### F/W

#### Interpretation- the aff cannot claim advantages not tied to the implementation of the plan

#### Key to predictable limits- infinite number of benefits the aff could claim to their speech act our discourse- impossible to get offense against.

#### Key to education- can’t clash with portions off the aff that aren’t predicated off of affirming the resolution- clash is key to two way education

#### Voting issue for fairness and education

### Must Prohibit 1NC shell

#### A. INTERPRETATION. Restrictions prohibit, requirements govern how energy production occurs

Hayden ’05 (J.D., Penn State Dickinson School of Law, 2005)

Tim 13 Penn St. Envtl. L. Rev. 217

B. Telecommunications Act of 1996

¶ In 1996, a major piece of legislation dealing with most aspects of our nation's telecommunications industry was passed. n113 The portion of that legislation dealing with mobile services creates substantive restrictions and procedural requirements dealing with the use of state and local powers by limiting, but not completely preempting, those powers. n114¶ 1. Substantive Restrictions¶ The TCA of 1996 prevents state and local governments from either prohibiting or taking actions which prohibit erecting cellular towers. n115 It was essential that this law be passed because state and local governments could effectively limit the building of cellular towers by passing laws or using strict zoning procedures. n116 In addition to the statutory framework, the circuit courts have further developed case law clarifying what constitutes unreasonable discrimination between functionally equivalent [\*232] services, as well as what amounts to a prohibition. n117 The Third Circuit developed a two-prong test requiring that a significant gap in wireless service exist, and that the manner in which the cellular provider proposes to fill that gap must be the least intrusive in terms of the values the community is trying to preserve. n118 While this test has been modified by other circuits, it is the most widely used. n119¶ 2. Preemption¶ The TCA did not fully preempt the laws of state and local governments. n120 Federal legislation could have completely preempted the laws of the state and local governments which dealt with cellular towers but chose not to, instead allowing those entities to express their values within certain federally created constraints. n121¶ 3. Procedural Requirements¶ Finally, the TCA created procedural requirements that must be met by those seeking to keep a cellular tower from being built. n122 First, the decision making body must act upon the request for authorization within a reasonable period of time. n123 Second, any denial shall be in writing. n124 And lastly, such a denial must be supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record. n125 These procedural requirements ensure that when a ruling is challenged, the courts will have the information relied upon in the decision of the municipality, providing them with a record on which to decide the case. n126¶ In summary, the TCA of 1996 created substantive restrictions on the abuse of the possibly prohibitive powers wielded by state and local governments. It did so without leaving those entities completely bereft of their powers, and at the same time created procedural requirements allowing for meaningful judicial review of decisions. All of this was done with the policy of promoting national wireless service provision in [\*233] mind.

And the restriction must be ON production

Dictionary.com No Date

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/on?s=t

“ON”:16. (used to indicate a source or a person or thing that serves as a source or agent): a duty on imported goods; She depends on her friends for encouragement.

#### B. Violation- The aff reduces a condition that makes production harder—that’s NOT A RESTRICTION on production

**This ev. gender paraphrased**

Priebe ’99 (Director of Agricultural Economic Law, European Commission)

Rhinehard, *Production Rights in European Agriculture* p.200

The milk quota system, to quote the prime example, is a levy imposed on production in¶ excess of reference quantities, or 'quotas' . The Community does not prohibit surplus production,¶ but it does make it subject to a very dissuasive tax. An 'overproduction tax' as high as¶ that under the milk quota system is tantamount, in economic terms at least, to a prohibition on¶ large-volume production above the limits laid down. The beet quota system, on the other¶ hand, is of a different legal nature. This is based on production limits that are governed in¶ practice by delivery contracts between growers and sugar companies.¶ In other industries, limits exist as conditions for the granting of direct aid. In such cases,¶ this is not a direct restriction on production, in a strictly legal sense. The farmer is free not to¶ comply with these conditions if he chooses not to accept the aid offered. Economically, s/he¶ often has no choice. Accordingly, in order to obtain Community aid, he has to comply with¶ the conditions that apply. For instance, under the support scheme for arable crop growers, aid¶ applications cannot be submitted in respect of land which was used for permanent pasture,¶ permanent crops, forest or non-agricultural uses4 as at 31 December 1991. Such a provision,¶ designed to avoid speculation in arable crops triggered purely by the introduction of the direct¶ aid system in 1992, divides agricultural land into two: land which is eligible for arable land¶ support and ineligible land. This is a permanent division. The set-aside obligation, signifYing¶ each producer's individual contribution to the disciplining of production under the same¶ system, is another example of this form of restriction.

#### C. REASONS TO PREFER.

#### 1. Fair Ground. Our interp allows afs to remove any restriction that actually prohibits production—ownership requirements, seasonal drilling restrictions, environmental impact rules. Their interp allows any aff that makes energy production less profitable—those are regulations or fees—not restrictions.

#### 2. Limits. Their interp justifies any aff that increases the size or profitability of the energy industry, exploding the size of an already large topic.

#### 3. Bright line. Our interp establishes a clear brightline—does the restriction prohibit energy production? If it does, it T, if it don’t, it aint.

#### D. Topicality is a voter for fairness and education.

### Production Shell

#### Obama will win- Polls and economic rebound

Cook 9-22

Charlie is the director of the Cook Political Report and a Columnist for National Journal, “Obama’s Uptick,” <http://nationaljournal.com/columns/cook-report/the-cook-report-obama-s-uptick-20120920>

