#### Impact ineitable- alt doesn’t solve the DOD using energy- or if it does, the aff is an impact turn

### 2AC Cuts Now

#### Modernization budget will be cut now - Mandated cuts

Weisgerber 2/12

(Marcus Weisgerber of Defense News which is a global newsweekly on politics, business and technology of defense. Defense News serves an audience of senior military, government and industry decision-makers throughout the world “2013 DoD Modernization Budget Falls 7% Below Prior Projections” Feb. 12, 2012 - 11:36AM http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120212/DEFREG02/302120003/2013-DoD-Modernization-Budget-Falls-7-Below-Prior-Projections, TSW)

The Pentagon has proposed slashing its 2013 modernization budget more than 7 percent from its spending projections a year ago, according to a U.S. Defense Department document obtained by Defense News.¶ Funds used to buy and develop new weapons, projected to total $193.3 billion in February 2012, will fall to $178.8 billion, down $14.5 billion, in DoD’s 2013 spending request, which will be sent to Congress on Feb. 13.¶ The so-called modernization budget is the sum of the procurement and research-and-development accounts in both the base budget and overseas contingency operations budget.¶ A year ago, the Pentagon projected spending $117.6 billion and procurement and another $75.7 on research and development (R&D). The new plan calls for spending $109.1 billion on procurement and $69.7 billion on R&D efforts.¶ The decline is attributed to the Pentagon’s plan to cut $487 billion from planned spending projections over the next decade. The first five years of those savings, totaling about $259 billion, will be outlined in DoD’s 2013 budget proposal.¶ The Budget Control Act of 2011, designed to lower the U.S. government deficit, mandated these defense cuts.¶ In early January, the Pentagon unveiled new strategic guidance, which officials said would help shape the cuts to defense spending. That guidance, the product of a months-long review, call for DoD to focus more on the Pacific region, while maintaining a focus on the Middle East.¶ Since the Pacific is such a vast, maritime region, spending on the Navy and Air Force programs is expected to be higher than Army and Marine Corps efforts.¶ Still, the funds requested for major mission sectors, such as aircraft and shipbuilding, in 2013 is down from what DoD asked for in 2012.¶ The Pentagon is requesting $47.6 billion for aircraft programs, down from a $54 billion 2012 request. The shipbuilding request is more than $1 billion less than last year’s $24 billion request.¶ The 2013 request includes $10.9 billion for ground systems. In 2012, DoD asked Congress to approve $16 billion for this type of equipment.¶ DoD’s 2013 budget request includes $11.9 billion for science-and-technology-related R&D nearly the same amount the Pentagon asked for in 2012.

#### **Alt causes to Middle East presence – this evidence is on fire**

Gvosdev, Naval War College, 7/20 – former editor of National Interest, faculty of Navy War College, foreign policy commentator [Nikolas K., 7/20/2012, World Politics Review, “The Realist Prism: Putting Out Mideast Fires Will Delay US Asia Pivot,” <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12178/the-realist-prism-putting-out-mideast-fires-will-delay-u-s-asia-pivot>]

It looks like the vaunted U.S. pivot to Asia is going to be delayed. The ongoing conflict in Syria and the escalation of tensions with Iran make it highly unlikely that Washington will be able to shift away from its long-held priority focus on the Middle East anytime soon.

When the Asia pivot was first floated by the Obama administration in 2009, it was based on a series of strategic assessments about the likely future of the Middle East. There was guarded optimism that a combination of effective sanctions and deft diplomacy could produce a workable deal on the Iranian nuclear program. The U.S. disengagement from Iraq was proceeding on schedule, and confidence was high that a surge in Afghanistan might similarly put that country on a positive trajectory allowing for the U.S. to successfully terminate its combat mission there. Then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ unequivocal pronouncement that any future U.S. leader who proposed a massive military intervention in the region should have “his head examined” seemed to indicate that once Iraq and Afghanistan were tidied up, the United States wouldn’t be “coming ashore” anywhere else anytime soon. And the smart Washington money was on a series of next-generation leadership transitions -- among them Gamal Mubarak in Egypt and Seif-al-Islam Gadhafi in Libya -- leading to political and economic reforms.

