# Round 1 v Emporia FT

## 1NC

### 1NC- Theory

**A. Definitions:**

**“Resolved” means to “reach a firm decision about”, Merriam-Webster.com**

**“Should” means “to express obligation, propriety, or expediency”, Merriam-Webster.com**

**“Increase” means to make greater, augment- that’s Merriam-Webster.com**

**B. Violation: The affirmative enters into a Memorandum of Understanding--**

**Those are NOT binding, they only establish a framework for FUTURE policy action, AND this evidence is contextual to the DOE**

**Reynolds & Curtiss 98**

**[Nicholas, James,** [**http://www.wmsym.org/archives/1998/html/sess20/20-04/20-04.htm**](http://www.wmsym.org/archives/1998/html/sess20/20-04/20-04.htm)**, mg]**

**In September 1996, the NRC, as part of the Commission's Strategic Assessment and Rebaselining, published a Direction Setting Issue Paper addressing options for NRC regulation of DOE facilities. In March 1997, the Commission endorsed the NRC's assumption of nuclear safety regulatory oversight for many, but not all, DOE nuclear facilities, contingent upon the agency's being given sufficient human and financial resources to assume this new responsibility, and also contingent upon a clear delineation as to what authority the NRC would exercise over DOE facilities.[6] The Commission also directed the NRC Staff to convene a high-level NRC Task Force to identify, in conjunction with DOE, the policy and regulatory issues that warrant study and resolution. In June 1997, NRC Chairman Dr. Shirley Ann Jackson and DOE Secretary Federico Peña agreed on a pilot program to pursue regulation of DOE nuclear facilities by the NRC. On October 16, 1997, the NRC and DOE entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (SECY-97-237) to establish the framework for such a pilot program.[7] In her speech to the 22nd Annual Symposium of the Uranium Institute last September, Chairman Jackson stated that the agency's primary goal is to "remain rigorous in ensuring public and environmental protection on a cost-justified basis, and to ensure that whatever steps we take toward phased-in DOE oversight do not compromise our ability to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety within the scope of our current mission."**

**MOUs not legally binding--- only a first step or an outline of intended future action**

**GreenCollar Technologies (No Date)**

**[http://greencollartech.com/memorandum-of-understanding-mou#axzz2HUAfDhP0, mg]**

Our **memorandums of understanding are NOT legally binding. They are not and should not be construed as contracts. They are simply used to bring us closer together, outline deliverables and demonstrate intention.** Please refer to the “General” section below for more details.¶ Consider it an expression of convergence of will between us. **It indicates an intended common line of action. We are not implying a legal commitment but it is a first step towards ultimate creation of a letter of commitment.** We keep signed MOU’s on file so we can act quickly to establish a partnership under various circumstances.

**C. This is a voting issue**

**1. Makes the 1AC conditional--- no guarantee that the MOU results in future implementation of the plan- this destroys all negative ground because we can’t get stable Counterplan competition or DA links and means we have to debate them on solvency just to get to square one. Uniquely allows unpredictable 2ac shifts because they can say plan never gets implemented and read signaling add-ons**

**2. It’s a 100% solvency takeout--- the plan is never implemented, the agencies just agree it’s a good idea**

**3. Its not an increase in production- only a recommendation of a future increase- destroys all market-based disads which are at the core of the topic**

**4. It’s future fiat at best--- this is illegit because it spikes out of DA links and destroys CPs that test the timeframe of the AFF**

**5. Its extra T because it includes an element of recommending the plan- this allows them to claim unpredictable link arguments, solvency deficits, and process-based advantages- this is an independent voter for fairness and clash**

### Topicality

#### A. Interpretation – Government purchases may be an incentive but they aren’t FINANCIAL incentives

Schoofs 4

Sam Schoofs, Calvin College, 2004,¶ [2004, Washington Internships for Students of Engineering Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, 6 August 2004 A federal Renewable Portfolio Standard: Policy Analysis and Proposal, http://www.wise-intern.org/journal/2004/WISE2004-SamSchoofsFinalPaper.pdf, accessed 9-20-12,

D. Renewable Energy Policy Overview There are two main categories of renewable energy policies. The first category gives some financial incentives to encourage renewable energy that includes tax incentives, grants, loans, rebates, and production incentives [13]. Tax incentives cover personal, sales, property, and corporate taxes and they help to reduce the investment costs and to reward investors for their support of renewable energy sources [12], [13]. As an example, 24 states currently have some form of grant program in place that ranges from as small as $500 up to $1,000,000 [13]. The second category of renewable energy policies is called rules and regulations, which mandate a certain action from an obligated entity. Included within this category are renewable portfolio standards, equipment certification, solar/wind access laws, **and green power purchasing**/aggregation polices [13]. As an example, equipment certification allows the states to regulate the performance criteria that equipment is required to meet in order to be eligible for financial incentives [12]. Seven states currently have equipment certification programs in place

#### B. Violation – the plan is procurement – that’s a nonfinancial incentive

#### C. Vote negative –

#### 1. Limits – expanding the topic outside of financial incentives makes it limitless

Czinkota et al 9

Czinkota et al, Georgetown University McDonough school of business professor, 2009¶ [Michael, Ilkka A. Ronkainen, Georgetown University McDonough school of business professor , and Michael H. Moffett, Thunderbird school of global management continental grain professorship, “Fundamentals of International Business” http://books.google.com/books?id=\_X-l25srIYkC&q=69#v=snippet&q=69&f=false, google books, p.69, accessed 6-25-12

Incentives offered by policymakers to facilitate foreign investments are mainly of three types: fiscal, financial, and nonfinancial. **Fiscal incentives** are specific tax measures designed to attract foreign investors. They typically consist of special depreciation allowances, tax credits or rebates, special deductions for capital expenditures, tax holidays, and the reduction of tax burdens. **Financial incentives** offer special funding for the investor by providing, for example, land or buildings, loans, and loan guarantees. **Nonfinancial incentives** include guaranteed government purchases; special protection from competition through tariffs, import quotas, and local content requirements, and investments in infrastructure facilities.

#### 2. Ground – we can’t get core offense based off financial incentives or CPs that offer a different type of incentive

### 1NC

#### Fiscal cliff gave Obama political capital for a compromise on the debt ceiling.

John B. Judis 1/3/13, Senior Editor – TNR http://www.tnr.com/blog/plank/111573/obama-didnt-get-rolled-the-fiscal-cliff-in-fact-he-won#

It is tempting, in view of Barack Obama’s re-election, to look back on his first term as a rousing success, but it was not. Obama got his initial stimulus and his healthcare bill, but he made political errors in the first two years that helped Republicans retake the House and a majority of governorships in a crucial redistricting year. And in 2011, he made back-room concessions on the budget that seriously imperiled the economic recovery. So I still don’t share Jon Chait’s halcyon view of the Obama presidency. But Obama learned from the difficulties of his first term. The debt-ceiling fiasco of Summer 2011 was clearly a turning point. In the election, Obama framed the campaign in classic Democratic terms as a contest of the party of the common man against the party of the rich, while carefully targeting the new Democratic demography. And in the two months since his reelection, he carried through on the promise of the campaign by centering the fiscal cliff negotiations on ending tax cuts for the wealthy. The bill, the American Tax Payer Relief Act, raises tax rates back to 39.6 percent for those making over $400,000; limits deductions and credits for those making over $250,000; extends unemployment insurance; expands the earned income tax credit; and gives Congress another two months to prevent sequestration. Some of my colleagues argue that he could have gotten more, but I don’t think so. The final result, approved by the House of Representatives, saves the country from another fiscal train wreck. It also positions Obama and the Democrats very well in future fights with a Republican Party that is becoming an embattled outpost for addled billionaires and white Southern revanchists. It may not happen during Obama’s second term, but the GOP may be on the way to marginalizing itself as a political party. Going into the negotiations over the fiscal cliff, Obama had two objectives. First, he had to prevent tax increases and further cuts to government spending that would imperil the recovery. As the CBO forecast last fall, further fiscal tightening could raise unemployment and slow growth, perhaps even leading to a recession. That’s certainly what happened in the United States in 1937 and in Japan in 1997 when policy-makers were under the illusion that reducing the deficit was the path to economic growth. The compromise, reached by Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell and Vice President Joe Biden, protected consumer demand and jobs. The Senate resolution only raised tax rates for the wealthy--who, because of their tendency to save rather than consume, could actually benefit the economy. It also contained no spending cuts. And the very act of avoiding the fiscal cliff and the ensuing weeks of clamor or crisis will protect America’s global reputation as a “safe haven” for investors. That’s no small matter, because foreigners’ willingness to hold and invest in dollars is a major reason why interest rates have not gone up. Secondly, Obama scored a major political triumph by getting Republicans to agree to raise back tax rates on the wealthy. Since 1978, Republicans have focused their popular appeal on the premise that cutting taxes on the wealthy – and secondarily everyone else -- will encourage growth. By putting Republicans in a position where, in order to protect tax cuts for the wealthy, they had to risk increasing taxes for everyone by letting the country go over the cliff, Obama and the Democrats robbed them of what has been their defining issue. They are now left with advocating spending cuts, which, as it turns out, are only popular in the abstract. In negotiating over the fiscal cliff, Obama also did something that he failed to do during the summer of 2011: He campaigned publicly. He framed the issues. He put the Republicans on the defensive in a way that he failed to do during much of his first term. Fifty years ago, perhaps, a Democratic president could have relied on constituent groups, led by the labor movement, to carry the battle for liberal initiatives, but while these groups are important, they don’t carry the same kind of clout they used to. And they don’t have the money to compete with Republican and conservative groups. But the President can command the public’s attention, and Obama did--right up through the final days of voting. There are arguments to be made about whether Obama got enough from the negotiations. Could he have held out for a $250,000 floor on increased tax rates? Perhaps, but he had to make some concession and he retained the central political principle, while keeping three-fourths of the promised revenue. More important, could Obama have gotten an agreement on the debt ceiling or the sequester instead of postponing these battles? That’s a more serious issue, but my sense is that with Republicans still controlling the House, Obama did not have the power to force Senate and House Republicans into a last minute deal on these issues without making very unfortunate concessions on spending and taxes. With a new House and Senate, Obama stands a good chance of winning these battles in the months to come -- if he continues to conduct these negotiations as political campaigns and not as backroom Washington affairs. The fiscal cliff deal took tax rates out of the discussion. What’s left are spending cuts. If Obama allows the Republicans and obnoxious groups like Fix the Debt to frame the issues, he’ll be in trouble.And he did seem to fall into this trap briefly when he proposed changing the cost of living index for Social Security. But if he reminds the public that what the Republicans andBut if he reminds the public that what the Republicans and their allies want to do is cut their Medicare and Social Security, he and the Democrats should be in good shape. As for the Republicans, the debate over the fiscal cliff, like the debate last year over the debt limit, revealed serious divisions within the party and its rank-and-file that Obama and the Democrats could exploit over the next months. There are at least three different kinds of divisions that have become visible. First is between the Senate and the House. Senate Republicans, who are in a minority, have proven more amenable to compromise on fiscal issues. Unlike most Republican House members, many senators can’t count on being re-elected by solid Republicans majorities. McConnell himself comes from a state where Democrats still hold most of the state offices. Secondly, there is a regional division in the party between the deep South, which contains many of the diehard House Republicans, and the Republicans from the Northeast, industrial Midwest, and the Far West. In the House vote on the fiscal cliff, Republican House members from the deep South opposed it by 83 to 10, while Republicans from the Northeast favored it by 24 to one, and those from the Far West by 17 to eight. After the Republican leadership refused to bring a Sandy hurricane relief bill to the floor before the end of the session – effectively killing it – New York Republican Peter King called on New York and New Jersey Republicans to withhold donations to the GOP. New Jersey Governor Chris Christe blew his top at the House Republicans. Third, there is a division among Republican lobbies, political organizations and interest groups that surfaced in the wake of the election and once again this week. It’s not easy to define, but it runs between pro-business conservatives, on the one hand, and the right-wing libertarians of the Tea Party and Club for Growth and their billionaire funders. Grover Norquist and Americans for Tax Reform gave their approval the Senate bill. The Chamber of Commerce grudgingly endorsed the final bill, and the National Federation of Independent Business said the tax provisions were acceptable. The Club for Growth, the Koch Brothers’ Americans for Prosperity, FreedomWorks (which itself has fallen under the sway of its most ideological elements), and the Tea Party Patriots opposed any compromise. These divisions don’t necessarily augur the kind of formal split that wrecked the Whig Party in the 1850s. Nor they suggest widespread defection of Republicans into the Democratic Party as happened during the 1930s. There is still far too much distance between, say, McConnell and Democratic Majority Leader Harry Reid. But they do suggest that a process of erosion is under way that will weaken the Republicans’ ability to maintain a united front against Democratic initiatives. That could happen in the debates over the sequester and debt ceiling if Obama and the Democrats make the kind of public fuss that they did over fiscal cliff.

**Plan drains capital and causes an immediate fight**

**Szondy, ‘12**

[David, freelance writer -- Gizmag, 2-16, “Feature: Small modular nuclear reactors - the future of energy?” http://www.gizmag.com/small-modular-nuclear-reactors/20860/]

**The problem is that nuclear energy is the proverbial political hot potato** - even in early days when the new energy source exploded onto the world scene. The tremendous amount of energy locked in the atom held the promise of a future like something out of a technological Arabian Nights. It would be a world where electricity was too cheap to meter, deserts would bloom, ships would circle the Earth on a lump of fuel the size of a baseball, planes would fly for months without landing, the sick would be healed and even cars would be atom powered. But **though nuclear power did bring about incredible changes in our world, in its primary role, generating electricity for homes and industry, it ended up as less of a miracle and more of a very complicated way of boiling water**.¶ **Not only complicated, but expensive and potentially dangerous**. Though hundreds of reactors were built all over the world and some countries, such as France, generate most of their electricity from it, nuclear power has faced continuing questions over cost, safety, waste disposal and proliferation. One hundred and four nuclear plants provide the United States with 20 percent of the nation's power, but a building permit hadn't been issued since 1978 with no new reactors coming on line since 1996 and after the uproar from the environmental movement after nuclear accidents at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima, it seemed unlikely that any more would ever be approved - until now. **This fierce domestic opposition to nuclear power has caused** many governments to take **a**n almost **schizophrenic stance regarding the atom.**

#### Obama’s limited political capital key to debt talks.

Chris Cillizza and Aaron Blake, 12/11/12, www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2012/12/11/what-susan-rice-can-tell-us-about-obamas-second-term/

President Obama continues to mull whether to nominate Susan Rice to be Secretary of State. How he decides on that question will tell us a lot about how he plans to approach his second term in office. Two things have become abundantly clear since the election: 1) Obama likes Rice quite a bit and seems inclined to pick her as the successor to outgoing Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and 2) Opposition to Rice on Capitol Hill is real and lasting. (Sen. John McCain’s move to the Foreign Relations committee makes that abundantly clear.) Given those two realities, what does Obama do? Down one path, he nominates Rice despite the fact that Republicans like McCain (Ariz.), Sen. Lindsey Graham (S.C.) and even Susan Collins (Maine) have made clear that doing so will mean a nasty confirmation fight, and in spite of the fact that many Democrats are (privately) leery of having to vote on a pick who has generated controversy even before she is nominated. (Remember that Senate Democrats have to defend 20 seats to 14 for Republicans in 2014, including those in hostile territory like Louisiana, Arkansas, South Dakota and West Virginia.) That is best described as the damn-the-torpedos path — in two ways. First, the Rice nomination would likely land right in the middle of the final fiscal cliff negotiations and could poison any good will built up with congressional Republicans. It would also make clear to Republicans that Obama the deal-cutter is gone, upping the ante even more on the fiscal cliff talks. Even if Obama does wait until early 2013 to pick a nominee, he would have to massage it around his inauguration in late January and the coming debt ceiling fight scheduled for late February. Either way, it wouldn’t be easy. Second, it would put Senate Democrats out on a limb they have made abundantly clear they don’t want to be on. That would be a clear signal to his party that Obama is, first and foremost, all about Obama — something congressional Democrats have long suspected. If Obama does go forward with Rice, rallying his party to some of his preferred second-term initiatives could get very complicated. In short: The reservoir of good will would be drained very quickly. Then there is the path of least resistance. In that scenario, Obama goes with Massachusetts Sen. John Kerry as Secretary of State and finds another, less controversial post for Rice. A nomination fight at the start of his second term is almost certainly dodged — people like Collins have relentlessly insisted that Kerry would be confirmed without any trouble — but Obama could (and likely would) be painted in some circles as toothless. A narrative would build — although it’s not clear whether it would be sustained — that Obama was giving in (again) to Republicans and we might even see a few “Is the liberal base abandoning Obama” stories. After all, Obama is a month removed from a convincing reelection victory, and Republicans are in the midst of an examination of their party and its principles. Now is a time to be bold, not a time to capitulate to the threats of the likes of McCain, the argument from the left will go. (The Arizona senator remains a loathed figure by the Democratic base following his 2008 bid for president.) It’s not clear how widespread that dissatisfaction might be. Bypassing Rice for Kerry is different than bypassing Rice for, say, McCain. Undoubtedly there would be some element of the liberal left unhappy, but how many “real people” would sour on Obama and his policies if he made the switch? On the other hand, stepping back from the brink on Rice would also likely be taken as a signal that the ever-pragmatic Obama wants to spend his political capital on things like fixing the nation’s debt problem and reforming the country’s immigration system rather than on a Cabinet nominee — even one as prominent as Secretary of State.

#### Not raising the limit immediately decks the global economy.

Jeff Uscher 12/18, Contributing Writer, Money Morning, http://moneymorning.com/2012/12/18/u-s-debt-ceiling-forget-fiscal-cliff-with-the-real-issue-still-ahead/

While there is a certain amount of novelty appeal to the $1 trillion coin idea, it is a silly solution to a very real problem. As bad as the fiscal cliff may be, if no agreement is reached, the changes take place over time and can be reversed before much damage is done to the economy. A default by the U.S. government would take effect immediately, would be far more devastating for the global economy and much more difficult to repair. The United States can't afford to have its credit rating cut again, so the U.S. debt ceiling needs to be raised.

#### Extinction

Kemp 10

Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East, p. 233-4

The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.

### 1NC

#### The Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration should sign a memorandum of understanding relating to the development, design, delivery, and operational support of civilian space nuclear reactors within NASA. The memorandum should include a provision to procure, through up-front appropriations, electricity from small modular reactors.

#### Solves the case---DOD procurement contracts accelerate SMR commercialization---spills over to widespread adoption

CSPO 10 – Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes, Arizona State University, June 2010, “FOUR POLICY PRINCIPLES FOR ENERGY INNOVATION & CLIMATE CHANGE: A SYNTHESIS,” http://www.catf.us/resources/publications/files/Synthesis.pdf

Government purchase of new technologies is a powerful way to accelerate innovation through increased demand (Principle 3a). We explore how this principle can be applied by considering how the DoD could purchase new nuclear reactor designs to meet electric power needs for DoD bases and operations.

Small modular nuclear power reactors (SMRs), which generate less than 300 MW of power (as compared to more typical reactors built in the 1000 MW range) are often listed as a potentially transformative energy technology. While typical traditional large-scale nuclear power plants can cost five to eight billion dollars, smaller nuclear reactors could be developed at smaller scale, thus not presenting a “bet the company” financial risk. SMRs could potentially be mass manufactured as standardized modules and then delivered to sites, which could significantly reduce costs per unit of installed capacity as compared to today’s large scale conventional reactor designs.
It is likely that some advanced reactors designs – including molten salt reactors and reactors utilizing thorium fuels – could be developed as SMRs. Each of these designs offers some combination of inherently safe operation, very little nuclear proliferation risk, relatively small nuclear waste management needs, very abundant domestic fuel resources, and high power densities – all of which are desirable attributes for significant expansion of nuclear energy.

Currently, several corporations have been developing small nuclear reactors. Table 2 lists several of these companies and their reactor power capacities, as well as an indication of the other types of reactor innovations that are being incorporated into the designs. Some of these technologies depend on the well-established light water reactor, while others use higher energy neutrons, coolants capable of higher temperature operation, and other innovative approaches. Some of these companies, such as NuScale, intend to be able to connect as many as 24 different nuclear modules together to form one larger nuclear power plant. In addition to the different power ranges described in Table 2, these reactors vary greatly in size, some being only 3 to 6 feet on each side, while the NuScale reactor is 60 feet long and 14 feet in diameter. Further, many of these reactors produce significant amounts of hightemperature heat, which can be harnessed for process heating, gas turbine generators, and other operations.

One major obstacle is to rapid commercialization and development are prolonged multi-year licensing times with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Currently, the NRC will not consider a reactor for licensing unless there is a power utility already prepared to purchase the device. Recent Senate legislation introduced by Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) has pushed for DOE support in bringing down reactor costs and in helping to license and certify two reactor designs with the NRC. Some additional opportunities to facilitate the NRC licensing process for innovative small modular reactors would be to fund NRC to conduct participatory research to get ahead of potential license applications (this might require ~$100million/year) and potentially revise the current requirement that licensing fees cover nearly all NRC licensing review costs.

One option for accelerating SMR development and commercialization, would be for DOD to establish SMR procurement specifications (to include cost) and agree to purchase a sufficient amount of SMR’s to underwrite private sector SMR development. Of note here may be that DARPA recently (3/30/10) issued a “Request for Information (RFI) on Deployable Reactor Technologies for Generating Power and Logistic Fuels” 2 that specifies may features that would be highly desirable in an advanced commercial SMR. While other specifications including coproduction of mobility fuel are different than those of a commercial SMR power reactor, it is likely that a core reactor design meeting the DARPA inquiry specifications would be adaptable to commercial applications. While nuclear reactors purchased and used by DOD are potentially exempt from many NRC licensing requirements 3 , any reactor design resulting from a DOD procurement contract would need to proceed through NRC licensing before it could be commercially offered. Successful use of procured SMR’s for DOD purposes could provide the knowledge and operational experience needed to aid NRC licensing and it might be possible for the SMR contractor to begin licensing at some point in the SMR development process4.

Potential purchase of small modular nuclear reactors would be a powerful but proven way in which government procurement of new energy technologies could encourage innovation. Public procurement of other renewable energy technologies could be similarly important.

#### Net benefit:

#### DOD reducing reliance on REC purchases now

FT 12 – Federal Times, 7/22/12, “Agencies buying energy credits to meet mandates,” http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20120722/FACILITIES02/307220006/Agencies-buying-energy-credits-meet-mandates

But some agencies are trying to buck the trend and reduce their reliance on RECs.

The Interior Department said it plans to build more renewable energy projects and purchase fewer RECs.

For example, the National Park Service plans to install solar panels on top of its visitor station at Assateague Island, in Berlin, Md.

“We anticipate a reduced reliance on RECs to meet mandated renewable energy goals,” spokesman Drew Malcomb said.

The Defense Department intends to buy fewer RECs and instead invest money in on-site projects.

“It takes money to buy RECs, and you are not creating any new capacity. You are just spending money to meet a goal,” Dorothy Robyn, deputy undersecretary of Defense for installations and environment, said in an interview.

Robyn is confident DoD will get there without paying for credits. “We are in a position to generate renewable energy on our own installations,” she said.

Pentagon spokeswoman Melinda Morgan said the department does not track how much it spends on credits each year.

In 2011, DoD decided to scale back its purchase of RECs, despite having a goal to obtain 5 percent of its facilities’ energy needs from renewable energy sources. It achieved only 3.1 percent after reducing its purchase of credits from 440,000 to 248,000 megawatt hours, Robyn said.

#### Energy obtained through alternative financing doesn’t count towards mandates that force DOD to increase reliance on renewables---causes renewable energy credit purchases to make up the difference

GAO 9 – Government Accountability Office, December 2009, “Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Take Actions to Address Challenges in Meeting Federal Renewable Energy Goals,” <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10104.pdf>

As we explained earlier in this report, DOD expects to rely increasingly on alternative financing approaches to meet the renewable energy goals. For DOD to effectively implement these approaches, the department will require energy management staff who have the relevant expertise for implementing the approaches. However, because we found that the services and their installations’ staff often lack expertise in developing alternative financing approaches, DOD may by limited in its ability both to use these approaches to develop renewable energy projects and to do so in a manner that adequately protects the government’s financial resources committed to these approaches.

According to DOD officials, in most cases, private developers are generally interested in partnering with DOD in order to sell the projects’ unbundled energy or associated renewable energy certificates to a third party. These officials explained that the generally accepted business model for these types of approaches includes a renewable energy resource on or near DOD land that is harnessed by a project financed, built, and operated by thirdparty developer that then sells the unbundled energy to DOD or other customers and typically retains ownership of the project’s renewable energy certificates.48

However, under such approaches, DOD often would neither consume the renewable energy nor retain the renewable energy certificates. When DOD does not consume the renewable energy, a developer would provide some other form of compensation for the use of the renewable resource on DOD land. For example, in the largest renewable energy project on DOD land, DOD does not consume the energy but instead receives financial compensation based on the sale of the project’s energy. If DOD neither consumes the renewable energy nor retains the renewable energy certificates, a serious challenge may be posed to DOD’s ability to meet the renewable energy goals. That occurs because, according to DOE’s guidance on implementation of the 2005 Act and the 2007 Executive Order—guidance designed to preserve the integrity of the renewable energy certificate market—for an agency to count a project’s renewable energy toward these goals, the project must meet two requirements. First, the renewable energy must be produced and used on-site at a federal agency or the renewable energy must be produced by a project owned by a federal agency but installed on private property. Second, the agency must retain or replace the renewable energy certificates associated with the energy produced. In addition, as we discussed earlier, unlike DOE, DOD has not issued guidance that provides a clear explanation of its methodology for calculating progress toward the fiscal year 2025 goal under the 2007 Defense Authorization Act, including DOD’s definition of “consumption” and the treatment of renewable energy certificates in that context.

#### DOD ownership of the project solves the case and avoids REC purchases

Loni Silva 12, J.D., The George Washington University Law School, Summer 2012, “THE PROBLEMS WITH USING RENEWABLE ENERGY CERTIFICATES TO MEET FEDERAL RENEWABLE ENERGY REQUIREMENTS,” Public Contract Law Journal, Vol. 41, No. 4

The best way to address the problems with FEMP’s REC interpretation is to render the use of RECs to meet EPAct 2005 and EO 13423 obsolete. RECs should only be used as a short-term, stop-gap solution to meet the renewable energy requirements. 139 The long-term goal should be for agencies to consume bundled renewable energy produced on or near agency installations.

Consuming renewable energy would eliminate the current problems with FEMP’s REC interpretation. First, consuming renewable energy would eliminate the problem with best value because, unlike RECs, renewable energy responds to and fulﬁlls agencies’ actual energy needs. 140 For Joe, the energy manager, the ability to use renewable energy means that he would not need to spend part of his energy budget on a commodity that does not address his actual energy needs. 141

Second, consuming renewable energy would eliminate the problems with transparency and accountability. 142 Because the policies plainly require agencies to consume renewable energy, complying by consuming renewable energy, rather than purchasing RECs, would be transparent. 143 Moreover, because this method of compliance is transparent and allows a clear view of what the Government is doing in response to the requirements of the policies, it allows the Government to be held accountable. 144

Third, consuming renewable energy produced at on-site facilities would further the policies’ goal of developing on-site renewable energy facilities. 145 Having facilities on or near agency property would provide power to the installation in case the grid is attacked or fails. 146 It would also promote the energy independence, security, and sustainability of both the Federal Government and the nation as a whole by developing new renewable energy facilities. 147

Developing new renewable energy facilities on or near agency installations would allow agencies to consume renewable energy, rather than RECs. 148 Of course, not all locations are able to support a renewable energy facility. 149 However, because the policy requirements are agency-wide rather than installation speciﬁc, agencies can build facilities at installations with available land, increasing renewably energy production to compensate for installations where the lack of available land or other factors makes facility development impossible. 150

#### Avoids politics---RECs trigger massive backlash---perceived as a backdoor carbon tax

Bill Sweet 12, Editor of IEEE Spectrum, a publication of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 3/2/12, “Are Renewable Energy Credits Excessively Expensive?,” http://spectrum.ieee.org/energywise/energy/renewables/are-renewable-energy-credits-excessively-expensive

The Manhattan Institute, a public policy research outfit with a free-market and somewhat libertarian orientation, has issued a report arguing that renewable energy credits (RECs) represent an excessively expensive way of addressing environmental concerns and promoting green technology. The REC is a device employed by the 29 states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico that have adopted renewable portfolio standards, sometimes with special "carve-outs" for solar energy. Grid participants unable to meet mandated targets for renewable generation purchase tradeable credits from those that can, where a single REC represents one MWh of green energy delivered. Thus, the REC is a means of delivering subsidies to producers of green energy that are paid for by producers of dirty energy.

The REC, and even perhaps some of the purposes the REC is meant to serve, is not popular among the kinds of people who write for the Manhattan Institute. As they see it—and arguably they are right—the REC is a poorly concealed substitute for a carbon emissions credit, which in turn is a poorly concealed substitute for a carbon tax. Nevertheless, the Manhattan Institute has a record of producing serious work that is respected by people who do not necessarily share the institute's general point of view. This latest report, "The High Cost of Renewable Energy Mandates," by Robert Bryce, deserves attention as a first stab at assessing the overall costs to consumers of RECs.

Basically Bryce compares the costs of electricity in states that have renewable energy mandates with costs in states that do not and finds that rates have gone up much more in states that do have such mandates. "The gap is particularly striking in coal-dependent states—seven such states with RPS mandates saw their rates soar by an average of 54.2 percent between 2001 and 2010, more than twice the average increase experienced by seven other coal-dependent states without mandates," reports Bryce. Though he devotes detailed attention to certain states such as California, Oregon and Washington, he does not try to disentangle the precise mix of reasons that have produced higher rates in states with portfolio standards, and nor does he claim to.

Bryce notes that tightening regulation of coal generating plants and higher expenditures on power transmission also have been major factors in driving up electricity costs. Citing figures from the Edison Electric Institute, Bryce says that "member companies spent over $55 billion on transmission projects between 2001 and 2009. Another $61 billion will likely be spent on transmission projects from 2010 through 2021."

However superficial, the Manhattan Institute report suggests worryingly that the costs of promoting wind and especially solar energy may start catching up with policy-makers and produce a political backlash, as we have been witnessing in Europe.

### 1NC

#### Their arguments about extinction and extending humanity into space require defending the intrinsic value of humans in opposition to other species. This is anthropocentric and abandons bare life.

KOCHI & ORDAN 2K8

[tarik and noam, queen’s university and bar llan university, “an argument for the global suicide of humanity”, vol 7. no. 4., bourderlands e-journal]

**If only some of our genes but not our species has survived, maybe the emphasis we place upon the notion of ‘survival’ is more cultural than simply genetic. Such an emphasis stems** not only **from** our higher cognitive powers of ‘self-consciousness’ or **self**-**awareness**, **but** **also** **from** **our** **conscious** **celebration** **of** **this** **fact**: **the image we create for ourselves of ‘humanity’, which is produced by via language, collective memory and historical narrative. The notion of the ‘human’ involves an identification of our species with particular characteristics with and upon which we ascribe certain notions of value.** Amongst others such characteristics and values might be seen to include: the notion of an inherent ‘human dignity’, the virtue of ethical behaviour, the capacities of creative and aesthetic thought, and for some, the notion of an eternal soul. Humans are conscious of themselves as humans and value the characteristics that make us distinctly ‘human’. **When many**, like Hawing, typically **think** **of** the notion of the **survival** of the human race, **it is** perhaps **this cultural-cognitive aspect of homo sapiens, made possible and produced by human self-consciousness,** which they are thinking of. If one is to make the normative argument that the human race should survive, then one needs to argue it is these cultural-cognitive aspects of humanity, and not merely a portion of our genes, that is worth saving. However, it remains an open question as to what cultural-cognitive aspect of humanity would survive in the future when placed under radical environmental and evolutionary pressures. We can consider that perhaps the fish people, having the capacity for self-awareness, would consider themselves as the continuation or next step of ‘humanity’. Yet, who is to say that a leap in the process of evolution would not prompt a change in self awareness, a different form of abstract reasoning about the species, a different self-narrative, in which case the descendents of humans would look upon their biological and genetic ancestors in a similar manner to the way humans look upon the apes today. Conceivably the fish people might even forget or suppress their evolutionary human heritage. While such a future cannot be predicted, it also cannot be controlled from our graves. In something of a sense similar to the point made by Giorgio Agamben (1998), revising ideas found within the writings of Michel Foucault and Aristotle, **the question of survival can be thought to involve a distinction between the ‘good life’ and ‘bare life’.** In this instance, **arguments in favour of human survival rest upon a certain belief in a distinctly human good life, as opposed to bare biological life, the life of the gene pool. It is thus such a good life, or at least a form of life considered to be of value, that is held up by a particular species to be worth saving.** When considering the hypothetical example of the fish people, what cultural-cognitive aspect of humanity’s good life would survive? The conditions of life under water, which presumably for the first thousand years would be quite harsh, would perhaps make the task of bare survival rather than the continuation of any higher aspects of a ‘human heritage’ the priority. Learning how to hunt and gather or farm underwater, learning how to communicate, breed effectively and avoid getting eaten by predators might displace the possibilities of listening to Mozart or Bach, or adhering to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or playing sport, or of even using written language or complex mathematics. Within such an extreme example **it becomes highly questionable to what extent a ‘human heritage’ would survive and thus to what extent we might consider our descendents to be ‘human’. In the case where what survives would not be the cultural-cognitive aspects of a human heritage considered a valuable or a good form of life, then, what really survives is just life. Such a life may well hold a worth or value altogether different to our various historical valuations and calculations.** While the example of the fish people might seem extreme, it presents a similar set of acute circumstances which would be faced within any adaptation to a new habitat whether on the earth or in outer space. Unless humans are saved by radical developments in technology that allow a comfortable colonisation of other worlds, then genetic adaptation in the future retains a reasonable degree of probability. However, **even if the promise of technology allows humans to carry on their cultural-cognitive heritage within another habitat, such survival is still perhaps problematic given the dark, violent, cruel and brutal aspects of human life which we would presumably carry with us into our colonisation of new worlds.** Thinkers like Hawking, who place their faith in technology, also place a great deal of faith in a particular view of a human heritage which they think is worth saving. **When considering the question of survival, such thinkers typically project a one-sided image of humanity into the future. Such a view presents a picture of only the good aspects** of humanity climbing aboard a space-craft and spreading out over the universe. **This presumes that only the ‘good aspects’ of the human heritage would survive, elements such as ‘reason’, creativity, playfulness, compassion, love, fortitude, hope. What however happens to the ‘bad’ aspects of the human heritage, the drives, motivations and thoughts that led to the Holocaust for example?**

**AND, this species-contingent paradigm creates unending genocidal violence against forms of life deemed politically unqualified.**

**KOCHI & ORDAN 2K8**

[tarik and noam, queen’s university and bar llan university, “an argument for the global suicide of humanity”, vol 7. no. 4., bourderlands e-journal]

**Within the picture** many paint **of humanity, events such as the Holocaust are considered as an** exception, an **aberration.** The Holocaust is often portrayed as an example of ‘evil’, a moment of hatred, madness and cruelty (cf. the differing accounts of ‘evil’ given in Neiman, 2004). The event is also treated as one through which humanity comprehend its own weakness and draw strength, via the resolve that such actions will never happen again. However**, if we take seriously the differing ways in which the Holocaust was ‘evil’, then one must surely include along side it the almost uncountable numbers of genocides that have occurred throughout human history**. Hence, **if we are to think of the content of the ‘human heritage’, then this must include the annihilation of indigenous peoples and their cultures across the globe and the manner in which their beliefs, behaviours and social practices have been erased** from what the people of the ‘West’ generally consider to be the content of a human heritage. Again the history of colonialism is telling here. It reminds us exactly how normal, regular and mundane acts of annihilation of different forms of human life and culture have been throughout human history. Indeed the history of colonialism, in its various guises, points to the fact that so many of our legal institutions and forms of ethical life (i.e. nation-states which pride themselves on protecting human rights through the rule of law) have been founded upon colonial violence, war and the appropriation of other peoples’ land (Schmitt, 2003; Benjamin, 1986). Further, the history of colonialism highlights the central function of ‘race war’ that often underlies human social organisation and many of its legal and ethical systems of thought (Foucault, 2003). This history of modern colonialism thus presents a key to understanding that **events such as the Holocaust are not an aberration and exception but are closer to the norm, and sadly, lie at the heart of any heritage of humanity**. After all, all too often **the European colonisation of the globe was justified by arguments that indigenous inhabitants were racially ‘inferior’ and** in some instances that they were **closer to ‘apes’ than to humans** (Diamond, 2006**). Such violence justified by an erroneous view of ‘race’ is in many ways merely an extension of an underlying attitude of speciesism involving a long history of killing and enslavement of non-human species by humans.** **Such a connection between the two histories of inter-human violence (via the mythical notion of differing human ‘races’) and interspecies violence, is well expressed** in Isaac Bashevis Singer’s comment that **whereas humans consider themselves “the crown of creation”, for animals “all people are Nazis” and animal life is “an eternal Treblinka”** (Singer, 1968, p.750).

**Alternative: the judge should vote negative to reject their ethic of human survival.**

**This rejection enables an understanding of the SPECIES-BEING.**

**HUDSON 2K4**

[Laura, The Political Animal: Species-Being and Bare Life, mediations journal, http://www.mediationsjournal.org/files/Mediations23\_2\_04.pdf]

**We are all equally reduced to mere specimens of human biology, mute and uncomprehending of the world in which we are thrown. Species-being, or “humanity as a species,” may require this recognition to move beyond the pseudo-essence of the religion of humanism.** Recognizing that what we call “the human” is an abstraction that fails to fully describe what we are, we may come to find a new way of understanding humanity that recuperates the natural without domination. The bare life that results from expulsion from the law removes even the illusion of freedom. Regardless of one’s location in production**, the threat of losing even the fiction of citizenship and freedom affects everyone.** This may create new means of organizing resistance across the particular divisions of society. Furthermore, the concept of bare life allows us to gesture toward a more detailed, concrete idea of what species-being may look like. Agamben hints that in the recognition of this fact, that in our essence we are all animals, that we are all living dead, might reside the possibility of a kind of redemption. Rather than the mystical horizon of a future community**, the passage to species-being may be experienced as a deprivation, a loss of identity. Species-being is not merely a positive result of the development of history; it is equally the absence of many of the features of “humanity” through which we have learned to make sense of our world**. It is an absence of the kind of individuality and atomism that structure our world under capitalism and underlie liberal democracy, and which continue to inform the tenets of deep ecology. The development of species-being requires the collapse of the distinction between human and animal in order to change the shape of our relationships with the natural world. **A true species-being depends on a sort of reconciliation between our “human” and “animal” selves, a breakdown of the distinction between the two both within ourselves and in nature in general. Bare life would then represent not only expulsion from the law but the possibility of its overcoming. Positioned in the zone of indistinction, no longer a subject of the law but still subjected to it through absence, what we equivocally call “the human” in general becomes virtually indistinguishable from the animal or nature.** But through this expulsion and absence, we may see not only the law but the system of capitalism that shapes it from a position no longer blinded or captivated by its spell. The structure of the law is revealed as always suspect in the false division between natural and political life, which are never truly separable. Though clearly the situation is not yet as dire as Agamben’s invocation of the Holocaust suggests, we are all, as citizens, under the threat of the state of exception. With the decline of the nation as a form of social organization, the whittling away of civil liberties and, with them, the state’s promise of “the good life” (or “the good death”) even in the most developed nations, with the weakening of labor as the bearer of resistance to exploitation, how are we to envision the future of politics and society?