Reality is often more complicated than conventional wisdom would have you believe, a point underscored in the latest NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll. The survey showed President Obama with a 6-point lead among all registered voters, a 7-point edge among registered voters in 12 swing states, and a 5-point advantage among likely voters nationally. The Obama lead in the survey, no matter which set of numbers you focus on, is wider than in many other public polls, including the widely watched automated robo-polls, which are not allowed to dial cell phones. Such robo-polls miss entirely the 30 to 40 percent of the electorate who don’t have land-line phones or rarely use them. The robo-polls rely on respondents who are not representative of the broader public and undercount young and minority voters, who are more likely than other demographic groups to have only cell phones.¶ As widely different as the NBC/WSJ poll is from many other public polls, the numbers are very close to the 4- or 5-point Obama lead I have been picking up in recent days from top pollsters and strategists from both parties. Of course, this shouldn’t be too much of a shocker, as the NBC/WSJ poll is conducted jointly by Peter Hart, the preeminent Democratic pollster (although Hart no longer does political campaigns), and Bill McInturff, a founder and partner of Public Opinion Strategies, a highly respected Republican polling firm.¶ To be sure, other highly regarded polls showed Obama with a smaller lead. The Gallup tracking poll conducted Sept. 11-17 had the race narrowing to a single point, 47 percent to 46 percent, down from a 3-point Obama lead from the two previous days, and a separate Sept. 11-17 Gallup poll in 12 swing states showed Obama up by 2 points, 48 percent to 46 percent. The most recent CBS News/New York Times national poll put the Obama edge at 3 points, 49 percent to 46 percent. Fox News had it at 5 points, 48 percent to 43 percent. The debate is over the margin, not over who is ahead.¶ There has been a lot of news in the past few weeks with the potential to affect the presidential race, including the party conventions and the anti-American violence in the Middle East. Obama’s job-approval rating in the Hart/McInturff survey, conducted Sept. 12-16 among 900 registered voters (including 270 cell-phone-only respondents), ticked up by 2 points since the August survey, from 48 percent to 50 percent, with his disapproval number dropping by a point to 48 percent. Not a big shift, but if you are an incumbent seeking reelection, it’s nice to have a job-approval rating of 50 percent or higher.¶ Three sets of numbers in other questions might explain the uptick. In the key “right direction/wrong track” question, called the “Dow Jones indicator of American politics” by the late Dick Wirthlin, President Reagan’s pollster, the “right direction” jumped up 7 points since August, from 32 percent to 39 percent; the “wrong track” dropped 6 points, from 61 percent to 55 percent. Obama’s job approval on handling the economy ticked up 3 points to 47 percent, while disapproval dropped 3 points, to 51 percent, perhaps driven by stock-market gains and more optimism about housing. In other words, Obama went from a net minus 10 points in August to a net minus 4 points in September. When asked, “During the next 12 months, do you think that the nation’s economy will get better, get worse, or stay about the same?” the percentage of respondents saying they expected the economy to get better increased 6 points, to 42 percent; the “get worse” remained the same at 18 percent; and the share saying “stay about the same” declined to 32 percent. In another question, 51 percent said they thought that the economy is recovering (up a point from August) and those saying that it isn’t dropped a point, so the net responses citing economic recovery shifted slightly from a net 4 to a net 6 points. These aren’t big changes, but they are an improvement on what had been Obama’s biggest liability: the state of the economy and the public’s perception of his stewardship of it.¶ While all of this modestly good news for the president was occurring, however, his approval rating on handling foreign policy dropped 5 points in a month, from 54 percent to 49 percent, with his disapproval number rising from 40 percent to 46 percent. Clearly, what is happening abroad is making an impression on voters, but it is being offset by a cautiously improving view of where the country and economy are going.¶ Central to Mitt Romney’s challenge is that too many Americans either don’t like him or can’t figure out if they do. Only 38 percent of registered voters had a positive view of Romney (the same as last month), while 43 percent had a negative view, 1 point down from August. Romney’s underwater ratings—minus 6 points in August, minus 5 points in September—compare with Obama being plus 5 points in August and plus 6 points this month.¶ Equally dispiriting for Republicans are the responses to questions about which candidate would be better in dealing with three subjects: Medicare, taxes, and the economy. On Medicare, 47 percent said that Obama would be better, while 37 percent chose Romney. On taxes, Obama had a 6-point edge, 45 percent to 39 percent. And on the economy, the two men are now tied at 43 percent, compared with a 6-point Romney edge in July.¶ With six weeks to go before the election, this contest is certainly not over. But it is becoming increasingly clear that Romney needs something to happen to change the trajectory of this race. Right now, it isn’t heading in a good direction for him.

#### Plan is unpopular, solar failures make selling solar difficult

Bloomberg 6-28

“Abound Failure Revives Debate over Obama Solar Policies,” <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-29/abound-failure-revives-debate-over-obama-solar-policies.html>

**The failure of a second solar manufacturer that received loan guarantees from the U.S. Energy Department adds to pressure on President Barack Obama to justify incentives for the clean-energy industry that’s being undercut by Chinese competition**. Abound Solar Inc., a U.S. solar manufacturer that was awarded a $400 million loan guarantee in 2010, said yesterday it will suspend operations and file for bankruptcy next week. Enlarge image Abound Solar Inc. solar panels in Germany. Source: Abound Solar Imc. Abound said its thin-film panels couldn’t compete against Chinese products, the same reason cited by Solyndra LLC, which closed its doors in August after receiving a $535 million guarantee from the same program. Half of the four solar manufacturers that received loan guarantees have failed, supporting the argument that backing clean-energy is a mistake, according to Representative Cliff Stearns. “We know why they went bankrupt. We warned them they would go bankrupt,” Stearns, a Florida Republican, told reporters yesterday. “**The larger question is why the administration was pursuing a green-energy policy in which companies are going bankrupt and wasting taxpayer money**.” Stearns is chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee’s oversight panel that has held hearings on the Energy Department’s loan guarantee program. Representative Jim Jordan, an Ohio Republican and chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee’s stimulus oversight panel that has investigated loan guarantees to solar companies, said **Abound’s failure is further proof the Energy Department program was a mistake. “It just adds to the weight of how ridiculous this was,” Jordan told reporters.**

**Approval Rating is key, lines up perfectly with reelection  
Silver ’11**

Nate directs five thirty eight and is a statistician, “Approval Ratings and Reelection Odds,” <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/approval-ratings-and-re-election-odds/>

