**2NC Impact Overview – Economy**

#### Economic collapse causes extinction - our 1NC Burrows evidence says an economic decline increases the risk of WMD terrorism, resource wars and great power conflict – all go nuclear. Decline makes cooperation impossible so backstops like interdependence would fail.

#### Increases the trade deficit because of Chinese retaliation

**Relations solve Iran nuclearization**

**Tisdall ‘05**

Simon Tisdall, World Briefing Columnist, The Guardian (London), September 21, 2005

**North Korea's** unexpected **pledge** this week **to abandon its nuclear weapons appears to be the result of a** highly unusual **diplomatic pincer movement by the US and China.** The manoeuvre **has potentially positive implications for resolving the nuclear stalemate with** another so-called axis of evil state, **Iran**. **The deal** forged at the six-party talks hosted by China in Beijing remains highly fragile, as yesterday's renewed demands from Pyongyang show. But if made to stick, diplomats believe that it **may come to be seen as a landmark in Sino-US strategic security cooperation and a paradigm for ending the west's dispute with Tehran.** After two years of fruitless talks, the turning point seems to have come not in Beijing but in New York, at a private meeting last week at the UN between George Bush and the Chinese leader, Hu Jintao. The US president is said to have warned his counterpart that in the absence of progress, the US may step up pressure on North Korea's weak and inherently unstable regime - with unpredictable consequences. "If the talks had failed again, it would have harmed China's credibility," said an Asian diplomat familiar with the Beijing talks. But China had more powerful motives, too. As its economy and international standing have grown, its broader interests in solving the dispute have increasingly fallen into line with Washington's. "China has its own security and economic concerns. It sees North Korea as a destabilising factor in the region. It wants to keep it as a buffer state, to keep the status quo. It doesn't want the Korean peninsula to be nuclearised or destroyed," the diplomat said. Beijing also feared Pyongyang's nuclear arms could lead its regional ri val, Japan, and South Korea to acquire similar weapons while encouraging a heightened US military presence. The US decision to offer security guarantees, aid and technology to North Korea, having long refused to do so, also reflects a more consensual perspective in Washington. That change is attributed in part to Condoleezza Rice's appointment as America's top diplomat and the reassignment to the UN of John Bolton, the former arms control chief whose abrasive style antagonised Pyongyang. But **preoccupations with Iraq**, growing worries about **Iran**, plus Japanese and South Korean concerns about escalation have also **helped persuade the White House that** China's insistence on **engagement, rather than confrontation, may best serve its interests**. The US eschewed bilateral contacts after the 2002 rupture that led North Korea to quit the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Now its chief negotiator, Christopher Hill,hailing the deal as a "turning point", may visit Pyongyang. The contradictions between this new US approach and its policy towards Iran may become increasingly difficult to justify internationally. Mohamed ElBaradei, the UN nuclear agency chief, made the comparison this week while warning against American (and Iranian) "brinkmanship". Iranian officials say privately that Washington's refusal to meet bilaterally, indirect threats of military coercion, and economic sanctions all hinder progress on the nuclear issue. Beijing seems to agree. With its UN veto in its pocket, it has opposed punitive measures against Iran, an important oil and gas exporter, while insisting engagement is the best path forward. Ironically, **it may be China, Washington's** new-found **"strategic partner"** in the east, **which** also **holds the key to the west's Iranian impasse.**

**US-Sino relations are key to preventing nuclear conflict in Kashmir**

**Xu ‘01**

Xianquan Xu, Senior Research Fellow, Chinese Academy, International Trade and Economic Coop, 2001

(China, the United States, and the Global Economy, Shuxun Chen & Charles Wolf, p. 266)

