### Traditional 1NC

#### 1) Interpretation: The ballot is to determine if the enactment of a topical plan is better than the status quo or a competitive option.

#### 2) Violation:

#### A) “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School, ‘4

(5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, <http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm>)

**The colon introduces** the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. **A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:"¶ Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.**

#### B) USFG is the national government in DC.

Encarta Online Encyclopedia, 2k

(http://encarta.msn.com)

“The federal government **of the U**nited **S**tates **is centered in** Washington **DC”**

#### C) Should means there is a practical reason for action

WordNet in ‘97

Princeton University, 1.6

**Should** v 1 : be expected to: “Parties should be fun” 2 : **expresses an** emotional**, practical,** or other **reason for doing something:** “You had better put on warm clothes”; “You should call your mother-in-law”; *“The State ought to repair bridges*”[syn**:** had better, ought]

#### 3) Vote Negative:

#### Limits on what can be debated protect subversion and meaningful debate.

Shively, 2K

(Former Assistant Politics Professor – Texas A&M, Partisan Politics and Political Theory, pp. 181-4, We have the full text of the card if you want to see it)

At the very least, **we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it.** For instance, once cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one’s target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, **contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagreements.** The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator’s audience must know what is being resisted. In short, **the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it.** In other words, **contestation rests on some basic agreements or harmony.**¶Continues on page 184¶ But, again, the response to the ambiguist must be that **the practice of questioning and undermining rules**, like all other social practices, **needs a certain order. The subversive needs rules to protect subversion. And when we look more closely at the rules protective of subversion, we find that they are roughly the rules of argument** discussed above. In fact, **the rules of argument are roughly the rules of democracy or civility: the delineation of boundaries necessary to protect speech and action from violence, manipulation, and other forms of tyranny.**

#### And, fair division of ground is necessary for meaningful switch-side debate – switch-side debating cultivates a civic attitude which threatens fundamentalism and turns debate into a training ground for progressive politics

Mitchell et al. 07

(Gordon, Eric English, Stephen Llano, Catherine E. Morrison, John Rief, and Carly Woods, Pitt Comm Studies Grad Students, Gordon Mitchell is an Associate Comm Studies Professor @ Pitt, Communication & Critical/Cultural Studies 4)

The problem for Greene and Hicks is that this notion of citizenship becomes tied to a normative conception of American democracy that justifies imperialism. They write, ‘‘The production and management of this field of governance allows liberalism to trade in cultural technologies in the global cosmopolitan marketplace at the same time as it creates a field of intervention to transform and change the world one subject (regime) at a time.’’11 Here, Greene and Hicks argue that this new conception of liberal governance, which epitomizes the ethical citizen as an individual trained in the switch-side technique, serves as a normative tool for judging other polities and justifying forcible regime change. One need look only to the Bush administration’s framing of war as an instrument of democracy promotion to grasp how the switch-side technique can be appropriated as a justification for violence. It is our position, however, that **rather than acting as a cultural technology expanding American exceptionalism, switch-side debating originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes.** **Several prominent voices reshaping the national dialogue on homeland security have come from the academic debate community and draw on its animating spirit of critical inquiry**. For example, Georgetown University law professor **Neal Katyal served as lead plaintiff ’s counsel in Hamdan, which challenged post-9/11 enemy combat definitions**. 12 The foundation for Katyal’s winning argument in Hamdan was laid some four years before, when he collaborated with former intercollegiate debate champion Laurence Tribe on an influential Yale Law Journal addressing a similar topic.13 Tribe won the National Debate Tournament in 1961 while competing as an undergraduate debater for Harvard University. Thirty years later, Katyal represented Dartmouth College at the same tournament and finished third. **The imprint of this debate training is evident in Tribe and Katyal’s contemporary public interventions, which are characterized by meticulous research, sound argumentation, and a staunch commitment to democratic principles**. Katyal’s reflection on his early days of debating at Loyola High School in Chicago’s North Shore provides a vivid illustration. ‘‘I came in as a shy freshman with dreams of going to medical school. Then Loyola’s debate team opened my eyes to a different world: one of argumentation and policy.’’ As Katyal recounts, ‘‘the most important preparation for my career came from my experiences as a member of Loyola’s debate team.’’14 **The success of former debaters like Katyal, Tribe, and others in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security points to the efficacy of academic debate as a training ground for future advocates of progressive change**. Moreover**, a robust understanding of the switch-side technique and the classical liberalism which underpins it would help prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies**. **For buried within an inner-city debater’s files is a secret threat to absolutism: the refusal to be classified as ‘‘with us or against us,’’ the embracing of intellectual experimentation in an age of orthodoxy, and reflexivity in the face of fundamentalism**. But by now, the irony of our story should be apparent\***the more effectively academic debating practice can be focused toward these ends, the greater the proclivity of McCarthy’s ideological heirs to brand the activity as a ‘‘weapon of mass destruction.’’**

#### Dialogue is critical to affirming any value—shutting down deliberation devolves into totalitarianism and reinscribes oppression

Morson 4

http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331

Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel); and his favorite writers -- Chekhov, Gogol, and, above all, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is especially interested in the relation of literature to philosophy.

 Bakhtin viewed the whole process of “ideological” (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic) development as an endless dialogue. As teachers, we find it difficult to avoid **a voice of authority,** however much we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice, because our rebelliousness against society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture.We speak the language and thoughts of **academic educators**, even when we imagine we are speaking in no jargon at all, and that jargon, inaudible to us, sounds with all the overtones of authority to our students. We are so prone to think of ourselves as **fighting oppression** that it takes some work to realize that we ourselves may be felt as oppressive and **overbearing,** and that our own voice may provoke the same reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree. So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image: helpful, but often painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on “The Theme of the Rebel” and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors. There is a famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox opponents. Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isn’t that itself often the root cause? We know from Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who escaped to Poland, that Ivan saw himself as someone who had been oppressed by noblemen as a child and pictured himself as the great rebel against traditional authority when he killed masses of people or destroyed whole towns. There is something in the nature of maximal rebellion against authority that produces ever greater intolerance, unless one is very careful. For **the skills of** fighting or **refuting an oppressive power are not** those of **openness, self-skepticism, or real dialogue**. In preparing for my course, I remember my dismay at reading **Hitler’s** Mein Kampf and discovering that his self-consciousness was **precisely** that of the rebel speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that much of his amazing appeal – otherwise so inexplicable – was to the German sense that they were rebelling victims. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic exploited much the same appeal. Bakhtin surely knew that Communist totalitarianism, **the Gulag,** and the unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power. His favorite writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that the worst oppression comes from those who, with the rebellious psychology of “the insulted and humiliated,” have seized power – **unless they have somehow cultivated the value of dialogue**, as Lenin surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had. Rebels often make the worst tyrants because their word, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has borrowed something crucial from the authoritative word it opposed, and perhaps exaggerated it: the aura of righteous authority. If one’s ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth, one is likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority; and rebels of the next generation may proceed in much the same way, **in an ongoing spiral of intolerance**.

