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### Adv 1 - Brazil

**Brazil is developing a nuclear sub based on a threshold fuel- gives nuclear breakout capacity- and they want a bomb**

**Santoro ‘12**

[David Santoro is senior fellow for nonproliferation and disarmament at Pacific Forum CSIS, where he directs the Forum’s various nuclear programs and conducts work on arms control, disarmament, deterrence, nonproliferation, and nuclear security and safety. Slaying the Nuclear Dragon: Disarmament Dynamics in the Twenty-First Century (Google eBook). pp 157-159. ETB]

**Brazil’s plan for nuclear sub**marine**s has been another** potential **challenge to global nuclear disarmament.** While nuclear submarines no longer have to be fueled with HEU, **“the fuel would be near the 20 percent enrichment HEU/LEU threshold, so** relatively **simpl**y **to convert.”** **Not only is the actual fuel a concern in terms of acquiring a breakout capability, but the question of inspections further complicates the issue**. Since Resende would have to produce 20 percent enriched uranium, this “would require significantly more intrusive inspections, containment, and surveillance.” Given the Brazilian authorities’ reluctance to provide even basic visual access, such negotiations could be very challenging. In addition, “**the question of how nuclear material could be withdrawn from safeguards for military, non-explosive purposes would be difficult to resolve.”** ¶Perkovich and Acton argue that nuclear submarines complicate the goal of disarmament: “Would these states, or any other non-nuclear-weapons states that might be inclined to consider the use of naval reactor in the future, be prepared to renounce them permanently in order to help bring about a nuclear-weapons-free world as part of a non-discriminatory agreement? Or would they be willing to give international inspectors unprecedented access to some of their most sensitive technologies in order to assuage international concerns?”¶ **Brazil is committed to its investment- both monetary and in national prestige- in nuclear submarines.** The formal program began in 1979 but languished due to lack of funds. However, in 2008, Brazil committed $160 million to the program, with more promised. President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva announced the country would “soon” have a nuclear submarine, but experts place a realistic completion date at 2020 or later. Nevertheless, **the armed forces are heavily invested in the program: a top Brazilian general said “Brazil’s number one military priority is the development of a nuclear submarine.**” Given the extended time frame, this particular challenge is less urgent than the questions over safeguards at Resende. However, the tension between nuclear submarines and disarmament has remained. ¶ **The combination of secrecy at Resende and plans for nuclear sub**marine**s has led to speculation that Brazil may be actively retaining a military nuclear option. If Brazil uses the shielding to secretly enrich greater quantities of uranium then declared, they could create a breakout capability.** Or **Brazil could declare facilities related to its nuclear submarines as restricted military areas and seek to keep IAEA inspectors out**. In either case**, detecting cheating would be** more **difficult**. Adding fuel to the fire are pro-nuclear statements by senior officials. In October 2007, **General** Jose Benedito de Barros **Moreira**, a senior four-star army officer, **argued: “We must have** Brazil in **the** future **possibility**, if the State agrees, **of developing a nuclear** **device**. We cannot be oblivious to the world’s reality.” He also said that **Brazil’s vice president and former defense minister** Jose **Alencar** **argued that Brazil needed weapons, both for deterrence and international respect**. In both cases, government officials played down the remarks and said that the comments were personal opinion and did not represent the official views of Brazil. (Vice President Alencar was a member of a different political party than President Lula). Nonetheless, **the combination of technical capacity, secrecy, and comments by senior officials has raised concerns about Brazil’s long-term commitment to** nuclear **disarmament**. However, because Brazil faces no serious military threats in its region, it is hard to see a compelling security rationale for nuclear weapons. The most likely scenarios in which Brazil seeks nuclear weapon is one in which the nuclear nonproliferation regime breaks down, leading Basilia to want to keep pace for status reasons. In his argument for acquisition of nuclear weapons, **Alencar “cited the case of other emerging regional powers**, **such as Pakistan**, **which he said has won international relevance ‘precisely because it has a nuclear bomb.’**” Along the same lines, a former high-level US bureaucrat cautioned that should India ever be given a permanent seat on the UN security council without Brazil also receiving one, “Brazil will light fire to the NPT and they will test.”

**Brazilian HEU naval propulsion is a cover for a nuclear weapons program- Brazilian prolif is rapid and highly likely- and it destroys the Latin American NWFZ**

**Rühle ‘10**

[Hans Rühle, a leading German security expert and former director of the planning department of the German Defense Ministry between 1982 and 1988. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nuclear-proliferation-in-latin-america-is-brazil-developing-the-bomb-a-693336.html> ETB]

Lula da Silva's self-confidence is indicative of **Brazil's claim to the status of a major power -- including in military terms.** The military claim is reflected in the country's National Defense Strategy, which was unveiled in late 2008. In addition to the mastery of the complete nuclear fuel cycle -- which has since been achieved -- the document **calls for the building of nuclear-**powered **sub**marine**s**.¶ Close to Building a Bomb¶ It sounds harmless enough, but it isn't, because **the term "nuclear-powered submarines" could in fact be a cover for a nuclear weapons program.** **Brazil already had three secret military nuclear programs between 1975 and 1990, with each branch of its armed forces pursuing its own route**. The navy's approach proved to be the most successful: using imported high-performance centrifuges to produce highly enriched uranium from imported uranium hexafluoride, so as to be able to operate small reactors for submarines. At the appropriate time, the country's newly acquired nuclear capabilities were to be revealed to the world with a "peaceful nuclear explosion," based on the example set by India. The 300-meter (984-foot) shaft for the test had already been drilled. According to statements by the former president of the National Nuclear Energy Commission, in 1990 the Brazilian military was on the verge of building a bomb.¶ But it never came to that. During the course of Brazil's democratization, the secret nuclear programs were effectively abandoned. Under the country's 1988 constitution, nuclear activities were restricted to "peaceful uses." Brazil ratified the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean in 1994 and, in 1998, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Brazil's flirtation with the bomb had apparently ended.¶ Under Lula da Silva, however, **this flirtation has now been reignited**, **and the Brazilians are becoming less and less hesitant about toying with their own nuclear option.** Only a few months after Lula's inauguration in 2003, the country officially resumed the development of a nuclear-powered submarine.¶ Even during his election campaign, Lula criticized the NPT, calling it unfair and obsolete. Although **Brazil** did not withdraw from the treaty, it demonstratively **tightened working conditions for inspectors** from the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA). The situation became tense in April 2004, when the IAEA was denied unlimited access to a newly built enrichment facility in Resende, near Rio de Janeiro. **The Brazilian government also made it clear that it did not intend to sign the additional protocol to the NPT,** which would have required it to open previously undeclared facilities to inspection.¶ In mid-January 2009, during a meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a group of nuclear supplier countries that works toward nonproliferation by controlling exports of nuclear materials, the reasons for this restrictive policy became clear to attendees **when Brazil's representative did his utmost to fight requirements that would have made the nuclear submarine program transparent.**¶ 'Open to Negotiation'¶ Why all this secrecy? **What is there to hide in the development of small reactors to power submarines, systems that several countries have had for decades**? **The answer is as simple as it is unsettling: Brazil is probably also developing something else in the plants it has declared as production facilities for nuclear submarines: nuclear weapons**. Vice President José **Alencar** offered a reason when he **openly advocated Brazil's acquisition of nuclear weapons** in September 2009. For a country with a 15,000-kilometer border and rich offshore oil reserves, Alencar says, these weapons would not only be an important tool of "deterrence," but would also give Brazil the means to increase its importance on the international stage. When it was pointed out that Brazil had signed the NPT, Alencar reacted calmly, saying it was "a matter that was open to negotiation."¶ How exactly could **Brazil** go about building n**uclear weapons?** The answer, unfortunately, is that it **would** be relatively **easy**. A precondition for the legal construction of small reactors for submarine engines is that nuclear material regulated by the IAEA is approved. But **because Brazil designates its production facilities for nuclear submarine construction as restricted military areas, the IAEA inspectors are no longer given access.** In other words, **once the legally supplied enriched uranium has passed through the gate of the plant where nuclear submarines are being built, it can be used for any purpose, including the production of nuclear weapons. And because** almost all **nuclear submarines are operated with h**ighly **e**nriched **u**ranium, which also happens to be weapons grade uranium, **Brazil can easily justify producing highly enriched nuclear fuel.**¶ Even if there is no definitive proof of Brazil's nuclear activities (yet), **past events suggest that it is highly likely that Brazil is developing nuclear weapons. Neither the constitution**al prohibition **nor the NPT will prevent this** from happening**.** All it would take to obtain a parliamentary resolution to eliminate these obstacles would be for Lula da Silva to say that the United States is not entitled to a monopoly on nuclear weapons in the Americas**. If that happens, Latin America would no longer be a n**uclear **w**eapons-**f**ree **z**one -- and Obama's vision of a nuclear-free world would be finished.

**Breaking the Latin American NWFZ destroys US-Latin American relations**

**Forman ‘12**

[Johanna Mendelson Forman, J.D., Ph.D. is a Senior Associate with the CSIS Americas Program. http://www.voxxi.com/nuclear-weapons-brazil-nukes-option/#ixzz2NMUGTrid ETB]

In the final analysis, **we should never forget that a region without nuclear weapons gives us common ground to build more constructive partnerships around other goals—stronger democratic governance, access to justice, and opportunities for workers to become educated to meet future economic needs. The hemisphere’s policymakers should consider how to riff off the success of a 45-year-old idea—**a nuclear free zone—**to create the Americas as a zone of peace, equality, justice and self-fulfillment for all citizens.** That would be the way to get respect from the major powers.

**Relations are key to solve a laundry list of existential threats**

Shifter 12

Michael is the President of Inter-American Dialogue. “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, <http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf>

There are compelling reasons for the United States and Latin America to pursue more robust ties. Every country in the Americas would benefit from strengthened and expanded economic relations, with improved access to each other’s markets, investment capital, and energy resources. Even with its current economic problems, the United States’ $16-trillion economy is a **vital** market and source of capital (including remittances) and technology **for Latin America**, and it could contribute more to the region’s economic performance. For its part, **Latin America’s rising economies will** inevitably **become** more and more **crucial to the U**nited **S**tates’ economic future. The United States and many nations of Latin America and the Caribbean would also gain a great deal by more cooperation on such **global matters as climate change**, nuclear non-proliferation, and **democracy and human rights.** With a rapidly expanding US Hispanic population of more than 50 million, the cultural and demographic integration of the United States and Latin America is proceeding at an accelerating pace, setting a firmer basis for hemispheric partnership Despite the multiple opportunities and potential benefits, relations between the United States and Latin America remain disappointing . If new opportunities are not seized, relations will likely continue to drift apart . The longer the current situation persists, the harder it will be to reverse course and rebuild vigorous cooperation . Hemispheric affairs require **urgent attention**—both from the United States and from Latin America and the Caribbean.

**Brazilian nuclear weapons development tanks US regional leadership- HEU subs are the key internal link**

**Stalcup ‘12**

[Travis C. Stalcup is a George and Barbara Bush Fellow at the George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. <http://journal.georgetown.edu/2012/10/10/what-is-brazil-up-to-with-its-nuclear-policy-by-travis-stalcup/> ETB]

What is Brazil up to? That is the question national security planners should be asking. Since abandoning its nuclear weapons program in the late 1990s, Brazil has appeared the model for nonproliferation. Relations with Argentina, its longtime rival, have warmed and the two states even cooperate on nuclear and other security issues. Compared to the Middle East, South America is stable and peaceful, hardly an environment that would necessitate nuclear weapons. Yet, changes in Latin America and a perceived shift in the balance of power away from the West require a reconsideration of that assessment. Moreover, **Brazil’s refusal to adopt the** Non-Proliferation Treaty’s **Additional Protocol and its pursuit of nuclear propulsion** technology **raise** worrisome **questions about its intentions**.¶ To Brazil, **Latin America is not as stable as** often **believed**. To the north, **Venezuela chaffs at the prospect of Brazil as regional hegemon.** In 2010, Russia and Venezuela reached a deal to build the Latin American country’s first nuclear reactor. Although the project was scrapped after the Fukushima disaster, the prospect remains. **Venezuela has** also **challenged Brazilian influence** in Bolivia and Ecuador, two countries that have or have attempted to nationalize the facilities of Petrobras, Brazil’s state oil company. In 2008, the government of Hugo Chavez levied a controversial $282 million tax on a Brazilian construction firm. Such actions have riled Brazilian leaders.¶ Further north, the United States, long the guarantor of South American stability, appears hamstrung by economic challenges. According to former Argentine diplomat Emilio Cárdenas, Brazil believes that the West is in gradual decline and that **Brazil is jockeying** with other rising nations **for position. This** shift in the balance of power **engenders** a greater degree of **uncertainty about U.S. capabilities** and intentions in the future. **Such uncertainty,** inaddition to Brazil’s new political and economic prowess, **gives it the ability to challenge the U.S. at the margins of its power.** Moreover, if the ability of the U.S. to maintain order in the hemisphere is truly constrained, it is incumbent upon the Brazilian government to seek alternative sources of security.¶ This perceived shift in the balance of power presents Brazil with an opportunity for international leadership. That is why **Brazil is seeking to achieve a degree of political clout commensurate with its new economic power,** setting as its chief foreign policy goal a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. A key component of permanent membership is the ability to share the burdens of maintaining international security. Currently, there is some question as to whether Brazil is capable of such a charge. **Looking at the current permanent members as well as the other BRICs** – Russia, India, and China – **Brazil sees nothing but countries with nuclear weapons.**¶ According to Kenneth Waltz, the preeminent realist international relations scholar, **states mirror other states – states without nuclear weapons see the power and prestige of states with nuclear weapons and they want in.** Former Brazilian Vice President José Alencar who died last year, remarked that Pakistan won international relevance “precisely because it has a nuclear bomb**.” A nuclear weapon would** not only deter rogue neighbors but **solidify Brazil’s regional dominance** and prove that it possesses the military capability to contribute to international security.¶ In addition to this perceived shift in the balance of power, consider **Brazil’s more aggressive military strategy** from 2003 to 2010 during the presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. **Part of that strategy is the development of an enormous nuclear attack submarine** analogous to India’s ballistic missile-capable Arihant-class. In addition to its potential as a missile platform, **the propulsion reactors in Brazil’s submarines would require** a **higher** degree of **uranium enrichment** than those for commercial power,possibly **above 90 percent.** In 2004, Brazilian Ambassador to the United States Roberto Abdenu remarked that “submarines are not subject to the [IAEA] safeguards regime.” **This** interpretation **provides Brazil the capability to enrich weapons-grade uranium** and develop a full fuel cycle outside of international scrutiny **and without violating its agreements**, such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco.¶ Furthermore, although **Brazil** does participate in various nonproliferation agreements, it **refuses to adopt the Additional Protocol** of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). **This protocol would strengthen the** International Atomic Energy **Agency (IAEA)’s ability to detect clandestine weapons programs** through various mechanisms, including a stronger inspections regime. According to Brazil’s National Strategy of Defense, a precondition to any additional restrictions under the NPT, such as the Additional Protocol, is the disarmament of nuclear states. However, even modest decreases in the nuclear inventories of the United States and Russia have proven difficult to accomplish. If the U.S. and Russia are unable or unwilling to disarm, Brazil feels no responsibility to take further steps to tie its hands by acceding to the Additional Protocol.¶ Taken independently, these actions are not necessarily provocative. However, when one considers how Brazil’s security environment is changing, these actions bring Brazil’s intentions into question. The perceived decline in the United States’ willingness and ability to intervene militarily in Latin America, hostility of neighboring countries to Brazil’s economic interests, and the hopelessness of nuclear disarmament provide powerful incentives to explore nuclear capability. None can claim that Brazil is actively pursuing a nuclear weapon, but **its more assertive military posture, refusal to sign the** NPT’s **Additional Protocol, and pursuit of nuclear propulsion technology should give American policymakers and nonprolif**eration **analysts pause.**

**US leadership in Latin America necessary to contain escalatory instability and make international institutions effective**

Christopher **Sabatini**, editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly and senior director of policy at Americas Society/Council of the Americas, **and** Ryan **Berger**, policy associate at the Americas Society/Council of the Americas, 6/13/**2012**, Why the U.S. can't afford to ignore Latin America, globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/13/why-the-u-s-cant-afford-to-ignore-latin-america/

Speaking in Santiago, Chile, in March of last year, President Obama called **Latin America** “a region on the move,” one that **is “more important to the prosperity and security of the U**nited **S**tates **than ever before**.” Somebody forgot to tell the Washington brain trust. The Center for a New American Security, a respected national security think tank a half-mile from the White House, recently released a new series of policy recommendations for the next presidential administration. The 70-page “grand strategy” report only contained a short paragraph on Brazil and made only one passing reference to Latin America. Yes, we get it. The relative calm south of the United States seems to pale in comparison to other developments in the world: China on a seemingly inevitable path to becoming a global economic powerhouse, the potential of political change in the Middle East, the feared dismemberment of the eurozone, and rogue states like Iran and North Korea flaunting international norms and regional stability. But the need to shore up our allies and recognize legitimate threats south of the Rio Grande goes to the heart of the U.S.’ changing role in the world and its strategic interests within it. Here are three reasons why the U.S. must include Latin America in its strategic calculations: 1. Today, **pursuing a global foreign policy requires regional allies**. Recently, **countries with emerging economies** have **appeared to be taking positions diametrically opposed to the U.S. when it comes to matters of global governance** and human rights. Take, for example, Russia and China’s stance on Syria, rejecting calls for intervention. Another one of the BRICS, **Brazil, tried to stave off the tightening of U.N. sanctions on Iran** two years ago. And last year, Brazil also voiced its official opposition to intervention in Libya, leading political scientist Randall Schweller to refer to Brazil as “a rising spoiler.” **At a time of (perceived) declining U.S. influence, it’s important that America deepens its ties with regional allies that might have been once taken for granted. As emerging nations** such as Brazil **clamor for permanent seats on the** U.N. **Security Council and more representatives** **in the higher reaches of the World Bank and** the **I**nternational **M**onetary **F**und, **the U.S. will need to integrate them into global decision-making rather than isolate them.** **If not, they could be a thorn in the side of the U.S. as it tries to implement its foreign policy agenda**. Worse, **they could threaten to undermine efforts to defend international norms and human rights.** 2. Latin America is becoming more international. It’s time to understand that **the U.S. isn’t the only country that has clout in Latin America**. For far too long, U.**S. officials and Latin America experts have tended to treat the region as separate,** politically and strategically, **from the rest of the world**. But as they’ve fought battles over small countries such as Cuba and Honduras and narrow bore issues such as the U.S.-Colombia free-trade agreement, other countries like China and India have increased their economic presence and political influence in the region. It’s also clear that **countries** such as Brazil and Venezuela **present** their own **challenges to U.S. influence in the region and** even on the **world forum**. **The U.S. must embed** its **Latin America** relations in the conceptual framework and strategy that it has for the rest of the world, rather than just focus on human rights and development as it often does toward southern neighbors such as Cuba. 3. **There are security and strategic risks** in the region. Hugo Chavez’s systematic deconstruction of the **Venezuelan** state and alleged **ties between** **FARC** rebels and some of Chavez’s senior officials have **created a volatile cocktail that could explode south of the U.S. border**. FARC, a left-wing guerrilla group based in Colombia, has been designated as a “significant foreign narcotics trafficker” by the U.S. government. At the same time, gangs, **narcotics traffickers and transnational criminal syndicates are overrunning Central America**. In 2006, Mexican President Felipe Calderón launched a controversial “war on drugs” that has since resulted in the loss of over 50,000 lives and increased the levels of violence and corruption south of the Mexican border in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and even once-peaceful Costa Rica. Increasingly, these **already-weak states are finding themselves overwhelmed by the corruption and violence** that has come with the use of their territory as a transit point for drugs heading north. **Given** their **proximity and close historical and political connections with Washington**, **the U.S. will find it increasingly difficult not to be drawn in**. Only this case, it won’t be with or against governments — as it was in the 1980s — but **in the far more complex, sticky situation of failed states.** There are many other reasons why **Latin America is important to U.S. interests**. It is a market for more than 20% of U.S. exports. With the notable exception of Cuba, it is nearly entirely governed by democratically elected governments — a point that gets repeated ad nauseum at every possible regional meeting. The Western Hemisphere is a major source of energy that has the highest potential to seriously reduce dependence on Middle East supply. And through immigration, Latin America has close personal and cultural ties to the United States. These have been boilerplate talking points since the early 1990s. But **the demands of the globe** today are different, and they **warrant a renewed engagement with Latin America — a strategic pivot point for initiatives the U.S. wants to accomplish elsewhere**. We need to stop thinking of Latin America as the U.S. “backyard” that is outside broader, global strategic concerns.