Earlier this month, we posted the simple version of a finding, based on the historical record, that is worth keeping in mind when you read articles about how Barack Obama’s presidency has (or has not been) been revitalized: It’s just too soon for his approval ratings to tell us very much about his re-election prospects for 2012. This is an overdue follow-up to that article — what you might think of as the slightly-more-complicated version. While **it’s true that approval ratings aren’t of much use now, it’s also the case that, by the time we get close to the election, they will have become a very reliable predictor of Mr. Obama’s chances of winning another term**. Based on Gallup polling, here is what I estimate that the incumbent president’s approval rating was on Election Day in almost every election since 1940. (There is no data for 1944 because Gallup went on wartime hiatus.) There are a few tricks I had to employ to derive these numbers; I’d ask you to take them on faith for a few moments, and then we’ll explain everything later on. **At first glance, the relationship seems nearly perfect: every incumbent with an approval rating of 49 percent or higher won re-election, while every candidate with a rating of 48 percent or lower lost.** In practice, things probably don’t work quite that crisply. For example, Harry Truman, whom we estimate had a 50 percent approval rating on Election Day 1948, won by 4.5 points, and 114 electoral votes, over Thomas E. Dewey, which suggests that he had some margin to spare. And candidate quality clearly makes a difference. Although Robert Dole is sometimes considered a weak Republican nominee, Bill Clinton beat him in 1996 by just 8.5 points, despite Mr. Clinton’s 55 percent approval rating. By contrast, in 1972, Richard Nixon, with an approval rating only a couple of points higher (57 percent), trounced a very weak Democratic nominee, George McGovern, by more than 23 points. Still, the approval rating at which an incumbent candidate goes from being an underdog to a favorite for re-election is somewhere in the high 40s. **The reason the threshold is probably slightly below 50 percent rather than right at 50 percent is that in any approval survey, some people (typically 5 to 10 percent) say they are undecided about the president’s performance**. For instance, at this writing, Barack Obama’s Gallup approval rating is 49 percent but his disapproval rating is just 42 percent, a net margin of +7. If those were the figures on Election Day, he would be a favorite to win unless nearly everybody who was undecided about his performance cast their ballots against him, something that is possible in theory but usually doesn’t occur in practice. Now, then, how did we come up with these numbers? As I said, it’s not quite so straightforward. Gallup has approval ratings data going back to 1937. The problem is that, until fairly recently, they had a habit of stopping their approval ratings polling several months before a presidential election. For instance, in 1956, their last poll of Dwight Eisenhower’s public approval was in early August; they did not survey him again until late November, after he had already defeated Adlai Stevenson. However, we can extrapolate what Mr. Eisenhower’s rating would have been on Election Day 1956 by drawing a smoothed regression line — known in the business as a Loess curve — using the data points before and after that date. The one hitch is that incumbent presidents, whether they win, lose, or don’t run at all, almost always receive a “bounce” in their approval rating after the election, as people either rally around a winner or feel sympathy for the lame duck. The average magnitude of this post-election bounce is 4 points. So, before I fitted the curves, I subtracted 4 points from approval rating polls conducted after Election Day. By applying this process of bounce-adjustment and curve-fitting, we are able to estimate an incumbent president’s Gallup approval rating on Election Day itself or on any day before it, as shown in this nifty-looking graphic: I haven’t labeled the curves by the candidate’s name in the chart, because that which create too much clutter. But I have distinguished those who eventually won re-election (blue lines) from those who lost (red). A couple of cases are worth attention. The red line that you see briefly extending above 80 percent is for George H.W. Bush. His approval ratings, which were already pretty good, shot up following the start of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, when American-led forces drove Iraqi troops back from their occupation of Kuwait. Politically, that made Mr. Bush look like an extremely formidable candidate for re-election: Saturday Night Live ran a sketch later that year entitled “Campaign ’92: The Race To Avoid Being The Guy Who Loses To Bush,” with Democratic candidates at a debate all trying to lose so they would not have to run against him. But Mr. Bush’s approval ratings fell precipitously throughout late 1991 and early 1992, and were below 40 percent by Election Day. If Mr. Bush is the precedent that challengers will cite when their campaign seems to be flailing, the opposite example is the original Comeback Kid, Harry Truman. He’s the blue line that you still see down around 40 percent approval with just five months to go before the election of 1948. It’s hard to know exactly where Mr. Truman’s approval numbers were on Election Day. When Gallup surveyed in late June, he had just 39 percent approval; in January, 1949, after he had beaten Thomas E. Dewey, he was up to 69 percent; and then he reverted back to 50 percent just a couple months later. Our Loess curve estimates that Mr. Truman’s approval rating was probably around 50 percent on Election Day, but this is just a guess. What’s clear is that Mr. Truman was at some point an extremely unpopular president, and he nevertheless — to the great surprise of the Chicago Daily Tribune — defeated Mr. Dewey. Another thing to take from the graphic is how the red and blue lines gradually untangle themselves as the relationship between approval ratings and re-election becomes stronger over time. We can see this a bit more clearly by taking the average approval rating for the 8 winning candidates and the 3 losing ones and tracking them over the two years leading up to the election: I would resist the idea that there is any one magical date when approval ratings go from meaningless to meaningful as predictors of re-election. In the chart, the first time the winners and the losers begin to separate themselves is about 19 months before the election — which would correspond roughly to March of the prior year — but the split would have come a bit earlier if not for Mr. Bush’s Gulf War bounce. There’s also increasing differentiation in the period roughly 10 to 5 months before the election, corresponding with primary season. Still, for the most part, the separation occurs gradually. I’ve also tried to play around with various sorts of logistic regression models that attempt to predict a president’s chances at re-election based solely on his Gallup approval rating and the number of days until the election. Don’t take this terribly seriously — it’s hard to do anything very rigorous based on so few data points (just 11 presidents in the sample), and I can imagine better model designs than the one that I’ve used. But it does yield some ballpark estimates of what this data implies. **For example, a year in advance of the election, the model figures that a president with a 60 percent approval rating is about 90 percent likely to win re-election, whereas a 40 percent rating translates into a win probability of a bit below 40 percent**. So by that point the differences have become fairly meaningful: What does this mean for Barack Obama? Right now, we’re still in the period where the most useful number for estimating his re-election chances is not his approval rating but rather the historical track record of incumbent presidents. As I wrote on Wednesday, since the Civil War, 73 percent of incumbent presidents who sought another term won, as have 70 percent since World War II. Plugging Mr. Obama’s current numbers into the regression model that I described above yields a 65 percent likelihood of re-election — but again, this is a really rough guess, based mostly on the high historical batting average for incumbents rather than anything to do with Mr. Obama himself. What we can say is important is the range in which Mr. Obama’s approval ratings have been varying in recent months: between about 45 and about 50 percent. **If Mr. Obama’s approval rating is at the top of that range, 50 percent, on Nov. 6, 2012 — about where it is now — the model figures that his chances of winning re-election will be greater than 80 percent. But if his approval rating is at the bottom of the range instead, at 45 percent, his chances for a second term will be only about one in three,** and he’ll have to hope that the Republican nominee is a weak one. Much will change between now and then, of course. But Mr. Obama would probably win an election held next Tuesday — and that would not have been true a couple of months ago.