Both **the United States and China want to see a stable South Asia and prevent conflicts between nuclear-equipped India and Pakistan from getting out of control**. Recently, the high-profile race for nuclear weapons tests between the two in 1998 and the Kashmir conflict in 1999 alerted the world to the instability in this region and confirmed the possible use of the ultimate threat. Theseincidents further re­mind the world of how disturbing their profound distrust could be to the region specifically and the world in general if a hostile game of threatened nuclear weapons use abruptly escalated. The United States is expected to continue to play a role in cooling down crises between India and Pakistan. China, although historically inclined to favor Pakistan, would be the last to want to see relations between the two escalate, both of which share borders with China. **Since China has increasingly neutralized its position in such conflicts, both countries will try to garner China's favor,** as indicated by both India and Pakistan **sending top envoys to Beijing during their most recent confrontation. China, thus, could provide strong support to the United States in preventing any such crises from becoming extreme.**

### 2NC UQ Extension

#### Obama will win now – Gallup polls in across 12 swing states show Obama ahead – his job approval increased by 3 points – voters expect the economy to get better – only 38% of voters like Romney – that the Cook 9-22 evidence

### Production 2NC

#### Increasing oil exploration is incredibly unpopular with Obama’s base that’s Prandoni because they think it screws up the environment.

#### That outweighs. Lehrer says they make up 19% of the vote and may either defect or not show up.

**A2: Obama Labels**

**Obama won’t label- he’s declined six times**

**Christian Science Monitor, 8/23/12**

(“Obama vs. Romney 101: 4 ways they differ on China” http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/2012/0901/Obama-vs.-Romney-101-4-ways-they-differ-on-China/China-as-currency-manipulator)

Mr. Romney says China’s leaders are “cheaters” who keep their currency artificially low to make Chinese products cheaper on the world market. He says that on “Day 1” of a Romney presidency, he would declare China a currency manipulator – a step the US has not taken since 1994, but which would pave the way to imposing duties on Chinese products. The US trade deficit with China amounted to nearly $300 billion in 2011.

Obama has resisted demands from both Democrats and Republicans to make the “manipulator” designation, which he says could set off a trade war. Instead, he claims that steady diplomatic pressure has worked better. The administration’s evidence? China’s currency has risen by almost a third against the dollar since 2005, helping to raise Chinese labor and manufacturing costs.

**Obama label would be different- 1NC Roach says Romney is dependent on China bashing and pushes for new legislation which breaks down relations and causes tariffs that collapse the economy.**

### AT Disarm

#### Wouild have already done it

#### It’s a Cold War relic—9/11 proves

Larsen, Professor of National Security Studies at Northwestern, 09 p. <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2009/Apr/larsenApr09.asp#author>

By the late 1990s, however, arms control had lost its luster, as had arms control’s cousin, nuclear weapons, and both became less important to a national security stance that no longer recognized the importance of such weapons, or such policies (arms control), or even such strategies (deterrence) in the globalizing post-Cold War world. With the arrival of President George W. Bush and the attacks of September 11th that put the country on a war footing against a dramatically different kind of enemy, arms control seemed passé, if not dead. The Bush administration did all it could to make sure it stayed that way.[1]

#### No one cares anymore—deterrence is irrelevant

Larsen, Professor of National Security Studies at Northwestern, 09 p. <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2009/Apr/larsenApr09.asp#author>

As an aside, it is interesting from an academic point of view that the value of nuclear weapons and deterrence have fallen to such a low standing that they are seldom considered worthy of separate and distinct studies or analyses anymore. All recent studies on “arms control” have included sections on new nuclear weapons, the value and purpose of said weapons, and the role of missile defenses.