#### They will say we exclude their argument

#### Not unique – rules and constraints are inevitable in debate – we should instead debate about what rules should guide the discussion – this argument begs the question of our procedural objection to their affirmative

#### There’s no impact to this violence or exclusion – voting against them because their advocacy is unfair doesn’t actually hurt them at all nor does it deal a blow to their project because it will just force them to craft their advocacy in a way that is more fair and thus more successful

#### They link worse - we articulate a vision of debate that is open to their arguments: they can read whatever they want on the neg, and any critical arguments that are solved by adoption of the affirmative. They exclude any consideration of our arguments against instrumental adoption of their policy, turning debate into a closed-circuit.

#### Policy-oriented and research-intensive debate is critical to empower minority students

**Warner and Bruschke ‘01**

(Ede, Professor – U Louisville and Jon, Professor – Cal State Fullerton, “’Gone on Debating’: Competitive Academic Debate as a Tool of Empowerment in Urban America”)

Education has long been a key facet of empowerment.  Galston (1996) has firmly located education at the center of empowerment: “For many younger Americans, **empowerment comes through** post-secondary education and **advanced training”** (p. 60).  “Education” is not a static variable, however, and there can be little doubt that the type of education one receives (both its content and its means of transmission) makes a profound difference.  What are the characteristics of an empowering education?  The possibilities are, of course, multifaceted, and to capture the richness of the concepts we quote Ira Shor (1992) at some length here: **Empowering education invites students to become** skilled workers and thinking citizens who are also **change agents and social critics**.  Giroux (1988) described this as educating students “to fight for a quality of life in which all human beings benefit.”  He went on to say, “Schools need to be defended, as an important public service that educates students to be critical citizens who can think, challenge, take risks, and believe that their actions will make a difference in the larger society” (214).  Further, McLaren (1989) discussed the pedagogy as “the process which students learn to critically appropriate knowledge existing outside their immediate experience in order to broaden their understanding of themselves, the world, and the possibilities for transforming the taken-for-granted assumptions about the way that we live” (186).  Banks (1991) defined empowerment in terms of transforming self and society: “**A curriculum** designed **to empower students must** be transformative in nature and **help students** to **develop the knowledge, skills, and values needed to become social critics** who can make reflective decisions in effective personal, social, political, and economic action” (131).  (pp. 16-17). Beyond the curricular issues, the manner in which education is conducted should be empowering.  In contrast to the traditional, top-down, and lecture-oriented model of educational communication, an empowering classroom must see student growth as “an active, cooperative, and social process” (Shor, 1992, p. 15).  Friere (1993) has taken a similar view and criticized what he deems “narrative sickness” in our schools. Broken down, this compendium of definitions include at least three requirements for an empowering education.  First, students must learn to engage knowledge in a critical way.  They must be able to listen carefully to a point of view, examine its strong and weak points in a dialectical way, and then choose for themselves their own beliefs about a subject.  They must “approach received wisdom and the status quo with questions” (Shor, 1992, p. 17).  Second, they must be social critics.  Essentially, they must apply the same dialectical stance toward the world they live in and the public policies they are asked to live by and participate in enacting.  Third, students must agents of change who are willing to take risks, and believe that those actions can make a difference.  Ostensibly, the more comfortable students are in participating with the systems that produce change the more willing they will be as risk takers and change agents.  Running through all themes is a critical approach, a dialectical thinking process whereby students develop “habits of inquiry and critical curiosity” (Shor, 1992, p. 15). In sum, empowerment is the ability to change one’s own life and one’s community, empowerment occurs at both individual and community levels, and **the most crucial role education can play in relation to empowerment is teaching students the skills of critical intellectual engagement**.  What remains is to discover how academic debate fits into this scheme of empowerment. **[Continues…]** Academic debate facilitates the development of students as social critics because of its policy oriented and research intensive nature.  Although learning to think dialectically certainly might have some transferable skill that would allow students to evaluate questions of governance, no such transfer is even necessary.  **Students are directly debating questions of policy,** and evaluating the effectiveness, morality, and desirability of different governmental actions and the possibility of non-governmental alternatives.**Because all debates begin with an affirmative indictment of the status quo, all policy debates invoke questions of what the current social order is like and how it can be improved.** Even when negative, students may offer “counter-plans” that provide alternative policy arrangements or philosophical critiques that ask the judge to “re-think” social orders and evaluate the affirmative plan in that new light.  The research intensive nature of debate facilitates all these processes, and not only requires that students develop a broad base of knowledge about particular policy questions but also teaches them how to obtain knowledge on any policy question that they encounter. Debate teaches students to become agents of change and risk takers because of its competitive, time-pressured, and interscholastic nature.  Because debate is competitive, it can be terrifying.  Students must engage in a public speaking event, then face the challenges of their opponent, and then immediately receive evaluation by a judge.  Students who can face and overcome those challenges and those fears are seldom afraid of public dialogue in any other context, be it a political rally, city board meeting, electoral campaign, legal proceeding, or town hall meeting.  The time pressured nature of the activity adds another element of challenge which, when mastered, makes other public discourse seem mundane by comparison.  Finally, the interscholastic nature of debate makes students comfortable in dialogues with others of different backgrounds. Although there is no single, easy solution to the problem of confronting an institution controlled by someone that “we do not know and whose values we often do not share,” debate at least gives students the experience of competing against someone from a different socioeconomic level.

#### Activism in debate doesn’t work

Solt ‘04

(Roger, Debate Coach – U. Kentucky, “Debate’s Culture of Narcissism”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 25, p. 46)

**In a**nother **early formulation, critical argument was deemed preferable because, unlike arguments resting on** the illusory notion of **policy fiat, it could have a real world** political **impact. This approach seems to have waned** in recent years, and it has done so **for good reason**. The idea of policy **fiat is sometimes dismissed as utopian, but the notion that a winning ballot in a college debate round could trigger a world-transforming social movement borders on megalomania**. Beyond college debate’s few hundred active participants, **some fraction of America**’s hundreds of millions **probably has a vague intimation that** something like **college debate exists**. (They do, after all, watch “The Apprentice.”) **But they are certainly not attentive to its outcomes**, no newspaper reports debate results (“kritik of capitalism 3, capitalism 1”), nor do they understand its intricacies. **And those relative few** who do know something about debate **know that it is a** competitive **game and that a** judge’s **ballot does not signify** conviction **or ideological conversion** (as those of use who have voted for arguments like “nuclear war good” can readily attest.) **People do not make fundamental** moral and political **judgments based on individual** debate **rounds**; nor should they. **Reflective people** surely **have better bases for their beliefs than** the outcomes of **fast, short, competitive debates**.