**Latin American instability causes extinction**

**Manwaring ‘5** (Max G., Retired U.S. Army colonel and an Adjunct Professor of International Politics at Dickinson College, venezuela’s hugo chávez, bolivarian socialism, and asymmetric warfare, October 2005, pg. PUB628.pdf)

President Chávez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community today. The argument in general is that failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as *Bolivarianismo.* More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict.62 Peru’s *Sendero Luminoso* calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure “armed propaganda.” Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities “business incentives.” Chávez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors’ strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chávez’s intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on selected Latin American governments’ ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such a government are real.64 But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new people’s democracies. In connection with the creation of new people’s democracies, one can rest assured that Chávez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and people’s democracies persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.65

**US influence in Latin America is key to global hegemony**

**Rochlin ’94** (James Francis, Prof. Pol. Sci. @ Okanagan University College, “Discovering the Americas: the evolution of Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America”, p. 130-131)

While there were economic motivations for Canadian policy in Central America, security considerations were perhaps more important. Canada possessed an interest in promoting stability in the face of a potential decline of U.S. hegemony in the Americas. **Perceptions of declining U.S. influence in** the region – which had some credibility in 1979-1984 due to the wildly inequitable divisions of wealth in some U.S. client states in **Latin America**, in addition to political repression, under-development, mounting external debt, anti-American sentiment produced by decades of subjugation to U.S. strategic and economic interests, and so on – **were linked to the prospect of** explosive events occurring in the hemisphere. Hence, the Central American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite **a cataclysmic process** throughout the region. Analysts at the time worried that in a worst-case scenario, **instability created by a regional war, beginning in Central America and spreading elsewhere** in Latin America, **might preoccupy Washington to the extent that the United States would be unable to perform adequately its important hegemonic role** in the international arena – a concern expressed by the director of research for Canada’s Standing Committee Report on Central America. It was feared that **such a predicament could generate increased global instability and** perhaps even **a hegemonic war**. This is one of the motivations which led Canada to become involved in efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as Contadora, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

**Hege solves multiple scenarios for nuclear war**

**Barnett 11**

Thomas P.M. Barnett is Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat., worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, March 7th, 2011, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads

It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute **lack of mass violence**. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because **if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire**." **We'll be engaging in** the same sort of **system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order** since World War II. Let me be more blunt: As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the **greatest force for peace the world has ever known.** Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable human civilization left, once **nuclear weapons** entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-**perpetual great-power peace.** We introduced the international liberal trade order known as **globalization** and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, **an** explosion of **democracy,** the persistent spread of **human rights**, **the liberation of women**, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a **profound** and persistent **reduction in** battle deaths from state-based **conflicts**. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. ¶ **As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head.** The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a **99 percent relative drop** in deaths due to war. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, **we would do well to keep U.S. power**, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come.

**Plan solves- US naval LEU conversion is modeled by Brazil**

**Ward ‘11**

[Rebecca, Stanton Nuclear Security Predoctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Project on Managing the Atom. http://www.heuphaseout.org/ ETB]

The topic of naval reactor conversion is of particular interest because it represents a military instance of an otherwise civilian problem. As such, the issue must be examined with attention to different priorities and faces greater obstacles than the largely successful conversion of critical research reactors. Like other uses of HEU, **naval reactors present a case where the behavior of the U**nited **S**tates **may have an appreciable influence over other nations.** **Three n**on-**n**uclear **w**eapons **s**tates **that** currently **do not possess nuclear sub**marine**s have expressed** serious **interest in the development of a nuclear-powered submarine fleet, and two of these nations, India and Brazil, have decided to pursue development. The decision of these two nations as to whether to use LEU or HEU could be heavily influenced by the U**nited **S**tates’ **use of HEU. The use of HEU for naval propulsion also has implications for drafting and eventually implementing the terms of a proposed** Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (**FMCT**).

### Adv 2 FMCT

**Global nuclear renaissance is happening now and is inevitable- these trends make the timing right for the passage of the FMCT**

**Pandey ‘12**

[Ms¶ Hina Pandey¶ is a¶ ¶ Research Associate at the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi. “The Fissile Missile Cutoff Treaty: A Debate In Perpetuity.” AIR POWER¶ Journal Vol. 7 No. 2, SUMMER 2012 (April-June¶ ). ETB]

The dawn of the 21st¶ century was filled with narratives of a nuclear rennaissance characterised by a sudden renewed interest in nuclear energy, leading to increasing international cooperation with regard to nuclear commerce. **As the world energy demand** **in the form of electricity is expected to grow at an exponential rate, combined with the global shift towards low carbon tech**nologies, **the prospects of nuclear energy** making a contribution towards generation of electricity today, **have indeed became brighter.** The green clean energy argument driven by the climate change lobby has also favoured the development of nuclear energy worldwide. The switch towards **nuclear** energy as clean energy **has** **offered itself as an attractive alternative for countries planning to diversify their energy needs**. Climate change being conceivably damaging would require all absolute means to reduce greenhouse gases. This has added **a sense of** **preventive responsibility** which **is likely to push countries to maximise efforts that would encourage the growth of nuclear power**. **The international trend in** **generating electricity globally through the nuclear energy route has been catching** up, especially in the Asian countries.¶ It is noteworthy that **despite** the **Fukushima** accident, **India and China have**¶ **decided to go ahead with** their **civilian nuclear power** development. Both countries have acknowledged the need to address the safety of their nuclear plants, but, at the same time, they plan to continue investing in nuclear¶ power. In fact, “**the world’s stock of** *443 nuclear* **reactors could more than double in the next 15 years***”*¶ according to the World Nuclear Association.¶ Over the last one year, countries such as **China, India, South Korea, and France have shown enthusiasm towards** the development of **their** **nuclear**¶ **industry** to boost their energy mix, **despite** the **Fukushima** disaster. Other **countries** such as Switzerland, Italy, and Germany¶ **that have planned for a phase-out** of nuclear power **could be seen as** more of **an exception rather than the rule**. The **Fukushima** accident **has** indeed **pushed** the **countries to**¶ **review their safety standards but it would be misleading to suggest that**¶ **this would ultimately lead to the collapse of the nuclear industry**. **The end of the nuclear industry that was predicted by many commentators post Fukushima is far from reality.**¶ **Nuclear power generation has been increasing continuously as a result**¶ **of improved performance**.¶ *For instance, the share of nuclear power in global generation of electricity increased from 7.8 percent in 1980 to 15.5 percent in2005, implying an increase of approximately 5.8 percent per annum in nuclear*¶ *power’s contribution to electricity generation.*¶ ¶ According to the World Nuclear Association’s statistics, **the coming 20 years would require greatly clean generated electricity; the overall demand of** ¶ **which would likely rise to 76 percent to 2030.**¶ **11**¶ In the recent years, many countries such as **Saudi Arabia and U**nited **A**rab **E**mirates **have expressed**¶ **interest in acquiring nuclear** power **plants**. **Middle**¶ **Eastern and North African countries** such as Jordan **have expressed interest in nuclear** power **plants**. In¶ fact, by 2019, Jordan’s first nuclear reactor would be operational, adding approximately 1,000 MW to its electricity generation capacity. **In Southeast**¶ **Asia as well, the demand for nuclear power has been raised by countries such as Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. The U**nited **S**tates **itself has remained motivated enough to continue expanding its nuclear industry despite Fukushima.** US Energy Secretary¶ Steven Chu clearly conveyed the need to include nuclear power in the¶ country’s future energy mix. Even one month after the Japanese crisis, the United States did not officially identify any area that required immediate¶ action in terms of nuclear safety. On the contrary, US Deputy Secretary Daniel¶ Poneman reiterated American commitment towards nuclear energy. He¶ stated, “¶ *Nuclear power must be considered as a part of any energy strategy.”* **The option of nuclear energy as an alternative energy source would persist for one more reason: the availability of uranium; the high energy density of the uranium fuel combined with the diverse and stable geo-**¶ **political distribution of the uranium resource.**¶ **“Uranium is ubiquitous and**¶ **many countries have workable deposits that could be exploited.”**¶ 14¶ Globally, approximately 4.7 million tonnes of uranium remains to be economically exploitable.¶ According to the Nuclear Energy Agency report, **sufficient uranium has been identified**, implying that even with the current usage rate, **uranium would**¶ **provide fuel supply for reactors for approximately100 years**. Hence, one may argue that **growth of the nuclear energy industry is inevitable despite events**¶ **such as Fukushima.** **The Japanese nuclear accident has indeed affected public**¶ **opinion** regarding nuclear safety, and the cost at which the nuclear industry ought to be expanded. **However, to suggest that this should directly imply a phase-out of nuclear energy is an “overreaction”.**¶ **The direct relation between the growing demand for nuclear energy and the increasing risks of diversion of nuclear energy, logically creates space for improving, and introducing, more stringent international verification mechanisms. Under this backdrop, it is likely that the larger nuclear non-proliferation goals such as the FMCT will be met.** Since 2001 onwards, one¶ of the key elements of the US nuclear non-proliferation policy has been the prevention of access to sensitive material by potential proliferators. The¶ cut-off treaty also in a way contributes towards this goal. **By imposing a quantitative limit on the amount of fissile material for military purposes, it**¶ **reduces its availability for proliferators to divert.**

**Conversion to naval LEU prompts new FMCT negotiations and is key to verification and preventing breakout prolif capacity**

**Maerli ‘2**

[Morten Bremer Maerli, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. “Components of Naval Nuclear Fuel Transparency.” ETB]

**Naval nuclear stockpiles outside the nuclear weapon states may also constitute a potential** ¶ **problem**. Paragraph 14 of the comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreement under the NPT ¶ allows any state to withdraw nuclear material for peaceful uses from safeguards if it is ¶ being used for a “non-proscribed military activity”.46 Thus, **naval nuclear fuel may** ¶ **represent a loophole for nuclear weapon production even outside the nuclear weapon** ¶ **states.** True, the safeguards agreement stresses that, during the period of non-application ¶ of safeguards, the nuclear material must not be used for the production of nuclear ¶ weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. However, **there is no prohibition of the nonexplosive use of nuclear material, equipment or technology for a military purpose such as** ¶ **the propulsion of naval ship**. Against this backdrop, concerns have been voiced that **the** ¶ **naval fuel cycle could be used as a back door to nuclear weapons.**47¶ **A non-nuclear weapon state under the NPT that wishes to acquire enriched uranium for** ¶ **submarine propulsion could either invoke the paragraph 14 exemption or could avoid** ¶ **IAEA safeguards entirely by obtaining unsafeguarded material from a nuclear weapon** ¶ **state or a non-NPT state**.48 The latter is possible because the NPT requires safeguards¶ only on special fissionable material provided to a non-nuclear weapon state for peaceful ¶ nuclear activities.49¶ **More far-reaching scenarios could include non-nuclear weapon states under the NPT** ¶ **building uranium enrichment and fuel fabrication plants for the production of submarine** ¶ **fuel and claiming that the material is not subject to IAEA safeguards since it is dedicated** ¶ **to non-proscribed military use.** **There would be no means for verifying that the material** ¶ **and facilities were not being misused to make nuclear weapons**. In either case**, the result** ¶ **would be that some of the HEU in a non-nuclear weapon state under the NPT would not** ¶ **be subject to IAEA safeguards**. This loophole was deliberately introduced into the treaty ¶ to accommodate some of the states involved in the negotiations and who were ¶ considering acquiring nuclear-propelled naval craft and wished to avoid foreign ¶ inspections, accountable to an international organization, on board such ships.50¶ **Increased transparency in the naval fuel cycle can also be paramount for the U.S. goal of** ¶ **prompting a resumption of negotiations on the next key multilateral step in the nuclear** ¶ **disarmament process: a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear** ¶ **weapons or other nuclear explosive devices**.51 **If a future Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty** ¶ **is to be implemented with a high level of confidence that no clandestine HEU diversion is** ¶ **taking place, and to bolster the HEU stockpile accounting and control under such a treaty,** ¶ **then the non-explosive uses of HEU (e.g. naval uses) must comprise part of the** ¶ **agreement.**

**Pakistan is blocking the FMCT now- won’t compromise until existing stocks are covered**

**Nisa 12/14**/12

[Waqar-un-Nisa. The Frontier Post. <http://www.thefrontierpost.com/article/197055/> ETB]

**Pakistan became the focus of** criticism by the international community for **blocking the** **negotiations** **for** Fissile Material (Cut off) Treaty (**FMCT**) at Conference on Disarmament. Despite the fact that Pakistan is not alone at the forum that has reservations but none of them is openly expressing their reservations saving their faces behind Pakistan. A Fissile Material Treaty is currently focus of attention of an international effort in non-proliferation arena which bans the future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other devices. ¶ In 2012, the global stockpile of the HEU was around 1440 tons while global Plutonium stockpile was around 500 tons. This includes the stockpile being used for civilian purposes. 99% of global stockpiles rest with the nuclear weapons states. There are several states in the CD which include the Non Aligned States argue that under the UNGA resolution 48/75L, the treaty should be non discriminatory. ¶ **Some suggest that the treaty should be named as FMT instead FM(C)T. FMCT would only require the ban on further production while FMT would also address the existing stocks of fissile material along with the ban on the further production. Pakistan also strongly supports the idea of FMT.**¶ Pakistan’s security interests are directly threatened by the proposed treaty at both regional and global level. Pakistan is among eight states which possess nuclear weapons. **Pakistan has clearly stated that it is not going to compromise over its principled position.**

**India will negotiate- favors non-discriminatory FMCT**

**India 3/12**/13

[Statement by India on FMCT in the CD Plenary¶ March 12, 2013. [http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/3A0847E2BD5BA9CDC1257B2D002D9E07/$file/1282IndiaFMCT.pdf](http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/3A0847E2BD5BA9CDC1257B2D002D9E07/%24file/1282IndiaFMCT.pdf) ETB]

We would like to begin by reiterating India’s support for the early ¶ commencement of substantive work in the CD on the basis of a Programme ¶ of Work. As we stated last week, the foremost priority issue for India has ¶ been and continues to be nuclear disarmament. Without prejudice to the ¶ priority India attaches to nuclear disarmament, **we support the negotiation** ¶ **in this forum of a universal, non-discriminatory and internationally** ¶ **verifiable FMCT** that meets India’s national security interests. **India is** a ¶ nuclear weapon state and **a responsible member of the international** ¶ **community and will approach FMCT negotiations as such**.

**P-5 supports FMCT- Pakistan key to successful negotiations**

**Kazmi ‘11**

[Zahir, master’s student at the Strategic and Nuclear Studies Department of the National Defence University, Islamabad. <http://tribune.com.pk/story/237766/pakistan-us-and-the-fmct/> ETB]

**The US** contends that it **has garnered P-5 support**, especially China’s, **that may** later **guarantee a start of negotiations over the FMCT, but these will be meaningless without Pakistan**. Consequently, Pakistan may be subjected to additional political and economic pressures but that is nothing new. Islamabad did not join the NPT, and the CTBT and test nuclear weapons in 1998 under duress. Similar pressure will only fuel the anti-US sentiment and even the goodwill American aid to the seminaries may fail.