### AT Econ

#### Romney collapses the economy:

**A spending cuts**

**Miller**, June 05, **2012** (Rich, Journalist, Business Week. " Nobel Winner Stiglitz Sees More Recession Odds in Romney" 06/05/12 Accessed Via Google 6/5/12)

**Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz said the election of Mitt Romney as president in November would “significantly” raise the odds of a recession because it would herald a shift to a much tighter budget. History shows that the adoption of fiscal austerity when an economy is weak can have disastrous consequences, as happened in the U.S. in 1929 on the eve of the Great Depression**, Stiglitz told Bloomberg editors and reporters in New York yesterday. **Republican candidate Romney risks making that same sort of mistake by backing a plan to slash the budget deficit, he said. “The Romney plan is going to slow down the economy, worsen the jobs deficit and significantly increase the likelihood of a recession,” said Stiglitz**, who served as chairman of President Bill Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers from 1995 to 1997. **In contrast, President Barack Obama “recognizes the need to stimulate the economy,” Stiglitz said.**

**B Romney collapses housing**

**Waldron, 12** (Travis Waldron, Thing Progress, “Economists: Romney’s Economic Plan Fails To Deal With ‘Main Drags’ On U.S. Economy”, 1/12/12, http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2012/01/12/403210/economists-romneys-draconian/?mobile=nc)

Former Massachusetts Gov. Mitt Romney’s (R) economic plan has become the centerpiece of his presidential campaign. Though his proposals are often vague, analyses of the plan shows that it would provide huge tax breaks for the wealthiest Americans while raising taxes on low-income families. And though **Romney** claims to be concerned about the federal budget deficit, his **plan would add more than $6 trillion in deficits over 10 years.** Romney, who touts his experience as a job creator, has suggested laying off thousands of public sector workers. He wants to slash vital programs for the poor and middle-classes, repeal the Affordable Care Act, and gut Medicare and Social Security. His embrace of the radical Cut, Cap, and Balance plan pushed by House Republicans would, in effect, shrink the federal government to pre-Ronald Reagan era sizes. But for all his talk about the plan on the campaign trail, **economists surveyed by Reuters say Romney’s plan likely wouldn’t deal with the main drags on the American economy, while the cuts to vital programs would be “utterly draconian“:** These steps would shrink the federal government’s role more than even former president Ronald Reagan managed 30 years ago when he turned many social programs over to the states. **That scenario concerns liberal economists. “If applied, these fiscal measures would be utterly draconian. The attacks on Medicare and Social Security would throw large portions of the population into poverty,”** said Jamie Galbraith, business professor at the University of Texa**s** in Austin. Mainstream economists worry more that neither Romney nor his Republican opponents are addressing the main drag on the U.S. economy – weak demand from American consumers still weighed down by debt. Among the “main drags” highlighted in the Reuters piece is the housing crisis, which has placed “a big drag on consumer spending which drives two thirds of the U.S. economy.” But **the GOP candidates have offered little in the way of solutions for the crisis, and Romney’s own prescription involves letting the housing market hit rock bottom — further damaging millions of homeowners.** “Markets work,” Romney told moderators at a debate in November when asked what he would do to address the housing crisis. According to former Wall Street economist Thomas Gallagher, addressing demand should be at the top of the list when it comes to speeding the recovery. Instead, **Romney is focused on budget deficits and tax reform — the types of austerity measures that are pushing Europe toward another recession.** Perhaps that’s why a survey of economics professors found that the Republican proposals were so bad, they wouldn’t pass an Econ 101 class.

### AT Appeasement

#### No chance of US – Sino war

#### A. no incentive for China

Bremmer, 10 – president of Eurasia Group and author (Ian Bremmer, “China vs. America: Fight of the Century,” Prospect, March 22, 2010, http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2010/03/china-vs-america-fight-of-the-century/)

China will not mount a military challenge to the US any time soon. Its economy and living standards have grown so quickly over the past two decades that it’s hard to imagine the kind of catastrophic event that could push its leadership to risk it all. Beijing knows that no US government will support Taiwanese independence, and China need not invade an island that it has largely co-opted already by offering Taiwan’s business elite privileged investment opportunities.

