dual-focus vision recalls Douglas Ehninger's and Wayne Brockriede's vision of "total" debate programs that blend switch-side intercollegiate tournament debating with forms of public debate designed to contribute to wider communities beyond the tournament setting.69 Whereas the political telos animating Davis's dual-focus vision certainly embraces background assumptions that Greene and Hicks would find disconcerting—notions of liberal political agency, the idea of debate using "words as weapons"70—there is little doubt that the project of pursuing environmental protection by tapping the creative energy of HBCU-leveraged dissoi logoi differs significantly from the intelligence community's effort to improve its tradecraft through online digital debate programming. Such difference is especially evident in light of the EPA's commitment to extend debates to public realms, with the attendant possible benefits unpacked by Jane Munksgaard and Damien Pfister: [End Page 109] Having a public debater argue against their convictions, or confess their indecision on a subject and subsequent embrace of argument as a way to seek clarity, could shake up the prevailing view of debate as a war of words. Public uptake of the possibility of switch-sides debate may help lessen the polarization of issues inherent in prevailing debate formats because students are no longer seen as wedded to their arguments. This could transform public debate from a tussle between advocates, with each public debater trying to convince the audience in a Manichean struggle about the truth of their side, to a more inviting exchange focused on the content of the other's argumentation and the process of deliberative exchange.71 Reflection on the EPA debating initiative reveals a striking convergence among (1) the expressed need for dissoi logoi by government agency officials wrestling with the challenges of inverted rhetorical situations, (2) theoretical claims by scholars regarding the centrality of argumentation in the public policy process, and (3) the practical wherewithal of intercollegiate debaters to tailor public switch-side debating performances in specific ways requested by agency collaborators. These points of convergence both underscore previously articulated theoretical assertions regarding the relationship of debate to deliberation, as well as deepen understanding of the political role of deliberation in institutional decision making. But they also suggest how decisions by rhetorical scholars about whether to contribute switch-side debating acumen to meet demand-driven rhetoric of science initiatives ought to involve careful reflection. Such an approach mirrors the way policy planning in the "argumentative turn" is designed to respond to the weaknesses of formal, decisionistic paradigms of policy planning with situated, contingent judgments informed by reflective deliberation.

### 2NC Decisionmaking Good

#### Decisionmaking outweighs – it’s key to social improvements in every and all facets of life

Steinberg & Freeley 8

\*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp9-10

If we assume it to be possible without recourse to violence to reach agreement on all the problems implied in the employment of the idea of justice we are granting the possibility of formulating an ideal of man and society, valid for all beings endowed with reason and accepted by what we have called elsewhere the universal audience.14¶ I think that the only discursive methods available to us stem from techniques that are not demonstrative—that is, conclusive and rational in the narrow sense of the term—but from argumentative techniques which are not conclusive but which may tend to demonstrate the reasonable character of the conceptions put forward. It is this recourse to the rational and reasonable for the realization of the ideal of universal communion that characterizes the age-long endeavor of all philosophies in their aspiration for a city of man in which violence may progressively give way to wisdom.13¶ Whenever an individual controls the dimensions of" a problem, he or she can solve the problem through a personal decision. For example, if the problem is whether to go to the basketball game tonight, if tickets are not too expensive and if transportation is available, the decision can be made individually. But if a friend's car is needed to get to the game, then that person's decision to furnish the transportation must be obtained.¶ Complex problems, too, are subject to individual decision making. American business offers many examples of small companies that grew into major corporations while still under the individual control of the founder. Some computer companies that began in the 1970s as one-person operations burgeoned into multimillion-dollar corporations with the original inventor still making all the major decisions. And some of the multibillion-dollar leveraged buyouts of the 1980s were put together by daring—some would say greedy—financiers who made the day-to-day and even hour-to-hour decisions individually.¶ When President George H. W. Bush launched Operation Desert Storm, when President Bill Clinton sent troops into Somalia and Haiti and authorized Operation Desert Fox, and when President George W. Bush authorized Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq, they each used different methods of decision making, but in each case the ultimate decision was an individual one. In fact, many government decisions can be made only by the president. As Walter Lippmann pointed out, debate is the only satisfactory way the exact issues can be decided:¶ A president, whoever he is, has to find a way of understanding the novel and changing issues which he must, under the Constitution, decide. Broadly speaking ... the president has two ways of making up his mind. The one is to turn to his subordinates—to his chiefs of staff and his cabinet officers and undersecretaries and the like—and to direct them to argue out the issues and to bring him an agreed decision…¶ The other way is to sit like a judge at a hearing where the issues to be decided are debated. After he has heard the debate, after he has examined the evidence, after he has heard the debaters cross-examine one another, after he has questioned them himself he makes his decision…¶ It is a much harder method in that it subjects the president to the stress of feeling the full impact of conflicting views, and then to the strain of making his decision, fully aware of how momentous it Is. But there is no other satisfactory way by which momentous and complex issues can be decided.16¶ John F. Kennedy used Cabinet sessions and National Security Council meetings to provide debate to illuminate diverse points of view, expose errors, and challenge assumptions before he reached decisions.17 As he gained experience in office, he placed greater emphasis on debate. One historian points out: "One reason for the difference between the Bay of Pigs and the missile crisis was that [the Bay of Pig\*] fiasco instructed Kennedy in the importance of uninhibited debate in advance of major decision."18 All presidents, to varying degrees, encourage debate among their advisors.¶ We may never be called on to render the final decision on great issues of national policy, but we are constantly concerned with decisions important to ourselves for which debate can be applied in similar ways. That is, this debate may take place in our minds as we weigh the pros and cons of the problem, or we may arrange for others to debate the problem for us. Because we all are increasingly involved in the decisions of the campus, community, and society in general, it is in our intelligent self-interest to reach these decisions through reasoned debate.

### 2NC Dialogue/Limits

#### C) Echo Chamber DA - This rejection of structured clash makes debate into an echo chamber. This impoverishes their project even if it is right

Talisse 5

Professor of Philosophy @Vandy¶ Robert, Philosophy & Social Criticism, Deliberativist responses to activist challenges, 31(4) p. 429-431

The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. **The deliberativist view** I have sketched hold that reasonableness **involved some degree of** what we may call **epistemic modesty. On this** view, **the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons,** and so she enters into public discourse **as a way of testing her views against the objections** and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly hold that **her present view is open to reasonable critique** and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of **politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable**. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness **for the activist** consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action; **discussion with those who disagree need not be involved**. **According to the activist,** there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which **there is no room for reasoned objection.** Under such conditions, **the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational**. It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001A; ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political **activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies,** demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. Activists also must engage in deliberation among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movement must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tact’s; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. **Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists**. **Group polarization** is a well-documented phenomenon that **has ‘been found all over the world** and is many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81-2). Importantly, **in group that ‘engage in repeated discussions’** over time, **the polarization is even more pronounced** (2003: 86). Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of an individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.).17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that **he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees** in cases in which the requirement of justice are so clear that he can be confidents that has the truth .Group polarization suggest that even deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even we have the truth. **For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views,** but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth ,In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggest that a engagement with

## 1NR

#### And, even if they are able to produce some ad hoc definintion of what neoliberalism is, it’s irrelevent because the ONLY empirical study of neoliberalism literature proves it has NO shared academic standing and thus their epistemology is only the disciplinary delusion of their authors and has no empirical basis.

BOAS AND MORSE 2K9

[taylor and Jordan, professor of political science uc Berkeley, Studies in Comparative International Development, “Neoliberalism: From New Liberal Philosophy to Anti-Liberal Slogan”]

Scholars not only tend to attach a negative normative valence to neoliberalism; they also frequently fail to define the term when using it in empirical research. In our content analysis, we employed extremely permissive criteria for characterizing an article as defining neoliberalism. We counted not only explicit and self-conscious definitions such as “by neoliberalism I mean…” but also those that offered only implicit “definitions-in-passing,” in which an author applied the neoliberal label to specific empirical phenomena without explaining why. Despite this permissive approach, we nonetheless found that a full 69% of articles offered no definition at all (Table 3). Nor has the situation improved over time. Between 1990 and 1997, approximately 63% of the articles failed to provide any definition; between 1998 and 2001, 69% offered no definition; and from 2002–2004, 76% left neoliberalism undefined. The problem of neoliberalism remaining undefined in empirical research might be less serious if the offending studies tended to be those invoking neoliberalism as a background condition as opposed to a key independent or dependent variable. Studies using neoliberalism as a contextual variable were in fact less likely to define it, with 74% offering no definition. However, even among empirical articles where neoliberalism was an independent or dependent variable, 65% did not define the term. The tendency to use the term neoliberalism in empirical research without defining it contrasts with the use of other important social science concepts. Examining how scholars employ democracy in empirical research, David Collier and Steven Levitsky (1996: 4, 7) found that “much of the usage by these authors is linked to explicit definitions,” which are “often presented and applied with considerable care.” The concept of democracy tends to encourage such good scholarly habits in part because of the lively debate over alternative definitions, obligating scholars to clearly specify which of the potential meanings they have in mind. If there were a scholarly consensus regarding the meaning of neoliberalism, the lack of explicit definitions might not be so problematic. However, as discussed below, scholars’ use of the term does not evidence any such agreement as to what it actually means.

#### AND, THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THEIR CLAIMS ABOUT NEILIBERALISM. USE OF THE TERMS PREVENTS CRITICAL DISCOURSE SURROUNDING ACTUAL ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION AND INEQUALITY. FLIPS all THEIR OFFENSE. vote neg on presumption.

BOAS AND MORSE 2K9

[taylor and Jordan, professor of political science uc Berkeley, Studies in Comparative International Development, “Neoliberalism: From New Liberal Philosophy to Anti-Liberal Slogan”]

By contrast, in the case of neoliberalism, the conjunction of terminological contestation and the contested normative valence of the underlying concepts to which it can refer short circuits debate over the term’s meaning and proper application. Because the normative valence of free market phenomena is contested, some scholars have an incentive to suggest that the negative aspects of markets are more widespread, whereas others have an incentive to argue that their positive aspects are more prevalent. Those who use neoliberalism, however, participate in only one side of this debate. To contest the intension and extension of neoliberalism, by arguing that certain cases do not qualify or that certain definitional criteria do not belong, would be to suggest that the negative aspects of markets are not as widespread as others maintain—undercutting the still-unresolved argument about whether the free market is ultimately good or bad. The result is that neoliberalism has become a conceptual trash heap capable of accommodating multiple distasteful phenomena without much argument as to whether one or the other component really belongs. 15

**Life should be valued as apriori – it precedes the ability to value anything else**

Amien **Kacou. 2008**. WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of “Life”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184

Furthermore, that manner of **finding things good** that is in pleasure **can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,”** as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, **pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation**, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation. Thus, we can see now that, in general, **something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself.** And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, **we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living** (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] **and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good.** However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that **the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value.** But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

**Ontology first is bogus – no warrant**

**Jackson 10**

Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, 2010. Associate Professor of International Relations in the School of International Service at the American University in Washington, DC. “The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and its Implications for the Study of World Politics,” p 27-8.

However, I do not think that putting ontology first in the panacea that many seem to think it is. For one thing**, if one puts ontology first then one is, at least provisionally, committed to a particular** (if revisable) **account of what the world is made up of**: co-constituted agents and structures, states interacting under conditions of anarchy, global class relations, or what have you. **This is a rather large leap to make on anyone’s authority**, let alone that of a philosopher of science. Along these lines**, it is unclear what if any *warrant* we could provide for most ontological claims if ontology in this sense were to always “come first.”** **If someone makes an ontological claim about something existing in the world, then we are faced with an intriguing epistemological problem of how possibly to know whether that claim is true, and the equally intriguing problem of selecting the proper methods to use in evaluating that claim** (Chernoff 2009b, 391). **But if epistemology and method are supposed to be fitted to ontology, then we are stuck with techniques and standards designed to respond to the specificity of the object under investigation**. This problem is roughly akin to using state-centric measurements of cross-border transactions to determine whether globalization is eroding state borders, because the very object under investigation—“state borders”—is presupposed by the procedures of data collection, meaning that the answer will always, and necessarily, assert the persistence of the state.

**Managerialism is necessary to prevent global extinction –processes of environmental destruction are unstoppable without intervention**

**Levy 99**

Dr Neil Levy 1999. Fellow of the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at Charles Sturt University. “Discourses of the Environment” p. 215

**If the ‘technological fix’ is unlikely to be more successful than strategies of limitation of our uses of resources, we are nevertheless unable to simply leave the environment as it is. There is a real and pressing need for more, and more accurate, technical and scientific information about the non-human world**. For we are faced with a situation in which **the processes we have already set in train will continue to impact upon that world, and therefore us, for centuries. It is therefore necessary**, not only to stop cutting down the rain forests, but **to develop real, concrete proposals for action, to reverse, or at least limit, the effects of our previous interventions**. More over, there is another reason why **our behaviour towards the non-human cannot simply be a matter of leaving it as it is,** at least **in so far as our goals are not only environmental but also involve social justice**. For if we simply preserve what remains to us of wilderness, of the countryside and of park land, we also preserve patterns of very unequal access to their resources and their consolations (Soper 1995: 207). In fact, we risk exacerbating these inequalities. It is no us, but the poor of **Brazil**, who **will bear the brunt of the misery which would result form a strictly enforced policy of leaving the Amazonian rain forest untouched, in the absence of alternative means of providing for their livelihood.** **It is the development of policies to provide such ecologically sustainable alternative which we require, as well as the development of technical means for replacing our current greenhouse gas-emitting sources of energy. Such policies and proposals for concrete action must be formulated by** ecologists, environmentalist, **people with expertise concerning the functioning of ecosystems and the impacts which our actions have upon them. Such proposals are**, therefore, **very much the province for Foucault’s specific intellectual, the one who works ‘within specific sectors, at the precise points where their won conditions of life or work situate them**’ (Foucault 1980g: 126). For who could be more fittingly described as ‘the strategists of life and death’ than these environmentalists? After the end of the Cold War, it is in this sphere, more than any other, that man’s ‘politics places his existence as a living being in question’ (Foucault 1976: 143). For **it is in facing the consequences of our intervention in the non-human world that the fate of our species, and of those with whom we share this planet, will be decided.**

**Space exploration results from our viewing of space as an infinite standing reserve, the supreme manifestation of the danger of technology.**

**Soccio in 09** (Douglas J., Professor of Philosophy @ Shasta University Archetypes of Wisdom: An Introduction to Philosophy Seventh Edition The Age of Technology: Danger p.515, 2009) JM

**We measure—“order”—the cosmos itself, looking to outer space** for new sources of energy **to add to the ever-expanding standing-reserve**. When nature as a whole is threatened by technology, **we employ technology to count and record** (“order”) endangered species via wireless transmitters. We scientifically analyze soil and air samples, track storms via satellite, and obsessively tweak additives and supplements to enhance our food supply. We seek out new superdrugs to kill off superbugs created by older drugs crafted to kill off older bugs. Yet **in these very attempts to control the world and to come to technically “correct” understandings of the world, “the truth will withdraw**,” Heidegger warns. **Correct, calculative, objective understanding of particulars, though not sufficient for grasping the truth of existence, is potently useful, seductive, and distracting and induces complacency. This**, says Heidegger, **is “the supreme danger” of technology, a danger rooted in our overall indifference to every- thing that is not part of the standing-reserve. So long as we are chiefly inter- ested in things as means**, as instruments, as standing-reserve, **we inevitably come to a point where we take ourselves for standing-reserve.** Then, ironically and monstrously, . . . precisely as the one so threatened, [man] exalts himself to the posture of the lord of the earth. In this way the illusion comes to prevail that everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct. This illusion gives rise in turn to one final delusion: it seems as though man everywhere and always encounters only himself. . . . In truth, however, precisely nowhere does man today any longer encounter himself, i.e., his essence.

**Extinction**

**Schulze-Makuch and Davies 2010** (Dirk Schulze-Makuch, Ph.D., School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, Washington State University and Paul Davies, Ph.D., Beyond Center, Arizona State University, “To Boldly Go: A One-Way Human Mission to Mars”, <http://journalofcosmology.com/Mars108.html>)

**There are several reasons that motivate the establishment of a permanent Mars colony. We are a vulnerable species living in a part of the galaxy where cosmic events such as major asteroid and comet impacts and supernova explosions pose a significant threat to life on Earth, especially to human life. There are also more immediate threats to our culture, if not our survival as a species. These include global pandemics, nuclear or biological warfare, runaway global warming, sudden ecological collapse and supervolcanoes (Rees 2004). Thus, the colonization of other worlds is a must if the human species is to survive for the long term. The first potential colonization targets would be asteroids, the Moon and Mars. The Moon is the closest object and does provide some shelter (e.g., lava tube caves), but in all other respects falls short compared to the variety of resources available on Mars. The latter is true for asteroids as well. Mars is by far the most promising for sustained colonization and development, because it is similar in many respects to Earth and, crucially, possesses a moderate surface gravity, an atmosphere, abundant water and carbon dioxide, together with a range of essential minerals. Mars is our second closest planetary neighbor (after Venus) and a trip to Mars at the most favorable launch option takes about six months with current chemical rocket technology.**

## 2NR

### AT Reasonability

#### Reasonability is impossible – it’s arbitrary and undermines research and preparation

Resnick ‘01

Resnick, assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University, ‘1¶ (Evan, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2)

In matters of national security, establishing **a clear definition of terms is a precondition** for effective policymaking. **Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk** alienating their constituencies. They also risk **exacerbating misperceptions** and hostility among those the policies target. **Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research**. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

# Round 5 v West Georgia GM

## 1NC

### 1st Off

#### 1. Interpretation: The role of the ballot is to determine if the enactment of a topical plan is better than the status quo or a competitive option. The 1ac must read and defend the implementation of such a topical plan.

#### 2. Violation:

#### A) “Resolved” implies a policy or legislative decision – means they must be resolved about a future federal government policy

Parcher 1

Jeff Parcher, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001 http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution.

#### B) USFG is the national government in DC

Encarta Online Encyclopedia, 2k

(http://encarta.msn.com)

“The federal government of the United States is centered in Washington DC”

#### C) Should means there is a practical reason for action

WordNet in ‘97

Princeton University, 1.6

Should v 1 : be expected to: “Parties should be fun” 2 : expresses an emotional, practical, or other reason for doing something: “You had better put on warm clothes”; “You should call your mother-in-law”; *“The State ought to repair bridges*” [syn: had better, ought]

#### 3. Vote Negative:

#### A) Decisionmaking - a limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to decision-making and advocacy skills

Steinberg & Freeley 8

\*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Specifically, decisionmaking skills based on specific energy policy proposals are key to motivate legislative fence-sitters – the aff’s strategy is doomed to the status quo

Brown 11

[heath, PhD Political Science, Roanoke, Salem, VA, “narrative strategies used by interest groups during the 2008 presidental transition”, 2011 Pat-Net Conference]

Milbrath argues that interest groups must strategically present information so as to ¶ overcome the “perceptual screen” that shields policy makers from absorbing endless amounts ¶ of information. He suggests that groups use facts (scientific information about policy ¶ outcomes), arguments (normative explanations of justness or rightness of action), and power¶ (typically subtle offers of political support or threats of political retribution) to communicate ¶ their interests and make their case for policy action (or inaction). In a more recent approach, ¶ Esterling (2007, p. 79) makes the case that groups can use [using] “instrumental” – “research or ¶ evidence-based causal” arguments -- or “normative” – “intrinsic desirability” arguments. By ¶ emphasizing one of these approaches, a group is tacitly communicating the way it wants to ¶ persuade the target of the information. By emphasizing power or normative arguments, the ¶ group implies that the policy maker should make decisions based primarily on their political ¶ judgment and political future. Conversely, by emphasizing facts-based or instrumental ¶ arguments, the group implies that the policy maker should base decisions primarily on rational ¶ or scientific considerations. In practice, it is difficult to disentangle these two types of ¶ arguments and many groups will likely combine various ways to present information (Wright ¶ 1996; Rochefort and Cobb 1994). The dichotomy though does help clarify the persuasive or ¶ argumentative tone of the information and advice given by groups to policy makers. 6 ¶ While public perceptions of interest groups might suggest crass self-interest, ¶ manipulation, and deception, groups have an incentive to be forthright in the information they ¶ provide and arguments they make. A group that provides shoddy statistics or misleading ¶ arguments will be discounted in future interactions with the policy maker (Kersh 2009; ¶ Easterling 2007). John E. Chubb (1983, p. 145) writes in regard to energy interest groups: ¶ “information and advice that are solely self-serving threaten the bond of trust that facilitates ¶ the informal play of influence.” In fact, rather than targeting political opponents or fence ¶ sitters, much research suggests that groups prefer or are invited to lobby friends and allies over ¶ adversaries (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999; Hall and Deardorff ¶ 2006; Bauer et al. 1963; Holyoke 2004; McCool 1990). If this is the case, the cost of ¶ misrepresenting or overstating information may be particularly high for those engaged in what ¶ Hall and Deardorff (2006) and others have called “legislative subsidy” (Hall and Deardorff 2006; ¶ Esterling 2007a). From this subsidy perspective, if a policy maker is sub-contracting information ¶ collection and analysis to an allied interest group, it behooves that group to be conscientious, ¶ thorough, and consistent in the information and advice it gives. And in many cases, as Wright ¶ (1996) contends, it is relatively easy for policy makers to check the authenticity of the ¶ information provided to them, sometimes simply through the contradictory information ¶ provided by other groups, thereby curtailing the inclination to blatantly misrepresent the truth. ¶ Furthermore, experimental research shows that factual or instrumental information is ¶ preferred by legislative staff (LaPira 2008) and neutral expert lobbyists have more legislative ¶ access than non-experts (Esterling 2007b). Facts may be useful on their own terms in ¶ formulating legislative decisions but scientific or statistically based arguments also serve as a 7 ¶ cue for policy makers to determine the credibility or reliability of the advice they are given ¶ (Sabatier 1978). ¶ Rather than convince those already in agreement, the approach taken by proactive ¶ theorists suggests that groups seek to convince legislative fence sitters or opponents to adopt ¶ the group’s position, advocate the group’s interests, or simply vote in the group’s way through ¶ the offer of, or refusal to give, political support (Smith 1984; Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; ¶ Wright 1996). Wright (1990) for one finds that groups which distribute campaign contributions ¶ to a wide group of legislators are then able to access a wider group, rather than just political ¶ allies (Wright 1990). Similarly, Heberling (2005) shows that one group, the AFL-CIO, seeks out ¶ legislators with unknown political preferences rather than targeting political allies (Heberling ¶ 2005). The field of interest group research has not yet resolved whether groups typically lobby ¶ friends, adversaries, or some combination of the two (Leech and Baumgartner 1998). This is ¶ likely due to the wide variation of group types and also policy domains in which groups operate. ¶ These inter-organizational and inter-policy differences affect the strategies employed and ¶ therefore the content of information presented during lobbying.

#### Switch-side is key to making those decisionmaking skills effective – EPA debates prove

Mitchell 10

(Gordon R., Associate Professor, Director of Graduate Studies, and Director of the William Pitt Debating Union at the University of Pittsburgh; Spring, “Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 1 – Kurr)

The preceding analysis of U.S. intelligence community debating initiatives highlighted how analysts are challenged to navigate discursively the heteroglossia of vast amounts of different kinds of data flowing through intelligence streams. Public policy planners are tested in like manner when they attempt to stitch together institutional arguments from various and sundry inputs ranging from expert testimony, to historical precedent, to public comment. Just as intelligence managers find that algorithmic, formal methods of analysis often don't work when it comes to the task of interpreting and synthesizing copious amounts of disparate data, public-policy planners encounter similar challenges. In fact, the argumentative turn in public-policy planning elaborates an approach to public-policy analysis that foregrounds deliberative interchange and critical thinking as alternatives to "decisionism," the formulaic application of "objective" decision algorithms to the public policy process. Stating the matter plainly, Majone suggests, "whether in written or oral form, argument is central in all stages of the policy process." Accordingly, he notes, "we miss a great deal if we try to understand policy-making solely in terms of power, influence, and bargaining, to the exclusion of debate and argument."51 One can see similar rationales driving Goodwin and Davis's EPA debating project, where debaters are invited to conduct on-site public debates covering resolutions crafted to reflect key points of stasis in the EPA decision-making process. For example, in the 2008 Water Wars debates held at EPA headquarters in Washington, D.C., resolutions were crafted to focus attention on the topic of water pollution, with one resolution focusing on downstream states' authority to control upstream states' discharges and sources of pollutants, and a second resolution exploring the policy merits of bottled water and toilet paper taxes as revenue sources to fund water infrastructure projects. In the first debate on interstate river pollution, the team of Seth Gannon and Seungwon Chung from Wake Forest University argued in favor of downstream state control, with the Michigan State University team of Carly Wunderlich and Garrett Abelkop providing opposition. In the second debate on taxation policy, Kevin Kallmyer and Matthew Struth from University of Mary Washington defended taxes on bottled water and toilet paper, while their opponents from Howard University, Dominique Scott and Jarred McKee, argued against this proposal. Reflecting on the project, Goodwin noted how the intercollegiate [End Page 106] debaters' ability to act as "honest brokers" in the policy arguments contributed positively to internal EPA deliberation on both issues.52 Davis observed that since the invited debaters "didn't have a dog in the fight," they were able to give voice to previously buried arguments that some EPA subject matter experts felt reticent to elucidate because of their institutional affiliations.53 Such findings are consistent with the views of policy analysts advocating the argumentative turn in policy planning. As Majone claims, "Dialectical confrontation between generalists and experts often succeeds in bringing out unstated assumptions, conflicting interpretations of the facts, and the risks posed by new projects."54 Frank Fischer goes even further in this context, explicitly appropriating rhetorical scholar Charles Willard's concept of argumentative "epistemics" to flesh out his vision for policy studies: Uncovering the epistemic dynamics of public controversies would allow for a more enlightened understanding of what is at stake in a particular dispute, making possible a sophisticated evaluation of the various viewpoints and merits of different policy options. In so doing, the differing, often tacitly held contextual perspectives and values could be juxtaposed; the viewpoints and demands of experts, special interest groups, and the wider public could be directly compared; and the dynamics among the participants could be scrutizined. This would by no means sideline or even exclude scientific assessment; it would only situate it within the framework of a more comprehensive evaluation.55 As Davis notes, institutional constraints present within the EPA communicative milieu can complicate efforts to provide a full airing of all relevant arguments pertaining to a given regulatory issue. Thus, intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might otherwise remain sedimented in the policy process. The dynamics entailed in this symbiotic relationship are underscored by deliberative planner John Forester, who observes, "If planners and public administrators are to make democratic political debate and argument possible, they will need strategically located allies to avoid being fully thwarted by the characteristic self-protecting behaviors of the planning organizations and bureaucracies within which they work."56 Here, an institution's need for "strategically located allies" to support deliberative practice constitutes the demand for rhetorically informed expertise, setting up what can be considered a demand-driven rhetoric of science. As an instance of rhetoric of science scholarship, this type of "switch-side public [End Page 107] debate"57 differs both from insular contest tournament debating, where the main focus is on the pedagogical benefit for student participants, and first-generation rhetoric of science scholarship, where critics concentrated on unmasking the rhetoricity of scientific artifacts circulating in what many perceived to be purely technical spheres of knowledge production.58 As a form of demand-driven rhetoric of science, switch-side debating connects directly with the communication field's performative tradition of argumentative engagement in public controversy—a different route of theoretical grounding than rhetorical criticism's tendency to locate its foundations in the English field's tradition of literary criticism and textual analysis.59 Given this genealogy, it is not surprising to learn how Davis's response to the EPA's institutional need for rhetorical expertise took the form of a public debate proposal, shaped by Davis's dual background as a practitioner and historian of intercollegiate debate. Davis competed as an undergraduate policy debater for Howard University in the 1970s, and then went on to enjoy substantial success as coach of the Howard team in the new millennium. In an essay reviewing the broad sweep of debating history, Davis notes, "Academic debate began at least 2,400 years ago when the scholar Protagoras of Abdera (481–411 BC), known as the father of debate, conducted debates among his students in Athens."60 As John Poulakos points out, "older" Sophists such as Protagoras taught Greek students the value of dissoi logoi, or pulling apart complex questions by debating two sides of an issue.61 The few surviving fragments of Protagoras's work suggest that his notion of dissoi logoi stood for the principle that "two accounts [logoi] are present about every 'thing,' opposed to each other," and further, that humans could "measure" the relative soundness of knowledge claims by engaging in give-and-take where parties would make the "weaker argument stronger" to activate the generative aspect of rhetorical practice, a key element of the Sophistical tradition.62 Following in Protagoras's wake, Isocrates would complement this centrifugal push with the pull of synerchésthé, a centripetal exercise of "coming together" deliberatively to listen, respond, and form common social bonds.63 Isocrates incorporated Protagorean dissoi logoi into synerchésthé, a broader concept that he used flexibly to express interlocking senses of (1) inquiry, as in groups convening to search for answers to common questions through discussion;64 (2) deliberation, with interlocutors gathering in a political setting to deliberate about proposed courses of action;65 and (3) alliance formation, a form of collective action typical at festivals,66 or in the exchange of pledges that deepen social ties.67 [End Page 108] Returning once again to the Kettering-informed sharp distinction between debate and deliberation, one sees in Isocratic synerchésthé, as well as in the EPA debating initiative, a fusion of debate with deliberative functions. Echoing a theme raised in this essay's earlier discussion of intelligence tradecraft, such a fusion troubles categorical attempts to classify debate and deliberation as fundamentally opposed activities. The significance of such a finding is amplified by the frequency of attempts in the deliberative democracy literature to insist on the theoretical bifurcation of debate and deliberation as an article of theoretical faith. Tandem analysis of the EPA and intelligence community debating initiatives also brings to light dimensions of contrast at the third level of Isocratic synerchésthé, alliance formation. The intelligence community's Analytic Outreach initiative invites largely one-way communication flowing from outside experts into the black box of classified intelligence analysis. On the contrary, the EPA debating program gestures toward a more expansive project of deliberative alliance building. In this vein, Howard University's participation in the 2008 EPA Water Wars debates can be seen as the harbinger of a trend by historically black colleges and universities (HBCUS) to catalyze their debate programs in a strategy that evinces Davis's dual-focus vision. On the one hand, Davis aims to recuperate Wiley College's tradition of competitive excellence in intercollegiate debate, depicted so powerfully in the feature film The Great Debaters, by starting a wave of new debate programs housed in HBCUS across the nation.68 On the other hand, Davis sees potential for these new programs to complement their competitive debate programming with participation in the EPA's public debating initiative. This dual-focus vision recalls Douglas Ehninger's and Wayne Brockriede's vision of "total" debate programs that blend switch-side intercollegiate tournament debating with forms of public debate designed to contribute to wider communities beyond the tournament setting.69 Whereas the political telos animating Davis's dual-focus vision certainly embraces background assumptions that Greene and Hicks would find disconcerting—notions of liberal political agency, the idea of debate using "words as weapons"70—there is little doubt that the project of pursuing environmental protection by tapping the creative energy of HBCU-leveraged dissoi logoi differs significantly from the intelligence community's effort to improve its tradecraft through online digital debate programming. Such difference is especially evident in light of the EPA's commitment to extend debates to public realms, with the attendant possible benefits unpacked by Jane Munksgaard and Damien Pfister: [End Page 109] Having a public debater argue against their convictions, or confess their indecision on a subject and subsequent embrace of argument as a way to seek clarity, could shake up the prevailing view of debate as a war of words. Public uptake of the possibility of switch-sides debate may help lessen the polarization of issues inherent in prevailing debate formats because students are no longer seen as wedded to their arguments. This could transform public debate from a tussle between advocates, with each public debater trying to convince the audience in a Manichean struggle about the truth of their side, to a more inviting exchange focused on the content of the other's argumentation and the process of deliberative exchange.71 Reflection on the EPA debating initiative reveals a striking convergence among (1) the expressed need for dissoi logoi by government agency officials wrestling with the challenges of inverted rhetorical situations, (2) theoretical claims by scholars regarding the centrality of argumentation in the public policy process, and (3) the practical wherewithal of intercollegiate debaters to tailor public switch-side debating performances in specific ways requested by agency collaborators. These points of convergence both underscore previously articulated theoretical assertions regarding the relationship of debate to deliberation, as well as deepen understanding of the political role of deliberation in institutional decision making. But they also suggest how decisions by rhetorical scholars about whether to contribute switch-side debating acumen to meet demand-driven rhetoric of science initiatives ought to involve careful reflection. Such an approach mirrors the way policy planning in the "argumentative turn" is designed to respond to the weaknesses of formal, decisionistic paradigms of policy planning with situated, contingent judgments informed by reflective deliberation.

#### B) Dialogue - Predictable points of stasis are key – effective dialogue and deliberation is critical to preventing mass violence as it overcomes politically debilitating self-obsession

Roberts-Miller 03

(Patricia Roberts-Miller is Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Texas "Fighting Without Hatred: Hannah Arendt’s Agonistic Rhetoric" JAC 22.2 2003)

Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into solipsistic and unreflective behavior. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58) What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with disastrous consequences, both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody. It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems, Arendt's solution is the playful and competitive space of agonism; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the assumption of competition, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, of one's thought. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives. Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it. The situation is agonistic not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference. This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity. Continued… Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, especially not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsibility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87). Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes, Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social. Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies. Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38). By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed. Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259). Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238). The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking. Arendt's Polemical Agonism As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. Persuasive agonism still values conflict, disagreement, and equality among interlocutors, but it has the goal of reaching agreement, as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added). Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it. In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it is how one tests the validity of one's thought. In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy. Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point: You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42) Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03). In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes. This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate. Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263). Like other proponents of agonism, Arendt argues that rhetoric does not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth; it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered. Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242). Agonism demands that one simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions, rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think. The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324). Yet, there are important positive political consequences of agonism. Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how the system could be actively moral. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the evil of conformity—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state makes possible extraordinary evil carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill undermines the political force of conformity, so it is a force against the bureaucratizing of evil. If people think for themselves, they will resist dogma; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, they will resist totalitarianism. And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action. In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere. On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric.

### 2nd Off

#### THE 1AC IGNORES THAT RACISM IS MERELY ONE AMONGST MANY TOOLS OF AXIOLOGICAL ANTHROPOCENTRISM WHEREBY VIOLENCE CAN ALWAYS BE JUSTIFIED WHEN APPLIED TO RACIALLY INFERIOR GROUPS. ONLY A CRITIQUE WHICH FOCUSES ON REJECTING SUBHUMAN THINKING CAN CONTEST THE MYRIAD FORMS OF RACISM.

Deckha 2k10

[Maneesha, faculty of law, university of Victoria, “it’s time to abandon the idea of human rights”, the scavenger, dec. 10]

While the intersection of race and gender is often acknowledged in understanding the etiology of justificatory narratives for war, the presence of species distinctions and the importance of the subhuman are less appreciated. Yet, the race (and gender) thinking that animates Razack’s argument in normalizing violence for detainees (and others) is also centrally sustained by the subhuman figure. As Charles Patterson notes with respect to multiple forms of exploitation: Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species, our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animas and do the same to them. Patterson emphasizes how the human/animal hierarchy and our ideas about animals and animality are foundational for intra-human hierarchies and the violence they promote. The routine violence against beings designated subhuman serves as both a justification and blueprint for violence against humans. For example, in discussing the specific dynamics of the Nazi camps, Patterson further notes how techniques to make the killing of detainees resemble the slaughter of animals were deliberately implemented in order to make the killing seem more palatable and benign. That the detainees were made naked and kept crowded in the gas chambers facilitated their animalization and, in turn, their death at the hands of other humans who were already culturally familiar and comfortable with killing animals in this way. Returning to Razack’s exposition of race thinking in contemporary camps, one can see how subhuman thinking is foundational to race thinking. One of her primary arguments is that race thinking, which she defines as “the denial of a common bond of humanity between people of European descent and those who are not”, is “a defining feature of the world order” today as in the past. In other words, it is the “species thinking” that helps to create the racial demarcation. As Razack notes with respect to the specific logic infusing the camps, they “are not simply contemporary excesses born of the west’s current quest for security, but instead represent a more ominous, permanent arrangement of who is and is not a part of the human community”. Once placed outside the “human” zone by race thinking, the detainees may be handled lawlessly and thus with violence that is legitimated at all times. Racialization is not enough and does not complete their Othering experience. Rather, they must be dehumanized for the larger public to accept the violence against them and the increasing “culture of exception” which sustains these human bodily exclusions. Although nonhumans are not the focus of Razack’s work, the centrality of the subhuman to the logic of the camps and racial and sexual violence contained therein is also clearly illustrated in her specific examples. In the course of her analysis, to determine the import of race thinking in enabling violence, Razack quotes a newspaper story that describes the background mentality of Private Lynndie England, the white female soldier made notorious by images of her holding onto imprisoned and naked Iraqi men with a leash around their necks. The story itself quotes a resident from England’s hometown who says the following about the sensibilities of individuals from their town: To the country boys here, if you’re a different nationality, a different race, you’re sub-human. That’s the way that girls like Lynndie England are raised. Tormenting Iraqis, in her mind, would be no different from shooting a turkey. Every season here you’re hunting something. Over there they’re hunting Iraqis. Razack extracts this quote to illustrate how “race overdetermined what went on”, but it may also be observed that species “overdetermined what went on”. Race has a formative function, to be sure, but it works in conjunction with species difference to enable the violence at Abu Ghraib and other camps. Dehumanization promotes racialization, which further entrenches both identities. It is an intertwined logic of race, sex, culture and species that lays the foundation for the violence.

