## 2AC Topicality

#### . We Meet

Rosner and Goldberg 11

(Robert Rosner, astrophysicist and founding director of the Energy Policy Institute at Chicago. He was the director of Argonne National Laboratory from 2005 to 2009, Stephen Goldberg, Special Assistant to the Director, Argonne National Laboratory Senior Fellow, Energy Policy Institute at Chicago Research Coordinator, Global Nuclear Future Initiative American Academy of Arts and Sciences, “Small Modular Reactors – Key to Future Nuclear Power Generation in the U.S.” Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, <http://csis.org/files/attachments/111129_SMR_White_Paper.pdf>

The Energy Policy Act of 2005 authorized a production tax credit of $18/MWh (1.8¢/kWh) for up to 6,000 MW of new nuclear power plant capacity. To qualify, a project must commence operations by 2021. Treasury Department guidelines further required that a qualifying project initiate construction, defined as the pouring of safetyrelated concrete, by 2014. Currently, two GW-scale projects totaling 4,600 MW are in early construction; consequently, as much as 1,400 MW in credits is available for other nuclear projects, including SMRs.

#### DoE just massively increased SMR incentives, but it fails

DoD Energy Blog, 2/16/11, Good Things in Small Packages:Small Reactors for Military Power Good Things in Small Packages:Small Reactors for Military Power, dodenergy.blogspot.com/2011/02/good-things-in-small-packagessmall.html

They conclude that DOD should lead the charge for small reactors to meet their own needs as well as to make sure that the US leads that industry’s development. When first written the paper mentioned that most of the technology was stymied somewhere between the drawing board and production. But there is good news in the President’s 2011 Budget for nukes. The New York Times reported that the budget contains $500 million over five years for DOE to complete two designs and secure National Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval. The reactors will be built entirely in a factory and trucked to the site, like “modular homes”. Sounds just like what Dr. Andres ordered. Only problem is that $500 million is only about half of the cost to get to NRC approval**.** Actual production is in the $2 billion neighborhood, and that is a pricey neighborhood. Enter Amory Lovins. Amory has often derided the cost for nuclear power as an unnecessary expenditure. His argument is that micropower is the way of the future, not big honking gigawatt nuclear power plants. Although there has been a resurgence in the interest in nuclear power, it is still difficult to find private investments willing to underwrite the expense. Maybe the development of small nukes for national security reasons will lead to cost effective small nukes for distributed micropower nationwide. Small reactors for FOBs are more problematic. Even Bagram only needs about 25 MW with other FOBS being smaller. Security will be the first concern. If someone tries a smash and grab at Fort Hood they have to go through a couple of armored divisions and have a long way to got to get away. Kabul to Peshawar is only 128 miles. Cost shouldn’t be an overriding factor in considering secure power, but even at a 75% cost reduction in production, half a billion for 25MW is a bit much. Of course if you could produce a 300MW system, Bagram could air condition Kabul! The real soft power. My buddy, T.C. the fighter pilot, would tell you that DOD's mission is to fight and win the Nation's wars, not spark business recovery. DOD needs to focus on conserving energy. “Reducing the consumption at Miramar by 50% might save a lot of fuel and money, but I'd rather reduce consumption by 50% at PB Jugroom even though the savings in gallons and dollars are tiny.” Reducing demand reduces risk. All that being said, it may well be worth DOE and DOD efforts to explore the potential. It is something that may be beyond the means of commercial entities, but not government (See China). If there is going to be a market here, let us not be left behind as we have been with other alternative energy production means.

#### 2. Counter Interpretation- Increase can be from zero.

WORDS AND PHRASES 7

CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENTARY PAMPHLET, Vol. 20A, 07, 76.

Increase: Salary change of from zero to $12,000 and $1,200 annually for mayor and councilmen respectively was an “increase” in salary and not merely the fixing of salary. King v. Herron, 243 S.E.2d36, 241 Ga. 5.

**You still get disad links – trade-off, spending, and cash assistance bad strategies all apply to our aff – make them prove a legitimate abuse story**

**No limits explosion – states and other topics – and any small disad would probably outweigh our aff if it’s really that insignificant**

**Reasonability solves your impact – competing interpretation leads to a race to the bottom to always exclude our affirmative – justifies counter-interpretation – only our case is topical**

### 2ac- K

#### Aff solves security of the commons- hege is key- secures things like navigation in SCS

#### Commercialization gets energy to the commons- DOD is key

#### IF aff doesn’t solve the K it means we’re a specific instance of why energy production for the military is good- means we’re any impact turn to the K

#### Interp- we get to weigh case against the alt- key to keep unpredictable frameworks from mooting the entire 1ac and ensuring clash- voter for fairness and education

#### Alt can’t result in plan action- moots 1ac and 2ac offense- voter for fairness

#### Plan solves multiple scenarios for extinction- Life should be valued as apriori – it precedes the ability to value anything else

Amien Kacou. 2008. WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of “Life”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184

Furthermore, that manner of finding things good that is in pleasure can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,” as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation. Thus, we can see now that, in general, something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself. And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good. However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value. But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

#### Managerialism is necessary to prevent global extinction –processes of environmental destruction are unstoppable without intervention