#### B. China lacks the initiative and projection capability

Bitzinger & Desker, 08 – senior fellow and dean of S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies respectively (Richard A. Bitzinger, Barry Desker, “Why East Asian War is Unlikely,” Survival, December 2008, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com-/678328\_731200556\_906256449.pdf)

Overall, most Western assessments agree that the PLA has made considerable progress over the past decade in adding new weapons to its arsenal, and that China has noticeably improved its military capabilities in several specific areas – particularly missile attack, power projection over sea and in the air, and information warfare. Most predict that Chinese military power relative to its likely competitors in the Asia-Pacific region – especially Taiwan – and the United States will continue to increase significantly over the next ten to 20 years. There are, however, some striking differences of opinion when it comes to interpreting the significance of these hardware developments. Many Western analysts assert that the PLA continues to suffer from considerable deficiencies and weaknesses that limit its ability to constitute a major military threat: in spite of all its efforts, China is still at least two decades behind the United States in terms of defence capabilities and technology. In particular, the PLA still lacks the logistical and lift capacity – both by sea and by air – for projecting force much beyond its borders. China also lags far behind the West in areas such as C4I architectures and surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. Some therefore argue that China’s current rearmament programme is an incremental, long-term modernisation process that must be understood in the context of competing force-modernisation activities taking place among China’s likely rivals.

### 2NC- Ext. Hege Collapse Inevitable

#### No internal link to hege collapse – their Electrification Coalition evidence isn’t qualified and doesn’t say who will increase prices

#### Entitlement spending makes hege collapse inevitable because it forces defense cuts and makes US’ global role unaffordable- that’s Cohen ‘12

#### Heg is over – That’s Rachman. The financial crisis has prompted international efforts to balance the US and has prevented the US from projecting it’s power. It also pre-empts any Aff claim to make heg sustainable, since it says the US will still be number one, but the benefits of hegemonic stability are gone now.

#### Collapse inevitable, more warrants:

#### A) Credibility gap, credit downgrade, and the rise of China

Clemons ‘11

[Steve, Washington editor at large for The Atlantic and editor in chief of Atlantic LIVE, “America Next: End of the World As We Knew It”, August 12, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/08/america-next-end-of-the-world-as-we-knew-it/243503/>]

In nature, when a piece of ice larger than Rhode Island breaks off of Antarctica, one sees tangibly the very different world that global warming is shaping. In the case of the United States -- which has been indisputably the reigning global superpower for six decades -- there are signs -- ranging from the tumult in the Middle East to a humiliating war in Afghanistan to a downgrade of US sovereign debt -- that America is at a key inflection point in its history and that the US network of global control (aka, "empire") is disintegrating. Chalmers Johnson, a scholar who authored Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire before 9/11, argued in the 1990s that the US had become blind to the global push-back to American dictates. With the USSR gone and China the fastest growing market economy, the moniker of "leader of the free world" carried with it diminishing privileges and power. Without the Soviet menace threatening the global order, the cost-benefit relationship between other nations and the US fundamentally changed. Other countries were no longer willing to pay the same political price to the US for protection that they once did, a price paid in terms of following American leadership in global institutions, respecting and relying on the US dollar as the global reserve currency, following trade and economic policies that were largely crafted by America's financial elite, and accepting the reality of the Pentagon's global sprawl. The world today sees a diminished America -- one whose military power seems over-extended and hemorrhaging in Afghanistan; whose economic leadership was in doubt when the US exported toxic financial products to the world through the sub-prime crisis and which now is officially crippled given the first ratings downgrade of American bonds; whose moral leadership remains tied in knots as long as Guantanamo remains open and the self-confidence Americans once had in their own systems of justice and government continues to decline. It's through this lens that the hopeful-sounding Arab Spring, the riots in London, the tumultuous financial markets, and the rise of China and a new crop of ascending powers like Brazil, India, Turkey, and South Africa need to be considered. The old order is crumbling; a new one is forming -- but between them is chaos, uncertainty and social and political friction.