### Solvency

#### SMRs empirically fail at commercialization

Magwood, commissioner – NRC, 7/14/’11

(William, “ECONOMICS AND SAFETY OF MODULAR REACTORS; COMMITTEE: SENATE APPROPRIATIONS; SUBCOMMITTEE: ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT,” CQ Congressional Testimony)

That is not to say that SMRs are a new idea. The conceptual benefits of small reactors have been the subject of discussion and analysis for decades, and all the potential benefits I've mentioned have been considered in the past. The potential advantages of smaller reactors prompted the government to provide considerable financial support for the development of the mid- size, passive-safety reactors in the 1990s and to encourage the pursuit of the pebble-bed modular reactor in the early years of this century.¶ **Both efforts proved unable to overcome** the **economic realities** of building and operating nuclear power plants realities that tend to penalize small reactors and reward larger designs. Thus, instead of the AP-600 and 500 megawatt Simplified Boiling Water Reactor of the early 1990s, the market pushed vendors to increase the size of their designs; today, vendors offer Generation III+ technologies based on those smaller systems the 1100 megawatt AP- 1000 and the 1600 megawatt Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor.2¶ Around the turn of the century, both DOE and industry became interested in the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor, or PBMR. This was a small, high-temperature gas-cooled reactor with a generating capacity of about 165 megawatts. This technology captured considerable media attention after U.S. companies became involved in an effort to build a commercial pilot in South Africa. However, as the high costs of the project became apparent, commercial participants began to peel away and eventually the South African project was abandoned.¶ **All small reactor technologies of the past failed** to find a way to overcome the fact that the infrastructure required to safely operate a nuclear power reactor of any size is considerable. Tons of steel and concrete are needed to construct containment buildings. Control rod drives, steam generators, and other key systems are **hugely expensive** to design and build. A larger plant with greater electric generating capacity simply has an inherently superior opportunity to recover these large up-front costs over a reasonable period.¶ So why is today different from yesterday? The greatest difference is the fact that the technology has evolved significantly over the years. Having learned lessons from the development of Generation III+ technologies and from the failure of previous small reactors, today's SMR vendors clearly believe they have solved the riddle of small reactor economics. They are presenting novel design approaches that could lead to significant improvements in nuclear safety. For example, design concepts that I have seen thus far further advance the use of passive safety systems, applying gravity, natural circulation, and very large inventories of cooling water to reduce reliance on human intervention during an emergency. SMR designs also apply novel technologies such as integral pressure vessels that contain all major system components and use fewer and smaller pipes and pumps, thereby reducing the potential for a serious loss-of- coolant accident.¶ Very importantly, these new SMRs are much smaller than the systems designed in the 1990s; this choice was made to assure that they could be factory-built and shipped largely intact by rail for deployment. The ability to "manufacture" a reactor rather than "constructing" it on-site could prove to be a major advantage in terms of cost, schedule reliability, and even quality control.¶ But will innovations like these allow this new breed of SMRs to be successful? Maybe.¶ Many years of work remain for SMR vendors to refine their designs and allow for the development of realistic and reliable cost estimates. **This is much the same state of affairs that existed in** the **2002** time frame when DOE launched the Nuclear Power 2010 program to spur the development and certification of Generation III+ designs such as the AP-1000. At that time, the level of design completeness was insufficient to enable vendors to provide utilities with reliable cost and schedule estimates.

#### Natural gas takes out solvency

Scientific America 3/27

(David Biello, “Small Reactors Make a Bid to Revive Nuclear Power¶ Can small, LEGO-like reactors help create better prospects for the nuclear industry?” <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=small-reactors-bid-to-revive-nuclear-power&print=true>, SEH)

Regardless of how cheap such small modular reactors may allow nuclear to be in future, it is unlikely to be as cheap as natural-gas-fired turbines in the present. In fact, low natural gas prices stalled the U.S. nuclear renaissance outside Georgia and South Carolina, long before the reactor meltdowns at Fukushima Daiichi in Japan. "Because of an unanticipated abundance of natural gas in the United States, nuclear energy, in general, is facing tough competition," noted an analysis of the prospects for small modular reactors from the University of Chicago published last November. The analysis also suggested that small reactors would be more expensive than large reactors on a per-megawatt basis until manufacturing in significant quantities has happened. "It [is] unlikely that SMRs will be commercialized without some form of government incentive."

#### Decade before solvency

St. Louis Post-Dispatch ‘12

[Jeffrey Tomich, <http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/business/2012/05/10/small-problem.html> ETB]

For all the hype, small reactors are still at least a decade away. And that’s if design, licensing and commercial development go at the pace hoped for by the nuclear industry.¶ And even then, the potential for small reactors hinges on how they compete in the energy marketplace. More than concerns about nuclear safety in the wake of the Fukushima disaster in Japan or the problem of where to dispose of highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel, the technology’s future will be dictated by economics.¶ Jackson said Westinghouse aspires to make small reactors whose costs are equal to or less than full-size reactors.¶ For now, there’s no cost data for small reactors and no firm evidence they will produce electricity at a lower price than larger plants.¶ “It’s too early to determine that,” Klein said. “We’re going to have to see some built.”

### Get off the rock

#### Colonization causes weaponization and arms races

Bailey 6 (Jonathan, read history @ U of Oxford, Dec 20, [www.idebate.org/debatabase/topic\_details.php?topicID=324]

Sending humans into spaceor to other planets so that they can erect the flag of a particular nation is a distinctly nationalistic act and one that is likely to create aggressive 'races' in the future just as it has before. China’s manned programme is openly intended to challenge the US dominance of space for the Communist regime’s huge propaganda benefit. George W. Bush’s pledge to boost spending on NASA and to restart the manned mission to Mars programme was a direct response. This is damaging not only because of the potential for space race conflicts to escalate **into greater international hostility**, but also because of the way such races could **result in the** militarization of space (as several Chinese hawks have called on the leadership to do), thereby turning something which should be preserved for the common good of humankind into a **neo-colonial battlefield.**

#### Space weaponization causes accidental nuclear war

Mitchell 1 – “Japan-U.S. Missile Defense Collaboration: Rhetorically Delicious, Deceptively Dangerous” by Gordon R. Mitchell, Member of the Center for Strategic and International Studies Working Group on Theater Missile Defenses in the Asia-Pacific Region., Winter 2001, <http://www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/JapanTMD.pdf>

A buildup of space weapons with capability to execute offensive missions might begin with noble intentions of “peace through strength” deterrence, but this rationale glosses over the tendency that “…**the presence of space weapons…will result in the increased likelihood of their use.”**65 Military commanders desiring to harness the precision strike capability afforded by spacebased “smart” weapons might order deliberate attacks on enemy ground targets in a crisis. The dizzyingspeed of space warfare would introduce intense **“use or lose” pressure** into strategic calculations, with the specter of split-second laser attacks creating incentives to rig orbiting death stars with automated **“hair trigger” devices.** In theory, this automation would enhance survivability of vulnerable space weapon platforms. However, by taking the decision to commit violence out of human hands and endowing computers with authority to make war, military planners could sow insidious seeds of accidental conflict Yale sociologist Charles Perrow has analyzed “complexly interactive, tightly coupled” industrial systems, which have many sophisticated components that all depend on each other’s flawless performance. According to Perrow, this interlocking complexity makes it impossible to foresee all the different ways such systems could fail. He further explains, “[t]he odd term ‘normal accident’ is meant to signal that, given the system characteristics, multiple and unexpected interactions of failures are inevitable 66 Deployment of space weapons with pre-delegated authority to fire death rays or unleash killer projectiles would likely make war itself inevitable, given the susceptibility of such systems to “normal accidents.” It is chilling to contemplate the possible effects of a space war. According to Bowman, “even a tiny projectile reentering from space strikes the earth with such high velocity that it can do enormous damage—**even more than would be done by a nuclear weapon of the same size!”**67 In the same laser technology touted by President Reagan as the quintessential tool of peace, David Langford sees one of the most wicked offensive weapons ever conceived: “One imagines dead cities of microwave-grilled people.”68 Given this unique potential for destruction, it is not hard to imagine that any nation subjected to a space weapon attack would **escalate by retaliating with maximum force, including use of nuclear, biological, and/or chemical weapons.** An accidental war sparked by a computer glitch in space could plunge the world into the **most destructive military conflict ever seen.**

#### Colonization's impossible and you should privilege short-term existential risks

Stross 7

(Charlie, "The High Frontier, Redux," http://www.antipope.org/charlie/blog-static/2007/06/the\_high\_frontier\_redux.html)

I'm going to take it as read that the idea of space colonization isn't unfamiliar; domed cities on Mars, orbiting cylindrical space habitats a la J. D. Bernal or Gerard K. O'Neill, that sort of thing. Generation ships that take hundreds of years to ferry colonists out to other star systems where — as we are now discovering — there are profusions of planets to explore. And I don't want to spend much time talking about the unspoken ideological underpinnings of the urge to space colonization, other than to point out that they're there, that the case for space colonization isn't usually presented as an economic enterprise so much as a quasi-religious one. "We can't afford to keep all our eggs in one basket" isn't so much a justification as an appeal to sentimentality, for in the hypothetical case of a planet-trashing catastrophe, we (who currently inhabit the surface of the Earth) are dead anyway. The future extinction of the human species cannot affect you if you are already dead: strictly speaking, it should be of no personal concern. Historically, crossing oceans and setting up farmsteads on new lands conveniently stripped of indigenous inhabitants by disease has been a cost-effective proposition. But the scale factor involved in space travel is strongly counter-intuitive. Here's a handy metaphor: let's approximate one astronomical unit — the distance between the Earth and the sun, roughly 150 million kilometres, or 600 times the distance from the Earth to the Moon — to one centimetre. Got that? 1AU = 1cm. (You may want to get hold of a ruler to follow through with this one.) The solar system is conveniently small. Neptune, the outermost planet in our solar system, orbits the sun at a distance of almost exactly 30AU, or 30 centimetres — one foot (in imperial units). Giant Jupiter is 5.46 AU out from the sun, almost exactly two inches (in old money). We've sent space probes to Jupiter; they take two and a half years to get there if we send them on a straight Hohmann transfer orbit, but we can get there a bit faster using some fancy orbital mechanics. Neptune is still a stretch — only one spacecraft, Voyager 2, has made it out there so far. Its journey time was 12 years, and it wasn't stopping. (It's now on its way out into interstellar space, having passed the heliopause some years ago.) The Kuiper belt, domain of icy wandering dwarf planets like Pluto and Eris, extends perhaps another 30AU, before merging into the much more tenuous Hills cloud and Oort cloud, domain of loosely coupled long-period comets. Now for the first scale shock: using our handy metaphor the Kuiper belt is perhaps a metre in diameter. The Oort cloud, in contrast, is as much as 50,000 AU in radius — its outer edge lies half a kilometre away. Got that? Our planetary solar system is 30 centimetres, roughly a foot, in radius. But to get to the edge of the Oort cloud, you have to go half a kilometre, roughly a third of a mile. Next on our tour is Proxima Centauri, our nearest star. (There might be a brown dwarf or two lurking unseen in the icy depths beyond the Oort cloud, but if we've spotted one, I'm unaware of it.) Proxima Centauri is 4.22 light years away.A light year is 63.2 x 103 AU, or 9.46 x 1012 Km. So Proxima Centauri, at 267,000 AU, is just under two and a third kilometres, or two miles (in old money) away from us. But Proxima Centauri is a poor choice, if we're looking for habitable real estate. While exoplanets are apparently common as muck, terrestrial planets are harder to find; Gliese 581c, the first such to be detected (and it looks like a pretty weird one, at that), is roughly 20.4 light years away, or using our metaphor, about ten miles. Try to get a handle on this: it takes us 2-5 years to travel two inches. But the proponents of interstellar travel are talking about journeys of ten miles. That's the first point I want to get across: that if the distances involved in interplanetary travel are enormous, and the travel times fit to rival the first Australian settlers, then the distances and times involved in interstellar travel are mind-numbing. This is not to say that interstellar travel is impossible; quite the contrary. But to do so effectively you need either (a) outrageous amounts of cheap energy, or (b) highly efficient robot probes, or (c) a magic wand. And in the absence of (c) you're not going to get any news back from the other end in less than decades. Even if (a) is achievable, or by means of (b) we can send self-replicating factories and have them turn distant solar systems into hives of industry, and more speculatively find some way to transmit human beings there, they are going to have zero net economic impact on our circumstances (except insofar as sending them out costs us money). What do I mean by outrageous amounts of cheap energy? Let's postulate that in the future, it will be possible to wave a magic wand and construct a camping kit that encapsulates all the necessary technologies and information to rebuild a human civilization capable of eventually sending out interstellar colonization missions — a bunch of self-replicating, self-repairing robotic hardware, and a downloadable copy of the sum total of human knowledge to date. Let's also be generous and throw in a closed-circuit life support system capable of keeping a human occupant alive indefinitely, for many years at a stretch, with zero failures and losses, and capable where necessary of providing medical intervention. Let's throw in a willing astronaut (the fool!) and stick them inside this assembly. It's going to be pretty boring in there, but I think we can conceive of our minimal manned interstellar mission as being about the size and mass of a Mercury capsule. And I'm going to nail a target to the barn door and call it 2000kg in total. (Of course we can cut corners, but I've already invoked self-replicating robotic factories and closed-cycle life support systems, and those are close enough to magic wands as it is. I'm going to deliberately ignore more speculative technologies such as starwisps, mind transfer, or AIs sufficiently powerful to operate autonomously — although I used them shamelessly in my novel Accelerando. What I'm trying to do here is come up with a useful metaphor for the energy budget realistically required for interstellar flight.) Incidentally, a probe massing 1-2 tons with an astronaut on top is a bit implausible, but a 1-2 ton probe could conceivably carry enough robotic instrumentation to do useful research, plus a laser powerful enough to punch a signal home, and maybe even that shrink-wrapped military/industrial complex in a tin can that would allow it to build something useful at the other end. Anything much smaller, though, isn't going to be able to transmit its findings to us — at least, not without some breakthroughs in communication technology that haven't shown up so far. Now, let's say we want to deliver our canned monkey to Proxima Centauri within its own lifetime. We're sending them on a one-way trip, so a 42 year flight time isn't unreasonable. (Their job is to supervise the machinery as it unpacks itself and begins to brew up a bunch of new colonists using an artificial uterus. Okay?) This means they need to achieve a mean cruise speed of 10% of the speed of light. They then need to decelerate at the other end. At 10% of c relativistic effects are minor — there's going to be time dilation, but it'll be on the order of hours or days over the duration of the 42-year voyage. So we need to accelerate our astronaut to 30,000,000 metres per second, and decelerate them at the other end. Cheating and using Newton's laws of motion, the kinetic energy acquired by acceleration is 9 x 1017 Joules, so we can call it 2 x 1018 Joules in round numbers for the entire trip. NB: This assumes that the propulsion system in use is 100% efficient at converting energy into momentum, that there are no losses from friction with the interstellar medium, and that the propulsion source is external — that is, there's no need to take reaction mass along en route. So this is a lower bound on the energy cost of transporting our Mercury-capsule sized expedition to Proxima Centauri in less than a lifetime. To put this figure in perspective, the total conversion of one kilogram of mass into energy yields 9 x 1016 Joules. (Which one of my sources informs me, is about equivalent to 21.6 megatons in thermonuclear explosive yield). So we require the equivalent energy output to 400 megatons of nuclear armageddon in order to move a capsule of about the gross weight of a fully loaded Volvo V70 automobile to Proxima Centauri in less than a human lifetime. That's the same as the yield of the entire US Minuteman III ICBM force. For a less explosive reference point, our entire planetary economy runs on roughly 4 terawatts of electricity (4 x 1012 watts). So it would take our total planetary electricity production for a period of half a million seconds — roughly 5 days — to supply the necessary va-va-voom. But to bring this back to earth with a bump, let me just remind you that this probe is so implausibly efficient that it's veering back into "magic wand" territory. I've tap-danced past a 100% efficient power transmission system capable of operating across interstellar distances with pinpoint precision and no conversion losses, and that allows the spacecraft on the receiving end to convert power directly into momentum. This is not exactly like any power transmission system that anyone's built to this date, and I'm not sure I can see where it's coming from. Our one astronaut, 10% of c mission approximates well to an unmanned flight, but what about longer-term expeditions? Generation ships are a staple of SF; they're slow (probably under 1% of c) and they carry a self-sufficient city-state. The crew who set off won't live to see their destination (the flight time to Proxima Centauri at 1% of c is about 420 years), but the vague hope is that someone will. Leaving aside our lack of a proven track record at building social institutions that are stable across time periods greatly in excess of a human lifespan, using a generation ship probably doesn't do much for our energy budget problem either. A society of human beings are likely to need more space and raw material to do stuff with while in flight; sticking a solitary explorer in a tin can for forty-something years is merely cruel and unusual, but doing it to an entire city for several centuries probably qualifies as a crime against humanity. We therefore need to relax the mass constraint. Assuming the same super-efficient life support as our solitary explorer, we might postulate that each colonist requires ten tons of structural mass to move around in. (About the same as a large trailer home. For life.) We've cut the peak velocity by an order of magnitude, but we've increased the payload requirement by an order of magnitude per passenger — and we need enough passengers to make a stable society fly. I'd guess a sensible lower number would be on the order of 200 people, the size of a prehistoric primate troupe. (Genetic diversity? I'm going to assume we can hand-wave around that by packing some deep-frozen sperm and ova, or frozen embryos, for later reuse.) By the time we work up to a minimal generation ship (and how minimal can we get, confining 200 human beings in an object weighing aout 2000 tons, for roughly the same period of time that has elapsed since the Plymouth colony landed in what was later to become Massachusetts?) we're actually requiring much more energy than our solitary high-speed explorer. And remember, this is only what it takes to go to Proxima Centauri our nearest neighbour. Gliese 581c is five times as far away. Planets that are already habitable insofar as they orbit inside the habitable zone of their star, possess free oxygen in their atmosphere, and have a mass, surface gravity and escape velocity that are not too forbidding, are likely to be somewhat rarer. (And if there is free oxygen in the atmosphere on a planet, that implies something else — the presence of pre-existing photosynthetic life, a carbon cycle, and a bunch of other stuff that could well unleash a big can of whoop-ass on an unprimed human immune system. The question of how we might interact with alien biologies is an order of magnitude bigger and more complex than the question of how we might get there — and the preliminary outlook is rather forbidding.) The long and the short of what I'm trying to get across is quite simply that, in the absence of technology indistinguishable from magic — magic tech that, furthermore, does things that from today's perspective appear to play fast and loose with the laws of physics — interstellar travel for human beings is near-as-dammit a non-starter. And while I won't rule out the possibility of such seemingly-magical technology appearing at some time in the future, the conclusion I draw as a science fiction writer is that if interstellar colonization ever happens, it will not follow the pattern of historical colonization drives that are followed by mass emigration and trade between the colonies and the old home soil. What about our own solar system? After contemplating the vastness of interstellar space, our own solar system looks almost comfortingly accessible at first. Exploring our own solar system is a no-brainer: we can do it, we are doing it, and interplanetary exploration is probably going to be seen as one of the great scientific undertakings of the late 20th and early 21st century, when the history books get written. But when we start examining the prospects for interplanetary colonization things turn gloomy again. Bluntly, we're not going to get there by rocket ship. Optimistic projects suggest that it should be possible, with the low cost rockets currently under development, to maintain a Lunar presence for a transportation cost of roughly $15,000 per kilogram. Some extreme projections suggest that if the cost can be cut to roughly triple the cost of fuel and oxidizer (meaning, the spacecraft concerned will be both largely reusable and very cheap) then we might even get as low as $165/kilogram to the lunar surface. At that price, sending a 100Kg astronaut to Moon Base One looks as if it ought to cost not much more than a first-class return air fare from the UK to New Zealand ... except that such a price estimate is hogwash. We primates have certain failure modes, and one of them that must not be underestimated is our tendency to irreversibly malfunction when exposed to climactic extremes of temperature, pressure, and partial pressure of oxygen. While the amount of oxygen, water, and food a human consumes per day doesn't sound all that serious — it probably totals roughly ten kilograms, if you economize and recycle the washing-up water — the amount of parasitic weight you need to keep the monkey from blowing out is measured in tons. A Russian Orlan-M space suit (which, some would say, is better than anything NASA has come up with over the years — take heed of the pre-breathe time requirements!) weighs 112 kilograms, which pretty much puts a floor on our infrastructure requirements. An actual habitat would need to mass a whole lot more. Even at $165/kilogram, that's going to add up to a very hefty excess baggage charge on that notional first class air fare to New Zealand — and I think the $165/kg figure is in any case highly unrealistic; even the authors of the article I cited thought $2000/kg was a bit more reasonable. Whichever way you cut it, sending a single tourist to the moon is going to cost not less than $50,000 — and a more realistic figure, for a mature reusable, cheap, rocket-based lunar transport cycle is more like $1M. And that's before you factor in the price of bringing them back ... The moon is about 1.3 light seconds away. If we want to go panning the (metaphorical) rivers for gold, we'd do better to send teleoperator-controlled robots; it's close enough that we can control them directly, and far enough away that the cost of transporting food and creature comforts for human explorers is astronomical. There probably are niches for human workers on a moon base, but only until our robot technologies are somewhat more mature than they are today; Mission Control would be a lot happier with a pair of hands and a high-def camera that doesn't talk back and doesn't need to go to the toilet or take naps. When we look at the rest of the solar system, the picture is even bleaker. Mars is ... well, the phrase "tourist resort" springs to mind, and is promptly filed in the same corner as "Gobi desert". As Bruce Sterling has puts it: "I'll believe in people settling Mars at about the same time I see people settling the Gobi Desert. The Gobi Desert is about a thousand times as hospitable as Mars and five hundred times cheaper and easier to reach. Nobody ever writes "Gobi Desert Opera" because, well, it's just kind of plonkingly obvious that there's no good reason to go there and live. It's ugly, it's inhospitable and there's no way to make it pay. Mars is just the same, really. We just romanticize it because it's so hard to reach." In other words, going there to explore is fine and dandy — our robots are all over it already. But as a desirable residential neighbourhood it has some shortcomings, starting with the slight lack of breathable air and the sub-Antarctic nighttime temperatures and the Mach 0.5 dust storms, and working down from there. Actually, there probably is a good reason for sending human explorers to Mars. And that's the distance: at up to 30 minutes, the speed of light delay means that remote control of robots on the Martian surface is extremely tedious. Either we need autonomous roots that can be assigned tasks and carry them out without direct human supervision, or we need astronauts in orbit or on the ground to boss the robot work gangs around. On the other hand, Mars is a good way further away than the moon, and has a deeper gravity well. All of which drive up the cost per kilogram delivered to the Martian surface. Maybe FedEx could cut it as low as $20,000 per kilogram, but I'm not holding my breath. Let me repeat myself: we are not going there with rockets. At least, not the conventional kind — and while there may be a role for nuclear propulsion in deep space, in general there's a trade-off between instantaneous thrust and efficiency; the more efficient your motor, the lower the actual thrust it provides. Some technologies such as the variable specific impulse magnetoplasma rocket show a good degree of flexibility, but in general they're not suitable for getting us from Earth's surface into orbit — they're only useful for trucking things around from low earth orbit on out. Again, as with interstellar colonization, there are other options. Space elevators, if we build them, will invalidate a lot of what I just said. Some analyses of the energy costs of space elevators suggest that a marginal cost of $350/kilogram to geosynchronous orbit should be achievable without waving any magic wands (other than the enormous practical materials and structural engineering problems of building the thing in the first place). So we probably can look forward to zero-gee vacations in orbit, at a price. And space elevators are attractive because they're a scalable technology; you can use one to haul into space the material to build more. So, long term, space elevators may give us not-unreasonably priced access to space, including jaunts to the lunar surface for a price equivalent to less than $100,000 in today's money. At which point, settlement would begin to look economically feasible, except ... We're human beings. We evolved to flourish in a very specific environment that covers perhaps 10% of our home planet's surface area. (Earth is 70% ocean, and while we can survive, with assistance, in extremely inhospitable terrain, be it arctic or desert or mountain, we aren't well-adapted to thriving there.) Space itself is a very poor environment for humans to live in. A simple pressure failure can kill a spaceship crew in minutes. And that's not the only threat. Cosmic radiation poses a serious risk to long duration interplanetary missions, and unlike solar radiation and radiation from coronal mass ejections the energies of the particles responsible make shielding astronauts extremely difficult. And finally, there's the travel time. Two and a half years to Jupiter system; six months to Mars. Now, these problems are subject to a variety of approaches — including medical ones: does it matter if cosmic radiation causes long-term cumulative radiation exposure leading to cancers if we have advanced side-effect-free cancer treatments? Better still, if hydrogen sulphide-induced hibernation turns out to be a practical technique in human beings, we may be able to sleep through the trip. But even so, when you get down to it, there's not really any economically viable activity on the horizon for people to engage in that would require them to settle on a planet or asteroid and live there for the rest of their lives. In general, when we need to extract resources from a hostile environment we tend to build infrastructure to exploit them (such as oil platforms) but we don't exactly scurry to move our families there. Rather, crews go out to work a long shift, then return home to take their leave. After all, there's no there there — just a howling wilderness of north Atlantic gales and frigid water that will kill you within five minutes of exposure. And that, I submit, is the closest metaphor we'll find for interplanetary colonization. Most of the heavy lifting more than a million kilometres from Earth will be done by robots, overseen by human supervisors who will be itching to get home and spend their hardship pay. And closer to home, the commercialization of space will be incremental and slow, driven by our increasing dependence on near-earth space for communications, positioning, weather forecasting, and (still in its embryonic stages) tourism. But the domed city on Mars is going to have to wait for a magic wand or two to do something about the climate, or reinvent a kind of human being who can thrive in an airless, inhospitable environment.

## 2NC

### 2NC Overview

#### Debt ceiling decks investment certainty – kills new energy adoption.

Note: This card is about renewables but every warrant applies to Aff.

Jorge J. Lopez 11, President and CEO of ConEdison Solutions, 8/1, http://www.cnbc.com/id/43971315/CEO\_of\_ConEdison\_Solutions\_Debt\_Ceiling\_Crisis\_May\_Hamper\_Greener\_Energy\_Future

Over the last decade, the United States has made a concerted effort to be more energy-efficient and less dependent on foreign sources of energy. Federal tax incentives have enabled small and large businesses alike to switch to renewable power or retrofit their facilities to use less energy. These efforts are good for our planet and they’re also good for our economy. With the debt ceiling crisis looming, we are at risk of losing the momentum America has gained toward energy independence and achieving a cleaner, greener future. Failing to get the United States’ fiscal house in order will inevitably lead to cuts in government energy programs, a weaker dollar, and higher interest rates. Each has a negative impact on business, whether it’s the energy sector or the neighborhood deli. The debt ceiling crisis will impact many aspects of the energy business including energy sales, energy efficiency services, and renewable energy development. Three significant ways are: #1 - Higher interest rates translate to less business —Higher interest rates will limit the impact for energy savings performance contracting (ESPC). ESPC is a tool that finances capital improvements required to save energy, utilizing the cash flow from the guaranteed reduction in utility bills to pay the financing. If more money goes to pay interest on financing, that leaves less dollars for additional energy efficiency measures. Facilities will save less money on energy upgrades simply because they will be investing in fewer upgrades. Higher financing costs for institutional and government customers translate into longer payback periods, making it more difficult to construct projects with acceptable returns. Additionally, another part of our business is helping customers save on their electricity bills by offering them electricity supply at prices below those of the local utility. The transactions we perform to hedge that supply for customers require well-functioning, liquid credit markets. Anything that jeopardizes those credit markets could limit our ability to offer those products or raise their cost to the customer. #2 – A weak dollar has a significant impact on trade —As the value of the dollar falls, the cost of doing business goes up. Supplies used for energy efficiency projects like solar panels, lighting and other installation equipment, which are often sourced from Europe and Asia, will cost more to import. The higher cost of available financing and materials will thus make renewable projects less economically feasible. #3 – Longer payment terms inflict pain on vendors —Like many businesses in this country, energy service companies often work for the federal government. If government contracts cannot be paid on time, vendor cash flows would be disrupted. This would trigger a harmful trickle-down effect with an array of damaging economic consequences. The crisis with our national debt and overall economy weaves itself into all business, and the energy sector is no exception.

#### Incentives fail to promote energy in a financial crisis.

Garthwaite 8 (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/josie-garthwaite/lehman-bankruptcy-puts-sq\_b\_126895.html)

What does this red inky mess mean for green energy, **which despite** billion-dollar venture capital investments and pending **government incentives, still relies on big loans from Wall Street's troubled financial institutions?** Angus McCrone, chief editor of research firm New Energy Finance, said Lehman's bankruptcy removes an important provider of what's called tax equity financing for U.S. wind farms. As one of the three most active providers of this kind of investment (behind JP Morgan and General Electric Financial Services), Lehman essentially helped fund new projects in exchange for tax benefits linked to clean energy generation. Lehman's holdings in companies like Clipper Windpower and geothermal developer Ormat Technologies are now likely to sell at "rather low prices" as energy companies scramble to get money back to creditors, said McCrone. "**It's just another downward push for clean energy share prices in the short term."** That could make companies working with wind, solar, energy efficiency, and other green technologies think twice about going public: "It puts a big question mark over some clean energy companies' plans to have IPOs in the next couple months." Financial challenges exacerbated by the credit crunch are not limited to the U.S., according to experts at a renewable energy conference held yesterday in London. Reuters reported that in Europe, the sector can expect a $29 billion debt financing shortfall by 2020. That's the year EU legislators have established as the deadline for at least one-fifth of European energy to come from renewable sources -- a pace that would require investment of about $120 billion (85 billion euros) per year in a time when lenders are growing increasingly averse to long-term investments. This trend could hit renewables especially hard, said Guy Turner, director of New Energy Finance's carbon market research service. As high-risk, high-reward investments, **alternative energy companies "tend to do even worse than the market" as a whole when things turn south**.

**AT Guns/Immigration 1st**

**Issues don’t cost capital until they are up**

**Drum ‘10**

Kevin is a Columnist for Mother Jones, “Immigration Coming Off the Backburner,” <http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2010/03/immigration-coming-back-burner>

There's been plenty of overheated rhetoric and creative paranoia on display this year, but nativism has been, to me, the dog that didn't bark. The Tea Parties haven't been very focused on immigration, and while abortion and socialism both became major issues during health-care reform, fears that the bill would cover illegal immigrants (it won't, incidentally) never became a marquee issue.¶ Not to pick on Ezra or anything, but this attitude betrays a surprisingly common misconception about political issues in general. The fact is that **political dogs never bark until an issue becomes an active one. Opposition to** **Social Security** privatization **was** pretty **mild until 2005, when** George **Bush turned it into an** active **issue.** Opposition to healthcare reform was mild until 2009, when Barack Obama turned it into an active issue. Etc.¶ I only bring this up because we often take a look at polls and think they tell us what the public thinks about something. But for the most part, they don't.1 That is, they **don't until the issue in question is squarely on the table and both sides have spent a couple of months filling the airwaves with their best agitprop. Polling data about gays in the military**, for example, **hasn't changed** a lot over the past year or two, **but once Congress takes up the issue** in earnest and the Focus on the Family **newsletters go out,** the push polling starts, Rush Limbaugh picks it up, and Fox News creates an incendiary graphic to go with its saturation coverage — well, that's when the polling will tell you something. And it will probably tell you something different from what it tells you now.¶ Immigration was bubbling along as sort of a background issue during the Bush administration too until 2007, when he tried to move an actual bill. Then all hell broke loose. The same thing will happen this time, and without even a John McCain to act as a conservative point man for a moderate solution. The political environment is worse now than it was in 2007, and I'll be very surprised if it's possible to make any serious progress on immigration reform. "Love 'em or hate 'em," says Ezra, illegal immigrants "aren't at the forefront of people's minds." Maybe not. But they will be soon.¶ POSTSCRIPT: And keep in mind that one of the reasons the tea parties haven't (yet) taken up the immigration fight is very specific to the agenda of Dick Armey and FreedomWorks. I doubt that Armey will win this battle in the long run, though.¶ 1Granted, polls do give us a general idea of where we're starting from. If immigration reform were polling at 80%, for example, I'd feel pretty good about it since that number could deteriorate 20 points and it would still have a lot of support. But if it's polling at around 50-60% — which it is — that's dangerous territory. Once the yelling starts you can expect that number to go down a bunch, and suddenly it won't be a popular issue to tackle during an election year.

**Biden leading on guns**

**NYT 12-29**

“Biden is Back for 2nd Run at Gun Limits,” <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/30/us/politics/newtown-task-force-returns-biden-to-gun-control-arena.html?pagewanted=all>

Five years later, that same type of weapon, a Bushmaster AR-15, is at the heart of a renewed national conversation about gun laws because it was used this month by the mass killer in Newtown, Conn. For Mr. Biden, now the vice president, the moment offers a second chance as he drafts a legislative response for President Obama that would reinstate his expired assault weapons ban, while also applying lessons from the last time around to make it more effective.¶ A president intent on pressing Congress to restrict access to high-powered guns could hardly find a more seasoned figure to take charge of the effort. Mr. Biden, who owns two shotguns, brings decades of experience and plenty of scar tissue from past battles with the National Rifle Association to frame recommendations that Mr. Obama wants ready by next month.¶ “He’s basically been doing this for a little over 30 years,” said former Senator Ted Kaufman of Delaware, a longtime Biden adviser who was appointed to fill out his term. “I really do believe there isn’t anybody in America who has a better chance of getting this done by Jan. 15 than he does, not just because of his background in guns but because he’s not politically intimidated by the N.R.A., to put it mildly.”¶ As far as the N.R.A. is concerned, Mr. Biden is an ideologue whose mind is already made up about the “conversation” he is now supposed to lead.¶ “This is somebody who’s bombastic and really does think that anybody who disagrees with him is not only wrong but crazy,” David Keene, the N.R.A. president, said in an interview. “That’s his style.”

**Immigration reform vote wont be until June**

**Foley & Stein 1/2**/2013

(Elise & Sam, HuffPost writers, “Obama's Immigration Reform Push To Begin This Month,” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/02/obama-immigration-reform_n_2398507.html> - Kurr)

It remains unclear what type of immigration policies the White House plans to push in January, but turning them into law could be a long process. Aides expect it will take about two months to write a bipartisan bill, then another few months before it goes up for a vote, possibly in June. A bipartisan group of senators are already working on a deal, although they are still in the early stages. Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.) will likely lead on the Democratic side in the House. While many Republicans have expressed interest in piecemeal reform, it's still unclear which of them plan to join the push.

**AT Agencies No Link**

**Obama is made of Velcro - everything from his administration sticks to him**

**Los Angeles Times 10**

7-30-10, p. <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/30/nation/la-na-velcro-presidency-20100730>

Reporting from Washington — If Ronald Reagan was the classic Teflon president, Barack **Obama is made of Velcro.**¶ Through two terms, Reagan eluded much of the responsibility for recession and foreign policy scandal. In less than two years, **Obama has become ensnared in blame.**¶ Hoping to better insulate Obama, **White House aides have sought to give other Cabinet officials a higher profile and additional public exposure**. They are also crafting new ways to explain the president's policies to a skeptical public.¶ But **Obama remains the colossus of his administration — to a point where trouble anywhere in the world is often his to solve.**¶ **The president is on the hook to repair the Gulf Coast oil spill disaster, stabilize Afghanistan, help fix Greece's ailing economy and do right by Shirley Sherrod, the Agriculture Department official fired as a result of a misleading fragment of videotape.**

**Obama is responsible for agencies
Ellis 94**

ELLIS, PROF OF GOV @ BERKELEY, 1994 PRICHARD, “PRESIDENTIAL LIGHTENING ROD, PG 2]

This argument seems plausible enough. But so too does the opposite case, argued by Harold Laski in his class *The American Presidency,* published in the same year (1940) as Herring’s treatise, **An American president**. Laski maintains, **cannot deflect blame unto subordinates. A president’s position as head of the executive branch**, Laski insists, “**makes him a target to be attacked by ever person or interest at all critical of his purposes. He is, there in all cases, to be blamed**; and there is no one, in any real sense, who can help to bear the burden of the blame. In contrast to England, where we blame an anonymous entity “the Government” **if things go wrong**, in the United States **it is the president who is blamed**. A decision of the Supreme Court is regarded as adverse to his policy; a defeat in Congress is a blow to *his* presidency; the mid-term congressional elections protect *his* policy, good or ill. NO one thinks of them in terms of their effects upon his cabinet.

**Perceived as figurehead**

**Edwards & Wayne 99**PROF @ TEXAS A&M AND PROF @ GEORGETOWN, 1999 [GEORGE AND STEPHEN, “PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP: POLITICS AND POLICY MAKING, PG 327]

**The hierarchical structure of the executive branch**, with the president at the pinnacle, **forces the president to take responsibility for the entire executive branch.** Moreover, when the president exercises power, it is clear who is acting and who should be held accountable. Congress, on the other hand, is not responsible for implementing polices, and each member is relatively obscure compared to the president. Since Congress is so decentralized, any member can disclaim responsibility for policies or their consequences. **Members of Congress**, therefore, **can**, and do, **make irresponsible or self serving decisions and then let the president take the blame.**

### AT No Agenda/Capital

#### Obama has the political capital now to force the Reps to compromise – he’ll drive negotiations.

Mike Dorning 1/3, Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-03/obama-fights-republicans-on-debt-as-investors-seek-growth.html

Obama Emboldened Lining up against the Republican leadership is an emboldened president, who appeared before the television cameras at the White House Jan. 1 to draw a line against accepting any conditions for an increase in the debt limit. “I will not have another debate with this Congress over whether or not they should pay the bills that they’ve already racked up through the laws that they passed,” the Obama said. “We can’t not pay bills that we’ve already incurred.” That sparked anger among some House Republicans. “If the president thinks that he’s not going to negotiate he’d better think again,” said Oklahoma Representative Tom Cole, according to NBC News. “He’s president of the United States. He’s not emperor of the planet.” Senator Michael Bennet, a Colorado Democrat, said he’s worried about the possibility of a debt default because of a standoff between congressional Republicans and the White House. “We were downgraded because of concern of the political risk that the two parties couldn’t work together,” Bennet said in an interview with Bloomberg Television’s Peter Cook for the program “Capitol Gains” airing Jan. 6. “There still isn’t evidence that we can do that.” Unusual Access The next chapter in the skirmishing over the nation’s finances plays out during a phase of the political calendar that gives Obama unusual access to the power of the presidential bully pulpit, with his inauguration for a second term and State of the Union address in the coming weeks. The administration is considering how to make the best use of the opportunities, the White House official said. Obama is likely to repeat tactics he used to mobilize public opinion in the fight over tax rates, including a social media campaign and campaign-style appearances outside Washington, the official said. Patrick Griffin, who was White House congressional lobbying chief for Democratic President Bill Clinton, said the debt limit “is not the leverage that Republicans think it will be.” Obama “is completely in a different position” than during the 2011 debt talks, Griffin said. Fresh Mandate The president has a fresh political mandate from his re- election. And corporate leaders anxious to avert the economic disruption of a debt default have taken a more prominent role in pressing for compromise, Griffin said. Obama also has gained more public credibility on the deficit, in part because he has spent more time speaking out about wanting to bring down government debt, Griffin said. A Bloomberg National Poll conducted Dec. 7-10 found 40 percent public approval of Obama’s handling of the deficit versus 32 percent in June 2011, at the start of the last debt-limit talks. Congressional Republicans have now twice backed off threats to stand fast in the face of a financial crisis, agreeing to the debt-limit increase in August 2011 and reaching a deal to avert the tax increase on Jan. 1. “Republicans conceded they did not want to create a crisis on the fiscal cliff,” Griffin said. “Why would they want to turn around and create an even bigger crisis on the debt limit?”

#### He’s still got leverage---their ev’s just GOP rhetoric

Miller 1/2 Emily is a writer for The Washington Times. “MILLER: Obama’s checkmate,” 2013, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jan/2/obamas-checkmate/

President Obama’s objective in the “fiscal cliff” battle was make Republicans break their pledge not to raise taxes. The GOP entered the game with the goal of winning real spending cuts and no higher tax rates. They lost on both counts as the lame-duck session of Congress came to a close minutes before the stroke of midnight on New Year's Day. Over the next 10 years, the deal they approved will hike taxes and spending, adding nearly $4 trillion in red ink. Mr. Obama gloated over his victory just before walking across the South Lawn to return to his vacation in Hawaii. “A central promise of my campaign for president was to change the tax code that was too skewed toward the wealthy at the expense of working middle-class Americans,” he said. “Tonight we’ve done that.”¶ The measure, which raises taxes on small businesses and individuals who make over $400,000 a year, passed on a bipartisan vote in both chambers. Republicans were split. In all, 151 rank-and-file House Republicans declined to go along with Speaker John A. Boehner in supporting the bill with Majority Leader Eric Cantor and Majority Whip Kevin McCarthy among the highest profile “no” votes. In the Senate, Minority Leader Mitch McConnell lost five of his members: Sens. Chuck Grassley of Iowa, Mike Lee of Utah, Rand Paul of Kentucky, Marco Rubio of Florida and Richard Shelby of Alabama. Mr. Paul explained his position before the Senate voted in the wee hours Tuesday morning by saying, “We’re going to raise taxes. We’re going to raise spending. Tell me what’s good about that.”¶ Spending goes up by $300 billion over 10 years in the final deal, and the $110 billion sequestration is punted for another two months. Congress is once again delaying the spending cuts it had agreed to in August 2011 in exchange for lifting the country’s borrowing limit by more than $2 trillion. As is standard operating procedure in Washington, the borrowing was immediate, while the “cuts” were phased in over 10 years. Predictably, the cuts effectively won’t happen as net spending will surely rise this year.¶ While Grover Norquist said Republicans didn’t break their pledge not to raise taxes, he’s offering an escape based on a technicality. Republican leaders strategically scheduled votes in both chambers after going over the cliff at midnight on Dec. 31 so they could say they only voted to cut taxes while the upper levels reverted to the Clinton-era rates. Lawmakers who signed the pledge to their constituents to not raise taxes or cut deductions and credits without lowering rates are not showing much integrity by accepting this excuse.¶ On a positive note, the GOP did make the tax rates permanent, limiting the Democratic ability to use this tactic again. The death tax threshold stays at $5 million, indexed for inflation, and the alternative minimum tax is fixed for good.¶ Republican leaders insist their strategy is to leverage this deal to fight for spending restraint when the sequestration returns, the current continuing resolution runs out and the debt ceiling is hit. Mr. Obama pre-empted the GOP Tuesday night by declaring, “We can’t simply cut our way to prosperity.” Actually, we can, but this deal showed Mr. Obama has what it takes to win the endgame. It’s a bad move for the nation’s economic recovery.