Dr Neil Levy 1999. Fellow of the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at Charles Sturt University. “Discourses of the Environment” p. 215

If the ‘technological fix’ is unlikely to be more successful than strategies of limitation of our uses of resources, we are nevertheless unable to simply leave the environment as it is. There is a real and pressing need for more, and more accurate, technical and scientific information about the non-human world. For we are faced with a situation in which the processes we have already set in train will continue to impact upon that world, and therefore us, for centuries. It is therefore necessary, not only to stop cutting down the rain forests, but to develop real, concrete proposals for action, to reverse, or at least limit, the effects of our previous interventions. More over, there is another reason why our behaviour towards the non-human cannot simply be a matter of leaving it as it is, at least in so far as our goals are not only environmental but also involve social justice. For if we simply preserve what remains to us of wilderness, of the countryside and of park land, we also preserve patterns of very unequal access to their resources and their consolations (Soper 1995: 207). In fact, we risk exacerbating these inequalities. It is no us, but the poor of Brazil, who will bear the brunt of the misery which would result form a strictly enforced policy of leaving the Amazonian rain forest untouched, in the absence of alternative means of providing for their livelihood. It is the development of policies to provide such ecologically sustainable alternative which we require, as well as the development of technical means for replacing our current greenhouse gas-emitting sources of energy. Such policies and proposals for concrete action must be formulated by ecologists, environmentalist, people with expertise concerning the functioning of ecosystems and the impacts which our actions have upon them. Such proposals are, therefore, very much the province for Foucault’s specific intellectual, the one who works ‘within specific sectors, at the precise points where their won conditions of life or work situate them’ (Foucault 1980g: 126). For who could be more fittingly described as ‘the strategists of life and death’ than these environmentalists? After the end of the Cold War, it is in this sphere, more than any other, that man’s ‘politics places his existence as a living being in question’ (Foucault 1976: 143). For it is in facing the consequences of our intervention in the non-human world that the fate of our species, and of those with whom we share this planet, will be decided.

#### **Reject calls to abandon science and the Enlightenment – the alt ensures their impacts are inevitable. Only by reforming the usages of technology can we avoid the form of modernism that resulted in the Holocaust**

Curtler 1997 (Hugh Mercer, Prof. Phil. – Southwest State U. “Rediscovering values: coming to terms with Postmodernism”, Netlibrary, p. 164-165)

At the same time, we must beware the temptation to reject out of hand everything that stinks of modernism and the Enlightenment. We must resist the postmodern urge to reject and reduce in the conviction that everything Western humans thought prior to 1930 leads inevitably to the Holocaust and its aftermath and that every exemplary work of art and literature diminishes the human soul. In particular, we must maintain a firm hold on our intellectual center and, while acknowledging the need for greater compassion and heightened imaginative power, also acknowledge our need for reasonable solutions to complex issues. Indeed, the rejection of reason and "techno-science" as it is voiced by such thinkers as Jean-François Lyotard seems at times little more than resentment born of a sense of betrayal: "it is no longer possible to call development progress" (Lyotard 1992, 78). Instead, modernism has given us Auschwitz. Therefore, we will blame reason and science as the vehicles that have brought us to this crisis. Reason has yielded technology, which has produced nuclear weapons, mindless diversions, and choking pollution in our cities while enslaving the human spirit. Therefore, we reject reason. This is odd logic. Reason becomes hypostatized and is somehow guilty of having made false promises. The fault may not lie with our tools or methods, however, but with the manner in which we adapted them and the tasks we demanded they perform. That is to say, the problem may lie not with our methods but with ourselves. At times, one wonders whether thinkers such as Lyotard read Dostoyevsky, Freud, or Jung, whether they know anything about human depravity. Science is not at fault; foolish men and women (mostly men) who have expected the impossible of methods that were designed primarily to solve problems are at fault. We cannot blame science because we have made of it an idol. Lyotard was correct when he said that "scientific or technical discovery was never subordinate to demands arising from human needs. It was always driven by a dynamic independent of the things people might judge desirable, profitable, or comfortable" (Lyotard 1992, 83). But instead of focusing attention on the "dynamic," he chooses to reject the entire techno-scientific edifice. This is reactionary. We face serious problems, and the rejection of science and technology will lead us back to barbarism, not to nirvana. What is required is a lesson in how to control our methods and make them serve our needs. Thus, although one can sympathize with the postmodern attack on scientific myopia, one must urge caution in the face of hysteria. There are additional problems with postmodernism, however.

