# Round 1 v ISU

## 2AC

### QPQ

#### Counter interpretation- financial incentives are disbursement of public funds or contingent commitments- includes procurement

Webb 93

(lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa (Kernaghan, “Thumbs, Fingers, and Pushing on String: Legal Accountability in the Use of Federal Financial Incentives”, 31 Alta. L. Rev. 501 (1993) Hein Online)

In this paper, "financial incentives" are taken to mean disbursements 18 of public funds or contingent commitments to individuals and organizations, intended to encourage, support or induce certain behaviours in accordance with express public policy objectives. They take the form of grants, contributions, repayable contributions, loans, loan guarantees and insurance, subsidies, procurement contracts and tax expenditures.19 Needless to say, the ability of government to achieve desired behaviour may vary with the type of incentive in use: up-front disbursements of funds (such as with contributions and procurement contracts) may put government in a better position to dictate the terms upon which assistance is provided than contingent disbursements such as loan guarantees and insurance. In some cases, the incentive aspects of the funding come from the conditions attached to use of the monies.20 In others, the mere existence of a program providing financial assistance for a particular activity (eg. low interest loans for a nuclear power plant, or a pulp mill) may be taken as government approval of that activity, and in that sense, an incentive to encourage that type of activity has been created.21 Given the wide variety of incentive types, it will not be possible in a paper of this length to provide anything more than a cursory discussion of some of the main incentives used.22 And, needless to say, the comments made herein concerning accountability apply to differing degrees depending upon the type of incentive under consideration.¶ By limiting the definition of financial incentives to initiatives where *public funds are either disbursed or contingently committed*, a large number of regulatory programs with incentive *effects* which exist, but in which no money is forthcoming,23 are excluded from direct examination in this paper. Such programs might be referred to as *indirect* incentives. Through elimination of indirect incentives from the scope of discussion, thedefinition of the incentive instrument becomes both more manageable and more particular. Nevertheless, it is possible that much of the approach taken here may be usefully applied to these types of indirect incentives as well.24 Also excluded from discussion here are social assistance programs such as welfare and *ad hoc* industry bailout initiatives because such programs are not designed primarily to *encourage* behaviours in furtherance of specific public policy objectives. In effect, these programs are assistance, but they are not incentives.

### Smart Grid CP

**Only smr’s solve the grid – renewables fail**

**Barton 11**

Charles Barton 11, founder of the Nuclear Green Revolution blog, MA in philosophy, “Future storm damage to the grid may carry unacceptable costs”, April 30, <http://nucleargreen.blogspot.com/2011_04_01_archive.html>

Amory Lovins has long argued that the traditional grid is vulnerable to this sort of damage. Lovins proposed a paradigm shift from centralized to distributed generation and from fossil fuels and nuclear power to renewable based micro-generation. Critics have pointed to flaws in Lovins model. **Renewable generation systems are unreliable and their output varies from locality to locality, as well as from day to day, and hour to hour**. In order to bring greater stability and predictability to the grid, electrical engineers have proposed **expanding the electrical transmission system** with thousands of new miles of transmission cables to be added to bring electricity from high wind and high sunshine areas, to consumers. This **would lead**, if anything, **to greater grid vulnerability to storm damage in a high renewable penetration situation**. Thus Lovins renewables/distributed generation model breaks down in the face of renewables limitations. **Renewables penetration, will increase the distance between electrical generation facilities and customer homes and businesses, increasing the grid vulnerable to large scale damage, rather than enhancing reliability**. Unfortunately Lovins failed to note that **the distributed generation model actually worked much better with small nuclear power plants than with renewable generated electricity**. **Small nuclear plants could be located much closer to customer's homes, decreasing the probability of storm damage to transmission lines**. At the very worst, small NPPs would stop the slide toward increased grid expansion. Small reactors have been proposed as electrical sources for isolated communities that are too remote for grid hookups. If the cost of small reactors can be lowered sufficiently **it might be possible for** many and perhaps even **most communities to unhook from the grid while maintaining a reliable electrical supply**. It is likely that electrical power will play an even more central role in a post-carbon energy era. Increased electrical dependency requires increased electrical reliability, and **grid vulnerabilities limit electrical reliability. Storm damage can disrupt electrical service for** days and even **weeks**. **In a future, electricity dependent economy, grid damage can actually impede storm recovery efforts, making large scale grid damage** semi-**self perpetuating**. Such grid unreliability becomes a threat to public health and safety. Thus grid reliability will be a more pressing future issue, than it has been. **It is clear that renewable energy sources will worsen grid reliability**, Some renewable advocates have suggested that the so called "smart grid" will prevent grid outages. Yet **the grid will never be smart enough to repair its own damaged power lines**. In addition **the "smart grid" will be venerable to hackers**, and would be a handy target to statures. A smart grid would be an easy target for a Stuxnet type virus attack. Not only does the "smart grid" not solve the problem posed by grid vulnerability to storm damage, but **efficiency**, another energy approach thought to be a panacea for electrical supply problems **would be equally useless**. Thus, **decentralized electrical generation through the use of small nuclear power plants offers real potential for increasing electrical reliability, but successful use of renewable electrical generation approaches may worsen rather than improved grid reliability**.

**Super vulnerable**

**Mo et al 12**

(Yilin Mo received the Bachelor of Engineering degree from Department of Automation, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China, in 2007. He is currently working towards the Ph.D. degree at the Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, Carnegie Mellon University, Tiffany Hyun-Jin Kim received the B.A. degree in computer science from University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, in 2002 and the M.S. degree in computer science from Yale University, New Haven, CT, in 2004. She is currently working towards the Ph.D. degree at the Electrical and Computer Engineering Department, Carnegie Mellon University, Kenneth Brancik completed a rigorous one year program in systems analysis at the former Grumman Data Information Systems in 1984 and an intensive two year program at Columbia University in the analysis and design of information systems in 1997. He received the M.S. degree in management and systems from New York University (NYU), New York, in 2002 and the Ph.D. degree in computing from Pace University, Dona Dickinson received the B.A. degree in industrial psychology from California State University, Heejo Lee received the B.S., M.S., and Ph.D. degrees in computer science and engineering from POSTECH, Pohang, Korea, Adrian Perrig received the Ph.D. degree in computer science from Carnegie Mellon University, Bruno Sinopoli received the Dr. Eng. degree from the University of Padova, Padova, Italy, in 1998 and the M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in electrical engineering from the University of California at Berkeley, “Cyber–Physical Security of a Smart Grid Infrastructure” “Proceedings of the IEEE” January 2012, Vol. 100, No. 1)

**A wide variety of motivations exist for launching an attack on the power grid, ranging from economic reasons** (e.g., reducing electricity bills), **to pranks, and all the way to terrorism** (e.g., threatening people by controlling electricity and other life-critical resources). **The** emerging **smart grid**, while benefiting the benign participants (consumers, utility companies), also **provides powerful tools for adversaries**. **The smart grid will reach every house and building, giving potential attackers easy access to some of the grid components.** **While incorporating** information technology (**IT**) systems and networks, **the smart grid will be exposed to a wide range of security threats** [5]. **Its large scale also makes it nearly impossible to guarantee security for every single subsystem**. Furthermore, **the smart grid** will be not only large but also very complex. It **needs to connect different systems and networks**, from generation facilities and distribution equipment to intelligent end points and communication networks, **which are** possibly **deregulated and owned by several entities**. It can be expected that the heterogeneity, diversity, and **complexity of smart grid components may introduce new vulnerabilities**, in addition to the common ones in interconnected networks and stand-alone microgrids [3]. To make the situation even worse, **the** sophisticated **control, estimation, and pricing algorithms** incorporated **in the grid may also create additional vulnerabilities.** The first-ever control system malware called Stuxnet was found in July 2010. This malware, targeting vulnerable SCADA systems, raises new questions about power grid security [6]. SCADA systems are currently isolated, preventing external access. **Malware**, however, **can spread using USB drives and can be specifically crafted to sabotage** SCADA **systems that control electric grids**. Furthermore, **increasingly interconnected smart grids will unfortunately provide external access which in turn can lead to compromise and infection of components**.

**Doesn’t solve regulatory confusion or cyberdefense**

**Sater 11**

Daniel Sater 11, Research Fellow at Global Green USA’s Security and Sustainability Office, “Military Energy Security: Current Efforts and Future Solutions”, August, <http://globalgreen.org/docs/publication-185-1.pdf>

**Cybersecurity remains one of the leading challenges impeding the development of a smart grid**. In January 2011, the GAO published a report on the progress being made on cybersecurity as it related to smart grids71. Unfortunately, the report did not specifically address microgrids. **The GAO found six challenges**, however, **to the development of a smart grid**. The DOD is nonetheless well suited to handle the challenges listed by the GAO and the confinement of microgrids to military installations should mitigate many cybersecurity risks. The challenges listed by the GAO and the advantages of military microgrids for cybersecurity appear below. Challenge 1: **Aspects of the regulatory environment may make it difficult to ensure smart grid systems’ cybersecurity**. **The federal government and state governments regulate electricity production and distribution. Having multiple entities produce regulations can lead to conflicting rules and thus confusion**. **Microgrids on military installations should avoid many of the regulatory issues the GAO found with the smart grid. The confinement of microgrids to military bases means that only the DOD will have regulatory control over them**. **There is precedent for states to exempt military installations from state regulations**. According to a different GAO report, states often excluded military installations from their renewable energy-production goals.72 Furthermore, **it is unlikely that any state government would want to get into the politically untenable battle with the Pentagon over issuing competing regulations governing military bases**. Challenge 2: Utilities are focusing on regulatory compliance instead of comprehensive security. **Microgrid cybersecurity will benefit from having the same entity, the DOD, issue the microgrid regulations and own the microgrids**. **Utilities have little incentive to invest in security measures past the bare minimum necessary for regulatory compliance**. However, **unlike a utility, the DOD will suffer in the event of a cybersecurity failure and thus has incentives to pursue comprehensive security**. Challenge 3: **The electric industry does not have an effective mechanism for sharing information on cybersecurity. Different utility companies across different states do not have a central authority analogous to that which military bases have in the Pentagon**. Though there will certainly be bureaucracy, **the DOD has more capacity to share information about cybersecurity and cyber-attacks than utilities**. Challenge 4: **Consumers are not adequately informed about the benefits, costs, and risks associated with smart grid systems. The DOD can take steps to inform all of its employees about microgrids in ways that may not be available to utilities to inform their customers**. The DOD could require short classes on the benefits and risks of microgrids for all its employees and more rigorous education for its base commanders and others making decisions about grid implementation. **A utility company cannot require its customers to take a class**. A utility’s best option for educating its customers would be to send out information packets with monthly bills and hope that consumers read them. Challenge 5: **There is a lack of security features being built into certain smart grid systems**. Given the importance of the DOD’s mission and the potentially catastrophic repercussions of lax cybersecurity, **the Pentagon will not take the security of its microgrids lightly**, especially with the recent publication of the “Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace.”73 Challenge 6: **The electricity industry does not have metrics for evaluating cybersecurity**. The lack of evaluation metrics is a serious problem, but the DOD could instruct USCYBERCOM to create a specific set of metrics for microgrid development.

**EPA**

**Debt Ceiling fight thumps**

**Business Insider 1-1**

“Ladies and Gentleman: Here’s the Date of Your Next Fiscal Cliff,” lexis

Assuming the House agrees to what the Senate voted on last night, then the Bush-era tax cuts will be made permanent for almost all Americans. Only those with incomes of $400K and up will see an income tax increase.¶ But the other half of the Fiscal Cliff, the sequester (the mandatorys pending cuts agreed to in the debt ceiling fight) has only been delayed, giving DC more time to fight over it.¶ That means we've already scheduled a new Fiscal Cliff, and the bill agreed to last night has the date: March 1, 2013 (exactly two months from today). This is from page 154 of the bill (HT: @jesse\_livermore[1])¶ What will be interesting timing-wise is when the Treasury says we will hit the hard debt ceiling.¶ **The next two months will be non-stop debt ceiling/sequester, and it will all come to a head in late February**/early March.¶ For more on what's in the 157-page bill, see here >[2]

**Hagel nomination drains capital**

**Bloomberg 12-30**

“Obama’s Political, Policy, and Pentagon Position,” <http://www.bendbulletin.com/article/20121230/NEWS0107/212300381/>

President Barack **Obama faces a growing dilemma in** **his choice of a new defense secretary** to succeed Leon Panetta.¶ Having dropped U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice and named Massachusetts Democratic Sen. John Kerry to replace Hillary Clinton as secretary of state, **Obama runs the risk of appearing weak if he bows to political opposition again** and chooses someone other than former Nebraska Republican senator Chuck Hagel to lead the Pentagon.¶ **Picking another candidate would show for a second time “that the president’s important choices for personnel can be vetoed by two or three senators**," said Sean Kay, a professor of politics and government at Ohio Wesleyan University in Delaware, Ohio, who specializes in U.S. foreign and defense policy. “**The White House will come out of this significantly weakened."¶ If Obama sticks with Hagel** in the face of opposition from an ad hoc coalition of Republican advocates of muscular defense policies, Democratic supporters of Israel and gay rights activists, though, **Obama might be forced to spend political capital he needs for the bigger battle over the federal budget and deficit reduction**.

**Immigration top issue for Obama**

**Washington Times 12-30**

“Obama Says Immigration at Top of List,” <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/dec/30/obama-names-immigration-top-second-term-priority/>

President **Obama says immigration is his major second-term priority, on par with** his push **for health care** in his first term, according to an interview aired Sunday that continues to boost the issue to the top of the political conversation.¶ “**Fixing our broken immigration system is a top priority. I will introduce legislation in the first year to get that done**,” Mr. Obama told NBC’s “Meet the Press” host David Gregory, who had asked the president what the second-term equivalent would be to his all-encompassing push for health care during his first term.

#### Plan’s popular

Pendidikan ‘11

Cinta writes for the Love and Like Education Blog, “Sanders is the Sole Vote Against Small Modular Reactor Research,” http://loveandlikeeducation.blogspot.com/2011/08/bernie-sanders-and-small-modular.html

Sanders is Sole Vote Against Small Modular Reactor Research¶ Bernie Sanders and Small Modular Reactors¶ Senator Bernie Sanders often speaks about his opposition to Vermont Yankee as having something to do with the age of the plant, the fact it is owned by Entergy, or his "state's rights" stance about regulating nuclear power plants.¶ Recently, however, Sanders made it clear that he is against nuclear power in any form and is proud of that opinion. On Senator Sanders website, he featured the fact that he was the only vote against "a pair of measures that would promote the development of small modular reactors."¶ One of these measures was the Nuclear Power Act S512. This act would authorize the Secretary of Energy to start a cost-shared program for development of small modular reactors (SMRs).¶ This act had strong bi-partisan support, being sponsored by 3 Republican and 4 Democratic Senators. The act requires research and development funds for SMRs. The Act is still in process, and does not have a firm dollar amount attached, but the dollar amount is likely to be small (in government terms, at least.). Current estimates are $100 million per fiscal year for four years, starting next year.¶ The act also requires that industry cost-share the expense. If industry doesn't think it is worth spending money on the research, the research will not receive government funding either.¶ As a background to the probable cost of this Act, we should note that President Obama requested $4.8 billion dollars for Department of Energy research, of which $3.2 billion is allocated for renewable energy and energy efficiency research. (This number has changed with the debt deal, but new numbers are not available at this time.)¶ Small Modular Reactors for The Future¶ Sander's opposition to this Nuclear Power Act will hurt America's chances to develop an important new exportable technology. Outside of Europe, the nuclear renaissance remains in full swing, with reactors being ordered and built in Arabia, China, India and Southeast Asia. Developing a strong set of SMR designs would be America's best chance to re-entering the world market for nuclear power.¶ SMRs are modular (assembled in a factory and delivered to the site), small (50 to 225 MW) and have many safety features, such as passive cooling. SMRs are expected to have a huge international market. They suitable for many places that do not have the population density or money for the current crop of huge reactors (1200 MW, built on site at great expense). SMRs would make nuclear power affordable and salable many places.¶ Westinghouse and Babcock & Wilcox have invested significant amounts of their own money in developing these products. The NRC is also active in assessing preliminary designs. At another Senate committee meeting on SMRs, Commissioner Magwood of the NRC said that he does not expect decisions made by the NRC to be the critical factor in the success or failure of SMRs. Magwood noted that SMRs have passive safety features and large water inventories; these would be considered during license review.¶ America Fallen Behind¶ America has fallen far behind the rest of the world in most nuclear technologies. Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) and Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) were developed in this country. They are being sold all over the world, but not by United States companies. We're out of the running. Other countries licensed and improved our original technologies. Companies from France, Korea, Russia and China compete to build large reactors in China, Arabia, and Southeast Asia.¶ Three American companies have put millions of dollars into the development of SMRs: Westinghouse, Babcock & Wilcox, and NuScale (a small start-up). Many people in the nuclear industry feel that the race to develop the first successful SMR is a truly high-stakes race, being fought at the level of nationwide efforts. Luckily, SMR development has bi-partisan support, and Mr. Sanders was alone in his opposition to supporting American industry efforts to develop these plants.¶ Should Government Be Involved?¶ Of course, one can make a case that the government should get out of the energy research business altogether. If Senator Sanders wished to save tax dollars by cutting all energy-research programs, he might have a valid case. However, if the government does plan to spend money on energy research, cost-sharing with industry on a new nuclear technology is certainly a far better use of funds than many of the projects in the swollen DOE renewable budget.

#### DoD doesn’t link

**Appelbaum 12**

Binyamin, Defense cuts would hurt scientific R&D, experts say, The New York Times, 1-8, <http://hamptonroads.com/2012/01/defense-cuts-would-hurt-scientific-rd-experts-say>

Sarewitz, who studies the government's role in promoting innovation, said **the Defense Department had been** more successful **than other federal agencies because it is the** main user of the innovations that it finances**.** **The Pentagon, which spends billions** each year on weapons, equipment and technology, **has an** unusually direct stake in the outcome **of its** research and development **projects.**¶ "The central thing that distinguishes them from other agencies is that they are the customer," Sarewitz said. "You can't pull the wool over their eyes."¶ **Another factor is the Pentagon's relative insulation from politics, which has allowed it to sustain a long-term research agenda** in controversial areas**. No matter which party is in power,** **the Pentagon has continued to invest in clean-energy tech**nology, **for example,** in an effort to find ways to reduce one of its largest budget items, energy costs.

**Nuke lobby supports- guarantees bipart support**

**Samuelsohn ‘11** (Darren Samuelsohn, March 16, 2011, “Nuclear industry lobbyists' clout felt on Hill,” Politico, <http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0311/51367.html>)

Facing its biggest crisis in 25 years, the U.S. nuclear power industry can count on plenty of Democratic and Republican friends in both high and low places.¶ During the past election cycle alone, the Nuclear Energy Institute and more than a dozen companies with big nuclear portfolios have spent tens of millions of dollars on lobbying and campaign contributions to lawmakers in key leadership slots and across influential state delegations.¶ The donations and lobbying funds came at a critical moment for the nuclear industry as its largest trade group and major companies pushed for passage of a cap-and-trade bill.¶ While that effort failed, the money is sure to **keep doors open** on Capitol Hill as lawmakers consider any response to the safety issues highlighted by multiple nuclear reactor meltdowns in Japan in the aftermath of last week’s monster earthquake and tsunami.¶ “The bottom line is you’ve got a variety of industrial interests that care about nuclear power and have a heck of a lot of money to spend if their business and their bottom line is put in political jeopardy,” said Dave Levinthal, communications director at the Center for Responsive Politics. “As Congress is talking about potentially diving deeper, these companies bring a lot of resources and a heck of a lot of cash to bear if tDhis fight goes forward.”¶ NEI, the industry’s biggest voice in Washington, for example, spent $3.76 million to lobby the federal government and an additional $323,000 through its political action committee on a bipartisan congressional slate, including 134 House and 30 Senate candidates, according to data compiled by the CRP.¶ Alex Flint, NEI’s senior vice president for government affairs, said the spending is a byproduct of record high demand for his industry.¶ “The fact that the day after the election, both the president and [House Speaker John Boehner] said nuclear was an area where it’s something they can agree, it’s made us that much more in demand,” Flint said. “Our lobbying expenses have gone up more in large part because we have more people talking to more members of Congress.”

#### Winners win

Marshall and Prins ‘11

Bryan W. MARSHALL AND PRINS 11, Miami University, Department of Political Science AND Brandon C. PRINS, University of Tennessee & Howard H. Baker, Jr. Center for Public Policy, September 2011 “Power or Posturing? Policy Availability and Congressional Inﬂuence on U.S. Presidential Decisions to Use Force”, Presidential Studies Quarterly, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1741-5705.2011.03885.x/pdf, [Stolarski]

Presidents rely heavily on Congress in converting their political capital into real policy success. Policy success not only shapes the reelection prospects of presidents, but it also builds the president’s reputation for political effectiveness and fuels the prospect for subsequent gains in political capital (Light 1982). Moreover, the president’s legislative success in foreign policy is correlated with success on the domestic front. On this point, some have largely disavowed the two-presidencies distinction while others have even argued that foreign policy has become a mere extension of domestic policy (Fleisher et al. 2000; Oldﬁeld and Wildavsky 1989) Presidents implicitly understand that there exists a linkage between their actions in one policy area and their ability to affect another. The use of force is no exception; in promoting and protecting U.S. interests abroad, presidential decisions are made with an eye toward managing political capital at home (Fordham 2002).

#### --Disad’s non-intrinsic to the plan - can pass the plan and vote to raise the pass \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ – rational decisionmaker calculus

#### --Introduction of the plan should have caused the link – controversy happens even if you vote neg

#### Political capital isn’t key

Dickinson 9 professor of political science at Middlebury College (Matthew, “Sotomayor, Obama and Presidential Power,” May 26, 2009 Presidential Power http://blogs.middlebury.edu/presidentialpower/2009/05/26/sotamayor-obama-and-presidential-power/]

What is of more interest to me, however, is what her selection reveals about the basis of presidential power. Political scientists, like baseball writers evaluating hitters, have devised numerous means of measuring a president’s influence in Congress. I will devote a separate post to discussing these, but in brief, they often center on the creation of legislative “box scores” designed to measure how many times a president’s preferred piece of legislation, or nominee to the executive branch or the courts, is approved by Congress. That is, how many pieces of legislation that the president supports actually pass Congress? How often do members of Congress vote with the president’s preferences? How often is a president’s policy position supported by roll call outcomes? These measures, however, are a misleading gauge of presidential power – they are a better indicator of congressional power. This is because how members of Congress vote on a nominee or legislative item is rarely influenced by anything a president does. Although journalists (and political scientists) often focus on the legislative “endgame” to gauge presidential influence – will the President swing enough votes to get his preferred legislation enacted? – this mistakes an outcome with actual evidence of presidential influence. Once we control for other factors – a member of Congress’ ideological and partisan leanings, the political leanings of her constituency, whether she’s up for reelection or not – we can usually predict how she will vote without needing to know much of anything about what the president wants. (I am ignoring the importance of a president’s veto power for the moment.) Despite the much publicized and celebrated instances of presidential arm-twisting during the legislative endgame, then, most legislative outcomes don’t depend on presidential lobbying. But this is not to say that presidents lack influence. Instead, the primary means by which presidents influence what Congress does is through their ability to determine the alternatives from which Congress must choose. That is, presidential power is largely an exercise in agenda-setting – not arm-twisting. And we see this in the Sotomayer nomination. Barring a major scandal, she will almost certainly be confirmed to the Supreme Court whether Obama spends the confirmation hearings calling every Senator or instead spends the next few weeks ignoring the Senate debate in order to play Halo III on his Xbox. That is, how senators decide to vote on Sotomayor will have almost nothing to do with Obama’s lobbying from here on in (or lack thereof). His real influence has already occurred, in the decision to present Sotomayor as his nominee. If we want to measure Obama’s “power”, then, we need to know what his real preference was and why he chose Sotomayor. My guess – and it is only a guess – is that after conferring with leading Democrats and Republicans, he recognized the overriding practical political advantages accruing from choosing an Hispanic woman, with left-leaning credentials. We cannot know if this would have been his ideal choice based on judicial philosophy alone, but presidents are never free to act on their ideal preferences. Politics is the art of the possible. Whether Sotomayer is his first choice or not, however, her nomination is a reminder that the power of the presidency often resides in the president’s ability to dictate the alternatives from which Congress (or in this case the Senate) must choose. Although Republicans will undoubtedly attack Sotomayor for her judicial “activism” (citing in particular her decisions regarding promotion and affirmative action), her comments regarding the importance of gender and ethnicity in influencing her decisions, and her views regarding whether appellate courts “make” policy, they run the risk of alienating Hispanic voters – an increasingly influential voting bloc (to the extent that one can view Hispanics as a voting bloc!) I find it very hard to believe she will not be easily confirmed. In structuring the alternative before the Senate in this manner, then, Obama reveals an important aspect of presidential power that cannot be measured through legislative boxscores.

#### EPA sucks

Fimrite ‘11

(Peter Fimrite, Chronicle Staff Writer, “Suit says EPA fails to shield species from poisons” 4:00 a.m., Friday, January 21, 2011 <http://www.sfgate.com/green/article/Suit-says-EPA-fails-to-shield-species-from-poisons-2478117.php>, TSW)

Two environmental groups filed a lawsuit Thursday accusing the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency of failing to prevent the pesticide poisonings of more than 200 endangered and threatened species, including the California condor.¶ The suit, filed in U.S. District Court in San Francisco by the Center for Biological Diversity and Pesticide Action Network North America, is the largest action brought against the EPA alleging pesticide poisoning of imperiled species.¶ The plaintiffs say EPA officials consistently ignored their obligation under the Endangered Species Act to consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to determine whether pesticides being considered for registration were harming listed species or their habitat.¶ The failure to hold the formal consultations prevented anything from being done about widespread pesticide contamination of groundwater, drinking water and wildlife habitats throughout the country, according to Jeff Miller, conservation advocate for the Center for Biological Diversity.¶ "For decades, the EPA has turned a blind eye to the disastrous effects pesticides can have on some of America's rarest species," Miller said. "This lawsuit is intended to force the EPA to follow the law and ensure that harmful chemicals are not sprayed in endangered species habitats."¶ Dale Kemery, the spokesman for the EPA, said the agency cannot comment on pending litigation.