#### Obama is outpacing republicans on the debt ceiling- must keep republicans on the defensive to ensure the win

Easley 1/6

[Jason, Writer for Politics USA, “Obama is Already Two Steps Ahead of Republicans on the Debt Ceiling” http://www.politicususa.com/blog/2013/01/06/obama-steps-republicans-debt-ceiling/]

By using the fiscal cliff as the first stage of his political strategy, President Obama is already two steps ahead of Republicans on the debt ceiling. Moments after the House passed the fiscal cliff deal, President Obama had already started winning the battle over the debt ceiling. Before the Republican congressional leadership had a chance to utter a word about the debt ceiling, the president said, But we can’t simply cut our way to prosperity. Cutting spending has to go hand-in-hand with further reforms to our tax code so that the wealthiest corporations and individuals can’t take advantage of loopholes and deductions that aren’t available to most Americans. And we can’t keep cutting things like basic research and new technology and still expect to succeed in a 21st century economy. So we’re going to have to continue to move forward in deficit reduction, but we have to do it in a balanced way, making sure that we are growing even as we get a handle on our spending. Now, one last point I want to make — while I will negotiate over many things, I will not have another debate with this Congress over whether or not they should pay the bills that they’ve already racked up through the laws that they passed. Let me repeat: We can’t not pay bills that we’ve already incurred. If Congress refuses to give the United States government the ability to pay these bills on time, the consequences for the entire global economy would be catastrophic — far worse than the impact of a fiscal cliff. Unlike what happened during the healthcare debate and the first debt ceiling crisis, President Obama was not about to give Republicans a moment to breathe and formulate their strategy on the debt ceiling. While Republicans were still fighting among themselves over the fiscal cliff deal, the president was already taking his case about the debt ceiling to the American people. Obama’s seizing of the issue has established the media narrative, and left Republicans playing catch up. During his Sunday show interviews today, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell was asked repeatedly about raising more revenue as part of a debt ceiling deal. McConnell was left playing defense, and forced to repeat the same just say no obstruction/blame Obama talking points that he has been using for years. It is becoming obvious that while congressional Republicans are bumbling from one self created crisis to the next, the White House is using a comprehensive strategy for dealing with the fiscal cliff, the debt ceiling, and the sequester. As Republicans continued to point fingers and blame for the fiscal cliff deal, President Obama had already moved on to the debt ceiling. The president is two steps ahead of his adversaries, and it looks like the debt ceiling is going to turn into a game of political chicken. Obama is going to sound reasonable in tone, but dare congressional Republicans to default. Republicans have now caved on the payroll tax extension in 2011 and the fiscal cliff in 2012, so the White House is betting, with good reason, that they will blink again on the debt ceiling.

### AT Nuclear Popular

**SMRs are politically “nuclear”**

**Fairley 10**

Peter, IEEE Spectrum, May, "Downsizing Nuclear Power Plants,” [spectrum.ieee.org/energy/nuclear/downsizing-nuclear-power-plants/0](http://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/nuclear/downsizing-nuclear-power-plants/0)

However, **there are political objections to SMRs**. Precisely **because they are more affordable, they** may well **increase the risk of proliferation by bringing the cost and** power **output of nuclear reactors within the reach of poorer countries**.¶ **Russia’s first SMR**, which the nuclear engineering group Rosatom expects to complete next year, **is of particular concern**. The Akademik Lomonosov is a floating nuclear power plant sporting two 35-MW reactors, which Rosatom expects to have tethered to an Arctic oil and gas operation by 2012. **The reactor’s portability prompted Greenpeace Russia to call this** floating plant **the world’s most dangerous nuclear project in a decade.¶ SMRs may be smaller than today’s reactors. But, politically at least, they’re just as nuclear.**

**Funding SMRs is politically explosive---gets caught up in spending and Solyndra debates---the link’s unique because Obama’s backed off SMRs due to election pressure**

**Nelson 9-24**

Gabriel Nelson 9-24, E&E Reporter, and Hannah Northey, 9/24/12, “DOE funding for small reactors languishes as parties clash on debt,” http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2012/09/24/3

It's not just wind and solar projects that are waiting for federal help as **Congress duels over the importance of putting taxpayer dollars on the line for cutting-edge energy projects.¶** Some of the nation's largest nuclear power companies are anxious to hear whether they will get a share of a $452 million pot from the Department of Energy for a new breed of reactors that the industry has labeled as a way to lessen the safety risks and construction costs of new nuclear power plants.¶ The grant program for these "**small modular reactors**," which was announced in January, **would mark the** official **start of a major U.S. foray into the technology even as rising construction costs** -- especially when compared to natural-gas-burning plants -- **cause** many **power companies to shy away from nuclear plants.¶** **DOE received four bids** before the May 21 deadline from veteran reactor designers Westinghouse Electric Co. and Babcock & Wilcox Co., as well as relative newcomers Holtec International Inc. and NuScale Power LLC. Now **the summer has ended with no announcement from DOE**, even though the agency said it would name the winners two months ago.¶ As the self-imposed deadline passed, companies started hearing murmurs that a decision could come in September, or perhaps at the end of the year. To observers within the industry, it seems **that election-year calculations may have sidelined the contest.¶** "The rumors are a'flying," said Paul Genoa, director of policy development at the Nuclear Energy Institute, in an interview last week. "All we can imagine is that **this is** now **caught up in politics**, and the campaign has to decide whether these things are good for them to announce, and how."¶ Small modular reactors do not seem to be lacking in political support. The nuclear lobby has historically courted both Democrats and Republicans and still sees itself as being in a strong position with key appropriators on both sides of the aisle.¶ Likewise, top energy officials in the Obama administration have hailed the promise of the new reactors, and they haven't shown any signs of a change of heart. DOE spokeswoman Jen Stutsman said last week that the department is still reviewing applications, but she did not say when a decision will be made.¶ "This is an important multiyear research and development effort, and we want to make sure we take the time during the review process to get the decision right," she wrote in an email.¶ **That the grants haven't been given out** during a taut campaign season, **even as** President **Obama announces agency actions** ranging from trade cases to creating new national monuments to make the case for his re-election, **may be a sign that the reactors are ensnared in a broader feud over energy spending.¶** Grant recipients would develop reactor designs with an eye toward eventually turning those into pilot projects -- and the **loan guarantees** that these first-of-a-kind nuclear plants are using today to get financing **would be blocked under the "No More Solyndras" bill** that passed the House last week (Greenwire, Sept. 14).¶ Congress has given the grant program $67 million for fiscal 2012, shy of the amount that would be needed annually to reach full funding. **If the "sequester" kicks in** at year's end and slashes DOE funding or the balance of power changes in Washington, **the amount of money available could dwindle yet again.¶** Even the staunchest supporters of the federal nuclear program are acknowledging **it is a tough time to promise a $452 million check.¶** Former Sen. Pete Domenici, a New Mexico Republican who pushed for new reactors as chairman of both the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee and the Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee, said during a brief interview Tuesday that well-designed loan guarantees won't cost too much because they get repaid over time. The cost could be borne by a "tiny little tax" on the nuclear industry, he said.¶ But when it comes to straight-up spending, like the grants that would support getting these cutting-edge reactors ready for their first demonstrations, the solution may not be so clear. While some **Republicans** remain staunch supporters of funding for the nuclear power industry, there are others who **label the government subsidies as a waste of taxpayer dollars.¶** "It's awful hard, with the needs that are out there and the debt that haunts us, to figure out how you're going to establish priorities," said Domenici, who has advocated for the deployment of new nuclear reactors as a fellow at the Bipartisan Policy Center. "I can't stand here and tell you that I know how to do that."

**SMR debates are polarizing**

**Carper and Schmid 11**

Ross Carper (rosscarper@gmail.com), a writer based in Washington state, is the founding editor of the creative nonfiction project BeyondtheBracelet.com. Sonja Schmid (sschmid@vt.edu) is an assistant professor in Science and Technology Studies at Virginia Tech. “The Little Reactor That Could?” Issues in Science and Technology, <http://www.issues.org/27.4/carper.html>

Historically, **nuclear energy has been** entangled in **one of the most polarizing debates in this country**. **Promoters and adversaries** of nuclear power alike **have accused the other side of** oversimplification and **exaggeration**. For today’s industry, **reassuring a** **wary public** and nervous government regulators **that** **small reactors are completely safe** **might not be the most promising strategy**. **People** may not remember much history, but they **usually** do **remember who let them down before**. It would make more sense to admit that nuclear power is an inherently risky technology, with enormous benefits that might justify taking these risks. So instead of framing small reactors as qualitatively different and “passively safe,” why not address the risks involved head-on? This would require that the industry not only invite the public to ask questions, but also that they respond, even—or perhaps especially—when these questions cross preestablished boundaries. Relevant historical experience with small compact reactors in military submarines, for example, should not be off limits, just because information about them has traditionally been classified.

**Yes War**

#### Going over the debt ceiling collapses the economy

Millhiser 12/30

(Ian Millhiser - Senior Constitutional Policy Analyst at the Center for American Progress Action Fund and the Editor of ThinkProgress Justice, “Lindsay Graham: I Will Destroy America’s Solvency Unless The Social Security Retirement Age Is Raised,” Dec 30, 2012, <http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2012/12/30/1379681/lindsay-graham-i-will-destroy-americas-solvency-unless-the-social-security-retirement-age-is-raised/?mobile=nc> KB)

Although official Washington is currently fixated on the so-called “Fiscal Cliff,” the biggest threat to American prosperity is the debt ceiling, which must be raised in February to prevent economic catastrophe. If Republicans refuse to reach a deal on the so-called cliff, the Congressional Budget Office predicts that they will spark a new recession in 2013. But if Republicans block action on the debt ceiling, they will make that potential recession look quaint. Without raising the debt ceiling, the United States will be forced to embrace austerity so severe it will lead to “a bigger GDP drop than that experienced during the Great Recession of 2008.”

#### Collapse causes war

#### A) Best studies

**Royal 2010**

Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, pg. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of **economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict**. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that **rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the** often **bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next**. As such, exogenous shocks such as **economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power** (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, **increasing the risk of miscalculation** (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, **even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict** as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that '**future expectation of trade' is a** **significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states**. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, **if the expectations of future trade decline**, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, **the likelihood for conflict increases**, **as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could** potentially be the **trigger** for **decreased trade expectations** either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, **others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess** (2002) **find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during** periods of **economic downturn**. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the **presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other**. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) **Economic decline has** also **been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism** (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. **"Diversionary theory" suggests** that, **when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline**, sitting **governments have increased incentives to fabricate external** **military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag'** **effect**. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that **the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states** than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that **periods of weak economic performance in the U**nited **S**tates, and thus weak Presidential popularity, **are statistically linked to an increase in the** **use of force**. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas **political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels**.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

**AT Bad Economics View**

#### Economic methodology is good --- it’s key to making accurate and progressive predictions in policy debates --- any alt fails

Gregory R. Beabout 8 is an adjunct fellow of the Center for Economic Personalism and Associate Professor of Philosophy at Saint Louis University Challenges to Using the Principle of Subsidiarity for Environmental Policy; 5 U. St. Thomas L.J. 210 (2008)

Economics offers many insights into how the world around us works, much more than would be possible to summarize even in a full-length law review article with many footnotes.5 From among those many insights, I have selected three "propositions" that demonstrate the fundamental points that economics is necessary, but not sufficient, to address environmental issues and that economics is necessary, but not sufficient, to reconcile the obligations of faith toward the poor and the need to protect the environment.

By "propositions" I mean fundamental truths about human behavior and the natural world that we ignore at our peril, truths as basic as the laws of gravity or humanity's susceptibility to sin. We can write statutes or regulations that ignore these-and Congress, legislatures, and regulators the world over frequently do-but such measures risk the same fatal results as bridges built without accounting for gravity. These propositions I will offer are economic "theory," but they are theory in the sense that the laws of gravity are a theory and are founded upon economic insights spanning hundreds of years of careful analyses, testing of hypotheses, and rigorous debates. That does not mean all economists agree on all policy implications or that every prediction by an economist comes true. It does mean that the core principles of the discipline are not mere matters of opinion and that economics is not a "point of view" to be accorded equal weight with folk tales or political preferences. All theories of how the world works are not equal -some work better than others and the ones that work deserve greater weight in policy debates than the ones that do not. Economics' great strength is that it is a concise and powerful theory that explains the world remarkably well. Those who ignore its insights are doomed to fail.

Science fiction author Robert Heinlein coined the phrase "TANSTAAFL" as a shorthand way of saying "There Ain't No Such Thing As A Free Lunch" in his classic 1966 science fiction novel The Moon is a Harsh Mistress, in which he described a revolution by residents of lunar colonies against oppressive governments on Earth in 2076.6 Heinlein had the revolutionaries emblazon TANSTAAFL on their flag and wove the principle through the free lunar society he imagined-a place where even air cost people money.

"No free lunch" means that everything costs something. Everything. No exceptions. At a minimum, if I spend my time doing one activity, I cannot spend that time doing something else. Economists refer to the idea that resources devoted to one activity are unavailable for other activities as "opportunity cost." If we do X, we cannot use those resources to do Y. The failure to recognize that there is an opportunity cost to committing resources to any given use can have disastrous consequences because when we do not recognize that our actions have costs we cannot intelligently consider our alternatives. And if we cannot assess the costs and benefits of our alternatives, we cannot make reasoned choices among them.7 In short, tradeoffs matter, and we need to pay attention to them.

**Capitalism prevents war**

**Bernstein 05**

[Andrew, Ph.D., Philosophy, Graduate School of the City University of New York, lecturer. The Capitalist Manifesto The Historic, Economic and Philosophic case for laissez-faire. 2005. p. 231-236]

The cause of **the Persian Gulf War** of the early 1990s was similar: the armies of the brutal dictator, Saddam Hussein of Iraq (armed, unfortunately, to some degree by the United States, but principally by the Soviet Union) invaded and conquered freer Kuwait. **The freer countries of the West, led by the United States, did not initiate that conflict; they went to war** — rightly or wrongly — **to prevent Kuwait** (and, eventually, Saudi Arabia and the entire Middle East) **from being conquered** by Saddam Hussein .**3 The current “war on terror” was initiated by the brutal Islamist tyrannies of the Middle East,** pre—eminently Iran, who sponsored terrorist organizations whose specific purpose was to attack the freer West, especially America. It is a proxy war in which murderous dictatorships, too weak to assault America and the other free nations directly, fund, train and support terrorists to do their dirty work. **America did not initiate the conflict; it fought only after decades of repeated terrorist attacks culminated in the atrocities of September 11**, 2001; and even then, unfortunately, used only a miniscule fraction of its military might to defend itself and only against a part, not the totality; of the despotic alliance assaulting it.4 Observe that **every** prominent **dictatorship of the 20th century** — the Fascists, the Communists, the Islamists — **hated their antipode, the world’s freest nation, America**, **and initiated war against her in some form**. Hitler’s ally attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor. **The Soviets** enslaved Eastern Europe and then **threatened** America’s allies — the free nations of Western Europe — with conquest, and **America** herself **with nuclear annihilation**. It was with Stalin’s approval that North Korea launched its murderous invasion of America’s ally, freer South Korea. Today, and in recent decades, the world’s blood-drenched Islamic dictatorships — Iran, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan — sponsor(ed) terrorist attacks against Americans and America.5 **That statism, not freedom, is responsible for war should be clear**. The question is: why? So far, only the external relations of a dictatorship have been examined — but the answer lies in its internal nature. Again, it is good to examine the facts. The Nazis enslaved their own citizens, forcing all to serve the state. They murdered a whole segment of their own population — the Jews — and terrorized the rest by means of their secret police, the Gestapo. The Communists have done the same. In Soviet Russia, **Stalin murdered untold millions of Soviet peasants in the attempt to force the rest onto the collective farms**. In China, among other atrocities**, Mao turned loose the Red Guards to intimidate and murder all “enemies of the revolution,” the overwhelming majority of whom were native Chinese**. In Cambodia, Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge slaughtered virtually twenty-five per cent of the country’s population in less than four years.6 Nor does a dictator have to be a Nazi or Communist to murder his own citizens. Saddam Hussein murdered any number of Kurds within Iraq, and silenced (often fatally) any Iraqi citizen who questioned his regime. In Uganda, Idi Amin murdered an estimated 300,000 people in his eight year reign of terror — one in every forty of the country’s population. “Bodies floated down the Nile and turned up by the hundreds in Mabira and Namanve forests. The prisons filled up and prisoners were forced to stand in line and beat each other to death with ten-pound sledgehammers; the last man was shot.” **In Afghanistan**, **the recent Islamic dictators, the Taliban, brutally oppressed the country’s entire female population**.7 The principle is: statist regimes are at chronic war with their own cit izens. Statism — in fact and in principle — is nothing more than gang rule. A dictatorship is a gang devoted to looting the productive citizens of its own country. ‘**When a statist ruler exhausts his own country’s economy, he attacks his neighbors**. **It is his only means of postponing internal collapse and prolonging his rule.** A county that violates the rights of its own citizens, will not respect the rights of its neighbors. **Those who do not recognize individual rights, will not recognize the rights of nations: a nation is only a number of individuals**. Statism needs war; a free country does not. **Statism survives by looting; a free country survives by production**.8 The cause of war is that men still accept the primitive notion that they can properly achieve their goals by initiating the use of force against their fellow men. To abolish war it is first necessary to outlaw the initiation of force. **Any so-called “peace” movement which endorses socialism is bound to fail.** To the extent that it succeeds in promoting socialism, to that same extent it will cause war. This is so, because a socialist regime, by its very nature, stands for the initiation of force against its own citizens, and therefore, **no moral principle constrains it from following an aggressive policy toward the citizens of neighboring countries**. The central point must be reiterated until mankind finally learns the lesson: No government which violates the rights of its own citizens can be expected to respect the rights of foreigners. Statism is the system of war.9 **The principle that a government exists to protect the rights of its citizens is the direct application to politics of the broader Enlightenment** creed of the Rights of Man, the conviction that every individual — domestic or foreign — has inalienable rights that include those to life, liberty, property and the pursuit of personal happiness. It follows that a government based on the principle of individual rights must both protect the rights of its own citizens and refuse to violate those of foreigners. There is a fundamental similarity in regard to its treatment of both domestic and foreign residents: it must refrain from the initiation of force or fraud against any and all of them. **Capitalism, as the only system based on the preservation of individual rights and the consequent banning of the initiation of force, must be understood as the system of peace.** “Laissez-faire capitalism is the only social system based on the recognition of individual rights and, therefore, the only system that bans force from social relationships. By the nature of its basic principles and interests, **it is the only system fundamentally opposed to war**.”10 **World peace, therefore, requires the establishment of global capitalism**. If there is ever to exist an enduring peace among men, then statism — the root cause of war — must be finally and fully extirpated from their political systems. The essence of capitalist foreign relations is international free trade. Free trade simply means that individuals and companies in one country can trade with individuals and companies in other countries without bar riers and taxes imposed by their respective governments. The moral right of peaceful, non-criminal individuals to trade and interact across national boundaries is protected. International free trade is simply the principle of individual rights applied to economic and cultural relationships across national borders. Practically, such a policy of abolishing tariffs and trade barriers opens nations to various forms of peaceful intercourse, including mutually-beneficial commerce, emigration and immigration, and cultural exchange. Free trade removes the economic incentive to war, by making it possible for citizens of one country to gain by trade the goods produced by citizens of other countries. **Capitalism renders unnecessary the murderous practice of plunder, and replaces it with the cordial and mutually-beneficial relation of trade.** The institution of such a policy is a major step toward the diminishment of suspicion and hostility between nations that have often developed over centuries. It is no accident “that capitalism gave mankind the longest period of peace in history — a period during which there were no wars involving the entire civilized world — from the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 to the outbreak of World War I in 1914.” It is also no accident that, with the 20th century emergence of the most virulent form of statism in history — the socialist regimes of Germany and Russia — the world was plunged into its most destructive war ever.11 **Even Marx and Engels introduced a semi-admiring note into their pervasive hostility toward capitalism when they described the universal benefits of free trade.** In place of the old wants, satisfied by the productions of the country we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climates. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there emerges a world literature.’2 Insofar as national policy makers are concerned with the rational self- interest of their countries, they would do well to realize that individual rights and free trade — not war, conquest, plunder and imperialism — will promote wealth and power; the only rational, life-giving power: that to produce.

### 2NC No Tech

#### Multiple diseases destroy sustainability of life in space

Matin and Lynch 5

(2005, A. C. Matin, PhD in Microbiology, Professor of Microbiology and Immunology at Stanford University in Stanford, California, and Susan V. Lynch, PhD, Molcular Microbiology, Assistant Professor In Residence, Division of Gastroenterology, UC San Francisco, “Investigating the Threat of Bacteria Grown in Space,” Volume 71, Number 5, 2005/ASM News, <http://www.asm.org/asm/files/ccLibraryFiles/Filename/000000001523/znw00505000235.pdf> )

Although tantalizing, space is an inhospitable and dangerous frontier for those sent to explore it. Hence, progress towards more safely navigating and perhaps colonizing space are tasks that demand that we develop knowledge on several fronts, from designing radically new means of space transport to determining how space conditions inﬂuence biological processes. Several harmful effects of space on humans are documented. During extended missions in space, for example, bones lose mass, predisposing space travelers not only to fracture their bones but also to develop renal stones from resorbed bone material. Moreover, muscles atrophy, decreased blood production and volume damage the cardiovascular system, latent viruses (such as Varicella zoster, which causes shingles) tend to reactivate, the incidence of diseases such as bacterial cystitis increases, wound healing slows, pharmacologic agents act differently, and pyschological conditions such as claustrophobia and anxiety tend to be accentuated, in part because of disrupted sleep and dietary patterns. Amid these physical and psychological conditions, there is the added problem that astronauts in space are exposed to intense radiation, involving high-energy protons and nuclei of heavy elements with greater penetrating power and increased capacity to cause malignancies and other problems, than they would be on earth. Additionally, the diminished gravity of space and planets, referred to as microgravity, also poses a direct threat to human health.

#### We should focus on short-term impacts before colonization – ignoring Earth makes terrestrial problems worse

**Williams 10** – M.S. in Physics and is a physics faculty member at Santa Rose Junior College (1/1/2010, Lynda, “Irrational Dreams of Space Colonization”, Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 22:4–8, http://www.scientainment.com/lwilliams\_peacereview.pdf)

According to scientific theory, the destruction of Earth is a certainty. About five billion years from now, when our sun exhausts its nuclear fuel, it will expand in size and envelope the inner planets, including Earth, and burn them into oblivion. So yes, we are doomed, but we have five billion years, plus or minus a few hundred million, to plan our extraterrestrial escape. The need to colonize the moon or Mars to guarantee our survival is not pressing. There are also real risks due to collisions with asteroids and comets, although none are of immediate threat and do not necessitate extraterrestrial colonization. There are many Earth-based technological strategies that can be developed in time to mediate such astronomical threats, such as gravitational tugboats that drag the objects out of range. The solar system could also potentially be exposed to galactic sources of highenergy gamma ray bursts that could fry all life on Earth; any moon or Mars base would face a similar fate. Thus, human-based colonies on the moon or Mars would not protect us from any of these astronomical threats in the near future. Life on Earth is more urgently threatened by the destruction of the biosphere and its life-sustaining habitat due to environmental catastrophes such as climate change, ocean acidification, disruption of the food chain, bio-warfare, nuclear war, nuclear winter, and myriads of other manmade doomsday possibilities. If we accept these threats as inevitabilities on par with real astronomical dangers and divert our natural, intellectual, political, and technological resources from solving these problems into escaping them, will we be playing into a self-fulfilling prophesy of our own planetary doom? Seeking spacebased solutions to our earthly problems may actually exacerbate the planetary threats we face. This is the core of the ethical dilemma posed by space colonization: should we put our resources into developing human colonies on other worlds to survive natural and manmade catastrophes, or should we focus all of our energies on solving and mitigating the problems that create these threats on Earth?

### Aliens

#### ALIEN CONTACT HAS ALREADY HAPPENED AND WAS AT ITS PEAK IN 1952 MEANING IT DIDN’T SOLVE RACISM AND ONLY INCREASED XENOPHOBIA AND MILITARISM.

PORTERFIELD 2K7

[mannix, alien contact came in 52, <http://www.register-herald.com/local/x519083359/Alien-contact-came-in-52-author-says>, register-herald]

Three decades earlier, in fact, back in 1952, just five years after the famed Roswell incident, the American military engaged a convoy of alien aircraft with orders to destroy them in a pitched air battle right off the Atlantic Coast, says Frank Feschino, author of “The Flatwoods Monster,” a phenomenon that rocked a tiny West Virginia hamlet that year.¶ An illustrator and writer, Feschino has produced a follow-up book, this one titled “Shoot Them Down,” an effort produced after years of painstaking research of the U.S. Air Force’s once-classified files on unidentified flying saucers and digesting countless magazine articles on the matter.¶ His years of exhaustive study have convinced Feschino that American jet fighters did indeed make contact — at the point of their guns.¶ “Shoot Them Down” draws its name from orders Feschino says President Truman gave military commanders while an American public was growing increasingly jittery over coast-to-coast UFO sightings.¶ Two years earlier, Truman had remarked at a news conference, “I can assure you that flying saucers, given that they exist, are not constructed by any power on earth.”¶ “There are tons of documents right there, intelligence reports, talking about pilots chasing these things, going after them,” Feschino said, citing the once-hidden reports on the Air Force’s so-called Project Blue Book.¶ “That’s when it hit the fan, and the government stepped up. That is when they had to simmer the whole country down. The whole country was in an uproar. Everybody was panicking. The job of the government is to keep things under control, and they couldn’t let the country panic.”¶ UFOs were buzzing the entire country that year, “and a good chunk of them were over military installations, and power plants, like Oak Ridge,” the author says.¶ Feschino pulls his theory largely from the writings of Air Force Capt. Edward Ruppelt, a decorated World War II veteran, recalled to duty when hostilities erupted in Korea.¶ Roswell might stand out as the mother of all UFO stories, but 1952 was the most prolific year by far for aircraft sightings — by one account, some 30,000 alone in the United States, many of them reported in local newspapers around the country.¶ Craft ranged from discs to round balls to elongated, cigar-shaped ships, the Port Orange, Fla., resident said.¶ “Capt. Ruppelt was dropping clues throughout his book,” Feschino said. “And that’s the premise of my book. During that time of 1952 we had the highest amount of sightings.”¶ In a book he wrote, Ruppelt said “other assorted historians have pointed out that normally the UFOs are peaceful,” but he alluded to a chase in which one of two pilots engaging unidentified aircraft perished.¶ “They just weren’t ready to be observed closely,” he wrote.¶ “If the Air Force hadn’t slapped down the security lid, these writers might not have reached this conclusion (about peaceful aliens). There have been other and more lurid duels of death. That’s what everybody missed.”¶ Feschino flatly says the Air Force took on alien aircraft just off the coast with orders to destroy them in a move to pacify a public growing ever restless over bizarre sightings. In the battle, apparently one craft hobbled back inland, resting on a knoll in a West Virginia community known as Flatwoods. And it was there on Sept. 12 a group of boys, accompanied by some adults, scampered up the hillside and saw a metallic, 12-foot object emitting a sulfuric odor. Locals dubbed it “the Flatwoods Monster.”¶ “I have no idea who they were,” Feschino said.¶ Based on his interviews with some 200 denizens of Flatwoods, however, the author believes the aliens remain interested in rural West Virginia.¶ “There are people in West Virginia who have been seeing UFOs for the past 50 years, and there are key locations where they are being seen — Wheeling, Huntington, and quite a few south of Charleston, around Cabin Creek, even down in the Beckley area,” he said.¶

#### ALIENS ABDUCT, PROBE, MURDER, SADISTICALLY TORTURE, AND FEED ON HUMAN SUFFERING AND BODIES.

BRANTON 2K10

[alex, <http://www.bibliotecapleyades.net/valdamar_valerian/esp_valdamar_valerian_8.htm>]

There are indications that the ritual of the Eucharist is a reflection of earlier rituals where aliens were eating off the bodies of humans or feeding off their energies. The phrase "food of the gods" takes on new meaning when these factors are understood. The true "nectar of the gods" which the aliens involved seem to prize most is a substance that is taken from freshly killed humans. This substance is generated at the moment of death by the strong surge of adrenaline. This surge of adrenaline through the body accumulates at the base of the brain [the brain stem] and some aliens thrive on this substance as though it were some kind of ultimate drug for their particular species. This substance is most potent in HUMAN CHILDREN... ¶ In the Draco system there are other types of entities which have visited the Earth in the past. These entities were described by John Keel in his book THE MOTHMAN PROPHECIES, released in the 1970's. The Draco are about 8 feet tall and have winged appendages coming out of their shoulders, dark scaly skin, and have glowing red eyes. They have the ability to fly and usually operate at night.¶ ¶ These entities, as well as the elite of the other Reptilian species [that also have winged appendages] were the source for some of the legends of the past relating to gargoyles and Valkyries. It is also apparent that some of the qualities ascribed to vampires have also been taken from these creatures. ¶ (Interjection: These 'elite' reptilians have gone by many names: Gargoyles, Mothmen, Birdmen, Winged Draco, Winged Serpents, Ciakars, etc. One such creature that was described by a female abductee -- who was taken to a multi-leveled underground system below camp Hero at Montauk Point, Long Island -- was described as follows. I will provide only the description of the creature itself, an alien that she encountered inside the base which is said to be maintained by European and American 'Nazis' working under the Bavarian Thule Society. However I will not release any personal details about this woman in honor of her wishes to keep the overall details of the abduction confidential:¶ ".. What I see is a creature about 6-7 ft tall...his ears are large and pointed at the top. His eyes are bright yellow-gold and seem to glow. He has pointy teeth and a large wrinkle on his forehead and he has a TAIL! He's coming towards me...I have never been so scared in my life. He comes to the foot of the table. He pulls off my shorts and bathing suit bottom...he pushes my legs open and pulls me down towards him. His face is so close to mine...I want to scream, but it's only in my head. I hear a raspy sound coming from him. He puts something inside me and I feel like I'm being ripped apart. He likes to see how terrified I am... it gives him a lot of pleasure. It hurts so much...I have to get away in my head to someplace safe... I go."

#### ALIEN CONTACT INCREASES RACISM, DIVISIONS IN HUMANITY, EUGENICS AND CONTROL OUR SOCIOPOLITICAL SYSTEMS WITH SEX, PAIN, AND DRUGS. UNIQUELY INTERNAL LINK TURNS THEIR ADVANTAGE, VOTE NEG ON PRESUMPTION.

BRANTON 2K10

[alex, <http://www.bibliotecapleyades.net/valdamar_valerian/esp_valdamar_valerian_8.htm>]

The mass consciousness of the government agencies cooperating with the Rigelians have failed to realize that it is not to the aliens' advantage to give either the Soviets or the U.S. an advantage in the "arms race". These aliens have given the U.S. technology that is flawed. Much of the technology can only be operated by the Greys. ¶ They control governments by picking up likely subjects and implanting them, manipulating their careers and elevating them within the societal structure to positions of power and/or a position as a leader of public opinion. When a human candidate becomes controlled by reason of inculcation therapy, they often knock the individual "out of his head" and store the human's consciousness/individuality [or soul/chakra matrix], while an artificially created intelligence is placed in the head of the candidate's body [via electronic intelligence implants] to carry forth covert operations against the human population. ¶ Humans implanted as controls are indoctrinated into the belief that they are superior to other humans.¶ ¶ (Leading to schisms within the 'body' of humanity, resulting in warfare as in the case of the racist Germanic atrocities in world wars I and II, eugenic population reduction policies, etc. - Branton).¶ ¶ The aliens then give the humans technology OR help them to obtain weapons for use against each other.¶ ¶ (The old divide and conquer strategy, as in the case with the Nazi forces whose elite leaders maintained a treaty with the Ashtarian "Komogul-II" or "Gizeh" empire, a joint humanoid-reptiloid collective operating from beneath the deserts of Egypt. - Branton).¶ ¶ All key personnel [in the NSA, etc.] are implanted and controlled by the alien species. If the 'elite' are successful, they are used as "priests and caretakers" of the SLAVE planet. If they fail [Hitler] then they are betrayed and thrown to the wolves... The first stage of their One World plan is to use biological warfare [ENGINEERED PLAGUES, etc.] to rid the planet of undesirables.¶ ¶ (Note: It is interesting how plagues have often historically accompanied the appearances of 'comets', as will be seen further on in this section. - Branton).¶ ¶ The biological warfare is out of control. Decimation of population places the remaining population ultimately under their control... They blanket couples for sexual thrills and are drawn to aberrant and sexual deviates¶ ¶ (feeding off of their negative orgasmic sexual energy, as -- according to legends -- do the vampirial incubus and succubi 'demons' that have been recorded throughout history. - Branton)...¶ ¶ The Markabs use sex, pain, drugs and fear as obsessive elements with which to aberrate humans... By coming to a thorough understanding of a hostile entities' ability to wear many faces, it unmasks and loses its ability to adversely influence...

### Overview Effect

#### THE OVERVIEW EFFECT IS THE LANGUAGE OF ECOCRACY THAT SEEKS TO ERASE ALL NOTIONS OF DIFFERENCE. IT IS THE CALL OF COLONIALISM

Wolfgang Sachs, Fellow at the Institute for Cultural Studies, 1995, Deep Ecology for the 21st Century, p. 442

Satellite pictures scanning the globe's vegetative cover, computer graphs running interacting curves through time, threshold levels held up as world­wide norms are the language of global ecology. It constructs a reality that contains mountains of data, but no people. The data do not explain why Tuar­egs are driven to exhaust their waterholes, or what makes Germans so obsessed with high speed on freeways; they do not point out who owns the timber shipped from the Amazon or which industry flourishes because of a polluted Mediterranean sea; and they are mute about the significance of forest trees for Indian tribals or what water means in an Arab country. In short, they provide a knowledge which is faceless and placeless; an abstraction that carries a con­siderable cost: it consigns the realities of culture, power and virtue to oblivion. It offers data, but no context; it shows diagrams, but no actors; it gives calcula­tions, but no notions of morality; it seeks stability, but disregards beauty. In­deed, the global vantage point requires ironing out all the differences and disregarding all circumstances; rarely has the gulf between observers and the observed been greater than between satellite-based forestry and the seringueiro in the Brazilian jungle. It is inevitable that the claims of global management are in conflict with the aspirations for cultural rights, democracy and self­determination. Indeed, it is easy for an ecocracy which acts in the name of "one earth" to become a threat to local communities and their lifestyles. After all, has there ever, in the history of colonialism, been a more powerful motive for streamlining the world than the call to save the planet.

#### NOT EVERYONE WILL GET THE SAME EFFECT. SOME WILL FEEL NOTHING

Frank White, Senior Associate at the Space Studies Institute, 1998, The Overview Effect: Space Exploration and Human Evolution, p. 25, JT//JEDI

#### There certainly have been breakthrough experiences akin to "en­lightenment" on space missions. However, this does not make space­flight a spiritual experience per se. Just as some people can go to church and feel nothing, while others are enraptured just by looking at a flower, there are those who have had profound experiences in outer space and those for whom it was simply a job well done. Edgar Mitchell preferred to avoid the word spiritual and to discuss, instead, expansions in consciousness and belief systems. He said that being open to the new information of the experience is the key: "To me, the difference between gelling and not getting an 'aha' experience out of it is whether it shifts your structure a bit. Do you get a sense of freedom, of expansiveness, because you've just experienced something that is different from your previous experiences and beliefs?"

#### EXPANDING INTO SPACE FOSTERS A FUNDAMENTAL DISCONNECTION FROM THE EARTH ENVIRONMENT

Charles S. Cockell, Ph.D., Professor and Chair of Geomicrobiology, Open University, 2007, Space on Earth: Saving Our World By Seeking Others, p. 122, JT//JEDI

The idea that we should protect the Earth because it helps us settle space is the easiest idea to understand. We might also pro­tect the Earth for its own intrinsic worth, not just because we think animals, plants and microbes should have a right to con­tinue to exist, but because the Earth has a universal intrinsic worth. The possibility that Earth might have an intrinsic value within a space-faring environmental ethic has a great deal of long-term importance. As humanity moves away and explores new regions of space, its connection with Earth weakens. For example, imagine a space-faring civilization that gathers all of its resources from asteroids and lives amongst these objects. As few of these new space-dwelling pioneers will visit the Earth, then their sense of the intrinsic worth of the planet will also fade away. It will be to them a distant world, a curiosity.

## 1NR

### CP

### Theory

#### MOUs are not binding on any of the parties involved: the plan does nothing, it can’t be implemented and isn’t enforceable

Bloomberg 13

[Business Week, <http://www.businessweek.com/small-business/legal-forms/diyl-business-affairs/memorandum-of-understanding-template.html>, mg]

A memorandum of understanding is document which describes an agreement between two parties and sets out the parties' common goals and courses of action to be taken for a particular purpose. Memorandums of Understanding are not legally binding upon the parties.

# Round 4 v Texas FS

## 1NC

### 1NC

#### 1. Interpretation: The role of the ballot is to determine if the enactment of a topical plan is better than the status quo or a competitive option. The 1ac must read and defend the implementation of such a topical plan.

#### 2. Violation:

#### A) “Resolved” implies a policy or legislative decision – means they must be resolved about a future federal government policy

Parcher 1

Jeff Parcher, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001 http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution.

#### B) USFG is the national government in DC

Encarta Online Encyclopedia, 2k

(http://encarta.msn.com)

“The federal government **of the U**nited **S**tates **is centered in** Washington **DC”**

#### C) Should means there is a practical reason for action

WordNet in ‘97

Princeton University, 1.6

**Should** v 1 : be expected to: “Parties should be fun” 2 : **expresses an** emotional**, practical,** or other **reason for doing something:** “You had better put on warm clothes”; “You should call your mother-in-law”; *“The State ought to repair bridges*”[syn**:** had better, ought]

#### 3. Vote Negative:

#### A) Decisionmaking - a limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to decision-making and advocacy skills

Steinberg & Freeley 8

\*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Specifically, decisionmaking skills based on specific energy policy proposals are key to motivate legislative fence-sitters – the aff’s strategy is doomed to the status quo

Brown 11

[heath, PhD Political Science, Roanoke, Salem, VA, “narrative strategies used by interest groups during the 2008 presidental transition”, 2011 Pat-Net Conference]

Milbrath argues that interest groups must strategically present information so as to ¶ overcome the “perceptual screen” that shields policy makers from absorbing endless amounts ¶ of information. He suggests that groups use facts (scientific information about policy ¶ outcomes), arguments (normative explanations of justness or rightness of action), and power¶ (typically subtle offers of political support or threats of political retribution) to communicate ¶ their interests and make their case for policy action (or inaction). In a more recent approach, ¶ Esterling (2007, p. 79) makes the case that groups can use [using] “instrumental” – “research or ¶ evidence-based causal” arguments -- or “normative” – “intrinsic desirability” arguments. By ¶ emphasizing one of these approaches, a group is tacitly communicating the way it wants to ¶ persuade the target of the information. By emphasizing power or normative arguments, the ¶ group implies that the policy maker should make decisions based primarily on their political ¶ judgment and political future. Conversely, by emphasizing facts-based or instrumental ¶ arguments, the group implies that the policy maker should base decisions primarily on rational ¶ or scientific considerations. In practice, it is difficult to disentangle these two types of ¶ arguments and many groups will likely combine various ways to present information (Wright ¶ 1996; Rochefort and Cobb 1994). The dichotomy though does help clarify the persuasive or ¶ argumentative tone of the information and advice given by groups to policy makers. 6 ¶ While public perceptions of interest groups might suggest crass self-interest, ¶ manipulation, and deception, groups have an incentive to be forthright in the information they ¶ provide and arguments they make. A group that provides shoddy statistics or misleading ¶ arguments will be discounted in future interactions with the policy maker (Kersh 2009; ¶ Easterling 2007). John E. Chubb (1983, p. 145) writes in regard to energy interest groups: ¶ “information and advice that are solely self-serving threaten the bond of trust that facilitates ¶ the informal play of influence.” In fact, rather than targeting political opponents or fence ¶ sitters, much research suggests that groups prefer or are invited to lobby friends and allies over ¶ adversaries (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999; Hall and Deardorff ¶ 2006; Bauer et al. 1963; Holyoke 2004; McCool 1990). If this is the case, the cost of ¶ misrepresenting or overstating information may be particularly high for those engaged in what ¶ Hall and Deardorff (2006) and others have called “legislative subsidy” (Hall and Deardorff 2006; ¶ Esterling 2007a). From this subsidy perspective, if a policy maker is sub-contracting information ¶ collection and analysis to an allied interest group, it behooves that group to be conscientious, ¶ thorough, and consistent in the information and advice it gives. And in many cases, as Wright ¶ (1996) contends, it is relatively easy for policy makers to check the authenticity of the ¶ information provided to them, sometimes simply through the contradictory information ¶ provided by other groups, thereby curtailing the inclination to blatantly misrepresent the truth. ¶ Furthermore, experimental research shows that factual or instrumental information is ¶ preferred by legislative staff (LaPira 2008) and neutral expert lobbyists have more legislative ¶ access than non-experts (Esterling 2007b). Facts may be useful on their own terms in ¶ formulating legislative decisions but scientific or statistically based arguments also serve as a 7 ¶ cue for policy makers to determine the credibility or reliability of the advice they are given ¶ (Sabatier 1978). ¶ Rather than convince those already in agreement, the approach taken by proactive ¶ theorists suggests that groups seek to convince legislative fence sitters or opponents to adopt ¶ the group’s position, advocate the group’s interests, or simply vote in the group’s way through ¶ the offer of, or refusal to give, political support (Smith 1984; Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; ¶ Wright 1996). Wright (1990) for one finds that groups which distribute campaign contributions ¶ to a wide group of legislators are then able to access a wider group, rather than just political ¶ allies (Wright 1990). Similarly, Heberling (2005) shows that one group, the AFL-CIO, seeks out ¶ legislators with unknown political preferences rather than targeting political allies (Heberling ¶ 2005). The field of interest group research has not yet resolved whether groups typically lobby ¶ friends, adversaries, or some combination of the two (Leech and Baumgartner 1998). This is ¶ likely due to the wide variation of group types and also policy domains in which groups operate. ¶ These inter-organizational and inter-policy differences affect the strategies employed and ¶ therefore the content of information presented during lobbying.