#### Perm- do the plan and the alt

#### Perm do the alt

#### ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITIZATION KEY TO HUMAN SURVIVAL AND INCENTIVIZE CONSERVATION.

CHALECKI ‘7

[Elizabeth, “environmental security: a case study of climate change”, pacific institute for studies in development, environment and safety, Asst. Professor in the International Studies Program at Boston College<http://www.pacinst.org/reports/environment_and_security/env_security_and_climate_change.pdf>]

The security of individuals, communities, nations, and the entire global community is increasingly jeopardized by unpremeditated, non-military environmental threats. These threats are self-generated: we perpetrate them on ourselves, by fouling our air and water, and overharvesting our land. These threats are not felt equally around the world. Southern countries face severe problems from desertification, while northern industrial countries deal with acid rain, and polar regions see large depositions of persistent organic chemical pollutants. Climate change will cause uneven effects over the entire globe for the next fifty to 100 years, with some countries benefiting and others suffering. ¶ Despite these omnipresent connections, environmental issues are still not high on the national security agenda. Those who study environmental problems such as deforestation, loss of biodiversity, and climate change generally don’t see the connection through to its higher-order effects, and those who study security problems such as non-proliferation, terrorism, and civil conflict often don’t recognize the environmental roots and effects of these problems. So why is this such a hard gap to bridge? Thinking in this multidisciplinary way is not traditional for either environmentalists or security specialists, the majority of whom have defined their fields in specific ways. Consequently the nexus of environmental security is seen neither as a security issue nor an environmental issue. However, environmental issues are often security concerns because even without directly causing open conflict, they have the potential to destabilize regimes, displace populations, and lead to state collapse. The environment is the planetary support system on which all other human enterprises depend. If political, social, cultural, religious, and most importantly economic systems are to remain secure and viable, the environment must also remain secure and viable. This makes global environmental conditions a legitimate national security concern for all countries.

#### ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITIZATION IS KEY TO MOBILIZE COMPLACENT ELITES TO ACT ON LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES TO ENABLE SURVIVAL.

Dojčanova ‘12

[Lenka, Applicability of Securitization Theory to Environmental Security, MA Environmental Studies Uppsala university]

According to the CS, the emergency action (called also the extraordinary or emergency measure) represents a failure to handle the issue within normal politics. As an outcome, securitization is perceived negatively and is not preferable to Copenhagen scholars. McDonald identifies security as the “most powerful of political categories” and therefore, the CS’ negative depiction of security becomes for him normatively problematic.206 The CS principally argues that securitization usually fails with the environmental sector because the environmental issue is typically addressed by emergency measures from the normal politics spectrum and hence is only politicized. In reality, environmental challenges often stand on the fringe of the main political or security talks being overlooked by political elites. The environmental issue articulated within the security realm helps to draw the attention of elites to a real problem and simplify implementation of solutions. John J. Hamre (cited by Brauch) Clinton’s deputy secretary of defence supports this idea: “...global warming couched in security terms would make it far more difficult for politicians to ignore.”207 Consequently, securitization achieved by the emergency action beyond the sphere of normal politics is questionable and is discussed in this section.¶ Generally, two problems occurred while estimating extraordinary measures and successful securitization in the environmental sector. On one hand, the underdeveloped theoretical foundation of emergency measures or ‘actions beyond normal politics’ does not allow us to appropriately identify these concepts, especially so, in empirical studies. On the other hand, environmental security does not follow the same confrontational logic as military or political security sectors. It differs by the type of emergency measures and a lower urgency of the problem, which can be characterized rather as a risk than as a threat. In conclusion, the use of the CS’ theoretical framework for environmental security might be a fundamental weakness. These two problems are discussed in the following section.

### No Impact to Ontology

#### World War II proves that attempting to predict the impact of a particular ontology is futile – it cannot explain why modernity produced varying responses to the conflict within the same population from genocidal nationalist militarism to pacificsm.

#### Ontology has no political impact

Srnicek 09 [Nick, Ph.D Candidate in International Relations @ the London School of Economics, “Notes on Ontology and Politics,” http://accursedshare.blogspot.com/2009/01/some-notes-on-ontology-and-politics.html]

It seems to me that one of the most contentious and unremarked upon effects of speculative realism has to do with its attack on a piece of continental dogma – namely the presupposition that ontology is necessarily political. This idea is seen in any number of continental works, from Deleuze’s constructivism, to Derrida’s deconstructions of presence, to the social constructivists, gender and identity theorists, among others. The basic idea being that ontology is always constructed through a political battle, a conflict over what exists. In this regards, the contribution of continental work was to undermine the notion that what exists can be definitively determined in an essential way. The problem was that they went too far with this line of thought and tended (I say tended, because there are almost always exceptions) to deny the independence of ontology from politics. In many cases, ontology even became passé, a mere relic of classical philosophy. These ideas, unsurprisingly, came along necessarily with the general acceptance of correlationism – if we can’t speak or know of anything independent of its manifestation to us, then every thing is necessarily already wrapped up in our political relations. With speculative realism, however, this situation changes. The turn towards objects, towards the absolute, and towards the real as indifferent, all imply that ontology must be independent of politics. We can see this most clearly in Brassier’s work, I believe (although it is implicit in all of them). The relative absence of politics in Nihil Unbound stems partly from the belief that we can study ontology without having to be concerned about its political effects. The results of such a study, as in Brassier’s work, can be rather disconcerting for politics – what if there is no such thing as agency? – but this alone fails to discredit the arguments for such a position. So what does the separation of politics and ontology entail? A few hesitant and suggestive remarks might begin to make clear what precisely is at stake for any speculative realist politics... The separation entails, first of all, that an ontology cannot be validated in terms of its political effects. Part of Badiou’s greatness is undoubtedly to have rejuvenated the concept of the subject, but when judging his ontology, we have to do so while bracketing these political effects. Similarly, when studying the results of neuroscience and their political implications, we must be careful not to reject them simply because they don't accord with our fundamental beliefs about ourselves. If it turns out that we are no more than patterns of neurons firing, this is a reality whose effective truth holds sway regardless of our political desires. (As an aside, I think that such an idea needs to reject Levi's 'Principle of Irreduction', as there are scientific examples of entities being reduced to other entities. The basic argument against such a principle being that we can be mistaken about how the difference an entity makes, makes that difference.) The second effect is that we can no longer construct an ontology in order to achieve some political goal. We may wish to privilege difference as a counter to constricting identity formations, but we cannot justify this privileging with political arguments. Rather, properly philosophical arguments need to be marshaled in support of these ideas. (This raises the important question of whether philosophy can ever be distinguished from politics completely, but the linguistic intermingling of the two need not entail their necessary correlation outside of language.) A third and similar point is that an ontology cannot dictate a political program. Difference may be privileged, for example, but this can be taken in the direction of a capitalist individualism or the direction of undermining traditional power relations - a realist ontology will allow for a multitude of political projects to be spawned from it, without necessarily being liberating or progressive (or constraining or conservative). The fourth effect is a little more radical, I think. This is a renunciation of the tendency among continental theorists to place their political arguments in terms of ontology – I’m thinking here of things like Badiou and the uncounted, Rancière and the people, Deleuze and the minor, etc. The common thread being that the collective agency for political change is always determined in terms of its ontological status – what is inexistent, or uncounted, or unactualized. But political change need not require that something fundamentally new come into being. There can be real political progress made without having to generate ontological novelty. (I’ll also mention too that the faith in the New tends to be another continental political dogma. As though the New was necessarily progressive. While the New may be considered an ontological category, its political content is entirely underdetermined by ontological reasoning.)