**An FMCT sends a signal of restraint and deescalates the conflict**

**Dunn 99**

, Director of the Center for Global Security and Cooperation, 1999

(Dr. Lewis, “A FMCT: Can We Get from Here to There?,” http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/fmct/2e-dunn.pdf )

Perhaps paradoxically, **the testing of nuclear weapons by**¶ **India and Pakistan** in May 1998 **may have made both countries**¶ **more prepared to contemplate entry into a FMCT**. Since the¶ nuclear tests, the leaderships in **both countries have argued that**¶ **they are committed to avoiding the type of expanding**¶ **deployments of nuclear arms and intensifying hostility that**¶ **characterized the American-Soviet nuclear relationship**. **Instead,**¶ **they have affirmed that their goal is mutual minimum nuclear**¶ **deterrence**. For several reasons, **both India and Pakistan** could¶ well **conclude that a ban on production of plutonium and HEU**¶ **would help serve that goal**. Like their adherence to the¶ Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (which now appears in the¶ offing), **adherence to a FMCT would be a further political signal of each side’s desire for restraint**.¶ **More directly, limitations on stocks of materials would build-in a technical brake on the further**¶ **expansion of each side’s nuclear force capability.** In both cases, **a cut-off could help lessen domestic**¶ **and bureaucratic pressures to “do more”.**

**Indo/Pak war goes nuclear**

**Hundley**, 9/5/**2012** (Tom – Pulitzer Center staff, Pakistan and India: Race to the End, Pulitzer Center, p. <http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/pakistan-nuclear-weapons-battlefield-india-arms-race-energy-cold-war>)

Nevertheless, **military analysts from both countries** still **say that a nuclear exchange triggered by miscalculation, miscommunication, or panic is** far more **likely** than terrorists stealing a weapon -- **and**, significantly, **that the odds of such an exchange increase with the deployment of battlefield nukes. As these** ready-to-use **weapons are maneuvered closer to enemy lines, the chain of command and control would be stretched and** more **authority** necessarily **delegated** to field officers. And, if they have weapons designed to repel a conventional attack, there is obviously a reasonable chance they will use them for that purpose. "**It lowers the threshold," said Hoodbhoy. "The idea that tactical nukes could be used against Indian tanks** on Pakistan's territory creates the kind of atmosphere that **greatly shortens the distance to apocalypse." Both sides speak of the possibility of a limited nuclear war**. But even those who speak in these terms seem to understand that this is fantasy -- that **once started, a nuclear exchange would be almost impossible to limit or contain. "The only move that you have control over is your first move; you have no control over the nth move** in a nuclear exchange," **said** Carnegie's **Tellis. The first launch would create hysteria; communication lines would break down, and events would rapidly cascade out of control**. Some of the world's most densely populated cities could find themselves under nuclear attack, and an estimated 20 million people could die almost immediately. What's more, the **resulting firestorms would put** 5 million to **7 million metric tons of smoke into the upper atmosphere, according to a new model developed by climate scientists at Rutgers University and** the University of **Colorado**. Within weeks, skies around the world would be permanently overcast, and the condition vividly described by Carl Sagan as "**nuclear winter" would be upon us**. The darkness would likely last about a decade. The Earth's temperature would drop, agriculture around the globe would collapse, and a billion or more humans who already live on the margins of subsistence could starve. **This is the real nuclear threat that is festering in South Asia. It is a threat to all countries**, including the United States, **not just India and Pakistan**. Both sides acknowledge it, but **neither seems able to slow their dangerous race to annihilation**.

**A FMT prevents terrorist access to nuclear materials**

**Preez 4**

Du Preez, Director of the International Organizations and Nonproliferation Program (IONP) at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) and Senior Lecturer at the Graduate School for International Policy Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies., 2004

The **physical security of fissile materials and their production facilities** **has**¶ **become increasingly important** in the post-September 11th environment, **given the**¶ **potential that non-state actors, especially terrorists, could gain access to such materials.**¶ **Despite existing instruments to improve physical protection**, such as the Convention on¶ Nuclear Safety and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, **large**¶ **inventories of plutonium and HEU are still under-protected,** **especially in former Soviet**¶ **Union countries.**48¶ The former **Soviet Union produced the largest stockpile of plutonium**¶ **and HEU, most of which is now in Russia**.49¶ Its **systems to adequately protect and**¶ **account for much of the fissile material**, however, **remain far below international**¶ **standards, making the stocks possible targets of theft by terrorists, proliferant states, or**¶ **criminal groups**.¶ In this context, **a FMT would serve an important objective: to cap certain types of**¶ **fissile material and reduce the number of processing facilities that might become**¶ **potential targets of terrorist seeking to develop a**n improvised **nuclear device** (IND).¶ **Reduced access to weapons grade HEU and weapons grade plutonium will present added**¶ **challenges to terrorist seeking to develop IND**s.50¶ **By ending production, a FMT woul**d¶ thus **limit the quantity of fissile material that has to be secured from theft.** In addition, **its**¶ **stringent international verification would prevent covert insider theft, which is most**¶ **likely at the stage of the bulk processing involved with large-scale production of nuclear**¶ **material**. A **redefined FMT should** therefore not only **addres**s **production and excess**¶ **stocks**, but also measures to improve physical security of nuclear material. **States should**¶ **be encouraged to adopt higher standards for the physical protection of fissile material.** In¶ this regard, a **FMT could include physical protection features and measures to** (a)¶ minimize and control access to weapons usable and other nuclear material, including¶ hazardous radioactive materials, facilities and transport systems; (b) **minimize the**¶ **vulnerability of nuclear plants**; (c) provide a response mechanism if an act of nuclear¶ terrorism is suspected or if unauthorized access to weapons usable material and facilities¶ is anticipated; (d) take immediate action to recover any stolen material; and (e) protect¶ vital equipment required to maintain radioactive materials in a safe state. This would also¶ require the establishment of a physical protection inspection service within the IAEA51¶ .¶

**Nuclear terrorism is probable and causes extinction**

**Hellman 8**

[Martin E. Hellman, emeritus prof of engineering @ Stanford, “Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence” SPRING 2008 THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI, <http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf>]

The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat of a full-scale nuclear war, yet this article focuses primarily on the latter. An explanation is therefore in order before proceeding. A terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon would be a catastrophe of immense proportions: “A 10-kiloton bomb detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical work day would likely kill some half a million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct economic damage. America and its way of life would be changed forever.” [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix]. The likelihood of such an attack is also significant. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has estimated the chance of a nuclear terrorist incident within the next decade to be roughly 50 percent [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright, a former weapons inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than one percent, but notes, “We would never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1% .... A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we can’t live in a world where it’s anything but extremely low-probability.” [Hegland 2005]. In a survey of 85 national security experts, Senator Richard Lugar found a median estimate of 20 percent for the “probability of an attack involving a nuclear explosion occurring somewhere in the world in the next 10 years,” with 79 percent of the respondents believing “it more likely to be carried out by terrorists” than by a government [Lugar 2005, pp. 14-15]. I support increased efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, but that is not inconsistent with the approach of this article. Because terrorism is one of the potential trigger mechanisms for a full-scale nuclear war, the risk analyses proposed herein will include estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall risk. If that risk, the overall risk, or both are found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies would be directed to reduce which- ever risk(s) warrant attention. Similar remarks apply to a number of other threats (e.g., nuclear war between the U.S. and China over Taiwan). his article would be incomplete if it only dealt with the threat of nuclear terrorism and neglected the threat of full- scale nuclear war. If both risks are unacceptable, an effort to reduce only the terrorist component would leave humanity in great peril. In fact, society’s almost total neglect of the threat of full-scale nuclear war makes studying that risk all the more important. The cosT of World War iii The danger associated with nuclear deterrence depends on both the cost of a failure and the failure rate.3 This section explores the cost of a failure of nuclear deterrence, and the next section is concerned with the failure rate. While other definitions are possible, this article defines a failure of deterrence to mean a full-scale exchange of all nuclear weapons available to the U.S. and Russia, an event that will be termed World War III. Approximately 20 million people died as a result of the first World War. World War II’s fatalities were double or triple that number—chaos prevented a more precise deter- mination. In both cases humanity recovered, and the world today bears few scars that attest to the horror of those two wars. Many people therefore implicitly believe that a third World War would be horrible but survivable, an extrapola- tion of the effects of the first two global wars. In that view, World War III, while horrible, is something that humanity may just have to face and from which it will then have to recover. In contrast, some of those most qualified to assess the situation hold a very different view. In a 1961 speech to a joint session of the Philippine Con- gress, General Douglas MacArthur, stated, “Global war has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. … If you lose, you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer does it possess even the chance of the winner of a duel. It contains now only the germs of double suicide.” Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ex- pressed a similar view: “If deterrence fails and conflict develops, the present U.S. and NATO strategy carries with it a high risk that Western civilization will be destroyed” [McNamara 1986, page 6]. More recently, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn4 echoed those concerns when they quoted President Reagan’s belief that nuclear weapons were “totally irrational, totally inhu- mane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization.” [Shultz 2007] Official studies, while couched in less emotional terms, still convey the horrendous toll that World War III would exact: “The resulting deaths would be far beyond any precedent. Executive branch calculations show a range of U.S. deaths from 35 to 77 percent (i.e., 79-160 million dead) … a change in targeting could kill somewhere between 20 million and 30 million additional people on each side .... These calculations reflect only deaths during the first 30 days. Additional millions would be injured, and many would eventually die from lack of adequate medical care … millions of people might starve or freeze during the follow- ing winter, but it is not possible to estimate how many. … further millions … might eventually die of latent radiation effects.” [OTA 1979, page 8] This OTA report also noted the possibility of serious ecological damage [OTA 1979, page 9], a concern that as- sumed a new potentiality when the TTAPS report [TTAPS 1983] proposed that the ash and dust from so many nearly simultaneous nuclear explosions and their resultant fire- storms could usher in a nuclear winter that might erase homo sapiens from the face of the earth, much as many scientists now believe the K-T Extinction that wiped out the dinosaurs resulted from an impact winter caused by ash and dust from a large asteroid or comet striking Earth. The TTAPS report produced a heated debate, and there is still no scientific consensus on whether a nuclear winter would follow a full-scale nuclear war. Recent work [Robock 2007, Toon 2007] suggests that even a limited nuclear exchange or one between newer nuclear-weapon states, such as India and Pakistan, could have devastating long-lasting climatic consequences due to the large volumes of smoke that would be generated by fires in modern megacities. While it is uncertain how destructive World War III would be, prudence dictates that we apply the same engi- neering conservatism that saved the Golden Gate Bridge from collapsing on its 50th anniversary and assume that preventing World War III is a necessity—not an option.

**FMT key incentive to get countries on board for international fuel bank**

**Nikitin et al. 2012**

(Mary Beth Nikitin, Coordinator, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. Congressional Research Service. Also contributing from that division were Marie Parillo and Sharon Squassoni. Also contirbuting were Anthony Andrews and Mark Holt, Resources, Science, and Industry Division, Congressional Research Service. “Managing the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Policy Implications of Expanding Global Access to Nuclear Power, October 19/2012, <http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34234_20121019.pdf>)

As in the past, the success of current proposals may depend on whether nuclear energy is truly ¶ revived not just in the United States, but globally. That revival will likely depend on significant ¶ support for nuclear energy in the form of policy, price supports, and incentives. Factors that may ¶ help improve the position of nuclear energy against alternative sources of electricity include ¶ higher prices for other sources (natural gas and coal through a carbon tax or other restrictions), ¶ improved reactor designs to reduce capital costs, regulatory improvements, and waste disposal ¶ solutions. ¶ **The willingness of fuel recipient states to participate in international enrichment centers rather** ¶ **than develop indigenous enrichment capabilities, and confidence in fuel supply assurance** ¶ **mechanisms such as an international fuel bank, will largely determine the success of the overall** ¶ **policy goal**—**to prevent further spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies**. Sofar, ¶ proposals addressing this challenge have originated in the supplier states, with many recipient ¶ states continuing to voice concern that their right to peaceful nuclear energy technology under the ¶ NPT is in jeopardy. Increasingly, however, **participation is being presented as a market-based** ¶ **decision by countries to refrain,** at least for the present**, from developing their own fuel** ¶ **enrichment programs**. ¶ **Another factor that will shape the success of these proposals is the possible addition of other** ¶ **incentives.** Simply making nuclear energy cost-effective may not induce countries to forgo ¶ indigenous enrichment and reprocessing. Such decisions may require other incentives, perhaps even outside the nuclear realm, to make them palatable. The experience of Iran may be instructive ¶ here. Russia’s offer to provide assured enrichment services on Russian soil has gone nowhere; ¶ instead, other, broader trade incentives may be necessary. While the case of Iran may illustrate the ¶ extreme end of the spectrum, in terms of a country determined to develop a capability for a ¶ weapons program, non-nuclear-weapon states will clearly take notice of how a solution develops ¶ for Iran. ¶ Issues for Congress ¶ Congress would have a considerable role in at least four areas of oversight related to fuel cycle ¶ proposals. The first is providing funding and oversight of U.S. domestic programs related to ¶ expanding nuclear energy in the United States. Key among these programs are nuclear research ¶ and development programs and federal incentives for building new commercial reactors.127¶ The second area is policy direction and/or funding for international measures to assure supply. ¶ **What guarantees should the United States insist upon in exchange for helping provide fuel** ¶ **assurances?** Although **the Six Country Concept contains an option for a fuel bank**, it would not ¶ require participants to forswear enrichment and reprocessing. ¶ A third set of policy issues may arise in the context of development of the International ¶ Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation. Observers may question what the nonproliferation ¶ benefits of this program are, how it overlaps with other programs such as those under the IAEA, ¶ and what the United States aims to achieve through IFNEC. The new mission statement ¶ emphasizes that members do not give up any rights under the NPT to the peaceful use of nuclear ¶ energy. Policymakers may explore whether the newly envisioned program goes far enough in ¶ encouraging states to refrain from enrichment and reprocessing, a key goal of the original ¶ international GNEP. ¶ Some observers believe that further restrictions on non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT ¶ are untenable in the absence of substantial disarmament commitments by nuclear weapon states. ¶ In particular, a January 4, 2007, Wall Street Journal op-ed by George Shultz, Bill Perry, Henry ¶ Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, entitled “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” noted that **non-nuclearweapon states have grown increasingly skeptical of the sincerity of nuclear weapon states in this** ¶ **regard.** Some observers have asserted that **non-nuclear-weapon states will not tolerate limits on** ¶ NPT Article IV rights (**right to pursue peaceful uses of nuclear energy**) **without progress under** ¶ Article VI of the NPT (**disarmament**). **Amending the NPT is seen by most observers as** ¶ **unattainable**. President Obama called for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons in a speech ¶ in the Czech Republic on April 5, 2009. ¶ The **IAEA experts group report,** INFCIRC/640, **did point to the political usefulness of achieving a** ¶ **ban on producing fissile material for nuclear weapons** **(known as fissile material production** ¶ **cutoff treaty**, or **FMCT**) **to provide more balance between the obligations of nuclear and nonnuclear-weapon states**. Obama Administration officials have indicated that they will pursue ¶ negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty that includes verification provisions. Ultimately, ¶ any such treaty would require Senate advice and consent to ratification.

**Combined FMCT and fuel bank solves Iran prolif**

**Ackerman 09** (Gary is part of the Presidential Task Force on Iranian Proliferation, Regional Security, and U.S. Policy, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “Preventing a Cascade of Instability: U.S. Engagement to Check Iranian Nuclear Progress,” March, p. 7)

At the same time that it steps up pressure on Iran, the  United States should clarify and expand on its offers to  address various concerns Iran has raised. To respond  to Iranian worries about ensuring access to fuel for its  civilian nuclear power plant if it gave up enrichment,  the **Obama** administration **should** follow through on  its announced intention to **bring to fruition the inter-national** nuclear **fuel bank**, to which the United States  has pledged $50 million. **In parallel, the administration should** follow through on the U.S. commitment to  **negotiate a fissile material cutoff treaty.** While Iran may  not think these measures are much as incentives, they  **provide a way to use the Iran crisis as an opportunity to  shore up** parts of **the global nonproliferation regime**.  And **if the international community sees the proposals on the table as effectively addressing Iran’s concerns,  Iran is** more **likely to accept the deal, because Iran does  not want to be isolated. To the extent that nonprolif-  eration efforts are global in scope, Iran is more likely to  accept their vigorous application to Iran as well.**

**Iranian nuclearization sparks global prolif guaranteeing miscalc and nuclear war**

**Ackerman 09** (Gary is part of the Presidential Task Force on Iranian Proliferation, Regional Security, and U.S. Policy, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “Preventing a Cascade of Instability: U.S. Engagement to Check Iranian Nuclear Progress,” March, p. 2)

**If Iran “gets away**” at low cost **with** years of **safeguards violations** and defiance of UN Security Council resolutions, **nonproliferation norms** likely **will** further **erode** across the globe. **Other countries may** consider  **tak**ing **the same path**, especially if Iran’s programs gain legitimacy. If the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is seen as fraying, it may be difficult to make progress on supplementary means to shore up the nonproliferation regime. **The greater the number of countries with nuclear weapons, the higher the risk that misperception and miscalculation could lead to a nuclear confrontation**, with horrible consequences. In the Middle East, those who see themselves as regional powers may want nuclear capabilities matching those in Iran—including enrichment or reprocessing facil- ities—for both strategic and prestige-related reasons. To be sure, Middle East states would need many years to build an indigenous nuclear infrastructure, but **the pursuit of** a broad range of **nuclear capabilities could be destabilizing by creating the impression that** the military **nuclearization** of the region **is inevitable**.

**Iran nuclearization wrecks Middle East stability- the region is at the tipping point**

**USIP ‘12**

[United States Institute of Peace. <http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2012/dec/13/us-intelligence-iran-key-future-mideast-stability-0> ETB]

**THE MIDDLE EAST: AT A TIPPING POINT**¶The future of the Middle East hinges primarily on political developmentsin the region. **If** the Islamic Republic maintains power in **Iran and is able to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East will face a highly unstable future.** The collapse of the House of Saud could wreak havoc on the region’s economy, and the emergence of a radical Islamist government in Egypt could exacerbate regional tensions on a variety of fronts. Fragmentation along ethnic and religious lines in Iraq and Syria could lead to an unraveling of current borders. On the other hand, the emergence of moderate, democratic governments in these countries, or a breakthrough agreement to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, could have enormously positive consequences…¶ ¶ Resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would have dramatic consequences for the region over the next two decades. For Israel, a permanent resolution to the conflict could open the door to regional relationships unthinkable today. The end of Palestinian conflict would provide a strategic setback to Iran and its resistance camp and over time undermine public support for militant groups such as Hizballah and Hamas. Without some sort of resolution, Israel would be increasingly absorbed with trying to control a burgeoning Palestinian population with limited political rights and a restive Gaza next door…¶ ¶ How will Iran project regional power?¶ Iran’s influence is linked to its nuclear aspirations. A number of our interlocutors believe that Iran will stop short of developing a nuclear weapon— but will retain the ability to develop such a weapon. In this scenario, **a breakdown of the nonprolif**eration **system would be inevitable, with Saudi Arabia obtaining nuclear weapons** **or capabilities from Pakistan**. **Turkey** **might** react to a nuclear Iran by **seek**ing **its own nuclear capability** or relying instead on the NATO defensive shield. **The UAE, Egypt, and** possibly **Jordan** almost certainly **would begin** **nuclear programs** in the energy field as hedges that enabled them to go forward if Iran, Saudi Arabia, or others in the region became overt nuclear powers. If this occurred, **the region would be in constant crisis**. **Sunni-Shia and Arab-Persian antagonisms would increase, spilling over to create far-reaching instability** outside the region.