### K

**Anti-imperialism undermines struggles for justice – the perm is necessary to defend threatened groups and undermine global hierarchies**

Martin **Shaw 2002**, International Relations and Politics, University of Sussex “Exploring imperia: Western-global power amidst the wars of quasi-imperial states” Dec 11 2002 www.theglobalsite.ac.uk/press/212shaw.htm

The abuses of anti-imperialism¶ It is worth asking how **the politics of anti-imperialism distorts Western leftists' responses to global struggles for justice**. John **Pilger**, for example, **consistently seeks to minimise the crimes of Milosevic in Kosovo, and to deny their genocidal character - purely because these crimes formed part of the rationale for Western intervention against Serbia**. He never attempted to minimise the crimes of the pro-Western Suharto regime in the same way. [In a more academic way, Kees van der Pijl also minimises the responsibility of the Serbian dictator and his regime - see Shaw 2002b.] The crimes of quasi-imperial regimes are similar in cases like Yugoslavia and Indonesia, but the West's attitudes towards them are undeniably uneven and inconsistent**. To take as the criterion of one's politics opposition to Western policy, rather than the demands for justice of the victims of oppression as such, distorts our responses to the victims and our commitment to justice. We need to support the victims regardless of whether Western governments take up their cause or not; we need to judge Western power not according to a general assumption of 'new imperialism' but according to its actual role in relation to the victims.¶** **The task** for civil society in the West **is not**, therefore **to oppose Western state policies as a matter of course, à la Cold War, but to mobilise solidarity with democratic oppositions and repressed peoples, against authoritarian, quasi-imperial states**. **It is to demand more effective global political, legal and military institutions that genuinely and consistently defend the interests of the most threatened groups.** It is to grasp the contradictions among and within Western elites, conditionally allying themselves with internationalising elements in global institutions and Western governments, against nationalist and reactionary elements. The arrival in power of George Bush II makes this discrimination all the more urgent.¶ In the long run, **we need to develop a larger politics of global social democracy and an ethic of global responsibility that address the profound economic, political and cultural inequalities between Western and non-Western worlds. We will not move far in these directions, however, unless we grasp the life-and-death struggles between many oppressed peoples and the new local imperialisms, rather than subsuming all regional contradictions into the false synthesis of a new Western imperialism.**

**Imperialism is key to stop terrorism and worse hegemons**

Earl C. **Ravenal 2009**. Distinguished senior fellow in foreign policy studies @ Cato, is professor emeritus of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. He is an expert on NATO, defense strategy, and the defense budget. He is the author of Designing Defense for a New World Order. What's Empire Got to Do with It? The Derivation of America's Foreign Policy.” Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society 21.1 (2009) 21-75

Most of the **anti-imperialists** and, more broadly, the non-interventionists happily **see isolationism as the beneficent solution to America’s existent and prospective difficulties with uncontrollable forces and rising powers in the world.** And one might, indeed, make a qualified prediction that such a stance might, one day, be adopted (though, reluctantly) by the United States, in the face of widespread international obstruction and hostility, and in the event of its own material inability to sustain a role of hegemony. But **such a stance is to be seen as a fall-back position, not an unequivocally preferred national strategy**. In fact, a reasonably detached observer might judge that the case against (even conditional, even occasional) military intervention is not sustained. It could be argued that s, or to keep them off balance (even on less-than-perfect intelligence); maintaining a wide national decisions are made, not on their own merits, but because the alternatives are worse. Thus, **if the United States were to withdraw from exerting forceful influence on global politics, and**, indeed, **on the determination of the structure and quality of the international system, the result might be either chaos and an upsurge in violent conflict, with no protection for even tangible American interests in the world, and with failed states offering a breeding ground for terrorism against American society; or** (almost conversely) **the rise of one, or more, successor hegemons—either of which futures might be worse than an American attempt to preserve its determining, deterring, and mitigating control**. The exponents of an absolute non-interventionist foreign and military policy for the United States may or may not be, in generalities, on the right side of the argument; but theirs is not an argument that is indisputable or beyond rebuttal. And the interventionist alternative, even in its starkest form, of unilateral military action and the preemptive use of force—is not, on its face, or even after some examination, simply dismissible. I would not be overly sanguine about any alleged invulnerability that America might achieve through retrenchment and restraint. And I would not “give much” for the putative cultural admiration, or moral sympathy, that America might thereby regain. It is likely that radical Islamist movements will continue to capture strategically potent sectors of the Muslim world, to enjoy the balance of sympathy of the larger Muslim populace, and to be implacably bent on inflicting heavy and frightening damage on American and other Western societies—as well as, of course, decisively intimidating the United States, or any other country, from coming to the assistance of Israel in any future terminal move against that country. **Even a consistent, wholesale strategy of disengagement would not absolve America from terrorist attack, and thus from the necessity of providing, at continuing high cost, large, varied, and competent military forces, in an active status, and with ready means of deployment and logistics; nor would it spare America the political mobilization required to interdict and suppress terrorism by means of the surveillance and monitoring of entry, movement, communications, and many kinds of transactions**.

**Inaction DA- the alternative is genocide**
**Vetleson, 2000**

(Arne Johan, Department of Philosophy University of Oslo, , “Genocide: A Case for the Responsibility of the Bystander”, Journal of Peace Research, July, p. 520-522)

is that **not acting is still acting**. Brought to bear on the case of genocide as a reported, on going affair**, the inaction making a difference is the inaction of the bystander to unfolding genocide**. The failure to act when confronted with such action, as is involved in accomplishing genocide, is a failure which carries a message to both the agent and the sufferer: the action may proceed. Knowing, yet still not acting, means-granting acceptance to the action. Such inaction entails letting things be done by someone else - clearly, in the case of acknowledged genocide, 'to the point of criminality', to invoke one of the quotes from Ricoeur. In short, **inaction here means complicity;** accordingly, **it raises the question of responsibility, guilt, and shame on the part of the inactive bystander**, by which I mean the bystander who decides to remain inactive.

**Images of nuclear apocalypse are necessary to problematize their usage**

James **Foard. 1997**. Associate Professor of Religion, Arizona State, “Imagining Nuclear Weapons: Hiroshima, Armageddon, and the Annihilation of the Students of Ichijo School,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, http://jaar.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/LXV/1/1.pdf TBC 7/1/10)

**This ambivalence about Hiroshima has been partially ameliorated by displacing it with Armageddon in our imagination of nuclear weapons** In America **the images of the atomic bomb**, particularly after the Soviet Union's successful test in 1949 (Boyer.341), **were pressed into the service of apocalyptic speculations**, both scientific and otherwise, a process which has until recently assigned the horror that Hiroshima represented to a superpower war in an imagined future (cf. Pease'562). Specifically, **images of a nuclear Armageddon have helped us perform two sorts of cultural tasks fundamental for imagining nuclear weapons**: those involving difference and those involving representation. By "difference" I mean both **the articulation of what makes nuclear weapons different from other weapons and the consequent reflection on the different human situation engendered by them**. By "representation" I mean **the expressions which seek to describe the use of nuclear weapons and incorporate that description into structures of meaning Armageddon permits us to define the difference of nuclear weapons by their capacity to destroy the human species** in a war that no one will win. It also has suggested to many, particularly literary critics but also some nuclear strategists, that nuclear war is but an imaginary event, divorced from reality, such that all representations are, to use the most famous phrase, "fabulously textual" (Derrida'23).

**We have a moral obligation to advocate nuclear---any alternative results in extinction due to warming**

**Baker 12**—Executive Director of PopAtomic Studios, the Nuclear Literacy Project (7/25/12, Suzy, Climate Change and Nuclear Energy: We Need to Talk, ansnuclearcafe.org/2012/07/25/climate-change-and-nuclear-energy-we-need-to-talk/)

Ocean Acidification¶ While I was making artistic monuments to single celled organisms in the ceramics studio, new research was emerging about ocean acidification affecting these beautiful and integral pieces of our ecosystem. **As the ocean absorbs excess carbon** from humans burning fossil fuels, **the pH of the ocean is rapidly changing**. This means that **our** ancient **oxygen-making pals cannot properly do their job**. As their ocean home becomes inhospitable, **they are dying off in droves**. **This not only impacts the ocean’s ability to naturally sequester** man made **carbon** emissions; **it** also **negatively impacts the entire food chain**, since they are the primary food source for other multi-cellular ocean creatures, some of which we enjoy eating.¶ Oh, and **did I mention that these** little **phytoplankton are** also **responsible for creating the ozone layer that protects all life on the planet from** cosmic **radiation**, **and they churn out** 70-**80% of the oxygen** **we breathe?** These creatures are much more than just a pretty floating form.¶ **Ocean acidification is the issue that brought me to supporting nuclear energy**. Ocean acidification is an often-overlooked aspect of climate change that is potentially more threatening than the heat, the super storms, the fires, the drought, the crop losses, and all of the other trends that we are seeing now, which climate scientists have been warning us about for decades.¶ Climate Change and Nuclear Energy: Like Oil and Water?¶ It didn’t take long for me to find out that in the nuclear industry, climate change is not something we all agree on. Discussing climate change as a concern is often polarizing, and brings up intrinsic conflicts of interest in the larger energy sector (the companies who design/build/run the nuclear plants also happen to design/build/run the fossil fuel plants). I’ve been advised by people who deeply care about me, and the success of my organization, not to bring up climate at all, and to be extremely careful not to base my support of nuclear on climate issues. I’ve also been specifically advised not to make the argument that nuclear energy is the only solution to climate change.¶ When you are the new kid, it is usually best not to make waves if you can help it. So, for the most part, I have heeded that advice and held my tongue, despite myself.¶ However, **as I** watch the news (and my wilting vegetable garden) and **see the magnitude of human suffering** that is **directly related to increasingly severe weather events**, **I cannot keep silent**. **Climate change is why I am here supporting nuclear energy, so what am I doing not talking about it?¶** The CEO of Exxon Mobile recently made clear that despite his company’s acknowledgement of the irrefutable evidence of climate change, and the huge ecological and human cost, he has no intentions of slowing our fossil fuel consumption. In fact, he goes as far to say that getting fossil fuels to developing nations will save millions of lives. While I agree that we need stronger, better energy infrastructure for our world’s poorest nations, I wholly disagree that fossils are the right fit for the job.¶ Fossil fuel usage could be cast as a human rights issue only to the extent that access to reliable and affordable electricity determines what one’s standard of living is. At the same time, **fossil fuel usage is the single largest threat to our planet and every species on it**. **Disregarding the impacts that fossil fuel use poses**, merely to protect and increase financial profits, **is unethical**, and cloaking fossil fuel use as a human rights issue is immoral.¶ Although we are all entitled to our own opinions and beliefs, **the idea that climate** change **and ocean acidification** **are** even **up for debate** **is not reasonable**. Just think: **The CEO of the largest fossil fuel** **company in America freely speaks out about climate change, while nuclear energy advocates are pressured to stay silent** on the subject.¶ **Silence is No Longer an Option**¶ I am someone who avoids conflict, who seeks consensus in my personal and professional lives, and so I have followed the advice of well-meaning mentors and stayed silent in hopes of preserving a false peace within my pro-nuclear circles, including my family and friends. But my keeping silent is now over— starting here and starting now—**because this is too big and too important to stay silent.** I am not alone in believing this, and the nuclear industry does itself no favors by tacitly excluding the growing movement of people who are passionate about the need to use nuclear energy to address climate change.¶ And **nuclear power is the only realistic solution**. **It would be great if there were** also **other viable solutions** that could be easily and quickly embraced; **however, the numbers just don’t work out**. **Renewables** and conservation **may have done more good if we had utilized them on a large scale 40 years ago**, when we were warned that our ecosystem was showing signs of damage from fossils fuels…**but** at this point **it’s really too late** for them. And burning more fossil fuels right now, when we have the technologies and know-how to create a carbon-free energy economy, would be the height of foolishness.¶ **In the meantime, there is real human suffering, and we here in the developed world are directly causing it. Our poorest brothers and sisters cannot escape the heat.** **They cannot import food when their crops fail.** They cannot buy bottled water when there is a drought. **They cannot “engineer a solution”** any more than my childhood friends the phytoplankton can.¶ ¶ Energy Choices as an Ethical Obligation¶ **We have an ethical obligation to stop killing people with our energy consumption**. That statement may sound oversimplified, but let’s be honest—we know that fossil fuels kill approximately 1.3 million people each year through respiratory diseases and cancers, and the death toll for climate change related events rises every day. Yet, we do nothing but dither about climate change politics. Where is the outrage?¶ The fossil fuel industry has been successful at presenting a united front and maintaining consistent strategic communications. In contrast, the safety record and clean energy contributions of nuclear are always overshadowed by politics favoring fossil fuel use. If anything, nuclear advocates should be particularly sensitive that the very same politics are happening with climate science.¶ **We should be championing nuclear energy as a science-based solution, instead of enforcing a meek code of silence**. People from outside the nuclear industry, like Gwyneth Cravens, Barry Brooks and Tom Blees, have pointed out these relationships, yet the nuclear industry has yet to internalize and accept these realities.¶ **How can we expect people to listen to science and not politics when it comes to nuclear energy, but not climate change?¶** Disagreeing with a policy does not change the facts. You can disagree with policy to limit carbon emissions, but that doesn’t change the fact that our fossil fuel consumption is changing the PH of our oceans. **Many people disagree with the use of nuclear energy, but that doesn’t change the fact that nuclear is our largest source of carbon free electricity and the safest source of electricity per kilowatt hour.¶** Nuclear Must Lead by Example¶ **If we want the public to overcome the cognitive dissonance between science and policy when it comes to nuclear energy, we need to lead by example**

 **and overcome our own cognitive dissonance when it comes to climate change** — even if it means risking our own interests as members of the larger energy industry. We are not going to run out of fossil fuels any time soon, so the decision to move to carbon-free energy—to move to nuclear energy—must be made willingly, and based on ethical principles, not the limits of our natural resources.¶ As green groups wait endlessly for renewable technologies to have some kind of breakthrough, and nuclear supporters stay mum on climate change, we continue using fossil fuels. Our collective inaction is allowing the destruction of our planet’s ecosystem, the dying of our oceans, and the suffering of the poorest members of our own species. The climate conversation has become so convoluted by politics and greed that many smart, compassionate people have “thrown in the towel.” We should be more concerned than ever at our lack of a comprehensive global response.¶ I strongly believe that **there’s still time to reclaim the dialogue about climate change based on ocean acidification evidence, and to use nuclear technologies to improve the long-term outcome for our planet** and our species. **The first step is acknowledging the complicated** and unique **role of the nuclear industry in this conflict**, **and the conflicts of interest that are impeding open communication.** The second step is to realize that the climate change community is a potential ally, and that openly addressing the subject of climate change in our communications is in the best interest of the nuclear community. The third step is choosing to do the right thing, not just the polite thing, and reclaim our legitimate role in the energy community as the “top dog” of carbon-free electricity, instead of quietly watching natural gas become “the new coal.”¶ Climate change is not going away—it is getting worse—and **each one of us** in the nuclear community **has an ethical obligation to speak up and to do something about it**. I am speaking up for the oceans, for the cyano-bacteria and diatoms and our shared mitochondrial RNA that still fills me with wonder at the beauty of this world. Please join me if you can, to speak up for what you love—and if you cannot, please understand that we all remain nuclear advocates, and that the nuclear community is much stronger with the no-longer-silent climate change harbingers in it.

## 1AR

### Kritik

**Policy implications of the plan should be evaluated first**

Roger E. **Solt** **2004**, Debate Coach at the University of Kentucky, 2004 (“Debate’s Culture of Narcissism,” Contemporary Argumentation & Debate, Volume 25, September, Available Online via Communication & Mass Media Complete, p. 45-46)

Beyond fashion and novelty, **there are** fairly **good reasons why a focus on assumptions rather than on plans posed difficulties**. In justifying its plan, the affirmative will typically advance scores of different arguments. And each of those arguments is linked to assumptions of a more or less fundamental nature. Thus, **in a typical debate, each side relies on hundreds, if not thousands, of implicit assumptions. A few** of these **assumptions may be critical to the** ultimate **policy** **conclusion that the plan is a good idea, but many are not.** **Undermining one assumption may discredit one argument, but the affirmative's final conclusion seldom rests on a single argument.** Also, **assumptions can rarely be completely confirmed or discredited**--they are not won or lost like chess pieces. Indeed, the things that we assume are those which it is most difficult, if not impossible, to convincingly establish. This is especially true of such basic ontological issues as the existence of an external world, of other minds, and of causal relationships. Because of this, in most cases**, the affirmative can neither prove, nor the negative disprove, many of the assumptions at play in a given debate**. **Nor**, in most cases, **is this necessary** **to establish the desirability of the affirmative plan**. The chance that an assumption may be true (i.e., causation may exist) will be enough to justify endorsing a certain course of action.

**Threats are real**

**Ravenal ‘9**

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Quite expectedly, the more doctrinaire of the non-interventionists take pains to deny any straightforward, and therefore legitimate, security motive in American foreign and military policy. In fact, this denial leads to a more sweeping rejection of any recognizably rational basis for American foreign policy, and, even, sometimes (among the more theoretical of the non-interventionists), a preference for non-rational accounts, or “models,” of virtually any nation’s foreign policy-making.4 One could call this tendency among anti-imperialists “motive displacement.” More specifically, in the cases under review here, one notes a receptivity to any reworking of history, and any current analysis of geopolitics, that denigrates “the threat”; and, along with this, a positing of “imperialism” (the almost self-referential and primitive impulse) as a sufficient explanation for the often strenuous and risky actions of great powers such as the United States. Thus, not only is “empire” taken to be a sufficient and, in some cases, a necessary condition in bringing about foreign “threats”; but, by minimizing the extent and seriousness of these threats, the anti-imperialists put themselves into the position of lacking a rational explanation for the derivation of the (pointless at best, counter-productive at worst) policies that they designate as imperialistic. A pungent example of this threat denigration and motive displacement is Eland’s account of American intervention in the Korean and Vietnam wars:

After North Korea invaded, the Truman administration intervened merely for the purpose of a demonstration to friends and foes alike. Likewise, according to eminent cold war historians, the United States did not inter- vene in Vietnam because it feared communism, which was fragmented, or the Soviet Union, which wanted détente with the West, or China, which was weak, but because it did not want to appear timid to the world. The behavior of the United States in both Korea and Vietnam is typical of imperial powers, which are always concerned about their reputation, pres- tige, and perceived resolve. (Eland 2004, 64)

Of course, the motive of “reputation,” to the extent that it exists in any particular instance, is a part of the complex of motives that characterize a great power that is drawn toward the role of hegemon (not the same thing as “empire”). Reputation is also a component of the power projec- tion that is designed to serve the interest of national security. Rummaging through the concomitants of “imperialism,” Eland (2004, 65) discovers the thesis of “threat inflation” (in this case, virtual threat invention): Obviously, much higher spending for the military, homeland security, and foreign aid are required for a policy of global intervention than for a policy of merely defending the republic. For example, after the cold war, the security bureaucracies began looking for new enemies to justify keeping defense and intelligence budgets high. Similarly, Eland (ibid., 183), in a section entitled “Imperial Wars Spike Corporate Welfare,” attributes a large portion of the U.S. defense budget—particularly the procurement of major weapons systems, such as “Virginia-class submarines . . . aircraft carriers . . . F-22 fighters . . . [and] Osprey tilt-rotor transport aircraft”—not to the systemically derived requirement for certain kinds of military capabilities, but, rather, to the imperatives of corporate pork. He opines that such weapons have no stra- tegic or operational justification; that “the American empire, militarily more dominant than any empire in world history, can fight brushfire wars against terrorists and their ‘rogue’ state sponsors without those gold- plated white elephants.”

The underlying notion of “the security bureaucracies . . . looking for new enemies” is a threadbare concept that has somehow taken hold across the political spectrum, from the radical left (viz. Michael Klare [1981], who refers to a “threat bank”), to the liberal center (viz. Robert H. Johnson [1997], who dismisses most alleged “threats” as “improbable dangers”), to libertarians (viz. Ted Galen Carpenter [1992], Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy of the Cato Institute, who wrote a book entitled A Search for Enemies). What is missing from most analysts’ claims of “threat inflation,” however, is a convincing theory of why, say, the American government significantly (not merely in excusable rhetoric) might magnify and even invent threats (and, more seriously, act on such inflated threat estimates). In a few places, Eland (2004, 185) suggests that such behavior might stem from military or national security bureaucrats’ attempts to enhance their personal status and organizational budgets, or even from the influence and dominance of “the military-industrial complex”; viz.: “Maintaining the empire and retaliating for the blowback from that empire keeps what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex fat and happy.” Or, in the same section:

In the nation’s capital, vested interests, such as the law enforcement bureaucracies . . . routinely take advantage of “crises”to satisfy parochial desires. Similarly, many corporations use crises to get pet projects— a.k.a. pork—funded by the government. And national security crises, because of people’s fears, are especially ripe opportunities to grab largesse. (Ibid., 182)

Thus, “bureaucratic-politics” theory, which once made several reputa- tions (such as those of Richard Neustadt, Morton Halperin, and Graham Allison) in defense-intellectual circles, and spawned an entire sub-industry within the field of international relations,5 is put into the service of dismissing putative security threats as imaginary. So, too, can a surprisingly cognate theory, “public choice,”6 which can be considered the right-wing analog of the “bureaucratic-politics” model, and is a preferred interpretation of governmental decision- making among libertarian observers. As Eland (2004, 203) summarizes:

Public-choice theory argues [that] the government itself can develop sepa- rate interests from its citizens. The government reflects the interests of powerful pressure groups and the interests of the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats in them. Although this problem occurs in both foreign and domestic policy, it may be more severe in foreign policy because citizens pay less attention to policies that affect them less directly.

There is, in this statement of public-choice theory, a certain ambiguity, and a certain degree of contradiction: Bureaucrats are supposedly, at the same time, subservient to societal interest groups and autonomous from society in general.

This journal has pioneered the argument that state autonomy is a likely consequence of the public’s ignorance of most areas of state activity (e.g., Somin 1998; DeCanio 2000a, 2000b, 2006, 2007; Ravenal 2000a). But state autonomy does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats substitute their own interests for those of what could be called the “national society” that they ostensibly serve. I have argued (Ravenal 2000a) that, precisely because of the public-ignorance and elite-expertise factors, and especially because the opportunities—at least for bureaucrats (a few notable post-government lobbyist cases nonwithstanding)—for lucrative self-dealing are stringently fewer in the defense and diplomatic areas of government than they are in some of the contract-dispensing and more under-the-radar-screen agencies of government, the “public-choice” imputation of self-dealing, rather than working toward the national interest (which, however may not be synonymous with the interests, perceived or expressed, of citizens!) is less likely to hold. In short, state autonomy is likely to mean, in the derivation of foreign policy, that “state elites” are using rational judgment, in insulation from self-promoting interest groups—about what strategies, forces, and weapons are required for national defense.

Ironically, “public choice”—not even a species of economics, but rather a kind of political interpretation—is not even about “public” choice, since, like the bureaucratic-politics model, it repudiates the very notion that bureaucrats make truly “public” choices; rather, they are held, axiomatically, to exhibit “rent-seeking” behavior, wherein they abuse their public positions in order to amass private gains, or at least to build personal empires within their ostensibly official niches. Such sub- rational models actually explain very little of what they purport to observe. Of course, there is some truth in them, regarding the “behavior” of some people, at some times, in some circumstances, under some conditions of incentive and motivation. But the factors that they posit operate mostly as constraints on the otherwise rational optimization of objectives that, if for no other reason than the playing out of official roles, transcends merely personal or parochial imperatives.

My treatment of “role” differs from that of the bureaucratic-politics theorists, whose model of the derivation of foreign policy depends heavily, and acknowledgedly, on a narrow and specific identification of the role- playing of organizationally situated individuals in a partly conflictual “pulling and hauling” process that “results in” some policy outcome. Even here, bureaucratic-politics theorists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999, 311) allow that “some players are not able to articulate [sic] the governmental politics game because their conception of their job does not legitimate such activity.” This is a crucial admission, and one that points— empirically—to the need for a broader and generic treatment of role.

Roles (all theorists state) give rise to “expectations” of performance. My point is that virtually every governmental role, and especially national-security roles, and particularly the roles of the uniformed mili- tary, embody expectations of devotion to the “national interest”; rational- ity in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and objectivity in the treatment of parameters, especially external parameters such as “threats” and the power and capabilities of other nations.

Sub-rational models (such as “public choice”) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to the “national” interest (or even the possibility that the national interest may be honestly misconceived in more paro- chial terms). In contrast, an official’s role connects the individual to the (state-level) process, and moderates the (perhaps otherwise) self-seeking impulses of the individual. Role-derived behavior tends to be formalized and codified; relatively transparent and at least peer-reviewed, so as to be consistent with expectations; surviving the particular individual and trans- mitted to successors and ancillaries; measured against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function and therefore derived from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious aggrandizement are conspicuously discouraged.

My own direct observation suggests that defense decision-makers attempt to “frame” the structure of the problems that they try to solve on the basis of the most accurate intelligence. They make it their business to know where the threats come from. Thus, threats are not “socially constructed” (even though, of course, some values are).