#### Attempting to create recognition through competition generates backlash.

Atchison and Panetta, 09

(Jarrod Atchison, Phd Rhetoric University of Georgia, Assistant Professor and Director of debate at Wake Forest University, and Edward Panetta, Phd Rhetoric Associate Professor University of Pitt and Director of Debate at Georgia, Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication, Historical Developments and Issues for the Future, “Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future,” The Sage Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, Lunsford, Andrea, ed. (Los Angeles: Sage Publications Inc., 2009)

Competition has been a critical component of the interest in intercollegiate debate from the beginning, and it does not help further the goals of the debate community to dismiss competition in the name of community change. The larger problem with locating the "debate as activism" perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change.¶ Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents' academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes mat each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community.

#### Using debate as a site for activism this collapses the potential of debate

Talisse 5

—Professor of Philosophy @Vandy¶ Robert, Philosophy & Social Criticism, Deliberativist responses to activist challenges, 31(4) p. 429-431

The activist implicitly holds that there could be no reasoned objection to his view concering justice, and no good reason to endorse those institutions he deems unjust. **The activist presumes to know that no deliberative encounter could lead him to reconsider his position or adopt a different method of social action**; **he ‘declines’ to ‘engage persons he disagrees with’** (107) **in discourse** because he has judged on a priori ground that all opponents are either pathetically benighted or balefully corrupt. When one holds one’s view as the only responsible or just option, **there is no need for reasoning with those who disagree, and hence no need to be reasonable. According the deliberativist, this is the respect in which the activist is unreasonable**. The deliberativist recognized that questions of justice are difficult and complex. This is the case not only because justice is a notoriously tricky philosophical concept, but also because, even supposing we had a philosophically sound theory of justice, questions of implementation are especially thorny. According, political philosophers, social scientists, economist, and legal theorists continue to work on these questions. In light of much of this literature, it is difficult to maintain the level of epistemic confidence in one’s own views that the activist seems to muster; thus **the deliberativist sees the activist’s confidence as evidence of a lack of honest engagement with the issues**. **A possible outcome** of the kind of encounter the activist ‘declines’ (107) **is the realization that the activist’s image of himself as a ‘David to the Golaith of power** wielded by the state and corporate actors’ (106) **is naïve.** That is, **the deliberativist comes to see, through** processes of public **deliberation, that there are often good arguments to be found on all sides of an important social issue**; reasonable hence demands that one must especially engage the reasons of those with whom one most vehemently disagrees and be ready to revise one’s own views if necessary Insofar as **the activist** hold a view of justice that he is unwilling to put to the test of public criticism, he **is unreasonable**. Furthermore, insofar as the activist’s conception commits him to the view that there could be no rational opposition to his views, **he is literally unable to be reasonable.** Hence **the deliberative democrat concludes that activism**, as presented by Young’s activist, **is an unreasonable model of political engagement.**

#### Even if they win we don’t gain access to the state - it’s still good – builds coalitions and stops violence

Rawls ‘99

John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, ‘99, p. 56-57

To answer this question, we say that, ideally, **citizens are to think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes**, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, **they would think it most reasonable to enact**. When firm and widespread, **the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal legislators, and to repudiate government officials** and candidates for public office **who violate public reason, forms part of the political and social basis of liberal democracy and is vital for its enduring strength and vigor**. Thus in domestic society **citizens fulfill their duty of civility and support the idea of public reason, while doing what they can to hold** government **officials to it.** **This duty**, like other political rights and duties, **is an intrinsically moral duty**. I emphasize that it is not a legal duty, for in that case it would be incompatible with freedom of speech. Similarly, the ideal of the public reason of free and equal peoples is realized, or satisfied, whenever chief executives and legislators, and other government officials, as well as candidates for public office, act from and follow the principles of the Law of Peoples and explain to other peoples their reasons for pursuing or revising a people’s foreign policy and affairs of state that involve other societies. As for private citizens, we say, as before, that ideally **citizens are to think of themselves as if they were executives and legislators and ask themselves what foreign policy** supported by what considerations **they would think it most reasonable to advance**. Once again, when firm and widespread, **the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal executives and legislators,** and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate the public reason of free and equal peoples**, is part of the political and social basis of peace and understanding among peoples.**

#### And, scientific and instrumental argumentation and research is key to motivate legislative fence-sitters. Their critical approach is just preaching to the choir which endangers public and decision-making backlashes which turn the case. Only our interp can generate the public debates necessary to ensure survival.

Brown 2k11

[heath, PhD Political Science, Roanoke, Salem, VA, “narrative strategies used by interest groups during the 2008 presidental transition”, 2011 Pat-Net Conference]