#### AND, this species-contingent paradigm creates unending genocidal violence against forms of life deemed politically unqualified.

KOCHI & ORDAN 2K8

[tarik and noam, queen’s university and bar llan university, “an argument for the global suicide of humanity”, vol 7. no. 4., bourderlands e-journal]

Within the picture many paint of humanity, events such as the Holocaust are considered as an exception, an aberration. The Holocaust is often portrayed as an example of ‘evil’, a moment of hatred, madness and cruelty (cf. the differing accounts of ‘evil’ given in Neiman, 2004). The event is also treated as one through which humanity comprehend its own weakness and draw strength, via the resolve that such actions will never happen again. However, if we take seriously the differing ways in which the Holocaust was ‘evil’, then one must surely include along side it the almost uncountable numbers of genocides that have occurred throughout human history. Hence, if we are to think of the content of the ‘human heritage’, then this must include the annihilation of indigenous peoples and their cultures across the globe and the manner in which their beliefs, behaviours and social practices have been erased from what the people of the ‘West’ generally consider to be the content of a human heritage. Again the history of colonialism is telling here. It reminds us exactly how normal, regular and mundane acts of annihilation of different forms of human life and culture have been throughout human history. Indeed the history of colonialism, in its various guises, points to the fact that so many of our legal institutions and forms of ethical life (i.e. nation-states which pride themselves on protecting human rights through the rule of law) have been founded upon colonial violence, war and the appropriation of other peoples’ land (Schmitt, 2003; Benjamin, 1986). Further, the history of colonialism highlights the central function of ‘race war’ that often underlies human social organisation and many of its legal and ethical systems of thought (Foucault, 2003). This history of modern colonialism thus presents a key to understanding that events such as the Holocaust are not an aberration and exception but are closer to the norm, and sadly, lie at the heart of any heritage of humanity. After all, all too often the European colonisation of the globe was justified by arguments that indigenous inhabitants were racially ‘inferior’ and in some instances that they were closer to ‘apes’ than to humans (Diamond, 2006). Such violence justified by an erroneous view of ‘race’ is in many ways merely an extension of an underlying attitude of speciesism involving a long history of killing and enslavement of non-human species by humans. Such a connection between the two histories of inter-human violence (via the mythical notion of differing human ‘races’) and interspecies violence, is well expressed in Isaac Bashevis Singer’s comment that whereas humans consider themselves “the crown of creation”, for animals “all people are Nazis” and animal life is “an eternal Treblinka” (Singer, 1968, p.750).

#### Alternative: the judge should vote negative to REJECT THE HUMAN/ANIMAL DIVIDE.

#### this rejection enables an understanding of the SPECIES-BEING. that SOLVES THE ETHICAL CONTRADICTION OF THEIR SPECIES-LEVEL RACISM.

HUDSON 2K4

[Laura, The Political Animal: Species-Being and Bare Life, mediations journal, http://www.mediationsjournal.org/files/Mediations23\_2\_04.pdf]

We are all equally reduced to mere specimens of human biology, mute and uncomprehending of the world in which we are thrown. Species-being, or “humanity as a species,” may require this recognition to move beyond the pseudo-essence of the religion of humanism. Recognizing that what we call “the human” is an abstraction that fails to fully describe what we are, we may come to find a new way of understanding humanity that recuperates the natural without domination. The bare life that results from expulsion from the law removes even the illusion of freedom. Regardless of one’s location in production, the threat of losing even the fiction of citizenship and freedom affects everyone. This may create new means of organizing resistance across the particular divisions of society. Furthermore, the concept of bare life allows us to gesture toward a more detailed, concrete idea of what species-being may look like. Agamben hints that in the recognition of this fact, that in our essence we are all animals, that we are all living dead, might reside the possibility of a kind of redemption. Rather than the mystical horizon of a future community, the passage to species-being may be experienced as a deprivation, a loss of identity. Species-being is not merely a positive result of the development of history; it is equally the absence of many of the features of “humanity” through which we have learned to make sense of our world. It is an absence of the kind of individuality and atomism that structure our world under capitalism and underlie liberal democracy, and which continue to inform the tenets of deep ecology. The development of species-being requires the collapse of the distinction between human and animal in order to change the shape of our relationships with the natural world. A true species-being depends on a sort of reconciliation between our “human” and “animal” selves, a breakdown of the distinction between the two both within ourselves and in nature in general. Bare life would then represent not only expulsion from the law but the possibility of its overcoming. Positioned in the zone of indistinction, no longer a subject of the law but still subjected to it through absence, what we equivocally call “the human” in general becomes virtually indistinguishable from the animal or nature. But through this expulsion and absence, we may see not only the law but the system of capitalism that shapes it from a position no longer blinded or captivated by its spell. The structure of the law is revealed as always suspect in the false division between natural and political life, which are never truly separable. Though clearly the situation is not yet as dire as Agamben’s invocation of the Holocaust suggests, we are all, as citizens, under the threat of the state of exception. With the decline of the nation as a form of social organization, the whittling away of civil liberties and, with them, the state’s promise of “the good life” (or “the good death”) even in the most developed nations, with the weakening of labor as the bearer of resistance to exploitation, how are we to envision the future of politics and society?

### 3rd Off

**THE 1AC PERFORMATIVELY HOMOGENIZES NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBES’ DISCRETE IDENTITIES INTO THE SIGNIFIER OF THE UNIVERSAL INDIAN. By doing so the affirmative recreates a colonizing binary that understands the native American tribes as sharing a singular identity, aligned oppositionally to the colonizers’.**

**Carson 06**

(James Taylor, Queens University Kingston, Ontario, Canada; “American Historians and Indians,” The Historical Journal, 49: 921–933 – Kurr)

The people he met posed a particular challenge. He called them indios, a term that reflected his own erroneous assumption about where he was and who he was seeing. But the meanings he attached to the term as he navigated the island seas came to denote so much more than a people who inhabited the Indies. The edenic qualities Columbus attributed to the islands he surveyed suggested that he wondered whether or not the Fall or the Flood had ever happened there. **If they had not, the ‘Indians’ were a people who had lived outside of time as he understood it.** And if they were innocent, their poverty, simplicity, and, ultimately, degradation made them ideal candidates for redemption before the One True Faith in vassalage to the Crowns of Castile and Aragón**. As he reported to his sovereigns, the ‘Indians’ were ‘fit to be ordered about and made to work, plant, and do everything else that may be needed, and build towns and be taught our customs’, and, lastly, ‘to go about clothed’.6**

**The place that Columbus brought into being, however, was neither blank nor empty**, nor particularly new, for where he saw Muslim tents, medieval monsters, and the Garden of Eden, **the people who lived there held altogether different conceptions of the land and of themselves. To limit the story of colonization to the narrative of the fall of the ‘Indian’ that so often follows from Columbus’s voyages predetermines the outcome of the story** and leaves unchallenged European notions of what the land and its possession meant. While explorers charted spiritual, gendered, and commercial cartographies, their encounters with other people and places unsettled the stability and veracity of the maps and the ideas that guided them. **Columbus, for one, saw a people who lacked all conventional accoutrements of civilization, as he knew it, such as towns, laws, clothing, and a work ethic. We do not know what deficiencies his hosts saw in him**. Probably a lack of generosity, a suite of bad manners, too much hair, and an unwillingness to become a part of their world that galled them every bit as much as their alleged indolence appalled him. But in order to contest the Eden and **the ‘Indians’ that the invaders imagined and the very real processes that created the colonies, we need to know, in a fundamental way, how the Columbian moment has transfixed our historical gaze in one way while distracting us from other possible readings of the American past**.7

Columbus has cast a long shadow over the field of American history and scholars still take refuge in his shade. Beginning with his diario and continuing through early chronicles by scholars such as Gabriel de Oviedo, cosmographers like André Thevet, and naturalists such as Thomas Hariot, each imperial power developed its own language to describe the people they saw and sought to dispossess.8 **Columbus coined indio while the French preferred sauvage. The early records of the English colony at Jamestown depicted ‘salvages’ who lived rude lives in the forest and ‘infidels’ who did the devil’s bidding. Scholars, of course, no longer write about savages or infidels, but among today’s national historiographies, scholars in the United States are almost alone in their use of the term ‘Indian’. Why?**

Canadians now write of aboriginals, first peoples, and first nations while Latin American anthropologists and historians use various terms derived from indigene. **It is important, then, to ponder the meaning of the word ‘Indian’ and the ways in which this foundational category, and its opposite ‘white’, have shaped the contours of United States historiography**. Dichotomies are oppositions, anthropologist Neil Whitehead has written, ‘that seem to demand, and permit, an answer but in fact are only methods of categorizing the processes of human change and expression that we are trying to conceptualize’.9 As such, **adversarial categories like ‘Indian’ and ‘white’ sustain a particular and exclusive view of the past and obscure other creative ways of posing and pondering questions about contact and colonization. We need a new historiographical language to wend our way out of the Columbian binary so that other possible pasts can rise to the horizon and lead us to new questions and new ways of thinking about our shared pasts.**10

**This notion of “The Indian” causes linguistic imperialism through homogenizing Indigenous peoples into a singular identity, which reproduces colonialism and racism and strips these groups of their individual sovereignty and culture that turns the aff.**

**Our alternative is to reject the affirmative’s singular notion of “Indian.”**

**Bird 95**

(Dr. Michael Yellow Bird, a citizen of the Sahnish (Arikara) and Hidatsa First Nations, is Assistant Professor and Director of the Office for the Study of Indigenous Social and Cultural Justice in the School of Social Welfare, University of Kansas, “Indian, American Indian, and Native Americans: Counterfeit Identities,”

 <http://www.aistm.org/yellowbirdessay.htm>)

 ¶**In our cultural renaissance there are certain concepts and movements which we should understand and give attention to. The first these in linguistic imperialism.** A tortured People: The Politics of Colonization, by Howard Adams, 1995. In his recent article "The Colonialism of Names" (Winds of Change, Winter, 1997), **Dr. Jack Forbes argued for** t**hrowing off the names of colonialism and insisted that Indigenous Peoples be treated as human beings worthy of respect**. **I totally agree with his thinking and suggest we begin by refusing to use "Indian," "American Indian," or "Native American" to identify the Indigenous Peoples of the United States.** I believe **these words are names of colonialism and reflect the linguistic imperialism** that Howard Adams cautions us about in the above quote. Colonialism refers to when an alien people invade the territory inhabited by people of a different race and culture and establish political, social, spiritual, intellectual, and economic domination over that territory. Colonialism includes territorial and resource appropriate by the colonizer and loss of sovereignty by the colonized.¶ In my most recent writings**, I consistently use the terms "Indigenous" and "First Nations" Peoples**. For me**, using these terms is an important part of** my i**ntellectual decolonization and liberation from linguistic imperialism. I prefer using Indigenous Peoples because it is an internationally accepted descriptor for peoples who are the descendants of the original inhabitants of the lands, and have suffered and survived a history of colonialism** (for example, see the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, www.halcyon.com/FWDP/drft9329.html). I like **the term** because it **is accurate and reflects who we really are.** For instance, **Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, 1981,** **defines indigenous "as having originated in...or living naturally in a particular region or environment"** **whereas, Indian is defined "as a native inhabitant of the subcontinent of India or of the East Indies."** **Adding American to the term Indian does little more than reflect the more recent colonization of Indigenous Peoples by the United States government.** I also prefer **First Nations because it suggests that such persons are the original peoples of the land and hold aboriginal title to the lands they occupy.** The **term also has a strong spiritual foundation because it comes from tribal elders in British Columbia who maintain the traditions of First Nations include a belief in a Creator who placed their Nations on the land to care for and control them.**¶ The terms Indigenous and First Nations Peoples still generalize the identity of the more than 550 Indigenous groups in the lower forty-eight states and Alaska. However, I believe **they are empowering "generalized" descriptors because they accurately describe the political, cultural, and geographical identities, and struggles of all aboriginal peoples in the United States. I no longer use "Indian," "American Indian," or "Native American" because I consider them to be oppressive, "counterfeit identities." A counterfeit identity is not only bogus and misleading, it subjugates and controls the identity of Indigenous Peoples.** ¶ **There are several additional problems with using the terms Indian, American Indian, and Native American. First, they are inaccurate and confusing labels.** For example, Indigenous Peoples in the United States are not from India and, therefore, not Indians. **They are the descendants of the First Nations of these lands. The term Native American is confusing because anyone born in the Americas can be referred to as a native American**. **Second, the terms threaten the sovereignty and nationhood of Indigenous Peoples and undermine our right to use our tribal affiliation as our preeminent national identity. The terms also subsume our original identity ("Indigenous Peoples," who are the first peoples of the land) and imply foreigners ("Indians").** Moreover, **they are highly inaccurate for tribal groups who continue to resist European American "citizenship" and colonization.** **Third, they are historically entangled in American racist discourses that claim Europeans "discovered" a "new world" that needed to be "settled," "claimed," and "civilized."** **This myth-making has promoted the notion that the original inhabitants were unable to settle, claim, and civilize these lands because they were "nomadic " (unsettled) and "savage" (uncivilized) peoples. Fourth, the terms dehumanize and stigmatize Indigenous Peoples by using stereotypical "American Indian" images as emblems for selling products and mascots for sports teams**. Indeed, educator Paulo Freire, who is most noted for the promotion of critical consciousness among the oppressed, suggests that **through the process of dehumanization the consciousness of the oppressor transforms Indigenous identity into a commodity of its domination and disposal**.¶ The **continued use of Indian, American Indian, and Native American maintains counterfeit identities for Indigenous Peoples. As part of the decolonization of Indigenous scholarship and thinking**, I suggest these terms must be discarded in favor of more empowering descriptors. To me, **ceasing to call Indigenous Peoples Indians, American Indians, or Native Americans is more than an attempt at "political correctness," or a change in semantics. It is an act of intellectual liberation that corrects a distorting narrative of imperialist "discovery and progress" that has been maintained far too long by Europeans and European Americans.¶**

### 4th Off

#### The plan massively increases energy production on native lands

House Natural Resources Committee 12

“Native American Energy Act (H.R. 3973)” May 15, http://naturalresources.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=296902

The Native American Energy Act streamlines burdensome and duplicative government regulations and increases the opportunity for Indian tribes to develop energy resources on their own land to create jobs and increase American energy production.¶ The bill addresses specific concerns from various Indian County leaders about getting approval from the Secretary of the Interior for energy development, while promoting and encouraging increased energy production on tribal lands by reducing government barriers and streamlining burdensome procedures.

#### That drastically increases coal, natural gas, and oil production in the US - 35% of reserves are on native land

Awehali 6

Brian is a writer for LiP Magazine. “# 25 Who Will Profit from Native Energy?” June 5, http://www.projectcensored.org/top-stories/articles/25-who-will-profit-from-native-energy/

Energy on Native American land is becoming big business. According to the Indigenous Environmental Network, 35 percent of the fossil fuel resources in the US are within Indian country. The Department of the Interior estimates that Indian lands hold undiscovered reserves of almost 54 billion tons of coal, 38 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and 5.4 billion barrels of oil. Tribal lands also contain enormous amounts of alternative energy. “Wind blowing through Indian reservations in just four northern Great Plains states could support almost 200,000 megawatts of wind power,” Winona LaDuke told Indian Country Today in March 2005, “Tribal landholdings in the southwestern US…could generate enough power to eradicate all fossil fuel burning power plants in the US.”

#### Natural gas development on Indian land is bad--- erases cultural and tribal history

Indian Country News 12

[Shannon Dininny, <http://www.indiancountrynews.com/index.php/news/news-sub/26-mainstream-politics/12941-yakama-nation-gas-pipeline-damages-historic-site>, mg]

The Yakama Nation has asked the federal government to halt construction of a natural gas pipeline across southwest Washington’s White Salmon River, saying the project will impair an archaeological site that is culturally significant to the tribe.¶ The line is being built to replace a small section of a 4,000-mile pipeline, stretching from Colorado to the Canadian border, which has been gradually unearthed since a dam was breached on the river last year.¶ The company building the line, Williams Northwest Pipeline, of Salt Lake City, said Monday that it consulted with state and federal agencies and with three Native American tribes, including the Yakama Nation, before moving forward with the project and believes it has acted in good faith to follow all required regulations.¶ The Yakama Nation claims otherwise in recent letters to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. The tribe urged the commission to order an immediate halt to construction and asked for the pipeline company to conduct an environmental assessment to determine the potential for harm to the site.¶ The location of the new pipeline sits in the tribe’s ceded lands, where tribal members retain the right to hunt, fish and gather roots and berries.¶ The pipeline company and the federal agency are violating laws that protect historic sites, Ruth Jim, Yakama Nation councilwoman said in a statement.¶ ‘‘Current construction cannot be sustained without additional destruction of significant archaeological resources,’’ she said.¶

### CASE

**Multiple structural alt. causes make paternalism inevitable – A. biological proof of race requirements, B. coercive boarding schools, C. BIA’s de-Indianization programs. And, Grande’s moderation is essential to a Red Pedegogy, don’t buy their holistic rejection of dominant thinking or political methods on the framework debate.**

**Crum 2k6**

[steven, prof of social studies, review of red pegeogy by sandy grande, UNL digital commons, great plains research: a journal of natural and social sciences, 4-1]

To put the term Red Pedagogy into perspective, the ¶ author provides a discussion of both historical and contemporary dominant modes of thinking that have been ¶ placed upon tribal people, many of them reflected in U.S. ¶ government policies over the last two centuries. She discusses how **the** Bureau of Indian Affairs **(BIA) "de-Indianized" thousands of young Indian children by removing** ¶ **them from their families and placing them in federally-operated boarding schools.** She **discusses the BIA's** ¶ **essentialist mode of imputing identity to tribal people, a** ¶ **mode based on biological determination**. Not to ignore ¶ how Euro-American women treated Native Americans, ¶ the author also discusses **white women reformers and antimodern feminists of the late 19th and early 20th centuries** ¶ **who, viewing Indians as "free" and "wild," favored assimilationist measures. By doing so, white women helped** ¶ **reinforce dominant modes applied to Native Americans.** ¶ **Although critical of dominant modes, Grande nevertheless maintains that scholars should not reject all of** ¶ **them, but instead maintain a critical stance, a key component of Red Pedagogy.** This book is necessary reading for anyone seeking "emancipatory pedagogies" for ¶ indigenous people.

**And the Woody decision proves that modern governmental actions actively minimize paternalistic policies towards tribes in its logic and implementation – democratic oversight checks the impact.**

**Ray 94**

[supryia m., Paternalism, Hostility, and Concern for the Slippery Slope: Factors in Judicial Decision-Making When Religion and Regulation Collide , <http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/data/184/sray.html>, LEDA @ Harvard Law]

Courts may also manifest paternalism in reference to those who are *already* members of a particular group. In essence, courts in these cases are asking whether we trust groups and individuals not to harm themselves**. Witness the government's argument in People v. Woody ,** one of the early cases of this nature. **The Attorney General of California contended that since "peyote could be regarded as a symbol, one that obstructs enlightenment and shackles the Indian to primitive condition**s," the state had the responsibility to eliminate its use.[[145]](http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/data/184/sray.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22fn145) **Today**, in this era of political correctness**, no government would be likely to make such an argument**--at least explicitly--but its assertion thirty years ago reminds us that such concerns do surface. And **what more paternalistic, even condescending reasoning could there be? To its credit, the court in Woody rejected the government's argument outright, but it is not so hard to imagine its implicit acceptance in a context less prominent than that of Native American religion**, especially given the prevalence of paternalism toward society generally. Few court decisions today, in a time when autonomy is applauded, overtly evince such paternalistic concerns, but they may be more hidden than nonexistent.

¶ **Not all courts, of course, are paternalistic**. Some are decidedly anti-paternalistic, even inclined to glorify individual freedom, and courts taking this view are among the few to decide consistently in favor of the religious claimant, providing, of course, that the court believes the claimant to be bona fide. **Woody is one such example. In rejecting the Attorney's General's paternalistic argument, the court flatly stated that "We know of no doctrine that the state, in its asserted omniscience, should undertake to deny to defendants the observance of their religion** in order to free them from the suppositious 'shackles' of their 'unenlightened' and 'primitive condition.""

**TYING IDENTITY TO LAND REPEATS THE VERY LOGIC OF DOMINANT STRUCTURES OF VIOLENCE. VOTE NEG ON PRESUMPTION.**

**Gupta and Ferguson, 1992.**

[Akhil, Department of Anthropology, Stanford University; James, Department of Anthropology, University of California, Irvine; “Beyond ‘Culture’: Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference”, Cultural Anthropology 7.1, p. 13-14, JSTOR.]

That the terms "society" and "culture" are routinely simply appended to the names of nation-states, as when a tourist visits India to understand "Indian culture" and "Indian society," or Thailand to experience "Thai culture," or the United States to get a whiff of "American culture." Of course, the geographical territories that cultures and societies are believed to map onto do not have to be nations. We do, for example, have ideas about culture-areas that overlap several nation-states, or of multicultural nations. On a smaller scale, perhaps, are our disciplinary assumptions about the association of culturally unitary groups (tribes or peoples) with "their" territories: thus, "the Nuer" live in "Nuerland" and so forth. (Anzaldua 1987:3**) Representations of space** in the social sciences **are** remarkably **dependent on images of** break**, rupture**, and disjunction. **The distinctiveness of societies**, nations, and cultures **is based upon** aseemingly **unproblematic division of space,** on the fact **that they occupy "naturally" discontinuous spaces. The premise of discontinuity forms the starting point from which to theorize contact, conflict, and contradiction between cultures and societies.** For example, **the representation of the world as a collection of "countries,"** as in most world maps, **sees it as** aninherently **fragmented** space, divided by different colors into diverse national societies, each **"rooted" in its proper place. It is** so **taken for granted that each country embodies its own** distinctive **culture** and society The clearest illustration of this kind of thinking are the classic "ethnographic maps" that purported to display the spatial distribution of peoples, tribes, and cultures. But in all these cases, **space itself becomes a kind of neutral grid on which cultural difference, historical memory, and societal organization are inscribed**. It is in this way that space functions as a central organizing principle in the social sciences at the same time that it disappears from analytical purview. This assumed isomorphism of space, place, and culture results in some significant problems. First, there is the issue of those who inhabit the border, that "narrow strip along steep edges" of national boundaries.The fiction of cultures as discrete, object-like phenomena occupying discrete spaces becomes implausible for those who inhabit the borderlands. Related to border inhabitants are those who live a life of border crossings-migrant workers, nomads, and members of the transnational business and professional elite. Finally, there are those who cross borders more or less permanently- immigrants, refugees, exiles, and expatriates. second set of problems A is to account for cultural differences within a locality. **"Multiculturalism" is both a feeble acknowledgment of the fact that cultures have lost their moorings in definite places** and an attempt to subsume this plurality of cultures within the framework of a national identity. The idea of "subcultures" attempts to preserve the idea of distinct "cultures" while acknowledging the relation of different cultures to a dominant culture within the same geographical and territorial space. Conventional accounts of ethnicity, even when used to describe cultural differences in settings where people from different regions live side by side, rely on an unproblematic link between identity and place.' they fail to interrogate this assumption in a truly fundamental manner. **We need to ask how to deal with cultural difference while abandoning received ideas of** (localized) **culture.** What is "the culture" of farm workers who spend half a year in Mexico and half a year in the United States? In their case, the disjuncture of place and culture is especially clear: Khmer refugees in the United States take "Khmer culture" with them in the same complicated way that Indian immigrants in England transport "Indian culture" to their new homeland. raised by the implicit mapping of cultures onto places Similarly, Although such concepts are suggestive because they endeavor to stretch the naturalized association of culture with place, Third, there is the important question of postcoloniality. To which places do the hybrid cultures of postcoloniality belong'! Does the colonial encounter create a "new culture" in both the colonized and colonizing country, or does it destabilize the notion that nations and cultures are isomorphic'! As discussed below, postcoloniality further problematizes the relationship between space and culture. Last, and most important, **challenging the ruptured landscape** of independent nations and autonomous cultures **raises the question of** understanding social change and **cultural transformation** as situated within interconnected spaces. **The presumption that spaces are autonomous has enabled the power of topography to conceal successfully the topography of power. The** inherently **fragmented space** assumed in the definition of anthropology as the study of cultures (in the plural) **may have been one of the reasons behind the long-standing failure to write** anthropology's **history as the biography of imperialism.** For **if one begins with the premise that spaces have always been hierarchically interconnected, instead of naturally disconnected, then cultural and social change becomes not a matter of cultural contact and articulation but one of rethinking difference through connection**. To illustrate, let us examine one powerful model of cultural change that attempts to relate dialectically the local to larger spatial arenas: articulation. Articulation models, whether they come from Marxist structuralism or from "moral economy," posit a primeval state of autonomy (usually labeled "precapitalist"), which is then violated by global capitalism. The result is that both local and larger spatial arenas are transformed, the local more than the global to be sure, but not necessarily in a redetermined direction. This notion of articulation allows one to explore the richly unintended consequences of, say, colonial capitalism, where loss occurs alongside invention. Yet, **by taking a preexisting, localized "community" as a given starting point, it fails to examine sufficiently the processes** (such as the structures of feeling that pervade the imagining of community) **that go into the construction of space as place or locality in the first instance**. In other words, **instead of assuming the autonomy of the primeval community, we need to examine how it was formed as a community out of the interconnected space that always already existed. Colonialism**, then, **represents the displacement of one form of interconnection by another.** This is not to deny that colonialism, or an expanding capitalism, does indeed have profoundly dislocating effects on existing societies. But **by always foregrounding the spatial distribution of** hierarchical **power relations, we can better understand the process whereby a space achieves a distinctive identity as a place.** **Keeping in mind that notions of locality or community refer both to a demarcated physical space and to clusters of interaction, we can see that the identity of a place emerges by the intersection of its specific involvement in a system of hierarchically organized spaces with its cultural construction as a community or locality.**

**THEIR DESCRIPTION OF NATIVE CULTURES AS ROOTED IN TRADITION AND TIED TO THE LAND REINFORCES COLONIALIST ATTITUDES ABOUT THE SUPERIORITY AND COMPLEXITY OF WESTERN CULTURE.**

**APPADURAI 88**

[Arjun, February 1988 (Professor at the Department of Anthropology at the University of Pennsylvania, Cultural Anthropology, Volume 3, No.1, Place and Voice in Anthropological Theory,pp. 36-49, Putting Hierarchy in Its Place, JSTOR]

**Who is a "native"** (henceforth without quotation marks) in the anthropological usage**?** The quick answer to this question is that **the native is a person who is born in (**and thus belongs to) **the place the anthropologist is observing** or writing about.This sense of the word native is fairly narrowly, and neutrally, tied to its Latin etymology. But **do we use the term native uniformly to refer to people who are born in certain places and, thus, belong to them?** We do not. **We have tended to use the word native for persons and groups who belong to those parts of the world that were, and are, distant from the** metropolitan **West. This** restriction **is,** in part, **tied to the vagaries of our ideologies** of authenticity over the last two centuries. Proper natives are somehow assumed to **represent** their selves and their history, without distortion or residue. **We exempt ourselves from** this sort of claim to authenticity **because we are too enamored of the complexities of our history**, the diversities of our societies, and the ambiguities of our collective conscience. When we find authenticity close to home, we are more likely to label it folk than native, the former being a term that suggests authenticity without being implicitly derogatory. **The anthropologist** thus **rarely thinks of himself as a native of some place, even when he knows that he is from somewhere.**

## 2NC

### Opening Lands Bad

#### Coal releases the most CO2 and damages the environment.

Malone 11

(Scott, Reuters, 2-16, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/16/usa-coal-study-idUSN 1628366220110216, 7-7-11, AH)

**The estimate of hidden costs takes into account a variety of side-effects of coal production** and use. **Among them are** the cost of treading elevated rates of cancer and other illnesses in coal-mining areas, **environmental damage and lost tourism opportunities in coal regions where mountaintop removal is practiced and climate change resulting from elevated emissions of carbon dioxide from burning the coal. Coal releases more carbon dioxide when burned than does natural gas or oil.** The $345 billion annual cost figure was the study's best estimate of the costs associated with burning coal. The study said the costs could be as low as $175 billion or as high as $523 billion. "**This is effectively a subsidy borne by** asthmatic children and rain-polluted lakes and **the climate** is another way of looking at it," said Kert Davies, research director with the environmental activist group Greenpeace. "**It's a tax by the industry on us that we are not seeing in our bills but we are bearing the costs**."

#### So does oil

Slocum, 06

(Tyson, Director, Public Citizen’s Energy Program, September, 2006, “Hot Profits and Global Warming: How Oil Companies Hurt Consumers And The Environment”, http://www.citizen.org/documents/HotProfitsGlobalWarming.pdf, 8/4/12, atl)

In just the first six months of 2006, the five largest oil companies in America posted $59.4¶ billion in profits. Since President Bush took office in 2001, oil prices have gone up more than¶ 260 percent, and the big five oil companies recorded $375 billion in profits. Investigations show¶ that a portion of these record earnings are fueled by market manipulation, made possible by¶ recent mergers and weak regulatory oversight. While the record prices families are paying for¶ energy are feeding the companies’ windfall, Americans are not getting any bang for their buck,¶ as oil companies refuse to adequately invest in sustainable resources necessary to end our¶ addiction to oil. Since January 2005, the top five oil companies have spent $112 billion buying¶ back stock and paying out dividends—as much as the companies spent on capital investment¶ (and that capital investment clearly is lacking, as evidenced by corrosion problems with BP’s¶ Alaska pipeline).¶ Public Citizen has identified fundamental problems of how the current era of record oil company¶ profits fails to deliver adequate economic or environmental results:¶ • The high prices we are now paying are simply feeding oil company profits and are not¶ being invested in sustainable energy solutions. Since January 2005, the largest five oil¶ companies—ExxonMobil, BP, Shell, ChevronTexaco and ConocoPhillips—spent $112¶ billion buying back their own stock and paying dividends, and have an extra $59.5 billion¶ in cash, while their investment in renewable energy pales in comparison. For example,¶ BP, the so-called renewable energy leader, in 2005 posted $38.4 billion in stock¶ buybacks, dividend payments and cash, but plans to invest two percent of that amount on¶ solar, wind, natural gas and hydrogen energy.¶ • Under the current market framework, oil companies aren’t making the investments¶ necessary to solve our addiction to oil and never will. With $1 trillion in assets tied up in¶ extracting, refining and marketing oil, their business model will squeeze the last cent of¶ profit out of that sunk capital for as long as possible. The oil industry’s significant¶ presence on Capitol Hill ensures that the government does not threaten their monopoly¶ over energy supply through funding of alternatives to oil. For example, energy legislation¶ signed by President Bush in August 2005 provides $5 billion in new financial subsidies to¶ oil companies.¶ • Other countries often feature higher gas prices than the U.S., but that is because they¶ impose higher taxes on gasoline than we do. For example, the average federal, state and¶ local gas taxes in the United States are 38 cents/gallon, compared to $3.92/gallon in¶ France; $4.10/gallon in Germany; and $4.40/gallon in the United Kingdom.1 These high¶ taxes are not only a disincentive to drive, but generate the revenue the countries need to¶ help subsidize mass transit and other sustainable energy investments to actively provide¶ citizens with alternatives to driving.¶ • High prices resulting in record profits are not dampening demand, because energy¶ consumption is inelastic, meaning most families have little leeway in altering their¶ driving habits in response to price increases. This summer’s motor gasoline demand is up¶ between 1.6 and 1.9 percent from last summer, despite the record price increases.2¶ • America’s addiction to oil is a major source of greenhouse gas emissions that cause¶ global warming. Forty-four percent of America’s world-leading carbon dioxide emissions¶ are from the burning of petroleum products.3 These emissions would be significantly¶ reduced with investment in sustainable energy. • High prices are having a detrimental impact on the economy and national security.¶ Imported oil represents one-third of America’s trade deficit,4 slows economic growth,¶ adds to inflationary pressures and creates financial hardship for families and businesses.¶ America’s addiction to oil enriches not only oil companies, but non-democratic nations¶ that are often hostile to U.S. interests. In our frenzied pursuit to secure sources of oil¶ abroad, we often prioritize oil company rights over human rights, as demonstrated in the¶ deferential treatment the Bush Administration shows towards Kazakhstan despite that¶ country’s abysmal human rights record.¶ • While some of their profit clearly stems from the global increase in the price of¶ petroleum, oil companies are also exploiting their huge market control and lax regulatory¶ oversight to price-gouge Americans. For example, in June 2006, the U.S. Commodity¶ Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) brought charges against BP for manipulating the¶ entire U.S. propane market. Investigations are expanding into manipulation of crude oil¶ and gasoline futures markets, and “many trading firms had received CFTC demands for¶ information, suggesting that the investigation went beyond BP.”5¶ • In just the last few years, mergers between giant oil companies—such as Exxon and¶ Mobil, Chevron and Texaco, Conoco and Phillips—have resulted in just a few companies¶ controlling a significant amount of America’s gasoline, squelching competition. In 1993,¶ the largest five oil refiners controlled one-third of the American market, while the largest¶ 10 had 55.6 percent. By 2005, as a result of all the mergers, the largest five now control¶ 55 percent of the market, and the largest 10 dominate 81.4 percent. This concentration¶ has led to skyrocketing profit margins.¶ • Increasingly, gasoline futures influence the price of crude oil, so the concentration of¶ U.S. refining assets is influencing world oil prices.¶ • Energy trading markets where prices for energy are set were recently deregulated,¶ providing additional opportunities for oil companies, hedge funds and investment banks¶ to price-gouge consumers.¶ • Oil companies, hedge funds and investment banks are abusing their control over¶ pipelines, storage facilities and terminals, exploiting the proprietary data that operating¶ the facilities provides, further helping them manipulate oil and gas trading markets

#### Warming specifically causes hydrogen sulfide expansion—that causes extinction.

Ward 10

(Peter, PhD, professor of Biology and Earth and Space Sciences at the University of Washington, paleontologist and NASA astrobiologist, Fellow at the California Academy of Sciences, The Flooded Earth: Our Future in a World Without Ice Caps, June 29, 2010)