A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much security planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circum- stances that offer scope for idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and reviewed organizational frameworks. Non-rationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend to get filtered out. People are fired for presenting skewed analysis and for making bad predictions.

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This is because something important is riding on the causal analysis and the contingent prediction. For these reasons, “public choice” does not have the “feel” of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decision-making. In that structure, obvious, and even not-so-obvious, “rent-seeking” would not only be shameful; it would present a severe risk of career termination. And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place for truly talented rent-seekers to operate, compared to opportunities for personal profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrat’s very self-placement in these reaches of government testi- fies either to a sincere commitment to the national interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.

#### Wholesale rejection of imperialism justifies genocide and denies the capacity of indigenous people

Ray **Kiely. 1995** Lecturer in Development Studies, University of East London. “Third Worldist Relativism: A New Form Of Imperialism” Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 25 No. 2 (1995)

Nevertheless, the point remains that **conflict exists within the Third World, and this cannot simply be read off from the machinations of "western imperialism." To do so is to deny the capacity of the peoples in the periphery to forge their own history -a classic example of imperialist thinking.** It is the case that power is concentrated firmly in the hands of the western powers, but it is not the case that this [a]ffects [sic] all nations of the periphery in a uniform way.¶ It is in this light that there is a basis for a re-assessment of nationalism, and therefore the case for intervention by western powers, in the developing world.¶ Third World Nationalism and Western Intervention¶ There is a long history of western intervention in the periphery, which can easily be denounced as imperialism. This applies to the colonial period, and to the alarming number of interventions which have taken place since 1945. These interventions occurred for a variety of reasons, such as access to important raw materials, strategic interests in the context of the Cold War, and (not least) a US political culture in which the ruling elite has consistently believed that it has a divine right to expand beyond its territorial boundaries (Kiernan 1980). Western rhetoric concerning the promotion of democracy against Communism during the Cold War can be dismissed as nonsense when one considers the countless interventions designed to prop up right-wing dictators, and even overturn liberal-democracies (see Blum 1986; Pearce 1982). Moreover, during the Cold War western intervention in the Third World was far more common than so-called communist expansion (Halliday 1983: 97-104).¶ Nevertheless, there is now a belief in the west, even among those on the Left, that there is case for western intervention in the Third World in the post-Cold War era. This is said to be the case because "**oppressed peoples are looking for forms of western intervention that can save them from the horrors visited on them by their 'own' and neighbouring regimes....To uphold national sovereignty and damn intervention is to give a free hand to genocide"** (Shaw 1993: 16). What is crucial here is that **Shaw justifies intervention on the basis of the sound observation that conflicts exist within the Third World, and these cannot simply be read off from the actions of an omnipresent "West."** This is made clear when Shaw (1993: 17) argues that **"(t)he left has a particular duty to respond, not to the self-serving nationalist rhetoric of corrupt and repressive third world governments, but to the people who suffer from them/'** This statement echoes Bill Warren's critique of (some versions of) dependency theory, which all too easily justified a reactionary nationalism in the name of so-called anti-imperialism (Warren 1980: chs.l and 7).¶ On the other hand, **many people on the western Left argue that intervention and imperialism amount to one and the same thing, and they cite the history of reactionary and bloody interventions by the western world** since 1945 (or earlier - Chomsky's 1993 taken us back to 1492). On this basis, interventions in the 1990s in the Gulf and Somalia are regarded as imperialist in character (Pilger 1993: 10-11). There are however competing strands within this school of thought, which I allude to below. The problem with these two views is that they tend to talk past each other. While both approaches may appeal to the justice of their respective positions, it is seldom spelt out what is meant by this concept, a weakness intensified by the one-sided nature of both approaches. On the one hand, the interventionists appeal to justice and the rights of subjects (rather than states) in the periphery, but they tend to do so in isolation from the real world of international politics. On the other hand, opponents of intervention focus on realpolitik and the bloody history of western interventions, but in so doing they tend to provide no clear grounds for any forms of intervention. These points can be illustrated by an examination of the competing positions in the Gulf War. The interventionists argued that United Nations' action to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait was largely justifiable (Halliday 1991). The best criterion for what constitutes a just war can be found in the work of Michael Walzer (1977). He argues that war is justified when it is in response to an act of aggression by one state against the territorial integrity of another. In a new edition of this work Walzer (1992: xi-xxiii) has argued that the Gulf War constitutes a just war. This is so for the following reasons: (i) the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 was against the wishes of its citizens, and the rest of the population; (ii) the declared aims of the UN forces were to liberate Kuwait, and to ensure that Iraq would be incapable of further aggression; (iii) the UN forces did not go on to overthrow Saddam Hussein or to occupy Iraq, except to guarantee some safety for the Kurds after their unsuccessful uprising. On the other hand, others have argued that United States' imperialism is so om-nipotent that the only correct position was to support the Iraqi regime. The United Nations is simply a tool of US imperialism, and the US' chief concern was economic (oil) and/or strategic (the preservation of Israel and Arab client regimes). Proponents of this view pointed out the double standards by which Iraq was condemned for its occupation of Kuwait, while there were no calls for "just wars" against Israel, Indonesia or in the past, South Africa (Samara 1991: 265-6). This point is more relevant than the interventionists would sometimes have us believe, as I show below. First, however, the pro-Iraq position needs further clarification. The key argument of this position is that Saddam Hussein represented a challenge to the status quo in the Middle East, whereby there were great discrepancies between the wealth of Arab states, and local "comprador" classes deposited their oil wealth in western banks. In this respect, the Iraqi takeover of Kuwait represented a liberation for that country (Samara 1991: 260-1). There are strong grounds for dismissing this position as every bit as opportunist as that of the worst hawks in successive United States' administrations. Saddam Hussein's nationalism can hardly be described as progressive - he was an old ally of the United States, especially during the latter stages of the Iran-Iraq war, his treatment of Kurds within Iraq has been brutal and he has persistently attempted to control the cause of Palestinian national liberation (Halliday 1990: 73). To simply assume that Saddam Hussein was now a progressive anti-imperialist because he had fallen out with his old allies is naive at best, and at worst represents a mirror-image of the US approach that "our enemy's enemy is our friend." (Elliott 1992: 11) Furthermore, Iraqi treatment of those living in Kuwait during the occupation can hardly be described as a 'liberation" - rather, it was characterised by extremely repressive measures against the population. Moreover, to point to isolated examples of successful social pro¬grammes in Iraq (Gowan 1991) is hardly sufficient (and indeed is patronising) to secure progressive credentials. Once again. Warren's point that **anti-imperialist rhetoric is not necessarily progressive** seems pertinent.¶ **A less extreme anti-interventionist position was to not take sides in the war, but at the same time not call for action against the Iraqi regime.** The basic justification for this view was that the international order was so unjust and exploitative that no one had the right to impose their will on anyone else. Of course this view abstracts from the fact that the Iraqi regime had done just that, and **it becomes a call for lack of action - the logic of this view is that there can be no change for the better**

**////**

**until the glorious day of world-wide socialism**. Moreover, this view implicitly rests on the view that the capitalist state always unproblematically serves the functional needs of capital, and so actions by capitalist states are always seen as inherently "bad." So, according to this view the West intervened in the Gulf because it suited its interests, but is reluctant to intervene in Bosnia because it too suits its interests. While I think that there is a great deal of truth in this assertion, it takes things too far. Just because the West has no intrinsic interest in intervention in Bosnia does not mean that we should simply leave it there (or worse still appeal to the Yugoslavian "class struggle" in a way that totally abstracts from the concrete conditions in the region), as many Marxists in the west imply (see Callmicos 1993) ~ instead, **when there is a case for some form of intervention** (as I believe there is in Bosnia**) there should be criticism of western governments precisely on the grounds that strategic or economic interests should not determine foreign policy** (Magas 1992). **The common assertion that these interests always win the day is to dismiss the struggle for alternatives from the outset. Similarly, just because intervention in one place may take imperialist forms** (such as in Somalia in 1992-3) **does not mean that the case against any form of intervention is established.¶ Standard western Left views** (which I show below have much in common with post-modernism) **can again be seen as based on an approach which is defeatist. The structures of international capitalism are seen as so universally bad that there is no room for reform within this system. Struggle for reforms against this system is thereby discounted at the outset. We are therefore forced back to the logic of a Frankian "pessimism of the intellect, pessimism of the will"** (Bernstein and Nicholas 1983), **in which there is no hope for the Third World until the glorious day of redemption (that is world-wide revolution led by "the vanguard party").** As Elliott (1992: 11) argues, **this perspective "proffered an abstract internationalism whereby the cure for all remediable ills was postponed to an indefinite future...."¶** So, to summarise: the pro-Iraq position is based on a patronising Third Worldist/ dependency approach in which all the ills of a country are blamed on the West, and so anti-western positions are automatically progressive. The anti-sanctions position rests on a similarly misguided view that the "world-system" is so omnipresent and bad that the call for reforms within it is doomed to failure.¶ Does this mean then, that the interventionist view is correct? In terms of the Gulf War, I think not. In terms of interventions in other places at other times, the only answer that can be given is that it depends on the concrete circumstances (rather than by recourse to an omnipresent imperialism which is assumed to always win the day). On the question of the Gulf War, the pro-intervention position abstracts from the motives that guided US-led intervention. As already stated, there were enormous double standards in the decision to punish Saddam's invasion whilst other equally illegal occupations had not led to military action, or even sanctions. It does seem odd that interventionists such as Fred Halliday and Norman Geras supported the US actions in the Gulf but made no call for similar action against South Africa, Israel or Indonesia (Cockbum 1991: 15-16). According to this view, the US intervened in the Gulf in order to maintain its hegemony in the region, and to help preserve regimes that had entered into an effective partnership with the West whereby the former deposited oil profits in the metropolitan countries in return for military protection (Stork and Lesch 1990; Bromley 1991; Brenner 1991: 134).

### Politics

#### That outweighs their links

Squassoni ‘12

[Sharon Squassoni serves as director and senior fellow of the Proliferation Prevention Program at CSIS. Prior to joining CSIS, Ms. Squassoni was a senior associate in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. From 2002-2007, Ms. Squassoni advised Congress as a senior specialist in weapons of mass destruction at the Congressional Research Service. “The Future of Nuclear Power in the US.” Federation of American Scientists, February 2012. ETB]

Concerns about contamination of the soil and water by radioactivity lay relatively dormant in recent years because of the strong support of the U.S. government for nuclear power and the portrayal of nuclear energy as “clean, green and secure.” Marketing campaigns by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) portraying nuclear energy as “clean air” energy and by the NEI-funded the Clean and Safe Energy Coalition were likely influential.16 On the whole, opponents of nuclear energy generally have had less money to spend on media campaigns, and their message is less pithy. ey have stressed that nuclear power is not the solution to climate change and that it is dangerous, polluting, unsafe, and expensive. The accident at Fukushima returned safety and waste concerns to headline news. Shortly after the accident, a Gallup poll showed 44 percent of the public in favor (in contrast to 59 percent the previous year) and 47 percent opposing nuclear power.17 Figure 6 below shows the results of a Pew Research Center poll conducted about a week after Fukushima.18

# Round 3 v UNT AA

## 2AC

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## 1AR

### CP

#### Nuke war leads to extinction

**Krieger 4/30/12**

(David, holds MA and Ph.D. degrees in ¶ political science from the University of Hawaii as well as a J.D. from the Santa Barbara ¶ College of Law, Assistant professor at University of Hawaii, founder of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and has served as its ¶ president since 1982. He is a councilor on the World Future Council, chair of the Executive ¶ Committee of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility, ¶ and a member of the Executive Committee of the Middle Powers Initiative. “NUCLEAR WEAPONS¶ AND A¶ SUSTAINABLE FUTURE” Nuclear Peace Foundation, <http://www.wagingpeace.org/menu/resources/publications/2012_prepcom.pdf>, SEH)

**Nuclear war would preclude a sustainable future. It would destroy the global environment, leading to ¶ the extinction of many forms of plant and animal life. Complex forms of life, such as humans, would be ¶ particularly at risk. A nuclear war fought with existing nuclear arsenals could leave the Earth ¶ uninhabitable for humans**. ¶ Leading atmospheric scientists, who warn of the utterly catastrophic effects nuclear war would have ¶ upon global climate and the environment, argue, “The combination of nuclear proliferation, political ¶ instability and urban demographics may constitute one of the greatest dangers to the stability of society ¶ since the dawn of humans. Only abolition of nuclear weapons will prevent a potential nightmare.”¶ 23¶ The ¶ scientists call for immediate reductions in US and Russian arsenals to a few hundred nuclear weapons to ¶ “reduce the possibility of nuclear winter and encourage the rest of the world to continue to work toward ¶ the goal of elimination.”¶ 24¶ ¶ It is necessary to ensure that nuclear weapons will not be used again as instruments of war, risking the ¶ destruction of civilization, nuclear famine and the extinction of most or all humans and other forms of ¶ complex life. Exposing the dangers of launch-on-warning nuclear policies and the dysfunctional and ¶ counterproductive nature of nuclear deterrence theory is essential for awakening policy makers and the ¶ public to the imperative goal of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. It is a goal that demands ¶ boldness by all who seek a sustainable future for humanity and the planet. The non-nuclear weapon states ¶ that are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty have both the right and the responsibility to assert ¶ leadership in assuring that the nuclear weapon states fulfill their obligations for good faith negotiations ¶ for complete nuclear disarmament.

#### Doesn’t turn war – wont run out of resources

Geddes 4

(Marc, Writer and Libertarian Analyst, “The Monster Non-Socialist Faq”, February 12, <http://solohq.com/War/MonsterFAQ.shtml>)

Answer: A significant disruption to supplies of critical resources can cause temporary problems, but in a free market, if resources start to become scarce, prices rise, leading to a search of substitutes and improved conservation efforts. The pool of resources is not fixed, because human ingenuity can find substitutes or new sources of resources. Supplies of most raw materials have been increasing throughout the 20th century, and the cost has been falling (See the entry on Natural resources). For instance, between 1950 and 1970, bauxite (aluminium source) reserves increased by 279 per cent, copper by 179 per cent, chromite (chromium source) by 675 per cent, and tin reserves by 10 per cent. In 1973 experts predicted oil reserves stood at around 700 billion barrels, yet by 1988 total oil reserves had actually increased to 900 billion barrels. Production of certain kinds of resources such as fossil fuels may finally be beginning to peak but there are renewable energy sources in development which can serve as substitutes. Simplistic thermodynamic analysis of energy production is misleading, because it's not the quantities of energy used or produced that determine economic value, but the utility, or usefulness if that energy to humans. If energy is being used more efficiently you don't need as much of it, and some forms of energy are more valuable than others- for instance kinetic energy in the form of wind power is less valuable than the same quantity of latent energy in the form of oil. Solar power is a virtually inexhaustible supply of new energy for stationary sources and the hydrogen fuel cell can serve for transportation in place of fossil fuels. Developing these technologies costs money, so to avoid resource shortages a good economy is essential. Libertarian capitalism is the system which generates wealth the fastest.

#### Certainty is key – crucial for investment

Trembath 11 Alex, Policy associate in the Energy and Climate Program at Breakthrough. He is the lead or co-author of several Breakthrough publications, including the 2012 report, 2/4/11, [Nuclear Power and the Future of Post-Partisan Energy Policy](http://leadenergy.org/2011/02/the-nuclear-option-in-a-post-partisan-approach-on-energy/), "Beyond Boom and Bust: Putting Clean Tech on a Path to Subsidy Independence" and "Where the Shale Gas Revolution Came From”, <http://leadenergy.org/2011/02/the-nuclear-option-in-a-post-partisan-approach-on-energy/>

If there is one field of the energy sector for which certainty of political will and government policy is essential, it is nuclear power. High up front costs for the private industry, extreme regulatory oversight and public wariness necessitate a committed government partner for private firms investing in nuclear technology. In a new [report](http://www.thirdway.org/publications/370) on the potential for a “nuclear renaissance,” Third Way references the failed cap-and-trade bill, delaying tactics in the House vis-a-vis EPA regulations on CO₂, and the recent election results to emphasize the difficult current political environment for advancing new nuclear policy. The report, “The Future of Nuclear Energy,” makes the case for political certainty: “It is difficult for energy producers and users to estimate the relative price for nuclear-generated energy compared to fossil fuel alternatives (e.g. natural gas)–an essential consideration in making the major capital investment decision necessary for new energy production that will be in place for decades.” Are our politicians willing to match the level of certainty that the nuclear industry demands? Lacking a suitable price on carbon that may have been achieved by a cap-and-trade bill removes one primary policy instrument for making nuclear power more cost-competitive with fossil fuels. The impetus on Congress, therefore, will be to shift from demand-side “pull” energy policies (that increase demand for clean tech by raising the price of dirty energy) to [supply-side “push” policies](http://leadenergy.org/2010/09/supply-demand-energy-innovation/), or industrial and innovation policies. Fortunately, there are signals from political and thought leaders that a package of policies may emerge to incentivize alternative energy sources that include nuclear power. One place to start is the recently deceased American Power Act, addressed above, authored originally by Senators Kerry, Graham and Lieberman. Before its final and disappointing incarnation, the bill [included](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/12/american-power-act-photos_n_573643.html#s90041&title=undefined) provisions to increase loan guarantees for nuclear power plant construction in addition to other tax incentives. Loan guarantees are probably the most important method of government involvement in new plant construction, given the high capital costs of development. One wonders what the fate of the bill, or a less ambitious set of its provisions, would have been had Republican Senator Graham not abdicated and removed any hope of Republican co-sponsorship. But that was last year. The changing of the guard in Congress makes this a whole different game, and the once feasible support for nuclear technology on either side of the aisle must be reevaluated. A New York Times [piece](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/17/business/energy-environment/17NUCLEAR.html) in the aftermath of the elections forecast a difficult road ahead for nuclear energy policy, but did note Republican support for programs like a waste disposal site and loan guarantees. Republican support for nuclear energy has roots in the most significant recent energy legislation, the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which passed provisions for nuclear power with wide bipartisan support. Reaching out to Republicans on policies they have supported in the past should be a goal of Democrats who wish to form a foundational debate on moving the policy forward. There are also signals that key Republicans, notably [Lindsey Graham](http://washingtonindependent.com/99171/graham-circulating-clean-energy-standard) and [Richard Lugar](http://www.plattsenergyweektv.com/story.aspx?storyid=132784&catid=293), would throw their support behind a clean energy standard that includes nuclear and CCS. Republicans in Congress will find intellectual support from a group that AEL’s Teryn Norris coined [“innovation hawks,”](http://leadenergy.org/2011/01/the-rise-of-innovation-hawks/) among them Steven Hayward, David Brooks and George Will. Will has been [particularly outspoken](http://www.newsweek.com/2010/04/08/this-nuclear-option-is-nuclear.html) in support of nuclear energy, writing in 2010 that “it is a travesty that the nation that first harnessed nuclear energy has neglected it so long because fads about supposed ‘green energy’ and superstitions about nuclear power’s dangers.” The extreme reluctance of Republicans to cooperate with Democrats over the last two years is only the first step, as any legislation will have to overcome Democrats’ traditional opposition to nuclear energy. However, here again there is reason for optimism. Barbara Boxer and John Kerry bucked their party’s long-time aversion to nuclear in a precursor bill to APA, and Kerry continued working on the issue during 2010. Jeff Bingaman, in a speech earlier this week, reversed his position on the issue by calling for the inclusion of nuclear energy provisions in a clean energy standard. The Huffington Post [reports](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/01/sen-jeff-bingaman-backs-n_n_816864.html) that “the White House reached out to his committee [Senate Energy] to help develop the clean energy plan through legislation.” This development in itself potentially mitigates two of the largest obstacle standing in the way of progress on comprehensive energy legislation: lack of a bill, and lack of high profile sponsors. Democrats can also direct [Section 48C](http://leadenergy.org/2010/12/clean-energy-financing-first-steps-towards-post-partisan-effort/#more-3320) of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 towards nuclear technology, which provides a tax credit for companies that engage in clean tech manufacturing. Democrats should not give up on their policy goals simply because they no longer enjoy broad majorities in both Houses, and Republicans should not spend all their time holding symbolic repeal votes on the Obama Administration’s accomplishments. The lame-duck votes in December on “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” the tax cut deal and START indicate that at least a few Republicans are willing to work together with Democrats in a divided Congress, and that is precisely what nuclear energy needs moving forward. It will require an agressive push from the White House, and a concerted effort from both parties’ leadership, but the road for forging bipartisan legislation is not an impassable one. The politician with perhaps the single greatest leverage over the future of nuclear energy is President Obama, and his rhetoric matches the challenge posed by our aging and poisonous energy infrastructure. “This is our generation’s Sputnik moment,” announced Obama recently. Echoing the calls of presidents past, the President used his [State of the Union](http://www.slate.com/id/2281847/) podium to signal a newly invigorated industrialism in the United States. He advocated broadly for renewed investment in infrastructure, education, and technological innovation. And he did so in a room with many more members of the opposition party than at any point during the first half of his term. The eagerness of the President to combine left and right agendas can hopefully match the hyper-partisan bitterness that dominates our political culture, and nuclear power maybe one sector of our economy to benefit from his political leadership.

**No enforcement because Congress has not authorized CIL as a source of law**

**Bradley and Goldsmith ’97** (Curtis law prof at U of Colorado and Jack law prof at UVA, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815, lexis)
We have argued that, **in the absence of federal political branch authorization, CIL is not a source of federal law.** Certain doctrinal consequences follow from this argument. First, as a general matter, a case arising under CIL would not by that fact alone establish federal question jurisdiction. Second, **federal court interpretations of CIL would not be binding on the federal political branches or the states.** If a state chooses to incorporate CIL into state law, then the federal courts would be bound to apply the state interpretation of CIL on issues not otherwise governed by federal law. If a state did not, in fact, incorporate CIL into state law, the federal court would not be authorized to apply CIL as federal or state law. [345](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=40ad254a4521e0fbac9ca451597ece93&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkVA&_md5=8f35e3cc40a433cb7f6ac99cf56f95a0" \l "n345" \t "_self)

# Round 6 v KCKCC MR

## 2AC

### China Adv

#### US-China war is not inevitable but miscalc in the SCS could trigger it

**Seth ‘12**

[S.P.. writer, senior journalist, and academic based in Sydney, Australia. http://www.globalresearch.ca/is-us-china-collision-inevitable/ ETB]

Australia, the US’s closet regional ally, fears that China’s rising economic and military power has the potential of destabilising the region. Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd hopes though (as he told the Asia Society in New York) that **there was “nothing inevitable” about a future war between the US and China**, emphasising the need to craft a regional architecture that recognised the coexistence of both countries, and the acceptance of US alliances in the region. He also saw hope (as a counterpoint to China) in the “collective economic might of Japan, India, Korea, Indonesia and Australia,” which means that, hopefully, **China’s perceived threat might be balanced and contained with the US’s enhanced commitment to the region**, and the rising clout of a cluster of regional countries.¶ **There are any number of issues that could become a flashpoint for future conflict, like** Taiwan, Korea, **the South China Sea** and its islands, the maritime dispute with Japan and so on. **With China determined to uphold its ‘core’ national interests, and the US** and others equally **committed** to**,** for instance, **freedom of navigation through the South China Sea, it only needs a spark to ignite a prairie fire.**¶ As it is, **neither China nor the US wants military conflict between their two countries**. China’s official position was expounded the other day in Beijing by its Vice-President Xi Jinping, who is also the country’s president-in-waiting. Xi, who is expected to visit the US next month, hoped that “the US can view China’s strategic intentions…in a sensible and objective way, and be committed to develop a cooperative partnership”. And he emphasised that: “Ultimate caution should be given to major and sensitive issues that concern each country’s core interests to avoid any distraction and setbacks in China-US relations.”¶ **The problem**, though, **is that when it comes to ‘core interests’, objectivity is generally the first casualty**. For instance, the US complains that China’s strategic doctrine, if there is one, lacks transparency. The double-digit growth in China’s defence budget, as viewed in Washington, is way beyond its defensive needs. On the other hand, the US has the largest defence budget of any country in the world. It is pertinent to remember that **wars have often been caused by miscalculation** rather than deliberation. **And this is even more so when an emerging power is staking its claims impinging on the existing superpower’s perceived interests and/or seen to be threatening its regional allies. This is how the two World Wars started.**

#### India gets drawn in to SCS disputes- causes Sino-Indian conflict

Reuters 12/3

<http://www.cnbc.com/id/100272629> ETB

India has declared itself ready to deploy naval vessels to the South China Sea to protect its oil-exploration interests there, a potential new escalation of tensions in a disputed area where fears of armed conflict have been growing steadily.¶ India's naval chief made the statement on Monday just as Vietnam's state oil and gas company, Petrovietnam, accused Chinese boats of sabotaging an exploration operation by cutting a seismic cable being towed behind a Vietnamese vessel.¶ Petrovietnam said the seismic vessel, Binh Minh 02, had been operating outside the Gulf of Tonkin when the cable was severed on Friday. It had earlier been surveying the Nam Con Son basin further south - an area where Indian state-run explorer Oil and Natural Gas Corp (ONGC) has a stake in a Vietnamese gas field.¶ Indian Navy Chief Admiral D.K Joshi said that, while India was not a territorial claimant in the South China Sea, it was prepared to act, if necessary, to protect its maritime and economic interests in the region.¶ "When the requirement is there, for example, in situations where our country's interests are involved, for example ONGC ... we will be required to go there and we are prepared for that," Joshi told a news conference.¶ "Now, are we preparing for it? Are we having exercises of that nature? The short answer is yes," he said.¶ Petrovietnam posted on its website comments made by the deputy head of exploration, Pham Viet Dung, to a journalist from Vietnam's Petrotimes that the seismic cable was quickly repaired and the survey resumed the following day.¶ "The blatant violation of Vietnamese waters by Chinese fishing vessels not only violates the sovereignty ... of Vietnam but also interferes in the normal operations of Vietnamese fishermen and affects the maritime activities of Petrovietnam," Dung was quoted as saying.¶ Tensions have simmered in the South China Sea for many years but have escalated this year as an increasingly powerful China, which sees virtually the entire sea as its territory, begins to assert its long-standing offshore claims more vigorously.¶ Parts of the South China Sea are also claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia and Taiwan. The region, Asia's biggest potential military troublespot, is believed to be rich in oil and gas - and more than half the world's oil-tanker traffic passes through it.¶ Last week, Chinese state media said police in southern Hainan province would board and search ships which illegally entered what China considers its territory in the sea - a move that immediately raised fears for the free passage of international shipping and the possibility of a naval clash.¶ Collision Course?¶ India is not the only non-claimant nation concerned about disruption to shipping or oil exploration in the South China Sea. The United States, a close ally to several of the Southeast Asian claimants, has also voiced concern at the prospect of China stopping international ships in contested waters.¶ India has sparred diplomatically with China in the past over its gas and oil exploration block off the coast of Vietnam.¶ Any display of naval assertiveness by India in the South China Sea would likely fuel concern that the navies of the two rapidly growing Asian giants could be on a collision course as they seek to protect trade routes and lock in the supply of coal, minerals and other raw material from foreign sources.