Milbrath argues that interest groups must strategically present information so as to ¶ overcome the “perceptual screen” that shields policy makers from absorbing endless amounts ¶ of information. He suggests that groups use facts (scientific information about policy ¶ outcomes), arguments (normative explanations of justness or rightness of action), and power¶ (typically subtle offers of political support or threats of political retribution) to communicate ¶ their interests and make their case for policy action (or inaction). In a more recent approach, ¶ Esterling (2007, p. 79) makes the case that groups can use [using] “instrumental” – “research or ¶ evidence-based causal” arguments -- or “normative” – “intrinsic desirability” arguments. By ¶ emphasizing one of these approaches, a group is tacitly communicating the way it wants to ¶ persuade the target of the information. By emphasizing power or normative arguments, the ¶ group implies that the policy maker should make decisions based primarily on their political ¶ judgment and political future. Conversely, by emphasizing facts-based or instrumental ¶ arguments, the group implies that the policy maker should base decisions primarily on rational ¶ or scientific considerations. In practice, it is difficult to disentangle these two types of ¶ arguments and many groups will likely combine various ways to present information (Wright ¶ 1996; Rochefort and Cobb 1994). The dichotomy though does help clarify the persuasive or ¶ argumentative tone of the information and advice given by groups to policy makers. 6 ¶ While public perceptions of interest groups might suggest crass self-interest, ¶ manipulation, and deception, groups have an incentive to be forthright in the information they ¶ provide and arguments they make. A group that provides shoddy statistics or misleading ¶ arguments will be discounted in future interactions with the policy maker (Kersh 2009; ¶ Easterling 2007). John E. Chubb (1983, p. 145) writes in regard to energy interest groups: ¶ “information and advice that are solely self-serving threaten the bond of trust that facilitates ¶ the informal play of influence.” In fact, rather than targeting political opponents or fence ¶ sitters, much research suggests that groups prefer or are invited to lobby friends and allies over ¶ adversaries (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999; Hall and Deardorff ¶ 2006; Bauer et al. 1963; Holyoke 2004; McCool 1990). If this is the case, the cost of ¶ misrepresenting or overstating information may be particularly high for those engaged in what ¶ Hall and Deardorff (2006) and others have called “legislative subsidy” (Hall and Deardorff 2006; ¶ Esterling 2007a). From this subsidy perspective, if a policy maker is sub-contracting information ¶ collection and analysis to an allied interest group, it behooves that group to be conscientious, ¶ thorough, and consistent in the information and advice it gives. And in many cases, as Wright ¶ (1996) contends, it is relatively easy for policy makers to check the authenticity of the ¶ information provided to them, sometimes simply through the contradictory information ¶ provided by other groups, thereby curtailing the inclination to blatantly misrepresent the truth. ¶ Furthermore, experimental research shows that factual or instrumental information is ¶ preferred by legislative staff (LaPira 2008) and neutral expert lobbyists have more legislative ¶ access than non-experts (Esterling 2007b). Facts may be useful on their own terms in ¶ formulating legislative decisions but scientific or statistically based arguments also serve as a 7 ¶ cue for policy makers to determine the credibility or reliability of the advice they are given ¶ (Sabatier 1978). ¶ Rather than convince those already in agreement, the approach taken by proactive ¶ theorists suggests that groups seek to convince legislative fence sitters or opponents to adopt ¶ the group’s position, advocate the group’s interests, or simply vote in the group’s way through ¶ the offer of, or refusal to give, political support (Smith 1984; Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; ¶ Wright 1996). Wright (1990) for one finds that groups which distribute campaign contributions ¶ to a wide group of legislators are then able to access a wider group, rather than just political ¶ allies (Wright 1990). Similarly, Heberling (2005) shows that one group, the AFL-CIO, seeks out ¶ legislators with unknown political preferences rather than targeting political allies (Heberling ¶ 2005). The field of interest group research has not yet resolved whether groups typically lobby ¶ friends, adversaries, or some combination of the two (Leech and Baumgartner 1998). This is ¶ likely due to the wide variation of group types and also policy domains in which groups operate. ¶ These inter-organizational and inter-policy differences affect the strategies employed and ¶ therefore the content of information presented during lobbying.

#### Prefer our framework – Policy role-play doesn’t indoctrinate or get stale – makes best Real World education.

Joyner ‘99

(Christopher C., Professor of International Law at Georgetown, “Teaching International Law”, 5 Ilsa. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 377, Lexis)

Use of the **debate can be an effective pedagogical tool** for education in the social sciences. Debates, like other **role-playing simulations, help students understand different perspectives on a policy issue by adopting a perspective as their own. But,** unlike other simulation games, **debates do not require that a student participate directly in order to realize the benefit of the game**. Instead of developing policy alternatives and experiencing the consequences of different choices in a traditional role-playing game, **debates present** the **alternatives** and consequences **in a** formal, **rhetorical fashion** before a judgmental audience. **Having the** class **audience serve as jury helps each student develop a well-thought-out opinion** on the issue **by providing contrasting** facts and **views and enabling** audience **members to pose challenges to each** debating **team**. These **debates ask** undergraduate **students to examine** the international legal **implications of various** United States foreign **policy actions.** Their chief tasks are to assess the aims of the policy in question, determine their relevance to United States national interests, ascertain what legal principles are involved, and conclude how the United States policy in question squares with relevant principles of international law. **Debate questions are formulated as resolutions**, along the lines of: "Resolved: The United States should deny most-favored-nation status to China on human rights grounds;" or "Resolved: The United States should resort to military force to ensure inspection of Iraq's possible nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities;" or "Resolved: The United States' invasion of Grenada in 1983 was a lawful use of force;" or "Resolved: The United States should kill Saddam Hussein." **In addressing both sides** of these legal propositions, **the student debaters must consult** the **vast literature** of international law, especially the nearly 100 professional law-school-sponsored international law journals now being published in the United States. This literature furnishes an incredibly rich body of legal analysis that often treats topics affecting United States foreign policy, as well as other more esoteric international legal subjects. Although most of these journals are accessible in good law schools, they are largely unknown to the political science community specializing in international relations, much less to the average undergraduate. **By assessing** the role of international law in **United States** foreign **policy**- making, **students realize that United States actions do not always measure up to** international legal **expectations**; that at times, international legal strictures get compromised for the sake of perceived national interests, and that concepts and principles of international law, like domestic law, can be interpreted and twisted in order to justify United States policy in various international circumstances. In this way, **the debate format gives students the benefits ascribed to simulations** and other action learning techniques, **in that it makes them become actively engaged with their subjects, and not be mere passive consumers. Rather than spectators, students become** legal **advocates,** **observing, reacting to, and structuring political** and legal **perceptions to fit the merits of their case.** The debate exercises carry several specific educational objectives. First, **students** on each team must work together to refine a cogent argument that compellingly asserts their legal position on a foreign policy issue confronting the United States. In this way, they **gain greater insight into the real-world** legal **dilemmas faced by policy makers.** Second, as they work with other members of their team, they realize the complexities of applying and implementing international law, and the difficulty of bridging the gaps between United States policy and international legal principles, either by reworking the former or creatively reinterpreting the latter. Finally, **research** for the debates **forces students to become familiarized with contemporary issues** on the United States foreign policy agenda and the role that international law plays in formulating and executing these policies. n8 The **debate** thus **becomes an excellent vehicle for pushing students beyond stale arguments** over principles **into the real world of policy analysis**, political critique, and legal defense.

### Cap

#### THE WORKING CLASS MUST COALESCE IN MATERIAL ACTION AGAINST FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION ESPECIALLY IN THE CONTEXT OF ENERGY PLANNING. THE AFF’S NOTION OF AGENCY UNIQUELY UNDERMINES THE MATERIALIST ANTI-CAPITALIST REVOLUTIONARY KNOWLEDGE KEY TO SURVIVAL.

Callinicos 2k10

[Alex, Bonfire of Illusions: The Twin Crisis of the Liberal World, Polity, professor of European studies King’s College – London, DPhil – Oxford, p. 139-43]

There are other strong reasons to press for a break with the logic of competitive accumulation. The scientific evi-dence that the emission of greenhouse gases - most notably C02 - caused by human activity is generating profound and irreversible processes of climate change is now beyond dispute. It is also very widely agreed that preventing these processes reaching a disastrous scale requires the rapid adoption and implementation of drastic targets for cutting CO2 emissions. But while the targets, particularly since the eclipse of the Bush gang, have become more ambitious, the actual emissions have continued to rise. The most plausible explanation appeals to the logic of competition.