**Impact’s global nuclear and biological war**

**Blake 11**

(Heidi Blake, WikiLeaks: tension in the Middle East and Asia has 'direct potential' to lead to nuclear war, The Telegraph, Feb 2, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8298427/WikiLeaks-tension-in-the-Middle-East-and-Asia-has-direct-potential-to-lead-to-nuclear-war.html)

**Tension in the Middle Eas**t and Asia **has given rise to an escalating** atomic **arms** and missiles **race** **which has “the** direct **potential to lead to nuclear war**,” leaked **diplomatic documents disclose. Rogue states are also increasing their efforts to secure chemical and biological weapons**, and the means to deploy them, **leaving billions** in the world's most densely populated area **at risk of a devastating strike,** the documents show. **States** such as North Korea, Syria and Iran **are developing long-range missiles capable of hitting targets outside the region**, records of **top-level security briefings** obtained by WikiLeaks **show**. Long-running hostilities between India and Pakistan – which both have nuclear weapons capabilities – are at the root of fears of a nuclear conflict in the region. A classified Pentagon study estimated in 2002 that a nuclear war between the two countries could result in 12 million deaths. Secret records of a US security briefing at an international non-proliferation summit in 2008 stated that “a nuclear and missile arms race [in South Asia] has the direct potential to lead to nuclear war in the world's most densely populated area and a region of increasing global economic significance”. The same briefing gave warning that **development of cruise and ballistic missiles in the Middle East** and Asia **could enable rogue states to fire weapons of mass destruction into neighbouring regions**. The leaked documents also disclose alarming details of the chemical and biological weapons programmes being pursued by rogue states such as Syria and North Korea. Syria - which backs the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah – is believed to be developing chemical weapons using the lethal nerve agents sarin and VX, which shut down the nervous system in under a minute if inhaled or absorbed through the skin.

**Ending naval HEU solves- allows the FMCT to cover existing HEU stocks and leads to stockpile reductions. US conversion is feasible and provides a global leadership model.**

**Zhang ‘5**

[Hui Zhang , Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. “Preventing Nuclear Terrorism:

Reducing the Danger of Highly Enriched Uranium.” ETB]

**There have been some thefts of Russian HEU naval fuel. While such danger has been reduced recently by the** ¶ **U.S.-Russian cooperative MPC&A program, conversion of the world’s nuclear navies to LEU is important to** ¶ **nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament, and to reduce the opportunities for terrorists to acquire HEU.** ¶ First**, ending the production and use of HEU for naval will fix the loophole of existing** NPT **safeguards.** ¶ Paragraph 14 of INFCIRC/153, the NPT model safeguards agreement, allows states to withdraw nuclear ¶ material from international safeguards for non-explosive military purposes, including HEU for use in ¶ military reactor fuel. **It would be very difficult to verify that the HEU for naval were not being diverted to** ¶ **make nuclear weapons.** Although only five nuclear weapon state currently have nuclear-powered vessels over the years several non-nuclear weapon states (including Canada and Brazil) have indicated an interest in ¶ also acquiring nuclear submarines. The potential proliferation impact of nuclear submarines has been an ¶ issue of great concern for decades and various approaches to deal with it have been proposed.28 Second, ¶ **allowing production and use of HEU for non-explosive military purposes would leave another loophole for** ¶ **FMCT treaty**. As currently envisioned, the FMCT would permit the continued production of HEU for use in ¶ naval reactors. Thus, **countries could** produce or **acquire HEU and remove it from** international **safeguards** ¶ **under pretext that it was to be used in naval reactor fuel.** However**, they could** then **use that material to make** ¶ **nuclear weapon. It would be impossible to verify** in a timely manner **that none of this HEU was going to** ¶ **weapons use.** Finally, **as long as HEU is used as a naval reactor fuel, large stocks of the material will be** ¶ **reserved for such a use, as the U.S. does** now**. Such** large **stockpiles** of fissile materials could **create a** ¶ **potential for "breakout" from arms reduction obligations**. ¶ **It is necessary to** take an effort for **convert**ing **naval reactors** or designing future reactors **with LEU**. At least ¶ China’s and some of France's nuclear submarines already use LEU. During the transition to LEU fuel, the ¶ U.S., Russia and British naval reactors designed to use HEU could be fueled from excess nuclear weapons. ¶ **The U.S. should provide leadership by** seriously investigating the potential for **using** new **LEU fuels for** ¶ **naval reactors.** In fact, in 1994, the U.S. Congress asked the Navy for a study of the feasibility of fueling U.S. ¶ naval reactors with LEU. However, the Director of the Office of Naval Propulsion responded that “the use of ¶ LEU for cores in the U.S. nuclear powered warships offers no technical advantage to the Navy.”29 Some ¶ **independent** discussions and **analysis**, however, **demonstrated the potential of such a conversion**.30 Another ¶ focus should be on converting Russian ice-breaker reactors to LEU. Russia currently operates seven nuclearpowered icebreakers and cargo ships. These vessels are powered by KLT-40 reactors. This reactor type uses ¶ 90% HEU, requires refueling every 3–5 years, and has a thermal power of 135 MWt. Preliminary ¶ calculations indicate that the Russian ice-breaker KLT-40 reactors can be fueled with LEU without ¶ decreasing the lifetime of the core.31

**US action is key- sets a norm for other countries**

**Pandey ‘12**

[Ms¶ Hina Pandey¶ is a¶ ¶ Research Associate at the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi. “The Fissile Missile Cutoff Treaty: A Debate In Perpetuity.” AIR POWER¶ Journal Vol. 7 No. 2, SUMMER 2012 (April-June¶ ). ETB]

**In international politics, the behaviour of the big powers matters**. It matters not because it may or may not transcend into a stringent foreign policy action, but because it could be useful in anticipating a probable scenario that might emerge in the due course of time. **The behaviour of the**¶ **U**nited **S**tates in **this respect matters, as it could be** interpreted as **a way of** ¶ **implicit norm setting for the near future, which the other states might be**¶ **expected to abide by.**

**Plan is key to make verification *effective***

**von Hippel ‘12**

[Frank von Hippel, co-chair, International Panel on Fissile Materials, Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University. “Preventing Nuclear-explosive Terrorism by Eliminating Fissile Material: A Progress Report.” ETB]

The U.S. fabricates an average of about 2 tons of weapon-grade uranium into naval fuel per year and has established a reserve of 130 tons of weapon-grade uranium for future naval-reactor use. **Although naval fuel cycle facilities are more secure than research reactors, thefts of HEU have occurred. It would be desirable to shift to LEU-fueled reactors.** Also, **if much lower levels of nuclear weaponry can be achieved, large stocks of HEU justified by the future needs of naval reactors** would **raise concerns about breakout.**¶ In 1994, the U.S. Congress required the U.S. Navy to study the possibility of moving to LEU-fuel. The report from the Director of Naval Nuclear Propulsion argued that the costs would be high and the benefits insignificant. In 2008, the Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report on the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 2009, stated that: ¶ “The committee directs the Office of Naval Reactors to review carefully options for using low enriched uranium fuel in new or modified reactor plants for surface ships and submarines.”¶ The Office has ignored this language. As of 2012, the design of a new aircraft propulsion reactor was about 96 percent complete and the design of the reactor for a new ballistic-missile submarine was launched in fiscal year 2012. Both designs are HEU fueled. The HEU-fueled Virginia-class attack submarine will be in production for at least another decade. ¶ Nevertheless**, it would be desirable to continue the effort to establish the use of low-enriched uranium as a norm for naval** as well as other **reactors**. **If,** in the future, **the production of HEU for weapons is banned but production for naval fuel is not by a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, one of the most difficult verification challenges will be difficult to detect governmental diversion of HEU from naval fuel cycles.**

**US will ratify- bipart support for verifiable FMCT**

**Reif 2/11/**13

[Kingston Reif is the Director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, where his work focuses on arms control, nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear weapons, and preventing nuclear terrorism. <http://armscontrolcenter.org/publications/factsheets/071509_factsheet_fmct/> ETB]

**Within the U**nited **S**tates, **bipartisan support exists for a verifiable FMCT. Both the bipartisan** **C**ongressional **C**ommission on the **S**trategic **P**osture of the United States **and the C**ouncil on **F**oreign **R**elations **Task Force** on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy **endorsed a verifiable treaty** that ends the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. In a June 3, 2009 Senate floor statement, Senator **McCain** again **endorsed a FMCT.**

### Plan

**The United States Navy should acquire, through advance appropriations, low-enriched-uranium fueled nuclear reactors for use on commissioned nuclear powered naval vessels and planned acquisitions of nuclear powered naval vessels.**

### Solvency

**Retrofitting the fleet to LEU is feasible, solves operational challenges, and complies with non-use norms**

**Harvey ‘10**

[Cole J. Harvey, Research Associate at Monterey Institute of International Studies. http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/expanding-nuclear-propulsion-challenges/ ETB]

Since current U.S. submarine designs utilize weapons-grade HEU to pack the maximum amount of uranium-235 into the smallest volume, the Director of the Office of Naval Nuclear Propulsion wrote in **a 1995 report** to Congress that a shift to 20% enriched uranium could only be achieved by either a) maintaining the size of the reactor and therefore decreasing the amount of uranium-235 available for fission, or b) increasing the size of the reactor. The report **stated** that the smaller quantities of uranium-235 present in the first case would require more frequent refueling, reducing the life of a load of fuel from 33 years for a Virgina-class submarine to 7.5 years. **A Nimitz-class aircraft carrier's reactor would last** only **10**.4 **years** instead of 45.[29] Refueling a nuclear submarine is a major interruption in the vessel's operational life; in the U.S. case refueling takes the submarine out of service for approximately two years.[30] **However**, **the** 1995 **study assumed no changes to fuel design that could extract more energy from LEU fuel and thus postpone refuelin**g.[31]¶ **French nuclear vessels are able to extract more energy from LEU than are U.S. vessels by taking advantage of a more LEU-efficient fuel design**. **The French navy uses a uranium-dioxide composite embedded in a zirconium alloy grid, an arrangement known as "caramel" fuel**. **Caramel fuel increases the efficiency of the burn-up of uranium-235 so that lower enrichment levels and/or smaller reactor volumes can be employed with a greater energy yield.** Studies have shown that a design in which small spheres of uranium dioxide are embedded in a zirconium matrix can boost the efficiency of the fission reaction even further.[32]¶ **Using this information,** and basing their findings on a 1990 MIT nuclear engineering thesis by Thomas Ippolito Jr., Chunyan **Ma** **and** Frank **von Hippel estimate that a submarine reactor utilizing 20-percent** **enriched** caramel **fuel could have a core life of 33 years** **at a 130 megawatt output with a height of 1.7 meters and a diameter of 1.4 meters**. The size of the reactor compartment of Virginia-class submarines is classified, but **such a reactor could easily fit in the** similarly-sized predecessor to the **Virginia**, the Los Angeles-class submarine.[33] Ma and von Hippel's analysis suggests that **the U.S. Navy could retrofit its fleet to achieve the flexibility afforded by** the present **HEU** cores **while** still **complying with a**n international **norm against the use of HEU.**

**No disads:**

**Nuke sub funding just passed**

**The Day 3/22**

<http://www.theday.com/article/20130321/NWS09/130329923/1017> ETB

Courtney pointed out that **a second submarine** in 2014 initially was removed from this year's budget plan but **was reinstated by the** House **Armed Services Committee**, of which he is a member.¶ **The** **resolution fully funds the** $564.9 million projected **cost** for developing a design **to replace** the current **Ohio-class subs** produced at EB. **It also allows the Navy to begin** planning for **its next** round **of submarine purchases**, **rather than delaying procurement plans for a year**, and directs the military to include 10 Virginia-class submarines in its next multi-year contract.¶ **A previous budget proposal had capped the purchase of Virginia-class submarines at nine.**¶ "**This bill extends the Navy's two-per-year submarine purchases** and lays the groundwork for multi-year authority in the next block of Virginia-class submarines **and the development of (the) next strategic** deterrent **submarine**," EB official Poitras said.

**Funding for propulsion reactors now**

**UPI 2/11**/13

[http://www.upi.com/Business\_News/Security-Industry/2013/02/11/Navy-funds-nuclear-submarine-work/UPI-46491360611942/ ETB]

**Babcock and** **Wilcox** Nuclear Operations Group Inc. **has received two U.S. Naval Reactors Program contracts** relating to Virginia class submarines.¶ The two awards are worth a total of $36 million.¶ "B&W is pleased to continue providing the U.S. Naval Reactors Program with products and services through these two new contracts," said Peyton S. Baker, president of B&W NOG.¶ "The role that B&W's unique capabilities play in preparing and supporting the men and women who serve aboard the U.S. Navy's nuclear fleet is a source of immense pride for our workforce."¶ **The first** contract **is for the assembly of nuclear propulsion components** for Virginia Class submarines. It is for a period of four years. Work will be conducted at company facilities in Lynchburg, Va.¶ B&W NOG said the contract is worth $32 million but supplied no specifics on the propulsion components to be supplied.¶ **The second contract**, worth $4 million, **enables the company to procure long-lead materials for the manufacture of the nuclear propulsion components** to be manufactured for the Virginia class submarines.

**SMR funding now**

**The New Fuelist 3/12**

<http://www.newfuelist.com/link/~7kwn#.UVSQmhzvv4Y> ETB

**The** US Department of Energy (**DOE) issued a new** funding opportunity announcement (DE-**FOA**-0000800) **for** up to $**266 million to help** US industry design and certify innovative small modular nuclear reactors (**SMRs**)—defined for this FOA as reactor units with nominal output of 300 megawatts electric (MWe) or less that are able to be factory fabricated and transported to the site for assembly of components and operation. With a 50% cost-share, total funding for the selected project will be around $462 million.

**Obama pushing SMRs**

**Midwest Energy News 3/27**

<http://www.midwestenergynews.com/2013/03/27/renewed-interest-and-criticism-for-small-modular-reactors/> ETB

**A** new, **smaller** breed of **nuclear reactor** that **is being promoted by** the **Obama** administration may offer some advantages over the larger reactors that now provide about 20 percent of the United States’ electricity, but critics say they also have the same drawbacks.

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**Terrorists have capacity to build gun-type nukes—only barrier is getting HEU**

**Ferguson 6**

[Charles D., PhD Boston University, fellow of science and technology at CFR, professor at School of Foreign Service at Georgetown, lecturer at Johns Hopkins, "Preventing Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism", Council On Foreign Relations, March]

**Should terrorists obtain HEU or plutonium, they** then **confront the hurdle of**¶ **constructing a bomb**. The **Manhattan Project designed and built the two basic types of**¶ **nuclear bombs**: **a gun-type device and an implosion-type device**. Most of the intellectual ¶ effort went into developing the **implosion-type bomb,** which is much more technically¶ challenging than a gun-type bomb. The **gun-type bomb simply shoots one lump of highly** ¶ **enriched uranium into another to start an explosive chain reaction. This type of nuclear** ¶ **weapon can only use HEU to produce a high-yield explosion**. Because the **Manhattan** ¶ **Project scientists were so confident that this bomb would work, they did not conduct a** ¶ **full-scale nuclear test.** The gun-type bomb was first used against Hiroshima Although **a gun-type bomb is relatively easy to construct,** it requires fairly large ¶ amounts of HEU to explode. Terrorists would need about fifty kilograms (110 pounds) of ¶ weapons-grade HEU to make a Hiroshima-yield bomb. **By using special techniques,** ¶ **terrorists could try to reduce the fissile material requirements**. Still, acquiring enough ¶ **HEU remains the most significant barrier to building a gun-type device**. ¶ In contrast to a gun-type bomb, **an implosion-type bomb can use either plutonium** ¶ **or HEU. This bomb rapidly implodes, or squeezes, the fissile material into a chainreacting mass that then explodes**. Fortunately, substantial technical barriers hamper ¶ terrorist efforts to build an implosion device. For instance, machining and assembling the ¶ parts for an implosion device are more difficult than making and fitting together the¶ components of a gun device. Moreover, triggering the implosion demands greater ¶ technical skills and specialized equipment than activating the assembly of a gun-type ¶ bomb. However, **an implosion-type bomb offers the advantage of requiring about half the** ¶ **HEU**, approximately twenty-five kilograms (fifty-five pounds) **of weapons-grade** ¶ **uranium, than that needed for a gun-type bomb**. Also, **compared to HEU, less plutonium,** ¶ **about four to ten kilograms** (nine to twenty-two pounds), **is needed to make an implosion** ¶ **bomb**. ¶ **Terrorists would be aided by the fact that they would not need to build weapons** ¶ **that would meet military requirements.** Professional militaries demand well-tested¶ weapons with reliable explosive yields. **Terrorists**, in contrast, **need a weapon that will** ¶ **produce any appreciable damaging yield**. A **crude** HEU gun-type bomb has a high ¶ probability of producing a massively destructive explosion.11 **Moreover, skilled** terrorists ¶ could **make** this **type of weapon** without state assistance.12 The **truly** onerous barrier **for** ¶ **nuclear terrorists** isacquiring **enough** HEU**.**¶

## 2AC

### FMCT

**Iran prolif increases risk of miscalculated nuke war which no defense assumes**

**Goldberg ‘12**

Jeffrey Goldberg 1-23, Bloomberg View columnist and a national correspondent for the Atlantic, January 23, 2012, “How Iran Could Trigger Accidental Armageddon,” online: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-24/how-iran-may-trigger-accidental-armageddon-commentary-by-jeffrey-goldberg.html

One of the arguments often made in favor of bombing Iran to cripple its nuclear program is this: The mullahs in Tehran are madmen who believe it is their consecrated duty to destroy the perfidious Zionist entity (which is to say, Israel) and so are building nuclear weapons to launch at Tel Aviv at the first favorable moment.

It’s beyond a doubt that the Iranian regime would like to bring about the destruction of Israel. However, the mullahs are also cynics and men determined, more than anything, to maintain their hold on absolute power.

Which is why it’s unlikely that they would immediately use their new weapons against Israel. An outright attack on Israel - - a country possessing as many as 200 nuclear weapons and sophisticated delivery systems -- would lead to the obliteration of Tehran, the deaths of millions, and the destruction of Iran’s military and industrial capabilities.

**The mullahs know this. But** here’s the problem: **It may not matter**. The threat of a deliberate nuclear attack **pales in comparison** with the chance that a nuclear-armed Iran could **accidentally trigger a cataclysmic exchange with Israel**.

Warp-Speed Escalation

The **experts** who study this depressing issue seem to **agree** that a Middle East in which Iran has four or five nuclear weapons would be **dangerously unstable** and prone to **warp-speed escalation**.