**Sino-Indian military disputes spiral and go nuclear**

**Caryl ‘10**

(CHRISTIAN CARYL “Nuclear arms race between China and India” JULY 13, 2010http://www.defence.pk/forums/indian-defence/65480-nuclear-arms-race-between-china-india.html, TSW)

Europeans and Americans, who have dominated world affairs for so long, are understandably fascinated by the recent rise of China and India. **It's obvious that the rapid economic resurgence of these two great Asian powers fundamentally alters the global rules of the game**.¶ China and India have built up a $60-billion-per-year trading relationship, and for years they've insisted that they want to work more closely on a variety of fronts. **Yet** **that expressed desire for collaboration co-exists uneasily with a long-running strategic rivalry**. **Parts of their mutual border remain in dispute. China has long supported Pakistan, India's main enemy**, **while the Indians have often befriended competitors of the Chinese** (**be it Moscow or Washington**). Lately Beijing has been cultivating relationships among countries in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean -- including Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka -- to protect the flow of commerce and access to supplies of natural resources. That has the Indians fearing encirclement. ¶ Lately, though, another **element is threatening to complicate the strategic calculus: the nuclear factor.** In themselves, of course, nuclear weapons are nothing new to either country. China has been a nuclear power for decades, while India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974 (though most outsiders tend to think of 1998, when New Delhi conducted a series of underground explosions designed to establish its bona fides as a genuine nuclear power). **Although both countries have sworn off first use, both have built up formidable deterrents designed to retaliate against any attackers.**¶ So what's new? A lot. **Concurrent with their rising economic might, China and India have set about modernizing their militaries to lend extra muscle to their growing strategic ambitions** -- and **given their complicated history, that can't help but spark worries**. "**China has the most active and diverse ballistic missile development program in the world**," noted one U.S. report. "**China's ballistic missile force is expanding in both size and types of missiles**." China's Dongfeng long-range missiles boast independently controlled multiple warheads, mobility, and solid fuel (meaning that they can be fired with little notice). That's just one of many areas in which the Chinese have demonstrated their advanced technological capabilities. In January China shot down one of its own satellites with a missile -- once again demonstrating, as it did with a previous test in 2007, that it's well down the path toward a ballistic missile defense system.¶ **That test unnerved the Indians, who saw the prospect of Chinese space weapons as a potential threat to the credibility of their own nuclear deterrent**. The **Indians**, meanwhile, **have been hard at work on a new generation of long-range missiles of their own.** The Agni-5, which is set for a test flight by the end of this year, has a projected range of 5,000 to 6,000 kilometers -- meaning that it would be able to hit even the northernmost of China's cities. The Indians are also conducting sea trials of their first ballistic missile submarine, the Arihant, which could be ready for deployment within another year or two.¶ It is undoubtedly true that the two countries mainly have other potential enemies in mind. China is primarily concerned about deterring potential attacks by the world's leading nuclear power, the United States, while India's strategic calculations focus on the threat from Pakistan. **Yet strategic logic is creating the potential for direct friction between Beijing and New Delhi on several fronts**. **The two countries are already engaged in a naval arms race** as **they jockey for influence in the waters around South Asia**. **Tensions have also been mounting over the two countries' border disputes** -- **especially the one involving the disputed area of Arunachal Pradesh (which is controlled by the Indians)**. The **Indians complain of a rising number of Chinese incursions into the area**; a remark by the Chinese ambassador to India a few years ago, when he claimed the territory as China's, stirred up public outrage. The Chinese, who regard Arunachal Pradesh as part of Tibet, worry in turn about a buildup of Indian troops in the region.¶ Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan of the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi notes one concern. Starting in 2007, the Chinese military began a major upgrade of its missile base near the city of Delingha in Qinghai province, next to Tibet. **In addition to the intermediate-range missiles already stationed in the region, Rajagopalan says there are indications the Chinese** may **have beefed up the force** with long-range DF-31s and DF-31As -- **thus threatening not only northern India, including Delhi, but targets in the south as well.** It's entirely possible, she acknowledges in a 2007 paper, that the Chinese move could be aimed primarily at countering Russian missiles stationed in Siberia, but warns that "what the Chinese may consider a routine exercise may send a wrong signal and have serious implications." For his part, former U.S. diplomat Charles Freeman says that he regards Indian fears of a Chinese nuclear buildup as exaggerated, but worries thatafateful **mismatch of perceptions could already be spur**ring both countries toward **a** genuine **nuclear arms race**.¶ **The extent to which the two militaries are getting on each other's nerves became apparent in a bit of high-ranking trash-talking earlier this year**. **India's chief military science office**r, V.K. Saraswat, **declared that new advances in his country's ballistic missile technology meant that "**as far as cities in China and Pakistan are concerned, **there will be no target that we want to hit but can't hit**." **That prompted a retort from Rear Adm. Zhang Zhaozhong of China's National Defense University, who pointedly derided the "low level" of Indian technology**. "In developing its military technology," Zhang said, "China has never taken India as a strategic rival, and none of its weapons were specifically designed to contain India." **If that was meant to console anyone south of the border, it doesn't seem to have worked**.¶ **The best time to talk about an arms race, of course, is before it really gathers steam.** Krishnaswami Subrahmanyam, former chairman of India's National Security Advisory Board, says that China and India should take their nuclear concerns to the Conference on Disarmament, a multilateral negotiating forum at the United Nations. **But that, of course, would require the Chinese to acknowledge that there's a problem, which they might not be willing to do.** Rajagopalan notes that India and Pakistan have managed to set up some effective confidence-building measures on their common border, but that India and China have yet to do the same (aside from a few stillborn efforts in the early 1990s). Instituting mechanisms to warn each other of pending missile tests might be a start. "I think there's a great need for that," she says. "**Otherwise these kinds of tensions can spiral out of control." You can say that again.**

#### 2. A US first strike decimates the environment --- cause extinction

Takai ‘9, Retired Colonel and Former Researcher in the military science faculty of the Staff College for Japan’s Ground Self Defense Force (“U.S.-China nuclear strikes would spell doomsday”, October 7, <http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2009/10/07/us-china_nuclear_strikes_would_spell_doomsday/7213/>)

What would happen if China launched its 20 Dongfeng-5 intercontinental ballistic missiles, each with a 5-megaton warhead, at 20 major U.S. cities? Prevailing opinion in Washington D.C. until not so long ago was that the raids would cause over 40 million casualties, annihilating much of the United States. In order to avoid such a doomsday scenario, consensus was that the United States would have to eliminate this potential threat at its source with preemptive strikes on China. But cool heads at institutions such as the Federation of American Scientists and the National Resource Defense Council examined the facts and produced their own analyses in 2006, which differed from the hard-line views of their contemporaries. The FAS and NRDC developed several scenarios involving nuclear strikes over ICBM sites deep in the Luoning Mountains in China’s western province of Henan, and analyzed their implications. One of the scenarios involved direct strikes on 60 locations – including 20 main missile silos and decoy silos – hitting each with one W76-class, 100-kiloton multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle carried on a submarine-launched ballistic missile. In order to destroy the hardened silos, the strikes would aim for maximum impact by causing ground bursts near the silos' entrances. Using air bursts similar to the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would not be as effective, as the blasts and the heat would dissipate extensively. In this scenario, the 6 megatons of ground burst caused by the 60 attacks would create enormous mushroom clouds over 12 kilometers high, composed of radioactive dirt and debris. Within 24 hours following the explosions, deadly fallout would spread from the mushroom clouds, driven by westerly winds toward Nanjing and Shanghai. They would contaminate the cities' residents, water, foodstuff and crops, causing irreversible damage. The impact of a 6-megaton nuclear explosion would be 360 times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb, killing not less than 4 million people. Such massive casualties among non-combatants would far exceed the military purpose of destroying the enemy's military power. This would cause political harm and damage the United States’ ability to achieve its war aims, as it would lose international support. On the other hand, China could retaliate against U.S. troops in East Asia, employing intermediate-range ballistic missiles including its DF-3, DF-4 and DF-21 missiles, based in Liaoning and Shandong provinces, which would still be intact. If the United States wanted to destroy China's entire nuclear retaliatory capability, U.S. forces would have to employ almost all their nuclear weapons, causing catastrophic environmental hazards that could lead to the annihilation of (human)kind. Accordingly, the FAS and NRDC conclusively advised U.S. leaders to get out of the vicious cycle of nuclear competition, which costs staggering sums, and to promote nuclear disarmament talks with China. Such advice is worth heeding by nuclear hard-liners.

#### 3, And, we don’t know where China’s weapons are --- a first strike is impossible and Lieber and Press’s study is flawed.

**Bin, Prof**essor of the Institute of International Studies, Tsinghua Universit, **06** [Li, “Paper Tiger with

Whitened Teeth”, http://www.wsichina.org/cs4\_5.pdf]

Rather than exploring why China chooses to do so, Lieber and Press use this fact as evidence to support their point on U.S. nuclear primacy.3 If the authors paid more heed to China’s choice of a small and low-alert nuclear arsenal **they would find their deductions faulty**, including technical problems in their calculations. All the calculations in their paper, including the sensitivity analyses, focus on the hardness of the targets as well as strike capabilities, which are determined by the lethal distance, accuracy, and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons. However, the calculations in the paper are based on a fundamentally unrealistic assumption: that is, the United States can detect and locate all Russian and Chinese long-range nuclear weapons. The authors never state this assumption in their paper – perhaps unknowingly so, as most former calculations do not discuss the issue of target detection. In other previous studies, where the numbers of surviving nuclear weapons in a calculation are much larger than zero, it may be alright to ignore the factor of intelligence. But, if such a calculation gives a result of almost zero surviving targets in a nuclear exchange, the intelligence factor becomes highly salient and therefore cannot be ignored. The authors understand that “… one surviving mobile ICBM might destroy a U.S. city …” So their sensitivity analysis tries to prove that no single Russian longrange nuclear weapon can survive even if the U.S. nuclear weapons are not as effective as assumed. However, the real problem is that if the United States does not know where some nuclear weapons are in Russia or China, the United *With near zero surviving targets in a nuclear exchange, the intelligence factor becomes highly salient.* States cannot destroy them even with superior numbers and performance of nuclear weapons. It is instructive to know that once the Soviet Union (and later, Russia) felt that it had a sufficient number of nuclear weapons to survive a first U.S. nuclear strike, it chose to sign the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) I and II that entail on-site inspections to verify the numbers and locations of the Russian long-range nuclear weapons. If Russia feels that not a single one of its nuclear weapons can survive a first strike by the United States, it may consider not revealing all its nuclear weapons to the United States. In fact, unlike the START treaties, the new Moscow Treaty does not require similar on-site inspections. It is evident, even more so in China’s case, that it has never declared the number or location of its nuclear weapons. Naturally, the United States relies on its intelligence to identify and locate China’s nuclear weapons and then uses this information to decipher which objects and how many objects appear to be nuclear weapons and where they are located. The calculations in their paper do prove that the United States can destroy all the objects that have been identified by U.S. intelligence as nuclear weapons. However, the paper misses the central point of whether the entirety of Chinese long-range nuclear weapons have been identified and located by U.S. intelligence or whether all the objects that are identified in China are real nuclear weapons. The paper simply omits possible deficiencies of intelligence. Furthermore, the performance of U.S. intelligence in the first Iraq war and the Kosovo war suggests that the United States may miss more than just a few large military targets. Technically speaking, it is a relatively simple countermeasure for China to conceal a few actual ICBMs and to deploy decoy missiles – given the large size of the Chinese territory. No matter how the United States increases the number, accuracy, and reliability of its nuclear weapons, even if used in a surprise attack, it has no means of destroying those Chinese ICBMs that its intelligence has not found. Thus, there is no method or model by which Lieber and Press can determine with any certainty that the number of surviving Chinese ICBMs after a surprise U.S. strike (equal to the number of undetected Chinese ICBMs) will be zero, and it seems far more likely survivability would be greater than zero. The definitive conclusion that the surviving Chinese ICBMs must be zero is technically wrong as it omits the intelligence deficiency. The uncertainties of the calculations in the paper are much greater and much more serious than indicated by the authors, and certainly goes beyond their single scenario of an enemy target surviving because a U.S. submarine commander does not believe his launch order. However, the greatest concern is that U.S. leaders actually believe that zero retaliation from China is possible, as predicted by Lieber and Press, and behave incautiously. Zero retaliation is an illusion, and if taken seriously it would bring dire risks to the United States.

#### 2. Nanotech is inevitable

UNECSO, **United Nations Education, Cultural, and Scientific Organization, 20**06**, “The Ethics and Politics of Nanotechnology” http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001459/145951e.pdf**

Following this initial surge of research money in the US, several other nations have begun fund- ing nanotechnology-related research in earnest. Japan’s Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology has contributed some $250 million to research in various areas of nano- technology. The UK Royal Society reports that the current level of EU research is about € 1 billion, and that the United Kingdom is currently spending roughly £45 million annually. In addition, China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Brazil and Israel have all made clear that national research priorities in science and technology include research into nanotechnology.

### Virillio

**Existence is apriori**

Amien **Kacou. 2008**. WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of “Life”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184

Furthermore, that manner of **finding things good** that is in pleasure **can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,”** as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, **pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation**, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation. Thus, we can see now that, in general, **something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself.** And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, **we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living** (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] **and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good.** However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that **the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value.** But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

**ECONOMIES OF SPEED ARE KEY TO DEMOCRATIC REISTANCE AGAINST TOTALITARIANISM – THIS STRAIGHT TURNS THE’S ALT’S INTENDED SOLVENCY.**

**SMITH 2K4**

[Richard, The Brain is the Milieu: Speed, Politics and the Cosmopolitan Screen, muse, theory and event]

In Neuropolitics contemporary life is distinguished by its speed. Life, Connolly explains, is now "fast-paced", "distance is compressed", concentric relations of self and politics are constantly being criss-crossed by eccentric relations of capital, information, and culture. These eccentric relations are not new but their attraction, value and efficacy have recently become culturally, economically and politically overarching. The eccentric world and the concentric world have been reordered are their relation is now characterised by disjunction. That is, the concentric institutional spaces of industrial modernity, the family, school, factory, and nation are confronted with eccentric flows of network postmodernity, consumers, information and the free-market. This disjunction has presented political theory with some interesting dilemmas. Is democratic deliberation disappearing? Should the nation be defended as the primary and, or most effective form of democratic life? Can the new economies of speed serve democratic life? For Connolly, political theory has not adequately explored the democratic possibilities of speed: ¶ My wager is that **it is more possible to negotiate a democratic ethos congruent with the accelerated tempo of modern life than it is either to slow the world down or to insulate the majority of people from the effects of speed.** It is important to reach a judgment on this issue, for the downside of pace without negotiation of a generous ethos is as bleak as its upside is enchanting. And **the attempt to slow the world down under contemporary conditions of life is almost certain to devolve into a search for scapegoats held responsible for the effects of a rapid pace of life that cannot itself be derailed** (Neuropolitics 162-63).¶ Clearly, **the danger of despotism in different forms looms over attempts to "slow things down". Isolationism and insularity threaten democratic** ways. It is also clear though that speed carries its own dangers. These dangers are no more apparent than in Paul Virilio's military paradigm of speed wherein the crucial gap between deliberation and action is greatly reduced if not annihilated. The danger inherent in the military machine is not in doubt -- speed is "profoundly ambiguous" (Neuropolitics. 179). Connolly's wager rests not on a dispute about Virilian speed but rather with the model of politics bound up with it: ¶ **Virilio remains transfixed by a model of politics insufficiently attuned to the positive role of speed in intrastate democracy** and cross-state cosmopolitanism. He underplays the positive role speed can play **in ventilating dogmatic identities in the domains of religion, sensuality, ethnicity, gender, and nationality** (Neuropolitics. 178).¶ **Democratic speed! Or better, the compression of space through the accelerated tempo of life may carry possibilities for reinventing a "generous ethos of negotiation". The question then is not if democracy is fast or slow but rather how to theorise democratic speed**. Such a project includes but is not restricted to the desire to democratise speed. The problem I want to focus on, and which runs through the entirety of Neuropolitics is the matter, or material of the speed of life? In other words, what is this new lived and living tempo that is dangerous and immutable but also mysteriously unexplored by democratic theorists?

**AND, SPEED IS KEY TO DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE AND BETTER DECISION-MAKING THROUGH QUALITATIVELY BETTER DELIBERATION – THAT INTERNAL LINK TURNS ANY RISK OF ALT SOLVENCY**

**SMITH 2K4**

[Richard, The Brain is the Milieu: Speed, Politics and the Cosmopolitan Screen, muse, theory and event]

**This suggests** not **the need** to operate according to the same regimes of speed as the economy of culture but to rethink the notion of political time**, to invent democratic speed**. Essentially, then, Connolly advocates not merely a different pace of politics but a different concept of pace: "I embrace the idea of rifts or forks in time that help to constitute it as time. A rift as constitutive of time itself, in which time flows into a future neither fully determined by a discernible past nor fixed by its place in a cycle of eternal return, nor directed by an intrinsic purpose pulling it along. Free time. Or better, time as becoming, replete with the dangers and possibilities attached to such a word" (144). **Democracy is not by nature slow, leisurely or belong to an order of continuity and universality. Speed is not therefore something that is intrinsically antidemocratic, so long as we do not merely think of speed as rapid redundancy and obliteration of the past.** Connolly is not rejecting outright a deliberative model of political theory. He accepts that concept oriented thought, and conscious reflection work at certain speeds, but there is also a concerted attempt to rethink thought in relation to speeds that are not thought -- to conceptualise imageless thought. This crucially involves a recognition of mental or neural processes that occur at very different speeds, and a call for these speeds to be accounted for in deliberative thinking, that they be given a certain standing in deliberative thought, and that deliberation open itself to different and perhaps incompatible speeds. **The problem though is that no sense is given as to how the various speeds of the brain can be utilised to political ends.** Much work is invested in opening the concept of thought to these speeds but as the chapters move towards politics, natural speeds either fall into abeyance or they survive merely through implication.

**Economics of speed is key to neolib – maintains tek innovation and creates efficiency**

**Giaretta ‘5**

(Elena, Associate Professor in Economics @ University of Verona, “Ethical Product Innovation: In Praise of Slowness”, TQM Magazine, Vol. 17 No. 2, 2005)

There are after all **many advantages associated with such company conduct**, both from the point of view of the business and that of the customer. From the company’s viewpoint there may be significant **improvements in terms of efficiency** (less design time and costs), as well as efficacy (in terms of the ability to reach the customer in the planned time scale and before competitors). Most of the **systems worked out to reduce the times for any determined action** in fact move in this direction: take for example the automatic teller machine, the highway Telepass, the locomotives placed at each end of the train, the doubling of a railway line and the reduction of “dead time” in the factory. The importance of the competitive advantage thusgained[30] has **led some writers to talk of the “economies of speed**”[31], i.e. the advantages deriving from the ability to make innovative choices and adopt new behaviour faster than the competition and thus determine the speed at which the continuous innovation is running. From the customer’s perspective, **continuous product innovation may also result in equally significant benefits insofar as it tends to lead to the better satisfaction of his ever-higher expectations**. This would seem to be all the more likely the more involved the customer is in the product planning stage, favouring the incorporation of his own knowledge into the products.

**Neolib solves war and the alt’s collapse causes it – historical evidence and studies prove**

**Tures ‘3 – Associate Professor of Political Science @ LaGrange College**

John A. Tures, Associate Professor of Political Science at LaGrange College, 2003, “ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND CONFLICT REDUCTION: EVIDENCE FROM THE 1970S, 1980S, AND 1990S”, Cato Journal, Vol. 22, No. 3. http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj22n3/cj22n3-9.pdf

**The last three decades have witnessed an unprecedented expansion of market-based reforms and the profusion of economic freedom in the international system**. This shift in economic policy has sparked a debate about whether free markets are superior to state controls. Numerous studies have compared the neoliberal and statist policies on issues of production capacity, economic growth, commercial vol- umes, and egalitarianism. An overlooked research agenda, however, is the relationship between levels of economic freedom and violence within countries. Proponents of the statist approach might note that a strong gov- ernment can bend the market to its will, directing activity toward policies necessary to achieve greater levels of gross domestic product and growth. By extracting more resources for the economy, a pow- erful state can redistribute benefits to keep the populace happy. Higher taxes can also pay for an army and police force that intimidate people. Such governments range from command economies of totali- tarian systems to autocratic dictators and military juntas. Other eco- nomically unfree systems include some of the authoritarian “Asian tigers.” **A combination of historical evidence, modern theorists, and statistical findings, however, has indicated that a reduced role for the state in regulating economic transactions is associated with a decrease in internal conflicts. Countries where the government dominates the commercial realm experience an increase in the level of domestic violence. Scholars have traced the history of revolutions to explain the relationship between statism and internal upheavals. Contemporary authors also posit a relationship between economic liberty and peace. Statistical tests show a strong connection between economic freedom and conflict reduction during the past three decades**.

**No alternatives to neoliberalism are possible – only the perm solves**

Ben **Fine** **and** David **Hall**. **No Date**.Terrains of neoliberalism: Constraints and opportunities for alternative models of service delivery. <http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/13588/1/fandhall.pdf>

The purpose of this chapter is not so much to demonstrate that neoliberalism is suffering some degree of crisis of legitimacy as it is to explain ¶ why, **despite this crisis, the momentum behind alternatives to neoliberalism ¶ remains so weak.** There are good reasons for this, reflecting the extent to ¶ which **neoliberalism is not merely an ideology and a set of policies to be ¶ reversed but is systemically attached to developments across contemporary ¶ capitalism over the past 30 years that have been underpinned by, but cannot be reduced to, what has been termed “financialization**”.¶ We begin by giving an account of financialization – what it is, what are ¶ its effects and what challenges it poses to alternative policy making. Of ¶ course, to point to financialization is not to blame finance or the economy ¶ for all of the world’s woes, even if this is in part an understandable reaction ¶ to the current crisis. For **neoliberalism is not simply confined to economic ¶ imperatives but has also reflected, for example, responses to the collapse of ¶ the Soviet bloc, the erosion of the vitality and strength of trade unions and ¶ liberation struggles, and the perceived failings of the (welfare) state following the collapse of the post-war boom.**¶ Financialization has, then, involved the excessive expansion and proliferation of financial markets and their penetration into, and influence over, ¶ almost every area of economic and social life. But this has occurred against ¶ a broader and deeper background of changes that have been systemically ¶ disadvantageous to public sector provision. The systemic hold of neoliberalism explains why proposals for public sector alternatives have been so ¶ thin on the ground and also why those that do prevail against the odds ¶ should be constrained from meeting wider goals than commercial viability. The institutional capacity to deliver public sector alternatives has been ¶ severely undermined so that even corresponding proposals remain limited, ¶ let alone delivery in practice.¶ As will be shown, these observations are borne out in acute form by ¶ the financial crisis that began in 2008 and the policy responses to it. The ¶ imperative to rescue the financial system from itself begs the question of ¶ “rescue it for what and how”, and here there tends to be a yawning gap in real outcomes, especially in public provision, reflecting the extent to which ¶ policy has been geared towards supporting the private sector in general and ¶ finance in particular. This leads us to suggest that **the building of public ¶ sector alternatives, on which the vast majority of the poorest in developing countries will continue to depend for provision of many of their basic ¶ needs into the foreseeable future, will have to dovetail with the building ¶ of broader policy initiatives and institutional capacity to deliver them. It ¶ is not, then, simply a matter of different policies and of a different politics ¶ that informs them. The most immediate, but far from final, task is one of ¶ placing finance at the service of delivery rather than the other way about.**

### Civilization K

Nuclear causes extinction and leaves earth uninhabitable

**Krieger 4/30/12**

(David, holds MA and Ph.D. degrees in ¶ political science from the University of Hawaii as well as a J.D. from the Santa Barbara ¶ College of Law, Assistant professor at University of Hawaii, founder of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and has served as its ¶ president since 1982. He is a councilor on the World Future Council, chair of the Executive ¶ Committee of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility, ¶ and a member of the Executive Committee of the Middle Powers Initiative. “NUCLEAR WEAPONS¶ AND A¶ SUSTAINABLE FUTURE” Nuclear Peace Foundation, <http://www.wagingpeace.org/menu/resources/publications/2012_prepcom.pdf>, SEH)

**Nuclear war would preclude a sustainable future. It would destroy the global environment, leading to ¶ the extinction of many forms of plant and animal life. Complex forms of life, such as humans, would be ¶ particularly at risk. A nuclear war fought with existing nuclear arsenals could leave the Earth ¶ uninhabitable for humans**. ¶ Leading atmospheric scientists, who warn of the utterly catastrophic effects nuclear war would have ¶ upon global climate and the environment, argue, “The combination of nuclear proliferation, political ¶ instability and urban demographics may constitute one of the greatest dangers to the stability of society ¶ since the dawn of humans. Only abolition of nuclear weapons will prevent a potential nightmare.”¶ 23¶ The ¶ scientists call for immediate reductions in US and Russian arsenals to a few hundred nuclear weapons to ¶ “reduce the possibility of nuclear winter and encourage the rest of the world to continue to work toward ¶ the goal of elimination.”¶ 24¶ ¶ It is necessary to ensure that nuclear weapons will not be used again as instruments of war, risking the ¶ destruction of civilization, nuclear famine and the extinction of most or all humans and other forms of ¶ complex life. Exposing the dangers of launch-on-warning nuclear policies and the dysfunctional and ¶ counterproductive nature of nuclear deterrence theory is essential for awakening policy makers and the ¶ public to the imperative goal of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. It is a goal that demands ¶ boldness by all who seek a sustainable future for humanity and the planet. The non-nuclear weapon states ¶ that are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty have both the right and the responsibility to assert ¶ leadership in assuring that the nuclear weapon states fulfill their obligations for good faith negotiations ¶ for complete nuclear disarmament.