The problem is, yet again, one of collective action. Evi- dently it is in everyone's interest to avoid drastic climate change. But no individual capital or state is willing to shoulder the additional costs involved in moving to a low- carbon economy. In international negotiations, the leading states play a game of pass-the-parcel - the US demanding that India and China adopt tough targets, the latter asking why they should bear the burden of two centuries of industrialization mainly in the North. The EU, despite its pre- tensions to be a master of 'soft power' that has transcended bad old nationalism, is particularly ineffectual. Germany has vocally and largely successfully defended its car firms against what they regarded as excessively tough targets. And the economic crisis has provided many governments with a perfect excuse to go slow in reducing reliance on fossil fuels. The logic of competitive accumulation here threatens the future of the human species.20 The implication is that any sustainable alternative to •capitalism has to be based, not on the market, but on democratic planning. In a democratically planned economy the allocation of resources would be the outcome of a democratic political process that would set overall priori- ties for the economy. There are some models of how this could work. One is Albert's Parecon, or participatory economics. This involves an economy of workers' and consumers' councils in which individuals and enterprises submit proposals for their share of society's resources and a process of gradual adjustments (Albert calls them 'iterations') takes place while technical experts come up with a plan that would give everyone as much as possible of what they want. The main weakness of this model is that it mimics a bit too closely the workings of a market economy, in which claims on resources are driven by individual demands. Albert is an anarchist, and his commitment to decentralization here goes too far. The allocation of society's resources isn't a neutral technical issue. It's a political question that requires some sort of collective and democratic decision-making process to choose between what would often be competing views of the priorities of the society in question. From this perspective, Pat Devine offers a superior model of what he calls negotiated coordination. Here the allocation of resources is largely the outcome of discussion between producers, consumers and other affected groups, but within the framework of overall decisions about economic priorities made democratically at the national and international level.21 Plainly there is much more to be said - and, above all, to be done - about democratic planning. All the same, the importance of the kind of work being done by Albert Devine and others is that they begin to break down the prejudice against planning and to sketch out how an economy that rejected the market could manage to be both democratic and efficient. But any break with capitalism couldn't take the form of an instantaneous leap into a fully planned economy. Marx long ago argued in the 'Critique of the Gotha Programme' that a new workers' state would inherit a society deeply marked by capitalism. Initially, it would have to make compromises with the old order, and gradually move towards a society governed by the communist principle 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!'22 Similarly today a government breaking with capitalism would need to make a decisive shift towards an economy in which priorities were decided democratically rather than left to the anarchy of competition. This would involve critically taking control of the financial markets, nationalizing under workers' control key sectors of the economy, and extending social provision on the basis of a progressive tax system that redistributed wealth and income from rich to poor. These measures, radical though they are, would still leave in place many aspects of a market economy. Large sectors would remain in private hands. Continuous pressure and the introduction of new mea- sures would be necessary to move the economy as a whole towards the principles of democratic planning. One key step would be to weaken the power of the capitalist labour market, which today rules our lives. In my view, the best way to do this would be to intro- duce universal direct income. In other words, every resi- dent of the country would receive, as of right, an income that met their basic needs at a relatively low but neverthe- less decent level. This would serve two goals. First, it would ensure a basic level of welfare for everyone much more efficiently than existing systems of social provision. (People with greater needs because they had children or were disabled or whatever would receive a higher basic income.) Secondly, having a guaranteed basic income would greatly reduce the pressure on individuals to accept whatever job was on offer on the labour market. One of the main presuppositions of capitalism - that workers have no acceptable alternative to wage labour - would be removed. The balance of power between labour and capital would shift towards the workers, irrespective of the nature of their employer.23 More broadly, the question of power is crucial. One obvious challenge to the kind of vision of change I have just sketched out is how to ensure that the direction of change would be towards a democratically planned economy rather than back to market capitalism or maybe to the kind of state capitalism that ended up dominating the Soviet Union. The only guarantee that counts is that levers of political power are in the hands of the workers and the poor themselves. As long as the state takes the form that it does today, of a bureaucratically organized, hierarchical set of apparatuses whose managers' interests are bound up with those of capital, any improvement in society can only be temporary and fragile. This is why the strategy of ignoring the state advocated by Holloway is so badly mistaken. If we are to move towards a democratically planned economy, then the existing state has to be confronted and broken. This task can only be achieved through the development of a different kind of power, one based on the self- organization of workers and other poor people that devel- ops out of their struggles against capital. The great revolutionary movements of the twentieth century offered some glimpses of this power - from the workers' and sol- diers' councils of the Russian Revolution of October 1917 to the workers' shoras during the Iranian Revolution of 1978-9. The self-organization displayed by the Bolivian popular movement during the insurrections of October 2003 and May-June 2005 showed that the contemporary movements against neoliberalism can generate this kind of power as well.24 A democratically planned economy would be the core of a self-managing society, one in which directly elected workplace and neighbourhood councils took responsibil- ity for their own affairs and linked together to make deci- sions for society at large. The key insight that Marx had during the Paris Commune of 1871 was that these forms of organization would develop before the new society was created, in the process of fighting the old society. The same methods of self-organization that would be the basis of a self-managing society are needed by the exploited and oppressed to resist and, ultimately, to overthrow capital itself. The overthrow of capital is itself a process. The dilemma that Albert imagines confronting a workers' cooperative in a market economy would face any society that was beginning to introduce the principles of democratic plan- ning in a world still ruled by capitalism. It was responsible for the corruption and eventual destruction of the Russian Revolution of October 1917. Any breakthrough in one part of the world could only survive by spreading and progressively overturning the logic of capital on a global scale. The globalization of capital has produced a global- ization of resistance. Struggles in different parts of the world contaminate each other. Chiapas and Seattle had global reverberations. The two European countries with the most advanced and combative social movements, France and Greece, have exerted a degree of mutual influ- ence on one another. The movements in Latin America have become a beacon to all those fighting neoliberalism. "We are still a very long way from overturning capitalism even in one country. Indeed, the more one seeks to elabo- rate on the shape of an alternative to capitalism the more one is overawed by the immensity of the task. The biggest immediate obstacle that confronts anyone seeking to address it is the chronic political weakness of the radical anticapitalist left on a global scale. Nevertheless, the present crisis has torn a huge hole in neoliberalism both as an ideology and as a mode of organizing capital- ism. The market no longer seems like a second nature unamenable to change or control. Those who are prepared to seize this moment boldly can help to ensure that the boundaries of the possible really are widened, allowing the billions of victims of capitalism finally to escape.