#### Switch-side is key to making those decisionmaking skills effective – EPA debates prove

Mitchell 10

(Gordon R., Associate Professor, Director of Graduate Studies, and Director of the William Pitt Debating Union at the University of Pittsburgh; Spring, “Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 1 – Kurr)

The preceding analysis of U.S. intelligence community debating initiatives highlighted how analysts are challenged to navigate discursively the heteroglossia of vast amounts of different kinds of data flowing through intelligence streams. Public policy planners are tested in like manner when they attempt to stitch together institutional arguments from various and sundry inputs ranging from expert testimony, to historical precedent, to public comment. Just as intelligence managers find that algorithmic, formal methods of analysis often don't work when it comes to the task of interpreting and synthesizing copious amounts of disparate data, public-policy planners encounter similar challenges. In fact, the argumentative turn in public-policy planning elaborates an approach to public-policy analysis that foregrounds deliberative interchange and critical thinking as alternatives to "decisionism," the formulaic application of "objective" decision algorithms to the public policy process. Stating the matter plainly, Majone suggests, "whether in written or oral form, argument is central in all stages of the policy process." Accordingly, he notes, "we miss a great deal if we try to understand policy-making solely in terms of power, influence, and bargaining, to the exclusion of debate and argument."51 One can see similar rationales driving Goodwin and Davis's EPA debating project, where debaters are invited to conduct on-site public debates covering resolutions crafted to reflect key points of stasis in the EPA decision-making process. For example, in the 2008 Water Wars debates held at EPA headquarters in Washington, D.C., resolutions were crafted to focus attention on the topic of water pollution, with one resolution focusing on downstream states' authority to control upstream states' discharges and sources of pollutants, and a second resolution exploring the policy merits of bottled water and toilet paper taxes as revenue sources to fund water infrastructure projects. In the first debate on interstate river pollution, the team of Seth Gannon and Seungwon Chung from Wake Forest University argued in favor of downstream state control, with the Michigan State University team of Carly Wunderlich and Garrett Abelkop providing opposition. In the second debate on taxation policy, Kevin Kallmyer and Matthew Struth from University of Mary Washington defended taxes on bottled water and toilet paper, while their opponents from Howard University, Dominique Scott and Jarred McKee, argued against this proposal. Reflecting on the project, Goodwin noted how the intercollegiate [End Page 106] debaters' ability to act as "honest brokers" in the policy arguments contributed positively to internal EPA deliberation on both issues.52 Davis observed that since the invited debaters "didn't have a dog in the fight," they were able to give voice to previously buried arguments that some EPA subject matter experts felt reticent to elucidate because of their institutional affiliations.53 Such findings are consistent with the views of policy analysts advocating the argumentative turn in policy planning. As Majone claims, "Dialectical confrontation between generalists and experts often succeeds in bringing out unstated assumptions, conflicting interpretations of the facts, and the risks posed by new projects."54 Frank Fischer goes even further in this context, explicitly appropriating rhetorical scholar Charles Willard's concept of argumentative "epistemics" to flesh out his vision for policy studies: Uncovering the epistemic dynamics of public controversies would allow for a more enlightened understanding of what is at stake in a particular dispute, making possible a sophisticated evaluation of the various viewpoints and merits of different policy options. In so doing, the differing, often tacitly held contextual perspectives and values could be juxtaposed; the viewpoints and demands of experts, special interest groups, and the wider public could be directly compared; and the dynamics among the participants could be scrutizined. This would by no means sideline or even exclude scientific assessment; it would only situate it within the framework of a more comprehensive evaluation.55 As Davis notes, institutional constraints present within the EPA communicative milieu can complicate efforts to provide a full airing of all relevant arguments pertaining to a given regulatory issue. Thus, intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might otherwise remain sedimented in the policy process. The dynamics entailed in this symbiotic relationship are underscored by deliberative planner John Forester, who observes, "If planners and public administrators are to make democratic political debate and argument possible, they will need strategically located allies to avoid being fully thwarted by the characteristic self-protecting behaviors of the planning organizations and bureaucracies within which they work."56 Here, an institution's need for "strategically located allies" to support deliberative practice constitutes the demand for rhetorically informed expertise, setting up what can be considered a demand-driven rhetoric of science. As an instance of rhetoric of science scholarship, this type of "switch-side public [End Page 107] debate"57 differs both from insular contest tournament debating, where the main focus is on the pedagogical benefit for student participants, and first-generation rhetoric of science scholarship, where critics concentrated on unmasking the rhetoricity of scientific artifacts circulating in what many perceived to be purely technical spheres of knowledge production.58 As a form of demand-driven rhetoric of science, switch-side debating connects directly with the communication field's performative tradition of argumentative engagement in public controversy—a different route of theoretical grounding than rhetorical criticism's tendency to locate its foundations in the English field's tradition of literary criticism and textual analysis.59 Given this genealogy, it is not surprising to learn how Davis's response to the EPA's institutional need for rhetorical expertise took the form of a public debate proposal, shaped by Davis's dual background as a practitioner and historian of intercollegiate debate. Davis competed as an undergraduate policy debater for Howard University in the 1970s, and then went on to enjoy substantial success as coach of the Howard team in the new millennium. In an essay reviewing the broad sweep of debating history, Davis notes, "Academic debate began at least 2,400 years ago when the scholar Protagoras of Abdera (481–411 BC), known as the father of debate, conducted debates among his students in Athens."60 As John Poulakos points out, "older" Sophists such as Protagoras taught Greek students the value of dissoi logoi, or pulling apart complex questions by debating two sides of an issue.61 The few surviving fragments of Protagoras's work suggest that his notion of dissoi logoi stood for the principle that "two accounts [logoi] are present about every 'thing,' opposed to each other," and further, that humans could "measure" the relative soundness of knowledge claims by engaging in give-and-take where parties would make the "weaker argument stronger" to activate the generative aspect of rhetorical practice, a key element of the Sophistical tradition.62 Following in Protagoras's wake, Isocrates would complement this centrifugal push with the pull of synerchésthé, a centripetal exercise of "coming together" deliberatively to listen, respond, and form common social bonds.63 Isocrates incorporated Protagorean dissoi logoi into synerchésthé, a broader concept that he used flexibly to express interlocking senses of (1) inquiry, as in groups convening to search for answers to common questions through discussion;64 (2) deliberation, with interlocutors gathering in a political setting to deliberate about proposed courses of action;65 and (3) alliance formation, a form of collective action typical at festivals,66 or in the exchange of pledges that deepen social ties.67 [End Page 108] Returning once again to the Kettering-informed sharp distinction between debate and deliberation, one sees in Isocratic synerchésthé, as well as in the EPA debating initiative, a fusion of debate with deliberative functions. Echoing a theme raised in this essay's earlier discussion of intelligence tradecraft, such a fusion troubles categorical attempts to classify debate and deliberation as fundamentally opposed activities. The significance of such a finding is amplified by the frequency of attempts in the deliberative democracy literature to insist on the theoretical bifurcation of debate and deliberation as an article of theoretical faith. Tandem analysis of the EPA and intelligence community debating initiatives also brings to light dimensions of contrast at the third level of Isocratic synerchésthé, alliance formation. The intelligence community's Analytic Outreach initiative invites largely one-way communication flowing from outside experts into the black box of classified intelligence analysis. On the contrary, the EPA debating program gestures toward a more expansive project of deliberative alliance building. In this vein, Howard University's participation in the 2008 EPA Water Wars debates can be seen as the harbinger of a trend by historically black colleges and universities (HBCUS) to catalyze their debate programs in a strategy that evinces Davis's dual-focus vision. On the one hand, Davis aims to recuperate Wiley College's tradition of competitive excellence in intercollegiate debate, depicted so powerfully in the feature film The Great Debaters, by starting a wave of new debate programs housed in HBCUS across the nation.68 On the other hand, Davis sees potential for these new programs to complement their competitive debate programming with participation in the EPA's public debating initiative. This dual-focus vision recalls Douglas Ehninger's and Wayne Brockriede's vision of "total" debate programs that blend switch-side intercollegiate tournament debating with forms of public debate designed to contribute to wider communities beyond the tournament setting.69 Whereas the political telos animating Davis's dual-focus vision certainly embraces background assumptions that Greene and Hicks would find disconcerting—notions of liberal political agency, the idea of debate using "words as weapons"70—there is little doubt that the project of pursuing environmental protection by tapping the creative energy of HBCU-leveraged dissoi logoi differs significantly from the intelligence community's effort to improve its tradecraft through online digital debate programming. Such difference is especially evident in light of the EPA's commitment to extend debates to public realms, with the attendant possible benefits unpacked by Jane Munksgaard and Damien Pfister: [End Page 109] Having a public debater argue against their convictions, or confess their indecision on a subject and subsequent embrace of argument as a way to seek clarity, could shake up the prevailing view of debate as a war of words. Public uptake of the possibility of switch-sides debate may help lessen the polarization of issues inherent in prevailing debate formats because students are no longer seen as wedded to their arguments. This could transform public debate from a tussle between advocates, with each public debater trying to convince the audience in a Manichean struggle about the truth of their side, to a more inviting exchange focused on the content of the other's argumentation and the process of deliberative exchange.71 Reflection on the EPA debating initiative reveals a striking convergence among (1) the expressed need for dissoi logoi by government agency officials wrestling with the challenges of inverted rhetorical situations, (2) theoretical claims by scholars regarding the centrality of argumentation in the public policy process, and (3) the practical wherewithal of intercollegiate debaters to tailor public switch-side debating performances in specific ways requested by agency collaborators. These points of convergence both underscore previously articulated theoretical assertions regarding the relationship of debate to deliberation, as well as deepen understanding of the political role of deliberation in institutional decision making. But they also suggest how decisions by rhetorical scholars about whether to contribute switch-side debating acumen to meet demand-driven rhetoric of science initiatives ought to involve careful reflection. Such an approach mirrors the way policy planning in the "argumentative turn" is designed to respond to the weaknesses of formal, decisionistic paradigms of policy planning with situated, contingent judgments informed by reflective deliberation.

#### B) Dialogue - Predictable points of stasis are key – effective deliberation is critical to preventing mass violence as it overcomes politically debilitating self-obsession

Roberts-Miller 03

(Patricia Roberts-Miller is Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Texas "Fighting Without Hatred: Hannah Arendt’s Agonistic Rhetoric" JAC 22.2 2003)

Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into solipsistic and unreflective behavior. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58) What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with disastrous consequences, both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody. It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems, Arendt's solution is the playful and competitive space of agonism; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the assumption of competition, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, of one's thought. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives. Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it. The situation is agonistic not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference. This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity. Continued… Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, especially not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsibility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87). Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes, Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social. Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies. Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38). By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed. Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259). Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238). The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking. Arendt's Polemical Agonism As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. Persuasive agonism still values conflict, disagreement, and equality among interlocutors, but it has the goal of reaching agreement, as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added). Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it. In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it is how one tests the validity of one's thought. In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy. Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point: You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42) Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03). In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes. This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate. Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263). Like other proponents of agonism, Arendt argues that rhetoric does not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth; it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered. Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242). Agonism demands that one simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions, rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think. The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324). Yet, there are important positive political consequences of agonism. Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how the system could be actively moral. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the evil of conformity—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state makes possible extraordinary evil carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill undermines the political force of conformity, so it is a force against the bureaucratizing of evil. If people think for themselves, they will resist dogma; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, they will resist totalitarianism. And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action. In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere. On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric.

### 1NC

#### Picking winners bad—distorts the market, causes trade-offs and deters private capital

Veronique de Rugy 6/19/2012 (Senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center, "Assessing the Department of Energy Loan Guarantee Program" mercatus.org/publication/assessing-department-energy-loan-guarantee-program)

This government involvement can *distort the market signals further*. For instance, the data shows that private investors tend to congregate toward government guarantee projects, independently of the merits of the projects, *taking capital away from unsubsidized projects that have a better probability of success* without subsidy and a more viable business plan. As the Government Accountability Office noted, “Guarantees would make projects [the federal government] assists financially more attractive to private capital than conservation projects not backed by federal guarantees. Thus both its loans and its guarantees will *siphon private capital away*.”[25] This reallocation of resources by private investors away from viable projects may even *take place within the same industry—that is, one green energy project might trade off with another, more viable green energy project.* More importantly, once the government subsidizes a portion of the market, the object of the subsidy becomes a safe asset. Safety in the market, however, often means low return on investments, which is likely to *turn venture capitalists away*. As a result, *capital investments will likely dry out and innovation rates will go down*.[26] In fact, the data show that in cases in which the federal government introduced few distortions, private investors were *more than happy to take risks and invest* their money even in projects that required high initial capital requirements. The Alaska pipeline project, for instance, was privately financed at the cost of $35 billion, making it one of the most expensive energy projects undertaken by private enterprise.[27] The project was ultimately abandoned in 2011 because of weak customer demand and the development of shale gas resources outside Alaska.28 However, this proves that the private sector invests money even when there is a chance that it could lose it. Private investment in U.S. clean energy totaled $34 billion in 2010, up 51 percent from the previous year.[29] Finally, when the government *picks winners and losers in the form of a technology or a company, it often fails*. First, the government does not have perfect or even better information or technology advantage over private agents. In addition, *decision-makers are insulated from market signals* and won’t learn important and necessary lessons about the technology or what customers want. Second, the resources that the government offers are so addictive that companies may *reorient themselves away from producing what customers want, toward pleasing the government officials*.

#### Causes crowd-out—decreases domestic investments and innovations

Veronique de Rugy 6/19/2012 (Senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center, "Assessing the Department of Energy Loan Guarantee Program" mercatus.org/publication/assessing-department-energy-loan-guarantee-program

4. *Crowding Out* To some (for example, those lucky enough to receive the loan guarantee), government money may seem to be free. But it isn’t, of course. The government has to borrow the money on the open market too. This additional borrowing comes from Americans’ savings, as does the money that Americans invest in the private sector’s growth. There comes a point when there just *aren’t enough savings to satisfy both masters*. In other words, when government runs a deficit to finance its preferred projects, it can affect private sector access to capital, and *lead to a reduction in domestic investment*. Economists use the term “crowding out” to describe the contraction in economic activity associated with deficit- financed spending.[30] In addition, the competition between public and private borrowing *raises interest rates for all borrowers*, including the government, making it *more expensive for domestic investors to start or complete projects*. Over time, this could mean that American companies will build fewer factories, cut back on research and development, and *generate fewer innovations*. As a result, our nation’s future earning prospects will dim, and our future living standards could suffer.

### THE AGUILARA COUNTERPLAN

#### TEXT: WE AFFIRM THE ENTIRETY OF THE 1AC WITHOUT THEIR USE OF THE PHRASE “THE GENIE WILL NOT GO BACK IN THE BOTTLE”

#### IT SOLVES THE ENTIRETY OF THE AFF – THERE IS NO ARGUMENTATIVE OR PERFORMATIVE OFFENSE TO THE UTTERANCE OF THIS PHRASE NOR ANY REASON WHY IT IS INTRINSIC TO ANY OTHER PART OF THE 1AC.

#### Use of the “genie in the bottle” metaphor is racist towards people of Arabic descent--- these stereotypes should be rejected in every instance

Ahmed 12

{Muddasser, Al-Arabiya News, <http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2012/07/25/228286.html>, mg]

**The depiction of Muslims as a singular embodiment of ‘terror’ and ‘menace’ by mainstream media** outlets **has long been a source of outcry for many Muslims**, but the struggle, too often, has been circular, wrapped around debates on ‘Islamophobia.’ Some western commentators dismiss the term, calling it a ‘political ploy’ to stifle freedom of expression. Amidst the importance placed on the sanctity of free expression in the West, these testimonies of distorted facts vis-à-vis Islam and Muslims seem to be a rather sinister breach of ideals.¶ Dr. Ahmed writes that the negative portrayal of Muslims has been largely ‘due to poor journalistic standards in the tabloid press, which sets the wider news agenda in print and broadcasting’ – a statement backed up by the journalists we interviewed. For instance, Brian Cathcart, former deputy editor at the Independent on Sunday, told us that ‘where Muslims are concerned, some of the country’s top-selling newspapers have too often failed... damaging stereotypes have been adopted and repeated by some newspapers... Since these papers enjoy such wide circulation, this cannot fail to disadvantage Muslims in British society.’¶ Notwithstanding the elusiveness of ‘Islamophobia’ as a term, it is worth inquiring about the larger frame of reference at work here now that the facts are out. **In the construction and transmutation of the Muslim or Islamic ‘menace,’** often unifying the left and the right in Europe, the report shows media **narratives regularly conflate the West’s Muslim diaspora communities with external instances of extremism, terrorism, despotism, and sexism.**¶ **Old habits die hard. The depiction of Muslims as the foreign ‘other’ has persisted in literary writings and mainstream media, from the time of** Dante’s Divine Comedy and **Aladdin’s exotic genie in the bottle** to the Iranian revolution, 9/11, 7/7 and the aftermath. Race and Reform represents a thorough investigation of a phenomenon that is, unfortunately, larger than the British context.

#### AND, THIS TYPE OF RACIAL DISCRIMATION PRODUCES GENOCIDAL POLITICS UNTO EXTINCTION

**Batur ‘7** (Pinar Batur, PhD at UT-Austin – Prof. of Scociology at Vassar, 2007, “The Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide,” in Handbook of the The Soiology of Racial and Ethnic Relations)

There needs to be a growing consensus on the part of human beings and organized society that penetrates the very basis of human culture that mass killing is unacceptable to civilized peoples, otherwise the prevailing momentum of historical experience will continue for generation after generation that genocide is a phenomenon of nature, like other disasters, and this view of the inevitability of genocide as an almost natural event will continue to justify in the sense of convincing people that nothing can be done. (Totten et al. 1977: xxxix) War and genocide are horrid, and taking them for granted is inhuman. In the 21st century, our problem is not only seeing them as natural and inevitable, but even worse: not seeing, not noticing, but ignoring them. Such act and thought, fueled by global racism, reveal that racial inequality has advanced from the establishment of racial hierarchy and institutionalization of segregation, to the confinement and exclusion, and elimination, of those considered inferior through genocide. In this trajectory, global racism manifests genocide. But this is not inevitable. This article, by examining global racism, explores the new terms of exclusion and the path to permanent war and genocide, to examine the integrality of genocide to the framework of global antiracist confrontation. Racist legitimization of inequality has changed from presupposed biological inferiority to assumed cultural inadequacy. This defines the new terms of impossibility of coexistence, much less equality. The Jim Crow racism of biological inferiority is now being replaced with a new and modern racism (Baker 1981; Ansell 1997) with “culture war” as the key to justify difference, hierarchy, and oppression. The ideology of “culture war” is becoming embedded in institutions, defining the workings of organizations, and is now defended by individuals who argue that they are not racist, but are not blind to the inherent differences between African-Americans/Arabs/Chinese, or whomever, and “us.” “Us” as a concept defines the power of a group to distinguish itself and to assign a superior value to its institutions, revealing certainty that affinity with “them” will be harmful to its existence (Hunter 1991; Buchanan 2002). How can we conceptualize this shift to examine what has changed over the past century and what has remained the same in a racist society? Joe Feagin examines this question with a theory of systemic racism to explore societal complexity of interconnected elements for longevity and adaptability of racism. He sees that systemic racism persists due to a “white racial frame,” defining and maintaining an “organized set of racialized ideas, stereotypes, emotions, and inclinations to discriminate” (Feagin 2006: 25). The white racial frame arranges the routine operation of racist institutions, which enables social and economic reproduction and amendment of racial privilege. It is this frame that defines the political and economic bases of cultural and historical legitimization. While the white racial frame is one of the components of systemic racism, it is attached to other terms of racial oppression to forge systemic coherency. It has altered over time from slavery to segregation to racial oppression and now frames “culture war,” or “clash of civilizations,” to legitimate the racist oppression of domination, exclusion, war, and genocide. The concept of “culture war” emerged to define opposing ideas in America regarding privacy, censorship, citizenship rights, and secularism, but it has been globalized through conflicts over immigration, nuclear power, and the “war on terrorism.” Its discourse and action articulate to flood the racial space of systemic racism. Racism is a process of defining and building communities and societies based on racialized hierarchy of power. The expansion of capitalism cast new formulas of divisions and oppositions, fostering inequality even while integrating all previous forms of oppressive hierarchical arrangements as long as they bolstered the need to maintain the structure and form of capitalist arrangements (Batur-VanderLippe 1996). In this context, the white racial frame, defining the terms of racist systems of oppression, enabled the globalization of racial space through the articulation of capitalism (Du Bois 1942; Winant 1994). The key to understanding this expansion is comprehension of the synergistic relationship between racist systems of oppression and the capitalist system of exploitation. Taken separately, these two systems would be unable to create such oppression independently. However, the synergy between them is devastating. In the age of industrial capitalism, this synergy manifested itself imperialism and colonialism. In the age of advanced capitalism, it is war and genocide. The capitalist system, by enabling and maintaining the connection between everyday life and the global, buttresses the processes of racial oppression, and synergy between racial oppression and capitalist exploitation begets violence. Etienne Balibar points out that the connection between everyday life and the global is established through thought, making global racism a way of thinking, enabling connections of “words with objects and words with images in order to create concepts” (Balibar 1994: 200). Yet, global racism is not only an articulation of thought, but also a way of knowing and acting, framed by both everyday and global experiences. Synergy between capitalism and racism as systems of oppression enables this perpetuation and destruction on the global level. As capitalism expanded and adapted to the particularities of spatial and temporal variables, global racism became part of its legitimization and accommodation, first in terms of colonialist arrangements. In colonized and colonizing lands, global racism has been perpetuated through racial ideologies and discriminatory practices under capitalism by the creation and recreation of connections among memory, knowledge, institutions, and construction of the future in thought and action. What makes racism global are the bridges connecting the particularities of everyday racist experiences to the universality of racist concepts and actions, maintained globally by myriad forms of prejudice, discrimination, and violence (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; Batur 1999, 2006). Under colonialism, colonizing and colonized societies were antagonistic opposites. Since colonizing society portrayed the colonized “other,” as the adversary and challenger of the “the ideal self,” not only identification but also segregation and containment were essential to racist policies. The terms of exclusion were set by the institutions that fostered and maintained segregation, but the intensity of exclusion, and redundancy, became more apparent in the age of advanced capitalism, as an extension of post-colonial discipline. The exclusionary measures when tested led to war, and genocide. Although, more often than not, genocide was perpetuated and fostered by the post-colonial institutions, rather than colonizing forces, the colonial identification of the “inferior other” led to segregation, then exclusion, then war and genocide. Violence glued them together into seamless continuity. Violence is integral to understanding global racism. Fanon (1963), in exploring colonial oppression, discusses how divisions created or reinforced by colonialism guarantee the perpetuation, and escalation, of violence for both the colonizer and colonized. Racial differentiations, cemented through the colonial relationship, are integral to the aggregation of violence during and after colonialism: “Manichaeism [division of the universe into opposites of good and evil] goes to its logical conclusion and dehumanizes” (Fanon 1963:42). Within this dehumanizing framework, Fanon argues that the violence resulting from the destruction of everyday life, sense of self and imagination under colonialism continues to infest the post-colonial existence by integrating colonized land into the violent destruction of a new “geography of hunger” and exploitation (Fanon 1963: 96). The “geography of hunger” marks the context and space in which oppression and exploitation continue. The historical maps drawn by colonialism now demarcate the boundaries of post-colonial arrangements. The white racial frame restructures this space to fit the imagery of symbolic racism, modifying it to fit the television screen, or making the evidence of the necessity of the politics of exclusion, and the violence of war and genocide, palatable enough for the front page of newspapers, spread out next to the morning breakfast cereal. Two examples of this “geography of hunger and exploitation” are Iraq and New Orleans.

### K

#### Object oriented ontology mistakenly identifies the problem, and quickly dissolves into nothingness. Their abdication of prescriptive solutions and of strategic conceptual reductionism dissolves the theories necessary to posit relationships to bring Late Capitalism into focus.

Berry 2012 (David M, Senior Lecturer in Digital Media, “The Uses of Object Oriented Ontology” <http://stunlaw.blogspot.com/2012/05/uses-of-object-oriented-ontology.html>

This definition is helpful in a number of ways, firstly it demonstrates in the move towards a flat ontology the attention has shifted from ontology (being) to things/objects (beings). The definition of everything as a single thing, in this case an object/unit – is precisely the danger that Heidegger identified for philosophy. The ‘Being’ that explains everything, the ‘Good’ for Plato, “Substance” for Spinoza, and “Object” for object-oriented ontologists. As Bryant remarks, “there is only one type of being: objects. As a consequence, humans are not excluded, but are rather objects among the various types of objects that exist or populate the world, each with their own specific powers and capacities” (Bryant 2011: 20, original emphasis). This is a problem, as "correctness" in identifying objects as beings does not, for me, make a sufficient ontology, as Heidegger argues¶ What is essential is not what we presumably establish with exactness by means of instruments and gadgets; what is essential is the view in advance which opens up the field for anything to be established (Heidegger 1995: 60).¶ Bogost’s work is exemplary and highly suggestive for the work of software studies and platforms studies, however, his descriptive work is an example of object-oriented onticology, rather than ontology as such. For me, this is worthy and important work, we do need to map certain kinds of objects and their interrelations, however, we also need to be aware of the consequences of certain ways of seeing and categorizing the world. The problem seems to be that object-oriented ontology has no notion of an exemplar, no special case, no shining examples. As such, it quickly descends into endless lists and litanies. As Heidegger observes,¶ So it happens that we, lost as we usually are in the activities of observing and establishing, believe we “see” many things and yet do not see what really is (Heidegger 1995: 60).¶ To draw back to the original question: what are the uses of object-oriented ontology? It seems to me that object-oriented ontology and speculative realism together reflect a worrying spirit of conservatism within philosophy. They discount the work of human activity and place it alongside a soporific litany of naturalised objects – a method that points less at the interconnected nature of things, and gestures more towards the infinity of sameness, the gigantic of objects, the relentless distanceless of a total confusion of beings (see Harman 2009a for a discussion of things and objects). In short, experience as passive, disoriented and overwhelming, what Heidegger described as the “terror” of pure unmitigated flatness. And with that, philosophy becomes ‘cold’ philosophy, instead of understanding, we have lists and litanies of objects. Not so much philosophy as philosography, where rather than understanding the world, there is an attempt to describe it, and a worrying tendency towards the administration of things through a cataloguing operation.¶ These litanies – cascades and tumbling threads of polythetic classification – are linked merely by sequence, in which each item has no need to bear any resemblance to the ones before or after. They posit no relationships, and offers no narrative connections, and are therefore “essentially uncontrollable: at the limit so indeterminable that anything can be connected with anything” (Anderson 2012). But of course there is a connection, a link, a thread, performed by thephilosographer who chooses consciously or unconsciously the elements that make up the chain, and which are inscribed in books and articles. The use of object-oriented ontology, then, is bound up in its apparent conservatism which rallies at the temerity of human-beings to believe in themselves, their politics, and their specialness. Instead of World, object-oriented ontology posits universe, its founding principle is the [Gigantic](http://stunlaw.blogspot.co.uk/2011/12/gigantic-inc.html). As Heidegger explained:¶ 1. The gigantism of the slowing down of history (from the staying away of essential decisions all the way to lack of history) in the semblance of speed and steer ability of "historical" [historisch] development and its anticipation. 2. The gigantism of the publicness as summation of everything homogeneous in favour of concealing the destruction and undermining of any passion for essential gathering. 3. The gigantism of the claim to naturalness in the semblance of what is self-evident and "logical"; the question-worthiness of being is placed totally outside questioning. 4. The gigantism of the diminution of beings in the whole in favour of the semblance of boundless extending of the same by virtue of unconditioned controllability. The single thing that is impossible is the word and representation of "impossible" (Heidegger 1999: 311).¶ To see what "shows up" to the philosographer one is unsurprised to see lists that are often contaminated by the products of neoliberal capitalism, objects which could not just appear of themselves, but required actual concrete labour of human beings to mediate their existence. For some reason, object-oriented ontology is attracted to the ephemerality of certain objects, as if by listing them they doubly affirm their commitment to realism, or that the longer the list the more ‘real’ it is. There is also the tendency to attempt to shock the reader by the juxtaposition of objects that would normally be thought to be categorically different – see Bogost (2009) for a discussion of whether including Harry Potter, blinis, and humans in a list was a striking enough example. These rhetorical strategies are interesting in thermselves, but I do not see them as replacements for philosophy. This demonstrates that the speculative realists have not escaped the so-called ‘correlationist circle’ (Harman 2009b), nor provided a model for thinking about the anti-correlationist paradox which remains present in their own work. ¶ We should therefore ask object-oriented ontologist to move beyond merely staring at the objects they see around them and catch sight of what is being listed in their descriptive litanies. That is, examining the lists they produce, we can see what kind of objects they see as near, and which they see as far, and therefore question their claims to see objects all the way down (see Bogost 2012: 83-84). Yet as we examine these lists there appears to be a profound forgetting of Being, as it were, as they write both for and as subjects of Late Capitalism – a fact which remains hidden from them – and a seemingly major aporia in their work.

#### Alternative text: vote negative to reject the 1ac in favor of materialist revolutionary knowledge production against capitalism.

#### Ecological catastrophe necessitates materialist revolutionary dialectics against capitalism’s exploitation to ensure survival.

Foster 2k11

[john bellamy,  professor of sociology at the University of Oregon and also editor of Monthly Review, Since the Great Financial Crisis hit in 2008, Foster has been sought out by academics, activists, the media, and the general public as a result of his earlier prescient writings on the coming crisis. He has given numerous interviews, talks, and invited lectures, as well as written invited commentary, articles, and books on the subject]

In the twenty-first century it is customary to view the rise of planetary ecological problems as a surprising development scarcely conceivable prior to the last few decades. It is here, however, that we have the most to learn from the analysis of nineteenth-century thinkers who played a role in the development of ecology, including both early ecological scientists and classical historical materialists. Science has long warned of the negative, destructive side of the human transformation of the earth—a warning which the system, driven by its own imperatives, has continually sought to downplay. Indeed, what distinguishes our time from earlier centuries is not so much the conservation of catastrophe, which has long been recognized, but rather the accelerated pace at which such destruction is now manifesting itself, i.e., what I am calling the accumulation of catastrophe. The desertification arising in pre-capitalist times, partly through human action, manifested itself over centuries, even millennia. Today changes in the land, the atmosphere, the oceans, indeed the entire life-support system of the earth, are the product of mere decades. If in the past, Darwin was struck that in a mere three centuries after European colonization, the ecology of the island of St. Helena had been destroyed to the point that it was reduced to “desert”—today, in only two generations, we have altered the biogeochemical processes of the entire planet.28The absence of a historical perspective on the conservation, even accumulation, of catastrophe is a major barrier to needed change in our time. Many environmentalists, including some who perceive themselves as being on the left, persist in believing that we can address our immense and growing ecological problems without altering our fundamental social-production relationships. All that is necessary in this view is the combined magic of green technology and green markets. Short-term fixes are presumed to be adequate solutions, while society remains on the same essential course as before. Indeed, the dominant perspective on ecology can be characterized, I believe, as consisting of three successive stages of denial: (1) the denial altogether of the planetary ecological crisis (or its human cause); (2) the denial that the ecological crisis is fundamentally due to the system of production in which we live, namely capitalism; and (3) the denial that capitalism is constitutionally incapable of overcoming this global ecological threat—with capital now being presented instead as the savior of the environment.The first stage of ecological denial is easy to understand. This is the form of denial represented by Exxon-Mobil. Such outright denial of the destructive consequences of their actions is the automatic response of corporations generally when faced with the prospect of environmental regulations, which would negatively affect their bottom lines. It is also the form of absolute denial promoted by climate-change denialists themselves, who categorically reject the reality of human agency in global climate change. The second stage of denial, a retreat from the first, is to admit there is a problem, while dissociating it from the larger socioeconomic system. The famous IPAT formula, i.e. Environmental Impact = Population x Consumption x Technology (which amounts to saying that these are the three factors behind our environmental problems/solutions), has been used by some to suggest that population growth, the consumption habits of most individuals, and inappropriate technology carry the totality of blame for environmental degradation. The answer then is sustainable population, sustainable consumption, and sustainable technology. This approach, though seemingly matter-of-fact, and deceptively radical, derives its acceptability for the vested interests from the fact that it generally serves to disguise the more fundamental reality of the treadmill of capitalist production itself.29 The third stage of denial, a last-ditch defense, and exhibiting a greater level of desperation on the part of the established order, is, I would argue, the most dangerous of all. It admits that the environmental crisis is wrapped up with the existence of capitalism, but argues that what we need is an entirely new kind of capitalism: variously called “sustainable capitalism,” “green capitalism,” “natural capitalism,” and “climate capitalism” by thinkers as various as Al Gore, Paul Hawken, Amory and L. Hunter Lovins, and Jonathon Porritt.30 The argument here varies but usually begins with the old trope that capitalism is the most efficient economic system possible—a form of “spontaneous order” arising from an invisible hand—and that the answer to ecological problems is to make it more efficient still by internalizing costs on the environment previously externalized by the system. Aside from the presumed magic of the market itself, and moral claims as to “the greening of corporations,” this is supposed to be achieved by means of a black box of technological wonders. Implicit in all such views is the notion that capitalism can be made sustainable, without altering its accumulation or economic growth imperative and without breaking with the dominant social relations. The exponential growth of the system ad infinitum is possible, we are told, while simultaneously generating a sustainable relation to the planet. This of course runs up against what Herman Daly has called the Impossibility Theorem: If the whole world were to have an ecological footprint the size of the United States we would need multiple planets.31 The idea that such a development process can persist permanently on a single planet (and indeed that we are not at this point already confronting earthly limits) is of course an exercise in delusion, bordering on belief in the supernatural. “Capitalism,” as the great environmental economist K. William Kapp once wrote, is “an economy of unpaid costs.”32 It can persist and even prosper only insofar as it is able to externalize its costs on the mass of the population and the surrounding environment. Whenever the destruction is too severe the system simply seeks to engineer another spatial fix. Yet, a planetary capitalism is from this standpoint a contradiction in terms: it means that there is nowhere finally to externalize the social and environmental costs of capitalist destruction (we cannot ship our toxic waste into outer space!), and no external resources to draw upon in the face of the enormous squandering of resources inherent to the system (we can’t solve our problems by mining the moon!). Market-based solutions to climate change, such as emissions trading, have been shown to promote profits, and to facilitate economic growth and financial wealth, while increasing carbon emissions. From an environmental standpoint, therefore, they are worse than nothing—since they stand in the way of effective action. Nor are the technologies most acceptable to the system (since not requiring changes in property relations) the answer. So-called “clean coal” or carbon capture and storage technologies are economically unfeasible and ecologically dubious, and serve mainly as an ideological justification for keeping coal-fired plants going. Worse still, are geoengineering schemes like dumping sulfur particles in the atmosphere or iron filings in the ocean (the first in order to deflect the sun’s rays, the second in order to promote algal growth to increase ocean absorption of carbon). These schemes carry with them the potential for even greater ecological disasters: in the first case, this could lead to a reduction of photosynthesis, in the second the expansion of dead zones. Remember the Sorcerer’s Apprentice!33 The potential for the accumulation of catastrophe on a truly planetary level as a result of geoengineering technology is so great that it would be absolute folly to proceed in this way—simply in order to avoid changes in the mode of production, i.e., a fundamental transformation of our way of life, property relations, and metabolism with nature. Science tells us that we are crossing planetary boundaries everywhere we look, from climate change, to ocean acidification, to species destruction, to freshwater shortages, to chemical pollution of air, water, soil, and humans. The latest warning sign is the advent of what is called “extreme weather”—a direct outgrowth of climate change. As Hansen says: “Global warming increases the intensity of droughts and heat waves, and thus the area of forest fires. However, because a warmer atmosphere holds more water vapor, global warming must also increase the intensity of the other extreme of the hydrologic cycle—meaning heavier rains, more extreme floods, and more intense storms driven by latent heat.” Scientists involved in the new area of climate-attribution science, where extreme weather events are examined for their climate signatures, are now arguing that we are rapidly approaching a situation where the proverbial “‘hundred-year’ flood” no longer occurs simply once a century, but every few years. Natural catastrophes are thus likely to become more severe and more frequent occurrences in the lives of all living beings. The hope of some scientists is that this will finally wake up humanity to its true danger.34 How are we to understand the challenge of the enormous accumulation of catastrophe, and the no less massive human action required to address this? In the 1930s John Maynard Keynes wrote an essay entitled “Economic Possibilities of Our Grandchildren,” aimed at defending capitalism in response to revolutionary social challenges then arising. Keynes argued that we should rely for at least a couple more generations on the convenient lie of the Smithian invisible hand—accepting greed as the basis of a spontaneous economic order. We should therefore continue the pretense that “fair is foul and foul is fair” for the sake of the greater accumulation of wealth in society that such an approach would bring. Eventually, in the time of our “grandchildren”—maybe a “hundred years” hence (i.e., by the early 2030s)—Keynes assumed, the added wealth created by these means would be great enough that we could begin to tell the truth: that foul is foul and fair is fair. It would then be necessary for humanity to address the enormous inequalities and injustices produced by the system, engaging in a full-scale redistribution of wealth, and a radical transformation of the ends of production.35 Yet, the continued pursuit of Keynes’s convenient lie over the last eight decades has led to a world far more polarized and beset with contradictions than he could have foreseen. It is a world prey to the enormous unintended consequences of accumulation without limits: namely, global economic stagnation, financial crisis, and planetary ecological destruction. Keynes, though aware of some of the negative economic aspects of capitalist production, had no real understanding of the ecological perils—of which scientists had already long been warning. Today these perils are impossible to overlook. Faced with impending ecological catastrophe, it is more necessary than ever to abandon Keynes’s convenient lie and espouse the truth: that foul is foul and fair is fair. Capitalism, the society of “après moi le déluge!” is a system that fouls its own nest—both the human-social conditions and the wider natural environment on which it depends. The accumulation of capital is at the same time accumulation of catastrophe, not only for a majority of the world’s people, but living species generally. Hence, nothing is fairer—more just, more beautiful, and more necessary—today than the struggle to overthrow the regime of capital and to create a system of substantive equality and sustainable human development; a socialism for the twenty-first century.

### Case

#### And THEIR ARGUMENTATIVE EXCHANGE INTENDING TO PROVE THE VALIDITY OF THEIR SPEECH ACT IS A PERFORMATIVE CONTRADICTION TO THEIR NOTION OF NON-HUMAN AGENCY. THEIR PHILOSOPHY SUPPORTS A REACTIVELY NIHILISTIC AND NEOCONSERVATIVE POLITICAL BACKLASH MORE POWERFUL AND PERSUASIVE THAN THE AFF.