Here’s one possible scenario for the not-so-distant future: Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese proxy, launches a cross-border attack into Israel, or kills a sizable number of Israeli civilians with conventional rockets. Israel responds by invading southern Lebanon, and promises, as it has in the past, to destroy Hezbollah. Iran, coming to the defense of its proxy, warns Israel to cease hostilities, and leaves open the question of what it will do if Israel refuses to heed its demand.

Dennis Ross, who until recently served as President Barack Obama’s Iran point man on the National Security Council, notes Hezbollah’s political importance to Tehran. “The only place to which the Iranian government successfully exported the revolution is to Hezbollah in Lebanon,” Ross told me. “If it looks as if the Israelis are going to destroy Hezbollah, you can see Iran threatening Israel, and they begin to change the readiness of their forces. This could set in motion a chain of events that would be like ‘Guns of August’ on steroids.”

Imagine that Israel detects a mobilization of Iran’s rocket force or the sudden movement of mobile missile launchers. Does Israel assume the Iranians are bluffing, or that they are not? And would Israel have time to figure this out? Or imagine the opposite: Might Iran, which will have no second-strike capability for many years -- that is, no reserve of nuclear weapons to respond with in an exchange -- feel compelled to attack Israel first, knowing that it has no second chance?

Bruce Blair, the co-founder of the nuclear disarmament group Global Zero and an expert on nuclear strategy, told me that in a sudden crisis Iran and Israel might each **abandon traditional peacetime safeguards**, making an accidental exchange more likely.

“A confrontation that brings the two nuclear-armed states to a boiling point would likely lead them to raise the launch- readiness of their forces -- mating warheads to delivery vehicles and preparing to fire on short notice,” he said. “Missiles put on hair-trigger alert also obviously increase the danger of their launch and release on false warning of attack -- false indications that the other side has initiated an attack.”

Then comes the problem of **misinterpreted data**, Blair said. “Intelligence failures in the midst of a nuclear crisis could readily lead to a false impression that the other side has decided to attack, and induce the other side to launch a preemptive strike.”

‘Cognitive Bias’

Blair notes that in a crisis it isn’t irrational to expect an attack, and this expectation makes it more likely that a leader will read the worst into incomplete intelligence. “This predisposition is a **cognitive bias** that increases the danger that one side will **jump the gun** on the basis of incorrect information,” he said.

Ross told me that Iran’s relative proximity to Israel and the **total absence of ties** between the two countries -- the thought of Iran agreeing to maintain a hot line with a country whose existence it doesn’t recognize is far-fetched -- make the situation **even more hazardous.** “This is not the Cold War,” he said. “In this situation we don’t have **any communications channels**. Iran and Israel have zero communications. And even in the Cold War we nearly had a nuclear war. We were much closer than we realized.”

The answer to this predicament is to **deny Iran nuclear weapons**, but not through an attack on its nuclear facilities, at least not now. “The liabilities of preemptive attack on Iran’s nuclear program vastly outweigh the benefits,” Blair said. “But certainly Iran’s program must be stopped before it reaches fruition with a nuclear weapons delivery capability.”

Ross argues that the Obama administration’s approach -- the imposition of **steadily more debilitating sanctions** -- may yet work. There’s a chance, albeit slim, that he may be right: New sanctions are just beginning to bite and, combined with an intensified cyberwar and sabotage efforts, they might prove **costly enough to deter Tehran.**

**Likelihood of theft is rising- Chechens want nukes**

**Bunn et al ‘12**

(Matthew Bunn is an Associate Professor of Public Policy at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy ¶ School of Government. Before coming to Harvard, Bunn served as an adviser to the White ¶ House Office of Science and Technology Policy, as a study director at the National Academy of ¶ Sciences, and as editor of Arms Control Today. He is the author or co-author of some 20 books or ¶ major technical reports, and over a hundred articles in publications ranging from Science to The ¶ Washington Post. He is an elected Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of ¶ Science; a recipient of the American Physical Society’s Joseph A. Burton Forum Award and the ¶ recipient of the Hans A. Bethe Award from the Federation of American Scientists. ¶ Eben Harrell is a Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center ¶ for Science and International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School. Harrell worked for four years ¶ in the London bureau of TIME magazine prior to joining HKS. He has also written for The ¶ Economist and Sports Illustrated and worked on the staff of The Scotsman newspaper in Edinburgh ¶ and The Aspen Times in Colorado. ¶ Martin B. Malin is the Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer ¶ Center. Prior to coming to the Kennedy School, Malin taught courses on international relations, ¶ American foreign policy, and Middle East politics at Columbia University, Barnard College, and ¶ Rutgers University. He also served as Director of the Program on Science and Global Security at ¶ the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. “Progress on ¶ Securing ¶ Nuclear Weapons ¶ and Materials: ¶ The Four-Year ¶ Effort and ¶ Beyond” March 2012 <http://www.nuclearsummit.org/files/security_progress_report_2_482949862.pdf>, TSW)

**Russia has the world’s largest stockpiles of** **nuclear weapons, plutonium, and** **HEU**, **located in the** ¶ **world’s largest number of buildings and bunkers**. Having recovered from the chaos following the ¶ collapse of the Soviet Union, **Russia put in place dramatically improved security and accounting** ¶ **measures for its nuclear weapons a**nd materials during the past two decades, with billions of dollars ¶ of U.S. help. **But** **significant weaknesses remain in some areas, and its security measures face substantial threats** from both corrupted insiders and hostile outsiders. As just one indicator of the problem ¶ of corruption in Russia, in 2010 Major-General Victor Gaidukov, commander of a nuclear weapon ¶ storage site, was relieved of his duties for false income reports, and accused of corruption and theft of ¶ state funds; press reports suggest that Gaidukov’s activities included stealing funds from U.S. efforts ¶ to beef up nuclear safety and security.22 **Terrorists in Russia have also shown the ability to organize and execute large scale overt attacks such** ¶ **as the Moscow theater siege in 2002 and the Beslan school massacre of 2004**. **After those attacks, the** ¶ **Russian government largely defeated Chechen separatist groups,** **and killed Shamil Basayev, who had** ¶ **claimed credit for both the Moscow** theater and Beslan attacks; Chechen terrorists’ ability to organize ¶ large-scale attacks in Russia was substantially reduced. During the period of the four-year nuclear ¶ security effort, however, **the terrorist threat in Russia has been rising again**—**the movement has** ¶ **regrouped and spread,** carrying out dozens of deadly attacks a year, with a new goal of establishing an ¶ Islamic caliphate throughout the North Caucasus.23

**Chechens will use nuclear terrorism against Moscow**

**DOWLE 2005** (Mark, Teaches at the Graduate School of Journalism at Berkeley, California Monthly, September, http://www.alumni.berkeley.edu/Alumni/Cal\_Monthly/September\_2005/COVER\_STORY-\_Berkeleys\_Big\_Bang\_Project\_.asp)

One thing was stressed. **Moscow is a feasible target for a terrorist nuclear attack**. It is the capital of a fractious nation with a ruthless interior enemy, the **Chechens**, who **have** more than once proven their **willingness** to kill large numbers of Russian civilians. The country has had difficulty containing its own fissionable material. And **a domestic terrorist in possession of a nuclear device would not have to cross an international border** to reach Moscow. Moreover, **Chechen rebels are** mostly Muslim and **aligned with al-Qaeda, which has** expressed **interest in** obtaining **a nuclear device**

**Nuclear terrorism against Russia would cause nuclear retaliation against the U.S.**

**DOWLE 2005** (Mark, Teaches at the Graduate School of Journalism at Berkeley, California Monthly, September, http://www.alumni.berkeley.edu/Alumni/Cal\_Monthly/September\_2005/COVER\_STORY-\_Berkeleys\_Big\_Bang\_Project\_.asp)

In the scenario presented by the BBP team, Vladimir Putin survives the attack. He is traveling in southern Russia when it happens and returns to find his entire military high command and most of his key ministries annihilated. He immediately institutes martial law, although most of the officers prepared to administer it are gone. In public briefings, Putin struggles to persuade his country and the world that there remains a chain of command, although that’s unlikely to be the case. He is by all indications a confident, thoughtful, and level-headed leader, unlikely to lash out. But many **officers in the Russian m**ilitary, and more than a few powerful civilians, **harbor deep**, residual post-Cold War **distrust of America**. More than a few surviving Russian military leaders still believe that the August 2000 sinking of the Kursk nuclear submarine in the Barents Sea somehow involved the United States Navy. **Such** **people** **could be** persuaded with relative ease **that America was complicit in a nuclear attack**, which almost certainly will surface as a conspiracy theory in Russia and elsewhere in the world. If we didn’t set it off, we knew it was coming and could have stopped it. Adding fuel to the scenario of a possible Russian reprisal against the United States has been the recent decline of relations between the two nations as the Bush administration has castigated Putin for human rights violations. Russia, in turn, has leaned more heavily toward China in trade and the two nations have been conducting joint military operations. Putin will be pressed to subdue suspicious military leaders, many of them in distant reaches of the country and in virtual possession of loaded nukes. **If Putin were killed** by the Big Bang, a question one member of the BBP posits, **the** post-attack **likelihood of** political instability and **nuclear retaliation becomes even greater**. One goal of the BBP team was to search for ways to quickly convince surviving Russian leaders that they would have no grounds for retaliating against the West. With that danger in mind, Harold Smith made a strategic decision. He brought two well-known Russians into the project’s deliberations—Nobel Laureate Zhores Alferov and Alexei Arbatov, a popular member of the Duma and, according to Smith, “the smartest man in Russia.” Their presence was meant to counteract a Russian general from waving the Big Bang report as “proof’’ that the U.S. Department of Defense had foreknowledge of just such an attack. If they are not too near ground zero when the Big Bang occurs, one or both of them could assure their fellow citizens that the BBP report is what it is—the product of an essential, collaborative exercise in theoretical, long-range, post-terrorist planning, in which they participated. The Berkeley team also stressed concerns about profiteering from collapsed markets, **exploiting** “holes of **ungoverned spaces’’ by terrorist** **organizations** seeking sanctuary, **start**ing other **wars between** longtime **adversaries**, or taking advantage of Russia’s weakened international position.

### States

#### Perm- do both

#### Perm- do the counterplan

#### No solvency- states have no authority over ships

**Jordan 7**
(Michael, shares name with second best basketball player in history, Lawyer and partner at Gardere Wynne Sewell, LLP, “Texas MDL Judge: Ship Docked At Navy Yard Part Of ‘Federal Enclave”” http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/MealeysLitigationReport\_TexasMDLJudge\_16may07.pdf)

The Texas Asbestos Multi-District Litigation (MDL)1¶ **Judge**, Hon. Mark **Davidson, recently ruled that a** ¶ **Navy ship docked at a Navy Shipyard is within a** ¶ **“federal enclave**.”2¶ Plaintiffs with naval asbestos exposure specifically ¶ disclaim recovery for any injury arising as a result of ¶ working within a federal enclave. This disclaimer allows a state court to retain jurisdiction and precludes ¶ removal to the federal MDL. The U.S. Const. Art. ¶ I, Sec. 8, Clause 17 states that the Congress has exclusive legislative power over “all Places purchased by ¶ the consent of the legislature of the State in which the ¶ same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, ¶ Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.” ¶ Courts have interpreted this clause to grant federal jurisdiction over federally-owned lands including ¶ military bases, naval shipyards, certain chemical and ¶ power plants, and federal buildings. Accordingly, ¶ disclaimer of exposure at a federal enclave may be a ¶ requisite for a state court’s jurisdiction over the cause ¶ of action.

**50 state fiat is a voting issue- steals the 1ac while allowing the neg to skit around the lit base about fragmented implementation which is key to 2ac solvency deficits and offense, which makes debate impossible for the aff and kills clash- no solvency advocate in the context of nuclear subs proves it is unpredictable - also no rational decision maker could pick between the Navy and the States acting.**

**Actor funding pics are a voting issue- steals the aff with no recourse because they could have any actor fund- lack of predictability prevents 2ac offense and solvency deficits and kills clash.**

#### DOD procurement professionals will ignore the CP–only fiat overcomes bureaucratic reluctance

Warwick 8

W.M. Warwick, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Dept. of Energy, 2008, Purchasing Renewable Power for the FederalSector: Basics, Barriers, and Possible Options, www.pnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical\_reports/PNNL-16485.pdf

**To date, DOD has not used** 10 USC 2394 or 10 USC 2922 (a) **to enter into long-term power purchase agreements for renewable power**. **The lack of precedent is a major reason why this authority has not been used**. **Committing an agency to longer term contracts is risky and thus** far, **procurement professionals have been reluctant to do so**. Their reasons are many and varied. One of **the major stumbling blocks is inherent to the** “ideal” renewable power **contract model**. As discussed, **the best terms appear to be available by entering into a contract with a developer needing a power purchase contract to obtain construction financing**. In other words, **the contract is a promise to provide power from an as yet unbuilt project**. There are limits to how far in advance the government can enter into contracts for future delivery of products and services. This also raises questions about how to pick a “winner.” To comply with Federal procurement requirements (10 USC 2922 (a) and 41 USC 253), the procurement should be competitive, which opens the door to offers from proposers and projects that may not be equal. Unfortunately, most procurement professionals feel (and are) unqualified to assess the merits of such proposals. Similarly, the power supply has to be synchronized with the current supplier’s contract termination. What happens if the new provider’s project isn’t operational when the current contract ends? Finally, what is the government cost estimate for a project like this? That requires a projection of future power costs, which does not exist and would be imperfect if it did. Available projections are not site specific enough to answer this question, and none extend out to the 30 plus years needed for the economic analysis. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) determined that LCC procedures are also inadequate for markets that are as volatile as energy and power markets have been and are likely to be into the future. Similarly, although the renewable power price can be forecasted with some precision, the necessary firming, shaping, and other services cannot. This point can be illustrated using the wind farm example cited previously (Figure 1). Finally, use of 10 USC 2922 (a) requires approval of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef). **This means a contract will need to pass up the chain-of-command within a Service, through the Service Secretary, and then on to the SecDef**. According to an Army general, **decisions for SecDef approval pass through over 20 inboxes before they reach the SecDef. Because energy contracts are often time sensitive** (many price offers expire within a day), **this process may be too unwieldy to be effective.**

**Links to politics**

**Kiely ‘12** [[EUGENE KIELY](http://www.factcheck.org/author/eugene-kiely/), Washington assignment editor USA today, February 17, 2012 Factcheck.org “Did Obama ‘Approve’ Bridge Work for Chinese Firms?” http://www.factcheck.org/2012/02/did-obama-approve-bridge-work-for-chinese-firms/]

Who’s to blame, if that’s the right word, if the project ends up using manufactured steel from China? The National Steel Bridge Alliance blames the state railroad agency. The Alliance for American Manufacturing says the federal Buy American laws have been “weakened with loopholes and various exemptions that make it easier for bureaucrats to purchase foreign-made goods instead of those made in American factories with American workers.” So**,** how did **Obama get blamed** for the decisions by state agencies and for state projects that, in at least one case**, didn’t even use federal funds?** The answer is a textbook lesson in how **information gets distorted** when emails go viral. We looked at the nearly 100 emails we received on this subject and found that Obama wasn’t mentioned at all in the first few emails. Typical of the emails we received shortly after the ABC News report aired was this one from Oct. 11, 2011: “I just got an email regarding Diane Sawyer on ABC TV stating that U. S. Bridges and roads are being built by Chinese firms when the jobs should have gone to Americans. Could this possible be true?” The answer: Yes, it’s true. End of story, right? Wrong. Days later, emails started to appear in our inbox that claimed ABC News reported that Chinese firm were receiving stimulus funds to build U.S. bridges — even though the broadcast news story didn’t mention stimulus funds at all. (The report did include a clip of Obama delivering a speech on the need to rebuild America’s bridges and put Americans to work, but said nothing about the president’s $830 billion stimulus bill.) Still, we received emails such as this one on Nov. 4, 2011, that included this erroneous claim language: “Stimulus money meant to create U.S. jobs went to Chinese firms. Unbelievable….” **It didn’t take long for Obama to be blamed**. That same day — Nov. 4, 2011 — we received an email that made this leap to Obama: “SOME CHINESE COMPANIES WHO ARE BUILDING ‘OUR’ BRIDGES. (3000 JOBS LOST TO THE CHINESE FIRM)…..AND NOW OBAMA WANTS ‘MORE STIMULUS MONEY’…..THIS IS NUTS ! ! ! If this doesn’t make you furious nothing will….” This year, Obama’s name started to surface in the subject line of such critical emails — raising the attack on the president to yet another level and perhaps ensuring the email will be even more widely circulated. Since Jan. 17, we have gotten more than a dozen emails with the subject line, “ABC News on Obama/USA Infrastructure,” often preceded with the word “SHOCKING” in all caps. The emails increasingly contain harsh language about the president. Since Jan. 11, 23 emails carried this added bit of Obama-bashing: “I pray all the unemployed see this and cast their votes accordingly in 2012!” One of those emails — a more recent one from Feb. 8 — contained this additional line: “Tell me again how Obama’s looking out for blue collar guys**. He** cancels pipelines, and **lets Chinese contractors build our bridges…” And so it goes, on and on. All from a news report that blamed state officials — not Obama — for spending taxpayer money** on Chinese firms to build U.S. bridges.

### Politics

#### No link uniqueness- nuke sub funding just passed, Navy is funding propulsion reactors now, DOE just increased SMR funding and Obama is pushing SMRs- that’s the 1ac uniqueness slayers

\*The Day 3/22, UPI 2/11, the New Fuelist 3/12, Midwest Energy News 3/27

#### Plan popular

**King et al 11**

(Marcus King, Associate Director of Research at The George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs LaVar Huntzinger, Thoi Nguyen, “Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S.

Military Installations” <http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear%20Power%20on%20Military%20Installations%20D0023932%20A5.pdf>, SEH)

Recent surveys show that American public opinion has shifted toward¶ nuclear power. In survey results, those who say they favor nuclear¶ energy moved from 49 percent in 1983 to 74 percent in 2010 [24]. In¶ 1984, 35 percent gave a high rating to the safety of nuclear plants;¶ today that number is 66 percent [25].