#### , THE AFFIRMATIVE’S CLAIM TO PERFORMATIVELY EFFECT CHANGE AGAINST CAPITALISM LOCATES AGENCY IN RHETORICAL PERFORMANCES LIKE THE PRECIOUS 1AC. THIS SHUTS DOWN MATERIALIST COALITIONAL ANTI-CAPITALIST MOVEMENTS.

GUNN AND CLOUD 2K10

[Joshua gunn and dana cloud, Phd Communicatoins, University of Texas Austin, Agentic Orientation as magical Voluntarism, Communication Theory]

Notably, Campbell’s statement on the status of agency does not attempt to reverse the posthumanist turn, but rather, sets out to reconcile the theoretical perspectives of Judith Butler and Michelle Balif with close textual reading practices that, until the crisis of agency, were assumed to have singular, self-transparent authors. Similarly,

John Lucaites’ call to jettison agency as a concept and locate power, instead, in historically particular rhetorical performances ‘‘in relationship to a set of perceived or constituted tensions . . . between cultural, institutional, and technological norms and structures’’ is a theoretical compromise: Agency is best understood on a caseby-case basis, leading to a multiplicity of conceptions of agency (Lucaites, 2003, paras. 1–2). Carolyn R. Miller’s (2007) recharacterization of agency as an attribution that makes certain kinds of symbolic action possible also ﬁgures a subject’s actions between the constraints of an exterior and the motives of an interior. The most widely known, explicitly dialectical positions on agency in rhetorical studies, however, are those of James Arnt Aune, Dana Cloud, and other Marxist critics. For example, critical of certain posthumanist theories of agency (namely, those of Greene 1998; 2004; 2007), Cloud, Macek, & Aune (2006) argue that social groups, especially class-based groups, harbor a capacity for political action grounded in their material circumstances: Either workers and their allies claim the real agency of that they possess and take the chance of making a world in which they are free in body as well as mind; or they resign themselves to generation after generation of grinding exploitation, settling for the meaningful but insufﬁcient consolations of sporadic, creative, ungrounded, and symbolic resistance. (2006, p. 81) Cloud, Macek, & Aune (2006) argue not only that ordinary people must mobilize collectively in order to pressure or overthrow employers and institutions, but also that it is the intersection of consciousness and experience that is generative of agency. In other words, as Cloud (2005) explains, working class agency is a product of both the experience of embodied labor and explicit political intervention and collective organizing. Agency in this view is not primarily characteristic of individuals; rather, the working class is a particular kind of collective agent that can manifest a real challenge to the capitalist system. In contrast, to believe that one can individually effect political change, or worse, to believe that one is powerless to effect political change, is to succumb to oppressive structures, economic and otherwise. Again, agency is located in the tensions between a larger structure and the (collective)

subject (also see Jameson, 1977).

#### AND, MATERIALIST EXPLANATIONS OF INSTITUTIONALIZED CAPITALIST RACISM THROUGH OBJECTIVE MEASUREMENTS LIKE “LIFE CHANCES” ARE EMPIRICALLY VERIFIED AND KEY TO GENERATE MATERIAL CHANGE - INDUCING ACTION THROUGH ARGUMENT. THEIR CONCIOUSNESS-BASED EXPLANATION ENDS UP BLAMING ABSTRACT GROUPS FOR “THINKING RACISM INTO EXISTENCE BECAUSE OF IRRATIONAL HATRED”. THAT JUSTIFIES THE STATUS QUO, NOT REVOLUTIONARY ACTION.

WILLIAMS 2K5

[Christopher j., in defense of materialism: a critique of afrocentric ontology, PhD Candidate, Sociology, York university, institute of race relations, vol 47 1, Race and Class]

The picture becomes even more confounding when concepts rooted¶ in materialist analyses of the social are appropriated and reinterpreted¶ within an idealist Afrocentric framework. The concept of life chances,¶ for example, has long been understood in unambiguously structural¶ terms by a number of leading sociologists. Weber, in his essay entitled¶ ‘Class, status, party’, wrote about life chances as indicative of classes;¶ that is, he considered people with similar life chances as the constituent¶ elements of a social class. In the course of building upon the work of¶ Weber, Ralph Dahrendorf, who has formulated the most thorough¶ sociological explication of life chances, explains that ‘life chances are¶ opportunities for individual growth, for the realization of talents,¶ wishes and hopes, and these opportunities are provided by social conditions’.¶ 7 Similarly, Peter M. Blau has demonstrated how life chances¶ are shaped by ascribed characteristics, occupational structures and¶ transformations at the level of macroeconomics.8 Perspectives on life¶ chances such as these have not only guided contemporary research¶ on structural violence under late capitalism, but also contain insights¶ that ought to be of interest to people of African descent, for the¶ power of racism is, in large measure, the power to truncate the life¶ chances of oppressed groups. The US black–white gap in life expectancy¶ is one of the more obvious manifestations of this phenomenon.¶ From an Afrocentric perspective, however, prevailing structural¶ arrangements and asymmetrical intergroup power relations are less¶ important determinants of life chances than individual consciousness.¶ As Harris explains:¶ While not anti-materialistic, an Afrocentric orientation is one which¶ asserts that consciousness determines being. Consciousness in this¶ sense means the way an individual (or a people) thinks about relationships¶ with self, others, with nature, and with some superior¶ idea or Being . . . For example, the ancient Egyptian assertion,¶ ‘Man Know Thy Self,’ indicates that the way one sees (thinks about¶ and conceptualizes) the world precedes and determines life chances¶ more so than exposure to or deprivation from various material¶ conditions.9¶ Presumably, then, if the life chances of African-Americans undergo a¶ sharp decline over the next two decades, this development will be the¶ consequence of an aggregate – and probably inexplicable – degradation¶ of consciousness rather than, say, the intensification of structural disadvantage.¶ Notwithstanding Harris’s disclaimer, this conception of¶ life chances is anti-materialistic: any other description stretches the limits of plausibility. The proposition that variations in life chances are reducible to variations in consciousness dovetails neatly with mainstream¶ pop psychology ‘mind over matter’ rhetoric, which has the¶ effect of discouraging critiques of the racial-economic status quo. To¶ wit: if being is determined by consciousness, then how reasonable is¶ it to put forth institutional racism as an explanation of the unacceptably¶ high levels of infant mortality among African-Americans? The¶ point is that, although it would be a mistake to contend that nonstructural¶ influences on life chances are non-existent, it is far more¶ egregious to sever the concept of life chances from the same materialist¶ ontology that gives it full meaning. Not to recognise this is to unwittingly¶ formulate a discourse of demobilisation rather than radicalisation.