In the rest of this chapter I will support a contention that within several millennia (or less) the planet will see a changeover of the oceans from their current “mixed” states to something much different and dire. Oceans will become stratified by their oxygen content and temperature, with warm, oxygen-free water lining the ocean basins. Stratified oceans like this in the past (and they were present for most of Earth’s history) have always been preludes to biotic catastrophe. Because the continents were in such different positions at that time, models we use today to understand ocean current systems are still crude when it comes to analyzing the ancient oceans, such as those of the Devonian or Permian Periods. Both times witnessed major mass extinctions, and these extinctions were somehow tied to events in the sea. Yet catastrophic as it was, the event that turned the Canning Coral Reef of Devonian age into the Canning Microbial Reef featured at the start of this chapter was tame compared to that ending the 300 million- to 251 million-year-old Permian Period, and for this reason alone the Permian ocean and its fate have been far more studied than the Devonian. But there is another reason to concentrate on the Permian mass extinction: it took place on a world with a climate more similar to that of today than anytime in the Devonian. Even more important, it was a world with ice sheets at the poles, something the more tropical Devonian Period may never have witnessed. For much of the Permian Period, the Earth, as it does today, had abundant ice caps at both poles, and there were large-scale continental glaciations up until at least 270 million years ago, and perhaps even later.4 But from then until the end of the Permian, the planet rapidly warmed, the ice caps disappeared, and the deep ocean bottoms filled with great volumes of warm, virtually oxygen-free seawater. The trigger for disaster was a short-term but massive infusion of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere at the end of the Permian from the spectacular lava outpourings over an appreciable portion of what would become northern Asia. The lava, now ancient but still in place, is called the “Siberian Traps,” the latter term coming from the Scandinavian for lava flows. The great volcanic event was but the start of things, and led to changes in oceanography. The ultimate kill mechanism seems to have been a lethal combination of rising temperature, diminishing oxygen, and influx into water and air of the highly poisonous compound hydrogen sulfide. The cruel irony is that this latter poison was itself produced by life, not by the volcanoes. The bottom line is that life produced the ultimate killer in this and surely other ancient mass extinctions. This finding was one that spurred me to propose the Medea Hypothesis, and a book of the same name.5 Hydrogen sulfide poisoning might indeed be the worst biological effect of global warming. There is no reason that such an event cannot happen again, given short-term global warming. And because of the way the sun ages, it may be that such events will be ever easier to start than during the deep past. How does the sun get involved in such nasty business as mass extinction? Unlike a campfire that burns down to embers, any star gets ever hotter when it is on the “main sequence,” which is simply a term used to described the normal aging of a star—something like the progression we all go through as we age. But new work by Jeff Kiehl of the University of Colorado shows that because the sun keeps getting brighter, amounts of CO2 that in the past would not have triggered the process result in stagnant oceans filled with H2S-producing microbes. His novel approach was to estimate the global temperature rise to be expected from carbon dioxide levels added to the energy hitting the earth from the sun. Too often we refer to the greenhouse effect as simply a product of the gases. But it is sunlight that actually produces the heat, and that amount of energy hitting the earth keeps increasing. He then compared those to past times of mass extinctions. The surprise is that a CO2 level of 1,000 ppm would—with our current solar radiation—make our world the second hottest in Earth history—when the five hottest were each associated with mass extinction. In the deep history of our planet, there have been at least five short intervals in which the majority of living species suddenly went extinct. Biologists are used to thinking about how environmental pressures slowly choose the organisms most fit for survival through natural selection, shaping life on Earth like an artist sculpting clay. However, mass extinctions are drastic examples of natural selection at its most ruthless, killing vast numbers of species at one time in a way hardly typical of evolution. In the 1980s, Nobel Prize-winning physicist Luis Alvarez, and his son Walter Alvarez, first hypothesized that the impact of comets or asteroids caused the mass extinctions of the past.6 Most scientists slowly come to accept this theory of extinction, further supported by the discovery of a great scar in the earth—an impact crater—off the coast of Mexico that dates to around the time the dinosaurs went extinct. An asteroid probably did kill off the dinosaurs, but the causes of the remaining four mass extinctions are still obscured beneath the accumulated effects of hundreds of millions of years, and no one has found any credible evidence of impact craters. Rather than comets and asteroids, it now appears that short-term global warming was the culprit for the four other mass extinctions. I detailed the workings of these extinctions first in a 1996 Discover magazine article,7 then in an October 2006 Scientific American article, and finally in my 2007 book, Under a Green Sky.8 In each I considered whether such events could happen again. In my mind, such extinctions constitute the worst that could happen to life and the earth as a result of short-term global warming. But before we get to that, let us look at the workings of these past events. The evidence at hand links the mass extinctions with a changeover in the ocean from oxygenated to anoxic bottom waters. The source of this was a change in where bottom waters are formed. It appears that in such events, the source of our earth’s deep water shifted from the high latitudes to lower latitudes, and the kind of water making it to the ocean bottoms was different as well: it changed from cold, oxygenated water to warm water containing less oxygen. The result was the extinction of deep-water organisms. Thus a greenhouse extinction is a product of a changeover of the conveyor-belt current systems found on Earth any time there is a marked difference in temperatures between the tropics and the polar regions. Let us summarize the steps that make greenhouse extinction happen. First, the world warms over short intervals due to a sudden increase in carbon dioxide and methane, caused initially by the formation of vast volcanic provinces called flood basalts. The warmer world affects the ocean circulation systems and disrupts the position of the conveyor currents. Bottom waters begin to have warm, low-oxygen water dumped into them. The warming continues, and the decrease of equator-to-pole temperature differences brings ocean winds and surface currents to a near standstill. The mixing of oxygenated surface waters with the deeper and volumetrically increasing low-oxygen bottom waters lessens, causing ever-shallower water to change from oxygenated to anoxic. Finally, the bottom water exists in depths where light can penetrate, and the combination of low oxygen and light allows green sulfur bacteria to expand in numbers, filling the low-oxygen shallows. The bacteria produce toxic amounts of H2S, with the flux of this gas into the atmosphere occurring at as much as 2,000 times today’s rates. The gas rises into the high atmosphere, where it breaks down the ozone layer. The subsequent increase in ultraviolet radiation from the sun kills much of the photosynthetic green plant phytoplankton. On its way up into the sky, the hydrogen sulfide also kills some plant and animal life, and the combination of high heat and hydrogen sulfide creates a mass extinction on land.9 Could this happen again? No, says one of the experts who write the RealClimate.org Web site, Gavin Schmidt, who, it turns out, works under Jim Hansen at the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center near Washington, DC. I disagreed and challenged him to an online debate. He refused, saying that the environmental situation is going to be bad enough without resorting to creating a scenario for mass extinction. But special pleading has no place in science. Could it be that global warming could lead to the extinction of humanity? That prospect cannot be discounted. To pursue this question, let us look at what might be the most crucial of all systems maintaining habitability on Planet Earth: the thermohaline current systems, sometimes called the conveyor currents.

#### Warming disproportionately affects natives – tanks their economy and makes lands inhospitable

Masterson 09

(Crystal, Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law, "WIND-ENERGY VENTURES IN INDIAN COUNTRY: FASHIONING A FUNCTIONAL PARADIGM", JSTOR, KB)

Climate change is of particular concern to Native Americans, as its impacts¶ can weigh especially heavily on tribal economies." Tribal economies¶ commonly center on agriculture, natural resources, and tourism, all of which¶ suffer direct adverse affects as a result of natural disasters and other events¶ associated with climate change." Additionally, Native Americans “may be¶ unable to relocate if their climates become inhospitable” due to the ravaging¶ effects of global warming.“ Native American tribes “are place-based entities¶ whose subsistence . . . [is] intimately connected to the lands they inhabit?“¶ Even a slight change in climate has the potential to “cause the migration or¶ extinction of culturally important species if their habitat . . . [is] no longer¶ suitable?" in short, “Indian tribes have little opportunity to follow the¶ migrating species because tribes are often tied to speciﬁc parcels of land”¶ created by treaty or other agreement.“¶ The effects of climate change burden every member of society, but the¶ Negative impacts on tribal entities cut much more deeply as a result of their¶ relationship with the lands they inhabit. Accordingly, Native Americans are¶ likely to be further incentivized to participate in renewable-energy projects,¶ which serve effectively to reduce emissions and, in turn, prevent depletion of¶ vital environmental, cultural, and economic resources.

### Trust Doctrine DA

#### The plan opens up the floodgates for renewables – justifies corporate exploitation – Turns the aff – recreates neo-colonial structures

Mills 11 (Andrew D, Energy and Resources Group at UC Berkeley, Wind Energy in Indian Country: Turning to Wind for the Seventh Generation,")

Broadly, the idea of dependency is summarized in the common phrase “the development of underdevelopment.” Dependency is a critique of the idea of the economic base in that underdeveloped regions become specialists in providing raw materials and resources that are used in developed regions to create manufactured goods. Substantial value is added to products in the latter stages of processing, but very little of that value is transferred to the developing region. Furthermore, when large multi-national companies control the extraction of the resources the developing region often forgoes the opportunity to build capacity in the production of the base resource. Instead, the local economy simply provides access to the resource and unskilled or semiskilled laborers (See Palma 1989 and Kay 1991). Beyond the lack of opportunity to capture value, the dependency critique argues that the success of developing a base resource can distort the structure of the regional economy. Instead of entrepreneurs developing a strong, diversified economy, the businesses that do emerge in the regional economy are oriented toward providing services to the large industrial companies that extract resources (Gunton 2003, 69). The services provided by the government can become focused on increasing the development of just one sector and income to the government becomes tied to the production of the resource. The economy of the entire region and the services provided by the government become linked to the price of the export resource. Moreover, if the resource is depleteable, the economy contracts as the resource becomes more and more difficult to extract in comparison to alternative resources. One measure of the degree of specialization in the production of energy resources is called the “oil dependency” metric. The “oil dependency” of the Navajo Nation is the ratio of the value of the energy exports (oil, coal, and gas) to the gross regional product of the Navajo Nation (Ross 2001). A rough approximation of the “oil dependency” for the Navajo Nation was found to be 1.1 using data available in the Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy of the Navajo Nation (Choudhary 2003) and energy prices from the Energy Information Agency. The most oil dependent national economy in the world is Angola (68.5). Norway, which exports a considerable amount of oil has an oil dependency of 13.5. The 25th of the top 25 most oil dependent nations has an oil dependency of 3.5 (Ross 2001). Although the Navajo Nation would not be considered as “oil dependent” as these other countries, it is also important to realize that 15- 20% of the Navajo Nation annual funds are from royalties on energy resources. If the grants from external sources like the federal government are not included in the sources of annual funds, then the share of energy resources increases to 25-50% of the Navajo Nation budget (Choudhary 2003, 65 - Table 7). Furthermore, the second largest recipient of revenues from the Navajo General Fund is the Division of Natural Resources (ibid, 64 – Table 6C). Overall these statistics indicate that the Navajo Nation is oriented toward a heavy reliance and focus on energy development. Discussions of the Navajo economy in the context of dependency often focus on the importance of the tribe being in control of energy development. By control, most authors are referring to the right to dictate the pace and laws surrounding energy development on their lands (Owens 1979, Ruffing 1980). However, gaining control of energy development is only one part of the dependency critique. The second part is that even with control over the pace and quality of energy development the Navajo government needs to steer the economy in diverse directions so that the economy does not become specialized in providing services to energy extraction companies. One could easily argue that the Navajo Nation is focusing significant efforts on increasing the level of energy development at the expense of supporting alternative development pathways (for example, the speech by Shirley and Trujillo to the World Bank, 2003). Many authors draw from dependency theories to show why the Navajo Nation is locked into an energy development pathway. One of the more important historical reasons for the orientation of the Navajo government toward energy development was that the Navajo government was first formed in 1922 by the federal government to act as a representative of the Navajo interests in signing oil leases on Navajo land. As part of organizing the relationship between the federal government, the Navajo Business Council (as it was first called) and energy developers, the Interior Department set policy such that the Navajo government would own all of the mineral resources on tribal land, rather than individual Navajo owning rights to the mineral resources (Wilkins 2002, 101-3). At the end of World War II, the still fledgling tribal government turned to economic development to improve the conditions in Navajoland in hopes that young people would not feel forced to live elsewhere (Iverson and Roessel 2002, 189). In a process LaDuke and Churchill refer to as “Radioactive Colonialism”, the driver of economic development became, with pressure from energy companies and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), revenues from leasing land for large-scale extraction of the Navajo’s mineral resources by private non-Navajo enterprises. The Vanadium Corporation of America and Kerr-McGee provided $6.5 million in uranium mining revenues and jobs for Navajo miners. The miners worked under dangerous and unhealthy conditions, but many of the jobs were the only wage employment ever brought to the southeastern part of the reservation. An oil boom in Navajoland between 1958-62 provided tens of millions of dollars in revenues to the tribal government (Iverson and Roessel 2002, 218-20). The Tribal Council used the revenues to provide services to many of the Navajo and increasingly employed Navajo in government related jobs. The government officials and workers, along with the few that obtained jobs in the capital-intensive extractive industries formed a class with similar economic interests. Their wealth and power increased with increasing energy development. LaDuke and Churchill explain: “With this reduction in self-sufficiency came the transfer of economic power to a neo-colonial structure lodged in the US/tribal council relationship: ‘development aid’ from the US, an ‘educational system’ geared to training the cruder labor needs of industrialism, and employment contracts with mining and other resource extraction concerns… for now dependent Indian citizens.”(LaDuke and Churchill 1985, 110) The relationship between economic development and energy development was further extended in the 1960’s with the development of large coalmines and power plants on Navajo lands. The federal government played numerous roles in support of connecting energy developers and the tribal government. One example that illustrates the diverse ways in which the federal government encouraged energy development with tribes was a stipulation in the contracts for cooling water for the Mohave Generating Station in Nevada that specified that the owners of Mohave could only use the Colorado River for cooling water as long as the power plant used “Indian Coal”6 (also see Wiley and Gottlieb 1982, 41-53; and Wilkinson 1996, 1999 for more of the history of coal development in the Western Navajo Nation). Recommendations for economic development in initial stages of the self-determination era focused not on how to build a diverse economy, but how to take control of energy development and ensure that the Navajo Nation received the best deal for their resources. In describing the role of policy in energy development on the Navajo Nation one author focuses on the capital-intensive nature of energy development. Whereas one recommendation might be to shift the focus to other development pathways, her recommendation was to take steps to ensure that the jobs that are created by energy development go toward tribal members. She recommended that provisions should be included in contracts for training and preference hire for tribal members with all energy development projects (Ruffing 1980, 56-7). A major transition point in the history of energy development on Navajo lands involved the Chairman of the Navajo Nation, Peter McDonald, declaring that changes needed to take place before the Navajo Nation would support continued development of energy resources on their land in the 1970’s. Two major points he stressed included making sure that energy development was being carried out for the benefit of the Navajo people and that the tribe should be given opportunities to participate in and control energy development (Robbins 1979, 116). The main critique of both these stances from dependency theory is that even with control over energy development, it is still a capital-intensive, highly technical, and tightly controlled industry (Owens 1979, 4). The Navajo Nation can participate in energy development, but not without creating distortions in the orientation of the economy and government. In this same vein, it is difficult to argue that wind energy is inherently different that other forms of energy development from the dependency perspective. While it is possible for the Navajo Nation to take steps to ensure that the tribe will obtain the maximum benefit from wind development, such as ensuring that tribal members and Navajo owned businesses have preference in hiring, it is not likely that the tribe can become a self-sufficient wind developer without severely distorting the priorities of the economy and Navajo government. The alternative is to allow a specialized, large company from off the reservation to develop the wind farm, with the possibility that a Navajo partner can take part in the ownership of the wind farm. While the Navajo Nation may now have the institutional structure in place to control wind energy development on their land, wind development is still subject to the dependency critique.

#### Turns the entire aff

Awehali 6

(Brian, "# 25 Who Will Profit from Native Energy?," http://www.projectcensored.org/top-stories/articles/25-who-will-profit-from-native-energy/)

America’s native peoples may attain a modicum of energy independence and tribal sovereignty through the development of wind, solar, and other renewable energy infrastructure on their lands. But, according to Brian Awehali, it won’t come from getting into bed with, and becoming indebted to, the very industry currently driving the planet to its doom. UPDATE BY Brian Awehali I believe the topic of this article was important and urgent because sometimes all that glitters really is gold, even if the marketing copy says it’s green. The long and utterly predictable history where indigenous peoples and US government and corporate interests are both concerned shouldn’t be forgotten as we enter the brave new green era. Marketing for-profit energy schemes on Indian lands as a means of promoting tribal sovereignty is both ludicrous and offensive, as are “green” development plans intrinsically tied to the extraction of fossil fuels in the deregulated Wild West of Indian Country. Energy companies are only interested in native sovereignty because it means operations on Indian lands are not subject to federal regulation or oversight. This is why I included a discussion in my article about the instructive example of the Alaska tribal corporations and the ways they’ve mutated into multi-billion dollar loophole exploiters. (My brief examination of Alaska tribal corporations drew heavily from an excellent Mother Jones article, “Little Big Companies,” by Michael Scherer). It’s also my belief that the probably well-intentioned idea of “green tags,” carbon offset credits, and market-enabled “carbon neutrality” should be examined very closely: Why are we introducing systems for transferring (or trading) the carbon emissions of “First World” polluters to those who contributed least to global warming? I would argue that this is merely a nice-sounding way for the overdeveloped world to purchase the right to continue its pathologically unsustainable mode of existence, while doing little to address the very grave ecological realities we now face.

#### A federal trust doctrine based on protecting Native resources prevents Native extinction.

Wood, ’94 (Oregon Assistant Law Professor, 1994 Utah L. Rev. 1471)

Since first entering into treaties with the United States, native nations have waged a 200-year struggle to maintain their autonomy against an encroaching majority society. With all too few exceptions, native interests have been overwhelmingly subjugated to the political will of the majority. Now, positioned at the threshold of the twenty-first century, tribes are still adjusting to the relatively new era of Self-Determination--an era marked by federal policy supportive of native sovereignty. Despite the comforting tenor of current federal policy, the future of tribal existence for many native nations is imperiled. While the remaining three percent of the native land base is vital to preserving tribal autonomy, **it stands to be lost in a storm of development and pollution** throughout the United States. Many native lands are severely contaminated as a result of non-Indian activities occurring off reservations, and tribes are finding it increasingly difficult to continue their traditional way of life because of unrestrained non-Indian activities that are depleting and degrading shared resources. But the threat also arises from within Indian society itself. Indian lands are increasingly eyed by the majority society to alleviate scarcity outside of Indian Country. Such lands may be developed only with the consent of the governing tribal entity--consent that is more readily given in times of economic hardship, such as the present. As this Article points out, the deep aversion of a significant portion of the native population to industrial development of their lands is largely overlooked in the face of tribal council approvals legitimized by the policy of Self-Determination. This Article has explored the federal government's role in the continuing assault on Indian lands and has examined modern governmental duties and obligations owed to tribes within a sovereign trust paradigm. The federal government's trust duty is rooted in the land cessions made by the native nations. As expressed in treaties and elsewhere, the land cessions were conditioned upon an understanding that the federal government would safeguard the autonomy of the native nations by protecting their smaller, retained territories from the intrusions of the majority society and its ambitious entrepreneurs. This promise of a viable separatism forms the heart of the federal government's continuing trust responsibility toward the native nations. The continuing entitlement of tribes to maintain a separate existence, however, has been obfuscated by a modern trend [\*1568] to address native needs through the legal structure developed for a non-Indian society--a structure consisting primarily of constitutional and statutory protections. Such legal protections, geared as they are toward non-Indian needs and values, are often inadequate to protect the distinctive sovereign character of native nations. Now, with much of the native land base and corollary resources on the verge of irrevocable deterioration, renewed attention to the trust doctrine **is critical.** This Article charted a course for the trust doctrine within the context of the Mitchell decisions and post-Mitchell precedent. It concluded that, while courts will likely remain reluctant to enforce trust obligations against Congress, trust claims against the executive branch remain viable after Mitchell in both the federal landmanagement and incidental-action contexts. In the incidental-action context, the trust doctrine allows tribes to challenge federal action which, though perhaps permissible under federal environmental law, detrimentally affects their unique way of life. In the land-management context, the trust doctrine provides important redress for tribes against governmental mismanagement of tribal lands and resources. Just as important, the trust claim may provide critical protection to tribal members seeking to safeguard their lands and resources against large-scale disposition to private interests through lease arrangements. In this latter context, the federal fiduciary duty to protect a tribe's territory against market encroachments of the majority society may sometimes outweigh the inevitable intrusion into tribal council prerogatives resulting from federal disapproval of a project. This argument recognizes the complex underpinnings of tribal sovereignty on many reservations and seeks to define the federal government's trust obligation not as a duty to automatically approve each transaction negotiated by a tribal government, but rather as a duty to safeguard the land interests of the tribe as a whole for present and future generations. To conclude, native nations in the Self-Determination era face threats to their autonomy perhaps more subversive and subtle **than those of any previous era**. While the current Self-Determination era carries pleasant overtones of tribal autonomy, in reality it may be promoting a rapid conversion of tribes from culturally autonomous, land-based societies, to substantially assimilated, corporate-like entities reflecting normative characteristics of the highly industrialized majority society that surrounds them. Undoubtedly the most dangerous aspect of the modern policy is its effective disguise of the continued pressures exerted by the majority society to sever native people from their lands and extinguish their way of life. As this Article has pointed out, Self-Determination will prove a hollow concept [\*1569] if industry and the government **exploit it to serve the interests** of the majority society at the expense of the native nations. Indeed, it will become nothing more than continued **colonialism under the banner of native sovereignty.**At a very basic level this Article has suggested a fundamental shift in the policy and law paradigm governing federal-tribal relations. The federal duty of protection, which forms the basis of the sovereign trusteeship as secured by the vast land cessions of two centuries ago, should again serve as the focal point of future dealings between tribes and the federal government. This duty of protection does not justify or authorize plenary power over sovereign native nations, but rather translates into self-restraint on the part of the majority society to refrain from taking actions injurious to native lands and resources.

#### This trust relationship shouldn’t be confused with colonialism – it is necessary to prevent exploitation of Native America.

Clinton, '93 (Former Iowa Law Prof -- Go Hawks!, 46 Ark. L. Rev. 77)

Given the chameleon-like nature of and complex roles played by the federal trusteeship doctrine over the course of American legal history, it may not be sufficient only to identify it as a legacy of colonial oppression of Indian tribes and to condemn it to the oblivion of America's colonialist past. Although the doctrine has been destructive to Indian tribes and their cultures, it also **has protected ~~tribal~~ communities by affording redressability for past wrongs**. For example, Chief Justice Marshall used the doctrine in Cherokee Nation in part to insinuate the federal government's obligation by treaty or otherwise to protect the sovereignty and lands of the Cherokee Nation from encroachment by the State of Georgia and its [\*134] citizens. Surely, this protective role, for which many tribes diligently negotiated in many of the treaties**, does not represent a legacy of colonialism**. Rather, it is a logical outgrowth of the political relationships created by such treaties and the course of dealings between the federal government and the tribes. Similarly, while colonialism certainly caused the federal government to assume the management of many Indian minerals and resources, the legal doctrines derived from the trusteeship hold the federal government legally accountable for actual mismanagement of such Indian resources, and therefore, **they should not be simplisticly condemned and eliminated as a vestige of colonialism.** Thus, dealing with the federal trusteeship in the visionary world of a decolonized federal Indian law poses significant conceptual problems. Certainly, the elements of the doctrine which justify the exercise of plenary federal authority, federal usurpation of the management of or decision making about Indian resources, or federal efforts to "enlighten" Indians by depriving them of their tribal traditions and culture represent a part of the legacy of conquest and properly should be jettisoned by a decolonized federal Indian law as relics of America's colonialist past. By contrast, a decolonized federal Indian law still might retain those elements of the trusteeship under which the federal government justified its protection of the legal autonomy of communities from the onslaught of the legal authority of the states that surrounded them or under which it has sought to provide legal redress for harms caused by its past colonialist excesses. Perhaps doctrinal labels less paternalistic than trusteeship, guardianship, wardship, or the like could be found to describe these legal theories, but, nevertheless, these elements, which historically have been associated with the federal trusteeship over Indian affairs, **should escape the scalpel of decolonization of federal Indian law.**

### 2NC Decisionmaking Good

#### Decisionmaking outweighs – it’s key to social improvements in every and all facets of life

Steinberg & Freeley 8

\*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp9-10

If we assume it to be possible without recourse to violence to reach agreement on all the problems implied in the employment of the idea of justice we are granting the possibility of formulating an ideal of man and society, valid for all beings endowed with reason and accepted by what we have called elsewhere the universal audience.14¶ I think that the only discursive methods available to us stem from techniques that are not demonstrative—that is, conclusive and rational in the narrow sense of the term—but from argumentative techniques which are not conclusive but which may tend to demonstrate the reasonable character of the conceptions put forward. It is this recourse to the rational and reasonable for the realization of the ideal of universal communion that characterizes the age-long endeavor of all philosophies in their aspiration for a city of man in which violence may progressively give way to wisdom.13¶ Whenever an individual controls the dimensions of" a problem, he or she can solve the problem through a personal decision. For example, if the problem is whether to go to the basketball game tonight, if tickets are not too expensive and if transportation is available, the decision can be made individually. But if a friend's car is needed to get to the game, then that person's decision to furnish the transportation must be obtained.¶ Complex problems, too, are subject to individual decision making. American business offers many examples of small companies that grew into major corporations while still under the individual control of the founder. Some computer companies that began in the 1970s as one-person operations burgeoned into multimillion-dollar corporations with the original inventor still making all the major decisions. And some of the multibillion-dollar leveraged buyouts of the 1980s were put together by daring—some would say greedy—financiers who made the day-to-day and even hour-to-hour decisions individually.¶ When President George H. W. Bush launched Operation Desert Storm, when President Bill Clinton sent troops into Somalia and Haiti and authorized Operation Desert Fox, and when President George W. Bush authorized Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq, they each used different methods of decision making, but in each case the ultimate decision was an individual one. In fact, many government decisions can be made only by the president. As Walter Lippmann pointed out, debate is the only satisfactory way the exact issues can be decided:¶ A president, whoever he is, has to find a way of understanding the novel and changing issues which he must, under the Constitution, decide. Broadly speaking ... the president has two ways of making up his mind. The one is to turn to his subordinates—to his chiefs of staff and his cabinet officers and undersecretaries and the like—and to direct them to argue out the issues and to bring him an agreed decision…¶ The other way is to sit like a judge at a hearing where the issues to be decided are debated. After he has heard the debate, after he has examined the evidence, after he has heard the debaters cross-examine one another, after he has questioned them himself he makes his decision…¶ It is a much harder method in that it subjects the president to the stress of feeling the full impact of conflicting views, and then to the strain of making his decision, fully aware of how momentous it Is. But there is no other satisfactory way by which momentous and complex issues can be decided.16¶ John F. Kennedy used Cabinet sessions and National Security Council meetings to provide debate to illuminate diverse points of view, expose errors, and challenge assumptions before he reached decisions.17 As he gained experience in office, he placed greater emphasis on debate. One historian points out: "One reason for the difference between the Bay of Pigs and the missile crisis was that [the Bay of Pig\*] fiasco instructed Kennedy in the importance of uninhibited debate in advance of major decision."18 All presidents, to varying degrees, encourage debate among their advisors.¶ We may never be called on to render the final decision on great issues of national policy, but we are constantly concerned with decisions important to ourselves for which debate can be applied in similar ways. That is, this debate may take place in our minds as we weigh the pros and cons of the problem, or we may arrange for others to debate the problem for us. Because we all are increasingly involved in the decisions of the campus, community, and society in general, it is in our intelligent self-interest to reach these decisions through reasoned debate.

### 2NC Dialogue/Limits

#### C) Echo Chamber DA - This rejection of structured clash makes debate into an echo chamber. This impoverishes their project even if it is right

Talisse 5

Professor of Philosophy @Vandy¶ Robert, Philosophy & Social Criticism, Deliberativist responses to activist challenges, 31(4) p. 429-431

The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. **The deliberativist view** I have sketched hold that reasonableness **involved some degree of** what we may call **epistemic modesty. On this** view, **the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons,** and so she enters into public discourse **as a way of testing her views against the objections** and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly hold that **her present view is open to reasonable critique** and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of **politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable**. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness **for the activist** consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action; **discussion with those who disagree need not be involved**. **According to the activist,** there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which **there is no room for reasoned objection.** Under such conditions, **the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational**. It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001A; ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political **activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies,** demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. Activists also must engage in deliberation among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movement must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tact’s; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. **Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists**. **Group polarization** is a well-documented phenomenon that **has ‘been found all over the world** and is many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81-2). Importantly, **in group that ‘engage in repeated discussions’** over time, **the polarization is even more pronounced** (2003: 86). Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of an individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.).17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that **he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees** in cases in which the requirement of justice are so clear that he can be confidents that has the truth .Group polarization suggest that even deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even we have the truth. **For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views,** but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth ,In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggest that a engagement with

### 2NC Switch Side Good

#### C) Predictable ground – it’s necessary for meaningful switch-side debate – key to progressive politics

English et al 7

(Eric English, Stephen Lano, Gordon Mitchell, University of Pittsburgh communications professor, Catherine Morrison, John Reif, and Carly Woods, Schenley Park Debate Authors Working Group, “Debate as a Weapon of Mass Destruction,” June 2007, Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, [www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/EnglishDAWG.pdf](http://www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/EnglishDAWG.pdf%5D), - Kurr)

The problem for Greene and Hicks is that this notion of citizenship becomes tied to a normative conception of American democracy that justifies imperialism. They write, ‘‘The production and management of this field of governance allows liberalism to trade in cultural technologies in the global cosmopolitan marketplace at the same time as it creates a field of intervention to transform and change the world one subject (regime) at a time.’’11 Here, Greene and Hicks argue that this new conception of liberal governance, which epitomizes the ethical citizen as an individual trained in the switch-side technique, serves as a normative tool for judging other polities and justifying forcible regime change. One need look only to the Bush administration’s framing of war as an instrument of democracy promotion to grasp how the switch-side technique can be appropriated as a justification for violence. It is our position, however, that rather than acting as a cultural technology expanding American exceptionalism, switch-side debating originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes. Several prominent voices reshaping the national dialogue on homeland security have come from the academic debate community and draw on its animating spirit of critical inquiry. For example, Georgetown University law professor Neal Katyal served as lead plaintiff’s counsel in Hamdan, which challenged post-9/11 enemy combat definitions.12 The foundation for Katyal’s winning argument in Hamdan was laid some four years before, when he collaborated with former intercollegiate debate champion Laurence Tribe on an influential Yale Law Journal addressing a similar topic.13 Tribe won the National Debate Tournament in 1961 while competing as an undergraduate debater for Harvard University. Thirty years later, Katyal represented Dartmouth College at the same tournament and finished third. The imprint of this debate training is evident in Tribe and Katyal’s contemporary public interventions, which are characterized by meticulous research, sound argumentation, and a staunch commitment to democratic principles. Katyal’s reflection on his early days of debating at Loyola High School in Chicago’s North Shore provides a vivid illustration. ‘‘I came in as a shy freshman with dreams of going to medical school. Then Loyola’s debate team opened my eyes to a different world: one of argumentation and policy.’’ As Katyal recounts, ‘‘the most important preparation for my career came from my experiences as a member of Loyola’s debate team.’’14 The success of former debaters like Katyal, Tribe, and others in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security points to the efficacy of academic debate as a training ground for future advocates of progressive change. Moreover, a robust understanding of the switch-side technique and the classical liberalism which underpins it would help prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies. For buried within an inner-city debater’s files is a secret threat to absolutism: the refusal to be classified as ‘‘with us or against us,’’ the embracing of intellectual experimentation in an age of orthodoxy, and reflexivity in the face of fundamentalism. But by now, the irony of our story should be apparent\*the more effectively academic debating practice can be focused toward these ends, the greater the proclivity of McCarthy’s ideological heirs to brand the activity as a ‘‘weapon of mass destruction.’’

## 1NR

### Spatial Identity DA

**they say there’s no link but Grande’s Red Pedagogy is explicitly an attempt to spatialize native identity – there’s only a risk of our offense, no risk of the turn. Also, this answers their anthro link turn and their reflexivity arguments on the case flow- Grande’s RP is caught up in Western theories of scholarship that ignores the basis for soveriegnty**

**Dolores 2k6**

[calderon, review: red pedagogy, ucls journal of education and informational studies, 2(1), UCLA]

To illustrate**, Grande’s indigenous theory of subjectivity** presented in¶ Chapter Four **is both “geographically rooted and historically placed” and “is¶ committed to providing American Indian students the** social and intellectual **space¶ to re-imagine what it means to be Indian in contemporary U.S. society, arming¶ them with a critical analysis** of the intersecting systems of domination and the¶ tools to navigate them” (pp. 116, 118). Similarly, the author asserts that the¶ “frameworks of a revolutionary critical theory provide indigenous educators and¶ scholars a way **to think about the issues of sovereignty and self-determination that¶ moves beyond simple cultural constructions and analysis**” (p. 165). **However,¶ tribal knowledge systems do** provide American Indian students with information¶ about what it means to be Indian in the United States. **Grande’s dismissal of the¶ current treatment of the issues of sovereignty and self-determination by¶ indigenous scholars and educators as grounded in “simple cultural constructions¶ and analysis” is problematic and exposes the author’s predisposition towards¶ Western theories. What Grande overlooks is that these “simple cultural¶ constructions” are in fact sophisticated, based on millennia of observation, and¶ thus the best and primary foundations for tribal sovereignty.¶**

**2nc link**

#### and, each instance of the link disputes their solvency claims both in and out of round – their academic fixation on ‘the Indian’ belongs to the methodology the 1ac actively critiques, meaning it turns the case. Vote neg on presumption on any link.

**Carson 06**

(James Taylor, Queens University Kingston, Ontario, Canada; “American Historians and Indians,” The Historical Journal, 49: 921–933 – Kurr)

Recent **studies**, such as Conn’s, **that deconstruct the object of the ‘Indian’ rarely push beyond the object to explore the real people** who found themselves depicted in paintings, books, and academic treatises as ‘natural’ people. Lucy **Maddox’s Removals** (1991), for example, **focuses on the ‘Indian’ as object leaving unexplored both their role in either influencing the form of such objectification or suffering under its weight**. The social import of such ideas, however, is **what sustained them, so any investigation of the idea of the ‘Indian’ that leaves out the people who were forced to wear the red mask belongs, in some ways, to the same genealogy such scholars purport to examine and to criticize**. In this way, **such books are revisionist but also very much a part of the uniquely American intellectual fetishism of the ‘Indian’**.16

**the aff’s use of the word “Indian” recreates “us/them” binaries that prevent an understanding of Indian cultures**

**Carson 06**

(James Taylor, Queens University Kingston, Ontario, Canada; “American Historians and Indians,” The Historical Journal, 49: 921–933 – Kurr)

In her recent exploration of ‘Indian’ intellectuals in the late nineteenth-century United States, Citizen Indians (2005), Lucy **Maddox remarked that ‘white’ intellectuals of that time relied on ‘Indian’ as a ‘generic category’ and ‘stylistic commonplace’. The same could be said for historians’ use of ‘Indian’ today**. And what Maddox found, that ‘**the Indian of intellectual debate and the thousands of Indians whose futures awaited the outcome of the debate … often had little in common’, is as true today as it was then.**37 No other fields of study in the history of the Americas reveal as clearly the origins of the western hemisphere’s modern nation-states and societies than the ancient origins of American civilizations and their encounter with the nations of Europe and Africa. But **so long as scholars hold to the old verities of ‘white’ and ‘Indian’ or, more bluntly, ‘us’ and ‘them’, we run all the risks of navigating by dead reckoning**, of seeking Eden, and **of never quite understanding the actual people and places we find in either the documents or the imaginations we use to reconstruct our past**. A concept like creolization, however, can take us out of Columbus’s shadow into the full light of day, afford a different way of viewing North America’s past and present, and enable us to tell stories of creation rather than destruction.