Many of those assumptions have been upset by the events of the past year. The Arab Spring deposed a number of familiar and predictable faces, while installing previously unknown ones, such as Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi. In so doing, it has introduced a great deal of uncertainty into the politics of the region as to whether successor governments will continue to support the American security agenda, undermining part of the assumption on which the U.S. pivot to Asia was based: namely, the assessment that the U.S. could continue to count on the strong support of key states such as Egypt. And while the United States remains committed to turning over security responsibilities to the Afghan government in 2014, no one expects a rapid American disengagement from Afghanistan to follow.

As the fighting continues in Syria -- with the government of President Bashar al-Assad unable to crush the uprising and its control over the country as a whole slipping away, as highlighted by Wednesday’s bombing in Damascus -- the prospect of any sort of managed transition to resolve the crisis erodes. A fracturing of Syria along ethno-sectarian lines, in turn, imperils other fragile states, such as Iraq and Lebanon, and opens up two distinct but unwelcome possibilities: Yugoslav-style conflicts as groups seek to create compact statelets, creating further unrest and instability; or the need for a large-scale peacekeeping intervention to separate warring factions and hold countries together. Neither option is attractive to the Obama administration in an election year dominated by concerns about America’s own economic future.

And while Iran denies responsibility for the bombing Wednesday in Bulgaria that targeted Israeli tourists, the attack -- along with the deployment of U.S. naval forces to the Persian Gulf and the failure of nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 powers to reach even the outlines of an agreement -- makes it highly unlikely that a diplomatic grand bargain that wraps up all the outstanding issues between Iran and the United States is in the cards. While Washington’s preference is still for using sanctions to exert more pressure on the Islamic Republic to modify its behavior, the possibility of a more direct confrontation between Iran and the United States cannot be ruled out.

Indeed, the twin possibilities of an impending meltdown in Syria and an open clash with Iran mean that the United States must be prepared for new large-scale engagements in the Middle East, notwithstanding the apparent validation of the approach taken in Libya, where a relatively low-cost intervention deposed Moammar Gadhafi and has seemingly empowered a moderate coalition to take power. Already, some in Washington are advocating that the United States take advantage of the situation in Syria to redraw the political map of the Middle East. By this logic, helping to administer a final blow to the Baathist regime in Syria would simultaneously sever Iran’s ability to connect to its allies in Lebanon and its proxies in the Palestinian territories, thereby creating the conditions that will bring the Islamic Republic itself crumbling down.

But if this happens, the United States cannot manage the subsequent transition by relying on drones and a few special forces units while otherwise leading from behind. As much as Washington might want to get out of the business of being intimately involved in the political and security arrangements of the Middle East, which requires dedicating a large proportion of the nation’s focus and military might, events are conspiring to suck the United States back in. President Barack Obama ran for office in 2008 promising to wrap up American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, but Iran and Syria, not East Asia, may be where American attention will be focused next.

One cannot help but wonder, therefore, if the reluctance of China and Russia to back Washington’s preferred approach on Syria and Iran -- both to force the Assad regime out and start the process of political transition in Syria and to implement crippling sanctions that would collapse the economy in Iran -- is based on an assessment that drawing out the Middle East endgame prevents the United States from focusing its full attention on Asia. Certainly, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s timetable for getting his vaunted Eurasian Union off the ground is geared to expectations that U.S. involvement in the greater Middle East will continue for the next several years. And China’s ability to exercise pressure to block the mention of territorial disputes in the South China Sea in the final communiqué of the ASEAN summit last week suggests that for now, at least, Beijing continues to see the American pivot as more rhetorical than real.

When first announced in 2009, the pivot to Asia was predicated on the assumption that the United States would be able to focus more on Asia by extracting itself from the Middle East. This, then, is the premier challenge that either a second-term Obama administration or a first-term Romney administration must grapple with: how, under conditions of growing scarcity, to resource and sustain a credible Asia pivot, even as the United States remains deeply engaged in the Middle East.

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policy responses to such issues are largely framed in terms of “energy security”.

### War O/W Structural Violence Impacts

#### War fuels structural violence, not the other way around

Goldstein 2001. IR professor at American University (Joshua, War and Gender, p. 412, Google Books)

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps. among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.9 So, “if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

### AT Root Cause

#### The alternative locks in the war system – infinite number of non-falsifiable ‘root causes’ means only incentive theory solves

Moore ’04 – Dir. Center for Security Law @ University of Virginia, 7-time Presidential appointee, & Honorary Editor of the American Journal of International Law, Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace, John Norton Moore, pages 41-2.