Berry 2012 (David M, Senior Lecturer in Digital Media, “The Uses of Object Oriented Ontology” <http://stunlaw.blogspot.com/2012/05/uses-of-object-oriented-ontology.html>

Indeed, if we were to take this claim seriously then one would be driven to wonder why Bogost is writing his book at all, but of course, “musket buckshot and gypsum and space shuttles” cannot be the addressees of this text as patently they do not read. So object-oriented ontology (OOO) is trying to do two things here, on the one hand deny the specialness of humans’ existence in relation to other objects, whilst simultaneously having to write for them and to make arguments supporting their claims – thereby acknowledging the very special existence that humans possess, namely qualities of understanding, taking a stand on their own being, etc. This is a classic performative contradiction. Whilst it would be perfectly legitimate to outline a formalist theory or methodological position that, for the sake of the approach, limits the requirement to treat human actors as particular or special in relation to others (this is the methodological innovation within Actor-Network Theory), it is quite another to then extend this claim into a philosophical system which is part of a special order of discourse particular to human beings, that is, philosophy. This so-called philosophical non-human turn, is interesting for its nihilistic and conservative implications, something we now turn to in detail.

#### No nuke power investment without carbon tax

FAS ‘12

[John F. Ahearne, Albert V. Carr, Jr, Harold A. Feiveson,¶ Daniel Ingersoll, Andrew C. Klein, Stephen Maloney, Ivan¶ Oelrich, Sharon Squassoni, and Richard Wolfson. The Future of Nuclear¶ Power in the United States]

In May 2008, CBO analyzed the effects of Energy Policy Act incentives with special ¶ attention to the production tax credit and a loan guarantee program.5¶ The tax credit ¶ provides up to $18 in tax relief per megawatt hour of electricity produced at qualifying ¶ power plants during the first eight years of operation. CBO assesses that generating ¶ electricity with nuclear technology would be roughly 35 percent more expensive than using ¶ conventional coal technology and 30 percent more expensive than using natural gas ¶ capacity. CBO concludes that investment in nuclear capacity would be unlikely in the ¶ absence of carbon dioxide charges and Energy Policy Act incentives

**Nuke power has peaked and will decline**

**Roney 5/29/12**

[J. Mathew Roney, Research Associate @ Earth Policy Institute, graduated from the University of New Hampshire in 2006 with a BS in Environmental Conservation, summa cum laude. http://cleantechnica.com/2012/05/29/did-fukushima-just-increase-the-inevitable-decline-of-nuclear-power/ ETB]

On May 5, 2012, Japan shut down its Tomari 3 nuclear reactor on the northern island of Hokkaido for inspection, marking the first time in over 40 years that the country had not a single nuclear power plant generating electricity. The March 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and subsequent Fukushima Daiichi nuclear meltdown shattered public confidence in atomic energy, thus far making it politically impossible to restart any of the reactors taken offline. And the disaster’s legacy has spread far beyond Japan. Some European countries have decided to phase out their nuclear programs entirely. In other countries, nuclear plans are proceeding with caution. But **with** the world’s fleet of **reactors** **aging, and** with **new plants suffering** construction **delays** **and** **cost** **increases**, it is possible that world **nuclear** **electricity generation has peaked and begun a long-term decline**. Prior to the Fukushima crisis, Japan had 54 reactors providing close to 30 percent of its electricity, with plans to increase this share to more than 50 percent by 2030. But nuclear power dropped to just 18 percent of Japan’s electricity over the course of 2011. When the quake and tsunami hit, 16 reactors had already been temporarily shut down for inspections or maintenance; another 13 underwent emergency shutoffs, including the four Fukushima Daiichi reactors now permanently shut down. Others were subsequently closed due to earthquake vulnerability or for regular inspection. Now that Tomari 3 is offline, **all** 44,200 megawatts **of Japan’s** **nuclear** **capacity** that are listed as “operational” by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) **are** in fact **idle with no set date for** **restart.** Next to Japan, the most dramatic shift in nuclear energy policy following Fukushima occurred in Germany. Within days of the disaster, Chancellor Angela Merkel announced that **Germany’s** seven **oldest** **reactors**, all built before 1980, would **shut down** immediately. **And** in May 2011, the government declared that Germany **would phase out nuclear entirely by 2022**. Nuclear power generated 18 percent of the country’s electricity in 2011, down from 24 percent in recent years and well below the peak in 1997 of 31 percent. Just before Germany’s phaseout decision, **Switzerland abandoned plans for** three **new reactors** that were going through the approval process. The government also announced that **all five of the** **country’s reactors**—which for years had provided some 40 percent of its electricity—**will close** **permanently** as their operating licenses expire **over the next 22 years. Italy,** which had discontinued its nuclear program after the infamous 1986 nuclear disaster in Chernobyl, Ukraine, had in 2010 decided to restart it. But in a June 2011 referendum, more than 90 percent of Italian voters **chose to ban nuclear power.** Later in 2011, **Belgium** announced **plans to phase** **out** the seven **reactors** that provide more than half of the country’s electricity. Even in **France**, **with a world-leading 77 percent of its electricity coming from nuclear power,** newly elected President François Hollande has said he **intends to reduce this share to** roughly **50 percent** by 2025. According to IAEA data, 13 reactors with a combined **11,400 megawatts were permanently shut down** in Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom **in 2011.** Seven **new reactors totaling 4,000** **megawatts were connected to the grid**—three in China and one each in India, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia—**with less than 1,000 megawatts added through** increasing, or “**uprating**,” existing nuclear plant capacities. As of May 2012, after two new reactor connections in South Korea and two permanent U.K. shutdowns, the world’s 435 operational nuclear reactors total 370,000 megawatts of capacity. Actual nuclear electricity generation in 2011 fell to 2,520 terawatt-hours, 5 percent below the 2006 peak.

## 2NC

### AT We Influence Policy

#### THEIR VIBRANT POLITICS IS INSUFFICIENT – IT MUST BE SUPPLEMENTED BY A POLITICAL METHOD WHICH ALLOWS COLLECTIVE PARTICIPATION AND REFUTATION OF EXPECTED POLITICAL FUTURES I.E. DISCUSSIONS ORIENTED AROUND A PLAN OF FUTURE ACTION TO PHYSICALLY INTERACT WITH MATTER. FRAMEWORK IS A PRE-REQ TO EVALUATING THEIR THEORY OF AGENCY, NOT THE OTHER WAY AROUND.

Wyk 2k12

[review of bennett’s vibrant matter, cosmos and history, 8, no 2, 136-7, alan r.]

Both philosophically and political this is a necessary and inspiring proposition.¶ Bennett is right to recognize that any future that we are to have must begin with a¶ reordering of our politics into a recognition of the ecological implication of humanity¶ and nature, of human and non-human bodies; our future must be materialist in this¶ sense. She also right in recognizing that this political reordering must itself arise with¶ refiguring of our ontological world, one which overcomes the privileged binaries of¶ subject-object, human-non-human. As we have seen, Bennett clearly sides with objects¶ as this overcoming. To this end, one of the founding gestures of her project is announced¶ in the Introduction as an “eliding” of the “rich and diverse literature on subjectivity and¶ its genesis” (ix). There are certainly good reasons for this, but in eliding the discourse on¶ subjectivity Bennett also abandons the rich and diverse analysis of power that has been¶ a part of that discourse. Again, there may be very good reasons for wanting to move¶ beyond power for political analysis, but in moving beyond power politics still requires an¶ analytic of becoming, one that can account for, as Rancière might say, the distribution of¶ what matters, of what comes to matter. The political public must be more than a field of¶ feeling, of becoming, even if that is an expansive feeling and becoming of the world, of¶ the human and non-human alike. A politics of the future which is a sustainable politics¶ must account not only for the force of life, of the vibrancy of matter, but the force of the¶ negative as well, the forces that demarcate the field of becoming into the possible and is a necessary step in developing a political ecology of this sustainable future, it remains¶ to be supplemented by a something that will allow us to intervene in the becoming of¶ what matters.

### AT We Engage in Resolution

#### Lol no

#### C) Echo Chamber DA - This rejection of structured clash makes debate into an echo chamber. This impoverishes their project even if it is right

Talisse 5

Professor of Philosophy @Vandy¶ Robert, Philosophy & Social Criticism, Deliberativist responses to activist challenges, 31(4) p. 429-431

The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. **The deliberativist view** I have sketched hold that reasonableness **involved some degree of** what we may call **epistemic modesty. On this** view, **the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons,** and so she enters into public discourse **as a way of testing her views against the objections** and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly hold that **her present view is open to reasonable critique** and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of **politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable**. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness **for the activist** consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action; **discussion with those who disagree need not be involved**. **According to the activist,** there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which **there is no room for reasoned objection.** Under such conditions, **the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational**. It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001A; ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political **activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies,** demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. Activists also must engage in deliberation among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movement must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tact’s; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. **Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists**. **Group polarization** is a well-documented phenomenon that **has ‘been found all over the world** and is many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81-2). Importantly, **in group that ‘engage in repeated discussions’** over time, **the polarization is even more pronounced** (2003: 86). Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of an individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.).17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that **he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees** in cases in which the requirement of justice are so clear that he can be confidents that has the truth .Group polarization suggest that even deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even we have the truth. **For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views,** but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth ,In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggest that a engagement with

### AT Backlash DA

#### Topical limits enable creativity. Beauty emerges from identifying constraints and working within them.

Flood 10

(Scott, BS in Communication and Theatre Arts – St. Joseph’s College, School Board Member – Plainfield Community School Corporation, and Advertising Agent, “Business Innovation – Real Creativity Happens Inside the Box”, http://ezinearticles.com/?Business-Innovation---Real-Creativity-Happens-Inside-the-Box&id=4793692)

It seems that we can accomplish anything if we're brave enough to step out of that bad, bad box, and **thinking "creatively" has come to be synonymous with ignoring rules** and constraints or pretending they just don't exist. **Nonsense.** Real creativity is put to the test within the box. In fact, that's where it really shines. It might surprise you, but **it's** actually **easier to think outside the box than within its confines**. How can that be? It's simple. When you're working **outside the box, you don't face rules**, or boundaries, or assumptions. You create your own as you go along. If you want to throw convention aside, you can do it. If you want to throw proven practices out the window, have at it. You have the freedom to create your own world. Now, I'm not saying there's anything wrong with thinking outside the box. At times, it's absolutely essential - such as when you're facing the biggest oil spill in history in an environment in which all the known approaches are failing. But most of us don't have the luxury of being able to operate outside the box. We've been shoved into reality, facing a variety of limitations, from budgets, to supervisors' opinions and prejudices, to the nature of the marketplace. Even though the box may have been given a bad name, it's where most of us have to spend our time. And no matter how much we may fret about those limits, inside that box is where we need to prove ourselves. If you'll pardon the inevitable sports analogy, **consider a baseball player who belts ball after ball** over 450 feet. **Unfortunately**, he has a wee problem: **he can't place those** hits **between the foul lines**, so they're harmful strikes instead of game-winning home runs. To the out-of-the-box advocates, he's a mighty slugger who deserves admiration, but **to his** teammates and the **fans, he's a loser** who just can't get on base. He may not like the fact that he has **to limit his hits** to **between the foul poles**, but that's one of the realities of the game he chose to play. The same is true of ideas and approaches. **The most** dazzling and **impressive tactic is essentially useless** if it doesn't offer a practical, realistic way to address the need or application. **Like the baseball player, we** may not like the realities, but we **have to operate within** their **limits**. Often, I've seen people blame the box for their inability or unwillingness to create something workable. For example, back in my ad agency days, I remember fellow writers and designers complaining about the limitations of projects. If it was a half-page ad, they didn't feel they could truly be creative unless the space was expanded to a full page. If they were given a full page, they demanded a spread. Handed a spread, they'd fret because it wasn't a TV commercial. If the project became a TV commercial with a $25,000 budget, they'd grouse about not having a $50,000 budget. Yet **the greatest artists** of all time **didn't complain about what they didn't have; they worked their magic using what they did. Monet captured** the grace and **beauty** of France astonishingly well **within the bounds of a canvas. Donatello exposed** the breathtaking **emotion** that lurked **within ordinary chunks of marble**. And **I doubt** that **Beethoven** ever **whined because there were only 88 keys on the piano**. Similarly, I've watched the best of my peers do amazing things in less-than-favorable circumstances. There were brilliant commercials developed with minimal budgets and hand-held cameras. Black-and-white ads that outperformed their colorful competitors. Simple postcards that grabbed the attention of (and business from) jaded consumers. You see, real creativity isn't hampered or blocked by limits. It actually flowers in response to challenges. Even though it may be forced to remain inside the box, it leverages everything it can find in that box and makes the most of every bit of it. **Real creativity is driven by a need to create. When Monet approached a** blank **canvas,** it's safe to say that **he didn't agonize over its size**. He wanted to capture something he'd seen and share how it looked through his eyes. The size of the canvas was incidental to his talent and desire. **Think about** the **Apollo 13** mission. **NASA** didn't have the luxury of flying supplies or extra tools to the crew. They **couldn't rewrite** the laws of **physics**. Plus, they faced a rapidly shrinking timeline, so their box kept getting smaller and less forgiving. And **yet they arrived upon a solution that was creative**; more important, that was successful. **The next time someone tells you** that **the** real **solution involves stepping outside the box, challenge him or her to think and work harder**. After all, **the best solution may** very well **be lurking in a corner of that familiar box**.

#### This is true, even if rules are artificial

Hough 11

(Karen, Founder and CEO – ImprovEdge, “Creative Constraint: Why Tighter Boundaries Propel Greater Results”, Mashable, 3-2, http://mashable.com/2011/03/02/creative-constraint-business/)

Where do great ideas come from? **Many** of us **imagine creativity comes from** an environment of **boundless possibility — no rules or restrictions**. We also have a stereotype of “creatives” — they work in studios rather than office buildings, wear jeans instead of suits and are filled with endless creative solutions. **But why should creativity be the province of a totally open environment** or a certain type of person? **We falsely think that if our world** or profession **is constrained, we cannot enjoy wild creativity. That isn’t the case**. Here are some examples and ways that you can make creative constraint work for you and your business. The Benefit of Boundaries It sounds counter-intuitive, but **boundaries** can **actually boost creativity**. Think about procrastination — deadlines are often the single factor that ensures projects get done. As Dave Gray commented on his blog, “**Creativity is driven by constraints. When we have limited resources — even when** the limits are **artificial — creative thinking is enhanced**. That’s because **the fewer resources you have, the more you are forced to rely on your ingenuity**.” When there are no boundaries, the possibilities may seem too large. That’s why some of **the greatest art** and innovation **has come from** a situation of **constraint. In** 19**70, Apollo 13 went on a lunar mission**. The launch was successful, but **a fault** from inside the space module **caused an explosion** that turned the exploration into a test for survival for the crew. Carbon dioxide exhaled by the astronauts began to build up in the module. On the ground, an engineering team had to figure out a way to clean the air with only the equipment on board and very little time. It was the **unbelievable constraints** and the pressure of lives at risk that **drove** them to **a** totally **unexpected solution**. They figured out a way for the command module’s square air cleaners to be used in the lunar module’s round receivers. Who says a square peg can’t fit in a round hole? Improvisation Improv provides a perfect template for creating more with less. Improvisational performers see a dearth of resources — like a script, props or costumes — as a golden opportunity rather than a problem. Good improvisation also follows unspoken rules: You must accept all contributions, you must justify anything that’s introduced on stage, and everyone must participate. Yet by adhering to these boundaries, improvisers know they can be wildly creative in all other ways. While “improv” seems to imply the absence of constraints, most scenes have to be based around suggestions from the audience. These constraints are what make improv both so enjoyable and so creative. In many instances, **boundaries are an unavoidable fabric of a person’s life**. A Newsweek article discussed the effects of hardship on children, and how it may have fueled their success as adults. “Highly creative adults frequently grew up with hardship. **Hardship** by itself doesn’t lead to creativity, but it **does force kids to become more flexible — and flexibility helps with creativity**.” Resiliency makes people less afraid of mistakes. Resilient people continue to try, fall down, stand up and try again. Each time they take a new tack, they try more and more unconventional possibilities. Boundaries don’t defeat them — **boundaries inspire** them **to keep trying other options**. Applying It to Your Business So how does this apply at work? My company once worked with the distribution leadership team of one of the largest retailers in the U.S. We were tasked to stretch the thinking, strategy and creativity of the group. We found that the executives could be lazy in their brainstorming. This was around 2003-04, and they had gigantic budgets, huge numbers of employees and seemingly endless resources. You would think that with that surplus, anything would be possible. On the contrary, they seemed to care very little for innovation, since the entire enterprise was fat and happy. In our practice exercises, we imposed ridiculous boundaries of time and money on them, and demanded high-level outcomes. For example, we asked them to light an entire warehouse with only one light bulb, $5 for supplies and two hours to work. Or we asked them to take a high school juvenile delinquent and make him/her able to run a new division of their company in 48 hours or less, with a $100 budget. I finally saw them lean in, work hard, and come up with a few really startling ideas — but only because they were forced to. When constraint becomes mandatory, we suddenly have to recalibrate how we work. The economic downturn has forced us to realize that business will never, ever be conducted in the same way. We have to be more innovative, leaner, faster and smarter. From this difficult time, companies have started collaborating with former competitors, created unforeseen relationships with their clients through social media and created products that are better, yet cheaper. They’ve discovered creative ways to address unexpected constraints. So **the next time a situation** just **seems** too hard, too locked down, and **surrounded by boundaries, think like an improviser. This could be your best opportunity for a creative solution**.

### AT Substantially = Essentially

#### It means at present time

Words and Phrases 64 (40W&P 759)

The words" outward, open, actual, visible, substantial, and exclusive," in connection with a change of possession, mean substantially the same thing. They mean not concealed; not hidden; exposed to view; free from concealment, dissimulation, reserve, or disguise; in full existence; denoting that which not merely can be, but is opposed to potential, apparent, constructive, and imaginary; veritable; genuine; certain: absolute: real at present time, as a matter of fact, not merely nominal; opposed to form; actually existing; true; not including, admitting, or pertaining to any others; undivided; sole; opposed to inclusive.

### AT Reasonability

#### Reasonability is impossible – it’s arbitrary and undermines research and preparation

Resnick ‘01

Resnick, assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University, ‘1¶ (Evan, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2)

In matters of national security, establishing **a clear definition of terms is a precondition** for effective policymaking. **Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk** alienating their constituencies. They also risk **exacerbating misperceptions** and hostility among those the policies target. **Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research**. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

## 1NR

#### Can’t find the document but I don’t think a card was read. The 1NR was the Aguilera CP and case

# Round 5 v Texas CM

## 1NC

### 1NC

#### 1. Interpretation: The role of the ballot is to determine if the enactment of a topical plan is better than the status quo or a competitive option. The 1ac must read and defend the implementation of such a topical plan.

#### 2. Violation:

#### A) “Resolved” implies a policy or legislative decision – means they must be resolved about a future federal government policy

Parcher 1

Jeff Parcher, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001 http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution.

#### B) USFG is the national government in DC

Encarta Online Encyclopedia, 2k

(http://encarta.msn.com)

“The federal government **of the U**nited **S**tates **is centered in** Washington **DC”**

#### C) Should means there is a practical reason for action

WordNet in ‘97

Princeton University, 1.6

**Should** v 1 : be expected to: “Parties should be fun” 2 : **expresses an** emotional**, practical,** or other **reason for doing something:** “You had better put on warm clothes”; “You should call your mother-in-law”; *“The State ought to repair bridges*”[syn**:** had better, ought]

#### 3. Vote Negative:

#### A) Decisionmaking - a limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to decision-making and advocacy skills

Steinberg & Freeley 8

\*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Specifically, decisionmaking skills based on specific energy policy proposals are key to motivate legislative fence-sitters – the aff’s strategy is doomed to the status quo

Brown 11

[heath, PhD Political Science, Roanoke, Salem, VA, “narrative strategies used by interest groups during the 2008 presidental transition”, 2011 Pat-Net Conference]

Milbrath argues that interest groups must strategically present information so as to ¶ overcome the “perceptual screen” that shields policy makers from absorbing endless amounts ¶ of information. He suggests that groups use facts (scientific information about policy ¶ outcomes), arguments (normative explanations of justness or rightness of action), and power¶ (typically subtle offers of political support or threats of political retribution) to communicate ¶ their interests and make their case for policy action (or inaction). In a more recent approach, ¶ Esterling (2007, p. 79) makes the case that groups can use [using] “instrumental” – “research or ¶ evidence-based causal” arguments -- or “normative” – “intrinsic desirability” arguments. By ¶ emphasizing one of these approaches, a group is tacitly communicating the way it wants to ¶ persuade the target of the information. By emphasizing power or normative arguments, the ¶ group implies that the policy maker should make decisions based primarily on their political ¶ judgment and political future. Conversely, by emphasizing facts-based or instrumental ¶ arguments, the group implies that the policy maker should base decisions primarily on rational ¶ or scientific considerations. In practice, it is difficult to disentangle these two types of ¶ arguments and many groups will likely combine various ways to present information (Wright ¶ 1996; Rochefort and Cobb 1994). The dichotomy though does help clarify the persuasive or ¶ argumentative tone of the information and advice given by groups to policy makers. 6 ¶ While public perceptions of interest groups might suggest crass self-interest, ¶ manipulation, and deception, groups have an incentive to be forthright in the information they ¶ provide and arguments they make. A group that provides shoddy statistics or misleading ¶ arguments will be discounted in future interactions with the policy maker (Kersh 2009; ¶ Easterling 2007). John E. Chubb (1983, p. 145) writes in regard to energy interest groups: ¶ “information and advice that are solely self-serving threaten the bond of trust that facilitates ¶ the informal play of influence.” In fact, rather than targeting political opponents or fence ¶ sitters, much research suggests that groups prefer or are invited to lobby friends and allies over ¶ adversaries (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999; Hall and Deardorff ¶ 2006; Bauer et al. 1963; Holyoke 2004; McCool 1990). If this is the case, the cost of ¶ misrepresenting or overstating information may be particularly high for those engaged in what ¶ Hall and Deardorff (2006) and others have called “legislative subsidy” (Hall and Deardorff 2006; ¶ Esterling 2007a). From this subsidy perspective, if a policy maker is sub-contracting information ¶ collection and analysis to an allied interest group, it behooves that group to be conscientious, ¶ thorough, and consistent in the information and advice it gives. And in many cases, as Wright ¶ (1996) contends, it is relatively easy for policy makers to check the authenticity of the ¶ information provided to them, sometimes simply through the contradictory information ¶ provided by other groups, thereby curtailing the inclination to blatantly misrepresent the truth. ¶ Furthermore, experimental research shows that factual or instrumental information is ¶ preferred by legislative staff (LaPira 2008) and neutral expert lobbyists have more legislative ¶ access than non-experts (Esterling 2007b). Facts may be useful on their own terms in ¶ formulating legislative decisions but scientific or statistically based arguments also serve as a 7 ¶ cue for policy makers to determine the credibility or reliability of the advice they are given ¶ (Sabatier 1978). ¶ Rather than convince those already in agreement, the approach taken by proactive ¶ theorists suggests that groups seek to convince legislative fence sitters or opponents to adopt ¶ the group’s position, advocate the group’s interests, or simply vote in the group’s way through ¶ the offer of, or refusal to give, political support (Smith 1984; Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; ¶ Wright 1996). Wright (1990) for one finds that groups which distribute campaign contributions ¶ to a wide group of legislators are then able to access a wider group, rather than just political ¶ allies (Wright 1990). Similarly, Heberling (2005) shows that one group, the AFL-CIO, seeks out ¶ legislators with unknown political preferences rather than targeting political allies (Heberling ¶ 2005). The field of interest group research has not yet resolved whether groups typically lobby ¶ friends, adversaries, or some combination of the two (Leech and Baumgartner 1998). This is ¶ likely due to the wide variation of group types and also policy domains in which groups operate. ¶ These inter-organizational and inter-policy differences affect the strategies employed and ¶ therefore the content of information presented during lobbying.

#### Switch-side is key to making those decisionmaking skills effective – EPA debates prove

Mitchell 10

(Gordon R., Associate Professor, Director of Graduate Studies, and Director of the William Pitt Debating Union at the University of Pittsburgh; Spring, “Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 1 – Kurr)

The preceding analysis of U.S. intelligence community debating initiatives highlighted how analysts are challenged to navigate discursively the heteroglossia of vast amounts of different kinds of data flowing through intelligence streams. Public policy planners are tested in like manner when they attempt to stitch together institutional arguments from various and sundry inputs ranging from expert testimony, to historical precedent, to public comment. Just as intelligence managers find that algorithmic, formal methods of analysis often don't work when it comes to the task of interpreting and synthesizing copious amounts of disparate data, public-policy planners encounter similar challenges. In fact, the argumentative turn in public-policy planning elaborates an approach to public-policy analysis that foregrounds deliberative interchange and critical thinking as alternatives to "decisionism," the formulaic application of "objective" decision algorithms to the public policy process. Stating the matter plainly, Majone suggests, "whether in written or oral form, argument is central in all stages of the policy process." Accordingly, he notes, "we miss a great deal if we try to understand policy-making solely in terms of power, influence, and bargaining, to the exclusion of debate and argument."51 One can see similar rationales driving Goodwin and Davis's EPA debating project, where debaters are invited to conduct on-site public debates covering resolutions crafted to reflect key points of stasis in the EPA decision-making process. For example, in the 2008 Water Wars debates held at EPA headquarters in Washington, D.C., resolutions were crafted to focus attention on the topic of water pollution, with one resolution focusing on downstream states' authority to control upstream states' discharges and sources of pollutants, and a second resolution exploring the policy merits of bottled water and toilet paper taxes as revenue sources to fund water infrastructure projects. In the first debate on interstate river pollution, the team of Seth Gannon and Seungwon Chung from Wake Forest University argued in favor of downstream state control, with the Michigan State University team of Carly Wunderlich and Garrett Abelkop providing opposition. In the second debate on taxation policy, Kevin Kallmyer and Matthew Struth from University of Mary Washington defended taxes on bottled water and toilet paper, while their opponents from Howard University, Dominique Scott and Jarred McKee, argued against this proposal. Reflecting on the project, Goodwin noted how the intercollegiate [End Page 106] debaters' ability to act as "honest brokers" in the policy arguments contributed positively to internal EPA deliberation on both issues.52 Davis observed that since the invited debaters "didn't have a dog in the fight," they were able to give voice to previously buried arguments that some EPA subject matter experts felt reticent to elucidate because of their institutional affiliations.53 Such findings are consistent with the views of policy analysts advocating the argumentative turn in policy planning. As Majone claims, "Dialectical confrontation between generalists and experts often succeeds in bringing out unstated assumptions, conflicting interpretations of the facts, and the risks posed by new projects."54 Frank Fischer goes even further in this context, explicitly appropriating rhetorical scholar Charles Willard's concept of argumentative "epistemics" to flesh out his vision for policy studies: Uncovering the epistemic dynamics of public controversies would allow for a more enlightened understanding of what is at stake in a particular dispute, making possible a sophisticated evaluation of the various viewpoints and merits of different policy options. In so doing, the differing, often tacitly held contextual perspectives and values could be juxtaposed; the viewpoints and demands of experts, special interest groups, and the wider public could be directly compared; and the dynamics among the participants could be scrutizined. This would by no means sideline or even exclude scientific assessment; it would only situate it within the framework of a more comprehensive evaluation.55 As Davis notes, institutional constraints present within the EPA communicative milieu can complicate efforts to provide a full airing of all relevant arguments pertaining to a given regulatory issue. Thus, intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might otherwise remain sedimented in the policy process. The dynamics entailed in this symbiotic relationship are underscored by deliberative planner John Forester, who observes, "If planners and public administrators are to make democratic political debate and argument possible, they will need strategically located allies to avoid being fully thwarted by the characteristic self-protecting behaviors of the planning organizations and bureaucracies within which they work."56 Here, an institution's need for "strategically located allies" to support deliberative practice constitutes the demand for rhetorically informed expertise, setting up what can be considered a demand-driven rhetoric of science. As an instance of rhetoric of science scholarship, this type of "switch-side public [End Page 107] debate"57 differs both from insular contest tournament debating, where the main focus is on the pedagogical benefit for student participants, and first-generation rhetoric of science scholarship, where critics concentrated on unmasking the rhetoricity of scientific artifacts circulating in what many perceived to be purely technical spheres of knowledge production.58 As a form of demand-driven rhetoric of science, switch-side debating connects directly with the communication field's performative tradition of argumentative engagement in public controversy—a different route of theoretical grounding than rhetorical criticism's tendency to locate its foundations in the English field's tradition of literary criticism and textual analysis.59 Given this genealogy, it is not surprising to learn how Davis's response to the EPA's institutional need for rhetorical expertise took the form of a public debate proposal, shaped by Davis's dual background as a practitioner and historian of intercollegiate debate. Davis competed as an undergraduate policy debater for Howard University in the 1970s, and then went on to enjoy substantial success as coach of the Howard team in the new millennium. In an essay reviewing the broad sweep of debating history, Davis notes, "Academic debate began at least 2,400 years ago when the scholar Protagoras of Abdera (481–411 BC), known as the father of debate, conducted debates among his students in Athens."60 As John Poulakos points out, "older" Sophists such as Protagoras taught Greek students the value of dissoi logoi, or pulling apart complex questions by debating two sides of an issue.61 The few surviving fragments of Protagoras's work suggest that his notion of dissoi logoi stood for the principle that "two accounts [logoi] are present about every 'thing,' opposed to each other," and further, that humans could "measure" the relative soundness of knowledge claims by engaging in give-and-take where parties would make the "weaker argument stronger" to activate the generative aspect of rhetorical practice, a key element of the Sophistical tradition.62 Following in Protagoras's wake, Isocrates would complement this centrifugal push with the pull of synerchésthé, a centripetal exercise of "coming together" deliberatively to listen, respond, and form common social bonds.63 Isocrates incorporated Protagorean dissoi logoi into synerchésthé, a broader concept that he used flexibly to express interlocking senses of (1) inquiry, as in groups convening to search for answers to common questions through discussion;64 (2) deliberation, with interlocutors gathering in a political setting to deliberate about proposed courses of action;65 and (3) alliance formation, a form of collective action typical at festivals,66 or in the exchange of pledges that deepen social ties.67 [End Page 108] Returning once again to the Kettering-informed sharp distinction between debate and deliberation, one sees in Isocratic synerchésthé, as well as in the EPA debating initiative, a fusion of debate with deliberative functions. Echoing a theme raised in this essay's earlier discussion of intelligence tradecraft, such a fusion troubles categorical attempts to classify debate and deliberation as fundamentally opposed activities. The significance of such a finding is amplified by the frequency of attempts in the deliberative democracy literature to insist on the theoretical bifurcation of debate and deliberation as an article of theoretical faith. Tandem analysis of the EPA and intelligence community debating initiatives also brings to light dimensions of contrast at the third level of Isocratic synerchésthé, alliance formation. The intelligence community's Analytic Outreach initiative invites largely one-way communication flowing from outside experts into the black box of classified intelligence analysis. On the contrary, the EPA debating program gestures toward a more expansive project of deliberative alliance building. In this vein, Howard University's participation in the 2008 EPA Water Wars debates can be seen as the harbinger of a trend by historically black colleges and universities (HBCUS) to catalyze their debate programs in a strategy that evinces Davis's dual-focus vision. On the one hand, Davis aims to recuperate Wiley College's tradition of competitive excellence in intercollegiate debate, depicted so powerfully in the feature film The Great Debaters, by starting a wave of new debate programs housed in HBCUS across the nation.68 On the other hand, Davis sees potential for these new programs to complement their competitive debate programming with participation in the EPA's public debating initiative. This dual-focus vision recalls Douglas Ehninger's and Wayne Brockriede's vision of "total" debate programs that blend switch-side intercollegiate tournament debating with forms of public debate designed to contribute to wider communities beyond the tournament setting.69 Whereas the political telos animating Davis's dual-focus vision certainly embraces background assumptions that Greene and Hicks would find disconcerting—notions of liberal political agency, the idea of debate using "words as weapons"70—there is little doubt that the project of pursuing environmental protection by tapping the creative energy of HBCU-leveraged dissoi logoi differs significantly from the intelligence community's effort to improve its tradecraft through online digital debate programming. Such difference is especially evident in light of the EPA's commitment to extend debates to public realms, with the attendant possible benefits unpacked by Jane Munksgaard and Damien Pfister: [End Page 109] Having a public debater argue against their convictions, or confess their indecision on a subject and subsequent embrace of argument as a way to seek clarity, could shake up the prevailing view of debate as a war of words. Public uptake of the possibility of switch-sides debate may help lessen the polarization of issues inherent in prevailing debate formats because students are no longer seen as wedded to their arguments. This could transform public debate from a tussle between advocates, with each public debater trying to convince the audience in a Manichean struggle about the truth of their side, to a more inviting exchange focused on the content of the other's argumentation and the process of deliberative exchange.71 Reflection on the EPA debating initiative reveals a striking convergence among (1) the expressed need for dissoi logoi by government agency officials wrestling with the challenges of inverted rhetorical situations, (2) theoretical claims by scholars regarding the centrality of argumentation in the public policy process, and (3) the practical wherewithal of intercollegiate debaters to tailor public switch-side debating performances in specific ways requested by agency collaborators. These points of convergence both underscore previously articulated theoretical assertions regarding the relationship of debate to deliberation, as well as deepen understanding of the political role of deliberation in institutional decision making. But they also suggest how decisions by rhetorical scholars about whether to contribute switch-side debating acumen to meet demand-driven rhetoric of science initiatives ought to involve careful reflection. Such an approach mirrors the way policy planning in the "argumentative turn" is designed to respond to the weaknesses of formal, decisionistic paradigms of policy planning with situated, contingent judgments informed by reflective deliberation.

#### B) Dialogue - Predictable points of stasis are key – effective deliberation is critical to preventing mass violence as it overcomes politically debilitating self-obsession

Roberts-Miller 03

(Patricia Roberts-Miller is Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Texas "Fighting Without Hatred: Hannah Arendt’s Agonistic Rhetoric" JAC 22.2 2003)

Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into solipsistic and unreflective behavior. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58) What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with disastrous consequences, both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody. It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems, Arendt's solution is the playful and competitive space of agonism; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the assumption of competition, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, of one's thought. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives. Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it. The situation is agonistic not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference. This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity. Continued… Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, especially not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsibility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87). Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes, Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social. Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies. Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38). By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed. Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259). Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238). The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking. Arendt's Polemical Agonism As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. Persuasive agonism still values conflict, disagreement, and equality among interlocutors, but it has the goal of reaching agreement, as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added). Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it. In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it is how one tests the validity of one's thought. In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy. Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point: You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42) Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03). In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes. This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate. Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263). Like other proponents of agonism, Arendt argues that rhetoric does not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth; it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered. Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242). Agonism demands that one simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions, rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think. The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324). Yet, there are important positive political consequences of agonism. Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how the system could be actively moral. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the evil of conformity—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state makes possible extraordinary evil carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill undermines the political force of conformity, so it is a force against the bureaucratizing of evil. If people think for themselves, they will resist dogma; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, they will resist totalitarianism. And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action. In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere. On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric.

### 1NC- DISAD

#### Picking winners bad—distorts the market, causes trade-offs and deters private capital

Veronique de Rugy 6/19/2012 (Senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center, "Assessing the Department of Energy Loan Guarantee Program" mercatus.org/publication/assessing-department-energy-loan-guarantee-program)

This government involvement can *distort the market signals further*. For instance, the data shows that private investors tend to congregate toward government guarantee projects, independently of the merits of the projects, *taking capital away from unsubsidized projects that have a better probability of success* without subsidy and a more viable business plan. As the Government Accountability Office noted, “Guarantees would make projects [the federal government] assists financially more attractive to private capital than conservation projects not backed by federal guarantees. Thus both its loans and its guarantees will *siphon private capital away*.”[25] This reallocation of resources by private investors away from viable projects may even *take place within the same industry—that is, one green energy project might trade off with another, more viable green energy project.* More importantly, once the government subsidizes a portion of the market, the object of the subsidy becomes a safe asset. Safety in the market, however, often means low return on investments, which is likely to *turn venture capitalists away*. As a result, *capital investments will likely dry out and innovation rates will go down*.[26] In fact, the data show that in cases in which the federal government introduced few distortions, private investors were *more than happy to take risks and invest* their money even in projects that required high initial capital requirements. The Alaska pipeline project, for instance, was privately financed at the cost of $35 billion, making it one of the most expensive energy projects undertaken by private enterprise.[27] The project was ultimately abandoned in 2011 because of weak customer demand and the development of shale gas resources outside Alaska.28 However, this proves that the private sector invests money even when there is a chance that it could lose it. Private investment in U.S. clean energy totaled $34 billion in 2010, up 51 percent from the previous year.[29] Finally, when the government *picks winners and losers in the form of a technology or a company, it often fails*. First, the government does not have perfect or even better information or technology advantage over private agents. In addition, *decision-makers are insulated from market signals* and won’t learn important and necessary lessons about the technology or what customers want. Second, the resources that the government offers are so addictive that companies may *reorient themselves away from producing what customers want, toward pleasing the government officials*.

#### Causes crowd-out—decreases domestic investments and innovations

Veronique de Rugy 6/19/2012 (Senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center, "Assessing the Department of Energy Loan Guarantee Program" mercatus.org/publication/assessing-department-energy-loan-guarantee-program

4. *Crowding Out* To some (for example, those lucky enough to receive the loan guarantee), government money may seem to be free. But it isn’t, of course. The government has to borrow the money on the open market too. This additional borrowing comes from Americans’ savings, as does the money that Americans invest in the private sector’s growth. There comes a point when there just *aren’t enough savings to satisfy both masters*. In other words, when government runs a deficit to finance its preferred projects, it can affect private sector access to capital, and *lead to a reduction in domestic investment*. Economists use the term “crowding out” to describe the contraction in economic activity associated with deficit- financed spending.[30] In addition, the competition between public and private borrowing *raises interest rates for all borrowers*, including the government, making it *more expensive for domestic investors to start or complete projects*. Over time, this could mean that American companies will build fewer factories, cut back on research and development, and *generate fewer innovations*. As a result, our nation’s future earning prospects will dim, and our future living standards could suffer.

### 1NC- K

#### Objectification of nature is not the problem – it is rather the liberation of nature, its becoming subject in the name of maximum transparency which brings about the ultimate danger for all – nature doesn’t want subjectivity anyway.

**Baudrillard 2007** (Jean, “Darwin’s Artificial Ancestors and the Terroristic Dream of the Transparency of the Good.” The International Journal of Baudrillard Studies 2007)

All this has been brought about by the highly dubious way in which the concept of nature has evolved. What was initially matter became energy. The modern discovery of nature consists in its liberation as energy and in a mechanical transformation of the world. After having first been matter, and then energy, nature is today becoming **an interactive subject**. It is ceasing to be an object, but this is bringing it all the more surely into the circuit of subjection. A dramatic paradox, and one which also affects human beings: we are much more compromised when we cease to be objects and become subjects. This is a trick that was pulled on us long ago in the name of absolute liberation. Let's not pull the same one on nature. For the **ultimate danger** is that, in an interactivity built up into a total system of communication, there is no other; there are only subjects – and, very soon, only subjects without objects. All **our problems today as civilized beings originate here:** **not in an excess of alienation, but a disappearance of alienation** in favour of a maximum transparency between subjects. An unbearable situation, all the more so for the fact that, in foisting on nature the status of a subject in law, we are also foisting on it all the vices of subjectivity, decking it out, in our own image, with a bad conscience, with nostalgia (for a lost object which, in this case, can only be us), with a range of drives ­in particular, an impulse for revenge. The “balance” we hear so much of in ecology (“out of balance”) is not so much that of planetary resources and their exploitation as the metaphysical one between subject and object. Now, that metaphysical subject/object balance is being upset and the subject, armed as he is with all the technologies of advanced communication (technologies on whose horizon the object has disappeared), is the beneficiary. **Once that balance is disrupted, it inevitably sparks violent reactions on the part of the object.** Just as individuals counter the transparency and virtual responsibility inflicted on them as subjects with unexplainable acts, acts of resistance, failure, delinquency and collective disorder, so nature counters this enforced promotion, this consensual, communicational black­mail, with various forms of behaviour that are radically other, **such as catastrophes, upheavals, earthquakes and chaos**. It would seem that nature does not really feel a sense of responsibility for itself, nor does it react to our efforts to give it one. We are, admittedly, indulging in a (bad) ecological conscience and attempting, by this moral violence, to stave off possible violence on nature's part. But if,. Contrary to the underlying Rousseauist ideology, which argues that the profound nature of the liberated subject can only by offering it the status of subject, we are handing it the same poisoned chalice as we gave to the decolonized nations, we ought not to be surprised if it behaves irrationally merely so as to assert itself as suchbe good and that nature itself, once emancipated, cannot but be endowed with natural equilibrium and all the ecological virtues, there is nothing more ambiguous or perverse than a subject. Now, nature is also germs, viruses, chaos, bacteria and scorpions, significantly eliminated from Biosphere 2 as though they were not meant to exist. Where are the deadly little scorpions, so beautiful and so translucent, which one sees in the Desert Museum not far away, scorpions whose magical sting certainly performs a higher, invisible – but necessary – function within our Biosphere 1: the incarnation of evil, of the venomous evil of chance, the mortal innocence of desire (the desire for death) in the equilibrium of living beings?