**Production and growth cannot be ended without the death of millions. Shifting to self-sufficiency causes resource wars and increased poverty.**

David **Barnhizer**, **2006**. Prof. of Law Cleveland State, Waking from Sustainability’s Impossible Dream, Research Paper 06-123 March 2006 , http://ssrn.com/abstract=878405

Grand utopian visions and even smaller utopias based on an ideal of pastoral communities harmoniously husbanding local resources simply aren’t reflective of the reality faced by the vast majority of people. E.F. Schumacher’s argument that “small is beautiful” may appear to be an elegant solution for how we can all live comfortable and rewarding lives within enriching community bonds but it is not going to happen.53 My concern here is related to the speed at which societies are approaching various kinds of large-scale dislocations, injustices, strife and even disaster. I don’t want to resort to doomsday prophecies or set a clear date on which critical resources will be irreversibly depleted such as done in the Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth report in 1972.54 In addition to being destructive and careless, humans are also adaptive and resilient. Placing hard and fast deadlines on when chaos occurs and the worst effects generated is unwise and chancy at best.55 But if it is unwise or at least extremely difficult to make accurate and detailed predictions involving “doom and gloom” scenarios, it is equally unwise and foolhardy to ignore that the equivalent of ecological and social tectonic plates with massive disruptive potential are shifting underneath the surface of our national and global systems. Failing to prepare for the most likely consequences reaches the level of gross stupidity. The crises we face are a combination of ecological, social and economic. They are located not only in natural systems but social systems. They involve the ability to fund potentially conflicting obligations for the provision of social benefits, health care, education, pensions, and poverty alleviation. They include as well the need for massive expenditures to “fix” what we have already broken.56 In the U.S. and Europe we have made fiscal promises that we cannot keep. We also have vast economic needs for wealth generation as a precondition to achieving social equity on both national and global scales. Figuring out how to reduce some of those obligations, eliminate others and rebuild the core and vitality of our system must become a part of any honest social discourse. There should be no doubt, however, that there will be pain and sacrifice in any action we take. But failing to take prompt and effective action will produce catastrophic results for many people and nations. The question is simple--whether the situation is one that “gets worse before it gets better or worse before it gets worse.” We still have the ability to determine the answer. “Small is beautiful” has become an impossible dream for all but a few communities. The process of impossibility is driven by population growth, the breakdown of local communities through migration, the infusion of multicultural diversity, and a materialistic ethos that has altered our sense of what constitutes quality of life. The most obvious driving forces include increasing urban densities and coastal development requiring massive infrastructures and supportive supply systems, overall population levels and the distortions of population distribution and age demographics. To these can be added quality of life demands caused people in economically impoverished countries can see how material life is led in richer countries and the spread of interdependent economic systems that allow global production and distribution systems to penetrate what had been largely closed economic and cultural systems. These conditions are not reversible. Such considerations render the dream of sustainability to the refuse heap of history. Of course it is possible for isolated pockets of activity to exist within niches, and for “sustainable” lifestyles to be supported for a limited number of people. But local self-sufficiency is no longer an option for the great majority of the earth’s people. While people still engage in low level, low impact and integrated sustainable production systems that fill a demand/supply niche for natural or organic products or meet the needs of a small and largely closed community, these will never be sufficient on a scale beyond the local context. **The scale of social needs, including the need for expanded productive activity, has grown so large that it cannot be shut off abruptly. It can’t even be ratcheted down in any significant fashion without producing serious harms to human societies and hundreds of millions of people. Even if it were possible to shift back to systems of local self-sufficiency, the consequences of the transition process would be catastrophic for many people and even deadly to the point of continual conflict, resource wars, increased poverty and strife.** **The transition costs in human, social and environmental terms are too dire to risk taking the chance. What are needed are concrete, workable, and pragmatic strategies that produce effective and intelligently designed economic activity in specific contexts and, while seeking efficiency and conservation, place economic and social justice high on a list of priorities**.57 **The imperative of economic growth applies not only to the needs and expectations of people in economically developed societies but to people living in nations that are currently underdeveloped in the economic sense. Opportunities must be created, jobs must be generated in huge numbers, economic resources expanded to address the tragedies of poverty and inequality.** Unfortunately, natural systems must be exploited to achieve this. **We can’t return to Eden. The question is not how to achieve a static state but how to achieve what is needed to advance social justice while avoiding and mitigating the most destructive consequences of our behavior**. (21-3)

#### Growth is sustainable and solves resource depletion

**Emerson 10** (Patrick, Associate Professor of Economics – Oregon State University, “Economic Growth: The Planet's Poor Need Sustainable Expansion,” Oregon Live, 8-7, <http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2010/08/economic_growth_the_planets_po.html>)

Does economic growth represent the biggest threat to the planet, or its salvation? In a recent op-ed ("The fallacy of growth in a finite world," Aug. 1), Jack Hart argues that the goal of economic growth is antithetical to a sustainable world. Hart's views reveal a wealthy-country bias about what growth means and fail to appreciate the perspective of poor countries. His characterization of growth is also inaccurate and perpetuates a common misconception about economic growth -- that it necessarily means resource depletion. Finally, his anti-growth agenda would leave the world more imperiled: Economic growth represents the world's best hope to meet the challenges of the future. What does growth mean for the stark realities of life in a low-income society? High-income countries enjoy an average life expectancy of almost 80 years, while in low-income countries it's just 53 years. In developing countries an estimated 900 million people do not have enough food, 1 billion people have no access to safe drinking water, 2.4 billion people have inadequate sanitation and 10,000 children die every day from diseases caused by contaminated water. The infant mortality rate in high-income countries is 7 per 1,000, compared with 114 in low-income countries. These sobering facts of poverty result from a lack of growth. What economic growth has brought to those of us fortunate to live in a wealthy country is not just big TVs and fancy cars, but a safe, secure and long life for ourselves and our children. These statistics are real measures of despair for most of the world's population. The myth of the happy peasant is an arrogant conceit of the wealthy that has existed for centuries to justify income inequality, and it is no truer today than it was in feudal times. Hart argues that the growth of the 19th and 20th centuries has come largely through the depletion and degradation of the earth's natural resources. Growth does not mean resource depletion, however; this is but one way to accomplish growth. Becoming more efficient -- in other words, conserving our resources -- is another. Anything that provides value produces growth. A better, more energy-efficient light bulb, a time-saving personal computer and a better electric car are all ways through which growth can be achieved. Poverty and population growth are highly correlated because poor families in developing countries need children to provide the social safety net that their governments do not. Societies that have experienced economic growth, however, have seen population growth rates decline precipitously. And more people doesn't necessarily represent a problem; it represents a challenge, an incentive and a resource. More people means an increased emphasis on finding more efficient ways to live; it means more potential talent -- brainpower and creativity -- to help solve the very problems we face. Not only does growth not mean resource depletion, but creating more efficient technologies is necessarily growth-enhancing. This is why growth represents the hope of the future, not the challenge to it. Much of the recent growth in developed countries has been achieved not through resource depletion but through the microcomputer and information technology revolution, through designing more efficient buildings and machines, and through substantial improvements in transportation efficiency. This is what will typify 21st century growth: doing more with less. High-income countries, led by the United States, do use the lion's share of the world's energy. But the U.S. produces a lot more value per unit of energy than does China. And high-income countries are making the biggest investment in renewable-energy technology, because our wealth causes us to place increased value on the environment.

### Consult India CP

#### Indo-Pak war does not cause extinction

Ball ‘6

(Desmond, prof at the Strategic and Defense Studies Centre at the Australian National Univ, “The Probabilities of On the Beach: Assessing ‘Armageddon Scenarios’ in the 21st Century,” Working Paper No. 401, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at The Australian National University, <http://rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/sdsc/wp/wp_sdsc_401.pdf>)

Analysis of these incidents suggests that nuclear war is in fact more likely between India and Pakistan than it ever was between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. On the other hand, the relatively small nuclear stockpiles mean that the resultant casualties would be much less than would have occurred in an all-out US-Soviet strategic nuclear exchange. Pakistan is especially vulnerable. Its total population is about 150 million, of whom more than half are under fifteen years of age and nearly a third are under nine. Only five cities have more than a million people—Karachi (15 million), Lahore (6 million), the Islamabad/Rawalpindi conurbation (2 million), Faisalabad (3 million) and Hyderabad (2 million). In-house studies by India’s nuclear planners have shown that only about 15 weapons would ever be required against these cities.34 Three warheads with nominal yields of only 20 kilotons each targeted on each of the five cities would kill perhaps 2-3 million people. Fifteen 1 megaton weapons, also allocated three to each city, could kill perhaps 10- 12 million. In June 2002 US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited both New Delhi and Islamabad and briefed his counterparts about a Pentagon study that concluded that a nuclear war between the two countries could result in 12 million deaths. A detailed study of the consequences of a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan was published in June 2002. It assumed two scenarios. The first involved the explosion of ten 15 kiloton bombs over five Indian and five Pakistani cities (Bangalore, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and New Delhi in India and Faisalabad, Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi in Pakistan). This produced around 1.7 million immediate deaths and 0.9 million severe injuries in India and 1.2 million deaths and 0.6 million severe injuries in Pakistan. The second scenario involved 24 25 kiloton weapons, 12 detonated on eight Pakistani cities and 12 on seven Indian cities. The immediate deaths from blast and fire were estimated to be around 8 million, but the ground-bursts would also produce substantial fallout. About 22.1 million people would die fairly quickly from exposure to lethal radiation doses, while another eight million would suffer severe radiation sickness; most of the very young, old and infirm would die. About half of the 30-35 million deaths would be in Pakistan and half in India. About 99 percent of the Indian population and 93 percent of the Pakistani population would survive.35

#### Deterrence checks

Waltz 2k

(Kenneth, poli sci prof at Columbia University, research associate of the Institute of War and Peace Studies, Winter/Spring, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1, “Interview: Is Kenneth Waltz Still M.A.D. about Nukes?” Interviewed by Jeremy Goldberg and Parag Khanna, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/gjia/gjia\_winspr00f.html)

Stability in the subcontinent now exists; it had not existed since World War II and the partition of India and Pakistan. Now with nuclear weapons on both sides, India and Pakistan can no longer fight even a conventional war over Kashmir, as former General Beg and former General Sardarji both admitted. But we still fear instability such as the intractable dispute over the Kashmir. Yet the bitterness between the United States and the Soviet Union was deep enough during the Cold War, and deterrence worked. Why would India and Pakistan be different? Does India and Pakistan’s common border increase the risk? Probably not in a modern world where there are airplanes and missiles that can reach anywhere. What difference does it make that you’ve got a common border as long as it’s perfectly easy for the two countries in an adversarial relationship to reach each other? Geographic proximity may shrink warning time, but nuclear deterrence does not depend on being able to react with split–second timing. What’s the hurry? If you have received a damaging blow from another country and you’re going to retaliate, what difference does it make if you retaliate now, ten minutes from now, or tomorrow? A country still has that same fear of the retaliation, and it’s that fear of retaliation that deters.

### Thorium PIC

**Should means ought**

**Howard 5**

Taylor and Howard, 05 - Resources for the Future, Partnership to Cut Hunger and Poverty in Africa (Michael and Julie, “Investing in Africa's future: U.S. Agricultural development assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa”, 9/12, http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001784/5-US-agric\_Sept2005\_Chap2.pdf)
Other legislated DA earmarks in the FY2005 appropriations bill are smaller and more targeted: plant biotechnology research and development ($25 million), the American Schools and Hospitals Abroad program ($20 million), women’s leadership capacity ($15 million), the International Fertilizer Development Center ($2.3 million), and clean water treatment ($2 million). Interestingly, in the wording of the bill, Congress uses the term shall in connection with only two of these eight earmarks; the others say that USAID should make the prescribed amount available. **The difference between shall and should may have legal significance—one is clearly mandatory while the other is a strong admonition**—but it makes little practical difference in USAID’s need to comply with the congressional directive to the best of its ability.

**New reactor types aren’t ready and can’t be regulated turns their impacts – only LWRs can be deployed quickly**

**Shellenberger 12** (Michael, founder of the Breakthrough Institute, graduate of Earlham College and holds a masters degree in cultural anthropology from the University of California, Santa Cruz, "New Nukes: Why We Need Radical Innovation to Make New Nuclear Energy Cheap", September 11, http://thebreakthrough.org/index.php/programs/energy-and-climate/new-nukes/)

Arguably, **the** **biggest impact of Fukushima on the nuclear debate**, ironically, **has been to force a growing number of pro-nuclear environmentalists out of the closet,** including us. **The reaction to the accident by anti-nuclear campaigners and** many **Western publics** **put a fine point** on **the gross misperception of risk that informs so much anti-nuclear fear**. **Nuclear remains the only** **proven technology** **capable of reliably generating zero-carbon energy at a scale** **that can** have any **impact** on global **warming**. Climate change -- and, for that matter, the enormous present-day health risks associated with burning coal, oil, and gas -- simply dwarf any legitimate risk associated with the operation of nuclear power plants**. About 100,000 people die every year due to exposure to air pollutants from the burning of coal**. **By contrast**, **about 4,000 people have died from nuclear energy** -- **ever** -- almost entirely due to Chernobyl. But rather than simply lecturing our fellow environmentalists about their misplaced priorities, and how profoundly inadequate present-day renewables are as substitutes for fossil energy, we would do better to take seriously the real obstacles standing in the way of a serious nuclear renaissance. Many of these obstacles have nothing to do with the fear-mongering of the anti-nuclear movement or, for that matter, the regulatory hurdles imposed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and similar agencies around the world. **As long as nuclear technology is characterized by enormous upfront capital costs, it is likely to remain just a hedge** against overdependence on lower-cost coal and gas, **not the wholesale replacement** **it needs to be** to make a serious dent in climate change. Developing countries need large plants capable of bringing large amounts of new power to their fast-growing economies. But they also need power to be cheap. So long as coal remains the cheapest source of electricity in the developing world, it is likely to remain king. **The most worrying threat to the future of nuclear** **is**n't the political fallout from Fukushima -- it's **economic reality**. Even as new nuclear plants are built in the developing world, old plants are being retired in the developed world. For example, Germany's plan to phase-out nuclear simply relies on allowing existing plants to be shut down when they reach the ends of their lifetime. Given the size and cost of new conventional plants today, those plants are unlikely to be replaced with new ones. As such**, the combined political and economic constraints associated with current nuclear energy technologies mean that nuclear energy's share of global energy generation is unlikely to grow in the coming decades**, **as global energy demand is likely to increase faster than new plants can be deployed. To move the needle on nuclear energy** to the point that it might actually be capable of displacing fossil fuels, **we'll need new nuclear technologies that are cheaper and smaller**. **Today, there are a range of nascent, smaller nuclear power plant designs, some of them modifications of the current light-water reactor technologies used on submarines, and others, like thorium fuel and fast breeder reactors, which are based on entirely different nuclear fission technologies**. **Smaller, modular reactors can be built much faster and cheaper than traditional large-scale nuclear power plants.** **Next-gen**eration nuclear **reactors are designed to be incapable of melting down, produce drastically less radioactive waste, make it very difficult or impossible to produce weapons grade material,** **use less water, and require less maintenance.** Most of these designs **still face substantial technical hurdles before they will be ready for commercial demonstration. That means a great deal of research and innovation will be necessary to make these next generation plants viable and capable of displacing coal and gas**. **The United States could be a leader on developing these technologies**, **but unfortunately U.S. nuclear policy remains mostly stuck in the past.** **Rather than creating new solutions**, **efforts to restart the U.S. nuclear industry have** mostly **focused on** **encouraging utilities to build** the next generation of **large, light-water reactors with loan guarantees** **and various other subsidies** and regulatory fixes. With a few exceptions**, this is largely true elsewhere around the world as well.** Nuclear has enjoyed bipartisan support in Congress for more than 60 years, but the enthusiasm is running out. The Obama administration deserves credit for authorizing funding for two small modular reactors, which will be built at the Savannah River site in South Carolina. But a much more sweeping reform of U.S. nuclear energy policy is required. At present, **the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has little institutional knowledge of anything other than light-water reactors and virtually no capability to review or regulate alternative designs. This affects nuclear innovation in other countries as well, since the NRC remains, despite its many critics, the global gold standard for thorough regulation of nuclear energy. Most other countries follow the NRC's lead when it comes to establishing new technical and operational standards for the design, construction, and operation of nuclear plants**. **What's needed now is a new national commitment to the development,** testing, demonstration, **and** early stage **commercialization of** a broad range of **new nuclear technologies** -- from much smaller light-water reactors to **next gen**eration ones -- in search of a few designs that can be mass produced and deployed at a significantly lower cost than current designs. **This will require** both greater public support for nuclear innovation and **an entirely different regulatory framework** to review and approve new commercial designs. **In the meantime, developing countries will continue to build traditional, large** **nuclear** power **plants**. **But time is of the essence.** **With the lion's share of future carbon emissions coming from those emerging economic powerhouses,** **the need to develop smaller and cheaper designs that can scale faster is all the more important. A true nuclear renaissance** can't happen overnight. And it **won't happen so long as large and expensive light-water reactors remain our only option**. But **in the end,** **there is no credible path to mitigating climate change without a massive global expansion of nuclear energy.** **If you care about climate change, nothing is more important than developing the nuclear technologies we will need to get that job done.**

## 1AR

### China

#### 3. Nanotech depresses the motivations for arms races and arms racing is born out of psychology and not technology

Jim **Logajan** Co-director of the MOD Business Newsgroup, 7-6-**2004**

<http://venusia.golgothe.net/pipermail/sci.nanotech/2004-July/001210.html>

Since nanotechnology will make irrelevant many of the motivations that drive national antagonisms, the more fundamental question is "Are nanotech arms races ever likely to arise?" - not "Are they unstable?" Furthermore, an objective list would have included those aspects of nanotechnology that lent stability to any ensuing arms race as well as those that caused instability. As a result, the list appears subjective, making it an inaccurate assessment of probable futures, and therefore of little value in determining policy. It needs to be redone with more objectivity, IMHO. 1) Cheaper to develop and test That is an odd claim to make since history has already invalidated it: An understanding of the physical laws needed to develop nuclear technology, microtechnology, and nanotechnology were all in place at the end of the 1930s. Nuclear reactors and bombs now exist, as do microelectronic devices, yet no MNT device yet exists. And Feynman spoke of MNT-like capabilities and their great promise back in 1959 - and yet they still don't exist. Therefore I simply can't reconcile your claim with reality. Furthermore, even when the first MNT assembler or nanofactory arrives on the scene, the design and development problems do not go away. The technology will be in virgin territory and there will be teething problems in the design of products and in each generation of device. Each of these problems will takes months and possibly even years to work out. And of course, it isn't clear why this makes a nanotech arms race "unstable". The "stability" of said race eventually rests on the psychology and motivations of the participants. If the intent of one side is to use the arms once they believe they have superiority, then a subsequent arms race is potentially unstable - but the technology involved is irrelevant.

#### 5. They cause the cold war’s nightmare scenarios to become reality

**Bin, Prof**essor of the Institute of International Studies, Tsinghua Universit, **06** [Li, “Paper Tiger with

Whitened Teeth”, http://www.wsichina.org/cs4\_5.pdf]

The power pattern in the world has significantly changed since the end of the cold war. The United States is indeed in a new period of power expansion. However, nuclear weapons of the United States provide little contribution to its fast growing power. Lieber and Press are therefore wrong to predict that the United States would gain new coercive power. First, the United States cannot develop a fully disarming nuclear strike capability against Russia and China given its intelligence deficiency; second, a disarming capability of surprise attack in peacetime cannot generate coercive power in crisis given the difficulty of signaling; third, the United States cannot gain new nuclear coercive power as its new methods of using nuclear weapons are constrained by the nuclear taboo. In this new era, nuclear weapons essentially remain a paper tiger. U.S. nuclear modernization toward greater strike capability is just a whitening of the paper tiger’s teeth. If more people in the world today understood that this fundamental nature of nuclear weapons will remain unchanged, even with the rise of American nuclear strike capabilities, we might still avoid **the reemergence of the Cold War’s worst nightmare scenarios**.

### Virilio

**AND, ANY RESIDUAL LINK WILL BE IMPACT TURNED – WE SHOULD STRIVE FOR ECONOMICS OF SPEED TO ENSURE JUSTICE**

**SMITH 2K4**

[Richard, The Brain is the Milieu: Speed, Politics and the Cosmopolitan Screen, muse, theory and event]

Connolly, I think, accepts Wolin's notion that speed is a problem for political theory but he approaches the problem from a different perspective: "[t]he acceleration of the fastest zones -- and the consequent accentuation of difference in tempo between fast and slow processes -- forms a constitutive dimension of the late-modern condition" (143**). The contemporary phenomena of speed provide an opportunity for political theory to rethink its concepts of place and deliberatio**n. Political theory, according to Wolin, is hampered even jeopardised by the rapid dissemination of ideas, by the capricious attention to cultural phenomena, and by the equally rapid disappearance of those objects subject to attention. **Deliberation is (necessarily) slow, it has its own time (leisurely but also complex, and fraught because it must weigh competing interests). It is this assumption** as to the leisurely nature of deliberation and some of its implications or imputations **that Connolly critiques: "The question for me, then, is not how to slow the world down, but how to work with and against a world moving faster than heretofore to promote a positive ethos of pluralism" (**143).