#### Nuclear popular—their generic links don’t apply

**Covert 12** Adrian is the Editorial Assistant at Gizmodo Magazine, “The US Government Is Banking on Small Nuclear Reactors for Future Energy”, March 12, 2012, http://gizmodo.com/5890394/the-us-government-is-banking-on-small-nuclear-reactors-for-future-energy

**Ever since Fukushima, nuclear power has not been a warmly-received concept** when it comes to energy solutions. But still, **small modular reactors have remained one iteration of nuclear power that people are optimistic about due to their relative safety and manageability**. That's why the US Department of Energy has entered into partnerships with the top SMR makers to help nurture the tiny wonders. According to Ars Technica, the governement is going to offer up land at the Savannah River Nuclear Lab to work on research and build test sites for development. In addition to their size and relative stability, **SMRs are popular because reactors are never opened on site, and are sent back to a central facility for refueling, which eases concerns about security**. Sure they may not generate Gigawatts, but Megawatts aren't so bad either.

#### Approval rating is low now

Vespa 3-22

[Matt, Writer for NewsBusters, “CBS Political Director Now: Obama Shouldn't Agitate GOP; Back in January: 'Go For The Throat,' Mr. President” http://www.newsbusters.org/blogs/matt-vespa/2013/03/22/180-turn-cbs-political-director-says-obama-shouldnt-agitate-gop-said-go-]

What happened in the interim? First, the president and the Democrats lost the sequester battle. Second, polling shows Americans tend to support the substance of Republican economic policies, even as the party label itself is, at present, not popular. This, coupled with the hyperbolic scenarios related to the sequestration cuts, have allowed Republicans to highlight the real pork, such as the studying of duck genitalia, to slam the president lamenting over the closure of White House tours. Indeed, even self-described lefties are starting to lose confidence in Obama. In a recent Washington Post/ABC poll, the president saw liberals lose confidence in him over handling the economy over Republicans by fourteen points! Women’s support of his economic agenda slipped an equally bad twelve points since December. Perhaps Dickerson was part of the liberal crowd that felt the president, fresh off his reelection, has a mandate, but was wholly illusory. Don't look for Dickerson's colleagues in the liberal media to examine this stunning reversal. Doing so would highlight that Obama fatigue is slowly but surely setting in, not just in Washington but in the hinterland. The president won a second term, but he lacks the political capital to set the agenda on his terms. He cannot negotiate from a position of strength because he has none. Dickerson now sees it, and surely others in the media do as well. The question is when will the media start to note openly that the emperor has no clothes.

#### Guns thumps

The Frontrunner 3-26

“Obama to Campaign Across the Country for Gun Measures,” lexis

The Hill (3/26, Sink, 21K) reports President Obama "will hit the road to rally Senate support for new gun controls in coming weeks, seeking to frame upcoming votes on an assault weapons ban and universal background checks as tests of political courage for skittish Democrats." White House spokesman Josh Earnest said on Monday, "I do anticipate that you will see the president using the power of the bully pulpit, as you describe it, by traveling across the country a little bit and talking about some of these issues."

#### Drones thumps

The Hill 3-24

“White House Moves to Let Pentagon take Over CIA armed Drones Sparks Concern,” <http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/policy-and-strategy/290049-white-house-plan-to-let-pentagon-take-over-cia-armed-drones-sparks-concern>

A White House plan to make the administration's armed drone program the sole domain of the Pentagon is creating concern among congressional lawmakers.¶ Senate Intelligence Committee Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) last week said lawmakers have closely monitored the intelligence community’s management of the drone program. She expressed confidence with the CIA’s handling of drone attacks, and questioned if the Defense Department (DOD) would exercise the same restraint with the controversial program.

#### Public popularity is irrelevant

Bernstein 3-28

Jonathan is a Political Scientist and covers politics for the American Prospect, “The Real Reason Public Opinion Doesn’t Work,” <http://plainblogaboutpolitics.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-real-reason-public-opinion-doesnt.html>

At his remarks today touting support for background checks on guns, President Obama said, "Nothing is more powerful than millions of voices calling for change." Actually, since background checks command 90 percent in the polls but lack support from Republicans in Congress, pretty clearly millions of voices calling for change are less powerful than holding a House majority. They're also less powerful than a Senate majority. Or even 41 Senators, who can stop anything they want. A well-funded lobby probably beats millions of voices calling for change, too.¶ Basically, everything is more powerful than millions of voices calling for change.¶ See, the problem here is equating "90 percent in the polls" with "calling for change." Sure, 90 percent of citizens, or registered voters, or whoever it is will answer in the affirmative if they're asked by a pollster about this policy. But that's not at all the same as "calling for change." It's more like...well, it is receiving a call. Not calling.¶ Those people who have been pushing for marriage equality? They were calling for change. And marching for it, demanding it, donating money to get it, running for office to achieve it and supporting candidates who would vote for it, filing lawsuits to make it legal. In many cases, they based their entire political identity around it.¶ Action works. "Public opinion" is barely real; most of the time, on most issues, change the wording of the question and you'll get entirely different answers. At best, "public opinion" as such is passive. And in politics, passive doesn't get results.¶ Action works. Oh, not all the time: sometimes action on one side is met by action on the other side, and on some things there's just going to be a winner and a loser. Sometimes, too, action by some is not enough, or it takes too much time, especially in a political system that is even more biased towards the status quo than most.¶ What's more, it's perfectly understandable why most of us, on most issues, barely have opinions, let alone take action. Action is hard! Action can be painful. Action is risky. Action is unpredictable. We all have plenty of other things to do, after all. For the most part, we only take action when we can't do other things -- when something is so wrong that we just have to do something about it. It's almost impossible to manufacture that artificially...that's why presidential attempts to go over the heads of Congress to the people rarely work. Not because Congress will ignore their constituents. But because a president, no matter how eloquent or popular, isn't going to stir people to action on something just because they happen to agree with him. Meaningful action is too big a commitment for the tiny signal of a presidential exhortation to get it to happen. It usually take something with a much more direct effect on our day to day lives. But if it does happen, look out.¶ So, yeah, Chait is right about the strategy of going over the heads of Congress, and that's the key point to make about all of this from the perspective of what a president should spend time on. But from the point of view of citizens: yes, action can make a difference. And it may not even take millions.

#### Winners win

Marshall and Prins ‘11

Bryan W. MARSHALL AND PRINS 11, Miami University, Department of Political Science AND Brandon C. PRINS, University of Tennessee & Howard H. Baker, Jr. Center for Public Policy, September 2011 “Power or Posturing? Policy Availability and Congressional Inﬂuence on U.S. Presidential Decisions to Use Force”, Presidential Studies Quarterly, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1741-5705.2011.03885.x/pdf, [Stolarski]

Presidents rely heavily on Congress in converting their political capital into real policy success. Policy success not only shapes the reelection prospects of presidents, but it also builds the president’s reputation for political effectiveness and fuels the prospect for subsequent gains in political capital (Light 1982). Moreover, the president’s legislative success in foreign policy is correlated with success on the domestic front. On this point, some have largely disavowed the two-presidencies distinction while others have even argued that foreign policy has become a mere extension of domestic policy (Fleisher et al. 2000; Oldﬁeld and Wildavsky 1989) Presidents implicitly understand that there exists a linkage between their actions in one policy area and their ability to affect another. The use of force is no exception; in promoting and protecting U.S. interests abroad, presidential decisions are made with an eye toward managing political capital at home (Fordham 2002).

#### No impact to econ decline

Miller 2k

(Morris, economist, adjunct professor in the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Administration, consultant on international development issues, former Executive Director and Senior Economist at the World Bank, Winter, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Vol. 25, Iss. 4, “Poverty as a cause of wars?” p. Proquest)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War theyconcluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) **to** an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

#### Econ is resilient

Oliver ‘9

Business columnist for the Star, a Canadian newspaper, “David Olive: Will the economy get worse?,” <http://www.thestar.com/printArticle/598050>, AM

Should we brace for another Great Depression? No. The notion is ludicrous. Conditions will forever be such that the economic disaster that helped define the previous century will never happen again. So why raise the question? Because it has suited the purposes of prominent folks to raise the spectre of a second Great Depression. Stephen Harper has speculated it could happen. Barack Obama resorted to apocalyptic talk in selling his economic stimulus package to the U.S. Congress. And British author Niall Ferguson, promoting his book on the history of money, asserts "there will be blood in the streets" from the ravages dealt by this downturn. Cue the famished masses' assault on a latter-day Bastille or Winter Palace. As it happens, the current economic emergency Obama has described as having no equal since the Great Depression has not yet reached the severity of the recession of 1980-82, when U.S. unemployment reached 11 per cent. The negativism has become so thick that Robert Shiller was prompted to warn against it in a recent New York Times essay. Shiller, recall, is the Yale economist and author of Irrational Exuberance who predicted both the dot-com collapse of the late 1990s and the likely grim outcome of a collapse in the U.S. housing bubble. Shiller worries that the Dirty Thirties spectre "is a cause of the current situation – because the Great Depression serves as a model for our expectations, damping what John Maynard Keynes called our `animal spirits,' reducing consumers' willingness to spend and businesses' willingness to hire and expand. The Depression narrative could easily end up as a self-fulfilling prophecy." Some relevant points, I think: LOOK AT STOCKS Even the prospects of a small-d depression – defined by most economists as a 10 per drop in GDP for several years – are slim. In a recent Wall Street Journal essay, Robert J. Barro, a Harvard economist, described his study of 251 stock-market crashes and 97 depressions in 34 nations dating back to the mid-19th century. He notes that only mild recessions followed the U.S. stock-market collapses of 2000-02 (a 42 per cent plunge) and 1973-74 (49 per cent). The current market's peak-to-trough collapse has been 51 per cent. Barro concludes the probability today of a minor depression is just 20 per cent, and of a major depression, only 2 per cent. LOOK AT JOBS NUMBERS In the Great Depression, GDP collapsed by 33 per cent, the jobless rate was 25 per cent, 8,000 U.S. banks failed, and today's elaborate social safety net of state welfare provisions did not exist. In the current downturn, GDP in Canada shrank by 3.4 per cent in the last quarter of 2008, and in the U.S. by 6.2 per cent. A terrible performance, to be sure. But it would take another 10 consecutive quarters of that rate of decline to lose even the 10 per cent of GDP that qualifies for a small-d depression. Allowing that 1,000 economists laid end to end still wouldn't reach a conclusion, their consensus view is economic recovery will kick in next year, if not the second half of this year. The jobless rate in Canada and the U.S. is 7.2 per cent and 8.1 per cent, respectively. Again, the consensus among experts is that a worst-case scenario for U.S. joblessness is a peak of 11 per cent. There have been no bank failures in Canada. To the contrary, the stability of Canadian banks has lately been acclaimed worldwide. Two of America's largest banks, Citigroup Inc. and Bank of America Corp., are on government life support. But otherwise the rate of collapse of U.S. lenders outside of the big "money centre" banks at the heart of the housing-related financial crisis has been only modestly higher than is usual in recessionary times. LOOK AT INTERVENTIONS In the Great Depression, Herbert Hoover and R.B. Bennett, just prior to the appearance of the Keynesian pump-priming theories that would soon dominate modern economic management, obsessed with balanced budgets, seizing upon precisely the wrong cure. They also moved very slowly to confront a crisis with no precedent. (So did Japan's economic administrators during its so-called "lost decade" of the 1990s.) Most earlier U.S. "panics" were directly tied to abrupt collapses in stock or commodity values not accompanied by the consumer-spending excesses of the Roaring Twenties and greatly exacerbated by a 1930s global trade war. Today, only right-wing dead-enders advance balanced budgets as a balm in this hour of economic emergency. In this downturn, governments from Washington to Ottawa to Beijing have been swift in crafting Keynesian stimulus packages. Given their recent legislative passage – indeed, Harper's stimulus package awaits passage – the beneficial impact of these significant jolts is only beginning to be felt. And, if one believes, as I long have, that this is a financial crisis – the withholding of life-sustaining credit from the economy by a crippled global banking system – and not a crisis with origins on Main Street, then the resolution to that banking failure may trigger a much faster and stronger economic recovery than anyone now imagines. tune out the static It's instructive that there was much talk of another Great Depression during the most painful recession since World War II, that of 1980-82. Indeed, alarmist talk about global systemic collapses has accompanied just about every abrupt unpleasantness, including the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, the Mexican default in 1995, the Asian currency crisis of the late 1990s, financial havoc in Argentina early this decade, and even the failure of U.S. hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in the late 1990s. Modern economic recoveries tend to be swift and unexpected. The nadir of the 1980-82 downturn, in August 1982, kicked off the greatest stock-market and economic boom in history. And no sooner had the dot-com and telecom wreckage been cleared away, with the Dow Jones Industrial Average bottoming out at 7,286 in October 2002, than the next stock boom was in high gear. It reached its peak of 14,164 – 2,442 points higher than the previous high, it's worth noting – just five years later. look at the big picture Finally, the case for a sustained economic miasma is difficult to make. You'd have to believe that the emerging economic superpowers of China and India will remain for years in the doldrums to which they've recently succumbed; that oil, steel, nickel, wheat and other commodities that only last year skyrocketed in price will similarly fail to recover, despite continued global population growth, including developing world economies seeking to emulate the Industrial Revolutions in China and South Asia.

#### US not key to global economy – decoupling is for real

Wassener 9

Wassener, MSC in IR, 9—London School of Economics and Political Science, MSc , International Relations, Politics (Bettina, In Asia, a Derided Theory Returns, 1 July 2009, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CEFDE163EF932A35754C0A96F9C8B63>)

HONG KONG -- For a while, when the global economic crisis was at its worst, it was a dirty word that only the most provocative of analysts dared to use. Now, the D-word -- decoupling -- is making a comeback, and nowhere more so than in Asia. Put simply, the term refers to the theory that emerging countries -- whether China or Chile -- will become more independent of the ups and downs in the United States as their economies become stronger and more sophisticated. For much of last year, the theory held up. Many **emerging economies** had **steered clear of investments that dragged down a string of banking behemoths in the West**, and saw nothing like the turmoil that began to engulf the United States and Europe in 2007. But then, last autumn, when the collapse of Lehman Brothers caused the global financial system to convulse and consumer demand to shrivel, emerging economies around the world got caught in the downdraft, and the D-word became mud. Now, the tables are turning again, especially in Asia, where many emerging economies are showing signs of a stronger recovery than in the West. And economists here have begun to use the D-word in public once again. ''Decoupling is happening for real,'' **the chief Asia-Pacific economist at Goldman Sachs in Hong Kong**, Michael Buchanan, **said in a recent interview**. Or as the senior Asia economist at HSBC, Frederic Neumann, said, ''Decoupling is not a dirty word.'' To be sure, the once sizzling pace of Asian economic growth has slowed sharply as exports to and investments from outside the region slumped. Across Asia, millions of people have lost their jobs as business drops off and companies cut costs and output. Asia is heavily dependent upon selling its products to consumers in the United States and Europe, and many executives still say a strong U.S. economy is a prerequisite for a return to the boom of years past. Nevertheless, the theory of decoupling is back on the table. **For the past couple of months, data from around the world have revealed a growing divergence between Western economies and those in much of Asia**, notably China and India. The World Bank last week forecast that the economies of the euro zone and the United States would contract 4.5 percent and 3 percent, respectively, this year -- in sharp contrast to the 7.2 percent and 5.1 percent economic growth it forecasts for China and India. **Forecasts from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development** that **were** also **published last week backed up this general trend**. Major statistics for June, due Wednesday, are expected to show manufacturing activity in China and India are on the mend. By contrast, purchasing managers' indexes for Europe and the United States are forecast to be merely less grim than before but still show contractions. Why this diverging picture? **The crisis hit Asia much later**. **While the U.S. economy began languishing in** 20**07**, **Asian economies were still doing well right up until the collapse of Lehman Brothers** last September. What followed was a rush of stimulus measures -- rate cuts and government spending programs. In Asia's case, these came soon after things soured for the region; in the United States, they came much later in the country's crisis. Moreover, **developing** Asian **economies were in pretty good shape when the crisis struck**. The last major crisis to hit the region -- the financial turmoil of 1997-98 -- forced governments in Asia to introduce overhauls that ultimately left them with lower debt levels, more resilient banking and regulatory systems and often large foreign exchange reserves. Another crucial difference is that **Asia**, unlike the United States and Europe, **has not had a banking crisis**. Bank profits in Asia have plunged and some have had to raise extra capital **but** there have been no major collapses and no bailouts. ''The single most important thing to have happened in Asia is that there has not been a banking crisis,'' said Andrew Freris, a regional strategist at BNP Paribas in Hong Kong. ''Asia is coming though this crisis with its banking system intact. Yes, some banks may not be making profits -- but **it is cyclical and not systemic**.'' The lack of banking disasters also has meant that, unlike in Europe and the United States, **Asian governments have not had to spend cash to clean the balance sheets of faltering banks**. In other words, all of the stimulus spending is going into the economy. The effect is greater and more immediate. Add to that the fact that companies and households in Asia are typically not burdened with the kind of debt that is forcing Americans and Europeans to cut back consumption and investment plans. Asians are generally big savers; those in developing nations have limited health care and pension systems to fall back on. So they put aside cash for retirement, sickness and their children's education, rather than maxing out multiple credit cards. Paul Schulte of Nomura said this difference was leading to a long-term shift.

#### No warming impact - threat overestimated and adaption solves

Mendelsohn 9

(Robert O. the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of¶ Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and¶ Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/¶ gcwp060web.pdf

The heart of the debate about climate change comes from a number of warnings from scientists and others that give the impression that human induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006.) Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b) crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20-30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people. (Dasgupta et al. 2009) Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and wellbeing may be at risk (Stern 2006). These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the Case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. the net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long-run balanced responses.

#### 6 degree warming’s inevitable

AP 9

(Associated Press, Six Degree Temperature Rise by 2100 is Inevitable: UNEP, September 24, <http://www.speedy-fit.co.uk/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=168>)

Earth's temperature is likely to jump six degrees between now and the end of the century even if every country cuts greenhouse gas emissions as proposed, according to a United Nations update. Scientists looked at emission plans from 192 nations and calculated what would happen to global warming. The projections take into account 80 percent emission cuts from the U.S. and Europe by 2050, which are not sure things. The U.S. figure is based on a bill that passed the House of Representatives but is running into resistance in the Senate, where debate has been delayed by health care reform efforts. Carbon dioxide, mostly from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil, is the main cause of global warming, trapping the sun's energy in the atmosphere. The world's average temperature has already risen 1.4 degrees since the 19th century. Much of projected rise in temperature is because of developing nations, which aren't talking much about cutting their emissions, scientists said at a United Nations press conference Thursday. China alone adds nearly 2 degrees to the projections. "We are headed toward very serious changes in our planet," said Achim Steiner, head of the U.N.'s environment program, which issued the update on Thursday. The review looked at some 400 peer-reviewed papers on climate over the last three years. Even if the developed world cuts its emissions by 80 percent and the developing world cuts theirs in half by 2050, as some experts propose, the world is still facing a 3-degree increase by the end of the century, said Robert Corell, a prominent U.S. climate scientist who helped oversee the update. Corell said the most likely agreement out of the international climate negotiations in Copenhagen in December still translates into a nearly 5-degree increase in world temperature by the end of the century. European leaders and the Obama White House have set a goal to limit warming to just a couple degrees. The U.N.'s environment program unveiled the update on peer-reviewed climate change science to tell diplomats how hot the planet is getting. The last big report from the Nobel Prize-winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change came out more than two years ago and is based on science that is at least three to four years old, Steiner said. Global warming is speeding up, especially in the Arctic, and that means that some top-level science projections from 2007 are already out of date and overly optimistic. Corell, who headed an assessment of warming in the Arctic, said global warming "is accelerating in ways that we are not anticipating." Because Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets are melting far faster than thought, it looks like the seas will rise twice as fast as projected just three years ago, Corell said. He said seas should rise about a foot every 20 to 25 years.