**THEIR GLORIFIED EXTENSION OF THE “INTRINSIC VALUE” OF ALL ORGANIC MATERIAL IS NOT A PROGRESSIVE EXTENSION OF CONCERN BUT MERELY SUSTAINS ENLIGHTENMENT HUMANISM; TURNS THE CASE.**

Garforth 2006

(Lisa Garforth, “Ideal Nature: Utopias of Landscape and Loss”, Spaces of Utopia: An Electronic Journal, nr. 3, Autumn/Winter 2006, pp. 5-26 <http://ler.letras.up.pt > ISSN 1646-4729.)

This situation produces debased or corrupted ecotopias whereby hyperreal or idealised representations of nature mask its disappearance outside the realm of simulation. The focus of Baudrillard’s scorn is Biosphere II’s microcosmic replication of global ecosystems in Arizona, USA – part scientific experiment, part tourist spectacle (Baudrillard 1994; Clark 1997). For Baudrillard, it represents above all the paucity of visions of the good life available in postmodernity, a testament to our desperate attempts to guarantee mere survival: [t]he real planet, presumed condemned, is sacrificed in advance to its miniaturized, air- conditioned clone (…) which is designed to vanquish death by total simulation (…) Must this be our only hope? Having lost our metaphysical utopias, do we have to build this prophylactic one? (Baudrillard 1994: 87) **The nature ideals enshrined in environmentalist discourse** represent yet more **death knells**. **“Ecology”**, Baudrillard explains, brings nature entirely into the realm of culture and meaning and in doing so **constitutes it as a subject**, granting it **rights** and **intrinsic value** in an extension of **Enlightenment** **humanism**. This process is essential to radical ecology’s visions of ecological integrity and human self-realisation. For Baudrillard, though, making nature a subject simply inscribes it in the hysterical sign-economy of the hyperreal, abandoning it to the logics of spectacle and virtuality. Thus Bartram and Shobrook argue that “eco-utopian” experiences like the Eden Project in Cornwall, England, confirm nature’s irrevocable loss and our desire for temporary refuge from anxieties over the environment’s vulnerability to human use and abuse. Perfected nature simulations are **not testaments to our capacity to care** for and conserve nature but nostalgic or **redemptive illusions of “forestalling the end through endless duplications of nature”** (Bartram / Shobrook 2000: 371). What separates these arguments about nature’s disappearance in the explosion of simulation from Cronon’s account of discursive construction is their relentless anti-foundationalism, from which **no utopian alternative or critique is possible** that has not always already been recuperated, whether rooted in nature itself or in the subversion of binary oppositions that are no longer available. All ecotopian representations are **prophylactic resolutions** of real problems gone too far to address; all utopian desire is channelled into the anxious, excessive production of endlessly circulating simulacra that merely **confirm the end of nature they are supposed to deny**. Nature cannot find or guarantee an emancipatory or oppositional ecotopian vision; nor does the prospect of a democratic green utopia of explicit values invested in environmental and social justice have currency in the face of an economy of simulation or hyperreality. The environmental crisis itself becomes discursive and depoliticised, another round of hysteria about the loss of the real.

**OUR ALTERNATIVE IS TO RENOUNCE THE AFFIRMATIVE. THIS RESITUATES OUR RELATIONSHIP TO NATURE AND THE NON-HUMAN OUTSIDE THE CONTEXT OF RECONCILABILITY, WITHIN THE REALM OF THE IRREDEEMABLE OBJECTS.**

**Baudrillard 1993** (Jean, The Transparency of evil: essays on extreme phenomena / Jean Baudrillard; translated by James Benedict. London: New York: Verso, 1993 Pages 146-148)

The very scale of the efforts made to exterminate the Other is testimony to the Other’s indestructibility, and by extension to the indestructible totality of Otherness.

 Such is the power of this idea. And such is the power of the facts. Radical otherness survives everything: conquest, racism, extermination, the virus of difference, the psychodrama of alienation. On the one hand, the Other is always-already dead; on the other hand, the Other is indestructible.

 This is the Great Game.

The ultimate inscrutability of beings, as of peoples.

 Segalen: ‘The inscrutability of races, which is merely the extension to races of the inscrutability of individuals.’

The survival of exoticism depends entirely on the impossibility of encounter, fusion and the exchange of differences. Fortunately, all this is an illusion – the illusion of subjectivity itself.

All that endures is the foreignness of the foreigner, the irredeemably of the object. The irredeemability of the object: ‘The essential exoticism is that which the Object has for the Subject.’ Exoticism as the fundamental law of the intensity of sensations, of the exaltation of the senses, and thus of living itself…

### 1NC- JPIC

#### We affirm the entirety of the 1AC except for their use of the phrase “the world doesn’t end with a bang but a whimper”; this phrase is environmental apocalypticism, and turns back the case; the world won’t end with a whimper

Schwei 98

[David, PhD, Professor of Classics @ McKinnen U, [http://www.luc.edu/faculty/dschwei/ecology.pdf,mg](http://www.luc.edu/faculty/dschwei/ecology.pdf%2Cmg)]

Is the world truly headed toward a whimpering finale? In an important sense the answer is¶ no. Neither the physical world nor the human species is going to come to a whimpering end¶ anytime soon. Ecological degradation is not going to extinguish humankind--as a nuclear war¶ between the United States and the Soviet Union might have done. Our species, in overexploiting¶ its resources and soiling its nest, is not going to render the planet unlivable. Climate change,¶ increasing incidents of environmental diseases, declining food and water supplies may cause¶ massive amounts of human suffering, but none of these factors threatens the species with¶ extinction. Billions may die prematurely (even more than now) and billions more may find their¶ quality of life deteriorate (even more than now), but billions will adapt and survive. We should be¶ wary of ecological "doomsdayism," which is the flip side of environmental classlessness.

**1NC- JPIC 2**

#### TEXT – WE AFFIRM THE ENTIRETY OF THE 1AC WITHOUT THE USE OF THE WORD ENVIRONMENTAL –

#### IT HAS BECOME MEANINGLESS JARGON AND IT REPEATS THE GUESTURE OF THE AFF HARMS – TURNS THE CASE.

**Fawcett, 2005** Lessa, prof @ York University, PHD PhD Biology: Human Ecology *from York University, “*Bioregional Teaching: How to Climb, Eat, Fall, and learn from Porcupines”, in Teaching as Activism: Equity Meets Environmentalism, p. 273, 2005

Natural history skills and knowledge will not be enough. I concur with Heshusius (1994) who states that educational **researchers should describe their work in ethical and participatory terms**, not just methodological ones. Natural history knowledge integrated with a biocentric ethics is needed. **I purposefully use the term biocentric** ethics **as opposed to environmental** ethics **because** I fear that **the word environment is losing meaning. Environment has become one of those** Uwe Porksen **plastic words “that has been used in science, given authority by virtue of its use there, and then relocated back into the vernacular, where it sounds important but doesn't** really **mean anything**." (Evernden 1992, 115). joy Williams, in IU Nature, writes expressively about how tiring the word environment has become. **Such a bloodless word. A flat-footed word with a shrunken heart. A word increasingly disengaged from its association with the natural world**. Urban planners, industrialists, economists, developers use it. **It’s a lost word, really. A cold word, mechanistic, suited strangely to the coldness generally felt towards Nature. lt's their word now. You don't mind giving it up.** (2001, 5) **It is time to return to the living and leave the cold, deadened words like environment behind** for a while. **Biocentric ethics is centred on the bios and all of its members; it signifies the living and their needs, desires, and gifts to one another**. Many **ecological feminist** scholars have **analyze**d the multiple oppressions acting in Western culture **(racism, sexism, homophobia, classism, able-bodied bias), and have enlarged our knowledge by including “speciesism" as one of the interlocking oppressions that hold larger systems in place** (Haraway 1991;

### Counterplan

#### Text- The United States federal government Should Substantially Increase Financial Incentives for Energy Production.

**Counterplan competes- it doesn’t capitalize the term “federal government”**

**Capitalizing the term “federal government” creates tacit acceptance of state power**

**Lock 02**

[Neil, “State Your Terms!”]

In English, **capital letters are not normally used for nouns,** except for proper names and for the first word of a sentence. **However, it is conventional to use capital letters for the names of establishment institutions** and personages. **Examples of such** words **are government**, king, parliament, president, **state**, church, pope. **To dignify these words with capital letters** – Government, President, State, Church, for example – **gives to the** **reader** an almost **subliminal message of power**, respect **and** even **reverence**. But, as historians and lovers of freedom know, many of **these organisations** and individuals **have shown**, by their actions, **that they are not** **worthy of** any **such** respect or reverence.

**And capitalization empowers state bureaucracy**

**Parkinson 03**

[Rob Parkinson has 35 years of experience in management communications — gained as a consultant, an instructor, a manager, an editor and a writer in both government and the private sector. He has specialized in briefings for senior executives for 15 years, including six years as the editor for the Deputy Minister of Natural Resources, Government of Canada. In that capacity, he designed departmental standards for executive documents that brought about dramatic improvements in the quality of briefing material prepared for the Minister and the Deputy Minister. M.B.A from the University of Ottowa. “Writing for Results”]

We often overuse capitals — sometimes out of fear of offending important people, sometimes to show that a certain word is important to us. However, **overuse of capitals, particularly when addressing outside readers, can convey the image of a bureaucracy that is overawed by its own concepts and processes.**

**STRONG STATE BUREAUCRACY MAKES GENOCIDE AND WAR INEVITABLE**

**Martin 90**

[Brian Martin, associate professor in [Science, Technology and Society](http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/ssmac/sts/index.html) at the University of Wollongong, UPROOTING THE WAR SYSTEM,, <http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/90uw/uw07.html>)]

Is the state system really so bad? War is the most obvious indictment of the system, and this alone should be enough to justify questioning the state. As wars have become more destructive, there is no sign that any steps to re-examine or transform the state system are being taken by state elites. This should not be surprising. War is not simply a by-product of the state system, to be moderated and regulated when it becomes too dangerous to populations. Rather, **war is part and parcel of the state system**, so the destructiveness of war makes little difference. State elites (and many others) see the world as a state-structured world, and all action is premised on this perspective. **War is the external manifestation of state violence. Political repression is its internal form.** Political freedoms are not only at a premium under military dictatorships and state socialism, but are also precarious in the representative democracies, especially in relation to 'national security.' One of the most telling indictments of **the state system** is found in Leo Kuper's book *Genocide*. Kuper **documents the most horrific exterminations in this century, including the killing of the Jews by the Nazis, the massacre of the Bangladeshis by the Pakistan army** in 1971 **and the extermination in Cambodia** beginning in 1975. What is damning of the state system is **the reluctance of governments** (and of that assemblage of state actors, the United Nations) **to intervene against** even the most well documented **genocidal killing. The reason** for this reluctance **is** the concern for the autonomy of the state. In short, **maintaining the 'integrity' of the state system** is more important for state elites than intervening against genocide. There are many other social problems caused, sustained or aggravated by the state, including suppression of dissent, state support for corporate elites, and the activities of spy agencies and secret police. These problems stem essentially from the system of unequal power and privilege which the state both is part of and sustains. The state is not the only way to embody and sustain unequal power and privilege: it is a particular way involving bureaucracies for administration and military forces for defending against external and internal enemies.

### Case

#### And THEIR ARGUMENTATIVE EXCHANGE INTENDING TO PROVE THE VALIDITY OF THEIR SPEECH ACT IS A PERFORMATIVE CONTRADICTION TO THEIR NOTION OF NON-HUMAN AGENCY. THEIR PHILOSOPHY SUPPORTS A REACTIVELY NIHILISTIC AND NEOCONSERVATIVE POLITICAL BACKLASH MORE POWERFUL AND PERSUASIVE THAN THE AFF.

Berry 2012 (David M, Senior Lecturer in Digital Media, “The Uses of Object Oriented Ontology” <http://stunlaw.blogspot.com/2012/05/uses-of-object-oriented-ontology.html>

Indeed, if we were to take this claim seriously then one would be driven to wonder why Bogost is writing his book at all, but of course, “musket buckshot and gypsum and space shuttles” cannot be the addressees of this text as patently they do not read. So object-oriented ontology (OOO) is trying to do two things here, on the one hand deny the specialness of humans’ existence in relation to other objects, whilst simultaneously having to write for them and to make arguments supporting their claims – thereby acknowledging the very special existence that humans possess, namely qualities of understanding, taking a stand on their own being, etc. This is a classic performative contradiction. Whilst it would be perfectly legitimate to outline a formalist theory or methodological position that, for the sake of the approach, limits the requirement to treat human actors as particular or special in relation to others (this is the methodological innovation within Actor-Network Theory), it is quite another to then extend this claim into a philosophical system which is part of a special order of discourse particular to human beings, that is, philosophy. This so-called philosophical non-human turn, is interesting for its nihilistic and conservative implications, something we now turn to in detail.

## 2NC

### AT We Meet

#### USFG is 3 branches in DC, not oil

Babylon.com, ‘7

(http://www.babylon.com/definition/United\_States\_federal\_government/English)

This article describes the government of the United States. For other issues, see Politics of the United States. The federal government of the United States is the United States governmental body that carries out the roles assigned to the federation of individual states established by the Constitution. The federal government has three branches: the executive, legislative, and judicial.

### AT Rob = Oil as an actor

#### THEIR VIBRANT POLITICS IS INSUFFICIENT – IT MUST BE SUPPLEMENTED BY A POLITICAL METHOD WHICH ALLOWS COLLECTIVE PARTICIPATION AND REFUTATION OF EXPECTED POLITICAL FUTURES I.E. DISCUSSIONS ORIENTED AROUND A PLAN OF FUTURE ACTION TO PHYSICALLY INTERACT WITH MATTER. FRAMEWORK IS A PRE-REQ TO EVALUATING THEIR THEORY OF AGENCY, NOT THE OTHER WAY AROUND.

Wyk 2k12

[review of bennett’s vibrant matter, cosmos and history, 8, no 2, 136-7, alan r.]

Both philosophically and political this is a necessary and inspiring proposition.¶ Bennett is right to recognize that any future that we are to have must begin with a¶ reordering of our politics into a recognition of the ecological implication of humanity¶ and nature, of human and non-human bodies; our future must be materialist in this¶ sense. She also right in recognizing that this political reordering must itself arise with¶ refiguring of our ontological world, one which overcomes the privileged binaries of¶ subject-object, human-non-human. As we have seen, Bennett clearly sides with objects¶ as this overcoming. To this end, one of the founding gestures of her project is announced¶ in the Introduction as an “eliding” of the “rich and diverse literature on subjectivity and¶ its genesis” (ix). There are certainly good reasons for this, but in eliding the discourse on¶ subjectivity Bennett also abandons the rich and diverse analysis of power that has been¶ a part of that discourse. Again, there may be very good reasons for wanting to move¶ beyond power for political analysis, but in moving beyond power politics still requires an¶ analytic of becoming, one that can account for, as Rancière might say, the distribution of¶ what matters, of what comes to matter. The political public must be more than a field of¶ feeling, of becoming, even if that is an expansive feeling and becoming of the world, of¶ the human and non-human alike. A politics of the future which is a sustainable politics¶ must account not only for the force of life, of the vibrancy of matter, but the force of the¶ negative as well, the forces that demarcate the field of becoming into the possible and is a necessary step in developing a political ecology of this sustainable future, it remains¶ to be supplemented by a something that will allow us to intervene in the becoming of¶ what matters.

### AT Words = No Meaning

#### Dialogic meaning is still SOCIALLY grounded and thus FIXED

Lähteenmäki 4

Senior Researcher at University of Jyväskylä¶ [http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/140391690X%20-%20-%20Bakhtinian%20Perspectives%20on%20Language%20and%20Culture~%20Meaning%20in%20Language,%20Art%20and%20New%20.pdf](http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/140391690X%20-%20-%20Bakhtinian%20Perspectives%20on%20Language%20and%20Culture~%20Meaning%20in%20Language%2C%20Art%20and%20New%20.pdf)¶ Mika Lähteenmäki works as an Academy of Finland Postdoctoral¶ Researcher in the Department of Languages at the University of¶ Jyväskylä, Finland. His current research interests include the exegesis of¶ Bakhtin’s and Voloshinov’s works on language. He has written several¶ articles on the linguistic aspects of the works of Bakhtin and Voloshinov.

 As the dialogical notion of meaning potential differs radically from the notion of literal meaning, it goes without saying that from the traditional, monologistic point of view **the notion of meaning potential may seem theoretically awkward**. **If meanings are not absolute**, invariant and identical for all the speakers, **it may seem that there is no way to make sense of the world** around us. The indeterminacy of meanings seems to lead to a situation in which there are as many possible meanings as there are situations. In other words, if one is not ready to accept the notion of literal meaning according to which there are absolute contextindependent meanings at the level of language system, **it may seem that the only alternative** **is to commit oneself to a relativistic ‘anything goes’ stance** according to which any expression can mean anything. **This** criticism, however, **can be seen as misguided**, since the basic assumption shared by Bakhtin, Voloshinov and Rommetveit is that the **meaning potential of a linguistic expression is inherently social** in its nature. The chief aim of this paper is to discuss the **dialogical** notion of **meaning** and to **argue against** **the view that** the notion of **meaning potential automatically implies a commitment to** an individualistic and **relativistic theory of meaning.** It is argued that the social nature of meaning potentials can be explicated by recontextualizing the **dialogical** approach to language and **communication** and considering it **from the viewpoint of ‘use-theory** of meaning’ **developed by Wittgenstein** in his Philosophical Investigations.2 The basic assumption is that meaning potentials are rooted in social practices of a given community and can be understood as properties that emerge from social activity. The main point is that, when interpreted within the framework of a ‘use-theory of meaning’, the **dialogical** notion of meaning potential can be given a definition which frees it from accusations of being relativistic, while, at the same time remaining, anti-essentialist and indeterministic in nature. To be more precise, **meaning potentials are** seen as being **emergent**3 by nature, which means they can be conceived of as **rules** which, on the one hand, function as resources for social and cultural practices and, on the other hand, are **(re)created via the actual rule-following behaviour.**

### AT Affect – need to feel it

#### Switch side solves that better

English et al 7

(Eric English, Stephen Lano, Gordon Mitchell, University of Pittsburgh communications professor, Catherine Morrison, John Reif, and Carly Woods, Schenley Park Debate Authors Working Group, “Debate as a Weapon of Mass Destruction,” June 2007, Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, [www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/EnglishDAWG.pdf](http://www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/EnglishDAWG.pdf%5D), - Kurr)

The problem for Greene and Hicks is that this notion of citizenship becomes tied to a normative conception of American democracy that justifies imperialism. They write, ‘‘The production and management of this field of governance allows liberalism to trade in cultural technologies in the global cosmopolitan marketplace at the same time as it creates a field of intervention to transform and change the world one subject (regime) at a time.’’11 Here, Greene and Hicks argue that this new conception of liberal governance, which epitomizes the ethical citizen as an individual trained in the switch-side technique, serves as a normative tool for judging other polities and justifying forcible regime change. One need look only to the Bush administration’s framing of war as an instrument of democracy promotion to grasp how the switch-side technique can be appropriated as a justification for violence. It is our position, however, that rather than acting as a cultural technology expanding American exceptionalism, switch-side debating originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes. Several prominent voices reshaping the national dialogue on homeland security have come from the academic debate community and draw on its animating spirit of critical inquiry. For example, Georgetown University law professor Neal Katyal served as lead plaintiff’s counsel in Hamdan, which challenged post-9/11 enemy combat definitions.12 The foundation for Katyal’s winning argument in Hamdan was laid some four years before, when he collaborated with former intercollegiate debate champion Laurence Tribe on an influential Yale Law Journal addressing a similar topic.13 Tribe won the National Debate Tournament in 1961 while competing as an undergraduate debater for Harvard University. Thirty years later, Katyal represented Dartmouth College at the same tournament and finished third. The imprint of this debate training is evident in Tribe and Katyal’s contemporary public interventions, which are characterized by meticulous research, sound argumentation, and a staunch commitment to democratic principles. Katyal’s reflection on his early days of debating at Loyola High School in Chicago’s North Shore provides a vivid illustration. ‘‘I came in as a shy freshman with dreams of going to medical school. Then Loyola’s debate team opened my eyes to a different world: one of argumentation and policy.’’ As Katyal recounts, ‘‘the most important preparation for my career came from my experiences as a member of Loyola’s debate team.’’14 The success of former debaters like Katyal, Tribe, and others in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security points to the efficacy of academic debate as a training ground for future advocates of progressive change. Moreover, a robust understanding of the switch-side technique and the classical liberalism which underpins it would help prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies. For buried within an inner-city debater’s files is a secret threat to absolutism: the refusal to be classified as ‘‘with us or against us,’’ the embracing of intellectual experimentation in an age of orthodoxy, and reflexivity in the face of fundamentalism. But by now, the irony of our story should be apparent\*the more effectively academic debating practice can be focused toward these ends, the greater the proclivity of McCarthy’s ideological heirs to brand the activity as a ‘‘weapon of mass destruction.’’

### AT We Engage in Resolution

#### C) Echo Chamber DA - This rejection of structured clash makes debate into an echo chamber. This impoverishes their project even if it is right

Talisse 5

Professor of Philosophy @Vandy¶ Robert, Philosophy & Social Criticism, Deliberativist responses to activist challenges, 31(4) p. 429-431

The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. **The deliberativist view** I have sketched hold that reasonableness **involved some degree of** what we may call **epistemic modesty. On this** view, **the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons,** and so she enters into public discourse **as a way of testing her views against the objections** and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly hold that **her present view is open to reasonable critique** and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of **politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable**. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness **for the activist** consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action; **discussion with those who disagree need not be involved**. **According to the activist,** there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which **there is no room for reasoned objection.** Under such conditions, **the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational**. It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001A; ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political **activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies,** demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. Activists also must engage in deliberation among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movement must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tact’s; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. **Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists**. **Group polarization** is a well-documented phenomenon that **has ‘been found all over the world** and is many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81-2). Importantly, **in group that ‘engage in repeated discussions’** over time, **the polarization is even more pronounced** (2003: 86). Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of an individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.).17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that **he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees** in cases in which the requirement of justice are so clear that he can be confidents that has the truth .Group polarization suggest that even deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even we have the truth. **For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views,** but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth ,In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggest that a engagement with those with whom one disagrees is essential to the proper pursuitof justice. Insofar as the activist denies this, he is unreasonable.

### AT You Kill Creativity

#### Topical limits enable creativity. Beauty emerges from identifying constraints and working within them.

Flood 10

(Scott, BS in Communication and Theatre Arts – St. Joseph’s College, School Board Member – Plainfield Community School Corporation, and Advertising Agent, “Business Innovation – Real Creativity Happens Inside the Box”, http://ezinearticles.com/?Business-Innovation---Real-Creativity-Happens-Inside-the-Box&id=4793692)

It seems that we can accomplish anything if we're brave enough to step out of that bad, bad box, and **thinking "creatively" has come to be synonymous with ignoring rules** and constraints or pretending they just don't exist. **Nonsense.** Real creativity is put to the test within the box. In fact, that's where it really shines. It might surprise you, but **it's** actually **easier to think outside the box than within its confines**. How can that be? It's simple. When you're working **outside the box, you don't face rules**, or boundaries, or assumptions. You create your own as you go along. If you want to throw convention aside, you can do it. If you want to throw proven practices out the window, have at it. You have the freedom to create your own world. Now, I'm not saying there's anything wrong with thinking outside the box. At times, it's absolutely essential - such as when you're facing the biggest oil spill in history in an environment in which all the known approaches are failing. But most of us don't have the luxury of being able to operate outside the box. We've been shoved into reality, facing a variety of limitations, from budgets, to supervisors' opinions and prejudices, to the nature of the marketplace. Even though the box may have been given a bad name, it's where most of us have to spend our time. And no matter how much we may fret about those limits, inside that box is where we need to prove ourselves. If you'll pardon the inevitable sports analogy, **consider a baseball player who belts ball after ball** over 450 feet. **Unfortunately**, he has a wee problem: **he can't place those** hits **between the foul lines**, so they're harmful strikes instead of game-winning home runs. To the out-of-the-box advocates, he's a mighty slugger who deserves admiration, but **to his** teammates and the **fans, he's a loser** who just can't get on base. He may not like the fact that he has **to limit his hits** to **between the foul poles**, but that's one of the realities of the game he chose to play. The same is true of ideas and approaches. **The most** dazzling and **impressive tactic is essentially useless** if it doesn't offer a practical, realistic way to address the need or application. **Like the baseball player, we** may not like the realities, but we **have to operate within** their **limits**. Often, I've seen people blame the box for their inability or unwillingness to create something workable. For example, back in my ad agency days, I remember fellow writers and designers complaining about the limitations of projects. If it was a half-page ad, they didn't feel they could truly be creative unless the space was expanded to a full page. If they were given a full page, they demanded a spread. Handed a spread, they'd fret because it wasn't a TV commercial. If the project became a TV commercial with a $25,000 budget, they'd grouse about not having a $50,000 budget. Yet **the greatest artists** of all time **didn't complain about what they didn't have; they worked their magic using what they did. Monet captured** the grace and **beauty** of France astonishingly well **within the bounds of a canvas. Donatello exposed** the breathtaking **emotion** that lurked **within ordinary chunks of marble**. And **I doubt** that **Beethoven** ever **whined because there were only 88 keys on the piano**. Similarly, I've watched the best of my peers do amazing things in less-than-favorable circumstances. There were brilliant commercials developed with minimal budgets and hand-held cameras. Black-and-white ads that outperformed their colorful competitors. Simple postcards that grabbed the attention of (and business from) jaded consumers. You see, real creativity isn't hampered or blocked by limits. It actually flowers in response to challenges. Even though it may be forced to remain inside the box, it leverages everything it can find in that box and makes the most of every bit of it. **Real creativity is driven by a need to create. When Monet approached a** blank **canvas,** it's safe to say that **he didn't agonize over its size**. He wanted to capture something he'd seen and share how it looked through his eyes. The size of the canvas was incidental to his talent and desire. **Think about** the **Apollo 13** mission. **NASA** didn't have the luxury of flying supplies or extra tools to the crew. They **couldn't rewrite** the laws of **physics**. Plus, they faced a rapidly shrinking timeline, so their box kept getting smaller and less forgiving. And **yet they arrived upon a solution that was creative**; more important, that was successful. **The next time someone tells you** that **the** real **solution involves stepping outside the box, challenge him or her to think and work harder**. After all, **the best solution may** very well **be lurking in a corner of that familiar box**.

## 1NR

### CP

#### The struggle between linguistic representations shapes reality and material politics

Wenden ‘5

Anita L. Wenden, M.A. linguistic, director of Peace Education and Research @ Earth and Peace Education International. “THE POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION: A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF AN ALJAZEERA SPECIAL REPORT.” International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 10, Number 2, Autumn/Winter 2005

As used in discourse analysis, representation refers to the language used in a text or talk to assign meaning to groups and their social practices, to events, and to social and ecological conditions and objects (e.g. Fairclough, 1989; 1995; van Dijk, 2002).1 Implicit in this view of the role of language in social life is that meaning is not embedded in the reality that is perceived but rather that it is construed by linguistic representation (Fairclough, 1992; Goatly, 2000; Halliday, 1990; Hodge and Kress, 1993; Mehan and Wills, 1988; Muntigl, 2002; Shapiro, 1988; van Dijk, 2002; Wenden and Schaffner, 1999; Wodak, 2002). Of course, modes of representation will vary depending on the perspective from which they are constructed, whether biographical, historical, socio- cultural (Voloshinov, 1986 cited in Mehan and Wills, 1988). Ideology will also influence the manner in which groups represent matters of import and relevance to the body politic (e.g. Fairclough, 1989, 1992; 1995; Hodge and Kress, 1993; Bloomaert and Verschueren, 1998; van Dijk, 1999; Goatly, 2000), including the achievement of a culture of peace. Moreover, inasmuch as linguistic representations determine the way in which we think about particular objects, events, situations and, as such, function as a principle of action influencing actual social practice (Shapiro, 1988; Fairclough, 1989; Hodge and Kress, 1993; Wodak, 2002; Karlsberg, 2005), there will be competition among groups over what is to be taken as the correct, appropriate, or preferred representation (Holquist, 1983; Fairclough, 1992; Wodak, 2001). The competition over meaning among groups is referred to as the “politics of representation” (Holquist, 1983; Shapiro, 1988). During the period of the Cold War, for example, views varied on how to define the role of nuclear weapons in international politics. Immediately after World War II, voices for international control proposed a nuclear partnership with the Soviet Union. However, voices for national interest dominated and, from the 1950’s to the 1990’s, deterrence was the accepted representation, justifying the need to develop and if necessary use nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, alternative views were proposed by groups from civil society such as MEND (Mothers Embracing Nuclear Disarmament), which challenged the dominant discourse with their doctrine of nurturance – emphasizing the role of mothers in creating a secure world for their children and in helping children cope with the threat of nuclear war (Mehan and Wills, 1988). Discourse can also be the focus of struggle in the representation of issues related to the achievement of a culture of peace other than nuclear war on a global scale, i.e. organized physical violence on a regional level within nation states (e.g. Firer and Adwan, 2004); domestic violence – unorganized physical violence within the home2 (e.g. Rapping 2000); and structural violence, e.g. the representation of the grievances of poor rural villagers in Thailand, social diversity in Europe, and North-South relations (for examples see respectively, Chalermsvipinyorat, 2004; Bloomaert and Verschueren, 1998; and Doty, 1996.) If the use of nuclear weapons was the major source of concern during the Cold War, in the post Cold War period and especially since the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio, June 1992), environmental degradation, i.e. ecological violence, and its implications for the survival of the whole Earth Community has become a priority,3 and groups with differing views on its seriousness and the manner of dealing with it contend for prominence in the representation of the various threats to ecological integrity and planetary well being. Global warming is one example, with the U.S. government proposing ‘climate variability’ as a challenge to ‘climate change’, the predominant view of (most) world governments and civic groups (Rohter, 2004). Among those who agree with the latter representation, emerging voices of poor countries and communities in the Arctic, atolls of the tropics, and the flanks of the Himalayas propose that global warming be viewed as a threat to human rights, challenging the prevailing voices of those who would represent it as an environmental issue (Revkin, 2004).4 Thus, discourse can also be the focus of politics, that is, the struggle for the power of representation and proponents of various views use a variety of strategies to ensure that their framing of the nature of a particular issue predominates. Approaching the matter with the conviction that reason will prevail, attempts can be made to persuade others of the logic of one’s arguments (e.g. the ‘development debate’, the ‘abortion debate’, the ‘AIDS debate’). Alternately or additionally, the language of opposing views can be incorporated into one’s discourse (e.g. Bill Clinton’s ‘welfare reform’, G.W. Bush’s ‘compassionate conservatism’) or as is evidenced in political campaigns, one can attempt to silence one’s opponents by attacking their positions. If physical coercion is the chosen strategy, those with opposing representations may suffer imprisonment or loss of life (e.g. poisoning, car accidents....).5 When one mode of representation prevails, a hierarchy is formed among the competing representations with the winner’s being given primacy as a way of framing a particular issue (Mehan and Wills, 1988), and taking into account the acknowledged power of discourse as a principle of social action, in the selection of social actions taken to deal with it.

#### Even minute distinctions in policy language have important political ramifications- its is an ethical imperative to distance yourself from modes of linguistic representation that recreate hegemonic systems of power

DOTY 96

(Roxanne Lynn, PROF of POL SCI @ Arizona State UNIV and PhD @ UNIV of Minnesota,Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North/South Relations, p. 169-171)

Because the center is not a fixed locus but a function in which an infinite number of sign substitutions come into play, the domain and play of signification is extended indefinitely. This both opens up and limits possibilities, generates alternative sites of meanings and political resistances that give rise to practices of reinscription that seek to reaffirm identities and relationships: The inherently incomplete and open nature of discourse makes this reaffirmation an ongoing and never finally completed project. In this study I have sought, through an engagement with various discourses in which claims to truth have been staked, to challenge the validity of the structures of meaning and to make visible their complicity with practices of power and domination. By examining the ways in which structures of meaning have been associated with imperial practices, I have suggested that the construction of meaning and the construction of social, political, and economic power are inextricably linked. This suggests an ethical dimension to making meaning and an ethical imperative that is incumbent upon those who toil in the construction of structures of meaning. This is especially urgent in North-South relations today: one does not have to search very far to find a continuing complicity with colonial representations that ranges from a politics of silence and neglect to constructions of terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, international drug trafficking, and Southern immigration to the North as new threats to global stability and peace. The political stakes raised by this analysis revolve around the question of being able to “get beyond” the representations or speak outside of the discourse that historically have constructed the North and the South. I do not believe that there are any pure alternatives by which we can escape the infinity of traces to which Gramsci refers. Nor do I wish to suggest that we are always hopelessly imprisoned in a dominant and all-pervasive discourse. Before this question can be answered – indeed, before we can even proceed to attempt to answer – attention must be given to the politics of representation. The price that international relations scholarship pays for its inattention to the issue of representation is perpetuation of the dominant modes of making meaning and deferral of its responsibility and complicity in dominant representations.

#### The aff’s retention of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ as a dominant signifier short circuits solvency for the counterplan

DOTY, 96

(Roxanne Lynn, PROF of POL SCI @ Arizona State UNIV and PhD @ UNIV of Minnesota,Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North/South Relations, p. 47-8)

But meaning was in fact FIXED, at least temporarily. How was this accomplished? Each of the oppositions depended upon a point of differentiation – a point where, for example, *civilized* became differentiated from *uncivilized*. This differentiation was made possible by a dominant signifier. The dominant signifier can be thought of as the center of the discursive structure: it both makes the structure itself possible and limits its play. It is the point where the substitution of signifiers is no longer possible (Derrida 1978: 279). The signifying chain stops. I would suggest that a distinctly “American” version of “white man” was the dominant signifier in these texts. The terms *civilized, enlightened, lovers of liberty, benevolent,* and so on became fused and came to rest with “white man” while the opposites came to rest with nonwhite races. “White man” was the reference point in relation to which the oppositional distinctions could be posited, the center that while governing the structure escaped structurality. “White man” was given transcendental status, implicitly understood to exist outside of the discursive system instead of itself being constructed by that system. A deconstructive reading of these texts reveals the contestations and rhetorical strategies that call this status into question.

#### Improper capitalization merely personalizes state institutions- the language of the plan must be rejected

Lock 02

[Neil, “State Your Terms!”]

Each individual shows his or her world-view in the way he or she uses language. And we (that is to say, lovers of freedom) are too prone to slip into our rivals’ way of speaking and writing. When we use “we”, for example, we should try to make it clear just who we mean. We should be alert to other misuses of “we”, for example to represent statist institutions, or to project false guilt. We should avoid implying that individuals must accept responsibility for things outside their control, particularly for actions carried out by politicians. We should try to avoid “bundling” people together into groups and making sweeping statements about them. We should reject the personalization of nation-states or cities. We should not dignify with capital letters personages or institutions that do not deserve them. We should not misuse words like “people” and “public”, and we should avoid warlike metaphors, such as calling our rivals “the enemy”. In short, we need to “state” our case in our terms, not our rivals’.

**Rejecting statist language is key to rolling back overwhelming state power**

**Lock 02**

[Neil, “State Your Terms!”]

We lovers of freedom are usually strong on facts and logic. But facts and logic alone will never persuade those very many people, whose minds have been poisoned towards our rivals’ world-view by their long-term, persistent propaganda. We will never roll back the power of the state, still less heal the damage done by nation-states and politicians, unless we strive to make our use of language reinforce, rather than dilute, our uncompromisingly individual, peaceful and optimistic message.

# Round 7 v UCO BY

## 1NC

### 1NC

#### 1. Interpretation: The role of the ballot is to determine if the enactment of a topical plan is better than the status quo or a competitive option. The 1ac must read and defend the implementation of such a topical plan.

#### 2. Violation:

#### A) “Resolved” implies a policy or legislative decision – means they must be resolved about a future federal government policy

Parcher 1

Jeff Parcher, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001 http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution.

#### B) USFG is the national government in DC

Encarta Online Encyclopedia, 2k

(http://encarta.msn.com)

“The federal government **of the U**nited **S**tates **is centered in** Washington **DC”**

#### C) Should means there is a practical reason for action

WordNet in ‘97

Princeton University, 1.6

**Should** v 1 : be expected to: “Parties should be fun” 2 : **expresses an** emotional**, practical,** or other **reason for doing something:** “You had better put on warm clothes”; “You should call your mother-in-law”; *“The State ought to repair bridges*”[syn**:** had better, ought]

#### 3. Vote Negative:

#### A) Decisionmaking - a limited topic of discussion that provides for equitable ground is key to decision-making and advocacy skills

Steinberg & Freeley 8

\*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Specifically, decisionmaking skills based on specific energy policy proposals are key to motivate legislative fence-sitters – the aff’s strategy is doomed to the status quo

Brown 11

[heath, PhD Political Science, Roanoke, Salem, VA, “narrative strategies used by interest groups during the 2008 presidental transition”, 2011 Pat-Net Conference]

Milbrath argues that interest groups must strategically present information so as to ¶ overcome the “perceptual screen” that shields policy makers from absorbing endless amounts ¶ of information. He suggests that groups use facts (scientific information about policy ¶ outcomes), arguments (normative explanations of justness or rightness of action), and power¶ (typically subtle offers of political support or threats of political retribution) to communicate ¶ their interests and make their case for policy action (or inaction). In a more recent approach, ¶ Esterling (2007, p. 79) makes the case that groups can use [using] “instrumental” – “research or ¶ evidence-based causal” arguments -- or “normative” – “intrinsic desirability” arguments. By ¶ emphasizing one of these approaches, a group is tacitly communicating the way it wants to ¶ persuade the target of the information. By emphasizing power or normative arguments, the ¶ group implies that the policy maker should make decisions based primarily on their political ¶ judgment and political future. Conversely, by emphasizing facts-based or instrumental ¶ arguments, the group implies that the policy maker should base decisions primarily on rational ¶ or scientific considerations. In practice, it is difficult to disentangle these two types of ¶ arguments and many groups will likely combine various ways to present information (Wright ¶ 1996; Rochefort and Cobb 1994). The dichotomy though does help clarify the persuasive or ¶ argumentative tone of the information and advice given by groups to policy makers. 6 ¶ While public perceptions of interest groups might suggest crass self-interest, ¶ manipulation, and deception, groups have an incentive to be forthright in the information they ¶ provide and arguments they make. A group that provides shoddy statistics or misleading ¶ arguments will be discounted in future interactions with the policy maker (Kersh 2009; ¶ Easterling 2007). John E. Chubb (1983, p. 145) writes in regard to energy interest groups: ¶ “information and advice that are solely self-serving threaten the bond of trust that facilitates ¶ the informal play of influence.” In fact, rather than targeting political opponents or fence ¶ sitters, much research suggests that groups prefer or are invited to lobby friends and allies over ¶ adversaries (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999; Hall and Deardorff ¶ 2006; Bauer et al. 1963; Holyoke 2004; McCool 1990). If this is the case, the cost of ¶ misrepresenting or overstating information may be particularly high for those engaged in what ¶ Hall and Deardorff (2006) and others have called “legislative subsidy” (Hall and Deardorff 2006; ¶ Esterling 2007a). From this subsidy perspective, if a policy maker is sub-contracting information ¶ collection and analysis to an allied interest group, it behooves that group to be conscientious, ¶ thorough, and consistent in the information and advice it gives. And in many cases, as Wright ¶ (1996) contends, it is relatively easy for policy makers to check the authenticity of the ¶ information provided to them, sometimes simply through the contradictory information ¶ provided by other groups, thereby curtailing the inclination to blatantly misrepresent the truth. ¶ Furthermore, experimental research shows that factual or instrumental information is ¶ preferred by legislative staff (LaPira 2008) and neutral expert lobbyists have more legislative ¶ access than non-experts (Esterling 2007b). Facts may be useful on their own terms in ¶ formulating legislative decisions but scientific or statistically based arguments also serve as a 7 ¶ cue for policy makers to determine the credibility or reliability of the advice they are given ¶ (Sabatier 1978). ¶ Rather than convince those already in agreement, the approach taken by proactive ¶ theorists suggests that groups seek to convince legislative fence sitters or opponents to adopt ¶ the group’s position, advocate the group’s interests, or simply vote in the group’s way through ¶ the offer of, or refusal to give, political support (Smith 1984; Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; ¶ Wright 1996). Wright (1990) for one finds that groups which distribute campaign contributions ¶ to a wide group of legislators are then able to access a wider group, rather than just political ¶ allies (Wright 1990). Similarly, Heberling (2005) shows that one group, the AFL-CIO, seeks out ¶ legislators with unknown political preferences rather than targeting political allies (Heberling ¶ 2005). The field of interest group research has not yet resolved whether groups typically lobby ¶ friends, adversaries, or some combination of the two (Leech and Baumgartner 1998). This is ¶ likely due to the wide variation of group types and also policy domains in which groups operate. ¶ These inter-organizational and inter-policy differences affect the strategies employed and ¶ therefore the content of information presented during lobbying.