**We have a moral obligation to advocate nuclear---any alternative results in extinction due to warming**

**Baker 12**—Executive Director of PopAtomic Studios, the Nuclear Literacy Project (7/25/12, Suzy, Climate Change and Nuclear Energy: We Need to Talk, ansnuclearcafe.org/2012/07/25/climate-change-and-nuclear-energy-we-need-to-talk/)

Ocean Acidification¶ While I was making artistic monuments to single celled organisms in the ceramics studio, new research was emerging about ocean acidification affecting these beautiful and integral pieces of our ecosystem. **As the ocean absorbs excess carbon** from humans burning fossil fuels, **the pH of the ocean is rapidly changing**. This means that **our** ancient **oxygen-making pals cannot properly do their job**. As their ocean home becomes inhospitable, **they are dying off in droves**. **This not only impacts the ocean’s ability to naturally sequester** man made **carbon** emissions; **it** also **negatively impacts the entire food chain**, since they are the primary food source for other multi-cellular ocean creatures, some of which we enjoy eating.¶ Oh, and **did I mention that these** little **phytoplankton are** also **responsible for creating the ozone layer that protects all life on the planet from** cosmic **radiation**, **and they churn out** 70-**80% of the oxygen** **we breathe?** These creatures are much more than just a pretty floating form.¶ **Ocean acidification is the issue that brought me to supporting nuclear energy**. Ocean acidification is an often-overlooked aspect of climate change that is potentially more threatening than the heat, the super storms, the fires, the drought, the crop losses, and all of the other trends that we are seeing now, which climate scientists have been warning us about for decades.¶ Climate Change and Nuclear Energy: Like Oil and Water?¶ It didn’t take long for me to find out that in the nuclear industry, climate change is not something we all agree on. Discussing climate change as a concern is often polarizing, and brings up intrinsic conflicts of interest in the larger energy sector (the companies who design/build/run the nuclear plants also happen to design/build/run the fossil fuel plants). I’ve been advised by people who deeply care about me, and the success of my organization, not to bring up climate at all, and to be extremely careful not to base my support of nuclear on climate issues. I’ve also been specifically advised not to make the argument that nuclear energy is the only solution to climate change.¶ When you are the new kid, it is usually best not to make waves if you can help it. So, for the most part, I have heeded that advice and held my tongue, despite myself.¶ However, **as I** watch the news (and my wilting vegetable garden) and **see the magnitude of human suffering** that is **directly related to increasingly severe weather events**, **I cannot keep silent**. **Climate change is why I am here supporting nuclear energy, so what am I doing not talking about it?¶** The CEO of Exxon Mobile recently made clear that despite his company’s acknowledgement of the irrefutable evidence of climate change, and the huge ecological and human cost, he has no intentions of slowing our fossil fuel consumption. In fact, he goes as far to say that getting fossil fuels to developing nations will save millions of lives. While I agree that we need stronger, better energy infrastructure for our world’s poorest nations, I wholly disagree that fossils are the right fit for the job.¶ Fossil fuel usage could be cast as a human rights issue only to the extent that access to reliable and affordable electricity determines what one’s standard of living is. At the same time, **fossil fuel usage is the single largest threat to our planet and every species on it**. **Disregarding the impacts that fossil fuel use poses**, merely to protect and increase financial profits, **is unethical**, and cloaking fossil fuel use as a human rights issue is immoral.¶ Although we are all entitled to our own opinions and beliefs, **the idea that climate** change **and ocean acidification** **are** even **up for debate** **is not reasonable**. Just think: **The CEO of the largest fossil fuel** **company in America freely speaks out about climate change, while nuclear energy advocates are pressured to stay silent** on the subject.¶ **Silence is No Longer an Option**¶ I am someone who avoids conflict, who seeks consensus in my personal and professional lives, and so I have followed the advice of well-meaning mentors and stayed silent in hopes of preserving a false peace within my pro-nuclear circles, including my family and friends. But my keeping silent is now over— starting here and starting now—**because this is too big and too important to stay silent.** I am not alone in believing this, and the nuclear industry does itself no favors by tacitly excluding the growing movement of people who are passionate about the need to use nuclear energy to address climate change.¶ And **nuclear power is the only realistic solution**. **It would be great if there were** also **other viable solutions** that could be easily and quickly embraced; **however, the numbers just don’t work out**. **Renewables** and conservation **may have done more good if we had utilized them on a large scale 40 years ago**, when we were warned that our ecosystem was showing signs of damage from fossils fuels…**but** at this point **it’s really too late** for them. And burning more fossil fuels right now, when we have the technologies and know-how to create a carbon-free energy economy, would be the height of foolishness.¶ **In the meantime, there is real human suffering, and we here in the developed world are directly causing it. Our poorest brothers and sisters cannot escape the heat.** **They cannot import food when their crops fail.** They cannot buy bottled water when there is a drought. **They cannot “engineer a solution”** any more than my childhood friends the phytoplankton can.¶ ¶ Energy Choices as an Ethical Obligation¶ **We have an ethical obligation to stop killing people with our energy consumption**. That statement may sound oversimplified, but let’s be honest—we know that fossil fuels kill approximately 1.3 million people each year through respiratory diseases and cancers, and the death toll for climate change related events rises every day. Yet, we do nothing but dither about climate change politics. Where is the outrage?¶ The fossil fuel industry has been successful at presenting a united front and maintaining consistent strategic communications. In contrast, the safety record and clean energy contributions of nuclear are always overshadowed by politics favoring fossil fuel use. If anything, nuclear advocates should be particularly sensitive that the very same politics are happening with climate science.¶ **We should be championing nuclear energy as a science-based solution, instead of enforcing a meek code of silence**. People from outside the nuclear industry, like Gwyneth Cravens, Barry Brooks and Tom Blees, have pointed out these relationships, yet the nuclear industry has yet to internalize and accept these realities.¶ **How can we expect people to listen to science and not politics when it comes to nuclear energy, but not climate change?¶** Disagreeing with a policy does not change the facts. You can disagree with policy to limit carbon emissions, but that doesn’t change the fact that our fossil fuel consumption is changing the PH of our oceans. **Many people disagree with the use of nuclear energy, but that doesn’t change the fact that nuclear is our largest source of carbon free electricity and the safest source of electricity per kilowatt hour.¶** Nuclear Must Lead by Example¶ **If we want the public to overcome the cognitive dissonance between science and policy when it comes to nuclear energy, we need to lead by example and overcome our own cognitive dissonance when it comes to climate change** — even if it means risking our own interests as members of the larger energy industry. We are not going to run out of fossil fuels any time soon, so the decision to move to carbon-free energy—to move to nuclear energy—must be made willingly, and based on ethical principles, not the limits of our natural resources.¶ As green groups wait endlessly for renewable technologies to have some kind of breakthrough, and nuclear supporters stay mum on climate change, we continue using fossil fuels. Our collective inaction is allowing the destruction of our planet’s ecosystem, the dying of our oceans, and the suffering of the poorest members of our own species. The climate conversation has become so convoluted by politics and greed that many smart, compassionate people have “thrown in the towel.” We should be more concerned than ever at our lack of a comprehensive global response.¶ I strongly believe that **there’s still time to reclaim the dialogue about climate change based on ocean acidification evidence, and to use nuclear technologies to improve the long-term outcome for our planet** and our species. **The first step is acknowledging the complicated** and unique **role of the nuclear industry in this conflict**, **and the conflicts of interest that are impeding open communication.** The second step is to realize that the climate change community is a potential ally, and that openly addressing the subject of climate change in our communications is in the best interest of the nuclear community. The third step is choosing to do the right thing, not just the polite thing, and reclaim our legitimate role in the energy community as the “top dog” of carbon-free electricity, instead of quietly watching natural gas become “the new coal.”¶ Climate change is not going away—it is getting worse—and **each one of us** in the nuclear community **has an ethical obligation to speak up and to do something about it**. I am speaking up for the oceans, for the cyano-bacteria and diatoms and our shared mitochondrial RNA that still fills me with wonder at the beauty of this world. Please join me if you can, to speak up for what you love—and if you cannot, please understand that we all remain nuclear advocates, and that the nuclear community is much stronger with the no-longer-silent climate change harbingers in it.

**We’re not nuclear optimism---it’s supported based on science and checked by pessimists**

**Adams 10** Rod, Technological Realism Should Replace Optimism, Pro-nuclear advocate with small nuclear plant operating and design experience. Former submarine Engineer Officer, <http://atomicinsights.com/2010/05/technological-realism-should-replace-optimism.html>

As a “served engineer” on a nuclear powered submarine, I learned a long time ago that things go wrong, even with the very best technology. **The recognition of inevitable “problems” should not deter technical development and should not make people afraid to develop new products** and services, **but it should add a healthy dose of humility backed up by continuous efforts to prepare for the worst**. My experiences have taught me to be uncomfortable with any proclamation of inevitable progress. I have worked on IT projects, been a full participant in the digital revolution, operated a custom plastics manufacturing company, and watched the nuclear industry work to regain respectability after some serious missteps in its early development history. **Progress is hard work and there are often failures that reset the development cycle just as it seems ready to take off. Too many technology observers** and pundits **point to Moore’s Law as** some kind of **a general rule for technical developments**. Moore’s Law is a very particular pronouncement – in 1965, Gordon Moore recognized that there was a recognizable path forward that would allow manufacturers to double the number of transistors that could be inexpensively placed on a chip every year for the next ten years and he recognized that he could apply that law to the 15-20 years of chip development that had already happened. He modified his prediction in 1975 to increase the doubling time to two years instead of one. He predicted that the implementation of that path would allow an increasing quantity of processing power, assuming that it would be possible to keep all of the transistors firing at the same rate as before. **Moore’s Law does not apply to** software development, to steel making, to underwater sensors, to remote manipulators, to wind **energy** collection systems, or to the rate of IP data transmission using satellite networks. It is not even infinitely applicable to semiconductor based processors – there are physical limits to the size of transistors and connecting wires that will eventually provide an asymptote that levels out the growth of processing power. I have never had much “faith” in technology. I like technology. I use lots of technology; my children have occasionally called me “Inspector Gadget” because of all of the tools (my wife and children sometimes call them “toys”) I have accumulated over the years. However, **I understand the limits of the technology that I use.** I read the manuals, heed the warnings, plan for failure, and worry about the potential consequences of inappropriately using technical devices**. I know that no technology can overcome physical barriers**; nothing I or anyone else can do will provide power from the wind when it is not blowing and nothing that I or anyone else can invent will enable chemical combustion to provide reliable heat energy without both a source of oxygen and a place to dump the waste products. Nothing that I or anyone else can invent will enable oil extraction from a dry well. I also know that not everything that breaks can be fixed, even if there is an unlimited amount of time and money. Some breaks and fissures can never be welded shut or forced to heal. This is where I believe that humble engineers and technicians who are not driven by sales numbers have a huge role to play. Their (our) natural pessimism can help to reduce the consequences of always listening to the optimists, the people who say “damn the torpedoes”, “failure is not an option”, or “whatever it takes”. **Failure is always possible. Before stretching limits it is important to recognize the consequences of the failure to determine if they are acceptable. If the reasonably predictable “worst possible event” results in consequences that cannot be accepted, the prudent course of action is to avoid the action** in the first place. I place deepwater drilling for oil and gas into that category. **It is pretty obvious that the possible consequences are unacceptable and that technological development has not yet found a way to mitigate those consequences**. I am not sure what the limits of “deepwater” should be, but it is apparent that 5,000 feet is beyond the limit. **I do not place operating nuclear energy production facilities in that category**. However, there are very definitely some kinds of nuclear plants – like very large graphite-moderated, water-cooled reactors operated by people who override safety systems and ignore warning indications – that have proven that they can cause consequences that are not acceptable. **The real value comes in determining what the reasonably predictable consequences might be and what failure modes are reasonable to assume. For people who have no firm foundation in real world mechanics, chemistry and physics, it is possible to spin all kinds of scary scenarios that depend on a series of impossible events**. (Note: Just because I believe that there is always something that can go wrong, I do not believe that all things are possible.) **My prescription for progress is not “faith” in engineers or technologists. It is for people to approach challenges with knowledge**, a questioning attitude, humility **and a willingness to expend the resources necessary to operate safely**. A thirst for maximizing short term profits or an attitude of blind optimism are both incompatible with performing difficult tasks in potentially dangerous environments.

# Octos V Fighting Bowles

## 2AC

### Nuclear Authoritarianism K

**Scientific and instrumental argumentation and research is key to motivate legislative fence-sitters. Their critical approach is just preaching to the choir which endangers public and decision-making backlashes which turn the case. Only our interp can generate the debates necessary to ensure survival.**

**Brown 2k11**

[heath, PhD Political Science, Roanoke, Salem, VA, “narrative strategies used by interest groups during the 2008 presidental transition”, 2011 Pat-Net Conference]

Milbrath argues that interest **groups must strategically present information so as to ¶ overcome the “perceptual screen” that shields policy makers from absorbing endless amounts ¶ of information**. He suggests that groups use facts (scientific information about policy ¶ outcomes), arguments (normative explanations of justness or rightness of action), and power¶ (typically subtle offers of political support or threats of political retribution) to communicate ¶ their interests and make their case for policy action (or inaction). In a more recent approach, ¶ Esterling (2007, p. 79) makes the case that groups can use [**using] “instrumental” – “research or ¶ evidence-based causal” arguments -- or “normative” – “intrinsic desirability” arguments.** By **emphasizing one of these approaches, a group is tacitly communicating the way it wants to persuade the target of the information.** By emphasizing power or normative arguments, the ¶ group implies that the policy maker should make decisions based primarily on their political ¶ judgment and political future. Conversely, by emphasizing facts-based or instrumental ¶ arguments, the group implies that the policy maker should base decisions primarily on rational ¶ or scientific considerations. In practice, it is difficult to disentangle these two types of ¶ arguments and many groups will likely combine various ways to present information (Wright ¶ 1996; Rochefort and Cobb 1994). The dichotomy though does help clarify the persuasive or ¶ argumentative tone of the information and advice given by groups to policy makers. 6 ¶ While public perceptions of interest groups might suggest crass self-interest, ¶ manipulation, and deception, groups have an incentive to be forthright in the information they ¶ provide and arguments they make. **A group that provides shoddy statistics or misleading ¶ arguments will be discounted in future interactions with the policy maker** (Kersh 2009; ¶ Easterling 2007). John E. Chubb (1983, p. 145**) writes in regard to energy interest groups**: ¶ “information and advice that are solely self-serving threaten the bond of trust that facilitates ¶ the informal play of influence.” In fact, **rather than targeting political opponents or fence ¶ sitters, much research suggests that groups prefer or are invited to lobby friends and allies over ¶ adversaries** (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999; Hall and Deardorff ¶ 2006; Bauer et al. 1963; Holyoke 2004; McCool 1990). If this is the case**, the cost of ¶ misrepresenting or overstating information may be particularly high for those engaged in** what ¶ Hall and Deardorff (2006) and others have called **“legislative subsidy” (**Hall and Deardorff 2006; ¶ Esterling 2007a). From this subsidy perspective, if a policy maker is sub-contracting information ¶ collection and analysis to an allied interest group, it behooves that group to be conscientious, ¶ thorough, and consistent in the information and advice it gives. And in many cases, as Wright ¶ (1996) contends, it is relatively easy for policy makers to check the authenticity of the ¶ information provided to them, sometimes simply through the contradictory information ¶ provided by other groups, thereby curtailing the inclination to blatantly misrepresent the truth. ¶ Furthermore, experimental research shows that **factual or instrumental information is preferred by legislative staff** (LaPira 2008) and **neutral expert lobbyists have more legislative access than non-experts** (Esterling 2007b). Facts may be useful on their own terms in ¶ formulating legislative decisions but **scientific or statistically based arguments also serve as a cue for policy makers to determine the credibility or reliability of the advice they are given** ¶ (Sabatier 1978). ¶ Rather than convince those already in agreement, the approach taken by proactive ¶ theorists suggests that **groups seek to convince legislative fence sitters or opponents to adopt ¶ the group’s position**, advocate the group’s interests, or simply vote in the group’s way through ¶ the offer of, or refusal to give, political support (Smith 1984; Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; ¶ Wright 1996). Wright (1990) for one finds that groups which distribute campaign contributions ¶ to a wide group of legislators are then able to access a wider group, rather than just political ¶ allies (Wright 1990). Similarly, Heberling (2005) shows that one group, the AFL-CIO, seeks out ¶ legislators with unknown political preferences rather than targeting political allies (Heberling ¶ 2005). The field of interest group research has not yet resolved whether groups typically lobby ¶ friends, adversaries, or some combination of the two (Leech and Baumgartner 1998). This is ¶ likely due to the wide variation of group types and also policy domains in which groups operate. ¶ These inter-organizational and inter-policy differences affect the strategies employed and ¶ therefore the content of information presented during lobbying.

**Group their Kaur and Derrida links - Our impact scenarios do not sponsor consumerism but instead are necessary to prevent global apocalypse**

JL **Schatz. 2012**. Professor of English and Feminist Evolutionary Studies & Director of Debate at Binghamton University. The Importance of Apocalypse: The Value of End-Of-The-World Politics While Advancing Ecocriticism. Journal of Ecocriticism: A New Journal of Nature, Society and Literature. 4(2)

It is no longer a question that human interaction with the world is destroying the very ecosystems that sustain life1. Nevertheless, **within academic communities people are divided over which discursive tactic, ontological position, or strategy for activism should be adopted.** I contend that **regardless of an ecocritic’s particular orientation** that **ecocriticism most effectively produces change when it doesn’t neglect the tangible reality that surrounds any discussion of the environment**. **This demands including human-induced ecocidal violence within all our accounts. Retreating from images of ecological collapse to speak purely within inner-academic or policymaking circles isolates our conversations away from the rest of the world—as it dies before our eyes**. This is not to argue that interrogating people’s discourse, tactics, ontological orientation, or anything else lacks merit. Timothy Luke, Chair and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute, explains that Because nothing in Nature simply is given within society, such terms must be assigned significance by every social group that mobilizes them[.] ... Many styles of ecologically grounded criticism circulate in present-­‐day American mass culture, partisan debate, consumer society, academic discourse, and electoral politics as episodes of ecocritique, contesting our politics of nature, economy, and culture in the contemporary global system of capitalist production and consumption. (1997: xi) Luke reminds us that regardless of how ecocritics advance their agenda they always impact our environmental awareness and therefore alter our surrounding ecology. In doing so he shows that both literal governmental policies and the symbolic universe they take place within reconstruct the discourses utilized to justify policy and criticism in the first place. This is why films like *The Day After Tomorrow* and *2012* can put forth realistic depictions of government response to environmental apocalypse. And despite being fictional, these films in turn can influence the reality of governmental policy. Even the science-­‐fiction of weather-­‐controlling weapons are now only steps away from becoming reality2. **Oftentimes it takes images of planetary annihilation to motivate people into action after years of sitting idly by watching things slowly decay. In reality it takes awareness of impending disaster to compel policymakers to enact even piecemeal reform.** On the screen it takes the actual appearance of ecological apocalypse to set the plot in motion. What is constant is that “as these debates unfold, visions of what is the good or bad life ... find many of their most compelling articulations as ecocritiques ... [that are] mobilized for and against various projects of power and economy in the organization of our everyday existence” (Luke 1997: xi). **We cannot motivate people to change the ecological conditions that give rise to thoughts of theorization without reference to the concrete environmental destruction ongoing in reality**. This means that, **even when our images of apocalypse aren’t fully accurate, our use of elements of scientifically-­established reality reconstructs the surrounding power structures in beneficial ways.** **When we ignore either ecological metaphors or environmental reality we only get part of the picture**.` In recent years, **many ecocritics have shied away from the very metaphors that compel a sense of urgency**. They have largely done so **out of the fear that its deployment will get co-opted by hegemonic institutions**. **Such critics** ignore how what we advocate alters our understanding of ourselves to the surrounding ecology. In doing so, our advocacies **render** such **co-optation meaningless because of the possibility to redeploy our metaphors in the future.** In the upcoming sections, I will provide an overview of how poststructuralist thinkers like Michel Foucault and Martin Heidegger influence some ecocritics to retreat from omnicidal rhetoric. This retreat minimizes the main objectives of their ecocriticism. I argue that **rather than withdrawing from images of apocalypse that we should utilize them in subversive ways to disrupt the current relationship people have to their ecology.** Professor of Sociology at York University, Fuyuki Kurasawa argues that **“instead of bemoaning the contemporary preeminence of a dystopian imaginary ... it can enable a novel form of transnational socio-political action ... that can be termed preventive foresight. .**.. [I**]t is a mode of ethico-political practice enacted by participants** in the emerging realm of global civil society ... [by] **putting into practice a sense of responsibility for the future by attempting to prevent global catastrophes**” (454-­‐455**). By understanding how metaphors around the environment operate we can better utilize discourse to steer us away from the brink of apocalypse. The alternative of abandoning apocalyptic deployments is far worse.** Put simply, **“by minimizing the urgency or gravity of potential threats, procrastination appears legitimate**” (Kurasawa 462). In the final section of my essay, I outline how **ecocritics can utilize images of omnicide to motivate the evolution of successful tactics that can slow the pace of environmental destruction.**

**Our knowledge of China is accurate—their authors have flawed information**

**Chan 4**—PhD in Political Science from Minnesota U, Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science at Colorado U at Boulder (Steve, Asian Affairs, Vol 31, No. 3 (Fall, 2004), “Extended Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait: Learning from Rationalist Explanations in International Relations”, JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30172621>, p. 167, RBatra)

Rationalist interpretations do not imply that people are omnipotent in their ability to procure and process information. We know all too well that people are subject to a variety of cognitive and perceptual errors (for example, Jervis 1976; Levy 1997; Kahneman and Tversky 2000; Tversky and Kahneman 1977). This recognition of limits to rationality, however, hardly warrants general attributions of naiveté , even stupidity, to government leaders. On the contrary, it seems sensible to start from the premise that officials know their counterparts far better than scholars may wish to acknowledge. Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, for instance, invest enormous time, effort, and resources in trying to gain an accurate understanding of each other. Academics have a hard time claiming **any special insight** or unique source of wisdom, whether it is based on mastery of the other side's language, intimate familiarity with its culture, or access to timely and sensitive information with restricted distribution. If anything, they are usually at a considerable disadvantage on these scores when compared to diplomats, intelligence analysts, and even journalists and business people. Indeed, academics in fields such as history and political science typically operate in the realm of common knowledge, outdated information, and mundane data. This confession in turn implies that at least for some of us, our individual and collective forte lies with the analysis of persistent empirical patterns and the formulation of general models of foreign policy conduct.

**AND PAN HIMSELF ADMITS THAT CHINA THREAT CONSTRUCTION IS INEVITABLE AND REFLEXIVELY BASED ON CHINESE STATE BEHAVIOUR.**

**Moran 2k11**

[lee, pride of the fleet: china’ first aircraft carrier…”, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2024425/Chinas-aircraft-carrier-takes-seas--fuelling-fears-countrys-military-strength.html>]

The official state Xinhua news agency added: 'Building a strong navy that is commensurate with **China's rising status** is a necessary step and an inevitable choice for the country to safeguard its increasingly globalised national interests.'¶ But **Chengxin Pan, an expert on China at Deakin University in Australia, warned it could unsettle neighbouring countries.**¶ He said: 'For many neighbours, it may symbolise something different and more unsettling.¶ **'It is inevitable that neighbouring countries will react with some alarm, especially given recent disputes in the South China Sea** as well as the maritime incident between China and Japan last year.'¶ Refitting and test work will now continue on the carrier.¶ The Varyag, yet to be officially renamed, was towed from Ukraine in 2001 as an empty shell without engines, weapons systems or other crucial equipment.¶ Ashley Townshend, at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney, said China would need at least three carriers if it was 'serious' about having a viable carrier strike group.¶ He also said that it would have to develop support ships and aircraft for any carrier group, which could take ten years.¶ China's neighbours India and Thailand already have aircraft carriers, and Australia has ordered two multi-purpose carriers. The United States operates 11.¶ The former chief of the Philippine's navy Admiral Ferdinand Golez said his country should not be worried by the development. He said: 'The Philippines should not be concerned with this development.¶ 'An aircraft carrier is an offensive tool but I don't think China has the intention to use it to bully its neighbours.'¶ Before the launch, a Pentagon spokesman played down the likelihood of any immediate leaps from China's carrier programme. ¶ But that is just one part of China's naval modernisation drive, which has forged ahead while other powers tighten their military budgets to cope with debt woes. ¶ China has been building new submarines, surface ships and anti-ship ballistic missiles as part of its naval modernisation, which has triggered regional jitters that have fed into long-standing territorial disputes, and could speed up military expansion across Asia.¶ In the past year, China has had run-ins at sea with Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. The incidents - boat crashes and charges of territorial incursions - have been minor, but the diplomatic reaction often heated. ¶ Chengxin **Pan added: 'Overall, the perception of a rapidly rising and potentially threatening China is likely to be reinforced and Beijing will face enormous challenges in dispelling such a perception.**'

**Despite its flaws, scenario planning is an effective way to cope with uncertainty – self-reflexivity solves**

Garry D. **Peterson et al. 2003**. Center for Limnology at the U of Wisconsin. “Scenario Planning: a Tool for Conservation in an Uncertain World” Conservation Biology. P 358-366. Vol. 17. No. 2.

Conservation biology continually confronts situations in¶ which decisions must be made in the face of uncertainty.¶ We suggest that the appropriate response to uncertainty¶ depends on the degree of uncertainty and the degree to¶ which a system can be controlled. **When control is difficult¶ and uncertainty is high, scenario planning is an effective¶ way of coping**. In other situations, hedging, adaptive¶ management, and optimal management may be¶ more appropriate (Fig. 1).¶ **Scenario planning, although potentially rewarding, risks¶ falling into the same traps as other planning or modeling¶ exercises**. However, **a variety of factors, such as overly weighting the present and overestimating our ability to¶ control the future, can reduce the range of uncertainty¶ considered. Furthermore, relying on expert opinion or¶ local knowledge can be constraining because scenarios¶ often deal with poorly understood issues outside the expertise¶ of most people. In such situations the predictions¶ of experts or local people may be no better, and¶ may even be worse, than those of nonexperts or outside¶ people**. Finally, the biggest traps of scenario planning¶ are the inability of participants to perceive their own assumptions¶ (Keepin & Wynne 1984) and the potential¶ consequences of being wrong. **There are no easy ways¶ to avoid these traps, but being aware of them, being reflective,¶ and trying to maintain an open process that includes¶ a variety of world views can help guard against¶ them** (Ney & Thompson 2000).

**Problem-solution impact is backwards---acting with a flawed epistemology allows us to change that epistemology.**

**Harris 7** (Graham, Adjunct Prf. @ Centre for Environment University of Tasmania, Seeking Sustainability in an age of complexity p. 9-10)

1 am not going to address the global 'litany' at length here. The arguments have been well made by others, especially and most elegantly by E. O. Wilson. What 1 wish to address here is the question: 'Can we grasp the complexity of it all and, if so, what do we do about it?' Given the fundamental nature of the problem the destruction of the biosphere and its ecosystem ser- vices together with the huge changes going on in human societies and cultures driven by globalisation and technological change the precautionary principle would suggest that even if the epistemology is flawed, the data are partial and the evidence is shaky, we should pay attention to the little we know and do whatever is possible to mitigate the situation even if we fundamentally disagree about the means and the ends. The only ethical course of action is, as John Ral- ston Saul writes," based on 'a sense of the other and of inclusive responsibility'. We know enough to act. Ethics is about uncertainty, doubt, system thinking and balancing difficult choices. It is about confronting the evidence**.** Over the past two or three decades, as there has been an increasing appre- ciation of the importance of good environmental management, and as western societies have become more open and the ICT revolution has made informa- tion much more widely available there has been a growing debate between the worlds of science, industry, government and the community around environ- mental ethics and environmental issues and their management. During this period new knowledge has been gained, ideas have changed (sometimes quite fundamentally) and there have been huge changes in government and social institutions and policies. We are all on a recursive journey together: we are lit- erally 'making it up as we go along'. This is not easy and there are no optimal solutions. This is an adaptive process requiring feedback from all parts of the system. Yes, there will be surprises. This is why it is so important that when we act we constantly reflect on what we know and what we are doing about it and where it is all going. As we reach the physical limits of the global biosphere the values we place on things are changing and must change further. A new environmental ethic is required, one that is less instrumental and more embracing. Traditionally there has tended to be a schism between those who take an anthropocentric view (that the world is there for us to use) and those who take the non-anthropocentric view (those who value nature in its own right). Orthodox anthropocentrisni dictates that non-human value is instrumental to human needs and interests. In contrast, non-anthropocentrics take an objectivist view and value nature intrinsically; some may consider the source of value in non-human nature to be independent of human consciousness.45 What is required is a more complex and systems view of ethics which finds a middle ground between the instrumentalist and objectivist views. Norton '46 for example, proposes an alternative and more complex theory of value - a universal Earth ethic - which values processes and dynamics as well as entities and takes an adaptive management view of changing system properties. For sustainable development to occur, choices about values will remain within the human sphere but we should no longer regard human preferences as the only criterion of moral significance. 'Humans and the planet have entwined destinies"' and this will be increasingly true in many and complex ways as we move forward. There are calls for an Earth ethic beyond the land ethic of Aldo Leopold.45 The science of ecology is being drawn into the web .49 Ecologists are becoming more socially and culturally aware and engaged" and the 'very doing' of ecology is becoming more ethical.tm' Some scientists are beginning to see themselves more as agents in relationships with society and less as observers.