#### Perm: do both.

#### Only by combining methods can we avoid fragmentation and facilitate real political change to prevent planetary extinction – even if the perm risks cooption the apocalyptic imagery of the aff is rejuvenating to ecocriticism

JL Schatz. 2012. Professor of English and Feminist Evolutionary Studies & Director of Debate at Binghamton University. The Importance of Apocalypse: The Value of End-Of-The-World Politics While Advancing Ecocriticism. Journal of Ecocriticism: A New Journal of Nature, Society and Literature. 4(2)

There are three things ecocriticism must keep in mind to retain its effectiveness in the poststructuralist era. First and foremost ecocritics must not allow their infighting over tactics and academic maneuvers to become debilitating. Ecocritics have enough on their plate fighting dominant political institutions. To never directly take up arms against ecologically destructive practices will merely cede potential avenues of resistance while we fight amongst ourselves. We must take from those ecocritics we partially disagree with what we can and then operate from a different platform so as to always be spectral in our resistance. Adopting varied tactics enables an ecological coalition centered on the connectedness that arises from the belief that we all have a shared stake in the planet. Awakening to our collective stake in the environment can overcome the illusionary boundaries of the nation-­‐state, species, or even sentience. Every molecule of the Earth’s ecology is interconnected. When one part dies we all stand on the brink of extinction. For ecocriticism to embrace this interconnection it must not erect borders between different approaches so long as the foundation of the struggle is premised upon the commons of our universe. Unfortunately, “what characterizes much campus left discourse is a substitution of moral rhetoric about evil policies[, leaving] ... absent ... a sober reckoning with the preoccupations and opinions of the vast majority of Americans ... who do not believe that the discourse of ‘anti-­‐imperialism’ speaks to their lives” (Isaac). As a result, there is a need for ecocritics to not just speak to the choir that mostly already agrees with them. They must also speak to the populations who don’t intuitively see the link between imperialism, technology, and capitalism with environmental destruction. Apocalyptic rhetoric can do precisely that because of its underlying tenant of self-­preservation. The above point is absolutely crucial because ecocriticism cannot be effective if its focus never goes beyond the individual alone. No single person is the entire ecology so no individual can save it. While each individual undoubtedly impacts the environment and can cause change, no large scale transformation can take place if we never inspire collective action. In evolutionary terms, ideas, thoughts, and actions must be passed on in order to survive. For that to happen it takes a combined effort, even though it can start by a single mutation. Luke reminds us that the typical consumer does not control the critical aspects of his or her existence[.] ... The absurd claim that average consumers only need to shop, bicycle, or garden their way to an ecological future merely moves most of the responsibility and much of the blame away from the institutional centers of power whose decisions actually maintain the wasteful, careless ways of material exchange[. It also] ... ignores how corporate capital, big government, and professional experts pushed the practices of ... affluent society ... as a political strategy to sustain economic growth, forestall mass discontent, and empower scientific authority. People did choose to live this way, but their choices were made from a very narrow array of alternatives presented to them as rigidly structured, prepackaged menus of very limited options. (Luke, 1997: 127-­‐128) In turn, ecocritics must not displace the blame away from current hegemonic structures by calling on individuals to act alone. Instead ecocriticism must articulate its arguments to influence change in both institutions of power and the very people whose mindsets make up the current collective. Many environmental groups have been able to do precisely that. For instance, “NGOs and social movements active in global civil society have ... introduce[ed] ... dystopian scenarios ... as rhetorical devices that act as ‘wake-­up calls’... to jolt citizens out of their complacency and ... foster ... public deliberation about the potential cataclysms facing humankind” (Kurasawa 464). Ecocritics must not cut down such NGOs for adopting end-­of-­the-­world tactics even though their rhetoric might get co-opted when specific policies get enacted. Secondly, ecocriticism must never forget that what they do is politics. There are two implications to this. On the one hand it means that activists who directly lobby the government should not denounce the academically-oriented ecocritic for struggling within the academy. On the other hand it means that those who denounce the managerial tendencies that come along with governmental policies shouldn’t condemn activists who operate within the system. Instead of attacking one another, ecocritics should understand opposing discourses and ontologies as part of a spectral strategy that works against the environmental imperialism of the status-quo. We should take each opportunity for its fullest even in the face of failure. Once we acknowledge the virtual inevitability of