#### China label kills relations and the economy

Roach 8-28

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True to his word as a candidate, a few hours after taking office as US president on January 20, 2013, Mitt Romney issued his first executive order, declaring China guilty of currency manipulation. In accordance with the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, President Romney’s act triggered immediate negotiations between US and Chinese officials. But the negotiations stalled and both parties blamed the other in press releases.¶ In early February, in his first State of the Union address, Mr Romney said: “Enough is enough. It is high time for China to play by our rules.” Congress roared its approval and within a week, overwhelming bipartisan majorities of both houses passed the Defend America Trade Act of 2013. Modelled on the currency manipulation “remedies” of countervailing tariffs first proposed in 2005, DATA was signed into law on President’s Day, February 18 2013. China was quickly deemed to be in violation of the new statute.¶ More¶ At that point negotiations took on a new urgency. But the new leaders in both countries were in no mood for compromise and the talks failed. In accordance with the provisions of DATA, Washington slapped immediate tariffs of 20 per cent on all Chinese products entering the US.¶ As plants shut down across China, Beijing declared this to be an act of economic war and filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization. Li Keqiang, newly installed as premier, announced after the National People’s Congress in March that China had no patience to endure a WTO dispute process that could take anywhere from two to five years to run its course.¶ China’s Ministry of Commerce then announced retaliatory tariffs of 20 per cent on all US exports to China. This hit growth-starved America right between the eyes. With $104bn of American-made goods sold in Chinese markets in 2011, China had become the US’s third-largest and its fastest-growing export market. To add insult to injury, China-dependent Walmart announced average price increases of 5 per cent. Other retailers followed suit. Talk of stagflation was in the air and hard-pressed American consumers hunkered down further.¶ US financial markets swooned. The stock market was hit by pressures on profit margins, growth and inflation. The bond market was also unnerved by the realisation that the Federal Reserve was seriously behind the curve. With good reason. After its meeting in June 2013, the Fed reaffirmed its ever-extending commitment to keep its benchmark policy rate near zero through 2015, and even dangled the possibility of yet another round of quantitative easing, QE4. Yields on 10-year Treasuries moved back above 4 per cent and stocks fell sharply further.¶ Feeling the heat from financial markets, Washington turned up the heat on China. Mr Romney called Congress back from its Independence Day holiday into a special session. By unanimous consent, Congress passed an amendment to DATA – upping the tariffs on China by another 10 percentage points.¶ At that point an indignant China turned to its own version of the big bazooka. The biggest foreign buyer of US debt was nowhere to be seen at the Treasury’s August 2013 auction. Long-term interest rates spiked and within weeks yields on 10-year Treasuries hit 7 per cent. The dollar plunged and the US stock market went into free fall.¶ Just like that, the so-called exorbitant privilege of the haven asset vanished. When asked at a press conference why China would willingly engage in actions that would undermine the value of more than $2tn in Treasuries and other dollar-based holdings, Zhou Xiaochuan, retiring governor of the People’s Bank of China, said: “This is not about risk-adjusted portfolio returns. We are defending our people against an act of economic war.”¶ By the autumn of 2013 there was little doubt of the severity of renewed recession in the US. Trade sanctions on China had backfired. Beleaguered American workers paid the highest price of all, as the unemployment rate shot back up above 10 per cent. A horrific policy blunder had confirmed that there was no bilateral fix for the multilateral trade imbalance of a savings-starved US economy.¶ In China, growth had slipped below the dreaded 6 per cent threshold and the new leadership was rolling out yet another investment stimulus for a still unbalanced and unstable Chinese economy. As the global economy slipped back into recession, the Great Crisis of 2008-09 suddenly looked like child’s play. Globalisation itself hung in the balance.¶ History warns us never to say never. We need only look at the legacy of US Senator Reed Smoot and Representative Willis Hawley, who sponsored the infamous Tariff Act of 1930 – America’s worst economic policy blunder. Bad dreams can – and have – become reality.

#### Economic decline causes nuclear war

Harris and Burrows, 09 –

PhD in European History @ Cambridge and Counselor of the US National Intelligence Council AND Member of the National Intelligence Council’s Long Range Analysis Unit (Mathew J. and Jennifer, “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis,” April, Washington Quarterly, <http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_Burrows.pdf>)

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the **Great Depression** is not likely to be repeated, the **lessons** to be drawn from that period **include the harmful effects on** **fledgling** **democracies** and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) **and** on the sustainability of **multilateral institutions** (think League of Nations in the same period). **There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first** as much as in the twentieth **century.** For that reason, the ways in which **the potential for greater conflict could grow** would seem to be even more apt **in a** constantly **volatile economic environment** as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. **Terrorism**’s appeal **will decline if** economic **growth continues** in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the **diffusion of technologies** and scientific knowledge **will place** some of **the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach**. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity **conflict** and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella **could lead to an unintended escalation** and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close **proximity of** potential **nuclear rivals** combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions **may place more focus on preemption** rather than defense, potentially **leading to escalating crises**. 36 Types of **conflict** that the world continues to experience, such as **over resources, could reemerge,** particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. **Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity** will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this **could result in interstate conflicts** if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, **cooperation** to manage changing water resources **is** likely to be increasingly **difficult** both within and between states **in a** more **dog-eat-dog world.**

### CP Shell

#### Text- the Supreme Court of the United States should rule the moratorium on oil drilling on the Outer Continental Shelf is unconstitutional as applied.

#### Counterplan competes: "The" means whole USFG

Merriam-Websters, 2010 (Online dictionary)

used as a function word before a noun or a substantivized adjective to indicate reference to a group as a whole

#### Solves the aff because it strikes down the moratorium

#### Court action induces legislative change.

Devins, ‘92

(William and Mary Associate Poli Sci Prof, July, 80 Calif. L. Rev. 1027)

**Courts matter. They matter a lot.** Sometimes their orders set in motion market mechanisms which guarantee their effectiveness. n199 Sometimes the threat of judicial action prompts either settlement or **legislative initiative.** n200 **Their opinions influence legislative deliberations** n201 **and change the status quo**. n202 Occasionally, they trump agencies and interpose their normative views into the law. It may be that these influences sometimes result in unwise policy decisions and sometimes exceed the proper judicial role in our system of separated powers, but they are judicial influences nonetheless

#### Courts don’t link to elections- shielded from political pressure

Ward ‘9

(Artemus Ward, Professor at NIU, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy, Congress and The Presidency, pg. 119)

After the old order has collapse the once- united, new-regime coalition begins to fracture as original commitments are extended to new issues. In chapter 3 Whittington combines Skowronek's articulation and disjunctive categories into the overarching "affiliated" presidencies as both seek to elaborate the regime begun under reconstructive leaders. By this point in the ascendant regime, Bourts are staffed by justices from the dominant ruling coalition via the appointment process - and Whittington spends time on appointment politics here and more fully in chapter 4. Perhaps counter-intuitively, affiliated political actors - including presidents - encourage Courts to exercise vetoes and operate in issue areas of relatively low political salience. Of course, this "activism" is never used against the affiliated president per se. Instead, affiliated Courts correct for the overreaching of those who operate outside the preferred constitutional vision, which are often state and local governments who need to be brought into line with nationally dominant constitutional commitments. Whittington explains why it is easier for affilitated judges, rather than affiliated presidents, to rein in outliers and conduct constitutional maintenance. The latter are saddled with controlling opposition political figures, satisfying short-term political demands, and navigating intraregime gridlock and political thickets. Furthermore, because of their electoral accountability, politicians engage in position-taking, credit-claiming, and blame-avoidance behavior. By contrast, their judicial counterparts are relatively sheltered from political pressures and have more straightforward decisional processes. Activist Courts can take the blame for advancing and legitimizing constitutional commitments that might have electoral costs. In short, a division of labor exists between politicians and judges affiliated with the dominant regime.