#### B) Poor Infrastructure

Cohen ‘12

[Michael A. Cohen is a regular columnist for Foreign Policy's Election 2012 Channel and a fellow at the Century Foundation. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/21/rotting_from_the_inside_out?page=full> ETB]

What about national infrastructure -- another key element of national economic power and global competitiveness? First, the nation's broadband penetration rates remain in the middle of the global pack and there is growing divide in the United States between digital haves and have nots. Overall, its transportation networks are mediocre compared to similarly wealthy countries and according to the World Economic Forum, the United States ranks 23rd in the OECD for infrastructure quality -- a ranking that has steadily declined over the past decade. American commuters spend more time in traffic than Western Europeans, the country's train system and high-speed rail lines in general pale next to that of other developed nations, and even the number of people killed on American highways is 60 percent higher than the OECD average. Part of the problem is that the amount of money the U.S. government spends on infrastructure has steadily declined for decades and now trails far behind other Western nations. In time, such infrastructure disadvantages have the potential to undermine the U.S. economy, hamstring productivity and competitiveness, and put the lives of more Americans at risk -- and this appears to be happening already.

#### C) Lack of military modernization

McKeon 2011

[Rep Buck, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, “Unpredictable future, aging weapons demand modernization of US forces”, March 29, <http://thehill.com/special-reports/defense-a-aerospace-march-2011/152567-unpredictable-future-aging-weapons-demand-modernization-of-us-forces>]

A wise military axiom cautions that “amateurs study strategy, professionals study logistics.” The eight years of Ronald Reagan’s presidency were the triumph of that wisdom. Today, America’s military forces are the best in the world. This is due to the courage and skillful training of the men and women of our armed forces, but also because President Reagan’s defense investment that ensured those men and women went into combat with the best equipment in the world. That equipment is now creeping on three decades worth of wear and tear. To compound matters, we canceled approximately half of our military modernization programs after the Cold War. In the past decade, we shelved another 25 percent. This is dangerous business. The strain on our force is dire. Many of the same planes, ships and tanks that won the brushfire conflicts of the late ’80s and ’90s are still in use. The average age of a U.S. Air Force aircraft is 30 years. The last B-52 — the backbone of our strategic bomber force — rolled off the assembly line during the Cuban missile crisis. Our F-16 and F-15 fighter jets first flew in the 1970s. The M1A1 Abrams, our main battle tank, was procured by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, when he served in the Ford administration. Now President Obama seems to be going after the remaining quarter of our modernization programs. This is a reckless approach. It is neither fiscally wise nor economically prudent to kick the modernization can down the road. By allowing our fighting vehicles to atrophy and by failing to adequately invest in basic research to hedge against tomorrow’s threats, we increase long-term costs and put our soldiers at risk. In my capacity as chairman of the Armed Services Committee, I will resist any penny-wise, pound-foolish attempt to play fiscal games with the defense budget.

### A2- Generic Heg – Extension: No War

#### There’s no impact to declining heg - Friedman and Preble 10 and Zakaria 8. Multiple warrants take out the impact –

#### - Aff impacts confuse hegemony with safety

#### - Leaders exaggerate enemy capabilities and invent new enemies by overstating the security threat of everyday geopolitical competition

#### - US military force isn’t relevant to contemporary international problems

#### - Current system disincentivizes conflict

#### - Small work-arounds solve conflicts that do erupt

#### Our arguments should be preferred over their warrantless neo-con hacks – they answer every warrant the aff makes and aren’t based in ethnocentric exaggeration of the importance of the US

#### AND, The aff evidence overstates the threat of declining US heg – cold war paranoia and global military command structures create a cognitive bias

Sapolsky et al, 09 (Harvey M. Sapolsky is a professor of public policy and organization at MIT. Benjamin H. Friedman is a research fellow in defense and homeland security studies at Cato Institute. Eugene Gholz is an associate professor of public affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. Daryl G. Press is an associate professor of government at Dartmouth College, "Restraining Order: For Strategic Modesty," World Affairs Journal, Fall 2009. http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/friedman-restraining\_order.pdf