co-optation the emphasis should be on creating successive struggles from a variety of standpoints. Captain Paul Watson, for instance, does not merely pack up his flagship the Steve Irwin and head home after the Japanese whaling season ends. He goes on to fight for seals, dolphins, and a number of other animals all the while participating within a larger discourse surrounding planetary ecology. Not all of Watson’s tactics have been successful. Neither has anyone else’s. However, that doesn’t mean we should give up. Quite the opposite. For example, just because revolutionaries like Che Guevara have been turned into trendy t-­‐shirts, fueling the industries of capitalism, doesn’t mean he shouldn’t have fought against imperialism in the first place. In the same way, just because environmental activists are inevitably going to fall victim to constructing an image of the planet on the brink of extinction, it doesn’t mean that we should discount their battles against such destruction. Their counter constructions enable a contestation over what it means to be human in relationship to the rest of the world. Absent these counter narratives only a singular construction of anthropocentric managerial domination would exist. A consequence to this second point is that the willingness to continually deploy different tactics is more powerful for ecocriticism than coming up with the perfect strategy. That way even when we become co-opted in one place we are already struggling from somewhere else. In turn, ecocriticism should focus on the underlying motivations that compel others to act in order to determine which ecocritics to be allies with. Through this way human beings can repair the willed manipulation inherent in calculative thinking and realize a patient equanimity toward Life. It is only in the context of this reawakened sense of the unity of life that revolutionary action gains an authentic basis. It is the engagement with “the Other” that shows the ELF actions are truly about defense of plant and animal life, and they demonstrate genuine liberation concerns that typically are trapped within Enframing. That is to say, ELF (and similar) actions, show themselves as part of a ... profound solidarity ... [that] serves as a general basis for a post-­‐Enframing, post-­‐capitalist order, an ecological, not a capitalist society. (Best and Nocella 83) This shift allows ecocriticism to formulate ever-­‐greater coalitions while at the same time preventing a descent into moral relativism. We can still utilize political action by eco-activists and NGOs such as PETA and Greenpeace productively, even if they result in reformist managerialism, so long as the sole focus doesn’t fall upon a singular tactic. Only a profound orientation of solidarity will ever have the hopes of succeeding. Everything we do is deeply political and we must understand that in acting or in thinking we necessarily impact the world. Uniting behind images of planetary omnicide holds the potential to collectively bring us together by awakening humanity to its shared stake in the global environment. Third, and most importantly, ecocritics must adopt tactics that can most effectively influence other people without proscribing end goals. By this I mean that ecocritics must use those tools that can appeal to the masses while simultaneously making their appeals in such a way as not to force a choice upon them. Apocalyptic imagery is ideal for this task. It appeals to notions of shared planetary concerns that serve as motivation for others to act, even without fully knowing how the apocalypse can truly be averted. By creating a compelling urge to do something that arises out of the image of planetary annihilation ecocriticism can influence a variety of people to take up arms through a multitude of techniques. Society as a whole will never mobilize to halt the very practices that threaten life without such compelling inspiration. When ecocriticism helps other people see how certain actions risk their very survival it will enable our planet to evolve differently. So long as ecocriticism never gives up on the struggle, even if this different direction may bring new scenarios of apocalypse, humanity as a species can continually evolve its patterns and behaviors to advert extinction. This is not to say we will live forever. Rather it is to say that as a species we can continue to exist in harmony with the lives all around us and give our deaths meaning. Ultimately, it is through imagining the end of the world that we will be able to envision how to save it.

### CP

perms

#### Multiple conditional worlds is a voting issue

#### It skews the 2AC strategy by dividing our offense into multiple worlds that we can’t access again when they jettison a position. Offense on one can also be cross-applied. 2ac is key to aff strategy and all other speeches. Outweighs neg flex because they can always react in the block while we can’t catch up in the 1ar

#### Encourages argumentative irresponsibility because they’ll go for whatever we under covered, leading to poor advocacy skills. And it undercuts research depth which is key to topic education

#### Don’t evaluate theory interpretations because they’re self serving and arbitrary

Doesn’t solve china

#### Only smr’s solve the grid – renewables fail

Charles Barton 11, founder of the Nuclear Green Revolution blog, MA in philosophy, “Future storm damage to the grid may carry unacceptable costs”, April 30, <http://nucleargreen.blogspot.com/2011_04_01_archive.html>