### Generic Picking Winners

#### Picking winners bad—distorts the market, causes trade-offs and deters private capital

Veronique de Rugy 6/19/2012 (Senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center, "Assessing the Department of Energy Loan Guarantee Program" mercatus.org/publication/assessing-department-energy-loan-guarantee-program)

This government involvement can *distort the market signals further*. For instance, the data shows that private investors tend to congregate toward government guarantee projects, independently of the merits of the projects, *taking capital away from unsubsidized projects that have a better probability of success* without subsidy and a more viable business plan. As the Government Accountability Office noted, “Guarantees would make projects [the federal government] assists financially more attractive to private capital than conservation projects not backed by federal guarantees. Thus both its loans and its guarantees will *siphon private capital away*.”[25] This reallocation of resources by private investors away from viable projects may even *take place within the same industry—that is, one green energy project might trade off with another, more viable green energy project.* More importantly, once the government subsidizes a portion of the market, the object of the subsidy becomes a safe asset. Safety in the market, however, often means low return on investments, which is likely to *turn venture capitalists away*. As a result, *capital investments will likely dry out and innovation rates will go down*.[26] In fact, the data show that in cases in which the federal government introduced few distortions, private investors were *more than happy to take risks and invest* their money even in projects that required high initial capital requirements. The Alaska pipeline project, for instance, was privately financed at the cost of $35 billion, making it one of the most expensive energy projects undertaken by private enterprise.[27] The project was ultimately abandoned in 2011 because of weak customer demand and the development of shale gas resources outside Alaska.28 However, this proves that the private sector invests money even when there is a chance that it could lose it. Private investment in U.S. clean energy totaled $34 billion in 2010, up 51 percent from the previous year.[29] Finally, when the government *picks winners and losers in the form of a technology or a company, it often fails*. First, the government does not have perfect or even better information or technology advantage over private agents. In addition, *decision-makers are insulated from market signals* and won’t learn important and necessary lessons about the technology or what customers want. Second, the resources that the government offers are so addictive that companies may *reorient themselves away from producing what customers want, toward pleasing the government officials*.

#### Causes crowd-out—decreases domestic investments and innovations

Veronique de Rugy 6/19/2012 (Senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center, "Assessing the Department of Energy Loan Guarantee Program" mercatus.org/publication/assessing-department-energy-loan-guarantee-program

4. *Crowding Out* To some (for example, those lucky enough to receive the loan guarantee), government money may seem to be free. But it isn’t, of course. The government has to borrow the money on the open market too. This additional borrowing comes from Americans’ savings, as does the money that Americans invest in the private sector’s growth. There comes a point when there just *aren’t enough savings to satisfy both masters*. In other words, when government runs a deficit to finance its preferred projects, it can affect private sector access to capital, and *lead to a reduction in domestic investment*. Economists use the term “crowding out” to describe the contraction in economic activity associated with deficit- financed spending.[30] In addition, the competition between public and private borrowing *raises interest rates for all borrowers*, including the government, making it *more expensive for domestic investors to start or complete projects*. Over time, this could mean that American companies will build fewer factories, cut back on research and development, and *generate fewer innovations*. As a result, our nation’s future earning prospects will dim, and our future living standards could suffer.

### Case

#### Solar scaleup impossible- Germany, California and decades prove

OC Register 12-27

Orange County Register, “Solar Power Failures Adding Up,” <http://www.ocregister.com/opinion/solar-333211-energy-company.html>

Sooner or later, the laws of economics prevail, even in heavily subsidized industries like solar power. The latest evidence that government manipulation cannot overcome economic reality is the decision by BP PLC, the giant British energy company, to leave the solar power business. BP has developed solar energy for 40 years and for more than a decade touted its "Beyond Petroleum" campaign. The Wall Street Journal suggested, however, that BP's solar experiment was more gimmick than serious investment. BP spent millions trying to go green, but simultaneously spent billions on its traditional gas and oil business. International competitors, particularly China, turn out solar panels more cheaply, even as global demand has slowed. When supply outstrips demand, higher-cost providers suffer, as BP learned. Even government subsidies, without which solar manufacturers couldn't begin to compete with less-costly, conventional energy, couldn't keep BP competitive. A similar lesson was learned this year by Solyndra, the bankrupted Northern California solar-panel maker that burned through $535 million in federal guaranteed loans. Last week, First Solar, the only pure-play solar-panel maker in the S&P 500 stock index, issued a profit warning for 2012, as profit fell to a four-year low, and the company said it will shift to large-scale utility projects rather than residential solar panels. "[B]eyond the United States," the Journal reported, "there have been a rash of recent solar company failures in Germany as well." The failures come as China, which heavily subsidizes its solar manufacturers, flooded the market with less-expensive products, and as other governments ratcheted back their own tax-financed subsidies. Solon became the first publicly traded solar company to file for bankruptcy in Germany, unable to repay loans of 275 million euros. Since 1990 Germany has imposed mandates that utilities must pay higher-than-market prices for solar and other so-called renewable energy sources, driving retail costs 46 percent higher than conventional sources, Bloomberg New Energy Finance says. California government mandates designed to stimulate renewable energy mean that utilities "are committed to spending - and their ratepayers to financing - at least $6 billion in above-market power costs, with more to come," according to columnist Dan Walters. Electric bills for U.S. consumers skyrocketed in the past five years, adding $300 a year to household costs, USA Today reported. This should be unsurprising. President Barack Obama three years ago said to move the nation off traditional energy sources and on to these impractical alternatives, "electricity rates would necessarily skyrocket." So-called renewable energy is possible only if government demands those sources replace conventional energy, and subsidizes their manufacture, purchase or operation with tax dollars. Even then, there isn't enough subsidy – let alone demand – to make these systems cost-effective. Sooner or later, economic reality prevails.