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war? Past, and many contemporary, theories of war have focused on the role of specific disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty or social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, and perceptions of "honor," or many other such factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or in serving as a means for generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high risk decisions leading to war that is the key to more effectively controlling war. And the same may also be true of democide. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents.I1 Certainly if we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so. Indeed, democratic governments must remain committed to policies that will produce a better world by all measures of human progress. The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress. No one, however, has yet been able to demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war as is reflected in the "democratic peace." Further, given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social problems, an approach to war exclusively dependent on their solution may be to doom us to war for generations to come. A useful framework in thinking about the war puzzle is provided in the Kenneth Waltz classic Man, the State, and War,12 first published in 1954 for the Institute of War and Peace Studies, in which he notes that previous thinkers about the causes of war have tended to assign responsibility at one of the three levels of individual psychology, the nature of the state, or the nature of the international system. This tripartite level of analysis has subsequently been widely copied in the study of international relations. We might summarize my analysis in this classical construct by suggesting that the most critical variables are the second and third levels, or "images," of analysis. Government structures, at the second level, seem to play a central role in levels of aggressiveness in high risk behavior leading to major war. In this, the "democratic peace" is an essential insight. The third level of analysis, the international system, or totality of external incentives influencing the decision for war, is also critical when government structures do not restrain such high risk behavior on their own. Indeed, nondemocratic systems may not only fail to constrain inappropriate aggressive behavior, they may even massively enable it by placing the resources of the state at the disposal of a ruthless regime elite. It is not that the first level of analysis, the individual, is unimportant. I have already argued that it is important in elite perceptions about the permissibility and feasibility of force and resultant necessary levels of deterrence. It is, instead, that the second level of analysis, government structures, may be a powerful proxy for settings bringing to power those who may be disposed to aggressive military adventures and in creating incentive structures predisposing to high risk behavior. We should keep before us, however, the possibility, indeed probability, that a war/peace model focused on democracy and deterrence might be further usefully refined by adding psychological profiles of particular leaders, and systematically applying other findings of cognitive psychology, as we assess the likelihood of aggression and levels of necessary deterrence in context. A post-Gulf War edition of Gordon Craig and Alexander George's classic, Force and Statecraft,13 presents an important discussion of the inability of the pre-war coercive diplomacy effort to get Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait without war.14 This discussion, by two of the recognized masters of deterrence theory, reminds us of the many important psychological and other factors operating at the individual level of analysis that may well have been crucial in that failure to get Hussein to withdraw without war. We should also remember that nondemocracies can have differences between leaders as to the necessity or usefulness of force and, as Marcus Aurelius should remind us, not all absolute leaders are Caligulas or Neros. Further, the history of ancient Egypt reminds us that not all Pharaohs were disposed to make war on their neighbors. Despite the importance of individual leaders, however, we should also keep before us that major international war is predominantly and critically an interaction, or synergy, of certain characteristics at levels two and three, specifically an absence of democracy and an absence of effective deterrence. Yet another way to conceptualize the importance of democracy and deterrence in war avoidance is to note that each in its own way internalizes the costs to decision elites of engaging in high risk aggressive behavior. Democracy internalizes these costs in a variety of ways including displeasure of the electorate at having war imposed upon it by its own government. And deterrence either prevents achievement of the objective altogether or imposes punishing costs making the gamble not worth the risk. Testing the Hypothesis Theory without truth is but costly entertainment. HYPOTHESES, OR PARADIGMS, are useful if they reflect the real world better than previously held paradigms.

In the complex world of foreign affairs and the war puzzle, perfection is unlikely. No general construct will fit all cases even in the restricted category of "major interstate war"; there are simply too many variables. We should insist, however, on testing against the real world and on results that suggest enhanced usefulness over other constructs. In testing the hypothesis, we can test it for consistency with major wars; that is, in looking, for example, at the principal interstate wars in the twentieth century, did they present both a nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence?' And although it is by itself not going to prove causation, we might also want to test the hypothesis against settings of potential wars that did not occur. That is, in nonwar settings, was there an absence of at least one element of the synergy? We might also ask questions about the effect of changes on the international system in either element of the synergy; that is, what, in general, happens when a totalitarian state makes a transition to stable democracy or vice versa? And what, in general, happens when levels of deterrence are dramatically increased or decreased?