### Implementing a strategy of restraint will be difficult because it requires us to overcome a belief that became ingrained in our worldview during the Cold War: the assumption that if we did not manage security affairs in every corner of the globe we would find ourselves on the defensive in a great ideological and military contest. Americans have learned to think it is our duty to fret over conditions in the Baltics, the Balkans, the Bosphorus, the Beqaa valley, the Persian Gulf, the Pashtun region, Thailand, Taiwan, and East Timor. Almost every country, no matter how small, distant, or unfamiliar, has been labeled “strategic” by some American official. The second obstacle to overcome is our global military command structure. The geographically based commands reflexively lobby for involvement in their regions. Their plans drive our thinking about larger national security issues and impose unbounded demands on our resources. Regional commanders overshadow our diplomats and overburden our defense budget. The more Unified Combatant Commands the United States has, the longer the list of certified threats and the less flexible our ability to respond due to the earmarking of forces. Doing away with the regional commands will improve strategic planning and our ability to weigh challenges and allocate our limited resources

#### Data disproves hegemony impacts**Fettweis, 11** Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone

#### Their laundry list of vague impacts is academic junk – conflicts can’t just emerge

Fettweis, 11

Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

Assertions that without the combination of U.S. capabilities, presence and commitments instability would return to Europe and the Pacific Rim are usually rendered in rather vague language. If the United States were to decrease its commitments abroad, argued Robert Art, “the world will become a more dangerous place and, sooner or later, that will redound to America’s detriment.”53 From where would this danger arise? Who precisely would do the fighting, and over what issues? Without the United States, would Europe really descend into Hobbesian anarchy? Would the Japanese attack mainland China again, to see if they could fare better this time around? Would the Germans and French have another go at it? In other words, where exactly is hegemony is keeping the peace? With one exception, these questions are rarely addressed. That exception is in the Pacific Rim. Some analysts fear that a de facto surrender of U.S. hegemony would lead to a rise of Chinese influence. Bradley Thayer worries that Chinese would become “the language of diplomacy, trade and commerce, transportation and navigation, the internet, world sport, and global culture,” and that Beijing would come to “dominate science and technology, in all its forms” to the extent that soon the world would witness a Chinese astronaut who not only travels to the Moon, but “plants the communist flag on Mars, and perhaps other planets in the future.”54 Indeed China is the only other major power that has increased its military spending since the end of the Cold War, even if it still is only about 2 percent of its GDP. Such levels of effort do not suggest a desire to compete with, much less supplant, the United States. The much-ballyhooed, decade-long military buildup has brought Chinese spending up to somewhere between one-tenth and one-fifth of the U.S. level. It is hardly clear that a restrained United States would invite Chinese regional, must less global, political expansion. Fortunately one need not ponder for too long the horrible specter of a red flag on Venus, since on the planet Earth, where war is no longer the dominant form of conflict resolution, the threats posed by even a rising China would not be terribly dire. The dangers contained in the terrestrial security environment are less severe than ever before. Believers in the pacifying power of hegemony ought to keep in mind a rather basic tenet: When it comes to policymaking, specific threats are more significant than vague, unnamed dangers. Without specific risks, it is just as plausible to interpret U.S. presence as redundant, as overseeing a peace that has already arrived. Strategy should not be based upon vague images emerging from the dark reaches of the neoconservative imagination. Overestimating Our Importance One of the most basic insights of cognitive psychology provides the final reason to doubt the power of hegemonic stability: Rarely are our actions as consequential upon their behavior as we perceive them to be. A great deal of experimental evidence exists to support the notion that people (and therefore states) tend to overrate the degree to which their behavior is responsible for the actions of others. Robert Jervis has argued that two processes account for this overestimation, both of which would seem to be especially relevant in the U.S. case.55 First, believing that we are responsible for their actions gratifies our national ego (which is not small to begin with; the United States is exceptional in its exceptionalism). The hubris of the United States, long appreciated and noted, has only grown with the collapse of the Soviet Union.56 U.S. policymakers famously have comparatively little knowledge of—or interest in—events that occur outside of their own borders. If there is any state vulnerable to the overestimation of its importance due to the fundamental misunderstanding of the motivation of others, it would have to be the United States. Second, policymakers in the United States are far more familiar with our actions than they are with the decision-making processes of our allies. Try as we might, it is not possible to fully understand the threats, challenges, and opportunities that our allies see from their perspective. The European great powers have domestic politics as complex as ours, and they also have competent, capable strategists to chart their way forward. They react to many international forces, of which U.S. behavior is only one. Therefore, for any actor trying to make sense of the action of others, Jervis notes, “in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, the most obvious and parsimonious explanation is that he was responsible.”57 It is natural, therefore, for U.S. policymakers and strategists to believe that the behavior of our allies (and rivals) is shaped largely by what Washington does. Presumably Americans are at least as susceptible to the overestimation of their ability as any other people, and perhaps more so. At the very least, political psychologists tell us, we are probably not as important to them as we think. The importance of U.S. hegemony in contributing to international stability is therefore almost certainly overrated. In the end, one can never be sure why our major allies have not gone to, and do not even plan for, war. Like deterrence, the hegemonic stability theory rests on faith; it can only be falsified, never proven. It does not seem likely, however, that hegemony could fully account for twenty years of strategic decisions made in allied capitals if the international system were not already a remarkably peaceful place. Perhaps these states have no intention of fighting one another to begin with, and our commitments are redundant. European great powers may well have chosen strategic restraint because they feel that their security is all but assured, with or without the United States.