**2NC Perm Do Both**

**Only total rejection solves – any attempts to include Indian foreclose the possibility of solving as it overwhelms the alternative**

**Carson 06**

(James Taylor, Queens University Kingston, Ontario, Canada; “American Historians and Indians,” The Historical Journal, 49: 921–933 – Kurr)

**To accept such colonial views of race, as Rolena Adorno has argued, involves mutating historical categories into historiographical ones**. The consequences are terrible, according to Adorno, because **reinscribing colonial racial terminology obscures both historical and contemporary challenges to the colonial and neo-colonial orders**.26 Indeed, Silverman criticizes colonial leaders like Samuel Sewall and John Elliot for being ‘willfully naïve’ in their belief that settlers and first people could someday merge as a people. Popular ‘Indian hating’ offers, to Silverman, a more reasonable foundation upon which to assess the consequent course of social relations on Martha’s Vineyard and in New England. But **we need not be beholden to such a dark colonial legacy today. We have a choice, naïve as it may seem.27¶ Binary oppositions like ‘white’ versus ‘Indian’** or ‘civilized’ versus ‘savage’ **expressed the tidy categories colonizers used to organize their thinking about the places they inhabited and the people they aspired to rule, but they foreclose any other kind of perspective**. Indeed, the **racial and cultural discourses of colonialism substitute the illusory simplicity of a phenotypically and behaviourally bounded and ordered society** for the variety and complexity of the human relationships that actually constituted the colonial and nation-state societies of the Americas. **The circularity and interconnectedness of historical and historiographical language, therefore, makes it difficult for scholars to break out of what Ashis Nandy has called ‘the strict rules of historiography’** that, **in the American case at least, rest on a fundamental division of people into ‘Indians’ and ‘whites’. Getting outside of such rules,** Nandy argued, **is imperative in order to uncover the multiple perspectives that were at work in past places**. As well, **scholars must avoid reinscribing the colonial categories that gave life to race and racism in the first place lest their works become the latest descendant in a long genealogy of racial reproduction that reaches back to the first exploration narratives and colonial chronicles**.28

**The aff’s retention a dominant signifier short circuits solvency for the alternative**

**Doty 96**

DOTY, PROF of POL SCI @ Arizona State UNIV and PhD @ UNIV of Minnesota, 96 (Roxanne Lynn, Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North/South Relations, p. 47-8)

But **meaning was** in fact **FIXED, at least temporarily**. **How was this accomplished?** Each of the oppositions depended upon a point of differentiation – a point where, for example, *civilized* became differentiated from *uncivilized*. This differentiation was made possible by a dominant signifier. **The dominant signifier can be thought of as the center of the discursive structure: it both makes the structure itself possible and limits its play**. **It is the point where the substitution of signifiers is no longer possible** (Derrida 1978: 279). **The signifying chain stops**. I would suggest that a distinctly “American” version of “white man” was the dominant signifier in these texts. The terms *civilized, enlightened, lovers of liberty, benevolent,* and so on became fused and came to rest with “white man” while the opposites came to rest with nonwhite races. “White man” was the reference point in relation to which the oppositional distinctions could be posited, the center that while governing the structure escaped structurality. “White man” was given transcendental status, implicitly understood to exist outside of the discursive system instead of itself being constructed by that system. **A deconstructive reading** of these texts **reveals the** contestations and **rhetorical strategies that call this status into question**.

**Representations cant be severed – they produce meaning and constitute reality through linguistic practices**

**Mihas ‘5**

[Elena Mihas, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. “Non-Literal Language in Political Discourse.” LSO Working Papers in Linguistics 5: Proceedings of WIGL 2005, 124-139.]

I follow the textualist tradition of Foucauldian research in my analysis of the Bush administration era political language, a tradition which focuses on public modes of representation, talk and texts. Foucault’s point was to study how certain discourses become authoritative, and how they infiltrate mind and character, and constitute the social world (Foucault 1994). Foucault’s textualist approach means that any reality is mediated by a mode of representation, and that representations are not descriptions of a world of facticity, but are ways of making facticity. Following Foucault, a researcher must point out the value- producing practice of discourse. In other words, as the world is described it is evaluated (Chandler 2003). Textualist or poststructuralist modes of analysis emphasize discourse rather than language, because the concept of discourse implies a concern with the meaning and value-producing practices in language, rather than simply the relationship between utterances and their referents. As Shapiro (1989) points out, in the more familiar approaches to political phenomena, language is treated as a transparent tool. It serves as a conduit between thoughts or concepts and things. In contrast, a discourse approach treats language as opaque, and encourages an analysis of both the linguistic practices within which various phenomena are embedded, and of the language of inquiry itself.

**The destruction of Native peoples through the lens of “sameness” result in genocide AND loss of cultural diversity threatens extinction**

**Friedberg, PhD Candidate, Germanic Studies, University of Illinois, 2000**

(Lilian, “Dare to Compare,” *American Indian Quarterly*; Summer, Vol. 24 Issue 3, p. 353)

**Attempts on the part of American Indians to transcend chronic, intergenerational maladies introduced by the settler population** (for example, in the highly contested Casino industry, in the ongoing battles over tribal sovereignty, and so on**) are challenged tooth and nail by the U.S. government and its "ordinary" people. Flexibility in transcending these conditions has been greatly curtailed by federal policies that have "legally" supplanted our traditional forms of governance, outlawed our languages and spirituality, manipulated our numbers and identity, usurped our cultural integrity, viciously repressed the leaders of our efforts to regain self-determination**, and systematically miseducated the bulk of our youth to believe that this is, if not just, at least inevitable."[55] **Today's state of affairs in America**, both with regard to public memory and national identity, **represents a flawless mirror image of the situation in Germany vis-hvis Jews and other non-Aryan victims of the Nazi regime**.[56] Collective indifference to these conditions on the part of both white and black America is a poor reflection on the nation's character. This **collective refusal to acknowledge the genocide further exacerbates the aftermath in Native communities and hinders the recovery process.** This, too, sets the American situation apart from the German-Jewish situation: Holocaust denial is seen by most of the world as an affront to the victims of the Nazi regime. In America, the situation is the reverse: victims seeking recovery are seen as assaulting American ideals. **But what is at stake today, at the dawn of a new millennium, is not the culture, tradition, and survival of one population on one continent on either side of the Atlantic. What is at stake is the very future of the human species**. LaDuke, in her most recent work, contextualizes the issues from a contemporary perspective: Our experience of survival and resistance is shared with many others. But it is not only about Native people. ... In the final analysis, **the survival of Native America is fundamentally about the collective survival of all human beings. The question of who gets to determine the destiny of the land, and of the people who live on it**--those with the money or those who pray on the land--is a question that is alive throughout society.[57**] "There is,"** as LaDuke reminds us, "**a direct relationship between the loss of cultural diversity and the loss of biodiversity. Wherever Indigenous peoples still remain, there is also a corresponding enclave of biodiversity.**"[58] But, she continues, The last 150 years have seen a great holocaust. There have been more species lost in the past 150 years than since the Ice Age. (During the same time, Indigenous peoples have been disappearing from the face of the earth. Over 2,000 nations of Indigenous peoples have gone extinct in the western hemisphere and one nation disappears from the Amazon rainforest every year.)[59] It is not about "us" as indigenous peoples--it is about "us" as a human species. We are all related. At issue is no longer the "Jewish question" or the "Indian problem." We must speak today in terms of the "human problem." And it is this "problem" for which not a "final," but a sustainable**, viable solution must be found--because it is no longer a matter of "serial genocide," it has become one of collective suicide**. As Terrence Des Pres put it, in The Survivor: "At the heart of our problems is that nihilism which was all along the destiny of Western culture: a nihilism either unacknowledged even as the bombs fell or else, as with Hitler or Stalin, demonically proclaimed as the new salvation."

**the aff creats an ideal “Indian” by creating a singular notion of what an “Indian” should be instead of evaluating the particular group they are talking about. This reifies racial lines separating these groups from whites**

**Carson 06**

(James Taylor, Queens University Kingston, Ontario, Canada; “American Historians and Indians,” The Historical Journal, 49: 921–933 – Kurr)

What is most striking, however, is how, in both Silverman’s and Merritt’s studies, **racial lines were drawn at precisely the same time as cultural lines were being blurred**. The congregational Wampanoags that New Englanders could not bring themselves to trust and the Conestogas of Lexington county, Pennsylvania, who sported trousers and shirts along with English names like John, Anne, and Peter bespoke something that was happening on both sides of the contact experience. The problem, for these scholars and for others, is that **while we tend to recognize the acculturation of ‘Indians’, the colonists’ cultivation of maize**, enjoyment of tobacco, **and mutilation of enemies tend to be underappreciated as the other side of the acculturative flow**. What **we are often left with, then, are ‘Indians’ who become unrecognizable as ‘Indians’** and English folk who become American. **Such an imbalance is a direct product of the ‘Indian/white’ dichotomy and the timelessness to which the ‘Indian’ is always subjected**. **Any lasting cultural convergence between the two is almost impossible to conceive.**¶ Regardless of their respective successes in showing the degree to which the histories of such nations are implicated in the broader national history of the United States, studies like Merritt’s, Silverman’s, and Ostler’s are still very much about ‘whites’ and ‘Indians’. Indeed, for their novel and important extension of our ability to see the degree to which the history of first peoples and of the English colonies and the United States are intertwined, their analysis comes up short at the edges of the Columbian dichotomy. **Merritt, for example, juxtaposes the ‘ideal Indian’ of the colonial mind with the ‘actual Indians’ who inhabited the borderlands. But ‘Indian’ is an ideal category. What is an actual ‘Indian’?**23 Ostler draws upon two categories with deeply colonial roots. **Like ‘Indian’, ‘mixed blood’ and ‘full blood’ are terms used today but such usage does not justify their historiographical utility**. Indeed, as Theda Perdue and I have argued, **the notion of native communities divided into discrete groups of ‘mixed bloods’ and ‘full bloods’ perpetuates a myth concocted in the early nineteenth century that the former were more disposed to acculturation** than the latter owing to the mystical properties of blood. Bloodedness, however, rarely affords a reliable predictor of either cultural tendencies or political allegiances and is yet another historical racial relic that has found its way into modern historiographical language.24

**2nc alt solvency/framing**

**Analyzing the discursive representations of the 1ac must precede any political decision-making or strategically essentialist strategy. This is an independent DA to their perms and any exclusive aff-focus framing argument they will make.**

**Crawford ‘2**

[Neta Crawford ,PhD MA MIT, BA Brown, Prof. of poli sci at boston univ. Argument and Change in World Politics, 2002 p. 19-21]

**Coherent arguments** are unlikely to take place unless and until actors, at least on some level, agree on what they are arguing about. The at least temporary resolution of meta-arguments- regarding the nature of the good (the content of prescriptive norms); what is out there, the way we know the world, how we decide between competing beliefs (ontology and epistemology); and the nature of the situation at hand( the proper frame or representation)- **must occur before specific arguments that could lead to decision and action may take place.** Meta-arguments over epistemology and ontology, relatively rare, occur in instances where there is a fundamental clash between belief systems and not simply a debate within a belief system. Such arguments over the nature of the world and how we come to know it are **particularly rare in politics** though they are more frequent in religion and science. Meta-arguments over the “good” are contests over what it is good and right to do, and even how we know the good and the right. They are about the nature of the good, specifically, defining the qualities of “good” so that we know good when we see it and do it. Ethical arguments are about how to do good in a particular situation. **More common** are meta-arguments over representations or frames- about how we out to understand a particular situation. Sometimes actors agree on how they see a situation. More often there are different possible interpretations. Thomas Homer-Dixon and Roger karapin suggest, “Argument and debate occur when people try to gain acceptance for their interpretation of the world”. For example, “is the war defensive or aggressive?”. Defining and controlling representations and images, or the frame, affects whether one thinks there is an issue at stake and **whether a particular argument applies** to the case. An actor fighting a defensive war is within international law; an aggressor may legitimately be subject to sanctions. Framing and reframing involve mimesis or putting forward representations of what is going on. In mimetic meta-arguments, actors who are struggling to characterize or frame the situation accomplish their ends by drawing vivid pictures of the “reality” through **exaggeration**, analogy, or differentiation. Representations of a situation **do not re-produce accurately** so much as they **creatively re-present** situations in a way that makes sense. “mimesis is a metaphoric or ‘iconic argumentation of the real.’ Imitating not the effectivity of events but their logical structure and meaning.” Certain features are emphasized and others de-emphasized **or completely ignored** as their situation is recharacterized or reframed. Representation thus **becomes a “constraint on reasoning in that it limits understanding to a specific organization of conceptual knowledge**.” The dominant representation delimits which arguments will be considered legitimate, framing how actors see possibities. As Roxanne Doty argues, “the possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain courses of action. Certain background meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships, must already be in place.” If, as Donald Sylvan and Stuart Thorson argue, “politics involves the selective privileging of representations, “it **may not matter whether one representation or another is true or not.** Emphasizing whether frames articulate accurate or inaccurate perceptions misses the rhetorical import of representation- how frames affect what is seen or not seen, and subsequent choices. **Meta-arguments over representation are thus crucial elements of political argument** because an actor’s arguments about what to do will be more persuasive if their characterization or framing of the situation holds sway. But, as Rodger Payne suggests, “No frame is an omnipotent persuasive tool that can be decisively wielded by norm entrepreneurs without serious political wrangling.” Hence framing is a meta-argument.

**Even minute distinctions in language have important political ramifications- its is an ethical imperative to distance yourself from modes of linguistic representation that recreate hegemonic systems of power**

**DOTY,** PROF of POL SCI @ Arizona State UNIV and PhD @ UNIV of Minnesota, **96** (Roxanne Lynn, Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North/South Relations, p. 169-171)

Because the center is not a fixed locus but a function in which an infinite number of sign substitutions come into play, the domain and play of signification is extended indefinitely. This both opens up and limits possibilities, generates alternative sites of meanings and political resistances that give rise to practices of reinscription that seek to reaffirm identities and relationships: The inherently incomplete and open nature of discourse makes this reaffirmation an ongoing and never finally completed project. In this study I have sought, through an engagement with various discourses in which claims to truth have been staked, to challenge the validity of the structures of meaning and to make visible their complicity with practices of power and domination. By examining the ways in which structures of meaning have been associated with imperial practices, I have suggested that the construction of meaning and the construction of social, political, and economic power are inextricably linked. This suggests an ethical dimension to making meaning and an ethical imperative that is incumbent upon those who toil in the construction of structures of meaning. This is especially urgent in North-South relations today: one does not have to search very far to find a continuing complicity with colonial representations that ranges from a politics of silence and neglect to constructions of terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, international drug trafficking, and Southern immigration to the North as new threats to global stability and peace. The political stakes raised by this analysis revolve around the question of being able to “get beyond” the representations or speak outside of the discourse that historically have constructed the North and the South. I do not believe that there are any pure alternatives by which we can escape the infinity of traces to which Gramsci refers. Nor do I wish to suggest that we are always hopelessly imprisoned in a dominant and all-pervasive discourse. Before this question can be answered – indeed, before we can even proceed to attempt to answer – attention must be given to the politics of representation. The price that international relations scholarship pays for its inattention to the issue of representation is perpetuation of the dominant modes of making meaning and deferral of its responsibility and complicity in dominant representations.

# Round 7 v Texas FS

## 1NC

### 1NC Framework

#### 1. Interpretation: The role of the ballot is to determine if the enactment of a topical plan is better than the status quo or a competitive option. The 1ac must read and defend the implementation of such a topical plan.

#### 2. Violation:

#### A) “Resolved” implies a policy or legislative decision – means they must be resolved about a future federal government policy

Parcher 1

Jeff Parcher, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001 http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution.

#### B) USFG is the national government in DC

Encarta Online Encyclopedia, 2k

(http://encarta.msn.com)

“The federal government **of the U**nited **S**tates **is centered in** Washington **DC”**

#### C) Should means there is a practical reason for action

WordNet in ‘97

Princeton University, 1.6

**Should** v 1 : be expected to: “Parties should be fun” 2 : **expresses an** emotional**, practical,** or other **reason for doing something:** “You had better put on warm clothes”; “You should call your mother-in-law”; *“The State ought to repair bridges*”[syn**:** had better, ought]

#### 3. Vote Negative:

#### A) Decisionmaking - a limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to decision-making and advocacy skills

Steinberg & Freeley 8

\*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Specifically, decisionmaking skills based on specific energy policy proposals are key to motivate legislative fence-sitters – the aff’s strategy is doomed to the status quo

Brown 11

[heath, PhD Political Science, Roanoke, Salem, VA, “narrative strategies used by interest groups during the 2008 presidental transition”, 2011 Pat-Net Conference]

Milbrath argues that interest groups must strategically present information so as to ¶ overcome the “perceptual screen” that shields policy makers from absorbing endless amounts ¶ of information. He suggests that groups use facts (scientific information about policy ¶ outcomes), arguments (normative explanations of justness or rightness of action), and power¶ (typically subtle offers of political support or threats of political retribution) to communicate ¶ their interests and make their case for policy action (or inaction). In a more recent approach, ¶ Esterling (2007, p. 79) makes the case that groups can use [using] “instrumental” – “research or ¶ evidence-based causal” arguments -- or “normative” – “intrinsic desirability” arguments. By ¶ emphasizing one of these approaches, a group is tacitly communicating the way it wants to ¶ persuade the target of the information. By emphasizing power or normative arguments, the ¶ group implies that the policy maker should make decisions based primarily on their political ¶ judgment and political future. Conversely, by emphasizing facts-based or instrumental ¶ arguments, the group implies that the policy maker should base decisions primarily on rational ¶ or scientific considerations. In practice, it is difficult to disentangle these two types of ¶ arguments and many groups will likely combine various ways to present information (Wright ¶ 1996; Rochefort and Cobb 1994). The dichotomy though does help clarify the persuasive or ¶ argumentative tone of the information and advice given by groups to policy makers. 6 ¶ While public perceptions of interest groups might suggest crass self-interest, ¶ manipulation, and deception, groups have an incentive to be forthright in the information they ¶ provide and arguments they make. A group that provides shoddy statistics or misleading ¶ arguments will be discounted in future interactions with the policy maker (Kersh 2009; ¶ Easterling 2007). John E. Chubb (1983, p. 145) writes in regard to energy interest groups: ¶ “information and advice that are solely self-serving threaten the bond of trust that facilitates ¶ the informal play of influence.” In fact, rather than targeting political opponents or fence ¶ sitters, much research suggests that groups prefer or are invited to lobby friends and allies over ¶ adversaries (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999; Hall and Deardorff ¶ 2006; Bauer et al. 1963; Holyoke 2004; McCool 1990). If this is the case, the cost of ¶ misrepresenting or overstating information may be particularly high for those engaged in what ¶ Hall and Deardorff (2006) and others have called “legislative subsidy” (Hall and Deardorff 2006; ¶ Esterling 2007a). From this subsidy perspective, if a policy maker is sub-contracting information ¶ collection and analysis to an allied interest group, it behooves that group to be conscientious, ¶ thorough, and consistent in the information and advice it gives. And in many cases, as Wright ¶ (1996) contends, it is relatively easy for policy makers to check the authenticity of the ¶ information provided to them, sometimes simply through the contradictory information ¶ provided by other groups, thereby curtailing the inclination to blatantly misrepresent the truth. ¶ Furthermore, experimental research shows that factual or instrumental information is ¶ preferred by legislative staff (LaPira 2008) and neutral expert lobbyists have more legislative ¶ access than non-experts (Esterling 2007b). Facts may be useful on their own terms in ¶ formulating legislative decisions but scientific or statistically based arguments also serve as a 7 ¶ cue for policy makers to determine the credibility or reliability of the advice they are given ¶ (Sabatier 1978). ¶ Rather than convince those already in agreement, the approach taken by proactive ¶ theorists suggests that groups seek to convince legislative fence sitters or opponents to adopt ¶ the group’s position, advocate the group’s interests, or simply vote in the group’s way through ¶ the offer of, or refusal to give, political support (Smith 1984; Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; ¶ Wright 1996). Wright (1990) for one finds that groups which distribute campaign contributions ¶ to a wide group of legislators are then able to access a wider group, rather than just political ¶ allies (Wright 1990). Similarly, Heberling (2005) shows that one group, the AFL-CIO, seeks out ¶ legislators with unknown political preferences rather than targeting political allies (Heberling ¶ 2005). The field of interest group research has not yet resolved whether groups typically lobby ¶ friends, adversaries, or some combination of the two (Leech and Baumgartner 1998). This is ¶ likely due to the wide variation of group types and also policy domains in which groups operate. ¶ These inter-organizational and inter-policy differences affect the strategies employed and ¶ therefore the content of information presented during lobbying.

#### Switch-side is key to making those decisionmaking skills effective – EPA debates prove

Mitchell 10

(Gordon R., Associate Professor, Director of Graduate Studies, and Director of the William Pitt Debating Union at the University of Pittsburgh; Spring, “Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 1 – Kurr)

The preceding analysis of U.S. intelligence community debating initiatives highlighted how analysts are challenged to navigate discursively the heteroglossia of vast amounts of different kinds of data flowing through intelligence streams. Public policy planners are tested in like manner when they attempt to stitch together institutional arguments from various and sundry inputs ranging from expert testimony, to historical precedent, to public comment. Just as intelligence managers find that algorithmic, formal methods of analysis often don't work when it comes to the task of interpreting and synthesizing copious amounts of disparate data, public-policy planners encounter similar challenges. In fact, the argumentative turn in public-policy planning elaborates an approach to public-policy analysis that foregrounds deliberative interchange and critical thinking as alternatives to "decisionism," the formulaic application of "objective" decision algorithms to the public policy process. Stating the matter plainly, Majone suggests, "whether in written or oral form, argument is central in all stages of the policy process." Accordingly, he notes, "we miss a great deal if we try to understand policy-making solely in terms of power, influence, and bargaining, to the exclusion of debate and argument."51 One can see similar rationales driving Goodwin and Davis's EPA debating project, where debaters are invited to conduct on-site public debates covering resolutions crafted to reflect key points of stasis in the EPA decision-making process. For example, in the 2008 Water Wars debates held at EPA headquarters in Washington, D.C., resolutions were crafted to focus attention on the topic of water pollution, with one resolution focusing on downstream states' authority to control upstream states' discharges and sources of pollutants, and a second resolution exploring the policy merits of bottled water and toilet paper taxes as revenue sources to fund water infrastructure projects. In the first debate on interstate river pollution, the team of Seth Gannon and Seungwon Chung from Wake Forest University argued in favor of downstream state control, with the Michigan State University team of Carly Wunderlich and Garrett Abelkop providing opposition. In the second debate on taxation policy, Kevin Kallmyer and Matthew Struth from University of Mary Washington defended taxes on bottled water and toilet paper, while their opponents from Howard University, Dominique Scott and Jarred McKee, argued against this proposal. Reflecting on the project, Goodwin noted how the intercollegiate [End Page 106] debaters' ability to act as "honest brokers" in the policy arguments contributed positively to internal EPA deliberation on both issues.52 Davis observed that since the invited debaters "didn't have a dog in the fight," they were able to give voice to previously buried arguments that some EPA subject matter experts felt reticent to elucidate because of their institutional affiliations.53 Such findings are consistent with the views of policy analysts advocating the argumentative turn in policy planning. As Majone claims, "Dialectical confrontation between generalists and experts often succeeds in bringing out unstated assumptions, conflicting interpretations of the facts, and the risks posed by new projects."54 Frank Fischer goes even further in this context, explicitly appropriating rhetorical scholar Charles Willard's concept of argumentative "epistemics" to flesh out his vision for policy studies: Uncovering the epistemic dynamics of public controversies would allow for a more enlightened understanding of what is at stake in a particular dispute, making possible a sophisticated evaluation of the various viewpoints and merits of different policy options. In so doing, the differing, often tacitly held contextual perspectives and values could be juxtaposed; the viewpoints and demands of experts, special interest groups, and the wider public could be directly compared; and the dynamics among the participants could be scrutizined. This would by no means sideline or even exclude scientific assessment; it would only situate it within the framework of a more comprehensive evaluation.55 As Davis notes, institutional constraints present within the EPA communicative milieu can complicate efforts to provide a full airing of all relevant arguments pertaining to a given regulatory issue. Thus, intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might otherwise remain sedimented in the policy process. The dynamics entailed in this symbiotic relationship are underscored by deliberative planner John Forester, who observes, "If planners and public administrators are to make democratic political debate and argument possible, they will need strategically located allies to avoid being fully thwarted by the characteristic self-protecting behaviors of the planning organizations and bureaucracies within which they work."56 Here, an institution's need for "strategically located allies" to support deliberative practice constitutes the demand for rhetorically informed expertise, setting up what can be considered a demand-driven rhetoric of science. As an instance of rhetoric of science scholarship, this type of "switch-side public [End Page 107] debate"57 differs both from insular contest tournament debating, where the main focus is on the pedagogical benefit for student participants, and first-generation rhetoric of science scholarship, where critics concentrated on unmasking the rhetoricity of scientific artifacts circulating in what many perceived to be purely technical spheres of knowledge production.58 As a form of demand-driven rhetoric of science, switch-side debating connects directly with the communication field's performative tradition of argumentative engagement in public controversy—a different route of theoretical grounding than rhetorical criticism's tendency to locate its foundations in the English field's tradition of literary criticism and textual analysis.59 Given this genealogy, it is not surprising to learn how Davis's response to the EPA's institutional need for rhetorical expertise took the form of a public debate proposal, shaped by Davis's dual background as a practitioner and historian of intercollegiate debate. Davis competed as an undergraduate policy debater for Howard University in the 1970s, and then went on to enjoy substantial success as coach of the Howard team in the new millennium. In an essay reviewing the broad sweep of debating history, Davis notes, "Academic debate began at least 2,400 years ago when the scholar Protagoras of Abdera (481–411 BC), known as the father of debate, conducted debates among his students in Athens."60 As John Poulakos points out, "older" Sophists such as Protagoras taught Greek students the value of dissoi logoi, or pulling apart complex questions by debating two sides of an issue.61 The few surviving fragments of Protagoras's work suggest that his notion of dissoi logoi stood for the principle that "two accounts [logoi] are present about every 'thing,' opposed to each other," and further, that humans could "measure" the relative soundness of knowledge claims by engaging in give-and-take where parties would make the "weaker argument stronger" to activate the generative aspect of rhetorical practice, a key element of the Sophistical tradition.62 Following in Protagoras's wake, Isocrates would complement this centrifugal push with the pull of synerchésthé, a centripetal exercise of "coming together" deliberatively to listen, respond, and form common social bonds.63 Isocrates incorporated Protagorean dissoi logoi into synerchésthé, a broader concept that he used flexibly to express interlocking senses of (1) inquiry, as in groups convening to search for answers to common questions through discussion;64 (2) deliberation, with interlocutors gathering in a political setting to deliberate about proposed courses of action;65 and (3) alliance formation, a form of collective action typical at festivals,66 or in the exchange of pledges that deepen social ties.67 [End Page 108] Returning once again to the Kettering-informed sharp distinction between debate and deliberation, one sees in Isocratic synerchésthé, as well as in the EPA debating initiative, a fusion of debate with deliberative functions. Echoing a theme raised in this essay's earlier discussion of intelligence tradecraft, such a fusion troubles categorical attempts to classify debate and deliberation as fundamentally opposed activities. The significance of such a finding is amplified by the frequency of attempts in the deliberative democracy literature to insist on the theoretical bifurcation of debate and deliberation as an article of theoretical faith. Tandem analysis of the EPA and intelligence community debating initiatives also brings to light dimensions of contrast at the third level of Isocratic synerchésthé, alliance formation. The intelligence community's Analytic Outreach initiative invites largely one-way communication flowing from outside experts into the black box of classified intelligence analysis. On the contrary, the EPA debating program gestures toward a more expansive project of deliberative alliance building. In this vein, Howard University's participation in the 2008 EPA Water Wars debates can be seen as the harbinger of a trend by historically black colleges and universities (HBCUS) to catalyze their debate programs in a strategy that evinces Davis's dual-focus vision. On the one hand, Davis aims to recuperate Wiley College's tradition of competitive excellence in intercollegiate debate, depicted so powerfully in the feature film The Great Debaters, by starting a wave of new debate programs housed in HBCUS across the nation.68 On the other hand, Davis sees potential for these new programs to complement their competitive debate programming with participation in the EPA's public debating initiative. This dual-focus vision recalls Douglas Ehninger's and Wayne Brockriede's vision of "total" debate programs that blend switch-side intercollegiate tournament debating with forms of public debate designed to contribute to wider communities beyond the tournament setting.69 Whereas the political telos animating Davis's dual-focus vision certainly embraces background assumptions that Greene and Hicks would find disconcerting—notions of liberal political agency, the idea of debate using "words as weapons"70—there is little doubt that the project of pursuing environmental protection by tapping the creative energy of HBCU-leveraged dissoi logoi differs significantly from the intelligence community's effort to improve its tradecraft through online digital debate programming. Such difference is especially evident in light of the EPA's commitment to extend debates to public realms, with the attendant possible benefits unpacked by Jane Munksgaard and Damien Pfister: [End Page 109] Having a public debater argue against their convictions, or confess their indecision on a subject and subsequent embrace of argument as a way to seek clarity, could shake up the prevailing view of debate as a war of words. Public uptake of the possibility of switch-sides debate may help lessen the polarization of issues inherent in prevailing debate formats because students are no longer seen as wedded to their arguments. This could transform public debate from a tussle between advocates, with each public debater trying to convince the audience in a Manichean struggle about the truth of their side, to a more inviting exchange focused on the content of the other's argumentation and the process of deliberative exchange.71 Reflection on the EPA debating initiative reveals a striking convergence among (1) the expressed need for dissoi logoi by government agency officials wrestling with the challenges of inverted rhetorical situations, (2) theoretical claims by scholars regarding the centrality of argumentation in the public policy process, and (3) the practical wherewithal of intercollegiate debaters to tailor public switch-side debating performances in specific ways requested by agency collaborators. These points of convergence both underscore previously articulated theoretical assertions regarding the relationship of debate to deliberation, as well as deepen understanding of the political role of deliberation in institutional decision making. But they also suggest how decisions by rhetorical scholars about whether to contribute switch-side debating acumen to meet demand-driven rhetoric of science initiatives ought to involve careful reflection. Such an approach mirrors the way policy planning in the "argumentative turn" is designed to respond to the weaknesses of formal, decisionistic paradigms of policy planning with situated, contingent judgments informed by reflective deliberation.

#### B) Dialogue - Predictable points of stasis are key – effective deliberation is critical to preventing mass violence as it overcomes politically debilitating self-obsession

Roberts-Miller 03

(Patricia Roberts-Miller is Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Texas "Fighting Without Hatred: Hannah Arendt’s Agonistic Rhetoric" JAC 22.2 2003)

Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into solipsistic and unreflective behavior. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58) What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with disastrous consequences, both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody. It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems, Arendt's solution is the playful and competitive space of agonism; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the assumption of competition, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, of one's thought. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives. Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it. The situation is agonistic not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference. This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity. Continued… Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, especially not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsibility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87). Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes, Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social. Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies. Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38). By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed. Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259). Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238). The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking. Arendt's Polemical Agonism As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. Persuasive agonism still values conflict, disagreement, and equality among interlocutors, but it has the goal of reaching agreement, as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added). Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it. In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it is how one tests the validity of one's thought. In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy. Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point: You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42) Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03). In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes. This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate. Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263). Like other proponents of agonism, Arendt argues that rhetoric does not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth; it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered. Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242). Agonism demands that one simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions, rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think. The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324). Yet, there are important positive political consequences of agonism. Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how the system could be actively moral. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the evil of conformity—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state makes possible extraordinary evil carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill undermines the political force of conformity, so it is a force against the bureaucratizing of evil. If people think for themselves, they will resist dogma; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, they will resist totalitarianism. And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action. In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere. On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric.

### 1NC CP

#### The United States federal government should establish a cap-and-trade system for carbon emissions in the United States. The federal government should reduce the corporate income tax and business capital-gains taxes. The United States federal government should end all energy subsidies.

#### Targeting specific industries and technology fails---cap and trade is key to market-based solutions that solve the case better

Morris et al 12

Adele C. Morris, Fellow and Deputy Director of the. Climate and Energy Economics project at Brookings, Pietro S. Nivola, Charles Schultze, Brookings Scholars, "CLEAN ENERGY:REVISITING THE CHALLENGES OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY" June 4 www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/6/04%20clean%20energy%20morris%20nivola%20schultze/04\_clean\_energy\_morris\_nivola\_schultze.pdf

Public investments of these magnitudes, targeted at specific industries, arguably constitute an industrial policy, albeit a sectoral one, unlike the earlier proposals of the 1980's —that is, a government strategy to steer resources toward select producers or technologies. The rationale and efficacy of these clean-energy expenditures call for scrutiny.¶ Proponents offer numerous reasons for scaling up particular energy technologies at the taxpayer's expense. One set of reasons involves the need to remediate market failures that have not been corrected by other policies. For example, clean-energy technologies are said to emit fewer greenhouse gases than do traditional sources per unit of energy produced. The United States does not have an economy-wide policy to control greenhouse gases, most notably, one that puts a price on C02 that reflects the environmental harm associated with use of fossil fuels.¶ A far more effective policy than subsidies for clean energy research, development and demonstration would be a tax or a cap-and-trade regime that would put an appropriate price on carbon and other greenhouse gases. Properly implemented, this alternative approach would help level the playing field for greener energy sources, for it would require emitters to pay prices that reflect the costs their emissions impose on society. The enhanced efficiency that would result has been widely recognized by economists.6 True costs would flow to purchasers of goods and services that require energy, suitably inducing conservation. Emitters would have incentives to invest in equipment and new production techniques, use alternative fuels, and seek other methods to reduce emissions. And America's innovators would channel their efforts into inventing, scaling up, and marketing competitive forms of clean energy. However, because existing market signals do not suffice to encourage climate-friendly technologies, carefully targeted federal funding seems warranted. But as we explain later, it is ironically only after incorporating the social costs of energy into market prices that many clean energy subsidies will succeed in deploying new technologies.

#### CP alone is key to preventing a collapse of innovation

Loris 11

Nicolas Loris is an analyst in the Heritage Foundation’s Roe Institute of Economic Policy Studies. "Power Down the Subsidies to Energy Producers" Aug 3 www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2011/08/power-down-the-subsidies-to-energy-producers

America has an energy addiction - and it’s not an addiction to oil, as many politicians would have you think. It’s an addiction to government subsidies. The addicts, you see, are energy producers, not the consumers.

Their growing dependence on federal handouts is the real cause of America’s energy crisis. Energy subsidies have needlessly wasted taxpayer dollars, retarded commercialization of new technologies and failed to reduce our reliance on foreign energy sources. Washington would do well to end all energy subsidies.¶ Energy subsidies come in numerous forms ranging from direct expenditures to targeted tax breaks, from production mandates to loan guarantees. Basically, any public policy that favorsthe production or consumption of one type of energy over another can be considered a subsidy.¶ None of them come cheap. According to the Energy Information Agency, the federal government gave the energy industry $8.2 billion in subsidies and financial aid in 1999. This figure more than doubled to $17.9 billion in 2007 and more than doubled again to $37.2 billion last year.¶ But the damage subsidies inflict on our economy extends well beyond direct costs. A special endorsement from the government artificially props up that technology. This reduces the incentive for the producer to become cost-competitive, stifles innovation and encourages government dependence.¶ The federal government has no business picking commercial winners and losers. That’s the job of the marketplace. Indeed, it’s doubly damaging when government decides to manipulate the market through subsidies, because government - almost invariably - picks losers. That’s not surprising, because companies that seek handouts most strenuously are those that cannot compete without them.

#### Solves great power war

Baru 9

Sanjaya is a Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School in Singapore Geopolitical Implications of the Current Global Financial Crisis, Strategic Analysis, Volume 33, Issue 2 March 2009 , pages 163 – 168

Hence, **economic policies and performance do have** strategic consequences**.**2 In the modern era, the idea that **strong economic performance is the** foundation of power was argued most persuasively by historian Paul Kennedy. **'Victory** (in war)', Kennedy claimed, **'has repeatedly gone to the side with more flourishing productive base**'.3 **Drawing attention to the interrelationships between** economic wealth, technological innovation, and the ability of states to efficiently mobilize economic and technological resources for power projection and national defence, Kennedy argued that **nations that were able to better combine military and economic strength scored over others**. 'The fact remains', Kennedy argued, **'that all of the major shifts in the world's military-power balance have followed alterations in the productive balances**; and further, that the **rising and falling** of the various empires and states in the international system **has been confirmed by the outcomes of the** major Great Power wars, where victory has always gone to the side with the greatest material resources'.4 In Kennedy's view, **the geopolitical consequences of an economic crisis, or even decline, would be transmitted through a nation's inability to find adequate financial resources to simultaneously sustain economic growth and** military power.

### K

#### Object oriented ontology mistakenly identifies the problem, and quickly dissolves into nothingness. Their abdication of prescriptive solutions and of strategic conceptual reductionism dissolves the theories necessary to posit relationships to bring Late Capitalism into focus.