#### Predictions are accurate enough and should be used as a basis for political action

Chernoff ‘9. Fred, Prof. IR and Dir. IR – Colgate U., European Journal of International Relations, “Conventionalism as an Adequate Basis for Policy-Relevant IR Theory”, 15:1

For these and other reasons, many social theorists and social scientists have come to the conclusion that prediction is impossible. Well-known IR reflexivists like Rick Ashley, Robert Cox, Rob Walker and Alex Wendt have attacked naturalism by emphasizing the interpretive nature of social theory. Ashley is explicit in his critique of prediction, as is Cox, who says quite simply, ‘It is impossible to predict the future’ (Ashley, 1986: 283; Cox, 1987: 139, cf. also 1987: 393). More recently, Heikki Patomäki has argued that ‘qualitative changes and emergence are possible, but predictions are not’ defective and that the latter two presuppose an unjustifiably narrow notion of ‘prediction’.14 A determined prediction sceptic may continue to hold that there is too great a degree of complexity of social relationships (which comprise ‘open systems’) to allow any prediction whatsoever. Two very simple examples may circumscribe and help to refute a radical variety of scepticism. First, we all make reliable social predictions and do so with great frequency. We can predict with high probability that a spouse, child or parent will react to certain well-known stimuli that we might supply, based on extensive past experience. More to the point of IR prediction – scepticism, we can imagine a young child in the UK who (perhaps at the cinema) (1) picks up a bit of 19th-century British imperial lore thus gaining a sense of the power of the crown, without knowing anything of current balances of power, (2) hears some stories about the US–UK invasion of Iraq in the context of the aim of advancing democracy, and (3) hears a bit about communist China and democratic Taiwan. Although the specific term ‘preventative strike’ might not enter into her lexicon, it is possible to imagine the child, whose knowledge is thus limited, thinking that if democratic Taiwan were threatened by China, the UK would (possibly or probably) launch a strike on China to protect it, much as the UK had done to help democracy in Iraq. In contrast to the child, readers of this journal and scholars who study the world more thoroughly have factual information (e.g. about the relative military and economic capabilities of the UK and China) and hold some cause-and-effect principles (such as that states do not usually initiate actions that leaders understand will have an extremely high probability of undercutting their power with almost no chances of success). Anyone who has adequate knowledge of world politics would predict that the UK will not launch a preventive attack against China. In the real world, China knows that for the next decade and well beyond the UK will not intervene militarily in its affairs. While Chinese leaders have to plan for many likely — and even a few somewhat unlikely — future possibilities, they do not have to plan for various implausible contingencies: they do not have to structure forces geared to defend against specifically UK forces and do not have to conduct diplomacy with the UK in a way that would be required if such an attack were a real possibility. Any rational decision-maker in China may use some cause-and-effect (probabilistic) principles along with knowledge of specific facts relating to the Sino-British relationship to predict (P2) that the UK will not land its forces on Chinese territory — even in the event of a war over Taiwan (that is, the probability is very close to zero). The statement P2 qualifies as a prediction based on DEF above and counts as knowledge for Chinese political and military decision-makers. A Chinese diplomat or military planner who would deny that theory-based prediction would have no basis to rule out extremely implausible predictions like P2 and would thus have to prepare for such unlikely contingencies as UK action against China. A reflexivist theorist sceptical of ‘prediction’ in IR might argue that the China example distorts the notion by using a trivial prediction and treating it as a meaningful one. But the critic’s temptation to dismiss its value stems precisely from the fact that it is so obviously true. The value to China of knowing that the UK is not a military threat is significant. The fact that, under current conditions, any plausible cause-and-effect understanding of IR that one might adopt would yield P2, that the ‘UK will not attack China’, does not diminish the value to China of knowing the UK does not pose a military threat. A critic might also argue that DEF and the China example allow non-scientific claims to count as predictions. But we note that while physics and chemistry offer precise ‘point predictions’, other natural sciences, such as seismology, genetics or meteorology, produce predictions that are often much less specific; that is, they describe the predicted ‘events’ in broader time frame and typically in probabilistic terms. We often find predictions about the probability, for example, of a seismic event in the form ‘some time in the next three years’ rather than ‘two years from next Monday at 11:17 am’. DEF includes approximate and probabilistic propositions as predictions and is thus able to catagorize as a prediction the former sort of statement, which is of a type that is often of great value to policy-makers. With the help of these ‘non-point predictions’ coming from the natural and the social sciences, leaders are able to choose the courses of action (e.g. more stringent earthquake-safety building codes, or procuring an additional carrier battle group) that are most likely to accomplish the leaders’ desired ends. So while ‘point predictions’ are not what political leaders require in most decision-making situations, critics of IR predictiveness often attack the predictive capacity of IR theory for its inability to deliver them. The critics thus commit the straw man fallacy by requiring a sort of prediction in IR (1) that few, if any, theorists claim to be able to offer, (2) that are not required by policy-makers for theory-based predictions to be valuable, and (3) that are not possible even in some natural sciences.15 The range of theorists included in ‘reflexivists’ here is very wide and it is possible to dissent from some of the general descriptions. From the point of view of the central argument of this article, there are two important features that should be rendered accurately. One is that reflexivists reject explanation–prediction symmetry, which allows them to pursue causal (or constitutive) explanation without any commitment to prediction. The second is that almost all share clear opposition to predictive social science.16 The reflexivist commitment to both of these conclusions should be evident from the foregoing discussion.

#### Solar development kills desert tortoise

Lovich & Ennen ‘11

Jeffrey and Joshua, “Wildlife Development and Solar Energy Development in the Desert Southwest, United States,” Bioscience Volume 61 No. 12 Pages 982-992 <http://www.avhidesert.com/pdf/downloaded_file-1.pdf>

Habitat fragmentation. **Until relatively recently, the desert Southwest was characterized by large blocks of continuous and interconnected habitat**. Roads and urban development continue to contribute to habitat fragmentation in this landscape. **Large-scale energy development has the potential to add to and exacerbate the situation, presenting potential barriers to movement and genetic exchange in wildlife populations, including** those of bighorn sheep (Ovis canadensis), deer (Odocoileus spp.), **tortoise**s, and other species of concern and social significance. Research conducted on the effects of oil and gas exploration and development (OGED) on wildlife in the Intermountain West provides a possible analog to USSEDO, since comparable data are not available for the desert Southwest. **The potential effects** on mule deer (Odocoileus hemionus) and other wildlife species **include impediments to free movement, the creation of migration bottlenecks, and a reduction in effective winter range size.** Mule deer responded immediately to OGED by moving away from disturbances, with no sign of acclimation during the three years of study by Sawyer and colleagues (2009). Some deer avoidance resulted in their use of lesspreferred and presumably less-suitable habitats. Despite a lack of data on the direct contributions of USSEDO to habitat fragmentation, USSEDO has the potential to be an impediment to gene flow for some species. Although the extent of this impact is, as yet, largely unquantified in the desert, compelling evidence for the effects of human-caused habitat fragmentation on diverse wildlife species has already been demonstrated in the adjacent coastal region of southern California (Delaney et al. 2010).