Amory Lovins has long argued that the traditional grid is vulnerable to this sort of damage. Lovins proposed a paradigm shift from centralized to distributed generation and from fossil fuels and nuclear power to renewable based micro-generation. Critics have pointed to flaws in Lovins model. Renewable generation systems are unreliable and their output varies from locality to locality, as well as from day to day, and hour to hour. In order to bring greater stability and predictability to the grid, electrical engineers have proposed expanding the electrical transmission system with thousands of new miles of transmission cables to be added to bring electricity from high wind and high sunshine areas, to consumers. This would lead, if anything, to greater grid vulnerability to storm damage in a high renewable penetration situation. Thus Lovins renewables/distributed generation model breaks down in the face of renewables limitations. Renewables penetration, will increase the distance between electrical generation facilities and customer homes and businesses, increasing the grid vulnerable to large scale damage, rather than enhancing reliability. Unfortunately Lovins failed to note that the distributed generation model actually worked much better with small nuclear power plants than with renewable generated electricity. Small nuclear plants could be located much closer to customer's homes, decreasing the probability of storm damage to transmission lines. At the very worst, small NPPs would stop the slide toward increased grid expansion. Small reactors have been proposed as electrical sources for isolated communities that are too remote for grid hookups. If the cost of small reactors can be lowered sufficiently it might be possible for many and perhaps even most communities to unhook from the grid while maintaining a reliable electrical supply. It is likely that electrical power will play an even more central role in a post-carbon energy era. Increased electrical dependency requires increased electrical reliability, and grid vulnerabilities limit electrical reliability. Storm damage can disrupt electrical service for days and even weeks. In a future, electricity dependent economy, grid damage can actually impede storm recovery efforts, making large scale grid damage semi-self perpetuating. Such grid unreliability becomes a threat to public health and safety. Thus grid reliability will be a more pressing future issue, than it has been. It is clear that renewable energy sources will worsen grid reliability, Some renewable advocates have suggested that the so called "smart grid" will prevent grid outages. Yet the grid will never be smart enough to repair its own damaged power lines. In addition the "smart grid" will be venerable to hackers, and would be a handy target to statures. A smart grid would be an easy target for a Stuxnet type virus attack. Not only does the "smart grid" not solve the problem posed by grid vulnerability to storm damage, but efficiency, another energy approach thought to be a panacea for electrical supply problems would be equally useless. Thus, decentralized electrical generation through the use of small nuclear power plants offers real potential for increasing electrical reliability, but successful use of renewable electrical generation approaches may worsen rather than improved grid reliability.

#### Intermittency and land

**Loudermilk 11**

Micah J. Loudermilk, Research Associate for the Energy & Environmental Security Policy program with the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University, 5/31/11, Small Nuclear Reactors and US Energy Security: Concepts, Capabilities, and Costs, www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=314:small-nuclear-reactors-and-us-energy-security-concepts-capabilities-and-costs&catid=116:content0411&Itemid=375

When discussing the energy security contributions offered by small nuclear reactors, it is not enough to simply compare them with existing nuclear technology, but also to examine how they measure up against other electricity generation alternatives—renewable energy technologies and fossil fuels. Coal, natural gas, and oil currently account for 45%, 23% and 1% respectively of US electricity generation sources. Hydroelectric power accounts for 7%, and other renewable power sources for 4%. These ratios are critical to remember because idealistic visions of providing for US energy security are not as useful as realistic ones balancing the role played by fossil fuels, nuclear power, and renewable energy sources. Limitations of renewables Renewable energy technologies have made great strides forward during the last decade. In an increasingly carbon emissions and greenhouse gas (GHG) aware global commons, the appeal of solar, wind, and other alternative energy sources is strong, and many countries are moving to increase their renewable electricity generation. However, despite massive expansion on this front, renewable sources struggle to keep pace with increasing demand, to say nothing of decreasing the amount of energy obtained from other sources. The continual problem with solar and wind power is that, lacking efficient energy storage mechanisms, it is difficult to contribute to baseload power demands. Due to the intermittent nature of their energy production, which often does not line up with peak demand usage, electricity grids can only handle a limited amount of renewable energy sources—a situation which Germany is now encountering. Simply put, nuclear power provides virtually carbon-free baseload power generation, and renewable options are unable to replicate this, especially not on the scale required by expanding global energy demands. Small nuclear reactors, however, like renewable sources, can provide enhanced, distributed, and localized power generation. As the US moves towards embracing smart grid technologies, power production at this level becomes a critical piece of the puzzle. Especially since renewable sources, due to sprawl, are of limited utility near crowded population centers, small reactors may in fact prove instrumental to enabling the smart grid to become a reality.

#### Empirics

**Andres and Breetz 11**

Richard Andres, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, and Hanna Breetz, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Small Nuclear Reactorsfor Military Installations:Capabilities, Costs, andTechnological Implications, [www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf)

In recent years, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has become increasingly interested in the potential of small (less than 300 megawatts electric [MWe]) nuclear reactors for military use.1 DOD’s attention to small reactors stems mainly from two critical vulnerabilities it has identified in its infrastructure and operations: the dependence of U.S. military bases on the fragile civilian electrical grid, and the challenge of safely and reliably supplying energy to troops in forward operating locations. DOD has responded to these challenges with an array of initiatives on energy efficiency and renewable and alternative fuels. Unfortunately, even with massive investment and ingenuity, these initiatives will be insufficient to solve DOD’s reliance on the civilian grid or its need for convoys in forward areas. The purpose of this paper is to explore the prospects for addressing these critical vulnerabilities through small-scale nuclear plants.