Berry 2012 (David M, Senior Lecturer in Digital Media, “The Uses of Object Oriented Ontology” <http://stunlaw.blogspot.com/2012/05/uses-of-object-oriented-ontology.html>

This definition is helpful in a number of ways, firstly it demonstrates in the move towards a flat ontology the attention has shifted from ontology (being) to things/objects (beings). The definition of everything as a single thing, in this case an object/unit – is precisely the danger that Heidegger identified for philosophy. The ‘Being’ that explains everything, the ‘Good’ for Plato, “Substance” for Spinoza, and “Object” for object-oriented ontologists. As Bryant remarks, “there is only one type of being: objects. As a consequence, humans are not excluded, but are rather objects among the various types of objects that exist or populate the world, each with their own specific powers and capacities” (Bryant 2011: 20, original emphasis). This is a problem, as "correctness" in identifying objects as beings does not, for me, make a sufficient ontology, as Heidegger argues¶ What is essential is not what we presumably establish with exactness by means of instruments and gadgets; what is essential is the view in advance which opens up the field for anything to be established (Heidegger 1995: 60).¶ Bogost’s work is exemplary and highly suggestive for the work of software studies and platforms studies, however, his descriptive work is an example of object-oriented onticology, rather than ontology as such. For me, this is worthy and important work, we do need to map certain kinds of objects and their interrelations, however, we also need to be aware of the consequences of certain ways of seeing and categorizing the world. The problem seems to be that object-oriented ontology has no notion of an exemplar, no special case, no shining examples. As such, it quickly descends into endless lists and litanies. As Heidegger observes,¶ So it happens that we, lost as we usually are in the activities of observing and establishing, believe we “see” many things and yet do not see what really is (Heidegger 1995: 60).¶ To draw back to the original question: what are the uses of object-oriented ontology? It seems to me that object-oriented ontology and speculative realism together reflect a worrying spirit of conservatism within philosophy. They discount the work of human activity and place it alongside a soporific litany of naturalised objects – a method that points less at the interconnected nature of things, and gestures more towards the infinity of sameness, the gigantic of objects, the relentless distanceless of a total confusion of beings (see Harman 2009a for a discussion of things and objects). In short, experience as passive, disoriented and overwhelming, what Heidegger described as the “terror” of pure unmitigated flatness. And with that, philosophy becomes ‘cold’ philosophy, instead of understanding, we have lists and litanies of objects. Not so much philosophy as philosography, where rather than understanding the world, there is an attempt to describe it, and a worrying tendency towards the administration of things through a cataloguing operation.¶ These litanies – cascades and tumbling threads of polythetic classification – are linked merely by sequence, in which each item has no need to bear any resemblance to the ones before or after. They posit no relationships, and offers no narrative connections, and are therefore “essentially uncontrollable: at the limit so indeterminable that anything can be connected with anything” (Anderson 2012). But of course there is a connection, a link, a thread, performed by thephilosographer who chooses consciously or unconsciously the elements that make up the chain, and which are inscribed in books and articles. The use of object-oriented ontology, then, is bound up in its apparent conservatism which rallies at the temerity of human-beings to believe in themselves, their politics, and their specialness. Instead of World, object-oriented ontology posits universe, its founding principle is the [Gigantic](http://stunlaw.blogspot.co.uk/2011/12/gigantic-inc.html). As Heidegger explained:¶ 1. The gigantism of the slowing down of history (from the staying away of essential decisions all the way to lack of history) in the semblance of speed and steer ability of "historical" [historisch] development and its anticipation. 2. The gigantism of the publicness as summation of everything homogeneous in favour of concealing the destruction and undermining of any passion for essential gathering. 3. The gigantism of the claim to naturalness in the semblance of what is self-evident and "logical"; the question-worthiness of being is placed totally outside questioning. 4. The gigantism of the diminution of beings in the whole in favour of the semblance of boundless extending of the same by virtue of unconditioned controllability. The single thing that is impossible is the word and representation of "impossible" (Heidegger 1999: 311).¶ To see what "shows up" to the philosographer one is unsurprised to see lists that are often contaminated by the products of neoliberal capitalism, objects which could not just appear of themselves, but required actual concrete labour of human beings to mediate their existence. For some reason, object-oriented ontology is attracted to the ephemerality of certain objects, as if by listing them they doubly affirm their commitment to realism, or that the longer the list the more ‘real’ it is. There is also the tendency to attempt to shock the reader by the juxtaposition of objects that would normally be thought to be categorically different – see Bogost (2009) for a discussion of whether including Harry Potter, blinis, and humans in a list was a striking enough example. These rhetorical strategies are interesting in thermselves, but I do not see them as replacements for philosophy. This demonstrates that the speculative realists have not escaped the so-called ‘correlationist circle’ (Harman 2009b), nor provided a model for thinking about the anti-correlationist paradox which remains present in their own work. ¶ We should therefore ask object-oriented ontologist to move beyond merely staring at the objects they see around them and catch sight of what is being listed in their descriptive litanies. That is, examining the lists they produce, we can see what kind of objects they see as near, and which they see as far, and therefore question their claims to see objects all the way down (see Bogost 2012: 83-84). Yet as we examine these lists there appears to be a profound forgetting of Being, as it were, as they write both for and as subjects of Late Capitalism – a fact which remains hidden from them – and a seemingly major aporia in their work.

#### Alternative text: vote negative to reject the 1ac in favor of materialist revolutionary knowledge production against capitalism.

#### Ecological catastrophe necessitates materialist revolutionary dialectics against capitalism’s exploitation to ensure survival.

Foster 2k11

[john bellamy,  professor of sociology at the University of Oregon and also editor of Monthly Review, Since the Great Financial Crisis hit in 2008, Foster has been sought out by academics, activists, the media, and the general public as a result of his earlier prescient writings on the coming crisis. He has given numerous interviews, talks, and invited lectures, as well as written invited commentary, articles, and books on the subject]

In the twenty-first century it is customary to view the rise of planetary ecological problems as a surprising development scarcely conceivable prior to the last few decades. It is here, however, that we have the most to learn from the analysis of nineteenth-century thinkers who played a role in the development of ecology, including both early ecological scientists and classical historical materialists. Science has long warned of the negative, destructive side of the human transformation of the earth—a warning which the system, driven by its own imperatives, has continually sought to downplay. Indeed, what distinguishes our time from earlier centuries is not so much the conservation of catastrophe, which has long been recognized, but rather the accelerated pace at which such destruction is now manifesting itself, i.e., what I am calling the accumulation of catastrophe. The desertification arising in pre-capitalist times, partly through human action, manifested itself over centuries, even millennia. Today changes in the land, the atmosphere, the oceans, indeed the entire life-support system of the earth, are the product of mere decades. If in the past, Darwin was struck that in a mere three centuries after European colonization, the ecology of the island of St. Helena had been destroyed to the point that it was reduced to “desert”—today, in only two generations, we have altered the biogeochemical processes of the entire planet.28The absence of a historical perspective on the conservation, even accumulation, of catastrophe is a major barrier to needed change in our time. Many environmentalists, including some who perceive themselves as being on the left, persist in believing that we can address our immense and growing ecological problems without altering our fundamental social-production relationships. All that is necessary in this view is the combined magic of green technology and green markets. Short-term fixes are presumed to be adequate solutions, while society remains on the same essential course as before. Indeed, the dominant perspective on ecology can be characterized, I believe, as consisting of three successive stages of denial: (1) the denial altogether of the planetary ecological crisis (or its human cause); (2) the denial that the ecological crisis is fundamentally due to the system of production in which we live, namely capitalism; and (3) the denial that capitalism is constitutionally incapable of overcoming this global ecological threat—with capital now being presented instead as the savior of the environment.The first stage of ecological denial is easy to understand. This is the form of denial represented by Exxon-Mobil. Such outright denial of the destructive consequences of their actions is the automatic response of corporations generally when faced with the prospect of environmental regulations, which would negatively affect their bottom lines. It is also the form of absolute denial promoted by climate-change denialists themselves, who categorically reject the reality of human agency in global climate change. The second stage of denial, a retreat from the first, is to admit there is a problem, while dissociating it from the larger socioeconomic system. The famous IPAT formula, i.e. Environmental Impact = Population x Consumption x Technology (which amounts to saying that these are the three factors behind our environmental problems/solutions), has been used by some to suggest that population growth, the consumption habits of most individuals, and inappropriate technology carry the totality of blame for environmental degradation. The answer then is sustainable population, sustainable consumption, and sustainable technology. This approach, though seemingly matter-of-fact, and deceptively radical, derives its acceptability for the vested interests from the fact that it generally serves to disguise the more fundamental reality of the treadmill of capitalist production itself.29 The third stage of denial, a last-ditch defense, and exhibiting a greater level of desperation on the part of the established order, is, I would argue, the most dangerous of all. It admits that the environmental crisis is wrapped up with the existence of capitalism, but argues that what we need is an entirely new kind of capitalism: variously called “sustainable capitalism,” “green capitalism,” “natural capitalism,” and “climate capitalism” by thinkers as various as Al Gore, Paul Hawken, Amory and L. Hunter Lovins, and Jonathon Porritt.30 The argument here varies but usually begins with the old trope that capitalism is the most efficient economic system possible—a form of “spontaneous order” arising from an invisible hand—and that the answer to ecological problems is to make it more efficient still by internalizing costs on the environment previously externalized by the system. Aside from the presumed magic of the market itself, and moral claims as to “the greening of corporations,” this is supposed to be achieved by means of a black box of technological wonders. Implicit in all such views is the notion that capitalism can be made sustainable, without altering its accumulation or economic growth imperative and without breaking with the dominant social relations. The exponential growth of the system ad infinitum is possible, we are told, while simultaneously generating a sustainable relation to the planet. This of course runs up against what Herman Daly has called the Impossibility Theorem: If the whole world were to have an ecological footprint the size of the United States we would need multiple planets.31 The idea that such a development process can persist permanently on a single planet (and indeed that we are not at this point already confronting earthly limits) is of course an exercise in delusion, bordering on belief in the supernatural. “Capitalism,” as the great environmental economist K. William Kapp once wrote, is “an economy of unpaid costs.”32 It can persist and even prosper only insofar as it is able to externalize its costs on the mass of the population and the surrounding environment. Whenever the destruction is too severe the system simply seeks to engineer another spatial fix. Yet, a planetary capitalism is from this standpoint a contradiction in terms: it means that there is nowhere finally to externalize the social and environmental costs of capitalist destruction (we cannot ship our toxic waste into outer space!), and no external resources to draw upon in the face of the enormous squandering of resources inherent to the system (we can’t solve our problems by mining the moon!). Market-based solutions to climate change, such as emissions trading, have been shown to promote profits, and to facilitate economic growth and financial wealth, while increasing carbon emissions. From an environmental standpoint, therefore, they are worse than nothing—since they stand in the way of effective action. Nor are the technologies most acceptable to the system (since not requiring changes in property relations) the answer. So-called “clean coal” or carbon capture and storage technologies are economically unfeasible and ecologically dubious, and serve mainly as an ideological justification for keeping coal-fired plants going. Worse still, are geoengineering schemes like dumping sulfur particles in the atmosphere or iron filings in the ocean (the first in order to deflect the sun’s rays, the second in order to promote algal growth to increase ocean absorption of carbon). These schemes carry with them the potential for even greater ecological disasters: in the first case, this could lead to a reduction of photosynthesis, in the second the expansion of dead zones. Remember the Sorcerer’s Apprentice!33 The potential for the accumulation of catastrophe on a truly planetary level as a result of geoengineering technology is so great that it would be absolute folly to proceed in this way—simply in order to avoid changes in the mode of production, i.e., a fundamental transformation of our way of life, property relations, and metabolism with nature. Science tells us that we are crossing planetary boundaries everywhere we look, from climate change, to ocean acidification, to species destruction, to freshwater shortages, to chemical pollution of air, water, soil, and humans. The latest warning sign is the advent of what is called “extreme weather”—a direct outgrowth of climate change. As Hansen says: “Global warming increases the intensity of droughts and heat waves, and thus the area of forest fires. However, because a warmer atmosphere holds more water vapor, global warming must also increase the intensity of the other extreme of the hydrologic cycle—meaning heavier rains, more extreme floods, and more intense storms driven by latent heat.” Scientists involved in the new area of climate-attribution science, where extreme weather events are examined for their climate signatures, are now arguing that we are rapidly approaching a situation where the proverbial “‘hundred-year’ flood” no longer occurs simply once a century, but every few years. Natural catastrophes are thus likely to become more severe and more frequent occurrences in the lives of all living beings. The hope of some scientists is that this will finally wake up humanity to its true danger.34 How are we to understand the challenge of the enormous accumulation of catastrophe, and the no less massive human action required to address this? In the 1930s John Maynard Keynes wrote an essay entitled “Economic Possibilities of Our Grandchildren,” aimed at defending capitalism in response to revolutionary social challenges then arising. Keynes argued that we should rely for at least a couple more generations on the convenient lie of the Smithian invisible hand—accepting greed as the basis of a spontaneous economic order. We should therefore continue the pretense that “fair is foul and foul is fair” for the sake of the greater accumulation of wealth in society that such an approach would bring. Eventually, in the time of our “grandchildren”—maybe a “hundred years” hence (i.e., by the early 2030s)—Keynes assumed, the added wealth created by these means would be great enough that we could begin to tell the truth: that foul is foul and fair is fair. It would then be necessary for humanity to address the enormous inequalities and injustices produced by the system, engaging in a full-scale redistribution of wealth, and a radical transformation of the ends of production.35 Yet, the continued pursuit of Keynes’s convenient lie over the last eight decades has led to a world far more polarized and beset with contradictions than he could have foreseen. It is a world prey to the enormous unintended consequences of accumulation without limits: namely, global economic stagnation, financial crisis, and planetary ecological destruction. Keynes, though aware of some of the negative economic aspects of capitalist production, had no real understanding of the ecological perils—of which scientists had already long been warning. Today these perils are impossible to overlook. Faced with impending ecological catastrophe, it is more necessary than ever to abandon Keynes’s convenient lie and espouse the truth: that foul is foul and fair is fair. Capitalism, the society of “après moi le déluge!” is a system that fouls its own nest—both the human-social conditions and the wider natural environment on which it depends. The accumulation of capital is at the same time accumulation of catastrophe, not only for a majority of the world’s people, but living species generally. Hence, nothing is fairer—more just, more beautiful, and more necessary—today than the struggle to overthrow the regime of capital and to create a system of substantive equality and sustainable human development; a socialism for the twenty-first century.

### Case

#### And THEIR ARGUMENTATIVE EXCHANGE INTENDING TO PROVE THE VALIDITY OF THEIR SPEECH ACT IS A PERFORMATIVE CONTRADICTION TO THEIR NOTION OF NON-HUMAN AGENCY. THEIR PHILOSOPHY SUPPORTS A REACTIVELY NIHILISTIC AND NEOCONSERVATIVE POLITICAL BACKLASH MORE POWERFUL AND PERSUASIVE THAN THE AFF.

Berry 2012 (David M, Senior Lecturer in Digital Media, “The Uses of Object Oriented Ontology” <http://stunlaw.blogspot.com/2012/05/uses-of-object-oriented-ontology.html>

Indeed, if we were to take this claim seriously then one would be driven to wonder why Bogost is writing his book at all, but of course, “musket buckshot and gypsum and space shuttles” cannot be the addressees of this text as patently they do not read. So object-oriented ontology (OOO) is trying to do two things here, on the one hand deny the specialness of humans’ existence in relation to other objects, whilst simultaneously having to write for them and to make arguments supporting their claims – thereby acknowledging the very special existence that humans possess, namely qualities of understanding, taking a stand on their own being, etc. This is a classic performative contradiction. Whilst it would be perfectly legitimate to outline a formalist theory or methodological position that, for the sake of the approach, limits the requirement to treat human actors as particular or special in relation to others (this is the methodological innovation within Actor-Network Theory), it is quite another to then extend this claim into a philosophical system which is part of a special order of discourse particular to human beings, that is, philosophy. This so-called philosophical non-human turn, is interesting for its nihilistic and conservative implications, something we now turn to in detail.

**Managerialism is necessary to prevent global extinction –processes of environmental destruction are unstoppable without intervention**

Dr Neil **Levy** **1999**. Fellow of the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at Charles Sturt University. “Discourses of the Environment” p. 215

**If the ‘technological fix’ is unlikely to be more successful than strategies of limitation of our uses of resources, we are nevertheless unable to simply leave the environment as it is. There is a real and pressing need for more, and more accurate, technical and scientific information about the non-human world**. For we are faced with a situation in which **the processes we have already set in train will continue to impact upon that world, and therefore us, for centuries. It is therefore necessary**, not only to stop cutting down the rain forests, but **to develop real, concrete proposals for action, to reverse, or at least limit, the effects of our previous interventions**. More over, there is another reason why **our behaviour towards the non-human cannot simply be a matter of leaving it as it is,** at least **in so far as our goals are not only environmental but also involve social justice**. For if we simply preserve what remains to us of wilderness, of the countryside and of park land, we also preserve patterns of very unequal access to their resources and their consolations (Soper 1995: 207). In fact, we risk exacerbating these inequalities. It is no us, but the poor of **Brazil**, who **will bear the brunt of the misery which would result form a strictly enforced policy of leaving the Amazonian rain forest untouched, in the absence of alternative means of providing for their livelihood.** **It is the development of policies to provide such ecologically sustainable alternative which we require, as well as the development of technical means for replacing our current greenhouse gas-emitting sources of energy. Such policies and proposals for concrete action must be formulated by** ecologists, environmentalist, **people with expertise concerning the functioning of ecosystems and the impacts which our actions have upon them. Such proposals are**, therefore, **very much the province for Foucault’s specific intellectual, the one who works ‘within specific sectors, at the precise points where their won conditions of life or work situate them**’ (Foucault 1980g: 126). For who could be more fittingly described as ‘the strategists of life and death’ than these environmentalists? After the end of the Cold War, it is in this sphere, more than any other, that man’s ‘politics places his existence as a living being in question’ (Foucault 1976: 143). For **it is in facing the consequences of our intervention in the non-human world that the fate of our species, and of those with whom we share this planet, will be decided.**

#### THE 1AC VISUAL METAPHOR ENTRENCHES THE PATRIARCHAL GAZE. CP USES DIALOGUE AS AN AURAL METAPHOR – THIS IS KEY TO CHANGE THE PATRIARCHAL NATURE OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM.

**Hibbits 94** Professor Bernard J. Hibbitts, professor at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 1994 Making Sense of Metaphors Visuality, Aurality, And The Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse <http://faculty.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/meta_p2.htm>

**It may be argued that the extent of their involvement with written material has led American men as a group-like men in other Western societies-to take a great interest in the phenomenon of visual observation that has been the source of so much of their textual knowledge and authority**.221 As modern feminist scholarship has taken pains to emphasize (if not necessarily explain), the "gaze" has historically been more of a "male" than a "female" medium.222 In the American tradition, men have been primarily responsible for reducing the world-and, in the process, women-to visual, two-dimensional texts, paintings, photographs,223 electronic images,224 diagrams, and equations.225 In their capacities as school administrators, college professors, historians, curators, and archivists, American men have long been in charge of preserving and perpetuating the corpus of American visual culture over time. As scientists and philosophers, they have further indulged their visuality by using mostly visual metaphors to describe the central intellectual operations of thinking and knowing: they have made "observations," offered "perspectives," and "speculated" on the nature of reality.226 **The desire and even the need to look that has animated American male experience has frequently been coupled with a limited and somewhat selective devaluation of aurality and evocatively aural forms. At least since the late eighteenth century, most American men have rejected dialogue and story as respectable vehicles for the communication of important written information**.227 More generally, American men as a group have been eager to prescribe silence as a positive personal and social value for others, if not necessarily for themselves.228 This latter strategy has been feasible in part because many American men have had access to a visual medium of communication (writing) which in their experience has not depended on sound to provide its sense. The strategy has moreover been politically useful because it has enabled American men to consolidate their control of other groups that have been more dependent on aural expression. **The command that women** (not to mention children) **be "seen and not heard**"-implicitly evoked from the anti-scolding laws of the seventeenth century**229** through the marital evidence laws of the nineteenth century**230**-**has been a prime guarantor of patriarchal power.**

#### IMPACT’S WAR.

**Warren and Cady 94** Karen J. Warren, Duane L. Cady, Professors at Macalester and Hamline, Spring 1994, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3810167?cookieSet=1>

Operationalized, the evidence of patriarchy as a dysfunctional system is found in the behaviors to which it gives rise, (c), and the unmanageability, (d), which results. For example, in the United States, current estimates are that one out of every three or four women will be raped by someone she knows; globally, rape, sexual harassment, spouse-beating, and sado-masochistic pornography are examples of behaviors practiced, sanctioned, or tolerated within patriarchy. In the realm of environmentally destructive behaviors, strip-mining, factory farming, and pollution of the air, water, and soil are instances of behaviors maintained and sanctioned within patriarchy. They, too, rest on the faulty beliefs that it is okay to "rape the earth," that it is "man's God-given right" to have dominion (that is, domination) over the earth, that nature has only instrumental value, that environmental destruction is the acceptable price we pay for "progress." **And the presumption of warism, that war is a natural, righteous, and ordinary way to impose dominion on a people or nation, goes hand in hand with patriarchy and leads to dysfunctional behaviors of nations and ultimately to international unmanageability.**

## 2NC

### 2NC Overview

#### **Should means must**

Summers 94 (Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-8, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13)

¶4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"[13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn13) in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling *in praesenti*.[14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn14) The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;[15](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn15) it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.[16](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287" \l "marker3fn16) ¶ [CONTINUES – TO FOOTNOTE]¶ [13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker2fn13) "*Should*" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with *ought* but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an *obligation* *and to be more than advisory*); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, [802 P.2d 813](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=802&box2=P.2D&box3=813) (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an *obligation* to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). [14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker2fn14) *In praesenti* means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is *presently* or *immediately effective*, as opposed to something that *will* or *would* become effective *in the future [in futurol*]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, [106 U.S. 360](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=106&box2=U.S.&box3=360), 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

### 2NC Decisionmaking Good

#### THEIR VIBRANT POLITICS IS INSUFFICIENT – IT MUST BE SUPPLEMENTED BY A POLITICAL METHOD WHICH ALLOWS COLLECTIVE PARTICIPATION AND REFUTATION OF EXPECTED POLITICAL FUTURES I.E. DISCUSSIONS ORIENTED AROUND A PLAN OF FUTURE ACTION TO PHYSICALLY INTERACT WITH MATTER. FRAMEWORK IS A PRE-REQ TO EVALUATING THEIR THEORY OF AGENCY, NOT THE OTHER WAY AROUND.

Wyk 2k12

[review of bennett’s vibrant matter, cosmos and history, 8, no 2, 136-7, alan r.]

Both philosophically and political this is a necessary and inspiring proposition.¶ Bennett is right to recognize that any future that we are to have must begin with a¶ reordering of our politics into a recognition of the ecological implication of humanity¶ and nature, of human and non-human bodies; our future must be materialist in this¶ sense. She also right in recognizing that this political reordering must itself arise with¶ refiguring of our ontological world, one which overcomes the privileged binaries of¶ subject-object, human-non-human. As we have seen, Bennett clearly sides with objects¶ as this overcoming. To this end, one of the founding gestures of her project is announced¶ in the Introduction as an “eliding” of the “rich and diverse literature on subjectivity and¶ its genesis” (ix). There are certainly good reasons for this, but in eliding the discourse on¶ subjectivity Bennett also abandons the rich and diverse analysis of power that has been¶ a part of that discourse. Again, there may be very good reasons for wanting to move¶ beyond power for political analysis, but in moving beyond power politics still requires an¶ analytic of becoming, one that can account for, as Rancière might say, the distribution of¶ what matters, of what comes to matter. The political public must be more than a field of¶ feeling, of becoming, even if that is an expansive feeling and becoming of the world, of¶ the human and non-human alike. A politics of the future which is a sustainable politics¶ must account not only for the force of life, of the vibrancy of matter, but the force of the¶ negative as well, the forces that demarcate the field of becoming into the possible and is a necessary step in developing a political ecology of this sustainable future, it remains¶ to be supplemented by a something that will allow us to intervene in the becoming of¶ what matters.

### 2NC Switch Side Good

#### C) Predictable ground – it’s necessary for meaningful switch-side debate – key to progressive politics

English et al 7

(Eric English, Stephen Lano, Gordon Mitchell, University of Pittsburgh communications professor, Catherine Morrison, John Reif, and Carly Woods, Schenley Park Debate Authors Working Group, “Debate as a Weapon of Mass Destruction,” June 2007, Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, [www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/EnglishDAWG.pdf](http://www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/EnglishDAWG.pdf%5D), - Kurr)

The problem for Greene and Hicks is that this notion of citizenship becomes tied to a normative conception of American democracy that justifies imperialism. They write, ‘‘The production and management of this field of governance allows liberalism to trade in cultural technologies in the global cosmopolitan marketplace at the same time as it creates a field of intervention to transform and change the world one subject (regime) at a time.’’11 Here, Greene and Hicks argue that this new conception of liberal governance, which epitomizes the ethical citizen as an individual trained in the switch-side technique, serves as a normative tool for judging other polities and justifying forcible regime change. One need look only to the Bush administration’s framing of war as an instrument of democracy promotion to grasp how the switch-side technique can be appropriated as a justification for violence. It is our position, however, that rather than acting as a cultural technology expanding American exceptionalism, switch-side debating originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes. Several prominent voices reshaping the national dialogue on homeland security have come from the academic debate community and draw on its animating spirit of critical inquiry. For example, Georgetown University law professor Neal Katyal served as lead plaintiff’s counsel in Hamdan, which challenged post-9/11 enemy combat definitions.12 The foundation for Katyal’s winning argument in Hamdan was laid some four years before, when he collaborated with former intercollegiate debate champion Laurence Tribe on an influential Yale Law Journal addressing a similar topic.13 Tribe won the National Debate Tournament in 1961 while competing as an undergraduate debater for Harvard University. Thirty years later, Katyal represented Dartmouth College at the same tournament and finished third. The imprint of this debate training is evident in Tribe and Katyal’s contemporary public interventions, which are characterized by meticulous research, sound argumentation, and a staunch commitment to democratic principles. Katyal’s reflection on his early days of debating at Loyola High School in Chicago’s North Shore provides a vivid illustration. ‘‘I came in as a shy freshman with dreams of going to medical school. Then Loyola’s debate team opened my eyes to a different world: one of argumentation and policy.’’ As Katyal recounts, ‘‘the most important preparation for my career came from my experiences as a member of Loyola’s debate team.’’14 The success of former debaters like Katyal, Tribe, and others in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security points to the efficacy of academic debate as a training ground for future advocates of progressive change. Moreover, a robust understanding of the switch-side technique and the classical liberalism which underpins it would help prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies. For buried within an inner-city debater’s files is a secret threat to absolutism: the refusal to be classified as ‘‘with us or against us,’’ the embracing of intellectual experimentation in an age of orthodoxy, and reflexivity in the face of fundamentalism. But by now, the irony of our story should be apparent\*the more effectively academic debating practice can be focused toward these ends, the greater the proclivity of McCarthy’s ideological heirs to brand the activity as a ‘‘weapon of mass destruction.’’

### 2NC Dialogue/Limits

#### C) Echo Chamber DA - This rejection of structured clash makes debate into an echo chamber. This impoverishes their project even if it is right

Talisse 5

Professor of Philosophy @Vandy¶ Robert, Philosophy & Social Criticism, Deliberativist responses to activist challenges, 31(4) p. 429-431

The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. **The deliberativist view** I have sketched hold that reasonableness **involved some degree of** what we may call **epistemic modesty. On this** view, **the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons,** and so she enters into public discourse **as a way of testing her views against the objections** and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly hold that **her present view is open to reasonable critique** and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of **politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable**. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness **for the activist** consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action; **discussion with those who disagree need not be involved**. **According to the activist,** there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which **there is no room for reasoned objection.** Under such conditions, **the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational**. It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001A; ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political **activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies,** demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. Activists also must engage in deliberation among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movement must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tact’s; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. **Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists**. **Group polarization** is a well-documented phenomenon that **has ‘been found all over the world** and is many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81-2). Importantly, **in group that ‘engage in repeated discussions’** over time, **the polarization is even more pronounced** (2003: 86). Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of an individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.).17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that **he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees** in cases in which the requirement of justice are so clear that he can be confidents that has the truth .Group polarization suggest that even deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even we have the truth. **For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views,** but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth ,In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggest that a engagement with

## 1NR

### Ethics Impact

#### Capitalism makes ethical relations impossible.

Morgareidge ’98

(Clayton Morgareidge, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Lewis & Clark College. August 22, 1998http://legacy.lclark.edu/~clayton/commentaries/evil.html)

To show why this is the case, let me turn to capital's greatest critic, Karl Marx. **Under capitalism**, Marx writes, **everything in nature and everything that human beings are and can do becomes an object: a resource for, or an obstacle, to the expansion of production, the development of technology, the growth of markets, and the circulation of money.** For those who manage and live from capital**, nothing has value of its own.** Mountain streams, clean air, **human lives -- all mean nothing in themselves, but are valuable only if they can be used to turn a profit**.[1] **If capital looks at (not into) the human face, it sees there only eyes through which brand names and advertising can enter and mouths that can demand and consume food, drink, and tobacco products**. If human faces express needs, then either products can be manufactured to meet, or seem to meet, those needs, or else, **if the needs are incompatible with the growth of capital, then the faces expressing them must be unrepresented or silenced.** **Obviously what capitalist enterprises do have consequences for the well being of human beings and the planet we live on. Capital profits from the production of food, shelter, and all the necessities of life. The production of all these things uses human lives in the shape of labor, as well as the resources of the earth. If we care about life, if we see our obligations in each others faces, then we have to want all the things capital does to be governed by that care,** to be directed by the ethical concern for life. But feeding people is not the aim of the food industry, or shelter the purpose of the housing industry. In medicine, making profits is becoming a more important goal than caring for sick people**. As capitalist enterprises these activities aim single-mindedly at the accumulation of capital**, and such purposes as caring for the sick or feeding the hungry becomes a mere means to an end, an instrument of corporate growth. Therefore **ethics, the overriding commitment to meeting human need, is left out of deliberations about what the heavyweight institutions of our society are going to do. Moral convictions are expressed in churches, in living rooms, in letters to the editor, sometimes even by politicians and widely read commentators, but almost always with an attitude of resignation to the inevitable.** People no longer say, "You can't stop progress," but only because they have learned not to call economic growth progress. They still think they can't stop it. And they are right -- as long as the production of all our needs and the organization of our labor is carried out under private ownership. Only a minority ("idealists") can take seriously a way of thinking that counts for nothing in real world decision making. **Only when the end of capitalism is on the table will ethics have a seat at the table.**¶

### Apocalyptic Imagery

**Images of catastrophe cause an empathic shift to common humanity---creates the condition for empathetic relationships that eschew the politically anesthetizing form of politics their evidence criticizes---and, this is especially crucial in the context of policy debates and advocacy simulations**

**Recuber 11**

Timothy Recuber is a doctoral candidate in sociology at the Graduate Center of the City. University of New York. He has taught at Hunter College in Manhattan "CONSUMING CATASTROPHE: AUTHENTICITY AND EMOTION IN MASS-MEDIATED DISASTER" gradworks.umi.com/3477831.pdf

Perhaps, then, **what** distant **consumers express when they sit glued** to the television **watching a disaster** replayed over and over, when they buy t-shirts or snow globes, when they mail teddy bears to a memorial, or when they tour a disaster site, **is** a deep, maybe **subconscious, longing for those age-old forms of community** **and** **real human compassion** **that emerge in a place when disaster has struck. It is a longing in some ways so alien to the world we currently live in that it requires catastrophe to call it forth**, even in our imaginations. Nevertheless, **the actions of unadulterated goodwill** **that become commonplace** in harrowing conditions **represent the truly authentic form of humanity** **that all of us**, to one degree or another, **chase after** in contemporary consumer culture every day. **And while it is certainly a bit foolhardy to seek authentic humanity through disaster-related** **media** and **culture, the sheer strength of that desire has been evident in the public’s response to all the disasters,** crises and catastrophes to hit the United States in the past decade**. The millions of television viewers who cried on September 11, or during Hurricane Katrina and the Virginia Tech shootings, and the thousands upon thousands who volunteered their time, labor, money, and even their blood, as well as the countless others who created art, contributed to memorials, or adorned their cars or bodies with disaster-related paraphernalia**— despite the fact that many knew no one who had been personally affected by any of these disasters—**all attest to a desire for real human community and compassion that is woefully unfulfilled by American life under normal conditions today**. In the end, **the consumption of disaster doesn’t make us unable or unwilling to engage with disasters on a communal level, or towards progressive political ends**—it makes us feel as if we already have, simply by consuming. **It is ultimately less a form of political anesthesia than a simulation of politics**, a Potemkin village of communal sentiment, that fills our longing for a more just and humane world with disparate acts of cathartic consumption. Still, **the positive political potential underlying such consumption**—**the desire for real forms of connection and community**—**remains the most redeeming feature of disaster consumerism.** Though that desire is frequently warped when various media lenses refract it, diffuse it, or reframe it to fit a political agenda, **its overwhelming strength should nonetheless serve notice that people want a different world than the one in which we currently live, with a different way of understanding and responding to disasters**. They want a world where risk is not leveraged for profit or political gain, but sensibly planned for with the needs of all socio-economic groups in mind. **They want a world where preemptive strategies are used to anticipate the real threats posed by global climate change**

**and global inequality, rather than to invent fears of ethnic others and justify unnecessary wars**. **They want a world where people can come together not simply as a market, but as a public**, **to exert real agency over the policies made** in the name of their safety and security. And, **when disaster does strike, they want a world where the goodwill and compassion shown by their neighbors**, by strangers in their communities, **and even by distant spectators and consumers, will be matched by their own government**. **Though this vision of the world is utopian, it is not unreasonable**, and if contemporary American culture is ever to give us more than just an illusion of safety, or empathy, or authenticity, **then it is this vision that we must advocate on a daily basis, not only when disaster strikes.**

# Doubles v UTD

## 1NC

### 1NC

#### CP text: the 50 States and all relevant Territories should enter into a compact on developing power purchase agreements for nuclear reactors under 300MW. The Compact should collect revenue via a Clean Energy Community Finance Initiative.

#### Compacts solve faster than the federal government

Mountjoy ‘01

John is a policy analyst with the council of State Governments, “Interstate Compacts Make a Comeback,” Spring <http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/ncic/Comeback.pdf>

Some may question the need for interstate compacts to address multi-state policy issues. Why ¶ not leave such regulation to the feds? ¶ “Interstate compacts help us maintain state control,” said Gary McConnell, director of the ¶ Georgia Emergency Management Agency. ¶ During his 10 years as GEMA director, McConnell has played an instrumental role in developing ¶ and promoting a successful interstate compact —the Emergency Management Assistance ¶ Compact, or EMAC. EMAC allows state emergency management agencies to cooperate and ¶ share resources in the event of natural and man-made disasters. ¶ “We can go to the federal government for all kinds of help when natural disasters strike, but the ¶ states [cooperating under an interstate compact] can provide specific resources quicker, which ¶ are likely to be problem specific,” McConnell said. “It’s less bureaucratic, and it’s far cheaper. ¶ It’s easier for us under EMAC to obtain resources from surrounding states than it is to use ¶ federal assistance, which we’d end up having to pay more for anyway. I suspect this is the case ¶ with many other interstate compacts as well.” ¶ “States are rediscovering that they have the power to address their own problems better than the ¶ federal government,” said Rick Masters, The Council of State Governments’ legal counsel and ¶ special counsel for interstate compacts. ¶ CSG, which has tracked interstate compacts for more than 40 years, maintains a clearinghouse of ¶ compact information. More recently, CSG helps administer EMAC and is facilitating the update ¶ of the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision and the Interstate Compact on ¶ Juveniles. Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution laid the legal foundation for interstate ¶ compacts: “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep ¶ Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another ¶ State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent ¶ Danger as will not admit of delay.” Compacts actually preceded the Constitution, having been ¶ used in colonial times to resolve boundary disputes between colonies. ¶ Prior to the 1920s, interstate compacts were typically bi-state agreements, addressing boundary ¶ disputes and territorial claims. In fact, only 36 interstate compacts were formed between 1783 ¶ and 1920. It is only in this century that states have turned to interstate compacts to facilitate ¶ cooperative solutions to multi-state problems. ¶ After a lull in the late 1970s and early 1980s, interstate compacts are beginning to enjoy a ¶ resurgence. Since the early 1990s, states have initiated or updated several high-profile compacts. ¶ Examples include EMAC, the Interstate Compact on Industrialized/Modular Buildings and the ¶ Interstate Insurance Receivership Compact. Interstate compacts can set the framework for cooperative solutions to today’s cross-state ¶ challenges, from policing drugs to supplying energy or controlling sprawl. ¶ “Issues within the states are becoming more complex and aren’t confined by state boundaries. As ¶ a result, solutions are becoming multi-state as well. Compacts are the only tool that is truly ¶ adequate for addressing these multi-state issues,” said Bill Voit, senior project director at The ¶ Council of State Governments. ¶ An example is an interstate compact being considered to facilitate taxation of e-commerce. ¶ Opponents of Internet taxation claim that it would be virtually impossible for online vendors to ¶ comply with the complex, often confusing system of state and local sales and use taxes. Since ¶ Internet sales are expected to reach $184 billion annually by 2004, states have a vested interest in ¶ breaking down this and other barriers to taxing online transactions. ¶ Congress currently is considering the Internet Tax Moratorium Equity Act (S. 512) to help states ¶ simplify their sales and use taxes, in part by authorizing states to enter into an Interstate Sales ¶ and Use Tax Compact. The compact would create a “uniform, streamlined sales and use tax ¶ system,” convenient to remote sales. ¶ At least 18 states are considering the model streamlined sales tax legislation in 2001. Kentucky, ¶ South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming already have signed bills into law. ¶ Existing interstate compacts, many drafted in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, are ripe for ¶ amendment and revision. Technology and the Internet now make the sharing of information ¶ seamless and immediate, yet several interstate compacts are plagued by inadequate ¶ administration. ¶ “Not only do we see the development of new compacts, but we are seeing the re-examination of ¶ existing compacts…revising them to keep pace with our changing world,” Masters said. ¶ Developed in 1937, the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers is ¶ one example of a compact in need of update. Adopted by all 50 states, the compact regulates the ¶ movement of parolees and probationers across state lines. The burgeoning offender population ¶ and the ease with which offenders now can travel have created several problems for the compact, ¶ including: frequent violations of compact rules, inability to enforce compliance, difficulty in ¶ creating new rules and slow, unreliable exchange of case information. ¶ The antiquated compact needed a replacement that would provide states the authority, ¶ enforcement tools and resources to adequately track and ensure supervision of parolees and ¶ probationers. ¶ The new interstate compact, the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision, provides ¶ these solutions. The new compact includes mechanisms for enforcement, accountability, resource provision, information sharing and state-to-state cooperation. Currently, the compact ¶ has been introduced in 39 states and enacted in 18. ¶ Just as technology can smooth the operation of interstate compacts, alternative dispute resolution ¶ techniques can increase their self-sufficiency. Enforcement tools within interstate compacts need ¶ to utilize more of the mediation and arbitration services that have proven successful throughout ¶ state government. By developing additional self-contained enforcement mechanisms, compact ¶ members would not need to rely solely on the crowded docket of the U.S. Supreme Court. ¶ States should further utilize interstate compacts to address new problems and create new ¶ methods of interstate cooperation. If not, federal preemption in certain policy areas is a distinct ¶ possibility.