**Paradigm wars are useless – combining epistemologies is key to intellectual and political progress. Only the perm solves.**

David A. **Lake. 2011**. Jerri-Ann and Gary E. Jacobs Professor of Social Sciences and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego. Why “isms” are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress. International Studies Quarterly 55, 465-480.

As I began, our task as scholars is to understand better the world in which we live. Our privileged position as scholars in society rests upon this goal, or at least its pursuit. **We do not produce understanding by ﬁghting theological wars between ourselves at either the theoretical or epistemological levels.** Rather, **we achieve understanding by asking questions about important phenomena that we do not now understand well, employing appropriate theories to answer these questions, and then being honest with ourselves and others about the strengths and weaknesses of the evidence we have been able to bring to bear**. Today, **no single theoretical or epistemological approach deserves hegemony. Diversity of theory and method is necessary, at least at this stage of our intellectual development**. Intellectual monocultures are rightfully feared. But the current cacophony is not what we should aspire to. **Rather than useful debate we have turned inward to self-contained research traditions and epistemologies** and, in turn, we focus on ﬁrst principles. **Intellectual progress does not come from proclaiming ever more loudly the superiority of one’s approach to audiences who have stopped listening. Let’s end the theological crusades and seek progress in understanding real problems of world politics**. Perhaps then we will earn the privileges society has accorded us.

**Us intervention is inevitable – the plan prevents ineffective forms of engagement**

Robert **Kagan 2011**. Contributing editor to The Weekly Standard and a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution. "The Price of Power" Jan 24 Vol 16 No18 www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power\_533696.html?page=3

**In theory, the United States could refrain from intervening abroad. But, in practice, will it? Many assume today that the American public has had it with interventions, and** Alice **Rivlin** certainly **reflects a strong current of opinion when she says that “much of the public does not believe that we need to go in and take over other people’s countries.” That sentiment has often been heard after interventions**, especially those with mixed or dubious results. **It was heard after the four-year-long war in the Philippines, which cost 4,000 American lives and untold Filipino casualties. It was heard after Korea and after Vietnam. It was heard after Somalia. Yet the reality has been that after each intervention, the sentiment against foreign involvement has faded, and the United States has intervened again. Depending on how one chooses to count, the United States has undertaken roughly 25 overseas interventions since 1898:** Cuba, 1898 The Philippines, 1898-1902 China, 1900 Cuba, 1906 Nicaragua, 1910 & 1912 Mexico, 1914 Haiti, 1915 Dominican Republic, 1916 Mexico, 1917 World War I, 1917-1918 Nicaragua, 1927 World War II, 1941-1945 Korea, 1950-1953 Lebanon, 1958 Vietnam, 1963-1973 Dominican Republic, 1965 Grenada, 1983 Panama, 1989 First Persian Gulf war, 1991 Somalia, 1992 Haiti, 1994 Bosnia, 1995 Kosovo, 1999 Afghanistan, 2001-present Iraq, 2003-present**That is one intervention every 4.5 years on average. Overall, the United States has intervened or been engaged in combat somewhere in 52 out of the last 112 years**, or roughly 47 percent of the time. **Since the end of the Cold War, it is true, the rate of U.S. interventions has increased, with an intervention roughly once every 2.5 years** and American troops intervening or engaged in combat in 16 out of 22 years, or over 70 percent of the time, since the fall of the Berlin Wall. **The argument for returning to “normal” begs the question: What is normal for the United States? The historical record of the last century suggests that it is not a policy of nonintervention**. This record ought to raise doubts about the theory that American behavior these past two decades is the product of certain unique ideological or doctrinal movements, whether “liberal imperialism” or “neoconservatism.” Allegedly “realist” presidents in this era have been just as likely to order interventions as their more idealistic colleagues. George H.W. Bush was as profligate an intervener as Bill Clinton. He invaded Panama in 1989, intervened in Somalia in 1992—both on primarily idealistic and humanitarian grounds—which along with the first Persian Gulf war in 1991 made for three interventions in a single four-year term. Since 1898 the list of presidents who ordered armed interventions abroad has included William McKinley, Theodore Roose-velt, William Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush. **One would be hard-pressed to find a common ideological or doctrinal thread among them—unless it is the doctrine and ideology of a mainstream American foreign policy that leans more toward intervention than many imagine or would care to admit.** **Many don’t want to admit it, and the only thing as consistent as this pattern of American behavior has been the claim by contemporary critics that it is abnormal and a departure from American traditions**. The anti-imperialists of the late 1890s, the isolationists of the 1920s and 1930s, the critics of Korea and Vietnam, and the critics of the first Persian Gulf war, the interventions in the Balkans, and the more recent wars of the Bush years have all insisted that the nation had in those instances behaved unusually or irrationally. And yet the behavior has continued.To note this consistency is not the same as justifying it. The United States may have been wrong for much of the past 112 years. Some critics would endorse the sentiment expressed by the historian Howard K. Beale in the 1950s, that “the men of 1900” had steered the United States onto a disastrous course of world power which for the subsequent half-century had done the United States and the world no end of harm. **But whether one lauds or condemns this past century of American foreign policy—and one can find reasons to do both—the fact of this consistency remains. It would require not just a modest reshaping of American foreign policy priorities but a sharp departure from this tradition to bring about the kinds of changes that would allow the United States to make do with a substantially smaller force structure**. Is such a sharp departure in the offing**? It is no doubt true that many Americans are unhappy with the on-going warfare in Afghanistan and to a lesser extent in Iraq, and that, if asked, a majority would say the United States should intervene less frequently in foreign nations, or perhaps not at all.** **It may also be true that the effect of long military involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan may cause Americans and their leaders to shun further interventions at least for a few years**—as they did for nine years after World War I, five years after World War II, and a decade after Vietnam. This may be further reinforced by the difficult economic times in which Americans are currently suffering. The longest period of nonintervention in the past century was during the 1930s, when unhappy memories of World War I combined with the economic catastrophe of the Great Depression to constrain American interventionism to an unusual degree and produce the first and perhaps only genuinely isolationist period in American history. **So are we back to the mentality of the 1930s? It wouldn’t appear so. There is no great wave of isolationism sweeping the country.** There is not even the equivalent of a Patrick Buchanan, who received 3 million votes in the 1992 Republican primaries. Any isolationist tendencies that might exist are severely tempered by continuing fears of terrorist attacks that might be launched from overseas. Nor are the vast majority of Americans suffering from economic calamity to nearly the degree that they did in the Great Depression. **Even if we were to repeat the policies of the 1930s, however, it is worth recalling that the unusual restraint of those years was not sufficient to keep the United States out of war.** On the contrary, the United States took actions which ultimately led to the greatest and most costly foreign intervention in its history. Even the most determined and in those years powerful isolationists could not prevent it. **Today there are a number of obvious possible contingencies that might lead the United States to substantial interventions overseas, notwithstanding the preference of the public and its political leaders to avoid them. Few Americans want a war with Iran, for instance. But it is not implausible that a president—indeed, this president—might find himself in a situation where military conflict at some level is hard to avoid**. The continued success of the international sanctions regime that the Obama administration has so skillfully put into place, for instance, might eventually cause the Iranian government to lash out in some way—perhaps by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz. Recall that Japan launched its attack on Pearl Harbor in no small part as a response to oil sanctions imposed by a Roosevelt administration that had not the slightest interest or intention of fighting a war against Japan but was merely expressing moral outrage at Japanese behavior on the Chinese mainland. Perhaps in an Iranian contingency, the military actions would stay limited. But perhaps, too, they would escalate. One could well imagine an American public, now so eager to avoid intervention, suddenly demanding that their president retaliate. **Then there is the possibility that a military exchange between Israel and Iran, initiated by Israel, could drag the United States into conflict with Iran. Are such scenarios so farfetched that they can be ruled out by Pentagon planners? Other possible contingencies include a war on the Korean Peninsula**, where the United States is bound by treaty to come to the aid of its South Korean ally; **and possible interventions in Yemen or Somalia,** should those states fail even more than they already have and become even more fertile ground for al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. And what about those “humanitarian” interventions that are first on everyone’s list to be avoided? Should another earthquake or some other natural or man-made catastrophe strike, say, Haiti and present the looming prospect of mass starvation and disease and political anarchy just a few hundred miles off U.S. shores, with the possibility of thousands if not hundreds of thousands of refugees, **can anyone be confident that an American president will not feel compelled to send an intervention force to help?Some may hope that a smaller U.S. military, compelled by the necessity of budget constraints, would prevent a president from intervening. More likely, however, it would simply prevent a president from intervening effectively. This, after all, was the experience of the Bush administration in Iraq and Afghanistan**. Both because of constraints and as a conscious strategic choice, **the Bush administration sent too few troops to both countries. The results were lengthy, unsuccessful conflicts, burgeoning counterinsurgencies, and loss of confidence in American will and capacity**, as well as large annual expenditures. Would it not have been better, and also cheaper, to have sent larger numbers of forces initially to both places and brought about a more rapid conclusion to the fighting? **The point is, it may prove cheaper in the long run to have larger forces that can fight wars quickly and conclusively**, as Colin Powell long ago suggested, than to have smaller forces that can’t. Would a defense planner trying to anticipate future American actions be wise to base planned force structure on the assumption that the United States is out of the intervention business? Or would that be the kind of penny-wise, pound-foolish calculation that, in matters of national security, can prove so unfortunate? **The debates over whether and how the United States should respond to the world’s strategic challenges will and should continue. Armed interventions overseas should be weighed carefully, as always**, with an eye to whether the risk of inaction is greater than the risks of action. And as always, these judgments will be merely that: judgments, made with inadequate information and intelligence and no certainty about the outcomes. No foreign policy doctrine can avoid errors of omission and commission. But **history has provided some lessons, and for the United States the lesson has been fairly clear: The world is better off, and the United States is better off, in the kind of international system that American power has built and defended.**

**US primacy has reduced war and violence – studies prove US hegemony makes globalization sustainable and is a proximate cause for peace**

John M. **Owen. 2011**. Professor of Politics at University of Virginia PhD from Harvard "DON’T DISCOUNT HEGEMONY" Feb 11 www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. **When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better.** (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding the downward trend in international war, Professor **Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war); the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were**. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically American hegemony. A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that **it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant. There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping** (UN or otherwise**), and so on.** What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that **American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world**. How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. The answer is that **U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes** outlined by Professor Mack. **Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which** (so say some theories) **render violence irrational.** American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. **The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also**, as Professor Mack notes, **eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon. The same case can be made**, with somewhat more difficulty, **concerning the spread of democracy**. Washington has supported democracy only under certain conditions—the chief one being the absence of a popular anti-American movement in the target state—but those conditions have become much more widespread following the collapse of communism. Thus in the 1980s the Reagan administration—the most anti-communist government America ever had—began to dump America’s old dictator friends, starting in the Philippines. Today Islamists tend to be anti-American, and so the Obama administration is skittish about democracy in Egypt and other authoritarian Muslim countries. But general U.S. material and moral support for liberal democracy remains strong.

**Consumption and consumerism are inevitable and build ethical democratic solidarity**

**Cohen 2**

(Patricia, Writer for the New York Times, citing James B. Twitchell, Professor of English at the University of Florida, “In Defense Of Our Wicked, Wicked Way”, The New York Times, July 7, <http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/jtwitche/nytimesarticle.pdf>)

''I CAN stand here and look at this for hours,'' said James B. Twitchell as he parked himself in front of the bottled water section in City Market, just past the jars of $30-per-pound teas and behind the eight-foot display of imported olive oils.¶ Mr. Twitchell, a professor of English at the University of Florida in Gainesville, specializes in the Romantic poets, but his real obsession is shopping. Given the choice of reading literary theorists like Foucault or gazing at shelves stacked with artfully shaped bottles of water piled up like Jay Gatsby's beautifully tailored shirts, he would quickly choose the latter. ''There is more that I can sustain myself with at the water aisle than in all of modern criticism,'' he said.¶ In a series of books, the latest of which is ''Living It Up: Our Love Affair With Luxury'' (Columbia University Press), Mr. **Twitchell has detailed the consumption habits of Americans** with all the scholarly delight of a field anthropologist who has discovered the secret courting rituals of a remote tribe. **He is** exquisitely **attuned to the** subtle **gradations of status conferred by the labels on what people wear, eat, drink, drive and freeze ice cubes in.¶** And he is not alone. **Whether prompted by the 90's spendathon or** the **endless fascination** not only **with shopping,** but with **reading about shopping**, a new title by an academic or journalist on the subject appears practically every week. Burlington, where Mr. Twitchell grew up and where he now spends summers, was singled out by David Brooks in his wickedly funny ''Bobos in Paradise'' as a model Latte Town, a city that has perfectly reconciled the mercenary instincts of the bourgeoisie with the artistic spirit of the bohemians to create an upscale consumer culture.¶ What distinguishes Mr. Twitchell's study of excessive consumerism, though, is that he applauds it. To him, Evian and Pellegrino, Vermont Pure and Dasani are evidence of what could be called his trickledown theory of luxury: that **the defining characteristic of today's society is the average person's embrace of** unnecessary **consumption**, **superficial indulgence, wretched excess and endless status-seeking**. Oh, earthly paradise!¶ Once defined by exclusiveness, luxury is now available -- **whether in the form of** limited-edition coffee at **Starbucks or Michael Graves tea kettles at Target** -- to all. And that, Mr. Twitchell maintains, **is a good thing**. Sure, he argues in his book, buying essentially useless luxury items ''is one-dimensional, shallow, ahistorical, without memory and expendable. But **it is** also strangely **democratic and unifying. If what you want is peace on earth, a unifying system** that transcends religious, cultural and caste differences, well, whoops!, **here it is. The Global Village** is not the City on the Hill, not quite the Emerald City, and certainly not quite what millennial utopians had in mind, but **it** **is closer to equitable distribution of rank than what other systems have provided.''¶** That is, to say the least, a minority report. For centuries, philosophers, artists and clerics railed against luxury. Ecclesiastical courts forbade most people from eating chocolate, drinking coffee or wearing colors like Prussian blue and royal purple -- ''luxuria'' that signaled living above one's God-ordered place.¶ Thorstein Veblen offered the first modern critique of ''conspicuous consumption'' in his 1899 treatise ''The Theory of the Leisure Class.'' Post-World War II social critics and economists extended Veblen's critique to the expanding middle class. John Kenneth Galbraith warned in ''The Affluent Society'' of the binge afflicting the postwar generation. Unwitting consumers, he said, were essentially suckered by admen and salesmen into spending money on things they didn't need.¶ In his 1970 study ''The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism'' Daniel Bell argued that ''the culture was no longer concerned with how to work and achieve, but with how to spend and enjoy.'' This trend, he warned, could end up undermining the very work ethic that made capitalism function.¶ That, obviously, did not happen. If anything people worked more so they could spend more. In ''The Overspent American,'' Juliet B. Schor noted that **people no longer compared themselves with** others in the same income bracket, but with **the richer and more famous they saw on television, propelling them to spend more** than they could afford.¶ To Mr. Twitchell, the naysayers are scolds and spoilsports. **Indoor plumbing, sewing machines, dishwashers, college educations, microwaves, coronary bypasses, birth control and air travel all began as luxury items for the wealthy.¶** Nor are buyers mindlessly duped by canny advertisers into buying items they don't really want, he said. Quite the opposite. They enjoy the sensual feel of an Hermès silk tie, the briny delicacy of Petrossian caviar or simply the sensation of indulging themselves. **These things may not bring happiness, but neither does their absence from the lives of people too poor to afford them.¶** It may seem an odd moment to champion luxury. The spectacular boom of the 90's now looks as if it was partly built on spectacular sleight of hand, with Enron, Global Crossing, Adelphia and WorldCom all recently admitting that billions in reported profits were nonexistent. The moment seems ripe for a chastened culture to repent its indulgences. Reassessing the get-and-spend ethic -- not defending consumerism -- might well be the defining current of the next few years.¶ The problem with Mr. Twitchell's view, said Robert H. Frank, author of ''Luxury Fever,'' is that our sense of what we need to live comfortably keeps spiraling upward. It is not that luxury spending isn't good for particular individuals, but that it is bad for society overall. ''It's like when everybody stands up for a better view, you don't see better than before,'' Mr. Frank said from his home in Ithaca. There's a lot of waste in luxury spending. Instead of building safer roads or providing better health care, we are spending that money on bigger diamonds and faster cars.¶ Mr. Twitchell is unpersuaded, however. Walking down Church Street, Burlington's busy pedestrian mall, he pointed out the transformation that the consumer culture has wrought in his hometown. Lean and tanned, with cropped gray hair and rounded tortoise-shell glasses, Mr. Twitchell looks a bit like Dennis the Menace's father after Dennis has grown up, moved across the country and given his old man a few years to recover. ''Church Street once serviced needs, now it services desires,'' Mr. Twitchell said. The optician's shop is gone, and so is Sears and JCPenney. He pointed out the Ann Taylor store, where the Masonic temple used to be. A chic French children's store sits in the old bank.¶ ''The key to modern luxe is that most of us can have a bit of it on the plate,'' Mr. Twitchell said. ''I can't own a Lexus, but I can rent one. I can't go to Bermuda for a winter, but I can have a time share for a weekend. I don't own a yacht but I'm taking a Princess cruise.''¶ The process of democratization is mirrored in Mr. Twitchell's family history. His great-grandfather Andrew A. Buell made his fortune building wooden boxes from Adirondack lumber. Driving up Lodge Road to ''the hill,'' where Mr. Buell built a red stone Romanesque mansion with a copper-topped tower, Mr. Twitchell passed the Burlington Country Club, which his grandfather Marshall Coleman Twitchell helped found. The family's sprawling former home is now a women's dormitory, and the surrounding 66-acre estate serves as the University of Vermont's Redstone campus. A couple of blocks from the hilltop, both in location and status, is the relatively modest white wooden house that Mr. Twitchell, the son of Marshall Coleman Twitchell Jr., an ophthalmologist, and his sisters grew up in.¶ At that time, said Mr. Twitchell, now 59, one's social place was determined by birth, or ''what I call the lucky sperm culture.'' Today, birth-ordained status has been supplanted by store-bought status. Mr. Twitchell has no regrets about this lost world. ''Though I was a beneficiary of it, I'm glad it's over,'' he said. ''There is something refreshing about the material world that downtown Burlington opened up.'' Compared to the traditional ways of marking status -- race, parentage, accent, private schools -- one's purchases are a preferable way of telling who's up and who's down, he said.¶ On that point, Mr. Twitchell is not alone. Gary Cross, a historian at Penn State University, said that consumer culture in one sense is ''democracy's highest achievement, giving meaning and dignity to people when workplace participation, ethnic solidarity and even representative democracy have failed.''¶ Still, as Mr. Cross argued in 2000 in ''An All-Consuming Century: Why Commercialism Won in Modern America,'' ''most of us, no matter our politics, are repulsed by the absolute identity of society with the market and individual choice with shopping.''¶ True enough, Mr. Twitchell readily conceded. But he maintains the critics are missing the essential characteristic of luxury spending. ''Luxury has very little to do with money or things,'' he said. ''Luxury is a story we tell about things,'' and it's ultimately the story we are after. That is, our purchases are imbued with elaborate narratives about the life we want to live.¶ It is advertisers and manufacturers who give objects meaning by constructing the stories about them, Mr. Twitchell said, and that meaning is as much a source of desire as the object itself. Think of the elaborate fantasies spun by marketers like Ralph Lauren and Martha Stewart.¶ It goes for whatever you're buying, whether it's Jimmy Choo, Birkenstock or Payless shoes. When Mr. Twitchell, a dedicated factory outlet shopper, flashes his member's card at Sam's Club, ''the allure is not just that I'm saving money,'' he said, ''but that I'm smarter and savvier, that I'm duping the duper.''¶ Or consider an experiment he performed on his colleagues. He told some English professors that he was going to spend $6,000 to buy an 1850 copy of Wordsworth's ''Prelude.'' Brilliant idea, everyone said. A few days later, Mr. Twitchell told the same colleagues that he had changed his mind and was going to use the $6,000 to buy a used BMW. ''I could have said that I was investing in a collection of Beanie Babies comics or a diamond pinkie ring for the shocked response that I got,'' he wrote.¶ **Critics of consumption will say they are making a moral argument**, Mr. Twitchell said, but ''often **what is condemned as luxury is really just a matter of taste.''**¶ To Mr. Twitchell, **as long as human beings crave sensation, they will desire material goods and luxurious** ones at that, Wall Street scandals notwithstanding. ''If this year it's Enron and WorldCom, then another year it was Long-Term Capital Management,'' he said.¶ **Recessions may come and go, but consumption is eternal.** The ad slogan is right: Diamonds are forever.

**War fuels structural violence, not the other way around**

**Goldstein 2001**. IR professor at American University (Joshua, War and Gender, p. 412, Google Books)

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. **Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.”** Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps. among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that **causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices**.9 So, “if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. **Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too**. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, **the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate**.