### Security K

#### Our interp is that debate should be about weighing the implementation of the plan vs the implementation of a competing alternative- role of the ballot is to decide is best. This is best for debate

#### Creates a race to the middle because we get to weigh case and they still get to run their epistemology and ontology arguments as long as the link them to plan implementation.

#### Any other framework is infinitely regressive, moots the 1ac, and kills clash.

#### Voting issue for fairness and education

#### Alt cant result in plan action- otherwise it moots the 1ac, forces us to debate against ourselves, and kills clash- voter for fairness and education

#### Perm- do the plan and the alt- expansion of nuclear power is increasing and inevitable in the squo due to energy demands and emissions concerns- that’s Pandey ’12. If the alt can overcome this than it can overcome the inclusion of the plan

#### Case impacts prove why security logic is good- key to prevent multiple scenarios for extinction- aff is an impact turn to the K. Outweighs- prefer proximate short-term extinction scenarios over their vacuous impact claims.

**Life should be valued as apriori – it precedes the ability to value anything else**

Amien **Kacou. 2008**. WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of “Life”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184

Furthermore, that manner of **finding things good** that is in pleasure **can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,”** as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, **pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation**, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation. Thus, we can see now that, in general, **something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself.** And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, **we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living** (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] **and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good.** However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that **the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value.** But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

#### War makes alt impossible- policy makers would default to security paradigm because it’s the most familiar

**The alt results in more securitization and intervention**

Tara **McCormack, 2010**, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 127-129)

The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the **rejection of the** old narrow national interest-based **security framework** by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, **has the consequence of problematising weak or unstable states and allowing international institutions or major states a more interventionary role, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation**. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework **there were at least formal and clear demarcations. This has the consequence of entrenching international power inequalities and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before**. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. **Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means the condemnation of millions to a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival.** Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to *create* self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that **these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for powerful states,** we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. **In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches**.

**Prefer specific scenarios – even if we invoke some security logic, the fact that others will securitize means that we have to make worst-case assessments to avoid escalation**

Ole **Waever**, Senior Research Fellow – Copenhagen Peace Research Inst., **2K**

(I. R. Theory & the Politics of European Integration, ed Kelstrup/Williams p. 282-285)

The other main possibility is to stress responsibility. Particularly **in a field like security one has to make choices and deal with the challenges and risks that one confronts** – and not shy away into long-range or principled transformations. The meta-political line risks (despite the theoretical commitment to the concrete other) implying that politics can be contained within large ‘systemic’ questions. In line with the classical revolutionary tradition, after the change (now no longer the revolution but the meta-physical transformation), there will be no more problems whereas in our situation (until the change) we should not deal with the ‘small questions’ of politics, only with the large one (cf. Rorty 1996). However, the ethical demand in post-structuralism (e.g. Derrida’s ‘justice’) is of a kind that can never be instantiated in any concrete political order – it is an experience of the undecidable that exceeds any concrete solution and re-inserts politics. Therefore, politics can never be reduced to meta-questions; there is no way to erase the small, particular, banal conflicts and controversies. In contrast to the quasi-institutionalist formula of radical democracy which one finds in the ‘opening’ oriented version of deconstruction, we could with Derrida stress the singularity of the event. To take a position, take part, and ‘produce events’ (Derrida 1994: 89) means to get involved in specific struggles. Politics takes place ‘in the singular event of engagement’ (Derrida 1996: 83). Derrida’s politics is focused on the calls that demand response/responsibility in words like justice, Europe and emancipation. Should we treat security in this manner? No, security is not that kind of call. ‘Security’ is not a way to open (or keep open) an ethical horizon. **Security** is a much more situational concept oriented to the handling of specifics. It **belongs to the sphere of how to handle challenges – and avoid ‘the worst’** (Derrida 1991). Here enters again the possible pessimism hich for the security analyst might be occupational or structural. The infinitude of responsibility (Derrida 1996: 86) or the tragic nature of politics (Morgenthau 1946, Chapter 7) means that one can never feel reassured that by some ‘good deed’, ‘I have assumed my responsibilities’ (Derrida 1996: 86). If I conduct myself particularly well with regard to someone, I know that it is to the detriment of an other; of one nation to the detriment of another nation, of one family to the detriment of another family, of my friends to the detriment of other friends or non-friends, etc. This is the infinitude that inscribes itself within responsibility; otherwise there would be no ethical problems or decisions. (ibid.; and parallel argumentation in Morgenthau 1946; Chapters 6 and 7) Because of this there will remain conflicts and risks – and the question of how to handle them. Should developments be securitized (and if so, in what terms)? Often our reply will be to aim for de-securitization and then politics meet meta-politics; but **occasionally** the underlying **pessimism** regarding the prospects for orderliness and compatibility among human aspirations **will point to** **scenarios sufficiently worrisome that** **responsibility will entail securitization in order to block the worst. As a security/securitization analyst, this means accepting the task of trying to manage and avoid spirals and accelerating security concerns, to try to assist in shaping the continent in a way that creates the least insecurity and violence – even if this occasionally means invoking/producing ‘structures’ or even using the dubious instrument of securitization**. In the case of current European configuration, the above analysis suggests the use of securitization at the level of European scenarios with the aim of preempting and avoiding numerous instances of local securitization that could lead to security dilemmas and escalations, violence and mutual vilification.

**Scenario planning is key to effective energy policy**

**Geri and McNabb 2k11**

Laurance R. Geri and David E. McNabb. 2011. teaches in the Masters Program in Public Administration (MPA) at Evergreen State. Energy Policy in the U.S.: Politics, Challenges, and Prospects for Change. p. 30

Energy planners were chastened by the failure to anticipate the oil embargo, and subsequent changes in the demand and supply of important energy sources. Eventually a new approach to energy planning was developed, termed integrated resource planning (IRP) that combined improved forecasting techniques, use of scenarios to clarify possible combinations of anticipated demand, and used a least-cost decision rule for selecting future sources. IRP also emphasizes alternatives to conventional generation, including demand-side management approaches and systematic improvements. The overall IRP approach was mandated for public utilities in the Energy Policy Act of 1992. Whether IRP has improved utility performance is an open question. The more difficult question of whether energy analysts have improved their capacity to forecast future energy needs and events is still under debate. Winebrake and Sakva (2006) concluded that U.S. Department of Energy forecasts had not improved over a twenty-year period. Smil (2008) is likely correct that a better strategy is to formulate scenarios of energy use and their implications for society as a whole. Those may be used as starting points for debate about the type of future we want, and how to enact and implement policies that help us create that future. Box 2.1 is one small contribution to an explanation of why a solution to our widely understood energy problem has yet to be presented, let alone adopted.

#### Threats are real

Ravenal ‘9

[Earl C. Ravenal, distinguished senior fellow in foreign policy studies @ Cato, is professor emeritus of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. He is an expert on NATO, defense strategy, and the defense budget. He is the author of *Designing Defense for a New World Order.* What's Empire Got to Do with It? The Derivation of America's Foreign Policy.” *Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society* 21.1 (2009) 21-75]

Quite expectedly, the more doctrinaire of the non-interventionists take pains to deny any straightforward, and therefore legitimate, security motive in American foreign and military policy. In fact, this denial leads to a more sweeping rejection of any recognizably rational basis for American foreign policy, and, even, sometimes (among the more theoretical of the non-interventionists), a preference for non-rational accounts, or “models,” of virtually any nation’s foreign policy-making.4 One could call this tendency among anti-imperialists “motive displacement.” More specifically, in the cases under review here, one notes a receptivity to any reworking of history, and any current analysis of geopolitics, that denigrates “the threat”; and, along with this, a positing of “imperialism” (the almost self-referential and primitive impulse) as a sufficient explanation for the often strenuous and risky actions of great powers such as the United States. Thus, not only is “empire” taken to be a sufficient and, in some cases, a necessary condition in bringing about foreign “threats”; but, by minimizing the extent and seriousness of these threats, the anti-imperialists put themselves into the position of lacking a rational explanation for the derivation of the (pointless at best, counter-productive at worst) policies that they designate as imperialistic. A pungent example of this threat denigration and motive displacement is Eland’s account of American intervention in the Korean and Vietnam wars:¶ After North Korea invaded, the Truman administration intervened merely for the purpose of a demonstration to friends and foes alike. Likewise, according to eminent cold war historians, the United States did not inter- vene in Vietnam because it feared communism, which was fragmented, or the Soviet Union, which wanted détente with the West, or China, which was weak, but because it did not want to appear timid to the world. The behavior of the United States in both Korea and Vietnam is typical of imperial powers, which are always concerned about their reputation, pres- tige, and perceived resolve. (Eland 2004, 64)¶ Of course, the motive of “reputation,” to the extent that it exists in any particular instance, is a part of the complex of motives that characterize a great power that is drawn toward the role of hegemon (not the same thing as “empire”). Reputation is also a component of the power projec- tion that is designed to serve the interest of national security. Rummaging through the concomitants of “imperialism,” Eland (2004, 65) discovers the thesis of “threat inflation” (in this case, virtual threat invention): Obviously, much higher spending for the military, homeland security, and foreign aid are required for a policy of global intervention than for a policy of merely defending the republic. For example, after the cold war, the security bureaucracies began looking for new enemies to justify keeping defense and intelligence budgets high. Similarly, Eland (ibid., 183), in a section entitled “Imperial Wars Spike Corporate Welfare,” attributes a large portion of the U.S. defense budget—particularly the procurement of major weapons systems, such as “Virginia-class submarines . . . aircraft carriers . . . F-22 fighters . . . [and] Osprey tilt-rotor transport aircraft”—not to the systemically derived requirement for certain kinds of military capabilities, but, rather, to the imperatives of corporate pork. He opines that such weapons have no stra- tegic or operational justification; that “the American empire, militarily more dominant than any empire in world history, can fight brushfire wars against terrorists and their ‘rogue’ state sponsors without those gold- plated white elephants.”¶ The underlying notion of “the security bureaucracies . . . looking for new enemies” is a threadbare concept that has somehow taken hold across the political spectrum, from the radical left (viz. Michael Klare [1981], who refers to a “threat bank”), to the liberal center (viz. Robert H. Johnson [1997], who dismisses most alleged “threats” as “improbable dangers”), to libertarians (viz. Ted Galen Carpenter [1992], Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy of the Cato Institute, who wrote a book entitled A Search for Enemies). What is missing from most analysts’ claims of “threat inflation,” however, is a convincing theory of why, say, the American government significantly (not merely in excusable rhetoric) might magnify and even invent threats (and, more seriously, act on such inflated threat estimates). In a few places, Eland (2004, 185) suggests that such behavior might stem from military or national security bureaucrats’ attempts to enhance their personal status and organizational budgets, or even from the influence and dominance of “the military-industrial complex”; viz.: “Maintaining the empire and retaliating for the blowback from that empire keeps what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex fat and happy.” Or, in the same section:¶ In the nation’s capital, vested interests, such as the law enforcement bureaucracies . . . routinely take advantage of “crises”to satisfy parochial desires. Similarly, many corporations use crises to get pet projects— a.k.a. pork—funded by the government. And national security crises, because of people’s fears, are especially ripe opportunities to grab largesse. (Ibid., 182)¶ Thus, “bureaucratic-politics” theory, which once made several reputa- tions (such as those of Richard Neustadt, Morton Halperin, and Graham Allison) in defense-intellectual circles, and spawned an entire sub-industry within the field of international relations,5 is put into the service of dismissing putative security threats as imaginary. So, too, can a surprisingly cognate theory, “public choice,”6 which can be considered the right-wing analog of the “bureaucratic-politics” model, and is a preferred interpretation of governmental decision- making among libertarian observers. As Eland (2004, 203) summarizes:¶ Public-choice theory argues [that] the government itself can develop sepa- rate interests from its citizens. The government reflects the interests of powerful pressure groups and the interests of the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats in them. Although this problem occurs in both foreign and domestic policy, it may be more severe in foreign policy because citizens pay less attention to policies that affect them less directly.¶ There is, in this statement of public-choice theory, a certain ambiguity, and a certain degree of contradiction: Bureaucrats are supposedly, at the same time, subservient to societal interest groups and autonomous from society in general.¶ This journal has pioneered the argument that state autonomy is a likely consequence of the public’s ignorance of most areas of state activity (e.g., Somin 1998; DeCanio 2000a, 2000b, 2006, 2007; Ravenal 2000a). But state autonomy does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats substitute their own interests for those of what could be called the “national society” that they ostensibly serve. I have argued (Ravenal 2000a) that, precisely because of the public-ignorance and elite-expertise factors, and especially because the opportunities—at least for bureaucrats (a few notable post-government lobbyist cases nonwithstanding)—for lucrative self-dealing are stringently fewer in the defense and diplomatic areas of government than they are in some of the contract-dispensing and more under-the-radar-screen agencies of government, the “public-choice” imputation of self-dealing, rather than working toward the national interest (which, however may not be synonymous with the interests, perceived or expressed, of citizens!) is less likely to hold. In short, state autonomy is likely to mean, in the derivation of foreign policy, that “state elites” are using rational judgment, in insulation from self-promoting interest groups—about what strategies, forces, and weapons are required for national defense.¶ Ironically, “public choice”—not even a species of economics, but rather a kind of political interpretation—is not even about “public” choice, since, like the bureaucratic-politics model, it repudiates the very notion that bureaucrats make truly “public” choices; rather, they are held, axiomatically, to exhibit “rent-seeking” behavior, wherein they abuse their public positions in order to amass private gains, or at least to build personal empires within their ostensibly official niches. Such sub- rational models actually explain very little of what they purport to observe. Of course, there is some truth in them, regarding the “behavior” of some people, at some times, in some circumstances, under some conditions of incentive and motivation. But the factors that they posit operate mostly as constraints on the otherwise rational optimization of objectives that, if for no other reason than the playing out of official roles, transcends merely personal or parochial imperatives.¶ My treatment of “role” differs from that of the bureaucratic-politics theorists, whose model of the derivation of foreign policy depends heavily, and acknowledgedly, on a narrow and specific identification of the role- playing of organizationally situated individuals in a partly conflictual “pulling and hauling” process that “results in” some policy outcome. Even here, bureaucratic-politics theorists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999, 311) allow that “some players are not able to articulate [sic] the governmental politics game because their conception of their job does not legitimate such activity.” This is a crucial admission, and one that points— empirically—to the need for a broader and generic treatment of role.¶ Roles (all theorists state) give rise to “expectations” of performance. My point is that virtually every governmental role, and especially national-security roles, and particularly the roles of the uniformed mili- tary, embody expectations of devotion to the “national interest”; rational- ity in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and objectivity in the treatment of parameters, especially external parameters such as “threats” and the power and capabilities of other nations.¶ Sub-rational models (such as “public choice”) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to the “national” interest (or even the possibility that the national interest may be honestly misconceived in more paro- chial terms). In contrast, an official’s role connects the individual to the (state-level) process, and moderates the (perhaps otherwise) self-seeking impulses of the individual. Role-derived behavior tends to be formalized and codified; relatively transparent and at least peer-reviewed, so as to be consistent with expectations; surviving the particular individual and trans- mitted to successors and ancillaries; measured against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function and therefore derived from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious aggrandizement are conspicuously discouraged.¶ My own direct observation suggests that defense decision-makers attempt to “frame” the structure of the problems that they try to solve on the basis of the most accurate intelligence. They make it their business to know where the threats come from. Thus, threats are not “socially constructed” (even though, of course, some values are).¶ A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much security planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circum- stances that offer scope for idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and reviewed organizational frameworks. Non-rationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend to get filtered out. People are fired for presenting skewed analysis and for making bad predictions. This is because something important is riding on the causal analysis and the contingent prediction. For these reasons, “public choice” does not have the “feel” of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decision-making. In that structure, obvious, and even not-so-obvious, “rent-seeking” would not only be shameful; it would present a severe risk of career termination. And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place for truly talented rent-seekers to operate, compared to opportunities for personal profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrat’s very self-placement in these reaches of government testi- fies either to a sincere commitment to the national interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.