#### States incentives solve nuclear development

Dow Jones Newswires, 7

(5-21-07, “States Maneuver to Lure New Nuclear Power Plants” <http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=19778941>

In a positive shift for U.S. power companies planning a new fleet of nuclear facilities, nuclear power has gained popularity in several states as a solution to high power prices and growing demand. ¶ Louisiana, Florida, South Carolina and Georgia are offering incentives to develop new nuclear generation, hoping that nuclear power prices will be lower and less volatile than power generated by natural gas. State regulators also hope new nuclear power plants will create jobs and bolster local industry. Nuclear operators say state rules ensuring cost recovery of new plants - particularly pre-construction costs - will likely affect their decisions about where to build new plants. ¶ Louisiana and Florida have approved measures that would allow New Orleans-based Entergy Corp. (ETR) and Juno Beach, Fla.-based FPL Group (FPL) to pass on some pre-construction nuclear plant development costs to their customers, while Georgia regulators are considering a similar move.

### 1NC

#### Immigration reform will pass in the status quo – insulated from the fiscal cliff – capital key and key to American economic competitiveness

Kinnari 12/29

Aaron, founder of the Future Forum a platform for educating and engaging young leaders on important global issues, Immigration Reform Would Be the Biggest Gift We Could Get This Year. 12/29/12. http://www.policymic.com/articles/21633/immigration-reform-would-be-the-biggest-gift-we-could-get-this-year.

When it takes session in January, the 113th Congress will have a number of critical issues that demand attention. There will be the potential fallout from the fiscal cliff, a new round of debt ceiling negotiations, and confirmation hearings for new cabinet secretaries, among others. But there is one policy matter that, while complex and long elusive, enjoys broad calls for improvement and immense potential for impact. The greatest gift we could get next year from Washington would be a comprehensive effort to finally fix America’s broken immigration system.¶ President Obama has signaled that immigration reform will be an early priority for his Administration in 2013. He’s not alone in calling for reform. The leading Republican presidential candidates all supported some elements of immigration reform, mostly focused on high-skilled labor and border security. And congressional leaders from both sides of the aisle are also coming together, with a bipartisan group of senators already meeting to discuss the issue.¶ A number of trade groups and research organizations from across industry and ideology have also signaled their support and have outlined the costs of inaction and benefits of reform. The U.S. Travel Association estimates that visa hurdles have resulted in a loss of 78 million foreign visitors over the past decade, resulting in the forfeiture of $606 billion in spending and 500,000 American jobs every year. Tourism and hospitality companies, as well as agricultural businesses, also find it difficult to hire short-term or seasonal workers – positions that Americans are often unable or unwilling to fill. While they depend on these employees to meet consumer demand, businesses often face bureaucratic barriers that can make an application for a temporary H-2B visa take several weeks and cost thousands of dollars.¶ Immigrants play important roles in America’s high-tech sectors as well but face similar obstacles. Researchers at Duke and UC Berkeley found that 25% of technology and engineering companies started between 1995 and 2005 had at least one immigrant key founder and those companies created more than 450,000 jobs. Another report by the American Enterprise Institute and the Partnership for a New American Economy found that every foreign-born STEM graduate that stays in the U.S. creates 2.62 American jobs. But despite their strong track record, the U.S. still lacks a visa for immigrant entrepreneurs, doesn’t grant STEM graduates enough green cards, and doesn’t have an adequate supply of H-1B visas for high-skilled immigrants.¶ And of course, a plan to address undocumented immigrants currently living in the United States must also be part of the fix. A recent poll demonstrates broad support for legalization, with 62% of Americans supporting a path to citizenship. And the Center for American Progress estimates that legalizing the 11 million undocumented immigrants in the U.S. would result in a gain of $1.5 trillion in GDP over 10 years.¶ The benefits are clear and the support for immigration reform is there. The question that remains is what’s the best strategy for Congress to pursue. Some argue for a piecemeal approach that would first address areas where there is broad support and potential for impact, and leave tougher questions for a later time. Given the political climate, this might seem like a practical path. But a comprehensive package might actually be more viable. Addressing challenges in silos would siphon support from those whose issues don’t make the first cut. Therefore, Congress must confront all components together – from a path to legalization to border security to a streamlined process for new immigrants – and leave enough room for the typical bartering that comes with political negotiations.¶ Past administrations and Congresses have tried to pass immigration reform and have failed. But we can no longer afford inaction if America hopes to maintain its status as a global engine for innovation and a destination for hard-working talent from around the world. If Washington can finally deliver a comprehensive package to fix our nation’s broken immigration system, it will be the gift that will keep on giving for generations to come.

#### Top priority and PC is key

Hesson 1/2

Ted, Reporter, ABC News, "Analysis: 6 Things Obama Needs To Do for Immigration Reform", <http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/News/things-president-obama-immigration-reform/story?id=18103115~~%23.UOSdSYnjlJ4>

On Sunday, President Barack Obama said that immigration reform is a "top priority" on his agenda and that he would introduce legislation in his first year.¶ To find out what he needs to do to make reform a reality, we talked to Lynn Tramonte, the deputy director at America's Voice, a group that lobbies for immigration reform, and Muzaffar Chishti, the director of the New York office of the Migration Policy Institute, a think tank. Here's what we came up with.¶ 1. Be a Leader¶ During Obama's first term, bipartisan legislation never got off the ground. The president needs to do a better job leading the charge this time around, according to Chishti. "He has to make it clear that it's a high priority of his," he said. "He has to make it clear that he'll use his bully pulpit and his political muscle to make it happen, and he has to be open to using his veto power." His announcement this weekend is a step in that direction, but he needs to follow through.¶ 2. Clear Space on the Agenda¶ Political priorities aren't always dictated by the folks in D.C., as the tragic Connecticut school shooting shows us. While immigration had inertia after the election, the fiscal cliff and gun violence have been the most talked about issues around the Capitol in recent weeks. The cliff could recede from view now that Congress has passed a bill, but how quickly the president can resolve the other issues on his agenda could determine whether immigration reform is possible this year. "There's only limited oxygen in the room," Chishti said.

#### The loss of economic leadership results in global conflict, withdrawal of global power projection, and escalation of hotspots

Friedberg and Schoenfeld 8

Aaron, professor of politics and international relations at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School, Gabriel, Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, The Dangers of a Diminished America, WSJ, 10/21, Proquest

With the global financial system in serious trouble, is America's geostrategic dominance likely to diminish? If so, what would that mean? One immediate implication of the crisis that began on Wall Street and spread across the world is that the primary instruments of U.S. foreign policy will be crimped. The next president will face an entirely new and adverse fiscal position. Estimates of this year's federal budget deficit already show that it has jumped $237 billion from last year, to $407 billion. With families and businesses hurting, there will be calls for various and expensive domestic relief programs. In the face of this onrushing river of red ink, both Barack Obama and John McCain have been reluctant to lay out what portions of their programmatic wish list they might defer or delete. Only Joe Biden has suggested a possible reduction -- foreign aid. This would be one of the few popular cuts, but in budgetary terms it is a mere grain of sand. Still, Sen. Biden's comment hints at where we may be headed: toward a major reduction in America's world role, and perhaps even a new era of financially-induced isolationism. Pressures to cut defense spending, and to dodge the cost of waging two wars, already intense before this crisis, are likely to mount. Despite the success of the surge, the war in Iraq remains deeply unpopular. Precipitous withdrawal -- attractive to a sizable swath of the electorate before the financial implosion -- might well become even more popular with annual war bills running in the hundreds of billions. Protectionist sentiments are sure to grow stronger as jobs disappear in the coming slowdown. Even before our current woes, calls to save jobs by restricting imports had begun to gather support among many Democrats and some Republicans. In a prolonged recession, gale-force winds of protectionism will blow. Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures. As for our democratic friends, the present crisis comes when many European nations are struggling to deal with decades of anemic growth, sclerotic governance and an impending demographic crisis. Despite its past dynamism, Japan faces similar challenges. India is still in the early stages of its emergence as a world economic and geopolitical power. What does this all mean? There is no substitute for America on the world stage. The choice we have before us is between the potentially disastrous effects of disengagement and the stiff price tag of continued American leadership.

### 1NC

#### U.S. coal exports to China are low, but downward pressure on domestic demand expands them massively

Walsh 12

Bryan Walsh 12, Senior Editor at TIME, May 31, 2012, “Drawing Battle Lines Over American Coal Exports to Asia,” online: http://science.time.com/2012/05/31/drawing-battle-lines-over-american-coal-exports-to-asia/

But across the Pacific Ocean, the demand for coal has never been hotter, with China burning 4.1 billion tons in 2010 alone, far more than any other country in the world. That insatiable demand forced China in 2009 to become a net coal importer for the first time, in part because congested rail infrastructure raised the cost of transporting coal from the mines of the country’s northwest to its booming southern cities. In April, Chinese coal imports nearly doubled from a year earlier. Right now Australia and Indonesia supply much of China’s foreign coal. U.S. coal from the Powder River Basin could be a perfect addition to the Chinese market. Montana and Wyoming are just short train trips to ports on the Pacific Northwest coast, and from there it’s a container ship away from Asian megacities where coal doesn’t have to compete with cheap natural gas and air-pollution regulations are far weaker than in the U.S. To a wounded Big Coal, China is a potential savior.¶ As I write in the new edition of TIME, there’s just one problem: right now, ports on the West Coast lack the infrastructure needed to transfer coal from railcars into container ships. (Just 7 million of the 107 million tons of U.S.-exported coal left the country via Pacific Ocean ports last year.) That’s why coal companies like Peabody and Ambre Energy are ready to spend millions to build coal-export facilities at a handful of ports in Washington and Oregon. If all those plans go forward, as much as 150 million tons of coal could be exported from the Northwest annually—-nearly all of it coming from the Powder -River -Basin and headed to Asia. Even if the U.S. kept burning less and less coal at home, it would have a reason to keep mining it.

#### SMRs cause coal plant retiring

King et al 11

Marcus King et al 11, Associate Director of Research, Associate Research Professor of International Affairs, Elliot School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, et al., March 2011, “Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S. Military Installations,” http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear%20Power%20on%20Military%20Installations%20D0023932%20A5.pdf

SMRs have potential advantages over larger plants because they provide owners more flexibility in financing, siting, sizing, and end-use applications. SMRs can reduce an owner's initial capital outlay or investment because of the lower plant capital cost. Modular components and factory fabrication can reduce construction costs and schedule duration. Additional modules can be added incrementally as demand for power increases. SMRs can provide power for applications where large plants are not needed or may not have the necessary infrastructure to support a large unit such as smaller electrical markets, isolated areas, smaller grids, or restricted water or acreage sites. Several domestic utilities have expressed considerable interest in SMRs as potential replacements for aging fossil plants to increase their fraction of non-carbon-emitting generators. Approximately 80 percent of the 1174 total operating U.S. coal plants have power outputs of less than 500 MWe; 100 percent of coal plants that are more than 50 years old have capacities below 500 MWe [3]. SMRs would be a viable replacement option for these plants.

#### U.S. exports lock in expanded Chinese coal capacity---causes warming over the tipping point---it’s unique because absent U.S. exports the rising cost of coal will cause a shift to renewables

Powers 12

Thomas M. Power 12, Research Professor and Professor Emeritus, Department of Economics, University of Montana; Principal, Power Consulting; February 2012, “The Greenhouse Gas Impact of Exporting Coal from the West Coast: An Economic Analysis,” <http://www.sightline.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/02/Coal-Power-White-Paper.pdf>

Note\* PRB = Powder River Basin

The cumulative impact of these coal port proposals on coal consumption in Asia could be much larger than even that implied by the two pending proposals. If Arch, Peabody, and other western U.S. coal producers’ projections of the competitiveness of western coal in Asia are correct, facilitating the opening of the development of West Coast coal ports could have a very large impact on the supply of coal to China and the rest of Asia. ¶ 6.4 The Long-term Implications of Fueling Additional Coal-Fired Electric Generation ¶ Although the economic life of coal-fired generators is often given as 30 or 35 years, a permitted, operating, electric generator is kept on line a lot longer than that, as long as 50 or more years through ongoing renovations and upgrades. Because of that long operating life, the impact of the lower Asian coal prices and costs triggered by PRB coal competing with other coal sources cannot be measured by the number of tons of coal exported each year. Those lower coal costs will lead to commitments to more coal being burned for a half-century going forward. ¶ That time-frame is very important. During exactly this time frame, the next half-century, the nations of the world will have to get their greenhouse gas emission stabilized and then reduced or the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere may pass a point that will make it very difficult to avoid massive, ongoing, negative climate impacts. Taking actions now that encourage fifty-years of more coal consumption around the world is not a minor matter. Put more positively, allowing coal prices to rise (and more closely approximate their full cost, including “external” costs) will encourage extensive investments in improving the efficiency with which coal is used and the shift to cleaner sources of energy. This will lead to long-term reductions in greenhouse gas emissions that will also last well into the next half-century. 57

#### Extinction

Flournoy 12

Citing Feng Hsu, PhdD NASA Scientist @ the Goddard Space Flight Center, Don FLournoy, PhD and MA from UT, former Dean of the University College @ Ohio University, former Associate Dean at SUNY and Case Institute of Technology, Former Manager for Unviersity/Industry Experiments for the NASA ACTS Satellite, currently Professor of Telecommunications @ Scripps College of Communications, Ohio University, “Solar Power Satellites,” January 2012, Springer Briefs in Space Development, p. 10-11

In the Online Journal of Space Communication , Dr. Feng Hsu, a  NASA scientist at Goddard Space Flight Center, a research center in the forefront of science of space and Earth, writes, “The evidence of global warming is alarming,” noting the potential for a catastrophic planetary climate change is real and troubling (Hsu 2010 ) . Hsu and his NASA colleagues were engaged in monitoring and analyzing climate changes on a global scale, through which they received first-hand scientific information and data relating to global warming issues, including the dynamics of polar ice cap melting. After discussing this research with colleagues who were world experts on the subject, he wrote: I now have no doubt global temperatures are rising, and that global warming is a serious problem confronting all of humanity. No matter whether these trends are due to human interference or to the cosmic cycling of our solar system, there are two basic facts that are crystal clear: (a) there is overwhelming scientific evidence showing positive correlations between the level of CO2 concentrations in Earth’s atmosphere with respect to the historical fluctuations of global temperature changes; and (b) the overwhelming majority of the world’s scientific community is in agreement about the risks of a potential catastrophic global climate change. That is, if we humans continue to ignore this problem and do nothing, if we continue dumping huge quantities of greenhouse gases into Earth’s biosphere, humanity will be at dire risk (Hsu 2010 ) . As a technology risk assessment expert, Hsu says he can show with some confidence that the planet will face more risk doing nothing to curb its fossil-based energy addictions than it will in making a fundamental shift in its energy supply. “This,” he writes, “is because the risks of a catastrophic anthropogenic climate change can be potentially the extinction of human species, a risk that is simply too high for us to take any chances” (Hsu 2010 )

#### Chinese emissions are sufficient to cause extinction

Nagle 11

John Copeland Nagle 11, the John N. Matthews Professor, Notre Dame Law School, Spring 2011, “How Much Should China Pollute?,” Vermont Journal of Environmental Law, 12 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 591

Third, the rest of the world suffers because of the inability of China and the United States to agree on a method for reducing their greenhouse gas emissions. Even if the rest of the world were to reach such an agreement, the failure to include China and the United States would doom the project from the start. Together, China and the United States account for forty-one percent of the world's greenhouse gas emissions. [FN19] Left unchecked, China's emissions alone could result in many of the harms associated with climate change. [FN20] That is why many observers believe that “[t]he decisions taken in Beijing, more than anywhere else, [will] determine whether humanity thrive[s] or perishe[s].”

### 1NC

#### Their thesis of a rising China is a racist construction of the non-western other

Pan 4

Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, at Deakin University, August 2004, Discourses Of ‘China’ In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 141-142

These are some of the questions in the minds of Western/American strategic analysts, who are wondering how to maintain U.S. preponderance in a world of anarchy and uncertainty. The conservative realist Samuel Huntington asks: “If being an American means being committed to the principles of liberty, democracy, individualism, and private property, and if there is no evil empire out there threatening those principles, what indeed does it mean to be an American, and what becomes of American national interests?” Obsessed with this self-imagery, many scholars and policy planners have been keen to reinvoke the timeless, structural certainty of geopolitical rivalry, and to embrace the ‘back to the future’ scenario, maintaining that despite the dawn of the post-Cold War period little has changed—the world remains a dangerous, volatile place. With such searching eyes for an enemy, it would be surprising if China failed to come into view. Indeed, China makes a perfect candidate, in that “China remains the major source of uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific.” That is, not only do the implications of its economic transformation and military ambition remain unclear, but the resilience of the Communist government even after its roundly condemned Tiananmen suppression seems also to fly in the face of the ‘End of History’ triumphalism. Consequently, (and before September 11), the only major certainty coming out of the post-Cold War era seems to be an unpredictable and dangerous China. From the beginning, this ‘China threat,’ I suggest, is not a result of its actual challenge to the West or the United States per se, but primarily a discursive dimension of the neorealist construction of the American self in terms of global supremacy and indispensable leadership. As Huntington makes it clear, “Chinese hegemony will reduce American and Western influence [in Asia] and compel the United States to accept what it has historically attempted to prevent: domination of a key region of the world by another power.” In the absence of such self-fashioning, most of China’s neighbours, which might arguably be more vulnerable to a China threat if there is one, have traditionally adopted a much less alarmist view on the ‘Middle Kingdom.’ Thus, China’s real challenge for America, as Yu Bin notes, “is perhaps more psychological and conceptual—that is, how to deal with a major power whose rise is not necessarily guided by Washington, unlike the post-World War II rise of Japan and Germany.” Also, it can be argued that the existence of an ‘enemy’ is indispensable to the continued imagination of the ‘indispensable nation.’ In Charles Frazier’s novel Cold Mountain, Inman, a soldier returning home from battle during the American Civil War, pondered the question: “What is the cost of not having an enemy?” Such a cost, then, seems very high indeed, for at stake here is what is seen as the ‘fundamental’ modern Western/American self-identity as a (global) rational being and indispensable leader. Heroic leadership would not be so needed if there was little left to fight for. Clearly mindful of this, Georgi Arbatov, Director of Moscow’s Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, told a U.S. audience the year before the collapse of the Berlin Wall: “We are going to do something terrible to you—we are going to deprive you of an enemy.” While he correctly noted that for the U.S. to live without an identity-defining enemy is terrible indeed, Arbatov was only half right, for the ‘enemy’ itself often has no control over its status as an enemy. Rather, as noted before, it is primarily a ready-made discursive category built into the American self-imagination. With this discursive category as the analytical framework for understanding other actors on the world stage, Western and particularly American scholars did not simply ‘discover’ a China threat out there; it was cognitively constructed beforehand.

**That creates a self-fufilling prophecy**

Al-Rodhan 2k7

[khalid, a critique of the china threat theory: a systematic analysis, asian perspective 31, 3, 41-66]

Methodologically**, the "China threat" is a hypothesis about**¶ **the future. Its supporting examples are imperfect analogies** (e.g.,¶ to Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany). Each nation's experience Is dif-¶ ferent and so are the circumstances of the international order.¶ Projecting from these assumptions tends to skew predictions.¶ The forecast that China will be a threat to U.S. national security¶ is a worst-case estimate. It assumes that China's economy and¶ military will continue to grow at the same rates, that its social¶ cohesion will not be disrupted, and that political stability will¶ not be seriously challenged. These assumptions may hold, but¶ they also may not.¶ **The theoretical foundations of the "China threat" suffer**¶ **from two contradictions. First, it is based on an assumption**¶ **about Chinese grand strategic intentions. Guessing intentions is**¶ **often a fruitless exercise. It leads to nothing more than guessti-**¶ **mates about possible futures**. The "China threat" theory, simply¶ put, chooses the worst-case scenario of those possible futures;¶ **proponents of the theory often use language that reflects certain-**¶ **ty and inevitabilit**y. Second, as with many theories, there are¶ exceptions to Mearsheimer's offensive realism; the most recent¶ example is the rise of the United States without war during the¶ early 20th century. Neorealists would argue that the United¶ States and Great Britain, the dominant powers at that time, had¶ "shared values," which made a war unlikely. This is, however, a¶ unit-level explanation that would not pass the test of systemic¶ theories under neorealism. In either case, the important point to¶ highlight here is that if internal factors matter, then there are¶ many indicators that would point to a different future from the¶ one envisioned by offensive realists.¶ Strategically, **the "China threat" thesis is as dangerous as it**¶ **is misleading. Arm waving by policy makers in Washington can**¶ **force China to militarize its intentions, even if they were benign,**¶ **which could lead to enhancing the tensions and** making the¶ "China threat" a self-fulfilling prophecy. **Overestimating the**¶ **threat posed by any nation can lead to the wrong policies to con-**¶ **tain the threat, which could hurt the U**nited **S**tates **strategically**¶ **in the long run.** It is not at all clear what China's exact intentions¶ are. Assuming the worst may be a wise strategy, if one discounts¶ the threats China faces and its security concerns, including insta-¶ bility in Central Asia, North Korea's nuclear weapons, maritime¶ security in the Pacific, and the potential militarization of Japan.

#### Alternative: Vote negative to endorse the 1ac plan text without the justification of their China advantage

**Hoffmann 2k12**

[Jeanne, unpacking images of china using causal layered analysis, Macquarie university, Australia, journal of future studies, 16(3):1-24, PhD Candidate – Political Science, March]

The transformation of China in the last thirty years has changed the world, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. **If China’s leaders and citizens do not engage in creating a positive preferred future and the rest of the world does not respond in a constructive and creative way, the future of the international order and perhaps the planet could be threatened. Each of the futures presented in this article is seen to be the ‘disowned self’ of the other, whereby it disowns or pushes away its opposite** (Inayatullah, 2007**). As long as the opposite future pushes away its alternative, we cannot discover or develop alternative scenarios that sit outside our discursive frames. By viewing the future of China through the narrow lens of IR theory, without examining the deeper myths and worldviews** held by those interest groups claiming expertise, **it is not possible to move to a future beyond the planned. IR theory in the West is considered a general theory and as such may be resistant to incorporating futures thinking and methodologies into constructing policy analysis.** This is a mistake. I argue that because the future cannot be predicted with any sort of accuracy, it is important to challenge the conclusions made by IR theory and make use of broader and deeper perspectives in order to move toward preferred images of the future. **Only** in this way, **by broadening the research agenda to explore the deeper layers of the way strategic identity is formed,** **can we move away from** continued limited and potentially **dangerous thinking and** allow a new story of transformation to occur

### STEM

#### No nuclear expertise shortage

World Nuclear News, 8-23-2012, “More options open for US workforce,” WNN, http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-More\_options\_open\_for\_US\_workforce-2308127.html

Nuclear-trained ex-servicemen and women from the US Navy should be able to seamlessly transition to employment in the country's civil nuclear power industry under a groundbreaking agreement between the US Naval Propulsion Program and representatives of the nuclear industry. Randy Edington of Arizona Public Service Co, Steve Trautman of the US Navy Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program and Steve Kuczynski of Southern Nuclear Operating Co at the signing ceremony (Image: NEI) The agreement of understanding, announced by US industry organisation the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), was signed on behalf of the Naval Propulsion Program by deputy director Steve Trautman. Some 31 nuclear industry representatives, including nuclear companies and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operators, have added their names to the list of signatories. The agreement forms the first ever formal partnership between the US Navy and the civilian industry aimed at helping nuclear-trained veterans to move into the domestic nuclear energy field, giving veterans the option of having their contact information forwarded directly to civil industry recruiters at the end of their service commitment. The agreement works in two directions: it also allows the US Navy to recruit directly from the 38 partner colleges in the Nuclear Uniform Curriculum Program (NUCUP), a partnership which aims to ensure a pipeline of nuclear industry talent trained to high, consistent standards. NUCUP was founded following efforts by the NEI to address anticipated skills shortage in a growing US nuclear energy industry. The US nuclear industry expects to hire some 25,000 more workers over the next five years, according to NEI senior vice president and chief nuclear officer Tony Pietrangelo. The new agreement "allows us to bring in experienced, highly skilled people who deserve rewarding civilian careers after selfless service to their country," he explained. "The beauty of this agreement is that it provides a multi-avenue flow for training the next generation of nuclear workers who can gain the skills and experience needed through formal education in or out of the military, on-the-job training or both that ensures a bright future in a growing industry," he said. Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program deputy director Steve Trautman noted that the new agreement would facilitate the navy's access to NUCUP graduates while allowing former sailors to use their skills after leaving the service. "Both of these are right for the Navy and the nation," he said.

**Plan wont attract students- Fukushima fears**

**Business Week ‘11**

[<http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/a-labor-shortage-for-us-nuclear-plants-07072011.html> ETB]

It took Japan’s **Fukushima** disaster to make nuclear energy interesting to students in Karl Craddock’s advanced placement chemistry class at William Fremd High School in Palatine, Ill. Too bad the buzz was about radiation plumes, iodine pills, and potential deadly threats at nuclear power plants that generate more than half the electricity in Illinois. It **wasn’t** **the sort** of talk **to get kids excited about a career in nuclear energy**. “It doesn’t have the cool factor right now, that’s for sure,” says Craddock, who has taught science at the suburban Chicago high school for seven years. Whether Fukushima, where the world watched three nuclear reactors begin to melt down following an earthquake and tsunami in March, marked the end of America’s nuclear renaissance remains to be seen. There is little doubt, though, **that it has cast a pall over the industry’s efforts to recruit a new generation of engineers,** technicians, and decontamination specialists **just as** nuclear **plant operators face a**n unprecedented **labor crunch. Nuclear utilities in the U.S. will need** to hire nearly **25,000 people to replace the 39 percent of its workforce** that will be **eligible for retirement** by 2016, says Carol L. Berrigan, senior director for industry infrastructure for the Nuclear Energy Institute, a Washington-based trade group. **Meanwhile, U.S. universities awarded a total of 715 graduate and undergraduate degrees in nuclear engineering in 2009**, the most recent year for which data is available.

#### Perception of no commitment means the aff doesn’t motivate anyone

Chiles et al 8

Henry Chiles et al, September 2008. Former US Navy Admiral, former commander in chief, U.S. Strategic Command, Chairman of the Defense Science Board. “Nuclear Deterrence Skills,” [www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2008-09-NDS.pdf](http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2008-09-NDS.pdf).

The perception exists that there is no national commitment to a robust¶ nuclear deterrent. This is reflected in the downgrading of activities within Ofﬁce¶ of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) policy and the joint Staff, U.S. Strategic¶ Command (STRATCOM), the U.S. Air Force, and congressional action on the¶ Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW).¶ Management and the work force in the defense industry and in nuclear¶ weapon contractors believe that “sustainment” programs (cg life extension¶ programs) will not retain the skills necessary to competently solve major¶ problems with existing systems or to initiate new programs should the need arise.¶ Pessimism exists about follow-on nuclear deterrence systems becoming a reality,¶ thereby leading to loss of opportunity to train the next generation of nuclear¶ weapon system experts. Priorities have shifted strongly, and to a degree¶ appropriately, but the pendulum has swung too far. Now the nation is faced with¶ about $100 billion of decisions (RRW, Complex Transformation, land-based¶ strategic deterrent, sea-based strategic deterrent), with an eroded capability to¶ think about these issues and with attention focused on other priorities.

#### Nuclear deterrence not key - conventional solves

Perry and Scowcroft et al 9

William J. Perry and Brent Scowcroft et al, 2009. Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor at Stanford University, co-director of the Preventive Defense Project, and national-security adviser to Presidents Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush. “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy,” Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force Report No. 62, http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Nuclear\_Weapons\_TFR62.pdf.

During much of the Cold War, the United States and NATO confronted¶ quantitatively superior conventional forces fielded by the Soviet Union¶ and the Warsaw Pact. To counter this threat, the United States developed¶ strategic and battlefield nuclear weapons and war plans with¶ options for first use of these weapons, massive retaliation in response to¶ a nuclear attack, as well as relatively limited nuclear attacks. This threat¶ diminished with the end of the Cold War. Today, the United States has¶ the world’s most powerful conventional military. More important, in¶ terms of power projection, the U.S. military can relatively rapidly cover¶ every point on the globe. Furthermore, no conventionally armed opponent¶ now or in the foreseeable future could conquer the United States. The United States does not currently need nuclear weapons to compensate¶ for conventional military inferiority or to deter conventional¶ attacks against U.S. territory or against its allies. But because of U.S.¶ conventional superiority, other states may perceive the need to compensate¶ for their relative weakness by acquiring nuclear weapons or at¶ least the capability to make such weapons as a way to deter the United¶ States from intervening on their territories.

#### No threat – weak leadership and no recent attacks

Zenko and Cohen 12

\*Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, \*Fellow at the Century Foundation, (Micah and Michael, "Clear and Present Safety," March/April, Foreign Affairs, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137279/micah-zenko-and-michael-a-cohen/clear-and-present-safety

 NONE OF this is meant to suggest that the United States faces no major challenges today. Rather, the point is that the problems confronting the country are manageable and pose minimal risks to the lives of the overwhelming majority of Americans. None of them -- separately or in combination -- justifies the alarmist rhetoric of policymakers and politicians or should lead to the conclusion that Americans live in a dangerous world.¶ Take terrorism. Since 9/11, no security threat has been hyped more. Considering the horrors of that day, that is not surprising. But the result has been a level of fear that is completely out of proportion to both the capabilities of terrorist organizations and the United States' vulnerability. On 9/11, al Qaeda got tragically lucky. Since then, the United States has been preparing for the one percent chance (and likely even less) that it might get lucky again. But al Qaeda lost its safe haven after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and further military, diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts have decimated the organization, which has essentially lost whatever ability it once had to seriously threaten the United States.¶ According to U.S. officials, al Qaeda's leadership has been reduced to two top lieutenants: Ayman al-Zawahiri and his second-in-command, Abu Yahya al-Libi. Panetta has even said that the defeat of al Qaeda is "within reach." The near collapse of the original al Qaeda organization is one reason why, in the decade since 9/11, the U.S. homeland has not suffered any large-scale terrorist assaults. All subsequent attempts have failed or been thwarted, owing in part to the incompetence of their perpetrators. Although there are undoubtedly still some terrorists who wish to kill Americans, their dreams will likely continue to be frustrated by their own limitations and by the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the United States and its allies.

#### No chance of a terrorist attack

Mueller 8-2

IR prof at Ohio State. PhD in pol sci from UCLA (2 August 2011, John, The Truth about Al Qaeda, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68012/john-mueller/the-truth-about-al-qaeda?page=show)

As a misguided Turkish proverb holds, "If your enemy be an ant, imagine him to be an elephant." The new information unearthed in Osama bin Laden's hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan, suggests that the United States has been doing so for a full decade. Whatever al Qaeda's threatening rhetoric and occasional nuclear fantasies, its potential as a menace, particularly as an atomic one, has been much inflated.¶ The public has now endured a decade of dire warnings about the imminence of a terrorist atomic attack. In 2004, the former CIA spook Michael Scheuer proclaimed on television's 60 Minutes that it was "probably a near thing," and in 2007, the physicist Richard Garwin assessed the likelihood of a nuclear explosion in an American or a European city by terrorism or other means in the next ten years to be 87 percent. By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates mused that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is "the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear." Few, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al Qaeda computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group's budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was some $2,000 to $4,000.¶ In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have more al Qaeda computers, which reportedly contain a wealth of information about the workings of the organization in the intervening decade. A multi-agency task force has completed its assessment, and according to first reports, it has found that al Qaeda members have primarily been engaged in dodging drone strikes and complaining about how cash-strapped they are. Some reports suggest they've also been looking at quite a bit of pornography.

### China

#### SMRs collapse IAEA efficacy—impact is accidents

Edwin Lyman, Ph.D., Senior Scientist, Global Security Program Union of Concerned Scientists, 7/14/11, “An Examination of the Safety and Economics of Light Water Small Modular Reactors”, http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear\_power/lyman-appropriations-subcom-7-14-11.pdf

Fukushima also demonstrated how rapidly a nuclear reactor accident can progress to a core meltdown if multiple safety systems are disabled. A well-planned and executed terrorist attack could cause damage comparable to or worse than the earthquake and tsunami that initiated the Fukushima crisis, potentially in even less time. And although Osama bin Laden is gone, the terrorist threat to domestic infrastructure may actually increase over time if al Qaeda seeks to retaliate. This is the wrong time to consider reducing security requirements for nuclear power plants, regardless of their size. However, SMR vendors have emphasized that reducing security staffing is critical for the economic viability of their projects. Christofer Mowry of B&W told the NRC in March that “whether SMRs get deployed in large numbers or not is going to come down to O&M [operations and maintenance]. And the biggest variable that we can attack directly ... is the security issue.” A Nuclear Energy Institute representative said in a presentation in June that “optimal security staffing levels [for SMRs] may appreciably differ from current levels.”¶ UCS is also concerned that reducing safety and security requirements for SMRs could facilitate their sale to utilities or other entities in the United States and abroad that do not have prior experience with nuclear power. Some SMR vendors argue that their technology is so safe that it can be deployed to remote areas, military bases, and countries in the developing world that have relatively low electric demand and no nuclear experience or emergency planning infrastructure. However, SMRs deployed in this manner could raise additional safety and security concerns compared to their deployment by established and experienced nuclear utilities.¶ The distributed deployment of small reactors would also put great strains on existing licensing and inspection resources. Nuclear reactors are qualitatively different from other types of generating facilities, not least because they require a much more extensive safety and security inspection regime. Similarly, deployment of individual small reactors at widely distributed and remote sites around the world would strain the resources of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its ability to adequately safeguard reactors to guard against proliferation, since IAEA inspectors would need to visit many more locations per installed megawatt around the world. Maintaining robust oversight over vast networks of SMRs around the world would be difficult, if feasible at all.¶ UCS believes that SMRs are only suitable for deployment where there is an established infrastructure to cope with emergencies, and if sufficient numbers of trained operator and security staff can be provided. It is unrealistic to assume the near-term availability of SMRs that are so safe they can be shipped around the world without the need to ensure the highest levels of competence and integrity of local regulatory authorities, plant operators, emergency planning organizations and security forces. Fukushima has demonstrated the importance of timely off-site response in the event of a severe accident, so the accessibility of reactors in remote locations also must be a prime consideration. Even within the U.S., small utilities with little or no experience in operating nuclear plants need to fully appreciate the unique challenges and responsibilities associated with nuclear power and should not expect that small modular reactors will provide any relief in this regard.