### Deployable Soon

#### SMRs are deployable soon because they’re based on current reactor designs and companies are already working on them- that’s U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade Administration 11

#### No R&D needed- plan has the DoD buy existing tech

#### Current SMR technology is well established- Navy ships

Freed 10

(Josh, Director of the Third Way Clean Energy Program, Elizabeth Horwitz is a Policy Advisor at Third Way’s Clean Energy ¶ Program, Jeremy Ershow was formerly a Policy ¶ Advisor at Third Way, “Thinking Small On Nuclear Power” <http://content.thirdway.org/publications/340/Third_Way_Idea_Brief_-_Thinking_Small_On_Nuclear_Power.pdf>, SEH)

The light water technology that current SMRs use is well-established; ¶ American manufacturers have designed and built small, light water reactors for ¶ 60 years to fuel the Navy’s carriers and submarines.¶ 29¶ While advanced reactor ¶ technology is further off, innovation is necessary to complete the transition to ¶ clean energy. Advanced reactor technologies are promising technologies that ¶ we need to invest in today

#### No link uniqueness-

#### a) SMR development inevitable globally, question is whether US leads development or gets the tech after it hits the market- that’s Hiruo ‘12

#### b) US nuke power is inevitable- US is committed to it even after accidents- Silverstein ‘12

#### Bioterror outweighs a nuclear attack – psychological, economic impact and ease of spread

Lilliefors ‘12

(James Lilliefors is a longtime journalist and writer, Lilliefors has written frequently for the Washington Post, the Miami Herald, The Boston Globe and the Baltimore Sun. He started his journalism career as a writer and editor for Runner's World magazine and worked for many years as a newspaper editor and reporter, in Maryland and in Florida, winning a number of reporting awards. He also has extensively explored the issue of biological weapons research in his novel Viral. “Bio-weapons 40 years later: Are we any safer?” APRIL 10, 2012 accessed online August 25, 2012 at http://www.sohopress.com/bio-weapons-40-years-later-are-we-any-safer/442/)

As many as a dozen other nations have pursued or developed offensive biological weapons programs since the treaty came into effect, U.S. officials believe, including North Korea, China, Iran and Syria. But perhaps more troubling is the fact that it has become easier for potential terrorists to obtain biological weapons. As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said at the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference in Geneva last December (the seventh such international conference since the treaty was signed): “Unfortunately, the ability of terrorists and other non-state actors to develop these weapons is growing.” So, too, apparently, is their desire to do so. In 2010, for instance, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula called for “brothers with degrees in microbiology or chemistry to develop a weapon of mass destruction.” The world community remains focused on potential nuclear threats—from Iran to North Korea to Pakistan—even though a biological attack could be just as devastating, and more unpredictable. This was the message that Ellen Tauscher, undersecretary of state for Arms Control and International Security, took to the 2009 annual meeting of the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention. Tauscher warned that “… a major biological weapons attack on one of the world’s major cities could cause as much death and economic and psychological damage as a nuclear attack.” Her comments came in conjunction with President Obama’s National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, which set a platform for identifying and responding to possible bio-attacks. This new national strategy was clearly a step in the right direction, updating some of the objectives and principles of the 1972 treaty (which now has 165 signatories). But a more robust international dialogue on improving global health security—something akin to the nuclear threat dialogue—is still sorely needed. To understand how insidiously disruptive even a small-scale biological event could be, we need only look at the anthrax attacks of September and October 2001. Several letters containing anthrax spores were mailed anonymously to news organizations and two United States senators. Five people died as a result, 17 others were infected. Congress was paralyzed and the country was on high alert for weeks—although the heightened concern was mostly transitory. The federal investigation into the attacks went on for more than eight years without an arrest. The case was finally closed in 2010, a year and a half after the FBI’s major suspect, a government bio-defense researcher named Brice Ivins, killed himself.¶ The potential for an “anonymous” event is one of the most frightening aspects of the increasingly complex biological threat. As new diseases emerge, as the life sciences grow more sophisticated and as globalization draws everyone closer together, there are simply more ways that a deadly virus could get loose than there were even a few years ago. It is possible that a deadly pathogen could sweep the planet and we would never know for certain if it was naturally occurring, accidental, a terror attack or something deliberately let loose by a deranged scientist—which is what the FBI believes happened with the anthrax attacks of 2001. As President Obama said recently, “We must come together to prevent and detect and fight every kind of biological danger, whether it’s a pandemic like H1N1 or a terrorist threat or a terrible disease.”