#### The impact is two fold-

#### 1. We should save the tortoise for the tortoise sake- humans have no right to drive species extinction based on our pursuit of solar energy. That is an ethical reason to vote neg

#### 2. Desert Tortoise is a keystone species, keeps hundreds of species alive and soil correct – turns the aff

Becker ’12

Kendall is an environmental researcher at the University of Washington, “Renewable Energy, Fire, and the Agassiz’s Desert Tortoise,” <http://scienceinshort.wordpress.com/2012/03/13/renewable-energy-fire-and-the-agassizs-desert-tortoise/>

**At the forefront of this debate is the Agassiz’s desert tortoise. The tortoise is a keystone species; the desert ecosystem revolves around the tortoises’ propensity to burrow. “Literally hundreds of other desert animals benefit from tortoise burrows,” says Dr.** Jeffrey **Lovich, director of the Southwest Biological Science Center** in Flagstaff, Arizona. Voles, enda**ngered lizards, and even rattlesnakes seek shady homes in burrows of dimensions they are incapable of engineering on their own**. **Still more critical to the desert ecosystem is the churning of the soil that occurs as tortoises dig these tunnels**. In an environment devoid of worms, **desert plants rely on tortoises to stir up the soil so more water and oxygen can reach plant roots**. In recent decades desert tortoise numbers have plummeted as encroaching civilization and industry fragment their habitat. **Where a full 1,000 tortoises used to populate each square kilometer, now as few as 100 remain**. With the California Bureau of Land Management currently reviewing 22 applications for solar energy permits, the question of how these facilities impact tortoises and, by extension, the entire desert ecosystem, is a pressing one.

#### The environment is indestructible

Easterbrook 95

Distinguished Fellow, Fullbright Foundation

**(**Gregg, A Moment on Earth pg 25)

IN THE AFTERMATH OF EVENTS SUCH AS LOVE CANAL OR THE Exxon Valdez oil spill, every reference to the environment is prefaced with the adjective "fragile." "Fragile environment" has become a welded phrase of the modern lexicon, like "aging hippie" or "fugitive financier." But the notion of a fragile environment is profoundly wrong. Individual animals, plants, and people are distressingly fragile. The environment that contains them is close to indestructible. The living environment of Earth has survived ice ages; bombardments of cosmic radiation more deadly than atomic fallout; solar radiation more powerful than the worst-case projection for ozone depletion; thousand-year periods of intense volcanism releasing global air pollution far worse than that made by any factory; reversals of the planet's magnetic poles; the rearrangement of continents; transformation of plains into mountain ranges and of seas into plains; fluctuations of ocean currents and the jet stream; 300-foot vacillations in sea levels; shortening and lengthening of the seasons caused by shifts in the planetary axis; collisions of asteroids and comets bearing far more force than man's nuclear arsenals; and the years without summer that followed these impacts. Yet hearts beat on, and petals unfold still. Were the environment fragile it would have expired many eons before the advent of the industrial affronts of the dreaming ape. Human assaults on the environment, though mischievous, are pinpricks compared to forces of the magnitude nature is accustomed to resisting.

#### Won’t cause extinction

Easterbrook ‘3

(Gregg, senior fellow at The New Republic, July, Wired Magazine, “We’re All Gonna Die!” <http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=1&topic=&topic_set>=)

If we’re talking about doomsday - the end of human civilization - many scenarios simply don’t measure up. A single nuclear bomb ignited by terrorists, for example, would be awful beyond words, but life would go on. People and machines might converge in ways that you and I would find ghastly, but from the standpoint of the future, they would probably represent an adaptation. Environmental collapse might make parts of the globe unpleasant, but considering that the biosphere has survived ice ages, it wouldn’t be the final curtain. Depression, which has become 10 times more prevalent in Western nations in the postwar era, might grow so widespread that vast numbers of people would refuse to get out of bed, a possibility that Petranek suggested in a doomsday talk at the Technology Entertainment Design conference in 2002. But Marcel Proust, as miserable as he was, wrote Remembrance of Things Past while lying in bed.

#### Their aff prevents the type of managerialism necessary to prevent global extinction –processes of environmental destruction are unstoppable without intervention

Dr Neil Levy 1999. Fellow of the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at Charles Sturt University. “Discourses of the Environment” p. 215

If the ‘technological fix’ is unlikely to be more successful than strategies of limitation of our uses of resources, we are nevertheless unable to simply leave the environment as it is. There is a real and pressing need for more, and more accurate, technical and scientific information about the non-human world. For we are faced with a situation in which the processes we have already set in train will continue to impact upon that world, and therefore us, for centuries. It is therefore necessary, not only to stop cutting down the rain forests, but to develop real, concrete proposals for action, to reverse, or at least limit, the effects of our previous interventions. More over, there is another reason why our behaviour towards the non-human cannot simply be a matter of leaving it as it is, at least in so far as our goals are not only environmental but also involve social justice. For if we simply preserve what remains to us of wilderness, of the countryside and of park land, we also preserve patterns of very unequal access to their resources and their consolations (Soper 1995: 207). In fact, we risk exacerbating these inequalities. It is no us, but the poor of Brazil, who will bear the brunt of the misery which would result form a strictly enforced policy of leaving the Amazonian rain forest untouched, in the absence of alternative means of providing for their livelihood. It is the development of policies to provide such ecologically sustainable alternative which we require, as well as the development of technical means for replacing our current greenhouse gas-emitting sources of energy. Such policies and proposals for concrete action must be formulated by ecologists, environmentalist, people with expertise concerning the functioning of ecosystems and the impacts which our actions have upon them. Such proposals are, therefore, very much the province for Foucault’s specific intellectual, the one who works ‘within specific sectors, at the precise points where their won conditions of life or work situate them’ (Foucault 1980g: 126). For who could be more fittingly described as ‘the strategists of life and death’ than these environmentalists? After the end of the Cold War, it is in this sphere, more than any other, that man’s ‘politics places his existence as a living being in question’ (Foucault 1976: 143). For it is in facing the consequences of our intervention in the non-human world that the fate of our species, and of those with whom we share this planet, will be decided.

#### Objectivity and scientific reasoning are a good foundation for making decisions—the aff’s decision making calculus is arbitrary and prevents progressive politics.

Alan Sokal, Professor of Physics at New York University, 1996 (“A Plea for Reason, Evidence and Logic,” Talk Presented at a Forum at New York University, October 26th, Available Online at http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/nyu\_forum.html, Accessed 07-31-2010)

I didn't write the parody for the reasons you might at first think. My aim wasn't to defend science from the barbarian hordes of lit crit or sociology. I know perfectly well that the main threats to science nowadays come from budget-cutting politicians and corporate executives, not from a handful of postmodernist academics. Rather, my goal is to defend what one might call a scientific worldview -- defined broadly as a respect for evidence and logic, and for the incessant confrontation of theories with the real world; in short, for reasoned argument over wishful thinking, superstition and demagoguery. And my motives for trying to defend these old-fashioned ideas are basically political. I'm worried about trends in the American Left -- particularly here in academia -- that at a minimum divert us from the task of formulating a progressive social critique, by leading smart and committed people into trendy but ultimately empty intellectual fashions, and that can in fact undermine the prospects for such a critique, by promoting subjectivist and relativist philosophies that in my view are inconsistent with producing a realistic analysis of society that we and our fellow citizens will find compelling. David Whiteis, in a recent article, said it well: Too many academics, secure in their ivory towers and insulated from the real-world consequences of the ideas they espouse, seem blind to the fact that non-rationality has historically been among the most powerful weapons in the ideological arsenals of oppressors. The hypersubjectivity that characterizes postmodernism is a perfect case in point: far from being a legacy of leftist iconoclasm, as some of its advocates so disingenuously claim, it in fact ... plays perfectly into the anti-rationalist -- really, anti-thinking -- bias that currently infects "mainstream" U.S. culture. Along similar lines, the philosopher of science Larry Laudan observed caustically that the displacement of the idea that facts and evidence matter by the idea that everything boils down to subjective interests and perspectives is -- second only to American political campaigns -- the most prominent and pernicious manifestation of anti-intellectualism in our time.