#### Switch-side is key to making those decisionmaking skills effective – EPA debates prove

Mitchell 10

(Gordon R., Associate Professor, Director of Graduate Studies, and Director of the William Pitt Debating Union at the University of Pittsburgh; Spring, “Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 1 – Kurr)

The preceding analysis of U.S. intelligence community debating initiatives highlighted how analysts are challenged to navigate discursively the heteroglossia of vast amounts of different kinds of data flowing through intelligence streams. Public policy planners are tested in like manner when they attempt to stitch together institutional arguments from various and sundry inputs ranging from expert testimony, to historical precedent, to public comment. Just as intelligence managers find that algorithmic, formal methods of analysis often don't work when it comes to the task of interpreting and synthesizing copious amounts of disparate data, public-policy planners encounter similar challenges. In fact, the argumentative turn in public-policy planning elaborates an approach to public-policy analysis that foregrounds deliberative interchange and critical thinking as alternatives to "decisionism," the formulaic application of "objective" decision algorithms to the public policy process. Stating the matter plainly, Majone suggests, "whether in written or oral form, argument is central in all stages of the policy process." Accordingly, he notes, "we miss a great deal if we try to understand policy-making solely in terms of power, influence, and bargaining, to the exclusion of debate and argument."51 One can see similar rationales driving Goodwin and Davis's EPA debating project, where debaters are invited to conduct on-site public debates covering resolutions crafted to reflect key points of stasis in the EPA decision-making process. For example, in the 2008 Water Wars debates held at EPA headquarters in Washington, D.C., resolutions were crafted to focus attention on the topic of water pollution, with one resolution focusing on downstream states' authority to control upstream states' discharges and sources of pollutants, and a second resolution exploring the policy merits of bottled water and toilet paper taxes as revenue sources to fund water infrastructure projects. In the first debate on interstate river pollution, the team of Seth Gannon and Seungwon Chung from Wake Forest University argued in favor of downstream state control, with the Michigan State University team of Carly Wunderlich and Garrett Abelkop providing opposition. In the second debate on taxation policy, Kevin Kallmyer and Matthew Struth from University of Mary Washington defended taxes on bottled water and toilet paper, while their opponents from Howard University, Dominique Scott and Jarred McKee, argued against this proposal. Reflecting on the project, Goodwin noted how the intercollegiate [End Page 106] debaters' ability to act as "honest brokers" in the policy arguments contributed positively to internal EPA deliberation on both issues.52 Davis observed that since the invited debaters "didn't have a dog in the fight," they were able to give voice to previously buried arguments that some EPA subject matter experts felt reticent to elucidate because of their institutional affiliations.53 Such findings are consistent with the views of policy analysts advocating the argumentative turn in policy planning. As Majone claims, "Dialectical confrontation between generalists and experts often succeeds in bringing out unstated assumptions, conflicting interpretations of the facts, and the risks posed by new projects."54 Frank Fischer goes even further in this context, explicitly appropriating rhetorical scholar Charles Willard's concept of argumentative "epistemics" to flesh out his vision for policy studies: Uncovering the epistemic dynamics of public controversies would allow for a more enlightened understanding of what is at stake in a particular dispute, making possible a sophisticated evaluation of the various viewpoints and merits of different policy options. In so doing, the differing, often tacitly held contextual perspectives and values could be juxtaposed; the viewpoints and demands of experts, special interest groups, and the wider public could be directly compared; and the dynamics among the participants could be scrutizined. This would by no means sideline or even exclude scientific assessment; it would only situate it within the framework of a more comprehensive evaluation.55 As Davis notes, institutional constraints present within the EPA communicative milieu can complicate efforts to provide a full airing of all relevant arguments pertaining to a given regulatory issue. Thus, intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might otherwise remain sedimented in the policy process. The dynamics entailed in this symbiotic relationship are underscored by deliberative planner John Forester, who observes, "If planners and public administrators are to make democratic political debate and argument possible, they will need strategically located allies to avoid being fully thwarted by the characteristic self-protecting behaviors of the planning organizations and bureaucracies within which they work."56 Here, an institution's need for "strategically located allies" to support deliberative practice constitutes the demand for rhetorically informed expertise, setting up what can be considered a demand-driven rhetoric of science. As an instance of rhetoric of science scholarship, this type of "switch-side public [End Page 107] debate"57 differs both from insular contest tournament debating, where the main focus is on the pedagogical benefit for student participants, and first-generation rhetoric of science scholarship, where critics concentrated on unmasking the rhetoricity of scientific artifacts circulating in what many perceived to be purely technical spheres of knowledge production.58 As a form of demand-driven rhetoric of science, switch-side debating connects directly with the communication field's performative tradition of argumentative engagement in public controversy—a different route of theoretical grounding than rhetorical criticism's tendency to locate its foundations in the English field's tradition of literary criticism and textual analysis.59 Given this genealogy, it is not surprising to learn how Davis's response to the EPA's institutional need for rhetorical expertise took the form of a public debate proposal, shaped by Davis's dual background as a practitioner and historian of intercollegiate debate. Davis competed as an undergraduate policy debater for Howard University in the 1970s, and then went on to enjoy substantial success as coach of the Howard team in the new millennium. In an essay reviewing the broad sweep of debating history, Davis notes, "Academic debate began at least 2,400 years ago when the scholar Protagoras of Abdera (481–411 BC), known as the father of debate, conducted debates among his students in Athens."60 As John Poulakos points out, "older" Sophists such as Protagoras taught Greek students the value of dissoi logoi, or pulling apart complex questions by debating two sides of an issue.61 The few surviving fragments of Protagoras's work suggest that his notion of dissoi logoi stood for the principle that "two accounts [logoi] are present about every 'thing,' opposed to each other," and further, that humans could "measure" the relative soundness of knowledge claims by engaging in give-and-take where parties would make the "weaker argument stronger" to activate the generative aspect of rhetorical practice, a key element of the Sophistical tradition.62 Following in Protagoras's wake, Isocrates would complement this centrifugal push with the pull of synerchésthé, a centripetal exercise of "coming together" deliberatively to listen, respond, and form common social bonds.63 Isocrates incorporated Protagorean dissoi logoi into synerchésthé, a broader concept that he used flexibly to express interlocking senses of (1) inquiry, as in groups convening to search for answers to common questions through discussion;64 (2) deliberation, with interlocutors gathering in a political setting to deliberate about proposed courses of action;65 and (3) alliance formation, a form of collective action typical at festivals,66 or in the exchange of pledges that deepen social ties.67 [End Page 108] Returning once again to the Kettering-informed sharp distinction between debate and deliberation, one sees in Isocratic synerchésthé, as well as in the EPA debating initiative, a fusion of debate with deliberative functions. Echoing a theme raised in this essay's earlier discussion of intelligence tradecraft, such a fusion troubles categorical attempts to classify debate and deliberation as fundamentally opposed activities. The significance of such a finding is amplified by the frequency of attempts in the deliberative democracy literature to insist on the theoretical bifurcation of debate and deliberation as an article of theoretical faith. Tandem analysis of the EPA and intelligence community debating initiatives also brings to light dimensions of contrast at the third level of Isocratic synerchésthé, alliance formation. The intelligence community's Analytic Outreach initiative invites largely one-way communication flowing from outside experts into the black box of classified intelligence analysis. On the contrary, the EPA debating program gestures toward a more expansive project of deliberative alliance building. In this vein, Howard University's participation in the 2008 EPA Water Wars debates can be seen as the harbinger of a trend by historically black colleges and universities (HBCUS) to catalyze their debate programs in a strategy that evinces Davis's dual-focus vision. On the one hand, Davis aims to recuperate Wiley College's tradition of competitive excellence in intercollegiate debate, depicted so powerfully in the feature film The Great Debaters, by starting a wave of new debate programs housed in HBCUS across the nation.68 On the other hand, Davis sees potential for these new programs to complement their competitive debate programming with participation in the EPA's public debating initiative. This dual-focus vision recalls Douglas Ehninger's and Wayne Brockriede's vision of "total" debate programs that blend switch-side intercollegiate tournament debating with forms of public debate designed to contribute to wider communities beyond the tournament setting.69 Whereas the political telos animating Davis's dual-focus vision certainly embraces background assumptions that Greene and Hicks would find disconcerting—notions of liberal political agency, the idea of debate using "words as weapons"70—there is little doubt that the project of pursuing environmental protection by tapping the creative energy of HBCU-leveraged dissoi logoi differs significantly from the intelligence community's effort to improve its tradecraft through online digital debate programming. Such difference is especially evident in light of the EPA's commitment to extend debates to public realms, with the attendant possible benefits unpacked by Jane Munksgaard and Damien Pfister: [End Page 109] Having a public debater argue against their convictions, or confess their indecision on a subject and subsequent embrace of argument as a way to seek clarity, could shake up the prevailing view of debate as a war of words. Public uptake of the possibility of switch-sides debate may help lessen the polarization of issues inherent in prevailing debate formats because students are no longer seen as wedded to their arguments. This could transform public debate from a tussle between advocates, with each public debater trying to convince the audience in a Manichean struggle about the truth of their side, to a more inviting exchange focused on the content of the other's argumentation and the process of deliberative exchange.71 Reflection on the EPA debating initiative reveals a striking convergence among (1) the expressed need for dissoi logoi by government agency officials wrestling with the challenges of inverted rhetorical situations, (2) theoretical claims by scholars regarding the centrality of argumentation in the public policy process, and (3) the practical wherewithal of intercollegiate debaters to tailor public switch-side debating performances in specific ways requested by agency collaborators. These points of convergence both underscore previously articulated theoretical assertions regarding the relationship of debate to deliberation, as well as deepen understanding of the political role of deliberation in institutional decision making. But they also suggest how decisions by rhetorical scholars about whether to contribute switch-side debating acumen to meet demand-driven rhetoric of science initiatives ought to involve careful reflection. Such an approach mirrors the way policy planning in the "argumentative turn" is designed to respond to the weaknesses of formal, decisionistic paradigms of policy planning with situated, contingent judgments informed by reflective deliberation.

#### B) Dialogue - Predictable points of stasis are key – effective deliberation is critical to preventing mass violence as it overcomes politically debilitating self-obsession

Roberts-Miller 03

(Patricia Roberts-Miller is Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Texas "Fighting Without Hatred: Hannah Arendt’s Agonistic Rhetoric" JAC 22.2 2003)

Totalitarianism and the Competitive Space of Agonism Arendt is probably most famous for her analysis of totalitarianism (especially her The Origins of Totalitarianism andEichmann in Jerusa¬lem), but the recent attention has been on her criticism of mass culture (The Human Condition). Arendt's main criticism of the current human condition is that the common world of deliberate and joint action is fragmented into solipsistic and unreflective behavior. In an especially lovely passage, she says that in mass society people are all imprisoned in the subjectivity of their own singular experience, which does not cease to be singular if the same experience is multiplied innumerable times. The end of the common world has come when it is seen only under one aspect and is permitted to present itself in only one perspective. (Human 58) What Arendt so beautifully describes is that isolation and individualism are not corollaries, and may even be antithetical because obsession with one's own self and the particularities of one's life prevents one from engaging in conscious, deliberate, collective action. Individuality, unlike isolation, depends upon a collective with whom one argues in order to direct the common life. Self-obsession, even (especially?) when coupled with isolation from one' s community is far from apolitical; it has political consequences. Perhaps a better way to put it is that it is political precisely because it aspires to be apolitical. This fragmented world in which many people live simultaneously and even similarly but not exactly together is what Arendt calls the "social." Arendt does not mean that group behavior is impossible in the realm of the social, but that social behavior consists "in some way of isolated individuals, incapable of solidarity or mutuality, who abdicate their human capacities and responsibilities to a projected 'they' or 'it,' with disastrous consequences, both for other people and eventually for themselves" (Pitkin 79). One can behave, butnot act. For someone like Arendt, a German-assimilated Jew, one of the most frightening aspects of the Holocaust was the ease with which a people who had not been extraordinarily anti-Semitic could be put to work industriously and efficiently on the genocide of the Jews. And what was striking about the perpetrators of the genocide, ranging from minor functionaries who facilitated the murder transports up to major figures on trial at Nuremberg, was their constant and apparently sincere insistence that they were not responsible. For Arendt, this was not a peculiarity of the German people, but of the current human and heavily bureaucratic condition of twentieth-century culture: we do not consciously choose to engage in life's activities; we drift into them, or we do them out of a desire to conform. Even while we do them, we do not acknowledge an active, willed choice to do them; instead, we attribute our behavior to necessity, and we perceive ourselves as determined—determined by circumstance, by accident, by what "they" tell us to do. We do something from within the anonymity of a mob that we would never do as an individual; we do things for which we will not take responsibility. Yet, whether or not people acknowledge responsibil¬ity for the consequences of their actions, those consequences exist. Refusing to accept responsibility can even make those consequences worse, in that the people who enact the actions in question, because they do not admit their own agency, cannot be persuaded to stop those actions. They are simply doing their jobs. In a totalitarian system, however, everyone is simply doing his or her job; there never seems to be anyone who can explain, defend, and change the policies. Thus, it is, as Arendt says, rule by nobody. It is illustrative to contrast Arendt's attitude toward discourse to Habermas'. While both are critical of modern bureaucratic and totalitar¬ian systems, Arendt's solution is the playful and competitive space of agonism; it is not the rational-critical public sphere. The "actual content of political life" is "the joy and the gratification that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed, thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something entirely new" ("Truth" 263). According to Seyla Benhabib, Arendt's public realm emphasizes the assumption of competition, and it "represents that space of appearances in which moral and political greatness, heroism, and preeminence are revealed, displayed, shared with others. This is a competitive space in which one competes for recognition, precedence, and acclaim" (78). These qualities are displayed, but not entirely for purposes of acclamation; they are not displays of one's self, but of ideas and arguments, of one's thought. When Arendt discusses Socrates' thinking in public, she emphasizes his performance: "He performed in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed at a banquet. It is sheer performance, sheer activity"; nevertheless, it was thinking: "What he actually did was to make public, in discourse, the thinking process" {Lectures 37). Pitkin summarizes this point: "Arendt says that the heroism associated with politics is not the mythical machismo of ancient Greece but something more like the existential leap into action and public exposure" (175-76). Just as it is not machismo, although it does have considerable ego involved, so it is not instrumental rationality; Arendt's discussion of the kinds of discourse involved in public action include myths, stories, and personal narratives. Furthermore, the competition is not ruthless; it does not imply a willingness to triumph at all costs. Instead, it involves something like having such a passion for ideas and politics that one is willing to take risks. One tries to articulate the best argument, propose the best policy, design the best laws, make the best response. This is a risk in that one might lose; advancing an argument means that one must be open to the criticisms others will make of it. The situation is agonistic not because the participants manufacture or seek conflict, but because conflict is a necessary consequence of difference. This attitude is reminiscent of Kenneth Burke, who did not try to find a language free of domination but who instead theorized a way that the very tendency toward hierarchy in language might be used against itself (for more on this argument, see Kastely). Similarly, Arendt does not propose a public realm of neutral, rational beings who escape differences to live in the discourse of universals; she envisions one of different people who argue with passion, vehemence, and integrity. Continued… Eichmann perfectly exemplified what Arendt famously called the "banal¬ity of evil" but that might be better thought of as the bureaucratization of evil (or, as a friend once aptly put it, the evil of banality). That is, he was able to engage in mass murder because he was able not to think about it, especially not from the perspective of the victims, and he was able to exempt himself from personal responsibility by telling himself (and anyone else who would listen) that he was just following orders. It was the bureaucratic system that enabled him to do both. He was not exactly passive; he was, on the contrary, very aggressive in trying to do his duty. He behaved with the "ruthless, competitive exploitation" and "inauthen-tic, self-disparaging conformism" that characterizes those who people totalitarian systems (Pitkin 87). Arendt's theorizing of totalitarianism has been justly noted as one of her strongest contributions to philosophy. She saw that a situation like Nazi Germany is different from the conventional understanding of a tyranny. Pitkin writes, Totalitarianism cannot be understood, like earlier forms of domination, as the ruthless exploitation of some people by others, whether the motive be selfish calculation, irrational passion, or devotion to some cause. Understanding totalitarianism's essential nature requires solving the central mystery of the holocaust—the objectively useless and indeed dysfunctional, fanatical pursuit of a purely ideological policy, a pointless process to which the people enacting it have fallen captive. (87) Totalitarianism is closely connected to bureaucracy; it is oppression by rules, rather than by people who have willfully chosen to establish certain rules. It is the triumph of the social. Critics (both friendly and hostile) have paid considerable attention to Arendt's category of the "social," largely because, despite spending so much time on the notion, Arendt remains vague on certain aspects of it. Pitkin appropriately compares Arendt's concept of the social to the Blob, the type of monster that figured in so many post-war horror movies. That Blob was "an evil monster from outer space, entirely external to and separate from us [that] had fallen upon us intent on debilitating, absorb¬ing, and ultimately destroying us, gobbling up our distinct individuality and turning us into robots that mechanically serve its purposes" (4). Pitkin is critical of this version of the "social" and suggests that Arendt meant (or perhaps should have meant) something much more complicated. The simplistic version of the social-as-Blob can itself be an instance of Blob thinking; Pitkin's criticism is that Arendt talks at times as though the social comes from outside of us and has fallen upon us, turning us into robots. Yet, Arendt's major criticism of the social is that it involves seeing ourselves as victimized by something that comes from outside our own behavior. I agree with Pitkin that Arendt's most powerful descriptions of the social (and the other concepts similar to it, such as her discussion of totalitarianism, imperialism, Eichmann, and parvenus) emphasize that these processes are not entirely out of our control but that they happen to us when, and because, we keep refusing to make active choices. We create the social through negligence. It is not the sort of force in a Sorcerer's Apprentice, which once let loose cannot be stopped; on the contrary, it continues to exist because we structure our world to reward social behavior. Pitkin writes, "From childhood on, in virtually all our institutions, we reward euphemism, salesmanship, slo¬gans, and we punish and suppress truth-telling, originality, thoughtful-ness. So we continually cultivate ways of (not) thinking that induce the social" (274). I want to emphasize this point, as it is important for thinking about criticisms of some forms of the social construction of knowledge: denying our own agency is what enables the social to thrive. To put it another way, theories of powerlessness are self-fulfilling prophecies. Arendt grants that there are people who willed the Holocaust, but she insists that totalitarian systems result not so much from the Hitlers or Stalins as from the bureaucrats who may or may not agree with the established ideology but who enforce the rules for no stronger motive than a desire to avoid trouble with their superiors (see Eichmann and Life). They do not think about what they do. One might prevent such occurrences—or, at least, resist the modern tendency toward totalitarian¬ism—by thought: "critical thought is in principle anti-authoritarian" (Lectures 38). By "thought" Arendt does not mean eremitic contemplation; in fact, she has great contempt for what she calls "professional thinkers," refusing herself to become a philosopher or to call her work philosophy. Young-Bruehl, Benhabib, and Pitkin have each said that Heidegger represented just such a professional thinker for Arendt, and his embrace of Nazism epitomized the genuine dangers such "thinking" can pose (see Arendt's "Heidegger"). "Thinking" is not typified by the isolated con¬templation of philosophers; it requires the arguments of others and close attention to the truth. It is easy to overstate either part of that harmony. One must consider carefully the arguments and viewpoints of others: Political thought is representative. I form an opinion by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent; that is, I represent them. This process of representation does not blindly adopt the actual views of those who stand somewhere else, and hence look upon the world from a different perspective; this is a question neither of empathy, as though I tried to be or to feel like somebody else, nor of counting noses and joining a majority but of being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not. The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am ponder¬ing a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for represen¬tative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion. ("Truth" 241) There are two points to emphasize in this wonderful passage. First, one does not get these standpoints in one's mind through imagining them, but through listening to them; thus, good thinking requires that one hear the arguments of other people. Hence, as Arendt says, "critical thinking, while still a solitary business, does not cut itself off from' all others.'" Thinking is, in this view, necessarily public discourse: critical thinking is possible "only where the standpoints of all others are open to inspection" (Lectures 43). Yet, it is not a discourse in which one simply announces one's stance; participants are interlocutors and not just speakers; they must listen. Unlike many current versions of public discourse, this view presumes that speech matters. It is not asymmetric manipulation of others, nor merely an economic exchange; it must be a world into which one enters and by which one might be changed. Second, passages like the above make some readers think that Arendt puts too much faith in discourse and too little in truth (see Habermas). But Arendt is no crude relativist; she believes in truth, and she believes that there are facts that can be more or less distorted. She does not believe that reality is constructed by discourse, or that truth is indistinguishable from falsehood. She insists tha^ the truth has a different pull on us and, consequently, that it has a difficult place in the world of the political. Facts are different from falsehood because, while they can be distorted or denied, especially when they are inconvenient for the powerful, they also have a certain positive force that falsehood lacks: "Truth, though powerless and always defe ated in a head-on clash with the powers that be, possesses a strength of its own: whatever those in power may contrive, they are unable to discover or invent a viable substitute for it. Persuasion and violence can destroy truth, but they cannot replace it" ("Truth" 259). Facts have a strangely resilient quality partially because a lie "tears, as it were, a hole in the fabric of factuality. As every historian knows, one can spot a lie by noticing incongruities, holes, or the j unctures of patched-up places" ("Truth" 253). While she is sometimes discouraging about our ability to see the tears in the fabric, citing the capacity of totalitarian governments to create the whole cloth (see "Truth" 252-54), she is also sometimes optimistic. InEichmann in Jerusalem, she repeats the story of Anton Schmidt—a man who saved the lives of Jews—and concludes that such stories cannot be silenced (230-32). For facts to exert power in the common world, however, these stories must be told. Rational truth (such as principles of mathematics) might be perceptible and demonstrable through individual contemplation, but "factual truth, on the contrary, is always related to other people: it concerns events and circumstances in which many are involved; it is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy. It is political by nature" (23 8). Arendt is neither a positivist who posits an autonomous individual who can correctly perceive truth, nor a relativist who positively asserts the inherent relativism of all perception. Her description of how truth functions does not fall anywhere in the three-part expeditio so prevalent in bothrhetoric and philosophy: it is not expressivist, positivist, or social constructivist. Good thinking depends upon good public argument, and good public argument depends upon access to facts: "Freedom of opinion is a farce unless factual information is guaranteed" (238). The sort of thinking that Arendt propounds takes the form of action only when it is public argument, and, as such, it is particularly precious: "For if no other test but the experience of being active, no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all" (Human 325). Arendt insists that it is "the same general rule— Do not contradict yourself (not your self but your thinking ego)—that determines both thinking and acting" (Lectures 3 7). In place of the mildly resentful conformism that fuels totalitarianism, Arendt proposes what Pitkin calls "a tough-minded, open-eyed readiness to perceive and judge reality for oneself, in terms of concrete experience and independent, critical theorizing" (274). The paradoxical nature of agonism (that it must involve both individuality and commonality) makes it difficult to maintain, as the temptation is great either to think one's own thoughts without reference to anyone else or to let others do one's thinking. Arendt's Polemical Agonism As I said, agonism does have its advocates within rhetoric—Burke, Ong, Sloane, Gage, and Jarratt, for instance—but while each of these theorists proposes a form of conflictual argument, not one of these is as adversarial as Arendt's. Agonism can emphasize persuasion, as does John Gage's textbook The Shape of Reason or William Brandt et al.'s The Craft of Writing. That is, the goal of the argument is to identify the disagreement and then construct a text that gains the assent of the audience. This is not the same as what Gage (citing Thomas Conley) calls "asymmetrical theories of rhetoric": theories that "presuppose an active speaker and a passive audience, a speaker whose rhetorical task is therefore to do something to that audience" ("Reasoned" 6). Asymmetric rhetoric is not and cannot be agonistic. Persuasive agonism still values conflict, disagreement, and equality among interlocutors, but it has the goal of reaching agreement, as when Gage says that the process of argument should enable one's reasons to be "understood and believed" by others (Shape 5; emphasis added). Arendt's version is what one might call polemical agonism: it puts less emphasis on gaining assent, and it is exemplified both in Arendt's own writing and in Donald Lazere's "Ground Rules for Polemicists" and "Teaching the Political Conflicts." Both forms of agonism (persuasive and polemical) require substantive debate at two points in a long and recursive process. First, one engages in debate in order to invent one's argument; even silent thinking is a "dialogue of myself with myself (Lectures 40). The difference between the two approaches to agonism is clearest when one presents an argument to an audience assumed to be an opposition. In persuasive agonism, one plays down conflict and moves through reasons to try to persuade one's audience. In polemical agonism, however, one's intention is not necessarily to prove one's case, but to make public one' s thought in order to test it. In this way, communicability serves the same function in philosophy that replicability serves in the sciences; it is how one tests the validity of one's thought. In persuasive agonism, success is achieved through persuasion; in polemical agonism, success may be marked through the quality of subsequent controversy. Arendt quotes from a letter Kant wrote on this point: You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve upon my previous insight may be obtainable. {Lectures 42) Kant's use of "impartial" here is interesting: he is not describing a stance that is free of all perspective; it is impartial only in the sense that it is not his own view. This is the same way that Arendt uses the term; she does not advocate any kind of positivistic rationality, but instead a "universal interdependence" ("Truth" 242). She does not place the origin of the "disinterested pursuit of truth" in science, but at "the moment when Homer chose to sing the deeds of the Trojans no less than those of the Achaeans, and to praise the glory of Hector, the foe and the defeated man, no less than the glory of Achilles, the hero of his kinfolk" ("Truth" 262¬63). It is useful to note that Arendt tends not to use the term "universal," opting more often for "common," by which she means both what is shared and what is ordinary, a usage that evades many of the problems associated with universalism while preserving its virtues (for a brief butprovocative application of Arendt's notion of common, see Hauser 100-03). In polemical agonism, there is a sense in which one' s main goal is not to persuade one's readers; persuading one's readers, if this means that they fail to see errors and flaws in one' s argument, might actually be a sort of failure. It means that one wishes to put forward an argument that makes clear what one's stance is and why one holds it, but with the intention of provoking critique and counterargument. Arendt describes Kant's "hope" for his writings not that the number of people who agree with him would increase but "that the circle of his examiners would gradually be en¬larged" {Lectures 39); he wanted interlocutors, not acolytes. This is not consensus-based argument, nor is it what is sometimes called "consociational argument," nor is this argument as mediation or conflict resolution. Arendt (and her commentators) use the term "fight," and they mean it. When Arendt describes the values that are necessary in our world, she says, "They are a sense of honor, desire for fame and glory, the spirit of fighting without hatred and 'without the spirit of revenge,' and indifference to material advantages" {Crises 167). Pitkin summarizes Arendt's argument: "Free citizenship presupposes the ability to fight— openly, seriously, with commitment, and about things that really mat¬ter—without fanaticism, without seeking to exterminate one's oppo¬nents" (266). My point here is two-fold: first, there is not a simple binary opposition between persuasive discourse and eristic discourse, the conflictual versus the collaborative, or argument as opposed to debate. Second, while polemical agonismrequires diversity among interlocutors, and thus seems an extraordinarily appropriate notion, and while it may be a useful corrective to too much emphasis on persuasion, it seems to me that polemical agonism could easily slide into the kind of wrangling that is simply frustrating. Arendt does not describe just how one is to keep the conflict useful. Although she rejects the notion that politics is "no more than a battlefield of partial, conflicting interests, where nothing countfs] but pleasure and profit, partisanship, and the lust for dominion," she does not say exactly how we are to know when we are engaging in the existential leap of argument versus when we are lusting for dominion ("Truth" 263). Like other proponents of agonism, Arendt argues that rhetoric does not lead individuals or communities to ultimate Truth; it leads to decisions that will necessarily have to be reconsidered. Even Arendt, who tends to express a greater faith than many agonists (such as Burke, Sloane, or Kastely) in the ability of individuals to perceive truth, insists that self-deception is always a danger, so public discourse is necessary as a form of testing (see especially Lectures and "Truth"). She remarks that it is difficult to think beyond one's self-interest and that "nothing, indeed, is more common, even among highly sophisticated people, than the blind obstinacy that becomes manifest in lack of imagination and failure to judge" ("Truth" 242). Agonism demands that one simultaneously trust and doubt one' s own perceptions, rely on one's own judgment and consider the judgments of others, think for oneself and imagine how others think. The question remains whether this is a kind of thought in which everyone can engage. Is the agonistic public sphere (whether political, academic, or scientific) only available to the few? Benhabib puts this criticism in the form of a question: "That is, is the 'recovery of the public space' under conditions of modernity necessarily an elitist and antidemocratic project that can hardly be reconciled with the demand for universal political emancipa¬tion and the universal extension of citizenship rights that have accompa¬nied modernity since the American and French Revolutions?" (75). This is an especially troubling question not only because Arendt's examples of agonistic rhetoric are from elitist cultures, but also because of com¬ments she makes, such as this one from The Human Condition: "As a living experience, thought has always been assumed, perhaps wrongly, to be known only to the few. It may not be presumptuous to believe that these few have not become fewer in our time" {Human 324). Yet, there are important positive political consequences of agonism. Arendt' s own promotion of the agonistic sphere helps to explain how the system could be actively moral. It is not an overstatement to say that a central theme in Arendt's work is the evil of conformity—the fact that the modern bureaucratic state makes possible extraordinary evil carried out by people who do not even have any ill will toward their victims. It does so by "imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Human 40). It keeps people from thinking, and it keeps them behaving. The agonistic model's celebration of achievement and verbal skill undermines the political force of conformity, so it is a force against the bureaucratizing of evil. If people think for themselves, they will resist dogma; if people think of themselves as one of many, they will empathize; if people can do both, they will resist totalitarianism. And if they talk about what they see, tell their stories, argue about their perceptions, and listen to one another—that is, engage in rhetoric—then they are engaging in antitotalitarian action. In post-Ramistic rhetoric, it is a convention to have a thesis, and one might well wonder just what mine is—whether I am arguing for or against Arendt's agonism. Arendt does not lay out a pedagogy for us to follow (although one might argue that, if she had, it would lookmuch like the one Lazere describes in "Teaching"), so I am not claiming that greater attention to Arendt would untangle various pedagogical problems that teachers of writing face. Nor am I claiming that applying Arendt's views will resolve theoretical arguments that occupy scholarly journals. I am saying, on the one hand, that Arendt's connection of argument and thinking, as well as her perception that both serve to thwart totalitarian¬ism, suggest that agonal rhetoric (despite the current preference for collaborative rhetoric) is the best discourse for a diverse and inclusive public sphere. On the other hand, Arendt's advocacy of agonal rhetoric is troubling (and, given her own admiration for Kant, this may be intentional), especially in regard to its potential elitism, masculinism, failure to describe just how to keep argument from collapsing into wrangling, and apparently cheerful acceptance of hierarchy. Even with these flaws, Arendt describes something we would do well to consider thoughtfully: a fact-based but not positivist, communally grounded but not relativist, adversarial but not violent, independent but not expressivist rhetoric.

### 1NC

#### AGAMBEN’S THEORIES ARE PERFORMATIVE ANTHROPOCENTRISM THAT REINSCRIBE MORE VIOLENT METAYPHSICAL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN FORMS OF LIFE THAN THOSE THEY ATTEMPT TO CHALLENGE. TURNS THE CASE

CALARCO 2K6

[Jamming the Anthropological Machine, Matthew, google]

Thus, when we consider the ethico-political status of animal life, the necessity for working toward a form of politics beyond the present humanist, democratic, and juridical orders becomes clear beyond any shadow of a doubt. Even Jacques Derrida—who has always taken a nuanced and generally respectful stance toward humanism and the law, refusing either fully to endorse or reject them—has acknowledged the limits of legislation in this regard. Concerning political and ethical relations between human beings and animals, he argues:¶ A transformation is . . . necessary and inevitable, for reasons that are both conscious and unconscious. Slow, laborious, sometimes gradual, sometimes accelerated, the mutation of relations between humans and animals will not necessarily or solely take the form of a charter, a declaration of rights, or a tribunal governed by a legislator. I do not believe in the miracle of legislation. Besides, there is already a law, more or less empirical, and that’s better than nothing. But it does not prevent the slaughtering, or the “techno-scientific” pathologies of the market or of industrial production.[4]¶ The point that I wish to make here is that, were sufficient attention given to the question of the animal by Agamben, his arguments aimed at the limitations of the logic of sovereignty and our current political and juridical models would become significantly more powerful and persuasive. That Agamben chooses to avoid this approach is indicative of what could be called a “performative anthropocentrism” in his texts. In the following section, I argue that if Agamben and other post-humanist approaches to politics are unable overcome this kind of anthropocentrism, the logic of the anthropological machine will reassert itself in places where we least expect it.

#### AND, this species-contingent paradigm creates unending genocidal violence against forms of life deemed politically unqualified.

KOCHI & ORDAN 2K8

[tarik and noam, queen’s university and bar llan university, “an argument for the global suicide of humanity”, vol 7. no. 4., bourderlands e-journal]

Within the picture many paint of humanity, events such as the Holocaust are considered as an exception, an aberration. The Holocaust is often portrayed as an example of ‘evil’, a moment of hatred, madness and cruelty (cf. the differing accounts of ‘evil’ given in Neiman, 2004). The event is also treated as one through which humanity comprehend its own weakness and draw strength, via the resolve that such actions will never happen again. However, if we take seriously the differing ways in which the Holocaust was ‘evil’, then one must surely include along side it the almost uncountable numbers of genocides that have occurred throughout human history. Hence, if we are to think of the content of the ‘human heritage’, then this must include the annihilation of indigenous peoples and their cultures across the globe and the manner in which their beliefs, behaviours and social practices have been erased from what the people of the ‘West’ generally consider to be the content of a human heritage. Again the history of colonialism is telling here. It reminds us exactly how normal, regular and mundane acts of annihilation of different forms of human life and culture have been throughout human history. Indeed the history of colonialism, in its various guises, points to the fact that so many of our legal institutions and forms of ethical life (i.e. nation-states which pride themselves on protecting human rights through the rule of law) have been founded upon colonial violence, war and the appropriation of other peoples’ land (Schmitt, 2003; Benjamin, 1986). Further, the history of colonialism highlights the central function of ‘race war’ that often underlies human social organisation and many of its legal and ethical systems of thought (Foucault, 2003). This history of modern colonialism thus presents a key to understanding that events such as the Holocaust are not an aberration and exception but are closer to the norm, and sadly, lie at the heart of any heritage of humanity. After all, all too often the European colonisation of the globe was justified by arguments that indigenous inhabitants were racially ‘inferior’ and in some instances that they were closer to ‘apes’ than to humans (Diamond, 2006). Such violence justified by an erroneous view of ‘race’ is in many ways merely an extension of an underlying attitude of speciesism involving a long history of killing and enslavement of non-human species by humans. Such a connection between the two histories of inter-human violence (via the mythical notion of differing human ‘races’) and interspecies violence, is well expressed in Isaac Bashevis Singer’s comment that whereas humans consider themselves “the crown of creation”, for animals “all people are Nazis” and animal life is “an eternal Treblinka” (Singer, 1968, p.750).

#### Alternative: the judge should vote negative to REJECT THE HUMAN/ANIMAL DIVIDE.

#### this rejection enables an understanding of the SPECIES-BEING. that SOLVES THE ETHICAL CONTRADICTION OF THEIR SPECIES-LEVEL RACISM.

HUDSON 2K4

[Laura, The Political Animal: Species-Being and Bare Life, mediations journal, http://www.mediationsjournal.org/files/Mediations23\_2\_04.pdf]

We are all equally reduced to mere specimens of human biology, mute and uncomprehending of the world in which we are thrown. Species-being, or “humanity as a species,” may require this recognition to move beyond the pseudo-essence of the religion of humanism. Recognizing that what we call “the human” is an abstraction that fails to fully describe what we are, we may come to find a new way of understanding humanity that recuperates the natural without domination. The bare life that results from expulsion from the law removes even the illusion of freedom. Regardless of one’s location in production, the threat of losing even the fiction of citizenship and freedom affects everyone. This may create new means of organizing resistance across the particular divisions of society. Furthermore, the concept of bare life allows us to gesture toward a more detailed, concrete idea of what species-being may look like. Agamben hints that in the recognition of this fact, that in our essence we are all animals, that we are all living dead, might reside the possibility of a kind of redemption. Rather than the mystical horizon of a future community, the passage to species-being may be experienced as a deprivation, a loss of identity. Species-being is not merely a positive result of the development of history; it is equally the absence of many of the features of “humanity” through which we have learned to make sense of our world. It is an absence of the kind of individuality and atomism that structure our world under capitalism and underlie liberal democracy, and which continue to inform the tenets of deep ecology. The development of species-being requires the collapse of the distinction between human and animal in order to change the shape of our relationships with the natural world. A true species-being depends on a sort of reconciliation between our “human” and “animal” selves, a breakdown of the distinction between the two both within ourselves and in nature in general. Bare life would then represent not only expulsion from the law but the possibility of its overcoming. Positioned in the zone of indistinction, no longer a subject of the law but still subjected to it through absence, what we equivocally call “the human” in general becomes virtually indistinguishable from the animal or nature. But through this expulsion and absence, we may see not only the law but the system of capitalism that shapes it from a position no longer blinded or captivated by its spell. The structure of the law is revealed as always suspect in the false division between natural and political life, which are never truly separable. Though clearly the situation is not yet as dire as Agamben’s invocation of the Holocaust suggests, we are all, as citizens, under the threat of the state of exception. With the decline of the nation as a form of social organization, the whittling away of civil liberties and, with them, the state’s promise of “the good life” (or “the good death”) even in the most developed nations, with the weakening of labor as the bearer of resistance to exploitation, how are we to envision the future of politics and society?

### PIC

**Counter advocacy text- Kanan and I affirm openness to Indigenous epistemologies of energy production, freeing ourselves from the violent domination of Western rationality.**

**Our counter advocacy is competitive- it uses the phrase “Kanan and I” instead of the word “we” to describe the agents of action**

**Using “we” to promote a normative statement of action empowers violent state practices by ceding individual agency to state authority**

**Johnson 08**

[Charles, a web developer, student of Philosophy, and sometime political activist, living and working in Las Vegas, Nevada holds a .B.A. in Philosophy and a minor in Computer Science. “The Statist ‘we don’t’”]

When [rioting St. Paul cops arrested Amy Goodman](http://radgeek.com/gt/2008/09/03/this_is/), CREDO Mobile published the video and issued an action alert with the odd declarative title [“This is America. We don’t arrest journalists here.”](http://act.credoaction.com/campaign/dont_arrest_journalists/?r=1376&id=803-446809-J83wjHx). The first problem is the false subject. “We” don’t arrest journalists, or anyone else. Government cops arrest people. I don’t, and neither do you. So, let’s rephrase: “This is America. Police don’t arrest journalists here.” But what’s the “don’t” supposed to mean here? If it’s supposed to be a simple declarative statement, then it’s obviously false. Police evidently do arrest journalists here; I know because I saw it happen in the video CREDO linked to. Obviously, even though the statement seems to be declarative, it’s actually intended to do something other than state a fact. The statement is being made in the context of an outraged action alert, so it seems fair to interpret it as a normative claim instead of a descriptive claim. If I say “You just don’t treat people that way,” what I’m saying is that you shouldn’t treat people like that. So let’s rephrase: “This is America. Police shouldn’t arrest journalists here.” That’s certainly true. Police shouldn’t arrest journalists. But then what’s the purpose of the “This is America” and the “here”? It’s true that police shouldn’t arrest journalists in America; but that’s no less true in Egypt or China. Police shouldn’t arrest journalists anywhere. So what did CREDO really mean? There’s another voice in which people sometimes use this kind of talk — a voice different from the statement of fact, and a voice different from the expression of a moral judgment. It is the voice of authority laying down an expectation for others to follow. (“We don’t use that kind of language in this household;” “Catholics do not use birth control;” etc.) And I think here we have a clear understanding of what it was CREDO meant to say, and what purpose the “This is America” is supposed to serve. Not content with simply pointing out the fact that it’s wrong for police to arrest journalists — that this kind of conduct is violent, repressive, tyrannical, and indeed evil — what they wanted to do was to cite an authority on their side. The authority is supposedly wrapped up in the idea of “America” (meaning the U.S.A.) — U.S. norms, U.S. political culture, and the U.S. Constitution. But what good does it do to try to assume the voice of authority here? What justifies the claim? What purpose does it serve? In St. Paul, several different police agencies, ramrodded by the Ramsey County Sheriff’s department, staged [massive pre-emptive raids](http://radgeek.com/gt/2008/09/04/this_is/) against houses where activists were staying and against the RNC Welcoming Committee’s convergence space. [Many of the imprisoned protesters were held for days without charges.](http://radgeek.com/gt/2008/09/05/emergency_action/) Many were abused by their jailers, including a woman being knocked to the ground and dragged by her hair, several protesters being denied prescription or over-the-counter medications for serious medical conditions, and a 19-year-old activist named Elliot Hughes, who was beaten and tortured for over an hour because, according to the Ramsey County Sheriff’s department, he was being verbally “disruptive.” There is little or no evidence that any legal authority, either executive or judicial, will ever hold any of these cops or jailers accountable for what they did. Nobody in a position of authority disapproves. Nobody in a position of authority cares. Whatever source of authority CREDO hopes to invoke here is a dead letter; the very people that it gave the power to interpret it and enforce it have decided that there’s nothing to forbid police to harass and terrorize journalists like this. If those authorities are right, then CREDO’s attempt to speak in the voice of authority is fraudulent: the authority that they are trying to invoke has nothing to say for them. If those authorities are wrong, then CREDO’s attempt to speak in the voice of authority is idle: the same system that they hope to call to their aid is constructed so that CREDO can do nothing about it. The first step is admitting that you have a problem. We live in a state where the highest authorities consider this repressive violence perfectly acceptable behavior in the name of Law and Order. And it is long past time to give up on the delusion that the Authorities and the Law will get our back against this kind of abuse of power.