### 1NC- Indo-Pak War Frontline

#### Indo-Pak war does not cause extinction

Ball ‘6

(Desmond, prof at the Strategic and Defense Studies Centre at the Australian National Univ, “The Probabilities of On the Beach: Assessing ‘Armageddon Scenarios’ in the 21st Century,” Working Paper No. 401, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at The Australian National University, <http://rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/sdsc/wp/wp_sdsc_401.pdf>)

Analysis of these incidents suggests that nuclear war is in fact more likely between India and Pakistan than it ever was between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. On the other hand, the relatively small nuclear stockpiles mean that the resultant casualties would be much less than would have occurred in an all-out US-Soviet strategic nuclear exchange. Pakistan is especially vulnerable. Its total population is about 150 million, of whom more than half are under fifteen years of age and nearly a third are under nine. Only five cities have more than a million people—Karachi (15 million), Lahore (6 million), the Islamabad/Rawalpindi conurbation (2 million), Faisalabad (3 million) and Hyderabad (2 million). In-house studies by India’s nuclear planners have shown that only about 15 weapons would ever be required against these cities.34 Three warheads with nominal yields of only 20 kilotons each targeted on each of the five cities would kill perhaps 2-3 million people. Fifteen 1 megaton weapons, also allocated three to each city, could kill perhaps 10- 12 million. In June 2002 US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited both New Delhi and Islamabad and briefed his counterparts about a Pentagon study that concluded that a nuclear war between the two countries could result in 12 million deaths. A detailed study of the consequences of a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan was published in June 2002. It assumed two scenarios. The first involved the explosion of ten 15 kiloton bombs over five Indian and five Pakistani cities (Bangalore, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and New Delhi in India and Faisalabad, Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi in Pakistan). This produced around 1.7 million immediate deaths and 0.9 million severe injuries in India and 1.2 million deaths and 0.6 million severe injuries in Pakistan. The second scenario involved 24 25 kiloton weapons, 12 detonated on eight Pakistani cities and 12 on seven Indian cities. The immediate deaths from blast and fire were estimated to be around 8 million, but the ground-bursts would also produce substantial fallout. About 22.1 million people would die fairly quickly from exposure to lethal radiation doses, while another eight million would suffer severe radiation sickness; most of the very young, old and infirm would die. About half of the 30-35 million deaths would be in Pakistan and half in India. About 99 percent of the Indian population and 93 percent of the Pakistani population would survive.35