**Power projection in Asia fails**

**Kato ‘8**

(Yoichi, bureau chief of the American General Bureau of the Asahi Shimbun, “Return from 9/11 PTSD to Global Leader,” Washington Quarterly, Fall 2008, lexis)

Moreover, the challenges facing the United States do not come only from Islamic extremism or the Middle East. Various challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, especially the rise of China, must also be addressed. **The failure of the Iraq war and the war on terrorism has** had an enormous impact on U.S. standing in the Asia Pacific. It has **reduced U.S. influence** among the policy elites and the general publics of nations **throughout the region**. **The U**nited **S**tates **is now often perceived as a not-so-capable and** sometimes **insecure country despite its** powerful **hard-power** economicand military **assets**.

**Cullinane Evidence should be given no weight, his warrant for what reactor the Chinese will use is because, “China’s State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation has partnered with Westinghouse to build a new and larger reactor.”**

**China’s not a dangerous power- Westinghouse Reactor is designed by the U.S. and happened because we asked the Chinese to build it**

**Ramana & Saikawa ’11**

M.V. and Eri are respectively, a Nuclear Futures Laboratory and Program on Science and Global Security, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 221 Nassau Street, Floor 2, Princeton, NJ 08542, USA Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 Massachusetts Avenue, MIT bldg. 54-1413, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA, “Choosing a Standard Reactor: International Competition and Domestic Politics in Chinese Nuclear Policy,” Energy Volume 36, Issue 12, December

In September 2004, China put out tenders for two Generation III reactors to be installed in Sanmen and Yangjiang. SNPTC, directly under China’s State Council, was in charge of technology selection [6]. More than 10 international nuclear vendors put in bids, with Areva and Westinghouse being shortlisted [1]. Areva’s bid was backed by Coface, the French export credit agency while the Export Import Bank of the United States approved $5 billion in loan guarantees for the Westinghouse tender [63]. The decision on reactor type was delayed, and came under review at the highest political level rather than China’s energy planning bureaucracy [64].¶ One reason for the delay was CNNC reportedly pushing for its indigenous reactor designs at both sites [6]. Eventually, in 2006, the Westinghouse bid to construct two AP-1000s was accepted. Areva’s EPR lost out to Westinghouse’s AP-1000 because Westinghouse was more open to the idea of transferring its technology to China [2].¶ Soon thereafter, early in 2007, the two units planned for Yangjiang were shifted to Haiyang. The following year, the government approved the largest nuclear project till that point, which is to involve the construction of six CPR-1000s [65]. Just eleven days later, after a ceremony to celebrate the start of work on these units, construction of two more CPR-1000s started in Fangjiashan [66]. Note that the chosen reactor designs were not the CNP-1000 that CNNC had designed, but something that CGNPC favored. At the same time, this is a Generation II reactor design.¶ Much political capital was invested by the United States in securing the contract for Westinghouse. Letters of support were provided by officials at the U.S. Departments of Commerce, Energy, and State as well as the U.S. ambassador to China [67]. The U.S. Commercial Service introduced Westinghouse officials to high-level Chinese decision makers. Westinghouse officials were included in an official trade mission led by the U.S. Secretary of Commerce. Another factor in favor of the choice of Westinghouse was intense U.S. pressure on China to reduce its trade balance with the United States [68].¶ Westinghouse had played an important part in getting the U.S. government to allow nuclear reactor sales to China in the mid 1990s. Around that period, U.S. nuclear vendors started becoming increasingly restive about not being allowed to sell reactors to China due to United States not having a nuclear agreement with the country.16 Westinghouse teamed up with companies such as Bechtel, Asea Brown Boveri, and Stone & Webster Engineering in a lobbying and public relations campaign that stressed domestic job creation in the United States from reactor and other nuclear technology sales to China [69]. Michael Jordan, chairman and chief executive of Westinghouse, argued that continuation of nuclear sanctions would “result in the loss of tens of thousands of jobs across 28 states and the gradual elimination of the trained personnel base now supporting more than 100 U.S. nuclear power plants and the nuclear Navy”. The lobbying was successful, in part because it fit well within the broader strategy of the Clinton administration, which focused on exports and was seeking for a way by which U.S. companies could beat the challenge from European, Canadian and Japanese competitors in Asia’s energy sector.

#### The US has the innovation lead – China is behind in R&D, patents, and new product development

Beckley, Michael is a research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a fellow at the Miller Center at the University of Virginia “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure.” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp: 41-78.

It is far from clear, therefore, that China is catching up to the United States in terms of basic scientific research. More important, such a trend would not necessarily affect the balance of power. After all, what ultimately matters is not scientific superiority but technological superiority—the ability to produce and use commercially viable and militarily relevant innovations. In the nineteenth century, German scientists excelled at turning scientific breakthroughs into practical products, developing major innovations in the chemical, electrical, and industrial dye industries that formed what many scholars now refer to as the “second industrial revolution.” Today, scientific superiority is not necessary for technological superiority because published articles circulate globally—they sit in searchable databases and can be obtained by anyone with access to a major library—and it is insufficient because most scientific breakthroughs are useless in isolation from lower-level innovations and infrastructure. Thus, the ability to produce scientific breakthroughs may be less important than the ability to capitalize on them. On first glance, China’s emergence as the world’s leading exporter of hightechnology products suggests it has capitalized on its scientific investments and become an “advanced-technology superstate,” perhaps even “the world’s leading technology-based economy.” On closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that China’s high-technology exports are “not very Chinese, and not very high-tech”—more than 90 percent are produced by foreign firms and consist of imported components that are merely assembled in China, a practice known as “export processing.” These percentages have increased over time, a trend that suggests Chinese firms are falling further behind foreign competitors. Moreover, approximately 50 percent of China’s total exports are produced by foreign enterprises (see figure 5). By comparison, foreign enterprises produced less than 25 percent of Taiwan and South Korea’s manufactured exports in the 1970s. Chinese technological stagnation is also evident in sales and patent statistics. From 1991 to 2008, Chinese firms’ sales of new products as a share of total sales revenues remained fast at 15 percent. In the United States, by contrast, new products account for 35 to 40 percent of sales revenue. The Chinese government grants the majority of its invention patents to foreign firms even though Chinese firms are five times more numerous. This result is all the more startling because many foreign firms do not seek Chinese patents. Instead they seek “triadic patents,” which are simultaneously recognized by the patent offices of the three largest markets for high-technology products (the United States, Europe, and Japan), and are thus the most secure and most difficult to obtain. Figure 6 shows that the U.S. lead in triadic patents has increased over the last twenty years. Chinese firms, moreover, do not seem to be taking genuine steps to improve their technological abilities. For the past twenty years, Chinese firms’ total spending on R&D as a percentage of sales revenue has remained at levels seven times below the average for American firms. Between 1995 and 2008, the share of Chinese enterprises engaged in scientific or technological activities declined from 59 percent to 37 percent, and the share of Chinese firms with an R&D department declined from 60 percent to 24 percent. When Chinese firms import technology, they spend a fraction of the total cost on absorbing the technology. This fraction increased recently from 4 percent to 25 percent, but it remains far lower than the 200 to 300 percent spent by Korean and Japanese firms when they were trying to catch up to the West in the 1970s. Technological leaders sometimes rest on their laurels and abandon innovative efforts in favor of “finding new markets for old products.” The United States, however, looks set to excel in emerging high-technology industries. It has more nanotechnology centers than the next three nations combined (Germany, the United Kingdom, and China) and accounts for 43 percent of the world’s nanotechnology patent applications (see figure 7). In biotechnology, the United States accounts for 41.5 percent of patent applications (China accounts for 1.6 percent) and 76 percent of global revenues. The United States accounts for 20 to 25 percent of all patent applications for renewable energy, air pollution, water pollution, and waste management technologies; China accounts for 1 to 4 percent of the patent applications in these areas (see figure 8). Since 1991, the United States has increased its lead in patent applications over China in all of these industries. Finally, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has identified ten “knowledge- and technology-intensive industries” that are capable of “altering lifestyles and the way business is conducted across a wide range of sectors.” 147 The U.S. lead, in terms of value added, in knowledge- and technology-intensive manufacturing industries dipped during the 2001 recession but quickly recovered and has increased overall since 1996. Over the same time period, the United States steadily increased its lead in knowledge and technology-intensive services (see figures 9 and 10). In sum, a comparison of U.S. and Chinese innovation systems over the past twenty years provides strong evidence against declinism and in favor of the alternative perspective that China continues to lag behind the United States. China has increased its investments in basic science, but these efforts have yet to significantly enhance its innovative capabilities. Data on Chinese hightechnology exports show that Chinese firms have increased their participation in high-technology industries. Data on commercial R&D, patents, and profits, however, suggest Chinese firms engage primarily in low-end activities, such as manufacturing and component supply. By contrast, U.S. firms seem to focus on activities in which profits and proprietary knowledge are highest, such as product design, development, and branding. This division of labor has remained stable over the last two decades; if anything, it has become more pronounced. ¶

**Chinese Prolif leadership is good- they follow norms and don’t give sensitive tech away**

**Boutin ’11**

J.D. Kenneth is a lecturer in international relations at the School of International and Political Studies at Deakin University in Geelong, Victoria, Australia, “Changing the Guard? China and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation,” Asian Politics & Policy Volume 3, Issue 3, pages 349–364, July 2011

China has had a difficult relationship with the nuclear nonproliferation regime. This has been due in part to generally negative Chinese attitudes toward multilateralism in the past. China was a relatively late recruit to multilateralism. It only gradually broadened its participation in multilateral processes after it took up a seat in the United Nations in 1971, and for some time was not a constructive contributor. China's leaders long displayed a marked preference for unilateral and bilateral foreign policy approaches, and even now often prefer directly engaging other major powers where important policy issues are concerned. China's approach to multilateralism has been characterized as “conditional” as a result of these features (Yuan, 1997, p. 81). China's perspective on multilateralism was conditioned by negative experiences in dealing with the international community from the time of its abrupt introduction into the Eurocentric world order in the mid-19th century until well after the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, and by the perception that multilateral mechanisms were dominated by states hostile to China's interests. This has left a legacy of distrust of international institutions and a heightened sensitivity over sovereignty, which has been manifest in China's sustained support for the principle of nonintervention in the international system (Medeiros, 2009, p. 254).¶ China was particularly reluctant to engage in multilateralism where security issues were involved. This wariness extended to nonproliferation. China's leaders were quite dismissive of multilateral nonproliferation initiatives, though they did not eschew them altogether. While China acknowledged the importance of and expressed strong support for the principle of nonproliferation, particularly in regard to WMDs, it simultaneously voiced strong concerns over what it regarded as the lack of objectivity of nonproliferation mechanisms (Chu & Rong, 2008, p. 178). Chinese authorities had particular reservations regarding transparency and intrusive verification measures such as on-site inspections (OSIs). Transparency, for example, has been seen in China as a useful instrument for helping to build trust between states, but which should not reveal information that was unavailable (Yuan, 1997, pp. 93–95). China began to participate in the multilateral nonproliferation processes in the late 1970s but provided little support for existing initiatives, preferring instead to offer proposals of its own that it made little effort to develop (Yuan, 2008, p. 56). China was itself the subject of considerable nonproliferation concern for many years due to its apparent willingness to export arms in violation of generally agreed-upon embargoes to conflict zones and on particular types of arms. China served as a “supplier of last resort” to a number of “pariah” states and was suspected of transferring nuclear weapons technologies to Pakistan. China constituted one of the targets of Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control technology controls during the Cold War as a result. Concern over Chinese assistance to horizontal nuclear proliferation now centers around the role of Chinese firms rather than the Chinese government (see, e.g., British Broadcasting Corporation, 2010).¶ The transformation of China's position with respect to multilateralism has been gradual but substantial (Kuik, 2008, pp. 113–119). Chinese authorities have adopted a much more positive view of the contribution of international institutions to Chinese security. Not only have they demonstrated a strong interest in working within the existing framework of the international system, but China has emerged as a strong supporter of established multilateral processes at the regional and global levels. Chinese authorities have embraced the “spirit” of multilateralism as they have deepened China's participation in multilateral processes and now are far more accepting of the norms involved (see Dobson, 2008, p. 193).¶ China's approach to multilateralism in the area of nonproliferation has mirrored this general trend, even if it has developed more slowly. Since the 1990s, China has expanded both the range and the degree of its participation in multilateral nuclear nonproliferation mechanisms. China joined the NPT in 1992, signed the CTBT in 1996, joined the Zangger Committee (also known as the NPT Exporters Committee) in 1997, and became a member of the NSG in 2004. In addition, China engages and informally adheres in part to the export guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime and Wassenaar Arrangement, without having formally joined them (see Yuan, 2006, pp. 41–43; Yuan, 2008, pp. 57–59, for useful overviews of the evolution of China's engagement of multilateral nonproliferation processes). Also noteworthy is China's contribution to the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which oversees the implementation of the NPT, including through seconding personnel to it. China also contributed personnel to United Nations Special Commission inspections of Iraq following the Gulf War of 1990–1991 and has played a crucial role in the Six-Party Talks process designed to address the nuclear weapons program of the DPRK, though this is more multinational than multilateral. As one study notes, China “shifted from being ‘part of the problem’ to ‘part of the solution’ ” to the problem of proliferation (Chu & Rong, 2008, p. 177).1¶ The seriousness of China's commitment to nuclear nonproliferation has been demonstrated by its instituting the domestic regulatory measures necessary to support its multilateral commitments. This involves the development of a national safeguards system for its nuclear facilities and material to verify that there has been no diversion of civil nuclear resources to the development or production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as required of all states' parties by Article III.1 of the NPT, and establishing a national export control regime for sensitive nuclear equipment, materials, and technologies to ensure that it does not contribute to horizontal nuclear proliferation (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2005).¶ The progressive development of the national basis of support for the nuclear nonproliferation regime by China is significant in another crucial respect. The transformation of China's approach to aspects of the nuclear nonproliferation regime that formerly were viewed with some concern demonstrates that it is embracing the norms as well as the practices of multilateralism in this issue area, which, like all those that impact security, remain sensitive to Chinese authorities. In fact, China has demonstrated the depth of its commitment to and support for the nuclear nonproliferation regime by subjecting itself to a far higher level of verification than it is required to under the NPT. China did this by signing the IAEA's Additional Protocol in 2002 (Yuan, 2008, p. 59). This complement to a comprehensive safeguards agreement commits China to a far more extensive verification regime intended to address the issue of undeclared as well as declared nuclear activities and materials (IAEA, n.d.).¶ It is noteworthy that China's commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation regime continued to deepen despite the negative environment engendered by a number of American policies pursued under President George W. Bush. The American approach to multilateralism during his term in office was of great concern to Chinese authorities (Kent, 2008, pp. 65–66). The actions of the United States that were poorly received in China included the American withdrawal from the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (commonly referred to as the ABM Treaty) in 2002, its withdrawal of formal support for the CTBT, and the negotiating of the United States-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative–Bilateral Agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation (Chu & Rong, 2008, p. 179). These concerns have been reinforced by the American National Missile Defense program, which as well as being widely regarded in China as directed against it, has considerable potential to encourage further horizontal nuclear proliferation (Graham & LaVera, 2002, pp. 240–241). The Chinese government stated in 2008 that this “global missile defense program will . . . have a negative impact on the process of nuclear disarmament” (Zhang, 2010, p. 149). The adoption of a more positive approach to nonproliferation multilateralism under President Obama will help to assuage Chinese concerns, but some aspects of American nonproliferation policy remain questionable from a Chinese perspective.¶ While a number of issues—such as perceived general American efforts to dominate and circumvent multilateral nonproliferation mechanisms, the American emphasis on counter-proliferation, and its missile defense program—had and in some cases still have considerable potential to reinforce established Chinese suspicions of multilateralism, this has not resulted in a reversion to China's former approach to the nonproliferation regime. Chinese authorities continue to harbor some reservations about the regime where issues of objectivity and the rules of engagement of suspected or confirmed proliferators are concerned, and they send mixed signals on nonproliferation on occasion as a result. China remains a less enthusiastic supporter of the imposition of sanctions on actual or suspected proliferators than many other states, but in a remarkable policy transformation, China emerged as a supporter of the nuclear nonproliferation regime in the face of considerable internal threats to its integrity and effectiveness. This demonstrates the importance of multilateral nonproliferation instruments to the Chinese government and the depth of its commitment to this approach

#### US nuclear leadership is irrelevant—countries won’t buy US if its constraining

Lewis 12

Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation, 8/1/12, It's Not as Easy as 1-2-3, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/01/it\_s\_not\_as\_easy\_as\_1\_2\_3?page=full

Creating market **incentives to discourage the spread of enrichment and reprocessing seems like a reasonable thing to do** - **except that most states make nuclear decisions on something other than a cost basis**. **Nuclear power enthusiasts have been no strangers to wishful thinking**, starting with claims that nuclear energy would be "too cheap to meter." **Government decisions about nuclear power** tend to **prioritize** concerns about **sovereignty** and keeping technological pace with neighbors. **It is not hard to see** national **nuclear programs as** something akin to national airlines - money-losing prestige projects **that barely take market forces into account**. Often, **aspiring nuclear states look to** countries like **the U**nited **S**tates and Japan as models. If such countries invest heavily in fuel-cycle services, developing **states** might **try to copy** them **rather than** simply **become** their **customers**.

**No China transition war**

**Ikenberry ‘8**

(G. John, professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, The Rise of China and the Future of the West Can the Liberal System Survive? Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb)

Some observers believe that the American era is coming to an end, as the Western-oriented world order is replaced by one increasingly dominated by the East. The historian Niall Ferguson has written that the bloody twentieth century witnessed "the descent of the West" and "a reorientation of the world" toward the East. Realists go on to note that as China gets more powerful and the United States' position erodes, two things are likely to happen: China will try to use its growing influence to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve its interests, and other states in the system -- especially the declining hegemon -- will start to see China as a growing security threat. The result of these developments, they predict, will be tension, distrust, and conflict, the typical features of a power transition. In this view, the drama of China's rise will feature an increasingly powerful China and a declining United States locked in an epic battle over the rules and leadership of the international system. And as the world's largest country emerges not from within but outside the established post-World War II international order, it is a drama that will end with the grand ascendance of China and the onset of an Asian-centered world order. That course, however, is not inevitable. **The rise of China does not** have to **trigger** a wrenching **hegemonic transition. The** U.S.-Chinese power **transition can be very different** from those of the past because **China faces an** **international order** that is **fundamentally different from those that past rising states confronted**. China does not just face the United States; it faces a Western-centered system that is open, integrated, and rule-based, with wide and deep political foundations. **The nuclear** **revolution**, meanwhile, **has made war among great powers unlikely -- eliminating the** major **tool** that **rising powers** have **used to overturn** international **systems defended by declining hegemonic** **states. Today's Western order**, in short, **is hard to overturn and easy to join**. This unusually durable and expansive order is itself the product of farsighted U.S. leadership. After World War II, the United States did not simply establish itself as the leading world power. It led in the creation of universal institutions that not only invited global membership but also brought democracies and market societies closer together. It built an order that facilitated the participation and integration of both established great powers and newly independent states. (It is often forgotten that this postwar order was designed in large part to reintegrate the defeated Axis states and the beleaguered Allied states into a unified international system.) Today, China can gain full access to and thrive within this system. And if it does, China will rise, but the Western order -- if managed properly -- will live on.

**No Azia war**

**Bitzinger & Desker ‘8**

 senior fellow and dean of S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies respectively (Richard A. Bitzinger, Barry Desker, “Why East Asian War is Unlikely,” Survival, December 2008, <http://pdfserve.informaworld.com-/678328_731200556_906256449.pdf>)

The Asia-Pacific region can be regarded as a zone of both relative insecurity and strategic stability. It contains some of the world’s most significant flashpoints – the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the Siachen Glacier – where tensions between nations could escalate to the point of major war. It is replete with unresolved border issues; is a breeding ground for transnationa terrorism and the site of many terrorist activities (the Bali bombings, the Manila superferry bombing); and contains overlapping claims for maritime territories (the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) with considerable actual or potential wealth in resources such as oil, gas and fisheries. Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area of strategic significance with many key sea lines of communication and important chokepoints. Yet **despite all the**se **potential crucibles of conflict, the Asia-Pacific,** if not an area of serenity and calm, **is** certainly more **stable** than one might expect. To be sure, there are separatist movements and internal struggles, particularly with insurgencies, as in Thailand, the Philippines and Tibet. Since the resolution of the East Timor crisis, however, **the region has been** relatively **free of** open armed **warfare.** Separatism remains a challenge, but **the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism is** a nuisance, but itsimpact is **contained.** The **North Korea**n nuclear issue, while not fully resolved, **is** at least **moving toward a** conclusion with the likely **denuclearisation** of the peninsula. **Tensions between China and Taiwan**, while always just beneath the surface, **seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict** any timesoon, especially **given** recent Kuomintang Party victories in Taiwan and **efforts** byTaiwan and China **to re-open** informal channels of **consultation as well as institutional relationships** between organisations responsible for cross-strait relations. And while in Asia there is no strong supranational political entity like the European Union**, there are many multilateral organisations and** international **initiatives dedicated to enhancing** peace and **stability**, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In Southeast Asia, **countries are united in a common geopolitical and economic organisation** – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – **which is dedicated** to peaceful economic, social and cultural development, and to **the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit,** ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) **and the ASEAN Regional Forum. All this suggests that war in Asia** – while not inconceivable – **is unlikely.**

### Solvency

#### No Solvency- NRC licensing suspension

**Reuters 8/7**/12

[http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/08/nuclear-power-plant-license\_n\_1753931.html ETB]

U.S. regulators on Tuesday suspended issuing final decisions on new licenses and on license renewals for nuclear power plants until the agency decides how to deal with the thorny issue of spent nuclear fuel. The order from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission - headed by Allison Macfarlane, a nuclear waste expert - will not stop hearings or other work on licensing activity and no license decisions are imminent, an NRC spokesman said.

#### Decade before solvency

St. Louis Post-Dispatch ‘12

[Jeffrey Tomich, <http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/business/2012/05/10/small-problem.html> ETB]

For all the hype, small reactors are still at least a decade away. And that’s if design, licensing and commercial development go at the pace hoped for by the nuclear industry.¶ And even then, the potential for small reactors hinges on how they compete in the energy marketplace. More than concerns about nuclear safety in the wake of the Fukushima disaster in Japan or the problem of where to dispose of highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel, the technology’s future will be dictated by economics.¶ Jackson said Westinghouse aspires to make small reactors whose costs are equal to or less than full-size reactors.¶ For now, there’s no cost data for small reactors and no firm evidence they will produce electricity at a lower price than larger plants.¶ “It’s too early to determine that,” Klein said. “We’re going to have to see some built.”

#### No chance of SMRs ever being commercially viable---negative learning means problems and cost overruns will only cascade and get worse---magnified by the lack of a price on carbon

Thomas B. Cochran 12, member of the Department of Energy's Nuclear Energy Advisory Committee, consultant to the Natural Resources Defense Council, was a senior scientist and held the Wade Greene Chair for Nuclear Policy at NRDC, and was director of its Nuclear Program, 5/30/12, “NRDC’s Perspectives on the Economics of Small Modular Reactors,” http://www.ne.doe.gov/smrsubcommittee/documents/NRDC%20Presentation%205-30-12.pptx

BROAD CONCLUSIONS AND QUESTIONS ON SMRs¶ In formulating conclusions and recommendations, there must be a full account of the wide range of unknowns and uncertainties, and difficult questions posed that require further analysis and resolution before large public sums are committed to an SMR industrialization strategy. ¶ The history of DOE is littered with DD&E programs for reactors that never found a home in the commercial marketplace, and thus there was never a return on the investment for US taxpayers or humanity at large. ¶ Our presentation has focused on the sensitivity of the U. of Chicago EPIC model’s projected SMR economic viability in the US context to modest variations in assumptions for industrial learning rates, LEAD unit direct costs, required contingency funds, and the future levelized cost of natural gas combined cycle generation. ¶ But the range of SMR uncertainties extends well beyond variations in this narrow set of modeled parameters, and includes the following 12 issues: ¶ Not all learning curve cost reductions derive from the same source, or occur uniformly over time. They are both time dependent and technology specific, and thus difficult to forecast accurately unless the details of the technology and production processes involved are already well understood. Early in the production cycle, sharp cost reductions can be expected going from the early LEAD units comprising the first plant to the next 6-12 FOAK plants built on an assembly line. But after these reductions, the rate of cost improvements could well decelerate or even disappear altogether, not only because of the law of diminishing returns to further capital investment at a given level of production, but also because “learning” works both ways, sometimes uncovering design or production defects that require increased costs to remedy.¶ The “negative learning” evident in the highly centralized and relatively standardized French nuclear program, is most likely the result of increased knowledge of, and required attention to, nuclear safety and quality control issues with each succeeding large LWR variant. A similar pattern could recur with SMRs.¶ Another source of uncertainty is the reliability of component supplier and system vendor cost projections – the well known problem in noncompetitive markets of companies offering “buy-in” prices to the government and any commercial customers to get them “hooked,” in the belief that either prices can be raised later, or costs recovered through the sale of larger numbers of components and systems than are actually represented in the forecast market demand.¶ Will international competition at the system vendor level help or inhibit the kind of dramatic cost reductions that are needed to make SMR’s a viable factor in mitigating global climate change? If several significantly different SMR designs, each with their own customized supply chains, are dividing-up limited domestic and international markets, how does any one vendor reach the stage of “commoditizing” production of the various constituent components in its plant, thereby significantly reducing its cost?¶ This process of wringing out cost in the production of components in turn requires reductions in the cost of the capital equipment needed to mass produce these commodity components, which reduction (in required capital cost per unit output) has been the real source of final product cost reductions in the electronics and solar PV and many other industries. What evidence is there that SMR reactor vessels, for instance, will cost less to produce per kilowatt of capacity than those produced for large LWR’s?¶ Is significant price competition among suppliers of key components, each susceptible of incorporation in multiple SMR designs – in place of a unique supply chain for each design -- also needed to achieve long term economies in the manufacture of SMR components. ¶ What is the evidence for the proposition that nuclear-safety-grade steel forgings, concrete, pumps, piping, welds, wiring, and instrumentation will be appreciably cheaper in the future than they are now, and if not, what does the alleged cost-reducing “learning” actually consist of? The argument appears to be that the direct labor costs of integrating these components will be less, and achieved more rapidly, in a factory environment than at a construction site. But even if this is assumed to be true to some extent, given that the direct materials costs-per-kilowatt must increase when you build five or six reactors to achieve the same output as one large one, what evidence is there that the required labor-hours-per-kilowatt-of-capacity will go in the opposite direction, and far enough to more than offset the increased materials costs per kilowatt? ¶ What is the evidence that staffing and O&M will be cheaper for six 200 MW units rather than one 1200 MW unit, and if it is not cheaper, where will the necessary offsetting cost reductions be found, such that the levelized SMR electricity cost is within an acceptable price range for future low carbon resources¶ Are current SMR vendor cost projections predicated on implicit assumptions linking prospective SMR “passive safety” improvements to streamlining and relaxation of current commercial LWR safety requirements that dictate costly requirements for emergency planning , operator staffing, and maintenance and inspection of safety related systems and components .¶ Could the longer proposed refueling interval (e.g. five years), intended to reduce O&M costs, create new safety issues in certain accident scenarios and actually add to costs by reducing the total energy output of the reactors?¶ A key question to consider is whether, in light of the above concerns, a nationally-focused SMR DD&E and deployment effort even makes sense. Is it plausible to believe that working on their own, DOE and a few U.S. vendors can development the SMR hardware, identify a sufficiently large customer base, finance the sale, and economically construct a large fleet of SMRs. As we have noted, at least in the near to medium term, the “coal replacement” market for SMR’s seems implausible in the light of competition from natural gas (although this could change over a longer time period), and the capital costs of constructing reactors in the U.S..¶ Are there national policies, such as carbon taxation and stricter environmental regulation of natural gas, that are REQUIRED accompaniments of an SMR deployment strategy, the absence of which makes the whole enterprise, at least on a national basis, appear hopeless? ¶ To avoid yet another failed DOE reactor development program that spends a billion or more of the taxpayers money and then grinds to a halt for want of any economically rational deployment strategy, the panel and DOE must seriously consider these questions before committing additional resources in pursuit of SMR development.

## 2NC

### 2NC Will Pass

#### Immigration pass now – Obama capital is key

MShale 1/6/2013

(African Community newspaper ran by Igbanugo Partners in Minneapolis, “Immigration Reform: A Top Second-Term Priority for Obama,” <http://mshale.com/2013/01/05/immigration-reform-top-second-term-priority-obama/> - Kurr)

In the midst of divisive political debates over gun control and tax-and-spending policies, the White House promised to keep a close eye on immigration reform. Just a week after being re-elected, President Barack Obama said he expects a bill to be introduced and acted upon in Congress soon after his inauguration on January 21. Then during a December 30 interview on Meet the Press, Obama noted, “Fixing our broken immigration system is a top priority. I will introduce legislation in the first year to get that done.”¶ ¶ By pledging to offer an immigration bill, Obama has taken a step beyond where he stood in his first term, when he encouraged Congress to strike a deal but did not write his own legislation. Obama now considers immigration reform to be the second-term equivalent of his first-term push for health care reform. The current political climate supports this post fiscal-cliff agenda, but the White House and Congress must act fast before the momentum loses steam.

### AT No Pass - Obama

#### Obama is pushing and a deal is being made – Hastert rule

HuffPo 1-2 (Obama's Immigration Reform Push To Begin This Month, Huffington Post)

The timeframe is likely to be cheered by Democrats and immigration reform advocates alike, who have privately expressed fears that Obama's second term will be drowned out in seemingly unending showdowns between parties. The just-completed fiscal cliff deal is giving way to a two-month deadline to resolve delayed sequestration cuts, an expiring continuing resolution to fund the government and a debt ceiling that will soon be hit.¶ With those bitter battles ahead, the possibility of passing other complicated legislation would seem diminished.¶ "The negative effect of this fiscal cliff fiasco is that every time we become engaged in one of these fights, there's no oxygen for anything else," said a Senate Democratic aide, who asked for anonymity to speak candidly. "It's not like you can be multi-tasking -- with something like this, Congress just comes to a complete standstill."¶ It remains unclear what type of immigration policies the White House plans to push in January, but turning them into law could be a long process. Aides expect it will take about two months to write a bipartisan bill, then another few months before it goes up for a vote, possibly in June. A bipartisan group of senators are already working on a deal, although they are still in the early stages. Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.) will likely lead on the Democratic side in the House. While many Republicans have expressed interest in piecemeal reform, it's still unclear which of them plan to join the push. Lofgren expressed hope that immigration reform would be able to get past partisan gridlock, arguing that the election was seen as something of a mandate for fixing the immigration system and Republicans won't be able to forget their post-election promises to work on a bill. "In the end, immigration reform is going to depend very much on whether Speaker [John] Boehner wants to do it or not," Lofgren said.¶ Advocates have vowed to keep pushing for reform. As part of their efforts, they plan to remind Republican members of Congress about their presidential nominee's defeat among Latino and Asian voters, a majority of whom support a fix to the immigration system.¶ "They can procrastinate as long as they want, but they're going to have a serious day of reckoning next election cycle," said Angela Kelley, vice president for immigration policy and advocacy at the Center for American Progress. "We're going to have a lot of near-death experiences with this issue, but I'm pretty confident it's never going to go completely to a flatline."¶ Good news for immigration advocates may have come Tuesday night, when Boehner broke the so-called "Hastert Rule" and allowed the fiscal cliff bill to come for a vote without support from a majority of his Republican conference. Given opposition to immigration reform by many Tea Party Republicans, the proof that Boehner is willing to bypass them on major legislation is a good sign, the Democratic aide said.¶ "If something is of such importance that the GOP establishment [is] telling Boehner, 'You must do this. You need to get this off the table soon,'" the Democratic aide said, the speaker could break the Hastert Rule again.¶ "He already did it with this fiscal issue, so I would not be surprised if when it came down to it he puts up a bill that he just allows to go through with a combination of Democratic and Republican votes, without worrying about a majority of the majority," the aide continued.¶ Frank Sharry, executive director of the pro-immigration reform group America's Voice, also said he thinks the House could pass an immigration bill in the same way it did last night, relying on support from both parties. He's hopeful that the fiscal cliff fight could even make them happy to work out legislation in a more standard way.¶ "I never thought I'd say this, but after bruising battles over the future of the American and world economy, the chance to legislate through regular order on immigration reform might have leaders in both parties working together and singing 'Kumbaya,'" Sharry said.

#### Pushing now means GOP will cave.

Ryu Spaeth 1/3/12, Writes about politics and business for TheWeek.com, http://theweek.com/article/index/238367/will-congress-budget-battles-kill-immigration-reform-and-gun-control

The key to congressional action is to strike when the iron is hot. In the case of immigration reform, the GOP has to feel the sting of Mitt Romney's defeat as if it were yesterday. Supporters of gun control, an issue that had been all but abandoned before the school shooting in Connecticut, say Obama must act while public opinion is on their side. As time passes, it's only logical to assume that a sense of urgency will give way to the gravitational pull of preserving the status quo. And, of course, there is the boulder-sized obstacle known as the GOP-controlled House, which has proven time and again that it has no interest in compromising with Democrats on pretty much anything. In addition to keeping immigration and gun control in the spotlight, the Obama administration may have to adopt the same strategy it used (or stumbled upon) in the deal to extend the Bush tax cuts for all but the wealthiest Americans, which involved securing strong Republican support in the Senate. On immigration, at least, GOP party leaders are reportedly eager to reach a deal in order to give Republicans a better shot at wooing Latino voters. As Karen Tumulty and Peter Wallsten write at The Washington Post: White House aides are debating whether they should take the unusual step of drafting an immigration bill or instead lay out principles that could serve as a rallying point. Pro-immigration Republicans will be recruited to help, among them evangelical pastors and small-business owners. Said one outside strategist who is familiar with White House thinking but who discussed the strategy on the condition of anonymity: "The second term rests on the hypothesis that the House Republicans can be broken."