**Rejecting security allows private forces to fill in the security vacuum left by the state resulting in more violent forms of securitization**

**Loader and Walker 07** <Ian and Neil, professor of criminology and Director of the center for Criminology at Oxford Professor of European Law European University Institute Florence , *Civilizing Security*, pg 22-25)

**Today it cannot be assumed that the state remains pre-eminent in either authorizing or delivering** policing and **security**. **Other non-state actors now lay claim to authority and competence in this field**. In defence of the contention that what Johnston and Shearing (2003) call the ‘governance of security’ is conducted by a multiplicity of institutions, one can point to the following: • **Private security has become big business across the world.** In Britain, the USA, Canada, South Africa and beyond it has long been acknowledged that those employed by commercial security outfits outstrip the total number of public police officers. Private security operatives are hired by corporations, national and local governments, and private citizens to guard office complexes, airports, universities, housing estates, schools, hospitals, shopping centres, civic buildings, courts, even police stations. People’s access to, and conduct within, large tracts of urban space is regulated by private security guards, employed by commercial companies, enforcing property rather than criminal law. Such guards also, in some settings, engage in ‘front-line’ law enforcement and order maintenance policework (Rigakos 2002). 1 Anxious citizens, in turn, rely on the security market for an array of protective hardware (alarms, gates, locks, CCTV systems), as well as resorting to forms of self-policing — often encouraged by insurance companies and neo-liberal governments. Some have formed ‘private residential associations’ or sought security inside ‘gated communities’, withdrawing their demand and support for public provision (including policing provision) in the process. In response, the public police increasingly act as market players, contracting-out non-core ‘business’, eliciting corporate sponsorship, and marketing or even selling their services to a public disaggregated into individual ‘customers’. • **All this is happening in societies with strong, established states**. In those with weak or failing states, or undergoing political transition, the public police are not the only or main security actor, nor can they lay claim to a monopoly over legitimate force inside their territory. **Across many parts of the globe today** — in Italy, Colombia, Brazil, Northern Ireland, Russia, Afghanistan, the impacted ghettos of US and European cities **one finds alternative power centres contesting state authority, ‘shadow sovereigns’** (Nordstrom 2000) operating their own codes of behaviour and mechanisms of enforcement (Gambetta 1993; Varese 2001). In these contexts, those who can afford to have, once more, fled behind walls, venturing from their residential enclosures only to make passage to other protected work and leisure domains. **The dispossessed by contrast are left at the mercy not only of militarized, partisan police forces, but also criminal gangs, hired ‘rent-a-cops’ and urban vigilantes.** Alternatively, in some isolated pockets parts of South Africa and Argentina for instance — poor communities are striving to put in place non-violent, local capacity-building forms of non-state security governance. • Nor are these developments confined within the borders of modern states. ‘**Security’ has also become a multinational business, one that crosses territorial boundaries and further erodes the internal/external security distinction.** Several private security enterprises now trade their wares across the globe (Johnston 2006). They sell security advice, equipment and personnel to anxious citizens and warring factions in weak and failed states. They claim to be filling the ‘security gaps’ left by the fall of communist rule in the former Soviet Union and eastern Europe. And they offer to serve and protect the interests of multinationals operating in disordered, crime-ridden locations. To this, one can add the ‘privatization of violence’ occurring in many conflict and post-conflict zones around the world, as ‘private military firms’ such as MPRI and Dyncorp — dubbed by Peter Singer (2003) ‘corporate warriors’ — promote and sell military ‘know-how’, equipment and intervention to beleaguered governments and other armed groups (Avant 2005). It is a telling symbol of these trends that one of the fastest-growing industries in post- invasion Iraq is private security. **These examples** too we will flesh out in more detail below. What they serve for the moment to **illustrate** is **the existence of a pluralized — market-driven — environment where the state exists alongside, sponsors and competes against a plethora of non-state actors in a bid to promise security to citizens**. It is a field where the state is not only less and less involved in delivering policing and security on the ground — what Osborne and Gaebler (1992) call ‘rowing’ — but also often lacks the effective regulatory capacity to ‘steer’. It is a field constituted by new sites of rule and authority beyond the state, one where market power or communal ordering escapes from the forms of public will- formation that only the democratic state can supply. **Against this backdrop, the project of civilizing security is faced not only** (or even mainly) **with the task of controlling the arbitrary, discriminatory exercise of sovereign force, or with the excesses of state power. It is confronted, rather more, with a notable absence of political institutions with the capacity and legitimacy required to prevent those with ‘the loudest voices and the largest pockets’** (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 144) **from organizing their own ‘security’ in ways that impose unjustifiable burdens of insecurity upon others**. Or, to put the same point more widely: **These days, the main obstacle to social justice is not the invasive intentions or proclivities of the state, but its growing impotence,** aided and abetted daily by the officially adopted ‘there is no alternative’ creed. I suppose that **the danger we will have to fight back in the coming century won’t be totalitarian coercion, the main preoccupation of the century just ended, but the falling apart of ‘totalities’ capable of securing the autonomy of human society.** (Bauman and Tester 2001: 139)

**Empirically denied – no root cause of war**

Greg **Cashman**. **2000**. Professor of Political Science at Salisbury State University “What Causes war?: An introduction to theories of international conflict” pg. 9

Two warnings need to be issued at this point. First, **while we have been using a single variable explanation of war merely for the sake of simplicity, multivariate explanations of war are likely to be much more powerful. Since social and political behaviors are extremely complex, they are almost never explainable through a single factor. Decades of research have led most analysts to reject monocausal explanations of war**. For instance, international relations theorist J. David **Singer suggests that we ought to move away from the concept of “causality” since it has become associated with the search for a single cause of war; we should instead redirect our activities toward discovering “explanations”—a term that implies multiple causes of war, but also a certain element of randomness or chance in their occurrence.**

**Problem-solution impact is backwards---acting with a flawed epistemology allows us to change that epistemology.**

**Harris 7** (Graham, Adjunct Prf. @ Centre for Environment University of Tasmania, Seeking Sustainability in an age of complexity p. 9-10)

1 am not going to address the global 'litany' at length here. The arguments have been well made by others, especially and most elegantly by E. O. Wilson. What 1 wish to address here is the question: 'Can we grasp the complexity of it all and, if so, what do we do about it?' Given the fundamental nature of the problem the destruction of the biosphere and its ecosystem ser- vices together with the huge changes going on in human societies and cultures driven by globalisation and technological change the precautionary principle would suggest that even if the epistemology is flawed, the data are partial and the evidence is shaky, we should pay attention to the little we know and do whatever is possible to mitigate the situation even if we fundamentally disagree about the means and the ends. The only ethical course of action is, as John Ral- ston Saul writes," based on 'a sense of the other and of inclusive responsibility'. We know enough to act. Ethics is about uncertainty, doubt, system thinking and balancing difficult choices. It is about confronting the evidence**.** Over the past two or three decades, as there has been an increasing appre- ciation of the importance of good environmental management, and as western societies have become more open and the ICT revolution has made informa- tion much more widely available there has been a growing debate between the worlds of science, industry, government and the community around environ- mental ethics and environmental issues and their management. During this period new knowledge has been gained, ideas have changed

(sometimes quite fundamentally) and there have been huge changes in government and social institutions and policies. We are all on a recursive journey together: we are lit- erally 'making it up as we go along'. This is not easy and there are no optimal solutions. This is an adaptive process requiring feedback from all parts of the system. Yes, there will be surprises. This is why it is so important that when we act we constantly reflect on what we know and what we are doing about it and where it is all going. As we reach the physical limits of the global biosphere the values we place on things are changing and must change further. A new environmental ethic is required, one that is less instrumental and more embracing. Traditionally there has tended to be a schism between those who take an anthropocentric view (that the world is there for us to use) and those who take the non-anthropocentric view (those who value nature in its own right). Orthodox anthropocentrisni dictates that non-human value is instrumental to human needs and interests. In contrast, non-anthropocentrics take an objectivist view and value nature intrinsically; some may consider the source of value in non-human nature to be independent of human consciousness.45 What is required is a more complex and systems view of ethics which finds a middle ground between the instrumentalist and objectivist views. Norton '46 for example, proposes an alternative and more complex theory of value - a universal Earth ethic - which values processes and dynamics as well as entities and takes an adaptive management view of changing system properties. For sustainable development to occur, choices about values will remain within the human sphere but we should no longer regard human preferences as the only criterion of moral significance. 'Humans and the planet have entwined destinies"' and this will be increasingly true in many and complex ways as we move forward. There are calls for an Earth ethic beyond the land ethic of Aldo Leopold.45 The science of ecology is being drawn into the web .49 Ecologists are becoming more socially and culturally aware and engaged" and the 'very doing' of ecology is becoming more ethical.tm' Some scientists are beginning to see themselves more as agents in relationships with society and less as observers.

## 1AR

### Brazil

**Empirically, hege explains great power peace**

**Wohlforth 8—**Daniel Webster Professor of Government, Dartmouth. BA in IR, MA in IR and MPhil and PhD in pol sci, Yale (William, Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War, October 2008, World Politics Vol. 61, Iss. 1; pg. 28, 31 pgs, Proquest)

Despite increasingly compelling findings concerning the importance of status seeking in human behavior, research on its connection to war waned some three decades ago.38 Yet empirical studies of the relationship between both systemic and dyadic capabilities distributions and war have continued to cumulate. If the relationships implied by the status theory run afoul of well-established patterns or general historical findings, then there is little reason to continue investigating them. **The clearest empirical implication** of the theory **is that** status **competition is unlikely to cause great power military conflict in unipolar systems**. If status competition is an important contributory cause of great power war, then, ceteris paribus, unipolar systems should be markedly less war-prone than bipolar or multipolar systems. And this appears to be the case. As Daniel Geller notes in a review of the empirical literature: "**The only polar structure that appears to influence conflict probability is unipolarity**."39 In addition, a larger number of studies at the dyadic level support the related expectation that narrow capabilities gaps and ambiguous or unstable capabilities hierarchies increase the probability of war.40 These studies are based entirely on post-sixteenth-century European history, and most are limited to the post-1815 period covered by the standard data sets. Though the systems coded as unipolar, near-unipolar, and hegemonic are all marked by a high concentration of capabilities in a single state, these studies operationalize unipolarity in a variety of ways, often very differently from the definition adopted here. An ongoing collaborative project looking at ancient interstate systems over the course of two thousand years suggests that historical systems that come closest to the definition of unipolarity used here exhibit precisely the behavioral properties implied by the theory. 41 As David C. Kang's research shows, the East Asian system between 1300 and 1900 was an unusually stratified unipolar structure, with an economic and militarily dominant China interacting with a small number of geographically proximate, clearly weaker East Asian states.42 Status politics existed, but actors were channeled by elaborate cultural understandings and interstate practices into clearly recognized ranks. Warfare was exceedingly rare, and the major outbreaks occurred precisely when the theory would predict: when China's capabilities waned, reducing the clarity of the underlying material hierarchy and increasing status dissonance for lesser powers. Much more research is needed, but initial exploration of other arguably unipolar systems-for example, Rome, Assyria, the Amarna system-appears consistent with the hypothesis.43 Status Competition and Causal Mechanisms Both theory and evidence demonstrate convincingly that competition for status is a driver of human behavior, and social identity theory and related literatures suggest the conditions under which it might come to the fore in great power relations. Both the systemic and dyadic findings presented in large-N studies are broadly consistent with the theory, but they are also consistent with power transition and other rationalist theories of hegemonic war.

### K

#### Reps don’t shape reality—focusing on them obscures material and political analysis which turns the criticism

**Tuathail 96** (Gearoid, Department of Georgraphy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Political Geography, 15(6-7), p. 664, science direct)

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decision- makers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problem- solving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby’s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‘Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought’-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is inadequate by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalby’s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby’s fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby’s book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and post- structuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby’s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev’s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly self- interested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engagethere is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant,. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies ‘poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

**Prolif impacts outweigh the K and flip ethics**

Ford 11

Chris Ford, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C. He previously served as U.S. Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, and General Counsel to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1/10/11, Havea and Have-Nots: "Unfairness in nuclear Weapons possession," www.newparadigmsforum.com/NPFtestsite/?p=658

First, however, let’s provide some context. As I noted above, it is fascinating that in the long history of military technological have/have not dynamics, the international politics of nuclear weaponry has acquired such a strong flavor of moral critique. To my knowledge, after all, one did not see Xiongnu politics emphasizing how darned unfair it was of those nasty Chinese Emperors to monopolize the presumed secrets of China’s bingjia strategic literature. Nor does the unfairness of Byzantine efforts to control the recipe for Greek Fire seem to have become a prevalent trope of Frankish or Persian diplomacy. “Have nots” have surely always coveted powerful tools possessed by the “haves,” or at least wished that the “haves” did not possess them. It seems pretty unusual, however, for non-possessors to articulate such understandable envy and resentment in the moral language of “unfairness,” and to assume that this presumed injustice should motivate the “haves” to change their behavior. This argument seems to be a curiously modern phenomenon.¶ One might respond that the very specialness of nuclear weapons makes such a position appropriate. After all, while a local monopoly on iron swords may have given the Vikings some advantage in skirmishes with Native Americans in what the Norsemen called Vinland, such technological asymmetry was not strategically decisive. (Indeed, the Vikings seem ultimately to have been pushed out of the New World entirely.) If iron had threatened to offer the Vikings an insuperable advantage, would the Skraelings have been justified in developing a moral language of “have/have not” resentment that demanded either the sharing of iron weaponry or Viking disarmament in the name of achieving a global “iron zero”? I’m skeptical, but for the sake of argument let’s say “maybe.”¶ The argument that nuclear weapons are “special,” however, is a two-edged sword. Perhaps they are indeed so peculiarly potent and militarily advantageous that their asymmetric possession is sufficiently “unfair” to compel sharing or disarmament. Such an argument, however, sits only awkwardly – to say the least – with the simultaneous claim by many advocates of the “have/have not” critique that nuclear weapons have no real utility in the modern world and can therefore safely be abandoned by their possessors. After all, it is hard to paint nuclear weapons as being strategically decisive and useless at the same time. (If they are indeed useless, the conclusion of “unfairness” hardly sounds very compelling. If they aren’t useless, however, it may be appropriately hard to abolish them.)¶ More importantly, any argument about the destructively “special” character of nuclear weaponry cuts against the “unfairness critique” in that it is this very specialness that seems to rob the “have/have not” issue of its moral relevance. Unlike iron swords, the bingjia literature, Greek Fire, or essentially all other past military technologies the introduction of which produced global control/acquisition dynamics, **nuclear weapons** have **introduced existential questions about the future of human civilization which utterly swamp the conventional playground morality of unfair “have/have not” competition. No prior technology held the potential to destroy humanity, making nuclear weapons – with the possible exception of certain techniques of biological weaponry – a sui generis case to which the conventional “unfairness” critique simply does not very persuasively apply.**¶III. Implications¶ Let me be clear about this. The moral critique of nuclear weapons possession may yet speak to the issue of whether anyone should have them. (This is not the place for a discussion of the feasibility of the remedies proposed by the disarmament community, but let us at least acknowledge the existence of a real moral issue.) But this matter has nothing to do with “unfairness” per se – and to the extent that it purports to, one should give it little credence. If indeed nuclear weapons do menace the survival of humanity, it is essentially irrelevant whether their possession is “unfairly” distributed – and it is certainly no solution to make the global balance of weaponry more “fair” by allowing more countries to have them. (Disarmament advocates hope to address the fairness problem by eliminating nuclear weapons, of course, but this is just icing. Disarmament is almost never articulated as being driven primarily by fairness; the critical part of that argument is instead consequentialist, stressing the dangers that any nuclear weapons are said to present.) As a moral critique, in other words, the fair/unfair dichotomy fails to speak intelligibly to the world’s nuclear dilemma. It isn’t really about “fairness” at all.¶ Given the entanglement of nuclear weapons issues with quasi-existential questions potentially affecting the survival of millions or perhaps even billions of people, moreover, **it stands to reason that an “unfair” outcome that nonetheless staves off such horrors is a perfectly good solution. On this scale, one might say, non-catastrophe entirely trumps accusations of “unfairness.” Questions of stability are far more important than issues of asymmetric distribution**.¶ This, of course, has powerful implications for nonproliferation policy, because pointing out the hollowness of the “unfairness” argument as applied to nuclear weapons suggests the moral sustainability of nonproliferation even if complete nuclear disarmament cannot be achieved and the world continues to be characterized by inequalities in weapons possession. **We forget this at our collective peril**.¶ Don’t get me wrong. “Unfairness” arguments will presumably continue to have a political impact upon the diplomacy of nuclear nonproliferation, either as a consequence of genuine resentment or as a cynical rationalization for the destabilizing pursuit of dangerous capabilities. (Indeed, one might even go so far as to suspect that the emergence of the “unfairness” critique in modern diplomatic discourse is in some sense partly the result of how morally compelling nonproliferation is, in this context, irrespective of the “fairness” of “have/have not” outcomes. Precisely because **the moral case for nonproliferation-driven inequality is** so **obvious and** so **compelling** if such imbalance serves the interests of strategic stability, perhaps it was necessary to develop a new rationale of “fairness” to help make proliferation aspirations seem more legitimate. Skraelings, one imagines, did not need an elaborate philosophy of “fairness” in order to justify trying to steal iron weapons; the desirability of such tools was simply obvious, and any effort to obtain them unsurprising and not in itself condemnable.) But even in this democratic and egalitarian age, merely to incant the mantra of “unfairness” – or to inveigh against the existence of “haves” when there also exist “have nots” – is not the same thing as having a compelling moral argument. Indeed, I would submit that **we lose our moral bearings if we allow “unfairness” arguments to distract us from what is really important here: substantive outcomes in the global security environment**.¶ “Unfairness,” in other words, is an overrated critique, and “fairness” is an overrated destination. At least where nuclear weapons are concerned, there are more important considerations in play. Let us not forget this.

**No risk of continual war making – institutional safeguards check**

Allen **Buchanan 7**, Professor of Philosophy and Public Policy at Duke, 2007 (Preemption: military action and moral justification, pg. 128)

The intuitively plausible idea behind the 'irresponsible act' argument is that, other things being equal, the higher the stakes in acting and in particular the greater the moral risk, the higher are the *epistemic requirements* for justified action. The decision to go to war is generally a high stakes decision par excellence and the moral risks are especially great, for two reasons. First, unless one is justified in going to war, one's deliberate killing of enemy combatants will he murder, indeed mass murder. Secondly, at least in large-scale modem war, it is a virtual certainty that one will kill innocent people even if one is justified in going to war and conducts the war in such a way as to try to minimize harm to innocents. Given these grave moral risks of going to war, quite apart from often substantial prudential concerns, some types of justifications for going to war may simply be too subject to abuse and error to make it justifiable to invoke them. The 'irresponsible act' objection is not a consequentialist objection in any interesting sense. It does not depend upon the assumption that every particular act of going to war preventively has unacceptably bad consequences (whether in itself or by virtue of contributing lo the general acceptance of a principle allowing preventive war); nor does it assume that it is always wrong lo rely on a justification which, if generally accepted, would produce unacceptable consequences. Instead, the "irresponsible act' objection is more accurately described as an agent-centered argument and more particularly an argument from moral epistemic responsibility. The 'irresponsible act' objection to preventive war is highly plausible if— but only if—one assumes that the agents who would invoke the preventive-war justification are, as it were, *on their own* in making the decision to go to war preventively. In other words, the objection is incomplete unless the context of decision-making is further specified. Whether the special risks of relying on the preventive-war justification are unacceptably high will depend, *inter alia,* upon whether the decision-making process includes effective provisions for redu­cing those special risks. Because the special risks are at least in significant part epistemic—due to the inherently speculative character of the preventive war-justification—the epistemic context of the decision is crucial. Because institutions can improve the epistemic performance of agents,

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it is critical to know what the institutional context of the preventive-war decision is, before we can regard the 'irresponsible agent' objection as conclusive. Like the 'bad practice' argument, this second objection to preventive war is inconclusive because it does not consider— and rule out—the possibility that well-designed institutions for decision-making could address the problems that would otherwise make it irresponsible for a leader to invoke the preventive-war justification.