#### Deterrence prevents war

Waltz ‘00

(Kenneth, poli sci prof at Columbia University, research associate of the Institute of War and Peace Studies, Winter/Spring, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1, “Interview: Is Kenneth Waltz Still M.A.D. about Nukes?” Interviewed by Jeremy Goldberg and Parag Khanna, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/gjia/gjia\_winspr00f.html)

Stability in the subcontinent now exists; it had not existed since World War II and the partition of India and Pakistan. Now with nuclear weapons on both sides, India and Pakistan can no longer fight even a conventional war over Kashmir, as former General Beg and former General Sardarji both admitted. But we still fear instability such as the intractable dispute over the Kashmir. Yet the bitterness between the United States and the Soviet Union was deep enough during the Cold War, and deterrence worked. Why would India and Pakistan be different? Does India and Pakistan’s common border increase the risk? Probably not in a modern world where there are airplanes and missiles that can reach anywhere. What difference does it make that you’ve got a common border as long as it’s perfectly easy for the two countries in an adversarial relationship to reach each other? Geographic proximity may shrink warning time, but nuclear deterrence does not depend on being able to react with split–second timing. What’s the hurry? If you have received a damaging blow from another country and you’re going to retaliate, what difference does it make if you retaliate now, ten minutes from now, or tomorrow? A country still has that same fear of the retaliation, and it’s that fear of retaliation that deters.

### 1NC- Biodiversity/Species Loss Frontline

#### Biodiversity loss is irrelevant- species will adapt

Willis ‘9

[Kathy J. Willis, Long-Term Ecology Laboratory, Oxford University Centre for the Environment and Department of Biology, University of Bergen. Shonil A. Bhagwat, Long-Term Ecology Laboratory, Oxford University Centre for the Environment. “Biodiversity and Climate Change.” Science 6 November 2009: Vol. 326 no. 5954 pp. 806-807. ETB]

Another complexity, however, is the impact of climate change on already highly altered fragmented landscapes outside of protected areas. Over 75% of the Earth's terrestrial biomes now show evidence of alteration as a result of human residence and land use ([10](http://www.sciencemag.org.proxy.lib.uiowa.edu/content/326/5954/806.full?sid=9a26dd19-f70d-4840-b971-26e78917d71a#ref-10)). Yet, recent case studies suggest that even in a highly fragmented landscape, all is not lost for biodiversity. ¶ It has long been assumed that in a fragmented landscape, the fragment size and its isolation are important factors in determining species persistence; the smaller and more isolated the fragment, the lower its occupancy. Yet few worldwide studies have attempted to quantify this relation. Prugh et al. ([11](http://www.sciencemag.org.proxy.lib.uiowa.edu/content/326/5954/806.full?sid=9a26dd19-f70d-4840-b971-26e78917d71a#ref-11)) compiled and analyzed raw data from previous research on the occurrence of 785 animal species in >12,000 discrete habitat fragments on six continents. In many cases, fragment size and isolation were poor predictors of occupancy. The quality of the matrix surrounding the fragment had a greater influence on persistence: When the matrix provided conditions suitable to live and reproduce, fragment size and isolation were less important and species were able to persist. ¶ This ability of species to persist in what would appear to be a highly undesirable and fragmented landscape has also been recently demonstrated in West Africa. In a census on the presence of 972 forest butterflies over the past 16 years, Larsen found that despite an 87% reduction in forest cover, 97% of all species ever recorded in the area are still present ([12](http://www.sciencemag.org.proxy.lib.uiowa.edu/content/326/5954/806.full?sid=9a26dd19-f70d-4840-b971-26e78917d71a#ref-12)). For reasons that are not entirely clear, these butterfly species appear to be able to survive in the remaining primary and secondary forest fragments and disturbed lands in the West African rainforest. However, presence or absence does not take into account lag effects of declining populations; a more worrying interpretation is therefore that the full effects of fragmentation will only be seen in future years.

### Econ