#### AND, MATERIALIST EXPLANATIONS OF INSTITUTIONALIZED CAPITALIST RACISM THROUGH OBJECTIVE MEASUREMENTS LIKE “LIFE CHANCES” ARE EMPIRICALLY VERIFIED AND KEY TO GENERATE MATERIAL CHANGE - INDUCING ACTION THROUGH ARGUMENT. THEIR CONCIOUSNESS-BASED EXPLANATION ENDS UP BLAMING ABSTRACT GROUPS FOR “THINKING RACISM INTO EXISTENCE BECAUSE OF IRRATIONAL HATRED”. THAT JUSTIFIES THE STATUS QUO, NOT REVOLUTIONARY ACTION.

WILLIAMS 2K5

[Christopher j., in defense of materialism: a critique of afrocentric ontology, PhD Candidate, Sociology, York university, institute of race relations, vol 47 1, Race and Class]

The picture becomes even more confounding when concepts rooted¶ in materialist analyses of the social are appropriated and reinterpreted¶ within an idealist Afrocentric framework. The concept of life chances,¶ for example, has long been understood in unambiguously structural¶ terms by a number of leading sociologists. Weber, in his essay entitled¶ ‘Class, status, party’, wrote about life chances as indicative of classes;¶ that is, he considered people with similar life chances as the constituent¶ elements of a social class. In the course of building upon the work of¶ Weber, Ralph Dahrendorf, who has formulated the most thorough¶ sociological explication of life chances, explains that ‘life chances are¶ opportunities for individual growth, for the realization of talents,¶ wishes and hopes, and these opportunities are provided by social conditions’.¶ 7 Similarly, Peter M. Blau has demonstrated how life chances¶ are shaped by ascribed characteristics, occupational structures and¶ transformations at the level of macroeconomics.8 Perspectives on life¶ chances such as these have not only guided contemporary research¶ on structural violence under late capitalism, but also contain insights¶ that ought to be of interest to people of African descent, for the¶ power of racism is, in large measure, the power to truncate the life¶ chances of oppressed groups. The US black–white gap in life expectancy¶ is one of the more obvious manifestations of this phenomenon.¶ From an Afrocentric perspective, however, prevailing structural¶ arrangements and asymmetrical intergroup power relations are less¶ important determinants of life chances than individual consciousness.¶ As Harris explains:¶ While not anti-materialistic, an Afrocentric orientation is one which¶ asserts that consciousness determines being. Consciousness in this¶ sense means the way an individual (or a people) thinks about relationships¶ with self, others, with nature, and with some superior¶ idea or Being . . . For example, the ancient Egyptian assertion,¶ ‘Man Know Thy Self,’ indicates that the way one sees (thinks about¶ and conceptualizes) the world precedes and determines life chances¶ more so than exposure to or deprivation from various material¶ conditions.9¶ Presumably, then, if the life chances of African-Americans undergo a¶ sharp decline over the next two decades, this development will be the¶ consequence of an aggregate – and probably inexplicable – degradation¶ of consciousness rather than, say, the intensification of structural disadvantage.¶ Notwithstanding Harris’s disclaimer, this conception of¶ life chances is anti-materialistic: any other description stretches the limits of plausibility. The proposition that variations in life chances are reducible to variations in consciousness dovetails neatly with mainstream¶ pop psychology ‘mind over matter’ rhetoric, which has the¶ effect of discouraging critiques of the racial-economic status quo. To¶ wit: if being is determined by consciousness, then how reasonable is¶ it to put forth institutional racism as an explanation of the unacceptably¶ high levels of infant mortality among African-Americans? The¶ point is that, although it would be a mistake to contend that nonstructural¶ influences on life chances are non-existent, it is far more¶ egregious to sever the concept of life chances from the same materialist¶ ontology that gives it full meaning. Not to recognise this is to unwittingly¶ formulate a discourse of demobilisation rather than radicalisation.

#### Text: VOTE NEGATIVE TO REJECT THE 1AC IN FAVOR OF MATERIALIST REVOLUTIONARY KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION AGAINST CAPITALISM.

#### AND, ECOLOGICAL CATASTROPHE NECESSITATES MATERIALIST REVOLUTIONARY DIALECTICS AGAINST CAPITALISM’S EXPLOITATION TO ENSURE SURVIVAL.

Foster 2k11

[john bellamy,  professor of sociology at the University of Oregon and also editor of Monthly Review, Since the Great Financial Crisis hit in 2008, Foster has been sought out by academics, activists, the media, and the general public as a result of his earlier prescient writings on the coming crisis. He has given numerous interviews, talks, and invited lectures, as well as written invited commentary, articles, and books on the subject]