**THAT MAKES GENOCIDE AND WAR INEVITABLE**

**Martin 90**

[Brian Martin, associate professor in [Science, Technology and Society](http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/ssmac/sts/index.html) at the University of Wollongong, UPROOTING THE WAR SYSTEM,, <http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/90uw/uw07.html>)]

Is the state system really so bad? War is the most obvious indictment of the system, and this alone should be enough to justify questioning the state. As wars have become more destructive, there is no sign that any steps to re-examine or transform the state system are being taken by state elites. This should not be surprising. War is not simply a by-product of the state system, to be moderated and regulated when it becomes too dangerous to populations. Rather, **war is part and parcel of the state system**, so the destructiveness of war makes little difference. State elites (and many others) see the world as a state-structured world, and all action is premised on this perspective. **War is the external manifestation of state violence. Political repression is its internal form.** Political freedoms are not only at a premium under military dictatorships and state socialism, but are also precarious in the representative democracies, especially in relation to 'national security.' One of the most telling indictments of **the state system** is found in Leo Kuper's book *Genocide*. Kuper **documents the most horrific exterminations in this century, including the killing of the Jews by the Nazis, the massacre of the Bangladeshis by the Pakistan army** in 1971 **and the extermination in Cambodia** beginning in 1975. What is damning of the state system is **the reluctance of governments** (and of that assemblage of state actors, the United Nations) **to intervene against** even the most well documented **genocidal killing. The reason** for this reluctance **is** the concern for the autonomy of the state. In short, **maintaining the 'integrity' of the state system** is more important for state elites than intervening against genocide. There are many other social problems caused, sustained or aggravated by the state, including suppression of dissent, state support for corporate elites, and the activities of spy agencies and secret police. These problems stem essentially from the system of unequal power and privilege which the state both is part of and sustains. The state is not the only way to embody and sustain unequal power and privilege: it is a particular way involving bureaucracies for administration and military forces for defending against external and internal enemies.

### Case

**Managerialism is necessary to prevent global extinction –processes of environmental destruction are unstoppable without intervention**

**Levy 99**

Dr Neil Levy 1999. Fellow of the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at Charles Sturt University. “Discourses of the Environment” p. 215

**If the ‘technological fix’ is unlikely to be more successful than strategies of limitation of our uses of resources, we are nevertheless unable to simply leave the environment as it is. There is a real and pressing need for more, and more accurate, technical and scientific information about the non-human world**. For we are faced with a situation in which **the processes we have already set in train will continue to impact upon that world, and therefore us, for centuries. It is therefore necessary**, not only to stop cutting down the rain forests, but **to develop real, concrete proposals for action, to reverse, or at least limit, the effects of our previous interventions**. More over, there is another reason why **our behaviour towards the non-human cannot simply be a matter of leaving it as it is,** at least **in so far as our goals are not only environmental but also involve social justice**. For if we simply preserve what remains to us of wilderness, of the countryside and of park land, we also preserve patterns of very unequal access to their resources and their consolations (Soper 1995: 207). In fact, we risk exacerbating these inequalities. It is no us, but the poor of **Brazil**, who **will bear the brunt of the misery which would result form a strictly enforced policy of leaving the Amazonian rain forest untouched, in the absence of alternative means of providing for their livelihood.** **It is the development of policies to provide such ecologically sustainable alternative which we require, as well as the development of technical means for replacing our current greenhouse gas-emitting sources of energy. Such policies and proposals for concrete action must be formulated by** ecologists, environmentalist, **people with expertise concerning the functioning of ecosystems and the impacts which our actions have upon them. Such proposals are**, therefore, **very much the province for Foucault’s specific intellectual, the one who works ‘within specific sectors, at the precise points where their won conditions of life or work situate them**’ (Foucault 1980g: 126). For who could be more fittingly described as ‘the strategists of life and death’ than these environmentalists? After the end of the Cold War, it is in this sphere, more than any other, that man’s ‘politics places his existence as a living being in question’ (Foucault 1976: 143). For **it is in facing the consequences of our intervention in the non-human world that the fate of our species, and of those with whom we share this planet, will be decided.**

**Technological thought inevitable**

**Leach 3**

date page modified (Neil, Professor at the University of Southern California, “Forget Heidegger”, August 15, <http://www.china-designer.com/magazine/leach/txt1.htm>)

Adorno's further example of the car reveals how the **technological has come to colonise our everyday lives not as standing reserve, but as something to which symbolic intention is always already being 'attached'**. The point here is that we have to understand that our engagement with technology involves a moment of 'proprioception'. **Technology may come to operate as a form of 'prosthesis' to the human body that is appropriated such that it becomes part of the motility of the body**. In driving a car we come to navigate the road through that car. As such, the car as an item of technology is not divorced - alienated - from the body. Indeed it becomes a form of extension to that body. What I am arguing here is not some simplistic manifesto for cyborgs, claiming that human beings can become part human and part machine. Rather I am trying to tease out the logic of mimesis itself. For according to this logic, **human beings have absorbed technology at an unconscious level, such that they have come to operate through technology**, as though by way of some tele-kinesis.¶ Not only this, but **technology may actually influence the way that human beings think. It may itself affect our consciousness**. Let us take the example of the computer. For, if as Walter Benjamin once argued, the factory worker in the modernist age comes to absorb the jolting, jarring repetitive action of the machine, such that those movements are appropriated into the worker's own behaviour, so too people today have absorbed the thinking and fluid circuitry behind the computer screen. **New conditions breed new ways of thinking**. As Douglas Rushkoff observes, a new computer generation is emerging. The computer kids of today come to behave like their computers. They identify with them, play with them, and mimic their operations. Analogical reasoning is out. Non-linear, multiple-layered thinking is in - Deleuzian surfing. Fractals, rhizomes and clones, fluidity and flux - these are the buzz words of this new generation. In such a context, those who argue against the use of the computer in the contemporary design studio are failing to address the concrete ontological reality of life today, and are doing no service to the students, for whom knowledge of computer has become a 'given' within the contemporary office. It may be that the still prevalent **antipathy towards digital technology is merely a form of 'denial'**. As in the case of homophobics, who often deny their latent homosexuality, critics of technology may be repressing a secret fascination with technology. An individual 'in denial' may be fascinated by some personal psychic obsession, but, not wishing to acknowledge it, will project that obsession on to some external object, and then criticise it. But **whether this antipathy towards digital technology is a form of repressed fascination or not, it is clearly out of place in what has become a highly digitalised world**.¶ This is not to say that the computer should be accepted unproblematically within the studio. Indeed the lessons of those design schools that have accepted the computer wholesale would seem to indicate that the concerns expressed in The Anaesthetics of Architecture about the potential aestheticisation and hence anaesthetisation of social issues are borne out only too clearly in such contexts. Rather it is a call for a self-critical, theoretically informed engagement with such realms. Theory may be unable in itself to combat the potential problems of aestheticisation. Yet it may provide the first crucial step. **Once a problem has been exposed, one is no longer trapped by that problem.**¶ **The consequences are all too obvious. Not only have we accepted technology as an essential part of our everyday life, such that the distinction once posed between techné and technology seems no longer valid, but our whole existence has become conditioned by technology**. In this new digital age, as Sarah Chaplin argues, we have adopted a form of cybervisuality. An important factor, then, is our interface with that technology. For **technology may take many forms**. Here the question of design becomes crucial. The message of mimesis is not that human beings will adapt to anything, so that design is unimportant, but precisely the opposite. Design becomes an important mechanism for making people feel at one with their world. This relates not simply to whether a piece of technology is itself aesthetically pleasing - as is the case, say, with the iMac computer - , but in the context of digital technology it relates also to the user interface - to software programming and its compatibility with human modes of operation. **Far from engendering alienation, well designed technology has the capacity to overcome alienation**.¶ There was a time when Heideggerian thought made a substantial and noteworthy contribution to architectural culture in challenging the spirit of positivism that was once so pervasive. But now **Heideggerian thinking must not** itself **go unchallenged, in that it threatens to install itself as a set of fixed values out of tune with the fluidity and flux of contemporary society**. And while some would criticise postmodern thought for being relativistic in accommodating plurality and difference, and questioning the ground on which any particular statement is made, the true relativism lies surely in a tradition that forecloses even the possibility of even asking these questions, by doggedly adhering to an out of date set of values, and by failing to engage substantively with any critical discourse.¶ In an increasingly digital world, it is time, it would seem, to adopt a more flexible and tolerant attitude towards digital technology. It is time to break free from the shackles of the past. **It is time**, perhaps, **to forget Heidegger**.

**The alt is violent, causes passivity, and makes exploitation worse**

**Graham ‘99**

(Phil, Graduate School of Management, University of Queensland, Heidegger’s Hippies: A dissenting voice on the “problem of the subject” in cyberspace, Identities in Action! 1999, <http://www.philgraham.net/HH_conf.pdf>)

Societies should get worried when Wagner’s music becomes popular because it usually means that distorted interpretations of Nietzsche’s philosophy are not far away. Existentialists create problems about what is, especially identity (Heidegger 1947). **Existentialism inevitably leads to an authoritarian worldview**: this, my Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying, this mystery world of twofold voluptuous delight, my “beyond good and evil,” without a goal, unless the joy of the circle itself is a goal; without will, unless a ring feels good will towards itself – do you want a name for this world? A solution to all its riddles? A light for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, most intrepid, most midnightly men? – This world is the will to power – and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power – and nothing besides! (Nietzsche 1967/1997). **Armed with a volume of Nietzsche, some considerable oratory skills**, several Wagner records, **and** an existentialist University Rector in the form of Martin **Heidegger, Hitler managed some truly astounding feats** of strategic identity engineering (cf. Bullock, 1991). Upon being appointed to the Freiberg University, **Heidegger pronounced the end of thought**, history, ideology, and civilisation: ‘**No dogmas and ideas will any longer be the laws of your being. The Fuhrer himself**, and he alone, **is the present and future reality for Germany’** (in Bullock 1991: 345). **Heidegger signed up to an ideology-free politics:** Hitler’s ‘Third Way’ (Eatwell 1997). The idealised identity, the new symbol of mythological worship, Nietzsche’s European Superman, was to rule from that day hence. **Hitler took control of the means of propaganda**: the media; the means of mental production: the education system; the means of violence: the police, army, and prison system; and pandered to the means of material production: industry and agriculture; and proclaimed a New beginning and a New world order. **He ordered Germany to look forward into the next thousand years and forget the past.** Heidegger and existentialism remain influential to this day, and history remains bunk (e.g. Giddens4, 1991, Chapt. 2). Giddens’s claims that ‘humans live in circumstances of … existential contradiction’, and that ‘subjective death’ and ‘biological death’ are somehow unrelated, is a an ultimately repressive abstraction: from that perspective, life is merely a series of subjective deaths, as if death were the ultimate motor of life itself (cf. Adorno 1964/1973). **History is, in fact, the simple and straightforward answer to the “problem of the subject”.** **“The problem” is** also **a handy device for confusing, entertaining, and selling trash to the masses**. **By emphasising the problem of the ‘ontological self’** (Giddens 1991: 49), **informationalism** and ‘consumerism’ **confines the navel-gazing, ‘narcissistic’ masses to a permanent present which they self-consciously sacrifice for a Utopian future** (cf. Adorno 1973: 303; Hitchens 1999; Lasch 1984: 25-59). **Meanwhile transnational businesses go about their work, ~~raping~~ [ruining] the environment;** **swindling each other and whole nations; and inflicting populations with declining wages, declining working conditions, and declining social security. Slavery is once again on the increase** (Castells, 1998; Graham, 1999; ILO, 1998). **There is no “problem of the subject”,** just as there is no “global society**”; there is only the mass amnesia of utopian propaganda**, the strains of which have historically accompanied revolutions in communication technologies. **Each person’s identity is, quite simply, their subjective account of a unique** and objective **history** of interactions within the objective social and material environments they inhabit, create, and inherit. **The identity of each person is their most intimate historical information, and they are its material expression: each person is a record of their own history at any given time. Thus, each person is a recognisably material, identifiable entity: an identity.** This is their condition. **People are not theoretical entities; they are people.** As such**, they have an intrinsic identity with an intrinsic value**. **No amount of theory** or propaganda **will make it go away. The widespread multilateral attempts to prop up consumer society** and **hypercapitalism as a valid and useful means of sustainable growth**, indeed, **as the path to an** inevitable**, international democratic Utopia, are already showing their disatrous cracks. The “problem” of subjective death threatens to give way,** once again, **to unprecedented mass slaughter.** **The numbed condition of a narcissistic society, rooted in a permanent “now”, a blissful state of Heideggerian Dasein, threatens to wake up to a world in which “subjective death” and ontology are the least of all worries**.

#### Space exploration results from our viewing of space as an infinite standing reserve, the supreme manifestation of the danger of technology.

Soccio in 09 (Douglas J., Professor of Philosophy @ Shasta University Archetypes of Wisdom: An Introduction to Philosophy Seventh Edition The Age of Technology: Danger p.515, 2009) JM

We measure—“order”—the cosmos itself, looking to outer space for new sources of energy to add to the ever-expanding standing-reserve. When nature as a whole is threatened by technology, we employ technology to count and record (“order”) endangered species via wireless transmitters. We scientifically analyze soil and air samples, track storms via satellite, and obsessively tweak additives and supplements to enhance our food supply. We seek out new superdrugs to kill off superbugs created by older drugs crafted to kill off older bugs. Yet in these very attempts to control the world and to come to technically “correct” understandings of the world, “the truth will withdraw,” Heidegger warns. Correct, calculative, objective understanding of particulars, though not sufficient for grasping the truth of existence, is potently useful, seductive, and distracting and induces complacency. This, says Heidegger, is “the supreme danger” of technology, a danger rooted in our overall indifference to every- thing that is not part of the standing-reserve. So long as we are chiefly inter- ested in things as means, as instruments, as standing-reserve, we inevitably come to a point where we take ourselves for standing-reserve. Then, ironically and monstrously, . . . precisely as the one so threatened, [man] exalts himself to the posture of the lord of the earth. In this way the illusion comes to prevail that everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct. This illusion gives rise in turn to one final delusion: it seems as though man everywhere and always encounters only himself. . . . In truth, however, precisely nowhere does man today any longer encounter himself, i.e., his essence.

#### Extinction

Schulze-Makuch and Davies 2010 (Dirk Schulze-Makuch, Ph.D., School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, Washington State University and Paul Davies, Ph.D., Beyond Center, Arizona State University, “To Boldly Go: A One-Way Human Mission to Mars”, <http://journalofcosmology.com/Mars108.html>)

There are several reasons that motivate the establishment of a permanent Mars colony. We are a vulnerable species living in a part of the galaxy where cosmic events such as major asteroid and comet impacts and supernova explosions pose a significant threat to life on Earth, especially to human life. There are also more immediate threats to our culture, if not our survival as a species. These include global pandemics, nuclear or biological warfare, runaway global warming, sudden ecological collapse and supervolcanoes (Rees 2004). Thus, the colonization of other worlds is a must if the human species is to survive for the long term. The first potential colonization targets would be asteroids, the Moon and Mars. The Moon is the closest object and does provide some shelter (e.g., lava tube caves), but in all other respects falls short compared to the variety of resources available on Mars. The latter is true for asteroids as well. Mars is by far the most promising for sustained colonization and development, because it is similar in many respects to Earth and, crucially, possesses a moderate surface gravity, an atmosphere, abundant water and carbon dioxide, together with a range of essential minerals. Mars is our second closest planetary neighbor (after Venus) and a trip to Mars at the most favorable launch option takes about six months with current chemical rocket technology.

## 2NC

### AT Ethics DA – they lead to exlcusion

#### C) Echo Chamber DA - This rejection of structured clash makes debate into an echo chamber. This impoverishes their project even if it is right

Talisse 5

Professor of Philosophy @Vandy¶ Robert, Philosophy & Social Criticism, Deliberativist responses to activist challenges, 31(4) p. 429-431

The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. **The deliberativist view** I have sketched hold that reasonableness **involved some degree of** what we may call **epistemic modesty. On this** view, **the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons,** and so she enters into public discourse **as a way of testing her views against the objections** and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly hold that **her present view is open to reasonable critique** and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of **politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable**. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness **for the activist** consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action; **discussion with those who disagree need not be involved**. **According to the activist,** there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which **there is no room for reasoned objection.** Under such conditions, **the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational**. It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001A; ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political **activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies,** demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. Activists also must engage in deliberation among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movement must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tact’s; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. **Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists**. **Group polarization** is a well-documented phenomenon that **has ‘been found all over the world** and is many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81-2). Importantly, **in group that ‘engage in repeated discussions’** over time, **the polarization is even more pronounced** (2003: 86). Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of an individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.).17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that **he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees** in cases in which the requirement of justice are so clear that he can be confidents that has the truth .Group polarization suggest that even deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even we have the truth. **For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views,** but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth ,In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggest that a engagement with those with whom one disagrees is essential to the proper pursuitof justice. Insofar as the activist denies this, he is unreasonable.

### AT Difference DA

#### Topical limits enable creativity. Beauty emerges from identifying constraints and working within them.

Flood 10

(Scott, BS in Communication and Theatre Arts – St. Joseph’s College, School Board Member – Plainfield Community School Corporation, and Advertising Agent, “Business Innovation – Real Creativity Happens Inside the Box”, http://ezinearticles.com/?Business-Innovation---Real-Creativity-Happens-Inside-the-Box&id=4793692)

It seems that we can accomplish anything if we're brave enough to step out of that bad, bad box, and **thinking "creatively" has come to be synonymous with ignoring rules** and constraints or pretending they just don't exist. **Nonsense.** Real creativity is put to the test within the box. In fact, that's where it really shines. It might surprise you, but **it's** actually **easier to think outside the box than within its confines**. How can that be? It's simple. When you're working **outside the box, you don't face rules**, or boundaries, or assumptions. You create your own as you go along. If you want to throw convention aside, you can do it. If you want to throw proven practices out the window, have at it. You have the freedom to create your own world. Now, I'm not saying there's anything wrong with thinking outside the box. At times, it's absolutely essential - such as when you're facing the biggest oil spill in history in an environment in which all the known approaches are failing. But most of us don't have the luxury of being able to operate outside the box. We've been shoved into reality, facing a variety of limitations, from budgets, to supervisors' opinions and prejudices, to the nature of the marketplace. Even though the box may have been given a bad name, it's where most of us have to spend our time. And no matter how much we may fret about those limits, inside that box is where we need to prove ourselves. If you'll pardon the inevitable sports analogy, **consider a baseball player who belts ball after ball** over 450 feet. **Unfortunately**, he has a wee problem: **he can't place those** hits **between the foul lines**, so they're harmful strikes instead of game-winning home runs. To the out-of-the-box advocates, he's a mighty slugger who deserves admiration, but **to his** teammates and the **fans, he's a loser** who just can't get on base. He may not like the fact that he has **to limit his hits** to **between the foul poles**, but that's one of the realities of the game he chose to play. The same is true of ideas and approaches. **The most** dazzling and **impressive tactic is essentially useless** if it doesn't offer a practical, realistic way to address the need or application. **Like the baseball player, we** may not like the realities, but we **have to operate within** their **limits**. Often, I've seen people blame the box for their inability or unwillingness to create something workable. For example, back in my ad agency days, I remember fellow writers and designers complaining about the limitations of projects. If it was a half-page ad, they didn't feel they could truly be creative unless the space was expanded to a full page. If they were given a full page, they demanded a spread. Handed a spread, they'd fret because it wasn't a TV commercial. If the project became a TV commercial with a $25,000 budget, they'd grouse about not having a $50,000 budget. Yet **the greatest artists** of all time **didn't complain about what they didn't have; they worked their magic using what they did. Monet captured** the grace and **beauty** of France astonishingly well **within the bounds of a canvas. Donatello exposed** the breathtaking **emotion** that lurked **within ordinary chunks of marble**. And **I doubt** that **Beethoven** ever **whined because there were only 88 keys on the piano**. Similarly, I've watched the best of my peers do amazing things in less-than-favorable circumstances. There were brilliant commercials developed with minimal budgets and hand-held cameras. Black-and-white ads that outperformed their colorful competitors. Simple postcards that grabbed the attention of (and business from) jaded consumers. You see, real creativity isn't hampered or blocked by limits. It actually flowers in response to challenges. Even though it may be forced to remain inside the box, it leverages everything it can find in that box and makes the most of every bit of it. **Real creativity is driven by a need to create. When Monet approached a** blank **canvas,** it's safe to say that **he didn't agonize over its size**. He wanted to capture something he'd seen and share how it looked through his eyes. The size of the canvas was incidental to his talent and desire. **Think about** the **Apollo 13** mission. **NASA** didn't have the luxury of flying supplies or extra tools to the crew. They **couldn't rewrite** the laws of **physics**. Plus, they faced a rapidly shrinking timeline, so their box kept getting smaller and less forgiving. And **yet they arrived upon a solution that was creative**; more important, that was successful. **The next time someone tells you** that **the** real **solution involves stepping outside the box, challenge him or her to think and work harder**. After all, **the best solution may** very well **be lurking in a corner of that familiar box**.

#### This is true, even if rules are artificial

Hough 11

(Karen, Founder and CEO – ImprovEdge, “Creative Constraint: Why Tighter Boundaries Propel Greater Results”, Mashable, 3-2, http://mashable.com/2011/03/02/creative-constraint-business/)

Where do great ideas come from? **Many** of us **imagine creativity comes from** an environment of **boundless possibility — no rules or restrictions**. We also have a stereotype of “creatives” — they work in studios rather than office buildings, wear jeans instead of suits and are filled with endless creative solutions. **But why should creativity be the province of a totally open environment** or a certain type of person? **We falsely think that if our world** or profession **is constrained, we cannot enjoy wild creativity. That isn’t the case**. Here are some examples and ways that you can make creative constraint work for you and your business. The Benefit of Boundaries It sounds counter-intuitive, but **boundaries** can **actually boost creativity**. Think about procrastination — deadlines are often the single factor that ensures projects get done. As Dave Gray commented on his blog, “**Creativity is driven by constraints. When we have limited resources — even when** the limits are **artificial — creative thinking is enhanced**. That’s because **the fewer resources you have, the more you are forced to rely on your ingenuity**.” When there are no boundaries, the possibilities may seem too large. That’s why some of **the greatest art** and innovation **has come from** a situation of **constraint. In** 19**70, Apollo 13 went on a lunar mission**. The launch was successful, but **a fault** from inside the space module **caused an explosion** that turned the exploration into a test for survival for the crew. Carbon dioxide exhaled by the astronauts began to build up in the module. On the ground, an engineering team had to figure out a way to clean the air with only the equipment on board and very little time. It was the **unbelievable constraints** and the pressure of lives at risk that **drove** them to **a** totally **unexpected solution**. They figured out a way for the command module’s square air cleaners to be used in the lunar module’s round receivers. Who says a square peg can’t fit in a round hole? Improvisation Improv provides a perfect template for creating more with less. Improvisational performers see a dearth of resources — like a script, props or costumes — as a golden opportunity rather than a problem. Good improvisation also follows unspoken rules: You must accept all contributions, you must justify anything that’s introduced on stage, and everyone must participate. Yet by adhering to these boundaries, improvisers know they can be wildly creative in all other ways. While “improv” seems to imply the absence of constraints, most scenes have to be based around suggestions from the audience. These constraints are what make improv both so enjoyable and so creative. In many instances, **boundaries are an unavoidable fabric of a person’s life**. A Newsweek article discussed the effects of hardship on children, and how it may have fueled their success as adults. “Highly creative adults frequently grew up with hardship. **Hardship** by itself doesn’t lead to creativity, but it **does force kids to become more flexible — and flexibility helps with creativity**.” Resiliency makes people less afraid of mistakes. Resilient people continue to try, fall down, stand up and try again. Each time they take a new tack, they try more and more unconventional possibilities. Boundaries don’t defeat them — **boundaries inspire** them **to keep trying other options**. Applying It to Your Business So how does this apply at work? My company once worked with the distribution leadership team of one of the largest retailers in the U.S. We were tasked to stretch the thinking, strategy and creativity of the group. We found that the executives could be lazy in their brainstorming. This was around 2003-04, and they had gigantic budgets, huge numbers of employees and seemingly endless resources. You would think that with that surplus, anything would be possible. On the contrary, they seemed to care very little for innovation, since the entire enterprise was fat and happy. In our practice exercises, we imposed ridiculous boundaries of time and money on them, and demanded high-level outcomes. For example, we asked them to light an entire warehouse with only one light bulb, $5 for supplies and two hours to work. Or we asked them to take a high school juvenile delinquent and make him/her able to run a new division of their company in 48 hours or less, with a $100 budget. I finally saw them lean in, work hard, and come up with a few really startling ideas — but only because they were forced to. When constraint becomes mandatory, we suddenly have to recalibrate how we work. The economic downturn has forced us to realize that business will never, ever be conducted in the same way. We have to be more innovative, leaner, faster and smarter. From this difficult time, companies have started collaborating with former competitors, created unforeseen relationships with their clients through social media and created products that are better, yet cheaper. They’ve discovered creative ways to address unexpected constraints. So **the next time a situation** just **seems** too hard, too locked down, and **surrounded by boundaries, think like an improviser. This could be your best opportunity for a creative solution**.

## 1NR

### Case

**Life should be valued as apriori – it precedes the ability to value anything else- ballot should vote to preserve life**

**Kacou 8**

Amien Kacou. 2008. WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of “Life”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184

Furthermore, that manner of **finding things good** that is in pleasure **can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,”** as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, **pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation**, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation. Thus, we can see now that, in general, **something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself.** And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, **we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living** (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] **and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good.** However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that **the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value.** But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

**Prior focus on ontology causes paralysis – having “good enough knowledge” is a sufficient condition for action**

**Kratochwil 8**

Kratochwil, professor of international relations – European University Institute, ‘8

(Friedrich, “The Puzzles of Politics,” pg. 200-213)

The lesson seems clear. **Even at the danger of “fuzzy boundaries”, when we deal with “practice**” ( just as with the “pragmatic turn”), **we would be well advised to rely on the use of the term rather than on its reference** (pointing to some property of the object under study), **in order to draw the bounds of sense and understand the meaning of the concept. My argument for the fruitful character of a pragmatic approach in IR,** therefore, **does not depend on a comprehensive mapping of the varieties of research in this area, nor on an arbitrary appropriation or exegesis of any specific and self-absorbed theoretical orientation**. For this reason, in what follows, I will not provide a rigidly specified definition, nor will I refer exclusively to some prepackaged theoretical approach. Instead, **I will sketch out the reasons for which a prag- matic orientation in social analysis seems to hold particular promise**. These reasons pertain both to the more general area of knowledge appropriate for praxis and to the more specific types of investigation in the field. The follow- ing ten points are – without a claim to completeness – intended to engender some critical reflection on both areas.¶ Firstly, **a pragmatic approach does not begin with objects** **or “things” (ontology), or with reason and method (epistemology**), **but with “acting**” (prattein), **thereby preventing some false starts**. Since, **as historical beings placed in a specific situations, we do not have the luxury of deferring decisions until we have found the “truth”, we have to act and must do so always under time pressures and in the face of incomplete information.** Pre- cisely **because the social world is characterised by strategic interactions, what a situation “is”, is hardly ever clear ex ante, because it is being “produced” by the actors and their interactions**, **and the multiple possibilities** are rife with incentives for (dis)information. **This puts a premium on** quick **diagnostic** and cognitive **shortcuts informing actors** about the relevant features of the situ- ation, and on leaving an alternative open (“plan B”) in case of unexpected difficulties. **Instead of** relying on **certainty and universal validity gained through abstraction** and controlled experiments, **we know that completeness and attentiveness to detail**, rather than to generality, **matter**. To that extent, likening practical choices to simple “discoveries” of an already independently existing “reality” which discloses itself to an “observer” – or relying on optimal strategies – is somewhat heroic.¶ These points have been made vividly by “realists” such as Clausewitz in his controversy with von Bülow, in which he criticised the latter’s obsession with a strategic “science” (Paret et al. 1986). While Clausewitz has become an icon for realists, only a few of them (usually dubbed “old” realists) have taken seriously his warnings against the misplaced belief in the reliability and use- fulness of a “scientific” study of strategy. Instead, most of them, especially “neorealists” of various stripes, have embraced the “theory”-building based on the epistemological project as the via regia to the creation of knowledge. A pragmatist orientation would most certainly not endorse such a position.¶ Secondly, **since acting in the social world often involves acting “for” some- one, special responsibilities arise that aggravate both the incompleteness of knowledge as well as its generality problem**. Since we owe special care to those entrusted to us, for example, as teachers, doctors or lawyers, **we cannot just rely on what is generally true, but have to pay special attention to the particular case**. Aside from avoiding the foreclosure of options, **we cannot refuse to act on the basis of incomplete information or insufficient know- ledge**, and the necessary diagnostic will involve typification and comparison, reasoning by analogy rather than generalization or deduction. Leaving out the particularities of a case, be it a legal or medical one, in a mistaken effort to become “scientific” would be a fatal flaw. Moreover, **there still remains the crucial element of “timing” – of knowing when to act**. Students of crises have always pointed out the importance of this factor but, in attempts at building a general “theory” of international politics analogously to the natural sci- ences, such elements are neglected on the basis of the “continuity of nature” and the “large number” assumptions. Besides, “timing” seems to be quite recalcitrant to analytical treatment.

**Worst-case scenarios calculate for the sake of ethical responsibility – mobilization is key to effective to political movements that prevent the worst forms of their impact**

Michael **Williams**, Professor of International Politics – U. Wales, Aberystwyth**, ‘5**

(*The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations* p. 165-7)

Moreover, the links between sceptical realism and prevalent post-modern themes go more deeply than this, particularly as they apply to attempts by post-structural thinking to reopen questions of responsibility and ethics.80 In part, the goals of post-structural approaches can be usefully charactised, to borrow Stephen White’s illuminating contrast, as expressions of ‘responsibility to otherness’ which question and challenge modernist equations of responsibility with a ‘responsibility to act’. A responsibility to otherness seeks to reveal and open the constitutive processes and claims of subjects and subjectivities that a foundational modernism has effaced in its narrow identification of responsibility with a ‘responsibility to act’.81 Deconstruction can from this perspective be seen as a principled stance unwilling to succeumb to modernist essentialism which in the name of responsibility assumes and reifies subjects and structures, obscures forms of power and violence which are constitutive of them, and at the same time forecloses a consideration of alternative possibilities and practices. Yet it is my claim that **the willful Realist tradition does not lack** understanding of the **contingency** of practice or a vision of responsibility to otherness. On the contrary, **its strategy of objectification is precisely an attempt to bring together a responsibility to otherness and a responsibility to act within a wilfully liberal vision. The construction** of a realm of objectivity and **calculation** is not just a consequence of a need to act – the framing of an epistemic context for successful calculation. It **is** a form of **responsibility to otherness**, **an attempt to allow for diversity and irreconcilability** precisely **by** – at least initially – **reducing the self and** the **other to** a **structure of material calculation in order to allow a structure of mutual intelligibility, mediation, and stability**. It is, in short, a strategy of *limitation*: a wilful attempt to construct a subject and a social world limited – both epistemically and politically – **in the name of a politics of toleration**: a liberal strategy that John Gray has recently characterized as one of *modus vivendi*.82 If this is the case, then the deconstructive move that gains some of its weight by contrasting itself to a non- or apolitical objectivism must engage with the more complex contrast to a sceptical Realist tradition that is itself a constructed, ethical practice. This issue becomes even more acute if one considers Iver Neumann’s incisive questions concerning postmodern constructions of identity, action, and responsibility.83 As Neumann points out, **the insight that identities are** inescapably contingent and relationally **constructed**, and even the claim that identities are inescapably *indebted* to otherness, **do** **not in themselves provide a foundation for practice**, particularly **in situations where identities are** **‘sedimented’ and conflictually defined**. In these cases, **deconstruction alone will not suffice unless it can demonstrate a capacity to counter in practice and not just in philosophic practice** the essentialist dynamics it confronts.84 Here, a responsibility to act must go **beyond** **deconstruction** **to consider viable alternatives and counter-practices**. To take **this** critique seriously **is not** necessarily **to be subjec**t yet again t**o the** straightforward **‘blackmail of the Englightenment** and a narrow ‘modernist’ vision of responsibility.85 While an unwillingness to move beyond a deconstructive ethic of responsibility to otherness for fear that an essentialist stance is the only (or most likely) alternative expresses a legitimate concern, it should not license a retreat from such questions or their practical demands. Rather, such **situations demand** also an evaluation of the **structures** (of identity and institutions) **that might viably be mobilized** in order **to offset the worst implications** of violently exclusionary identities. **It requires**, as Neumann nicely puts it, the generation of **compelling ‘as if’ stories around which** counter-subjectivities **and political practices can coalesce.** Wilful Realism, I submit, arises out of an appreciation of these issues, and comprises an attempt to craft precisely such ‘stories’ within a broader intellectual and sociological analysis of their conditions of production, possibilities of success, and likely consequences. The question is, to what extent are these limits capable of success, and to what extent might they be limits upon their own aspirations toward responsibility? These are crucial questions, but they will not be addressed by retreating yet again into further reversals of the same old dicohotomies.

#### Venturing into space reconstructs our connection with the earth, forcing us to become more environmentally aware.

O’NEILL 08, Ian: Ph.D in solar physics

[“The Human Brain in Space: Euphoria and the "Overview Effect" Experienced by Astronauts,” http://www.universetoday.com/2008/05/22/the-human-brain-in-space-euphoria-and-the-overview-effect-experienced-by-astronauts/]

Could be the best example yet of being "spaced out"? When in space, astronauts have repeatedly reported inexplicable euphoria, a "cosmic connection" or an increased sensitivity to their place in the Universe. The experience sounds like the ultimate high, or the ultimate enlightening; it would appear that without trying, astronauts are able to attain a similar mental state as meditating Buddhist monks. So what is happening when the human body is in space? Does zero-gravity create new connections in the brain? Or is it a natural human response to the vastness of space and realizing just how small we are in comparison? What ever the reason, it looks like even when astronauts are back on solid ground, they have changed profoundly… On March 6th, 1969, Rusty Schweikart experienced a feeling that the whole universe was profoundly connected. At the time, he was on a postponed space walk outside his Apollo 9 Lunar Module, carrying out tests for the forthcoming Moon landings. Already having suffered from space sickness (hence delaying the EVA) he felt a euphoric sensation: "When you go around the Earth in an hour and a half, you begin to recognize that your identity is with that whole thing. That makes a change… it comes through to you so powerfully that you're the sensing element for Man." - Russell "Rusty" Schweikart. Two years later, Apollo 14 astronaut, Edgar Mitchell (joint record holder with Alan Shepard for longest ever Moon walk of 9 hours and 17 minutes) reported experiencing an "Overview Effect". He described the sensation gave him a profound sense of connectedness, with a feeling of bliss and timelessness. He was overwhelmed by the experience. He became profoundly aware that each and every atom in the Universe was connected in some way, and on seeing Earth from space he had an understanding that all the humans, animals and systems were a part of the same thing, a synergistic whole. It was an interconnected euphoria. Schweikart and Mitchell's experiences are not isolated anomalies, many other astronauts since the 1970's have reported this Overview Effect. Andy Newberg, a neuroscientist/physician with experience in space medicine, hopes to find out whether this is an actual psychological phenomenon. Perhaps there is a medical reason for an actual change in an astronaut's brain function when in space. What's more, he's noticed a psychological change in the men and women that have come back from space: "You can often tell when youâ€™re with someone who has flown in space, its palpable." - Andy Newberg Newberg has scanned many brains to try to understand how humans reach this euphoric state on Earth. The religious communities, transcendental mediators and others around the world are able to experience similar states and have been the focus of interest to neuroscientists. In some cases, the meditation leads some people to view the whole cosmos as an interconnected quantum web, where consciousness is not separate, but a part of the Universe. Now Newberg hopes to monitor the brain of one of the first space tourists so a better grasp of the brain function of a human in zero-G can be understood. Edgar Mitchell has said that his personal event has changed his life, revealing a Universe that had remained hidden until he experienced the Overview Effect on that Apollo 14 mission in 1971. Whether this effect is a physical change in the brain, or a deeper, yet to be discovered event, Newberg hopes to find some answers.

#### Asteroid strike risks extinction

Stone 05 (Michael, JD U of CT School of Law, 59 U. Miami L. Rev. 435, lexis)

Among the natural catastrophes, Posner claims that the catastrophic risk with the greatest potential for harm is that of an asteroid collision. [55](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=b2b6359137718c08482967175946a126&docnum=25&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVtb-zSkAW&_md5=24f593d8dea626868dc5340b04f844cd#n55) It is believed that roughly 250 million years ago, an asteroid collision resulted in the extinction of ninety percent of the earth's species (p. 25). Likewise, some sixty-five million years ago, it is believed that an asteroid collision may have resulted in the extinction of the dinosaurs, although paleontologists disagree over the actual cause of extinction (p. 25). The dominant view is that the dust emitted from the asteroid strike  [\*449]  impeded photosynthesis and consequently caused the dinosaurs to starve to death (p. 25). An alternative view supposes that the synergy of dust, forest fires, and sulfuric acid emitted from the vaporizing of sulfate rock caused the extinction of the dinosaurs (p. 25). Regardless of which story is correct, the "real world" effect of asteroid impact is clear. Were a large enough asteroid to strike the earth, the extinction or near extinction of the human race could result from a "combination of fire, concussion, enormous tidal waves, and the blocking for several years of the sunlight required for crops and other plant life" (p. 25).

#### Probability and magnitude are at 100 percent—timeframe is irrelevant

Kunich 97 Lt. Colonel USAF, B.S., M.S., University of Illinois; J.D., Harvard Law School; LL.M., George Washington University School of Law, Staff Judge Advocate 50th Space Wing, Falcon Air Force Base (John, , 41 Air Force L. Rev. 119, lexis)

Consequently, it is easy to dismiss the hazard as negligible or to ridicule those who suggest that it be treated seriously. [32](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?y=&dom1=&dom2=&dom3=&dom4=&dom5=&crnPrh=&crnSah=&crnSch=&crnLgh=&crnSumm=&crnCt=&cc=&crnCh=&crnGc=&shepSummary=&crnFmt=&shepStateKey=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&_m=6981b603c11791c59b3982172874471a&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAl&_md5=90f0daf744fc5ecf220292f6a674fa1d&focBudTerms=nuclear+w%2F5+%28warhead+or+bomb+or+weapon+or+explosion+or+blast%29+w%2F10+space+w%2F20+%22outer+space+treaty%22&focBudSel=all#n32) On the other hand, as has been explained, when such impacts do occur, they are  capable of producing destruction and casualties on a scale that far exceeds any other natural disasters; the results of impact by an object the size of a small mountain exceed the imagined holocaust of a full-scale nuclear war... Even the worst storms or floods or earthquakes inflict only local damage, while a large enough impact could have global consequences and place all of society at risk... Impacts are, at once, the least likely but the most dreadful of known natural catastrophes. [33](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?y=&dom1=&dom2=&dom3=&dom4=&dom5=&crnPrh=&crnSah=&crnSch=&crnLgh=&crnSumm=&crnCt=&cc=&crnCh=&crnGc=&shepSummary=&crnFmt=&shepStateKey=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&_m=6981b603c11791c59b3982172874471a&docnum=5&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkAl&_md5=90f0daf744fc5ecf220292f6a674fa1d&focBudTerms=nuclear+w%2F5+%28warhead+or+bomb+or+weapon+or+explosion+or+blast%29+w%2F10+space+w%2F20+%22outer+space+treaty%22&focBudSel=all#n33) What is the most prudent course of action when one is confronted with an extremely rare yet enormously destructive risk? Some may be tempted to do nothing, in essence gambling on the odds. But because the consequences of guessing wrong may be so severe as to mean the end of virtually all life on planet Earth, the wiser course of action would be to take reasonable steps to confront the problem. Ultimately, rare though these space strikes are, there is no doubt that they will happen again, sooner or later. To do nothing is to abdicate our duty to defend the United States, and indeed the entire world, and place our very survival in the uncertain hands of the false god of probabilities. Thus, the mission of planetary defense might be considered by the United States at some point in