### Link

#### Funding SMRs is politically explosive---gets caught up in spending and Solyndra debates---the link’s unique because Obama’s backed off SMRs due to election pressure

Nelson 9-24

Gabriel Nelson 9-24, E&E Reporter, and Hannah Northey, 9/24/12, “DOE funding for small reactors languishes as parties clash on debt,” http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2012/09/24/3

It's not just wind and solar projects that are waiting for federal help as Congress duels over the importance of putting taxpayer dollars on the line for cutting-edge energy projects.¶ Some of the nation's largest nuclear power companies are anxious to hear whether they will get a share of a $452 million pot from the Department of Energy for a new breed of reactors that the industry has labeled as a way to lessen the safety risks and construction costs of new nuclear power plants.¶ The grant program for these "small modular reactors," which was announced in January, would mark the official start of a major U.S. foray into the technology even as rising construction costs -- especially when compared to natural-gas-burning plants -- cause many power companies to shy away from nuclear plants.¶ DOE received four bids before the May 21 deadline from veteran reactor designers Westinghouse Electric Co. and Babcock & Wilcox Co., as well as relative newcomers Holtec International Inc. and NuScale Power LLC. Now the summer has ended with no announcement from DOE, even though the agency said it would name the winners two months ago.¶ As the self-imposed deadline passed, companies started hearing murmurs that a decision could come in September, or perhaps at the end of the year. To observers within the industry, it seems that election-year calculations may have sidelined the contest.¶ "The rumors are a'flying," said Paul Genoa, director of policy development at the Nuclear Energy Institute, in an interview last week. "All we can imagine is that this is now caught up in politics, and the campaign has to decide whether these things are good for them to announce, and how."¶ Small modular reactors do not seem to be lacking in political support. The nuclear lobby has historically courted both Democrats and Republicans and still sees itself as being in a strong position with key appropriators on both sides of the aisle.¶ Likewise, top energy officials in the Obama administration have hailed the promise of the new reactors, and they haven't shown any signs of a change of heart. DOE spokeswoman Jen Stutsman said last week that the department is still reviewing applications, but she did not say when a decision will be made.¶ "This is an important multiyear research and development effort, and we want to make sure we take the time during the review process to get the decision right," she wrote in an email.¶ That the grants haven't been given out during a taut campaign season, even as President Obama announces agency actions ranging from trade cases to creating new national monuments to make the case for his re-election, may be a sign that the reactors are ensnared in a broader feud over energy spending.¶ Grant recipients would develop reactor designs with an eye toward eventually turning those into pilot projects -- and the loan guarantees that these first-of-a-kind nuclear plants are using today to get financing would be blocked under the "No More Solyndras" bill that passed the House last week (Greenwire, Sept. 14).¶ Congress has given the grant program $67 million for fiscal 2012, shy of the amount that would be needed annually to reach full funding. If the "sequester" kicks in at year's end and slashes DOE funding or the balance of power changes in Washington, the amount of money available could dwindle yet again.¶ Even the staunchest supporters of the federal nuclear program are acknowledging it is a tough time to promise a $452 million check.¶ Former Sen. Pete Domenici, a New Mexico Republican who pushed for new reactors as chairman of both the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee and the Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee, said during a brief interview Tuesday that well-designed loan guarantees won't cost too much because they get repaid over time. The cost could be borne by a "tiny little tax" on the nuclear industry, he said.¶ But when it comes to straight-up spending, like the grants that would support getting these cutting-edge reactors ready for their first demonstrations, the solution may not be so clear. While some Republicans remain staunch supporters of funding for the nuclear power industry, there are others who label the government subsidies as a waste of taxpayer dollars.¶ "It's awful hard, with the needs that are out there and the debt that haunts us, to figure out how you're going to establish priorities," said Domenici, who has advocated for the deployment of new nuclear reactors as a fellow at the Bipartisan Policy Center. "I can't stand here and tell you that I know how to do that."

####  SMR funding is unpopular- seen as another Solyndra

E&E News 9-24

“DOE Funding for Small Reactors Languishes as Parties Clash on Debt,” <http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2012/09/24/3>

Congress has given the grant program $67 million for fiscal 2012, shy of the amount that would be needed annually to reach full funding. If the "sequester" kicks in at year's end and slashes DOE funding or the balance of power changes in Washington, the amount of money available could dwindle yet again.¶ Even the staunchest supporters of the federal nuclear program are acknowledging it is a tough time to promise a $452 million check.¶ Former Sen. Pete Domenici, a New Mexico Republican who pushed for new reactors as chairman of both the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee and the Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee, said during a brief interview Tuesday that well-designed loan guarantees won't cost too much because they get repaid over time. The cost could be borne by a "tiny little tax" on the nuclear industry, he said.¶ But when it comes to straight-up spending, like the grants that would support getting these cutting-edge reactors ready for their first demonstrations, the solution may not be so clear. While some Republicans remain staunch supporters of funding for the nuclear power industry, there are others who label the government subsidies as a waste of taxpayer dollars.¶ "It's awful hard, with the needs that are out there and the debt that haunts us, to figure out how you're going to establish priorities," said Domenici, who has advocated for the deployment of new nuclear reactors as a fellow at the Bipartisan Policy Center. "I can't stand here and tell you that I know how to do that."¶

#### SMR debates are polarizing

Carper and Schmid 11

Ross Carper (rosscarper@gmail.com), a writer based in Washington state, is the founding editor of the creative nonfiction project BeyondtheBracelet.com. Sonja Schmid (sschmid@vt.edu) is an assistant professor in Science and Technology Studies at Virginia Tech. “The Little Reactor That Could?” Issues in Science and Technology, <http://www.issues.org/27.4/carper.html>

Historically, nuclear energy has been entangled in one of the most polarizing debates in this country. Promoters and adversaries of nuclear power alike have accused the other side of oversimplification and exaggeration. For today’s industry, reassuring a wary public and nervous government regulators that small reactors are completely safe might not be the most promising strategy. People may not remember much history, but they usually do remember who let them down before. It would make more sense to admit that nuclear power is an inherently risky technology, with enormous benefits that might justify taking these risks. So instead of framing small reactors as qualitatively different and “passively safe,” why not address the risks involved head-on? This would require that the industry not only invite the public to ask questions, but also that they respond, even—or perhaps especially—when these questions cross preestablished boundaries. Relevant historical experience with small compact reactors in military submarines, for example, should not be off limits, just because information about them has traditionally been classified.

### AT Winners Win

#### Doesn’t win on energy policy

Matthew N. Eisler, Research Fellow at the Center for Contemporary History and Policy at the Chemical Heritage Foundation, 12 [“Science, Silver Buckshot, and ‘All of The Above’” Science Progress, April 2, http://scienceprogress.org/2012/04/science-silver-buckshot-and-%E2%80%9Call-of-the-above%E2%80%9D/]

Conservatives take President Obama’s rhetoric at face value. Progressives see the president as disingenuous. No doubt White House planners regard delaying the trans-border section of the Keystone XL pipeline and approving the Gulf of Mexico portion as a stroke of savvy realpolitik, but one has to wonder whether Democratic-leaning voters really are as gullible as this scheme implies. And as for the president’s claims that gasoline prices are determined by forces beyond the government’s control (speculation and unrest in the Middle East), it is probably not beyond the capacity of even the mildly educated to understand that the administration has shown little appetite to reregulate Wall Street and has done its part to inflate the fear premium through confrontational policies in the Persian Gulf. Committed both to alternative energy (but not in a rational, comprehensive way) and cheap fossil fuels (but not in ways benefiting American motorists in an election year), President Obama has accrued no political capital from his energy policy from either the left or the right by the end of his first term. The president long ago lost the legislative capacity for bold action in practically every field, including energy, but because the GOP’s slate of presidential candidates is so extraordinarily weak in 2012, he may not need it to get re-elected. At least, that is the conventional wisdom in Democratic circles. Should President Obama win a second term, Congress is likely to be even more hostile than in his first term, as in the Clinton years. And as in the Clinton years, that will probably mean four more years of inaction and increased resort to cant.

**Wins take too long**

**Grist**, 7-28, **10**, <http://www.grist.org/article/2010-07-28-lessons-from-senate-climate-fail/>

Perhaps the most fateful decision the Obama administration made early on was to move healthcare reform before energy and climate legislation. I'm sure this seemed like a good idea at the time. Healthcare reform was popular, was seen as an issue that the public cared about on a personal level, and was expected to unite Democrats from all regions. **White House officials and Congressional leaders reassured environmentalists with their theory that success breeds success.** A quick victory on healthcare reform would renew Obama's political capital, some of which had to be spent early on to push the economic stimulus bill through Congress with no Republican help. **Healthcare reform was eventually enacted, but only after an exhausting battle that eroded public support, drained political capital, and created the Tea Party movement**. Public support **for healthcare reform is slowly rebounding** as some of the early benefits kick in and people realize that the forecasted Armageddon is not happening. B**ut this is occurring too slowly to rebuild Obama's political capital in time to help push climate legislation** across the finish line.

#### Presidents perceive their capital as finite – our theory is true in practice

Marshall and Prins 11

BRYAN W. MARSHALL Miami University BRANDON C. PRINS University of Tennessee & Howard H. Baker, Jr. Center for Public Policy Power or Posturing? Policy Availability and Congressional Influence on U.S. Presidential Decisions to Use Force Presidential Studies Quarterly 41, no. 3 (September) 2011

We argue that the more important effect of Congress occurs because presidents anticipate how the use of force may affect the larger congressional environment in which they inevitably have to operate (Brulé, Marshall, and Prins 2010). It may be true that presidents consider the chances that Congress will react to a specific use of force with countervailing tools, but even more importantly they anticipate the likelihood that a foreign conflict may damage (or advantage) their political fortunes elsewhere—in essence, the presidential calculus to use force factors in how such actions might shape their ability to achieve legislative priorities. To be clear, presidents can and do choose to use force and press for legislative initiatives in Congress. Taking unilateral actions in foreign policy does not preclude the president from working the legislative process on Capitol Hill. However, political capital is finite so spending resources in one area lessens what the president can bring to bear in other areas. That is, presidents consider the congressional environment in their decision to use force because their success at promoting policy change in either foreign or domestic affairs is largely determined by their relationship with Congress. Presidents do not make such decisions devoid of calculations regarding congressional preferences and behavior or how such decisions may influence their ability to achieve legislative objectives. This is true in large part because presidential behavior is motivated by multiple goals that are intimately tied to Congress. Presidents place a premium on passing legislative initiatives. The passage of policy is integral to their goals of reelection and enhancing their place in history (Canes-Wrone 2001; Moe 1985). Therefore, presidents seek to build and protect their relationship with Congress.

### AT Thumpers – Top Level

#### Prefer insiders

ADAM CLARK ESTES 1/2/13, http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2013/01/obamas-push-immigration-reform-starts-now/60525/

Everybody knew that Obama was going to tackle immigration reform in his second term. We just didn't know how soon. Well, the word is out, and it's good news for anybody eager for lawmakers to tackle an issue that's troubled the country for years. Obama will take on immigration reform this month. A fresh report from The Huffington Post's Elise Foley and Sam Stein quotes anonymous administration officials and Democratic aides in explaining that the president is going to move fast on immigration reform, as well as gun control, and advocates couldn't be happier. None of this is a tremendous surprise, though the expedited timeline is sort of curious. Obama's been talking about sweeping immigration since he took office and, at least until 2009, has left many guessing if and when that's going to happen. He made progress last year when he kept 800,000 young people who had been brought to the United States illegally as children from being deported, making a DREAM Act-like policy initiative as the DREAM Act itself floundered in Congress. Immigration remained an issue through the election, and almost as soon as Obama won his second term, whispers of a renewed push for immigration reform started, though the White House vowed to deal with the fiscal cliff first. Obama then reiterated his commitment to tackle immigration soon on his Meet the Press appearance last weekend.

#### Issues don’t cost capital until they are up

Drum ‘10

Kevin is a Columnist for Mother Jones, “Immigration Coming Off the Backburner,” <http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2010/03/immigration-coming-back-burner>

There's been plenty of overheated rhetoric and creative paranoia on display this year, but nativism has been, to me, the dog that didn't bark. The Tea Parties haven't been very focused on immigration, and while abortion and socialism both became major issues during health-care reform, fears that the bill would cover illegal immigrants (it won't, incidentally) never became a marquee issue.¶ Not to pick on Ezra or anything, but this attitude betrays a surprisingly common misconception about political issues in general. The fact is that political dogs never bark until an issue becomes an active one. Opposition to Social Security privatization was pretty mild until 2005, when George Bush turned it into an active issue. Opposition to healthcare reform was mild until 2009, when Barack Obama turned it into an active issue. Etc.¶ I only bring this up because we often take a look at polls and think they tell us what the public thinks about something. But for the most part, they don't.1 That is, they don't until the issue in question is squarely on the table and both sides have spent a couple of months filling the airwaves with their best agitprop. Polling data about gays in the military, for example, hasn't changed a lot over the past year or two, but once Congress takes up the issue in earnest and the Focus on the Family newsletters go out, the push polling starts, Rush Limbaugh picks it up, and Fox News creates an incendiary graphic to go with its saturation coverage — well, that's when the polling will tell you something. And it will probably tell you something different from what it tells you now.¶ Immigration was bubbling along as sort of a background issue during the Bush administration too until 2007, when he tried to move an actual bill. Then all hell broke loose. The same thing will happen this time, and without even a John McCain to act as a conservative point man for a moderate solution. The political environment is worse now than it was in 2007, and I'll be very surprised if it's possible to make any serious progress on immigration reform. "Love 'em or hate 'em," says Ezra, illegal immigrants "aren't at the forefront of people's minds." Maybe not. But they will be soon.¶ POSTSCRIPT: And keep in mind that one of the reasons the tea parties haven't (yet) taken up the immigration fight is very specific to the agenda of Dick Armey and FreedomWorks. I doubt that Armey will win this battle in the long run, though.¶ 1Granted, polls do give us a general idea of where we're starting from. If immigration reform were polling at 80%, for example, I'd feel pretty good about it since that number could deteriorate 20 points and it would still have a lot of support. But if it's polling at around 50-60% — which it is — that's dangerous territory. Once the yelling starts you can expect that number to go down a bunch, and suddenly it won't be a popular issue to tackle during an election year.

### NRC

#### No licensing for two years- prevents new construction

WNN 9/7/12

[World Nuclear News, <http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS_Two_year_hiatus_in_US_licensing_0709121.html> ETB]

Approval of four new reactors could be delayed as the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission reconsiders its confidence in long term waste management arrangements over the next 24 months.¶ The NRC has to develop an environmental impact statement on the storing of used nuclear fuel at power plant sites for extended periods, which will form part of a new 'waste confidence rule' fundamental to power plant licensing. The previous rule was invalidated in June by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which said the NRC should have considered the possiblity that a permanent waste disposal facility might never actually be built, as well as more factors relating to potential water leaks or fires at storage pools.¶ The NRC will "proceed directly" on the task, it said, noting that staff could draw on a history of similar work. Nevertheless, the NRC said it might take 24 months to develop the statement. In the meantime the lack of a robust position afforded by a waste confidence rule means that the NRC cannot issue final licenses to new nuclear power plants. This may mean postponed approval for construction and operating licenses for two reactors at Levy in Florida and another two at Lee in South Carolina, which were both expected in late 2013.¶ In theory the licensing hiatus also applies to final NRC decisions on licence extensions, of which applications are under consideration regarding 13 reactors. While final decisions schedules may be affected pending new waste confidence, the continued operation of the reactors should not. NRC rules say that a reactor may continue operating if its owner submitted a sufficient application to the NRC with at least five years of the original licence remaining.

### 2NC Time

#### SMR’s are decades away the 1NC St. Louis Post-Dispatch says they take at least a few decades to scale up.

#### The Air Force already tried to get companies to build SMRs - they concluded tech’s a decade away

Anderson 10

Kate Anderson 10, Senior Engineer in the Integrated Applications Office, National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 2/1/10, “SMALL NUCLEAR REACTORS,”https://smr.inl.gov/Document.ashx?path=DOCS%2FReading+Room%2Fgeneral%2FNuclear+White+Paper+by+NREL+020110.pdf

Small nuclear reactors were originally developed for defense applications. The US Navy began developing small nuclear reactors for naval propulsion in the early 1950s, and today operates more than 100 reactors aboard aircraft carriers, other surface ships, and submarines. The Army Nuclear Power Program ran between 1954 and 1976, with 8 small reactors constructed to power remote operations. The program was discontinued due to the poor economics of nuclear plants relative to cheaper alternative fuels available at the time.3 Today, the Army is studying small transportable reactor concepts for power, water, and synfuel production4,5 and the use of mobile nuclear reactors has been suggested for expeditionary forces.6 The Air Force explored nuclear powered aircraft, but discontinued the program in 1961. Today, they are considering fielding small nuclear reactors on domestic bases. In January 2008 the Air Force issued a request for proposals, looking for a private company that would be interested in building small nuclear reactors on Air Force bases. However, Air Force spokeswoman Vicki Stein says the Air Force is 12 to 14 years away from building such a power plant.7

### Expansion Impossible

#### Nuclear expansion impossible – laundry list of supply and siting constraints

Lisa Zyga, 5-11-2011, “Why nuclear power will never supply the world’s energy needs,” PhysOrg, http://phys.org/news/2011-05-nuclear-power-world-energy.html

The 440 commercial nuclear reactors in use worldwide are currently helping to minimize our consumption of fossil fuels, but how much bigger can nuclear power get? In an analysis to be published in a future issue of the Proceedings of the IEEE, Derek Abbott, Professor of Electrical and Electronic Engineering at the University of Adelaide in Australia, has concluded that nuclear power cannot be globally scaled to supply the world’s energy needs for numerous reasons. The results suggest that we’re likely better off investing in other energy solutions that are truly scalable. As Abbott notes in his study, global power consumption today is about 15 terawatts (TW). Currently, the global nuclear power supply capacity is only 375 gigawatts (GW). In order to examine the large-scale limits of nuclear power, Abbott estimates that to supply 15 TW with nuclear only, we would need about 15,000 nuclear reactors. In his analysis, Abbott explores the consequences of building, operating, and decommissioning 15,000 reactors on the Earth, looking at factors such as the amount of land required, radioactive waste, accident rate, risk of proliferation into weapons, uranium abundance and extraction, and the exotic metals used to build the reactors themselves. “A nuclear power station is resource-hungry and, apart from the fuel, uses many rare metals in its construction,” Abbott told PhysOrg.com. “The dream of a utopia where the world is powered off fission or fusion reactors is simply unattainable. Even a supply of as little as 1 TW stretches resources considerably.” His findings, some of which are based on the results of previous studies, are summarized below. Land and location: One nuclear reactor plant requires about 20.5 km2 (7.9 mi2) of land to accommodate the nuclear power station itself, its exclusion zone, its enrichment plant, ore processing, and supporting infrastructure. Secondly, nuclear reactors need to be located near a massive body of coolant water, but away from dense population zones and natural disaster zones. Simply finding 15,000 locations on Earth that fulfill these requirements is extremely challenging. Lifetime: Every nuclear power station needs to be decommissioned after 40-60 years of operation due to neutron embrittlement - cracks that develop on the metal surfaces due to radiation. If nuclear stations need to be replaced every 50 years on average, then with 15,000 nuclear power stations, one station would need to be built and another decommissioned somewhere in the world every day. Currently, it takes 6-12 years to build a nuclear station, and up to 20 years to decommission one, making this rate of replacement unrealistic. Nuclear waste: Although nuclear technology has been around for 60 years, there is still no universally agreed mode of disposal. It’s uncertain whether burying the spent fuel and the spent reactor vessels (which are also highly radioactive) may cause radioactive leakage into groundwater or the environment via geological movement. Accident rate: To date, there have been 11 nuclear accidents at the level of a full or partial core-melt. These accidents are not the minor accidents that can be avoided with improved safety technology; they are rare events that are not even possible to model in a system as complex as a nuclear station, and arise from unforeseen pathways and unpredictable circumstances (such as the Fukushima accident). Considering that these 11 accidents occurred during a cumulated total of 14,000 reactor-years of nuclear operations, scaling up to 15,000 reactors would mean we would have a major accident somewhere in the world every month. Proliferation: The more nuclear power stations, the greater the likelihood that materials and expertise for making nuclear weapons may proliferate. Although reactors have proliferation resistance measures, maintaining accountability for 15,000 reactor sites worldwide would be nearly impossible. Uranium abundance: At the current rate of uranium consumption with conventional reactors, the world supply of viable uranium, which is the most common nuclear fuel, will last for 80 years. Scaling consumption up to 15 TW, the viable uranium supply will last for less than 5 years. (Viable uranium is the uranium that exists in a high enough ore concentration so that extracting the ore is economically justified.) Uranium extraction from seawater: Uranium is most often mined from the Earth’s crust, but it can also be extracted from seawater, which contains large quantities of uranium (3.3 ppb, or 4.6 trillion kg). Theoretically, that amount would last for 5,700 years using conventional reactors to supply 15 TW of power. (In fast breeder reactors, which extend the use of uranium by a factor of 60, the uranium could last for 300,000 years. However, Abbott argues that these reactors’ complexity and cost makes them uncompetitive.) Moreover, as uranium is extracted, the uranium concentration of seawater decreases, so that greater and greater quantities of water are needed to be processed in order to extract the same amount of uranium. Abbott calculates that the volume of seawater that would need to be processed would become economically impractical in much less than 30 years. Exotic metals: The nuclear containment vessel is made of a variety of exotic rare metals that control and contain the nuclear reaction: hafnium as a neutron absorber, beryllium as a neutron reflector, zirconium for cladding, and niobium to alloy steel and make it last 40-60 years against neutron embrittlement. Extracting these metals raises issues involving cost, sustainability, and environmental impact. In addition, these metals have many competing industrial uses; for example, hafnium is used in microchips and beryllium by the semiconductor industry. If a nuclear reactor is built every day, the global supply of these exotic metals needed to build nuclear containment vessels would quickly run down and create a mineral resource crisis. This is a new argument that Abbott puts on the table, which places resource limits on all future-generation nuclear reactors, whether they are fueled by thorium or uranium. As Abbott notes, many of these same problems would plague fusion reactors in addition to fission reactors, even though commercial fusion is still likely a long way off.

### STEM High Now

#### STEM is fine, and they can’t solve

Mervis 12

Science magazine deputy news editor ¶ (Jeffrey, "What If the Science Pipeline Isn't Really Leaking?," Science, July 2012, 337.6092, Science Magazine, accessed 10-8-12, mss)

However, a new book on the overall health of the U.S. scientific enterprise argues not only that **the pipeline isn't leaky**, but that it's the wrong metaphor. “**There is little evidence that science suffers a ‘leaky pipeline’** during the college years **that** disproportionately **steers students away from scientific fields** and toward non-scientific studies,” **write** Yu Xieof the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, **a sociologist and longtime analyst of the scientific workforce,** and Alexandra Killewald, his former doctoral student, who this month joined the faculty at Harvard University. Xie and Killewald argue that **the pipeline paradigm ignores two important variables: students who obtain an undergraduate science degree after switching from a nonscience field, and those who drop out of school before earning any degree. Those omissions**, the authors assert, **make the pipeline a fatally flawed description of a system** that **they believe is actually doing a pretty good job of meeting the country's need for scientific talent.** While that conclusion goes against the accepted wisdom, **experts find the** new **book persuasive**. “I think they have made a pretty good case [on both issues],” says sociologist Robert Hauser, head of the Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education at the National Research Council of the U.S. National Academies. In particular, he adds, “the pipeline is clearly a much more complicated story [than most people realize]. It doesn't look like there is a wholesale slaughter of kids hoping to become scientists.” **Xie and Killewald draw their conclusion from national longitudinal studies** **of** high school seniors and their **career aspirations**. In particular, the pair found that **the percent**age **of college graduates who earned a degree in** natural **sciences** or engineering **was higher than the percent**age of high school students **who said they hoped to earn such a degree**. In the most recent cohort—students who graduated from high school in 1992 with plans to attend college—the comparable figures for men are 28.3% and 27.5%; for women, it's 13.2% and 10.5%. The numbers are comparable for the 1972 and 1982 cohorts. (A study following students who graduated from high school in 2004 is still under way.) Those figures don't mean there is no attrition. Individual students do drop out of science, Killewald says, and moving into science at the graduate level is much more difficult, Xie adds. But at the undergraduate level, **those turning away from science are outnumbered by “switchers,” or those who enter from nonscience fields**. The phenomenon is especially noticeable among women who decide to go into the life sciences. In fact, Killewald says, the pipeline paradigm “captures less than 40% of the women who end up with science degrees.” **The other big flaw** in the pipeline paradigm, Xie and Killewald argue, **is its failure to distinguish between students who abandon science for other fields and those who simply drop out of university**. Among men in the 1992 cohort who fall short of their goal of earning a science degree, Killewald says, “70% receive no college degree at all, while only 30% receive a nonscience degree.” Aspiring **science** and engineering **majors actually have a lower dropout rate** than those planning to earn nonscience degrees—45% versus 51% for men, and 34% versus 40% for women. Those numbers, Killewald says, suggest that “the **leaks in the science pipeline are really leaks in the education pipeline**.” What she calls an “**unequal access to higher education,” a combination of economic, educational, and cultural factors that make it harder for students to attend and complete college**, also undermines attempts to attract more Latino and African-American students into science. The authors give a flat no to the book's title question, Is American Science in Decline? Stagnant salaries, gloomy job prospects for academics, and growing international competition are indeed cause for concern, they write. But **U.S. science is holding up surprisingly well**, they say, **and** **the country is more likely to benefit than be hurt by scientific advances elsewhere**.

### Nuclear Deter

#### Alt cause to nuclear deterrence failure - communication

Spring 12

(Baker, F. M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy – Heritage Foundation, and Michaela Bendikova, Research Assistant for Missile Defense and Foreign Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies – Heritage Foundation, "Time to Modernize and Revitalize the Nuclear Triad", Heritage Backgrounder, 1-27, http://thf\_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/bg2646.pdf)

**To maintain** and protect **the U.S. ability to deter attacks** on its homeland, forward-deployed troops, or allies, **the** **U**nited **S**tates **needs to**:¶ • **Preserve the triad**. Eliminating any leg of the triad would put the other two under unacceptable pressure and increase attrition rates and operational and maintenance costs. The three legs of the triad also hedge against technological failures in the other two legs. The United States deploys only one type of ICBM and SLBM and a technical failure would likely take a large portion of the U.S. deterrent offline for an extended period. For example, on October 24, 2011, **the** U.S. **Air Force lost** **communication with** a squadron of **50 nuclear-armed Minuteman ICBMs** at Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming. In the past, this type of disruption was rare and limited to individual missiles. However, the broad scale of **this incident made** it one of t**he most serious and sizable ruptures in nuclear** command and control in **history**. 46 In addition, the United States would be left vulnerable to strategic and technological surprises as other nuclear powers modernize their systems.

### 2NC Turns Aff

#### Any accident turns case

Energy Fair, 12

[Energy Fair, THE FINANCIAL RISKS OF INVESTING IN NEW NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, www.energyfair.org.uk, March 2012 Energy Fair Email: nuclearsubsidies@gmail.com Phone: +44 (0) 1248 712962, +44 (0) 7746 290775 Web: www.energyfair.org.uk 23rdMarch 2012, http://www.nirs.org/neconomics/risks\_of\_nuclear\_investment\_published.pdf]

Political risk. Apart from the risk that politicians may decide to withdraw some or all of the subsidies for nuclear power, it is vulnerable to political action arising from events like the nuclear meltdowns in Fukushima. That disaster led to a sharp global shift in public opinion against nuclear power and it led to decisions by politicians in several different countries to close down nuclear power stations and to accelerate the roll-out of alternative sources of power. The next nuclear disaster—and the world has been averaging one such disaster every 11 years—is likely to lead to even more decisive actions by politicians, perhaps including the closing down of nuclear plants that are still under construction or are relatively new.

#### Crushes the industry

Squassoni, ‘8

[Sharon, Senior Associate, Nonproliferation Program -- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3-12, “The Realities of Nuclear Expansion” Congressional Testimony: House Select Committee for Energy Independence and Global Warming, Washington, DC]

A few caveats with respect to projecting nuclear energy expansion are necessary. Nuclear energy is undoubtedly safer and more efficient now than when it began fifty years ago, but it still faces four fundamental challenges: waste, cost, proliferation, and safety. It is an inherently risky business. Most industry executives will admit that it will only take one significant accident to plunge the “renaissance” back into the nuclear Dark Ages. Because of this, estimates are highly uncertain. For example, the U.S. Energy Information Administration does not use its computer model to estimate nuclear energy growth because, among other things, key variables such as public attitudes and government policy are difficult to quantify and project. That said, estimates tend to extrapolate electricity consumption and demand from gross domestic product (GDP) growth, make assumptions about nuclear energy’s share of electricity production, and then estimate nuclear reactor capacity.

### AT Accidents

**Chinese Prolif leadership is good- they follow norms and don’t give sensitive tech away**

**Boutin ’11**

J.D. Kenneth is a lecturer in international relations at the School of International and Political Studies at Deakin University in Geelong, Victoria, Australia, “Changing the Guard? China and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation,” Asian Politics & Policy Volume 3, Issue 3, pages 349–364, July 2011

China has had a difficult relationship with the nuclear nonproliferation regime. This has been due in part to generally negative Chinese attitudes toward multilateralism in the past. China was a relatively late recruit to multilateralism. It only gradually broadened its participation in multilateral processes after it took up a seat in the United Nations in 1971, and for some time was not a constructive contributor. China's leaders long displayed a marked preference for unilateral and bilateral foreign policy approaches, and even now often prefer directly engaging other major powers where important policy issues are concerned. China's approach to multilateralism has been characterized as “conditional” as a result of these features (Yuan, 1997, p. 81). China's perspective on multilateralism was conditioned by negative experiences in dealing with the international community from the time of its abrupt introduction into the Eurocentric world order in the mid-19th century until well after the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, and by the perception that multilateral mechanisms were dominated by states hostile to China's interests. This has left a legacy of distrust of international institutions and a heightened sensitivity over sovereignty, which has been manifest in China's sustained support for the principle of nonintervention in the international system (Medeiros, 2009, p. 254).¶ China was particularly reluctant to engage in multilateralism where security issues were involved. This wariness extended to nonproliferation. China's leaders were quite dismissive of multilateral nonproliferation initiatives, though they did not eschew them altogether. While China acknowledged the importance of and expressed strong support for the principle of nonproliferation, particularly in regard to WMDs, it simultaneously voiced strong concerns over what it regarded as the lack of objectivity of nonproliferation mechanisms (Chu & Rong, 2008, p. 178). Chinese authorities had particular reservations regarding transparency and intrusive verification measures such as on-site inspections (OSIs). Transparency, for example, has been seen in China as a useful instrument for helping to build trust between states, but which should not reveal information that was unavailable (Yuan, 1997, pp. 93–95). China began to participate in the multilateral nonproliferation processes in the late 1970s but provided little support for existing initiatives, preferring instead to offer proposals of its own that it made little effort to develop (Yuan, 2008, p. 56). China was itself the subject of considerable nonproliferation concern for many years due to its apparent willingness to export arms in violation of generally agreed-upon embargoes to conflict zones and on particular types of arms. China served as a “supplier of last resort” to a number of “pariah” states and was suspected of transferring nuclear weapons technologies to Pakistan. China constituted one of the targets of Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control technology controls during the Cold War as a result. Concern over Chinese assistance to horizontal nuclear proliferation now centers around the role of Chinese firms rather than the Chinese government (see, e.g., British Broadcasting Corporation, 2010).¶ The transformation of China's position with respect to multilateralism has been gradual but substantial (Kuik, 2008, pp. 113–119). Chinese authorities have adopted a much more positive view of the contribution of international institutions to Chinese security. Not only have they demonstrated a strong interest in working within the existing framework of the international system, but China has emerged as a strong supporter of established multilateral processes at the regional and global levels. Chinese authorities have embraced the “spirit” of multilateralism as they have deepened China's participation in multilateral processes and now are far more accepting of the norms involved (see Dobson, 2008, p. 193).¶ China's approach to multilateralism in the area of nonproliferation has mirrored this general trend, even if it has developed more slowly. Since the 1990s, China has expanded both the range and the degree of its participation in multilateral nuclear nonproliferation mechanisms. China joined the NPT in 1992, signed the CTBT in 1996, joined the Zangger Committee (also known as the NPT Exporters Committee) in 1997, and became a member of the NSG in 2004. In addition, China engages and informally adheres in part to the export guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime and Wassenaar Arrangement, without having formally joined them (see Yuan, 2006, pp. 41–43; Yuan, 2008, pp. 57–59, for useful overviews of the evolution of China's engagement of multilateral nonproliferation processes). Also noteworthy is China's contribution to the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which oversees the implementation of the NPT, including through seconding personnel to it. China also contributed personnel to United Nations Special Commission inspections of Iraq following the Gulf War of 1990–1991 and has played a crucial role in the Six-Party Talks process designed to address the nuclear weapons program of the DPRK, though this is more multinational than multilateral. As one study notes, China “shifted from being ‘part of the problem’ to ‘part of the solution’ ” to the problem of proliferation (Chu & Rong, 2008, p. 177).1¶ The seriousness of China's commitment to nuclear nonproliferation has been demonstrated by its instituting the domestic regulatory measures necessary to support its multilateral commitments. This involves the development of a national safeguards system for its nuclear facilities and material to verify that there has been no diversion of civil nuclear resources to the development or production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as required of all states' parties by Article III.1 of the NPT, and establishing a national export control regime for sensitive nuclear equipment, materials, and technologies to ensure that it does not contribute to horizontal nuclear proliferation (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2005).¶ The progressive development of the national basis of support for the nuclear nonproliferation regime by China is significant in another crucial respect. The transformation of China's approach to aspects of the nuclear nonproliferation regime that formerly were viewed with some concern demonstrates that it is embracing the norms as well as the practices of multilateralism in this issue area, which, like all those that impact security, remain sensitive to Chinese authorities. In fact, China has demonstrated the depth of its commitment to and support for the nuclear nonproliferation regime by subjecting itself to a far higher level of verification than it is required to under the NPT. China did this by signing the IAEA's Additional Protocol in 2002 (Yuan, 2008, p. 59). This complement to a comprehensive safeguards agreement commits China to a far more extensive verification regime intended to address the issue of undeclared as well as declared nuclear activities and materials (IAEA, n.d.).¶ It is noteworthy that China's commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation regime continued to deepen despite the negative environment engendered by a number of American policies pursued under President George W. Bush. The American approach to multilateralism during his term in office was of great concern to Chinese authorities (Kent, 2008, pp. 65–66). The actions of the United States that were poorly received in China included the American withdrawal from the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (commonly referred to as the ABM Treaty) in 2002, its withdrawal of formal support for the CTBT, and the negotiating of the United States-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative–Bilateral Agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation (Chu & Rong, 2008, p. 179). These concerns have been reinforced by the American National Missile Defense program, which as well as being widely regarded in China as directed against it, has considerable potential to encourage further horizontal nuclear proliferation (Graham & LaVera, 2002, pp. 240–241). The Chinese government stated in 2008 that this “global missile defense program will . . . have a negative impact on the process of nuclear disarmament” (Zhang, 2010, p. 149). The adoption of a more positive approach to nonproliferation multilateralism under President Obama will help to assuage Chinese concerns, but some aspects of American nonproliferation policy remain questionable from a Chinese perspective.¶ While a number of issues—such as perceived general American efforts to dominate and circumvent multilateral nonproliferation mechanisms, the American emphasis on counter-proliferation, and its missile defense program—had and in some cases still have considerable potential to reinforce established Chinese suspicions of multilateralism, this has not resulted in a reversion to China's former approach to the nonproliferation regime. Chinese authorities continue to harbor some reservations about the regime where issues of objectivity and the rules of engagement of suspected or confirmed proliferators are concerned, and they send mixed signals on nonproliferation on occasion as a result. China remains a less enthusiastic supporter of the imposition of sanctions on actual or suspected proliferators than many other states, but in a remarkable policy transformation, China emerged as a supporter of the nuclear nonproliferation regime in the face of considerable internal threats to its integrity and effectiveness. This demonstrates the importance of multilateral nonproliferation instruments to the Chinese government and the depth of its commitment to this approach.

### East Asia Answers

**East Asian Hegemony Impossible- Counterbalancing**

**Green ’12**

Michael is an associate professor of international relations at Georgetown University. He is also a senior adviser and holds the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “China Periphery: Implications for U.S. Policy and Interests,” Foreign Policy Research Institution

In recent years scholars and policy planners have asserted three possible ¶ scenarios for the future of Asian regional order. The first, which was common ¶ in the mid-1990s but has largely disappeared, is the idea of enduring U.S.¶ unipolarity. For Asia, the high water mark of this brief post-Cold War unipolar ¶ moment was the ’97-’98 financial crisis, when the Clinton administration and the ¶ International Monetary Fund (IMF) tried to impose the so-called “Washington ¶ Standard” of strict market-based conditionality on the emergency economic ¶ stabilization packages to Indonesia, Thailand and Korea. In response, leading ¶ officials and scholars within Japan, China, Korea and the Association of Southeast ¶ Asian Nations (ASEAN) began challenging the universality of “Western” economic ¶ principles and posited a competing development model based on “Asian values.” ¶ I Instructively for Beijing today, ASEAN reached out to Tokyo and Beijing to impose ¶ an influence cost on the United States, something we now see member states doing ¶ to China as Beijing overplays its hand. The blowback from the clash over economic ¶ ideology in the ’97-98 financial crisis continues to this day, manifest in the Chiang ¶ Mai Initiative, the ASEAN Plus Three free trade talks, and other regional forums ¶ that were deliberately conceived as a counterbalance to U.S. economic ideological ¶ hegemony. Fifteen years later, of course, the dynamic within the region is very ¶ different, and while the regional reaction to a sudden shift in the distribution of ¶ power after the Cold War was instructive, few expect a return of American ¶ unipolarity, even if it was only a matter of perceptions in the first place.

## 1NR

#### I don’t have Eli’s 1NR. It was a bunch of cards on the Pan K.