In the twenty-first century it is customary to view the rise of planetary ecological problems as a surprising development scarcely conceivable prior to the last few decades. It is here, however, that we have the most to learn from the analysis of nineteenth-century thinkers who played a role in the development of ecology, including both early ecological scientists and classical historical materialists. Science has long warned of the negative, destructive side of the human transformation of the earth—a warning which the system, driven by its own imperatives, has continually sought to downplay. Indeed, what distinguishes our time from earlier centuries is not so much the conservation of catastrophe, which has long been recognized, but rather the accelerated pace at which such destruction is now manifesting itself, i.e., what I am calling the accumulation of catastrophe. The desertification arising in pre-capitalist times, partly through human action, manifested itself over centuries, even millennia. Today changes in the land, the atmosphere, the oceans, indeed the entire life-support system of the earth, are the product of mere decades. If in the past, Darwin was struck that in a mere three centuries after European colonization, the ecology of the island of St. Helena had been destroyed to the point that it was reduced to “desert”—today, in only two generations, we have altered the biogeochemical processes of the entire planet.28The absence of a historical perspective on the conservation, even accumulation, of catastrophe is a major barrier to needed change in our time. Many environmentalists, including some who perceive themselves as being on the left, persist in believing that we can address our immense and growing ecological problems without altering our fundamental social-production relationships. All that is necessary in this view is the combined magic of green technology and green markets. Short-term fixes are presumed to be adequate solutions, while society remains on the same essential course as before. Indeed, the dominant perspective on ecology can be characterized, I believe, as consisting of three successive stages of denial: (1) the denial altogether of the planetary ecological crisis (or its human cause); (2) the denial that the ecological crisis is fundamentally due to the system of production in which we live, namely capitalism; and (3) the denial that capitalism is constitutionally incapable of overcoming this global ecological threat—with capital now being presented instead as the savior of the environment.The first stage of ecological denial is easy to understand. This is the form of denial represented by Exxon-Mobil. Such outright denial of the destructive consequences of their actions is the automatic response of corporations generally when faced with the prospect of environmental regulations, which would negatively affect their bottom lines. It is also the form of absolute denial promoted by climate-change denialists themselves, who categorically reject the reality of human agency in global climate change. The second stage of denial, a retreat from the first, is to admit there is a problem,while dissociating it from the larger socioeconomic system. The famous IPAT formula, i.e. Environmental Impact = Population x Consumption x Technology (which amounts to saying that these are the three factors behind our environmental problems/solutions), has been used by some to suggest that population growth, the consumption habits of most individuals, and inappropriate technology carry the totality of blame for environmental degradation. The answer then is sustainable population, sustainable consumption, and sustainable technology. This approach, though seemingly matter-of-fact, and deceptively radical, derives its acceptability for the vested interests from the fact that it generally serves to disguise the more fundamental reality of the treadmill of capitalist production itself.29 The third stage of denial, a last-ditch defense, and exhibiting a greater level of desperation on the part of the established order, is, I would argue, the most dangerous of all. It admits that the environmental crisis is wrapped up with the existence of capitalism, but argues that what we need is an entirely new kind of capitalism: variously called “sustainable capitalism,” “green capitalism,” “natural capitalism,” and “climate capitalism” by thinkers as various as Al Gore, Paul Hawken, Amory and L. Hunter Lovins, and Jonathon Porritt.30 The argument here varies but usually begins with the old trope that capitalism is the most efficient economic system possible—a form of “spontaneous order” arising from an invisible hand—and that the answer to ecological problems is to make it more efficient still by internalizing costs on the environment previously externalized by the system. Aside from the presumed magic of the market itself, and moral claims as to “the greening of corporations,” this is supposed to be achieved by means of a black box of technological wonders. Implicit in all such views is the notion that capitalism can be made sustainable, without altering its accumulation or economic growth imperative and without breaking with the dominant social relations. The exponential growth of the system ad infinitum is possible, we are told, while simultaneously generating a sustainable relation to the planet. This of course runs up against what Herman Daly has called the Impossibility Theorem: If the whole world were to have an ecological footprint the size of the United States we would need multiple planets.31 The idea that such a development process can persist permanently on a single planet (and indeed that we are not at this point already confronting earthly limits) is of course an exercise in delusion, bordering on belief in the supernatural. “Capitalism,” as the great environmental economist K. William Kapp once wrote, is “an economy of unpaid costs.”32 It can persist and even prosper only insofar as it is able to externalize its costs on the mass of the population and the surrounding environment. Whenever the destruction is too severe the system simply seeks to engineer another spatial fix. Yet, a planetary capitalism is from this standpoint a contradiction in terms: it means that there is nowhere finally to externalize the social and environmental costs of capitalist destruction (we cannot ship our toxic waste into outer space!), and no external resources to draw upon in the face of the enormous squandering of resources inherent to the system (we can’t solve our problems by mining the moon!).Market-based solutions to climate change, such as emissions trading, have been shown to promote profits, and to facilitate economic growth and financial wealth, while increasing carbon emissions. From an environmental standpoint, therefore, they are worse than nothing—since they stand in the way of effective action. Nor are the technologies most acceptable to the system (since not requiring changes in property relations) the answer. So-called “clean coal” or carbon capture and storage technologies are economically unfeasible and ecologically dubious, and serve mainly as an ideological justification for keeping coal-fired plants going. Worse still, are geoengineering schemes like dumping sulfur particles in the atmosphere or iron filings in the ocean (the first in order to deflect the sun’s rays, the second in order to promote algal growth to increase ocean absorption of carbon). These schemes carry with them the potential for even greater ecological disasters: in the first case, this could lead to a reduction of photosynthesis, in the second the expansion of dead zones. Remember the Sorcerer’s Apprentice!33 The potential for the accumulation of catastrophe on a truly planetary level as a result of geoengineering technology is so great that it would be absolute folly to proceed in this way—simply in order to avoid changes in the mode of production, i.e., a fundamental transformation of our way of life, property relations, and metabolism with nature. Science tells us that we are crossing planetary boundaries everywhere we look, from climate change, to ocean acidification, to species destruction, to freshwater shortages, to chemical pollution of air, water, soil, and humans. The latest warning sign is the advent of what is called “extreme weather”—a direct outgrowth of climate change. As Hansen says: “Global warming increases the intensity of droughts and heat waves, and thus the area of forest fires. However, because a warmer atmosphere holds more water vapor, global warming must also increase the intensity of the other extreme of the hydrologic cycle—meaning heavier rains, more extreme floods, and more intense storms driven by latent heat.” Scientists involved in the new area of climate-attribution science, where extreme weather events are examined for their climate signatures, are now arguing that we are rapidly approaching a situation where the proverbial “‘hundred-year’ flood” no longer occurs simply once a century, but every few years. Natural catastrophes are thus likely to become more severe and more frequent occurrences in the lives of all living beings. The hope of some scientists is that this will finally wake up humanity to its true danger.34 How are we to understand the challenge of the enormous accumulation of catastrophe, and the no less massive human action required to address this? In the 1930s John Maynard Keynes wrote an essay entitled “Economic Possibilities of Our Grandchildren,” aimed at defending capitalism in response to revolutionary social challenges then arising. Keynes argued that we should rely for at least a couple more generations on the convenient lie of the Smithian invisible hand—accepting greed as the basis of a spontaneous economic order. We should therefore continue the pretense that “fair is foul and foul is fair” for the sake of the greater accumulation of wealth in society that such an approach would bring. Eventually, in the time of our “grandchildren”—maybe a “hundred years” hence (i.e., by the early 2030s)—Keynes assumed, the added wealth created by these means would be great enough that we could begin to tell the truth: that foul is foul and fair is fair. It would then be necessary for humanity to address the enormous inequalities and injustices produced by the system, engaging in a full-scale redistribution of wealth, and a radical transformation of the ends of production.35 Yet, the continued pursuit of Keynes’s convenient lie over the last eight decades has led to a world far more polarized and beset with contradictions than he could have foreseen. It is a world prey to the enormous unintended consequences of accumulation without limits: namely, global economic stagnation, financial crisis, and planetary ecological destruction. Keynes, though aware of some of the negative economic aspects of capitalist production, had no real understanding of the ecological perils—of which scientists had already long been warning. Today these perils are impossible to overlook. Faced with impending ecological catastrophe, it is more necessary than ever to abandon Keynes’s convenient lie and espouse the truth: that foul is foul and fair is fair. Capitalism, the society of “après moi le déluge!” is a system that fouls its own nest—both the human-social conditions and the wider natural environment on which it depends. The accumulation of capital is at the same time accumulation of catastrophe, not only for a majority of the world’s people, but living species generally. Hence, nothing is fairer—more just, more beautiful, and more necessary—today than the struggle to overthrow the regime of capital and to create a system of substantive equality and sustainable human development; a socialism for the twenty-first century.