### A2- overpop

#### Population smaller – won’t cause overshoot.

Hugh, 6

Edward Hugh, RETHINKING THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION, 2006, <http://www.edwardhugh.net/rethinking_the_demographic_.pdf>

In the short-run there is no real global problem. The population range in 2050 will be only from 7.4 to 10.6 billion, numbers which at first can certainly be fed and, given proper safeguards, are not likely to cause a major upset to such global systems as the atmosphere.

### Imperialism Solves Genocide

#### Imperialism is key to stop war, terrorism and disease spread

Niall Ferguson. 2004. Historian @ NYU, COLLOSSAS: THE PRICE OF AMERICA’S EMPIRE, pp. 24-5

Unlike the majority of European writers who have written on this subject, I am fundamentally in favor of empire. Indeed, I believe that empire is more necessary in the twenty-first century than ever before. The threats we face are not in themselves new ones. But advances in technology make them more dangerous than ever before. Thanks to the speed and regularity of modern air travel, infectious diseases can be transmitted to us with terrifying swiftness. And thanks to the relative cheapness and destructive­ness of modern weaponry, tyrants and terrorists can realistically think of devastating our cities. The old, post-1945 system of sovereign states, bound loosely together by an evolving system of international law, cannot easily deal with these threats because there are too many nation-states where the writ of the "international community" simply does not run. What is required is an agency capable of intervening in the affairs of such states to contain epidemics, depose tyrants, end local wars and eradicate terrorist or­ganizations. This is the self-interested argument for empire. But there is also a complementary altruistic argument. Even if they did not pose a direct threat to the security of the United States, the economic and social conditions in a number of countries in the world would justify some kind of intervention. The poverty of a country like Liberia is explicable not in terms of resource endowment; otherwise (for example) Botswana would be just as poor."' The problem in Liberia, as in so many sub-Saharan African states, is simply misgovernment: corrupt and lawless dictators whose con­duct makes economic development impossible and encourages political opposition to take the form of civil wars Countries in this condition will not correct themselves. They require the imposition of some kind of external authority.

#### Imperialism is key to stop genocide – anti-imperialism guarantees inaction

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Anti-imperialism is based on a demonstrable falsehood – that Western military intervention always has negative results. Everyone knows that British and US military intervention liberated Western Europe from Nazism, and most anti- imperialists would concede that this was a good thing, but few are willing to acknowledge the implications of this for the anti-imperialist paradigm. External military intervention by Western ‘imperial’ powers helped to ensure the victory of the American Revolution; the liberation of Greece from the Ottoman Empire; the triumph of Italian unification; the liberation of Poland and Finland from Russia and the South Slavs from the Habsburg Empire. The anti-Nazi resistance movement in Yugoslavia during World War II received crucial military support from the Western Allies, including the bombing of enemy targets (and involving the killing of many civilians). Conversely, the failure of democratic states to intervene militarily led in the 1930s to the fascist victory in Spain, the Italian conquest of Abyssinia and the Nazi conquest of Czechoslovakia. The Western Allies could arguably have saved hundreds of thousands of Jewish and other lives by bombing the railway lines to Auschwitz, but chose not to; they nevertheless defeated Hitler, ended the Holocaust and saved hundreds of thousands more. Western military action could have halted the Rwandan genocide and prevented the Srebrenica massacre. Western military action did end Saddam’s persecution of the Kuwaitis and Kurds, and Milošević’s persecution of the Kosovo Albanians. Yet the anti-imperialists persist with their myth that Western military intervention must necessarily bring totally negative results – not because it is true, but because their ideology depends upon it. ¶ 9) Anti-imperialism is anti-internationalist. By rejecting Western military intervention, the anti-imperialists reject the only means by which Western progressives can hope to halt genocide and fight oppression and tyranny abroad. The more honourable and decent anti-imperialists have been ready to express solidarity with the suffering people of Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq. Yet such expressions of solidarity do nothing to halt genocide or persecution. By rejecting Western military intervention, the anti-imperialists confine themselves, at best, to being passive spectators in foreign conflicts. More usually, however, they are uninterested in such conflicts, unless and until the Western powers intervene in a more high-profile manner – in which case the anti-imperialists invariably mobilise to preserve the status quo and defend the fascists and persecutors from ‘Western military intervention.’