Existence comes first

**Kacou, 2008**

Amien Kacou. 2008. WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of “Life”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184

Furthermore, that manner of **finding things good** that is in pleasure **can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,”** as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense**, pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation**, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation. Thus, we can see now that, in general, **something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself.** And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, **we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living** (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] **and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good.** However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that **the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value.** But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

**There is a moral obligation to advocate nuclear---any alternative results in extinction due to warming**

**Baker 12**—Executive Director of PopAtomic Studios, the Nuclear Literacy Project (7/25/12, Suzy, Climate Change and Nuclear Energy: We Need to Talk, ansnuclearcafe.org/2012/07/25/climate-change-and-nuclear-energy-we-need-to-talk/)

Ocean Acidification¶ While I was making artistic monuments to single celled organisms in the ceramics studio, new research was emerging about ocean acidification affecting these beautiful and integral pieces of our ecosystem. **As the ocean absorbs excess carbon** from humans burning fossil fuels, **the pH of the ocean is rapidly changing**. This means that **our** ancient **oxygen-making pals cannot properly do their job**. As their ocean home becomes inhospitable, **they are dying off in droves**. **This not only impacts the ocean’s ability to naturally sequester** man made **carbon** emissions; **it** also **negatively impacts the entire food chain**, since they are the primary food source for other multi-cellular ocean creatures, some of which we enjoy eating.¶ Oh, and **did I mention that these** little **phytoplankton are** also **responsible for creating the ozone layer that protects all life on the planet from** cosmic **radiation**, **and they churn out** 70-**80% of the oxygen** **we breathe?** These creatures are much more than just a pretty floating form.¶ **Ocean acidification is the issue that brought me to supporting nuclear energy**. Ocean acidification is an often-overlooked aspect of climate change that is potentially more threatening than the heat, the super storms, the fires, the drought, the crop losses, and all of the other trends that we are seeing now, which climate scientists have been warning us about for decades.¶ Climate Change and Nuclear Energy: Like Oil and Water?¶ It didn’t take long for me to find out that in the nuclear industry, climate change is not something we all agree on. Discussing climate change as a concern is often polarizing, and brings up intrinsic conflicts of interest in the larger energy sector (the companies who design/build/run the nuclear plants also happen to design/build/run the fossil fuel plants). I’ve been advised by people who deeply care about me, and the success of my organization, not to bring up climate at all, and to be extremely careful not to base my support of nuclear on climate issues. I’ve also been specifically advised not to make the argument that nuclear energy is the only solution to climate change.¶ When you are the new kid, it is usually best not to make waves if you can help it. So, for the most part, I have heeded that advice and held my tongue, despite myself.¶ However, **as I** watch the news (and my wilting vegetable garden) and **see the magnitude of human suffering** that is **directly related to increasingly severe weather events**, **I cannot keep silent**. **Climate change is why I am here supporting nuclear energy, so what am I doing not talking about it?¶** The CEO of Exxon Mobile recently made clear that despite his company’s acknowledgement of the irrefutable evidence of climate change, and the huge ecological and human cost, he has no intentions of slowing our fossil fuel consumption. In fact, he goes as far to say that getting fossil fuels to developing nations will save millions of lives. While I agree that we need stronger, better energy infrastructure for our world’s poorest nations, I wholly disagree that fossils are the right fit for the job.¶ Fossil fuel usage could be cast as a human rights issue only to the extent that access to reliable and affordable electricity determines what one’s standard of living is. At the same time, **fossil fuel usage is the single largest threat to our planet and every species on it**. **Disregarding the impacts that fossil fuel use poses**, merely to protect and increase financial profits, **is unethical**, and cloaking fossil fuel use as a human rights issue is immoral.¶ Although we are all entitled to our own opinions and beliefs, **the idea that climate** change **and ocean acidification** **are** even **up for debate** **is not reasonable**. Just think: **The CEO of the largest fossil fuel** **company in America freely speaks out about climate change, while nuclear energy advocates are pressured to stay silent** on the subject.¶ **Silence is No Longer an Option**¶ I am someone who avoids conflict, who seeks consensus in my personal and professional lives, and so I have followed the advice of well-meaning mentors and stayed silent in hopes of preserving a false peace within my pro-nuclear circles, including my family and friends. But my keeping silent is now over— starting here and starting now—**because this is too big and too important to stay silent.** I am not alone in believing this, and the nuclear industry does itself no favors by tacitly excluding the growing movement of people who are passionate about the need to use nuclear energy to address climate change.¶ And **nuclear power is the only realistic solution**. **It would be great if there were** also **other viable solutions** that could be easily and quickly embraced; **however, the numbers just don’t work out**. **Renewables** and conservation **may have done more good if we had utilized them on a large scale 40 years ago**, when we were warned that our ecosystem was showing signs of damage from fossils fuels…**but** at this point **it’s really too late** for them. And burning more fossil fuels right now, when we have the technologies and know-how to create a carbon-free energy economy, would be the height of foolishness.¶ **In the meantime, there is real human suffering, and we here in the developed world are directly causing it. Our poorest brothers and sisters cannot escape the heat.** **They cannot import food when their crops fail.** They cannot buy bottled water when there is a drought. **They cannot “engineer a solution”** any more than my childhood friends the phytoplankton can.¶ ¶ Energy Choices as an Ethical Obligation¶ **We have an ethical obligation to stop killing people with our energy consumption**. That statement may sound oversimplified, but let’s be honest—we know that fossil fuels kill approximately 1.3 million people each year through respiratory diseases and cancers, and the death toll for climate change related events rises every day. Yet, we do nothing but dither about climate change politics. Where is the outrage?¶ The fossil fuel industry has been successful at presenting a united front and maintaining consistent strategic communications. In contrast, the safety record and clean energy contributions of nuclear are always overshadowed by politics favoring fossil fuel use. If anything, nuclear advocates should be particularly sensitive that the very same politics are happening with climate science.¶ **We should be championing nuclear energy as a science-based solution, instead of enforcing a meek code of silence**. People from outside the nuclear industry, like Gwyneth Cravens, Barry Brooks and Tom Blees, have pointed out these relationships, yet the nuclear industry has yet to internalize and accept these realities.¶ **How can we expect people to listen to science and not politics when it comes to nuclear energy, but not climate change?¶** Disagreeing with a policy does not change the facts. You can disagree with policy to limit carbon emissions, but that doesn’t change the fact that our fossil fuel consumption is changing the PH of our oceans. **Many people disagree with the use of nuclear energy, but that doesn’t change the fact that nuclear is our largest source of carbon free electricity and the safest source of electricity per kilowatt hour.¶** Nuclear Must Lead by Example¶ **If we want the public to overcome the cognitive dissonance between science and policy when it comes to nuclear energy, we need to lead by example and overcome our own cognitive dissonance when it comes to climate change** — even if it means risking our own interests as members of the larger energy industry. We are not going to run out of fossil fuels any time soon, so the decision to move to carbon-free energy—to move to nuclear energy—must be made willingly, and based on ethical principles, not the limits of our natural resources.¶ As green groups wait endlessly for renewable technologies to have some kind of breakthrough, and nuclear supporters stay mum on climate change, we continue using fossil fuels. Our collective inaction is allowing the destruction of our planet’s ecosystem, the dying of our oceans, and the suffering of the poorest members of our own species. The climate conversation has become so convoluted by politics and greed that many smart, compassionate people have “thrown in the towel.” We should be more concerned than ever at our lack of a comprehensive global response.¶ I strongly believe that **there’s still time to reclaim the dialogue about climate change based on ocean acidification evidence, and to use nuclear technologies to improve the long-term outcome for our planet** and our species. **The first step is acknowledging the complicated** and unique **role of the nuclear industry in this conflict**, **and the conflicts of interest that are impeding open communication.** The second step is to realize that the climate change community is a potential ally, and that openly addressing the subject of climate change in our communications is in the best interest of the nuclear community. The third step is choosing to do the right thing, not just the polite thing, and reclaim our legitimate role in the energy community as the “top dog” of carbon-free electricity, instead of quietly watching natural gas become “the new coal.”¶ Climate change is not going away—it is getting worse—and **each one of us** in the nuclear community **has an ethical obligation to speak up and to do something about it**. I am speaking up for the oceans, for the cyano-bacteria and diatoms and our shared mitochondrial RNA that still fills me with wonder at the beauty of this world. Please join me if you can, to speak up for what you love—and if you cannot, please understand that we all remain nuclear advocates, and that the nuclear community is much stronger with the no-longer-silent climate change harbingers in it.

**Anti-nuclear opposition is directly responsible for the spread of coal- alt makes warming inevitable**

**King 9** - Host and Executive Producer of “White House Chronicle” — a news and public affairs program airing on PBS, “After 40 Years, Environmentalists Start To See the Nuclear Light, Llewellyn King”, November 25, 2009 – 8:47 pm

Although very little happened, Nov. 24 was a red letter day for the nation’s nuclear power industry. No new nuclear reactors were purchased, no breakthrough in treating nuclear waste was announced, and the Obama administration did not declare that it would pay for new reactors.¶ Instead, the source of the industry’s happiness was The Washington Post leading Page One with an article that detailed how the environmental movement, after 40 years of bitter opposition, now concedes that nuclear power will play a role in averting further harm from global warming.¶ Mind you, not every environmental group has come around, but the feared and respected Natural Resources Defense Council has allowed that there is a place for nuclear power in the world’s generating mix and Stephen Tindale, a former anti-nuclear activist with Friends of the Earth in the United Kingdom, has said, yes, we need nuclear.¶ For the nuclear industry which has felt itself vilified, constrained and damaged by the ceaseless and sometimes pathological opposition of the environmental movement, this changing attitude is manna from on high.¶ No matter that the **environmentalists, in opposing nuclear since the late 1960s, have critically wounded the U.S. reactor industry and contributed to the construction of scores of coal and gas-fired plants that would not have been built without their opposition to nuclear**.¶ In short, **the environmental movement contributed in no small way to driving electric utilities to the carbon fuels they now are seeking to curtai**l.¶ Nuclear was such a target of the environmental movement that it embraced the “anything but nuclear” policy with abandon. Ergo its enthusiasm for all forms of alternative energy and its spreading of the belief —still popular in left-wing circles — that wind and solar power, with a strong dose of conservation, is all that is needed.¶ **A third generation of environmental activists, who have been preoccupied with global climate change, have come to understand that a substantial amount of new electric generation is needed**. Also some environmentalists are beginning to be concerned about the visual impact of wind turbines, not to mention their lethality to bats and birds.¶ Of all of the deleterious impacts of modern life on the Earth, it is reasonable to ask why the environmentalists went after nuclear power. And why they were opposed to nuclear power even before the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania and the catastrophic 1986 Chernobyl reactor failure in Ukraine. Those deserved pause, but the movement had already indicted the entire nuclear enterprise.¶ Having written about nuclear energy since 1969, I have come to believe that the environmental movement seized on nuclear first because it was an available target for legitimate anger that had spawned the movement in the ’60s. The licensing of nuclear power plants gave the protesters of the time one of the only opportunities to affect public policy in energy. They seized it; at first timorously, and then with gusto.¶ The escalation in environmental targets tells the story of how the movement grew in confidence and expertise; and how it added political allies, like Ralph Nader and Rep. Ed Markey, D-Mass.¶ The first target was simply the plants’ cooling water heating up rivers and estuaries. That was followed by wild extrapolations of the consequences of radiation (mutated children). Finally, it settled on the disposition of nuclear waste; that one stuck, and was a lever that turned public opinion easily. Just mention the 240,000-year half-life of plutonium without mentioning how, as an alpha-emitter, it is easily contained.¶ **It is not that we do not need an environmental movement**. We do. It is just that sometimes it gets things wrong.¶ In the days of the Atomic Energy Commission, the environmental groups complained that it was policeman, judge and jury. Indeed.¶ But **environmental groups are guilty of defining environmental virtue and then policing it, even when the result is a grave distortion, as in the nuclear imbroglio**. **Being both the arbiter of environmental purity and the enforcer has cost the environment 40 years when it comes to reducing greenhouse gases**.

**Scientific knowledge is best because it subjects itself to constant refinement based on empirical evidence**

**Hutcheon** **93**—former prof of sociology of education at U Regina and U British Columbia. Former research advisor to the Health Promotion Branch of the Canadian Department of Health and Welfare and as a director of the Vanier Institute of the Family. Phd in sociology, began at Yale and finished at U Queensland. (Pat, A Critique of "Biology as Ideology: The Doctrine of DNA", http://www.humanists.net/pdhutcheon/humanist%20articles/lewontn.htm)

The introductory lecture in this series articulated **the** increasingly **popular "postmodernist" claim that all science is ideology**. Lewontin then proceeded to justify this by stating the obvious: that scientists are human like the rest of us and subject to the same biases and socio-cultural imperatives. Although he did not actually say it, his **comments** seemed to **imply that** the enterprise of **scientific research** and knowledge building **could** therefore **be** no different and **no more reliable** as a guide to action **than any other set of opinions.** The trouble is that, **in order to reach such an conclusion, one would have to ignore all those aspects of the scientific endeavor that do** in fact **distinguish it from other** **types** and sources **of belief formation**.¶ Indeed, **if the integrity of the scientific endeavor depended only on the** wisdom and **objectivity of the individuals engaged in it we would be in trouble**. North American agriculture would today be in the state of that in Russia today. In fact it would be much worse, for the Soviets threw out Lysenko's ideology-masquerading-as-science decades ago. Precisely because an alternative scientific model was available (thanks to the disparaged Darwinian theory) the former Eastern bloc countries have been partially successful in overcoming the destructive chain of consequences which blind faith in ideology had set in motion. This is what Lewontin's old Russian dissident professor meant when he said that the truth must be spoken, even at great personal cost. How sad that Lewontin has apparently failed to understand the fact that while scientific knowledge -- with the power it gives us -- can and does allow humanity to change the world, ideological beliefs have consequences too. By rendering their proponents politically powerful but rationally and instrumentally impotent, they throw up insurmountable barriers to reasoned and value-guided social change.¶ What are the crucial differences between ideology and science that Lewonton has ignored? Both Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn have spelled these out with great care -- the former throughout a long lifetime of scholarship devoted to that precise objective. Stephen Jay Gould has also done a sound job in this area. How strange that someone with the status of Lewontin, in a series of lectures supposedly covering the same subject, would not at least have dealt with their arguments!¶ **Science has to do with the search for regularities in what humans experience of their physical and social environments**, beginning with the most simple units discernible, and gradually moving towards the more complex. **It has to do with expressing these regularities in the clearest** and most precise **language possible, so that cause-and-effect relations** among the parts of the system under study **can be publicly and rigorously tested**. And **it has to do with devising explanations of those empirical regularities which** have **survived** all **attempts to falsify them**. **These explanations**, once phrased in the form of testable hypotheses, **become predictors of future events**. In other words, **they lead to further** **conjectures** of additional relationships **which**, in their turn, **must survive repeated public attempts to prove them wanting** -- if the set of related explanations (or theory) is to continue to operate as a fruitful guide for subsequent research.¶ This means that **science, unlike** mythology and **ideology, has a self-correcting mechanism at its very heart.** **A conjecture, to be classed as scientific, must be amenable** **to empirical test**. **It must, above all, be open to refutation by experience**. There is a rigorous set of rules according to which hypotheses are formulated and research findings are arrived at, reported and replicated. **It is this process -- not the lack of prejudice of the particular scientist**, or his negotiating ability, or even his political power within the relevant university department -- **that ensures the reliability of scientific knowledge**. **The conditions established by** the community of **science is one of precisely** **defined and regulated "intersubjectivity".** Under these conditions **the theory that wins out**, and subsequently prevails, **does so not because of its agreement with conventional wisdom or because of the political power of its proponents, as is often the case with ideology**. **The survival of a scientific theory** such as Darwin's **is due**, instead, **to its power to explain and predict observable regularities in human experience**, **while withstanding** worldwide **attempts to refute it** -- **and proving itself open to elaboration and expansion in the process**. **In this sense only is scientific knowledge objective and universal. All this has little relationship to the claim of an absolute universality of objective "truth" apart from human strivings** that Lewontin has **attributed to scientists**.¶ **Because ideologies**, on the other hand, **do claim to represent truth, they are incapable of** **generating a means by which they can be corrected** **as circumstances change.** Legitimate **science makes no such claims. Scientific tests are not tests of verisimilitude**. **Science does not aim for "true" theories** **purporting to reflect an accurate picture of the "essence" of reality. It leaves such claims of infallibility to ideology**. **The tests of science**, therefore, **are** in terms of **workability and falsifiability**, **and its propositions are accordingly tentative in nature.** **A successful scientific theory is** one which, while guiding the research in a particular problem area, is **continuously** elaborated, **revised and refined**, until it is eventually superseded by that very hypothesis-making and testing process that it helped to define and sharpen. **An ideology**, on the other hand, **would** be considered to have **fail**ed **under those conditions, for the "truth" must be for all time**. More than anything, **it is this difference that confuses** those **ideological thinkers** who are **compelled to attack** Darwin's theory of evolution precisely because of **its success as a scientific theory**. **For them, and the world of desired** and imagined **certainty in which they live, that very success in contributing to a continuously evolving body of increasingly reliable** **-- albeit inevitably tentative -- knowledge can only mean failure, in that the theory itself has altered in the process.**

**Reps don’t shape reality—focusing on them obscures material and political analysis which turns the criticism**

**Tuathail 96** (Gearoid, Department of Georgraphy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Political Geography, 15(6-7), p. 664, science direct)

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decision- makers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problem- solving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby’s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‘Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought’-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is inadequate by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalby’s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby’s fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby’s book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and post- structuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby’s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev’s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly self- interested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engagethere is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant,. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies ‘poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

**Democratic safeguards prevent genocidal violence**

Rosemary H. T.  **O’Kane 1997**. Emeritus Professor of Comparative Political Theory at Keene University. “Modernity, the Holocaust, and politics”, Economy and Society, February.

**Chosen policies cannot be relegated to the position of immediate condition** (Nazis in power) **in the explanation of the Holocaust.**  **Modern bureaucracy is not ‘intrinsically capable of genocidal action’** (Bauman 1989: 106). Centralized state coercion has no natural move to terror**. In the explanation of modern genocides it is chosen policies which play the greatest part, whether in effecting bureaucratic secrecy, organizing forced labour, implementing a system of terror, harnessing science and technology or introducing extermination policies, as means and as ends.** As Nazi Germany and Stalin’s USSR have shown, furthermore, **those chosen policies of genocidal government turned away from and not towards modernity.** The choosing of policies, however, is not independent of circumstances. An analysis of the history of each case plays an important part in explaining where and how genocidal governments come to power and analysis of political institutions and structures also helps towards an understanding of the factors which act as obstacles to modern genocide. But **it is not just political factors which stand in the way of another Holocaust in modern society. Modern societies have not only pluralist democratic political systems but also economic pluralism where workers are free to change jobs and bargain wages and where independent firms, each with their own independent bureaucracies, exist in competition with state-controlled enterprises. In modern societies this economice pluralism both promotes and is served by the open scientific method.** By ignoring competition and the capacity for people to move between organizations whether economic, political, scientific or social, Bauman overlooks crucial but also very ‘ordinary and common’ attributes of truly modern societies**. It is these very ordinary and common attributes of modernity which stand in the way of modern genocides.**

#### Growth is sustainable and solves resource depletion

**Emerson 10** (Patrick, Associate Professor of Economics – Oregon State University, “Economic Growth: The Planet's Poor Need Sustainable Expansion,” Oregon Live, 8-7, <http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2010/08/economic_growth_the_planets_po.html>)

Does economic growth represent the biggest threat to the planet, or its salvation? In a recent op-ed ("The fallacy of growth in a finite world," Aug. 1), Jack Hart argues that the goal of economic growth is antithetical to a sustainable world. Hart's views reveal a wealthy-country bias about what growth means and fail to appreciate the perspective of poor countries. His characterization of growth is also inaccurate and perpetuates a common misconception about economic growth -- that it necessarily means resource depletion. Finally, his anti-growth agenda would leave the world more imperiled: Economic growth represents the world's best hope to meet the challenges of the future. What does growth mean for the stark realities of life in a low-income society? High-income countries enjoy an average life expectancy of almost 80 years, while in low-income countries it's just 53 years. In developing countries an estimated 900 million people do not have enough food, 1 billion people have no access to safe drinking water, 2.4 billion people have inadequate sanitation and 10,000 children die every day from diseases caused by contaminated water. The infant mortality rate in high-income countries is 7 per 1,000, compared with 114 in low-income countries. These sobering facts of poverty result from a lack of growth. What economic growth has brought to those of us fortunate to live in a wealthy country is not just big TVs and fancy cars, but a safe, secure and long life for ourselves and our children. These statistics are real measures of despair for most of the world's population. The myth of the happy peasant is an arrogant conceit of the wealthy that has existed for centuries to justify income inequality, and it is no truer today than it was in feudal times. Hart argues that the growth of the 19th and 20th centuries has come largely through the depletion and degradation of the earth's natural resources. Growth does not mean resource depletion, however; this is but one way to accomplish growth. Becoming more efficient -- in other words, conserving our resources -- is another. Anything that provides value produces growth. A better, more energy-efficient light bulb, a time-saving personal computer and a better electric car are all ways through which growth can be achieved. Poverty and population growth are highly correlated because poor families in developing countries need children to provide the social safety net that their governments do not. Societies that have experienced economic growth, however, have seen population growth rates decline precipitously. And more people doesn't necessarily represent a problem; it represents a challenge, an incentive and a resource. More people means an increased emphasis on finding more efficient ways to live; it means more potential talent -- brainpower and creativity -- to help solve the very problems we face. Not only does growth not mean resource depletion, but creating more efficient technologies is necessarily growth-enhancing. This is why growth represents the hope of the future, not the challenge to it. Much of the recent growth in developed countries has been achieved not through resource depletion but through the microcomputer and information technology revolution, through designing more efficient buildings and machines, and through substantial improvements in transportation efficiency. This is what will typify 21st century growth: doing more with less. High-income countries, led by the United States, do use the lion's share of the world's energy. But the U.S. produces a lot more value per unit of energy than does China. And high-income countries are making the biggest investment in renewable-energy technology, because our wealth causes us to place increased value on the environment.

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### Nuclear Authoritarianism K

**We’re not nuclear optimism---it’s supported based on science and checked by pessimists**

**Adams 10** Rod, Technological Realism Should Replace Optimism, Pro-nuclear advocate with small nuclear plant operating and design experience. Former submarine Engineer Officer, <http://atomicinsights.com/2010/05/technological-realism-should-replace-optimism.html>

As a “served engineer” on a nuclear powered submarine, I learned a long time ago that things go wrong, even with the very best technology. **The recognition of inevitable “problems” should not deter technical development and should not make people afraid to develop new products** and services, **but it should add a healthy dose of humility backed up by continuous efforts to prepare for the worst**. My experiences have taught me to be uncomfortable with any proclamation of inevitable progress. I have worked on IT projects, been a full participant in the digital revolution, operated a custom plastics manufacturing company, and watched the nuclear industry work to regain respectability after some serious missteps in its early development history. **Progress is hard work and there are often failures that reset the development cycle just as it seems ready to take off. Too many technology observers** and pundits **point to Moore’s Law as** some kind of **a general rule for technical developments**. Moore’s Law is a very particular pronouncement – in 1965, Gordon Moore recognized that there was a recognizable path forward that would allow manufacturers to double the number of transistors that could be inexpensively placed on a chip every year for the next ten years and he recognized that he could apply that law to the 15-20 years of chip development that had already happened. He modified his prediction in 1975 to increase the doubling time to two years instead of one. He predicted that the implementation of that path would allow an increasing quantity of processing power, assuming that it would be possible to keep all of the transistors firing at the same rate as before. **Moore’s Law does not apply to** software development, to steel making, to underwater sensors, to remote manipulators, to wind **energy** collection systems, or to the rate of IP data transmission using satellite networks. It is not even infinitely applicable to semiconductor based processors – there are physical limits to the size of transistors and connecting wires that will eventually provide an asymptote that levels out the growth of processing power. I have never had much “faith” in technology. I like technology. I use lots of technology; my children have occasionally called me “Inspector Gadget” because of all of the tools (my wife and children sometimes call them “toys”) I have accumulated over the years. However, **I understand the limits of the technology that I use.** I read the manuals, heed the warnings, plan for failure, and worry about the potential consequences of inappropriately using technical devices**. I know that no technology can overcome physical barriers**; nothing I or anyone else can do will provide power from the wind when it is not blowing and nothing that I or anyone else can invent will enable chemical combustion to provide reliable heat energy without both a source of oxygen and a place to dump the waste products. Nothing that I or anyone else can invent will enable oil extraction from a dry well. I also know that not everything that breaks can be fixed, even if there is an unlimited amount of time and money. Some breaks and fissures can never be welded shut or forced to heal. This is where I believe that humble engineers and technicians who are not driven by sales numbers have a huge role to play. Their (our) natural pessimism can help to reduce the consequences of always listening to the optimists, the people who say “damn the torpedoes”, “failure is not an option”, or “whatever it takes”. **Failure is always possible. Before stretching limits it is important to recognize the consequences of the failure to determine if they are acceptable. If the reasonably predictable “worst possible event” results in consequences that cannot be accepted, the prudent course of action is to avoid the action** in the first place. I place deepwater drilling for oil and gas into that category. **It is pretty obvious that the possible consequences are unacceptable and that technological development has not yet found a way to mitigate those consequences**. I am not sure what the limits of “deepwater” should be, but it is apparent that 5,000 feet is beyond the limit. **I do not place operating nuclear energy production facilities in that category**. However, there are very definitely some kinds of nuclear plants – like very large graphite-moderated, water-cooled reactors operated by people who override safety systems and ignore warning indications – that have proven that they can cause consequences that are not acceptable. **The real value comes in determining what the reasonably predictable consequences might be and what failure modes are reasonable to assume. For people who have no firm foundation in real world mechanics, chemistry and physics, it is possible to spin all kinds of scary scenarios that depend on a series of impossible events**. (Note: Just because I believe that there is always something that can go wrong, I do not believe that all things are possible.) **My prescription for progress is not “faith” in engineers or technologists. It is for people to approach challenges with knowledge**, a questioning attitude, humility **and a willingness to expend the resources necessary to operate safely**. A thirst for maximizing short term profits or an attitude of blind optimism are both incompatible with performing difficult tasks in potentially dangerous environments.

**It is better to overestimate terrorist threats**

Rahim **Kanani** **2011**. founder and editor-in-chief of World Affairs Commentary, Citing Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, former Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, U.S. Department of Energy, former Chief of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Department, Counter-terrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency, recipient of the CIA Director’s Award, graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, June 29th, “New al-Qaeda Chief Zawahiri Has Strong Nuclear Intent”, Forbes, http://blogs.forbes.com/rahimkanani/2011/06/29/new-al-qaeda-chief-zawahiri-has-strong-nuclear-intent/)

**We should be especially worried about the threat of nuclear terrorism under Zawahiri’s leadership**. In a recent report titled “Islam and the Bomb: Religious Justification For and Against Nuclear Weapons”, which I researched for and contributed to, lead author Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, former director of intelligence and counterintelligence at the U.S. Department of Energy, argues that al-Qaeda’s WMD ambitions are stronger than ever. And that “this intent no longer feels theoretical, but operational.” “I believe al-Qaeda is laying the groundwork for a large scale attack on the United States, possibly in the next year or two,” continues Mowatt-Larssen in the opening of the report issued earlier this year by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School. “**The attack may or may not involve the use of WMD, but there are signs that al-Qaeda is working on an event on a larger scale than the 9/11 attack.**” Most will readily dismiss such claims as implausible and unlikely, and we hope they are right, but after spending months with Mowatt-Larssen, who also served as the former head of the Central Intelligence Agency’s WMD and terrorism efforts, scrutinizing and cross-referencing Zawahiri’s 268-page treatise published in 2008 titled “Exoneration”, the analytics steered us towards something far more remarkable than expected. “As I read the text closely, in the broader context of al-Qaeda’s past, my concerns grew that Zawahiri has written this treatise to play a part in the ritualistic process of preparing for an impending attack,” states Mowatt-Larssen. “As Osama bin Laden’s fatwa in 1998 foreshadowed the 9/11 attack, **Ayman Zawahiri’s fatwa in 2008 may have started the clock ticking for al-Qaeda’s next large scale strike on America. If the pattern of al-Qaeda’s modus operandi holds true, we are in the middle of an attack cycle.”** Among several important findings, Zawahiri sophisticatedly weaves identical passages, sources and religious justifications for a nuclear terrorist attack against the United States previously penned by radical Saudi cleric Nasir al Fahd. Indeed, the language used, research cited, and arguments put forth are nothing short of detailed and deliberate. Reading as both a religious duty to kill millions of Americans and a lengthy suicide note together, this piece of literature is something we must take seriously with Zawahiri now at the helm of al-Qaeda. **The time may have come for al-Qaeda’s new CEO to leave a legacy of his own.** Concluding the author’s note, Mowatt-Larssen states, “**Even if this theory proves to be wrong, it is better to overestimate the enemy than to under­estimate him. Conventional wisdom holds that al-Qaeda is spent—that they are incapable of carrying out another 9/11**. Leaving aside whether this view is correct, for which I harbor grave doubts, **we will surely miss the signs of the next attack if we continue to overestimate our own successes, and dismiss what terrorists remain capable of accomplishing when they put their minds to it.”**