#### Biological weapons are the deadliest and easiest to use – New antibiotic immune strains and unmonitored labs

Akram ‘12

(Munir Akram is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN. “Nuclear terror” accessed online August 24, 2012 at http://dawn.com/2012/06/24/nuclear-terror/)

Extensive bureaucratic and military machinery has been created within governments and at the UN to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons, materials or knowledge by terrorists and extremists.¶ Among states, Pakistan has encountered the greatest pressure to reassure the ‘international community’ that its nuclear weapons and materials are ‘safe’ and will not fall into the hands of terrorists and Islamic militants. Pakistan’s detractors next door and in western capitals have missed no opportunity to portray it as the most likely source of nuclear terrorism.¶ Nuclear weapons are devilishly complex to develop, deploy and use. India required five decades (1948-1998) to master the atomic bomb; Pakistan developed its capability over 24 years; North Korea acquired a primitive capability after 20 years.¶ Iran’s enrichment capacity has evolved in even slower motion. Terrorist organisations will find it virtually impossible to develop nuclear weapons by themselves.¶ No state is likely to share its nuclear weapons capability with non-state actors because their unaccountable use, or threat of use, of a nuclear weapon, would most certainly invite a retaliatory response endangering the very existence of the transferring state. Islamic jihadis may resort to suicide attacks; Islamic states are not suicidal.¶ Moreover, it is totally beyond the capability terrorist organisations to arm, aim and fire a nuclear weapon. These complex systems require the coordinated actions of an entire team of highly trained people to use them.¶ Numerous studies have established that if fissionable material were to be acquired, by theft or capture, by terrorists or other non-state actors, the most they could do with it is build and explode a radiation (dirty) bomb. Depending on population density, a dirty bomb’s casualties would number in the hundreds rather than thousands. In comparison, a ‘daisy-cutter’ — the conventional fire and concussion bomb used extensively in Afghanistan — would cause thousands of casualties¶ if dropped on a population centre.¶ The most destructive weapons a terrorist can acquire or build are chemical or biological weapons. Both are banned by international treaty. A system is in place to verify the chemical weapons ban. Not so for biological weapons. Thousands of laboratories remain immune from international inspection due to opposition from the US and some other industrial countries. Recent news reports that scientists have developed bacteria immune to antibiotics are not reassuring.¶ Since Hiroshima, ‘nuclear terror’ has been the monopoly of states. Today, nuclear terror emanates from the failure of states to address those security issues that could precipitate the deliberate or accidental use of nuclear weapons. There are at least five areas of ‘nuclear concern’.¶ The planned deployment of US Anti-Ballistic Missile systems in Europe could erode the stability of deterrence, based, since the Cold War, on the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). Russia does not accept the American assurance that to be deployed ABMs are meant to shoot down Iranian rather than Russian missiles.¶ Although China faced nuclear threats in the early days, the nuclear equation has been a latent factor in China’s relations with both the US and Russia over the last four decades. This may change once the US implements its plans to deploy most of its naval forces to the Pacific and build a ring of alliances around China’s periphery. ABM systems could also be deployed by the US, Japan and India in the region. Unlike the US-Soviet Cold War relationship, there is no agreed doctrine to stabilise nuclear relations between China and the US.¶ In this context, the Korean peninsula is an especially dangerous nuclear ‘hot spot’. A weak, insecure and nuclear-armed North Korean regime confronts coercive efforts to denuclearise it. A miscalculation on either side could lead to a disastrous conflagration.¶ In the Middle East, the danger arises from coercive efforts to maintain Israel’s nuclear monopoly. Iraq’s nuclear endeavours have been obliterated. An alleged clandestine nuclear facility in Syria was destroyed by Israel three years ago. There is widespread speculation that Iran will be attacked before its enrichment programme moves into what the Israelis have called ‘the zone of immunity’. Iran’s direct and indirect retaliation will make the post-Arab Spring Middle East a most dangerous place.¶ The nuclear danger is pervasive in South Asia today. In 2004, Pakistan and India declared jointly that their acquisition of nuclear weapons had contributed to stability in South Asia. However, the nuclear parity which this declaration implied has been broken by three developments. The first and most important was the Indo-US Nuclear Cooperation Agreement which provided India a quantitative and a qualitative nuclear edge against Pakistan.¶ A second development was the publication of reports that the US has plans to seize Pakistan’s nuclear weapons if these were¶ in danger of being captured or taken over by Islamic radicals. Suffice it to say, plans to seize or destroy another country’s nuclear assets, and counter-measures to thwart this, do not mitigate the danger of conventional or non-conventional conflict.¶ The negative developments in Pakistan-US relations in 2011 validated and reinforced the dangerous strategic drift. Today, the relationship has passed into the zone of hostility at the popular and official level. It is entirely uncertain where the American insults, collaboration with our regional adversaries and talk of ‘losing patience’ with Pakistan will lead.¶ The history of the nuclear era reveals how often states have come, through blunder and miscalculation, to the brink of nuclear catastrophe. We continue to live with nuclear terror.

#### Bioweapons knowledge is widely dispersed

Loeb 9

Cheryl Loeb, (Research Associate, National Defense U.), JIHADISTS AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, 2009, 154.

Key to countering future biological weapons terrorism is developing an understanding of the threat as it relates to jihadist terrorism. Advances in life sciences research have rapidly diffused the knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to produce even quite sophisticated biological weapons around the world, potentially placing them in the hands of state and nonstate actors. The intersection of jihadist terrorism with this increasing revolution in life sciences only makes the threat more prevalent.