#### The impact is extinction

Krauthammer 2011

<Charles,  Pulitzer Prize–winning syndicated columnist, political commentator, and physician. His weekly column appears in The Washington Post and is syndicated to more than 275 newspapers and media outlets.[1] He is a contributing editor to the Weekly Standard and The New Republic. He is also a weekly panelist on the PBS news program Inside Washington[2] and a nightly panelist on Fox News's Special Report with Bret Baier,  Are we alone in the universe?,  Dec 30, 2011 @ 03:19 PM, The Washington Post>

Rather than despair, however, let’s put the most hopeful face on the cosmic silence and on humanity’s own short, already baleful history with its new Promethean powers: Intelligence is a capacity so godlike, so protean that it must be contained and disciplined. This is the work of politics — understood as the ordering of society and the regulation of power to permit human flourishing while simultaneously restraining the most Hobbesian human instincts. There could be no greater irony: For all the sublimity of art, physics, music, mathematics and other manifestations of human genius, everything depends on the mundane, frustrating, often debased vocation known as politics (and its most exacting subspecialty — statecraft). **Because if we don’t get politics right, everything else risks extinction.** We grow justly weary of our politics. But we must remember this: Politics — in all its grubby, grasping, corrupt, contemptible manifestations — is sovereign in human affairs.Everything ultimately rests upon it. Fairly or not, politics is the driver of history. It will determine whether we will live long enough to be heard one day. Out there. By them, the few — the only — who got it right.

#### The aff is apolitical and makes life meaningless

BEST AND KELLNER, 2001 Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, The Postmodern Adventure, Guilford Press, 2001, 268, google books

Extreme positions invite extreme responses. The erroneous rejoinder to anthropocentrism has been radical biocentric positions that are misanthropic mystical, and apolitical, and that go so far as to grant equal rights to all life- forms including deadly viruses (see Eltrenfeld 1981). Baudrillard (1993) en- joins us to abandon our long-held illusory subject positions and surrender to the object world. Taking this idea one step further, Paul and Cox (1996) and Moravec (1988) heap scorn on the flesh, proclaim the obsolescence of the body in a cybernetic world, and urge us to transfer our consciousness to machines in order to advance to the next stage in the evolution of intelligence. We don't just "jack in" to cyberspace, as in William Gibsons vision, rather we are cyberspace in our new brain state. In this vein, Kurzweil (1999) announces the coming of “the Age of Spiritual Machines" marked by neural implants self-aware machines ("a new form of intelligence on earth") and a growing importance of computers over human beings. Most extremely, the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement” invites the human species to initiate its own demise so that the natural world can regenerate. We find no rationality in leaping from the false sovereignty of the Cartesian ego to the disembodied brain tape vividly portrayed in Huckers robot novels (see Chapter 4) of Paul and Cox or Moravec. With Hayles (1999). we hold that the value of human existence is inseparably bound up with embodiment and sensuous existence and that the radical posthumanist vision would lead to a life as meaningless and abstract as that of Byron the talking lightbulb in Pynchon’s surreal fable (see Chapter I). Moreover-and here’s the worst part-we would never die and could not even scream in frustration. On the mechanistic assumption that the brain is a machine, Paul and Cox treat human identity as a simple matter and claim that it would be transferred whole and intact from flesh to machine (1996: 184, 190). In their cosmic cybertopia., no negative political or psychological dynamics transfer into cyberspace; there is a complete continuity of human identity and yet somehow there is a total break from the power politics of past human history, as if minds could avoid the struggle for recognition.

#### Their notion of nature separate from humanity prevents aff solvency. The world without human intervention is not closer to post-Chernobyl than pristine utopia – the environment has already adapted to human intervention and dominance.

Slavoj Zizek 2007. Philosopher and Abercrombie & Fitch Magazine Contributor. Ecology as a New Opium for the Masses, 11/26, http://kasamaproject.org/2008/12/28/zizek-ecology-as-a-new-opium-for-the-masse/)

The lesson to be fully endorsed is thus that of another environmental scientist who came to the result that, while one cannot be sure what the ultimate result of humanity’s interventions into geo-sphere will be, one thing is sure: if humanity were to stop abruptly its immense industrial activity and let nature on Earth take its balanced course, the result would have been a total breakdown, an imaginable catastrophe. “Nature” on Earth is already to such an extent “adapted” to human interventions, the human “pollutions” are already to such an extent included into the shaky and fragile balance of the “natural” reproduction on Earth, that its cessation would cause a catastrophic imbalance. This is what it means that humanity has nowhere to retreat: not only “there is no big Other” (self-contained symbolic order as the ultimate guarantee of Meaning); there is also no Nature qua balanced order of self-reproduction whose homeostasis is disturbed, thrown off the rails, by the imbalanced human interventions. Indeed, what we need is ecology without nature: the ultimate obstacle to protecting nature is the very notion of nature we rely on. Alan Weisman’s The World Without Us is a vision of what would have happened if humanity (and ONLY humanity) were suddenly to disappear from the earth – natural diversity blooming again, nature gradually regaining human artefacts. We, humans, are reduced to a pure disembodied gaze observing our own absence. (As Lacan pointed out, this is the fundamental subjective position of fantasy: to be reduced to a, the gaze which observes the world in the condition of the subject’s non-existence – like the fantasy of witnessing the act of one’s own conception, the parental copulation, or the act of witnessing one’s own burial, like Tom Sawyer and Huck Finn. A jealous child likes to indulge in the fantasy of imagining how his parents would react to his own death, putting at stake his own absence.) “The world without us” is thus fantasy at its purest: witnessing the Earth itself retaining its pre-castrated state of innocence, before we humans spoiled it with our hubris. The irony is that the most prominent example comes from the catastrophe of Chernobyl: the exuberant nature taking over the disintegrating debris of the nearby city Pripyat which was abandoned, left the way it was.