## CP

### 1AR

#### Microgrids don’t solve- turn off the renewables during outages

Sater 11

(Daniel, Research Fellow at Global Green USA’s Security and Sustainability Office in ¶ Washington, DC in the summer of 2011. He is a graduate student at the Frank Batten School of ¶ Leadership and Public Policy at the University of Virginia. Daniel holds a BA in Foreign Affairs ¶ from UVA and will receive his Master of Public Policy degree in May 2012. “Military Energy Security: Current Efforts and Future Solutions” <http://www.globalgreen.org/docs/publication-185-1.pdf>, SEH)

Microgrids are not without their drawbacks. Similar to the problems with the departing load ¶ charge utilities levy on installations that produce renewable energy, many utilities try to restrict ¶ the use of renewable energy generation as backup power during a power outage. The utilities’ ¶ reasoning is that, if there was any electricity in the grid during an outage, their workers would be ¶ at risk while repairing any damage. According to the GAO, four out of five installations it visited.

#### Only SMRS solves readiness

Pfeffer and Macon 1

(Robert A, physical scientist at the Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency in Springfield, Virginia, working on nuclear weapons effects. He is a graduate of Trinity University and has a master's degree in physics from The Johns Hopkins University, William A, a project manager at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. He was formerly the acting Army Reactor Program Manager at the Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency. He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and has a master's degree in nuclear engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, “Nuclear Power: An Option for the Army's Future” <http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/SepOct01/MS684.htm>, SEH)

Military Realities¶ Today, the military faces several post-Cold War realities. First, the threat has changed. Second, regional conflicts are more probable than all-out war. Third, the United States will participate in joint and coalition operations that could take our forces anywhere in the world for undetermined periods of time. Finally, the U.S. military must operate with a smaller budget and force structure. These realities already are forcing substantial changes on the Army.¶ So, as we consider future Army energy sources, we foresee a more mobile Army that must deploy rapidly and sustain itself indefinitely anywhere in the world as part of a coalition force. In addition, this future Army will have to depend on other nations to provide at least some critical logistics support. An example of such a cooperative effort was Operation Desert Storm, where coalition forces (including the United States) relied on some countries to supply potable water and other countries to provide fuel. This arrangement allowed U.S. cargo ships to concentrate on delivering weapon systems and ammunition.¶ But consider the following scenario. The U.S. military is called on to suppress armed conflict in a far-off region. The coalition forces consist of the United States and several Third World countries in the region that have a vested interest in the outcome of the conflict. Our other allies are either unwilling or unable to support the regional action, either financially or militarily. The military effort will be a challenge to support over time, especially with such basic supplies as fuel and water. How can the United States sustain its forces?¶ One way to minimize the logistics challenge is for the Army to produce fuel and potable water in, or close to, the theater. Small nuclear power plants could convert seawater into hydrogen fuel and potable water where needed, with less impact on the environment than caused by the current production, transportation, and use of carbon-based fuels.¶ Seawater: The Ultimate Energy Source¶ Industrial nations are seeing severe energy crises occur more frequently worldwide, and, as world population increases and continues to demand a higher standard of living, carbon-based fuels will be depleted even more rapidly. Alternative energy sources must be developed. Ideally, these sources should be readily available worldwide with minimum processing and be nonpolluting. Current options include wind, solar, hydroelectric, and nuclear energy, but by themselves they cannot satisfy the energy demands of both large, industrial facilities and small, mobile equipment. While each alternative energy source is useful, none provides the complete range of options currently offered by oil. It is here that thinking "outside the box" is needed.¶ As difficult as the problem seems, there is one energy source that is essentially infinite, is readily available worldwide, and produces no carbon byproducts. The source of that energy is seawater, and the method by which seawater is converted to a more direct fuel for use by commercial and military equipment is simple. The same conversion process generates potable water.¶ Seawater Conversion Process¶ Temperatures greater than 1,000 degrees Celsius, as found in the cores of nuclear reactors, combined with a thermochemical water-splitting process, is probably the most efficient means of breaking down water into its component parts: molecular hydrogen and oxygen. The minerals and salts in seawater would have to be removed by a desalination process before the water-splitting process and then burned or returned to the sea.¶ Sodium iodide (NaI) and other compounds are being investigated as possible catalysts for high-temperature chemical reactions with water to release the hydrogen, which then can be contained and used as fuel. When burned, hydrogen combines with oxygen and produces only water and energy; no atmospheric pollutants are created using this cycle.¶ Burning coal or oil to generate electricity for production of hydrogen by electrolysis would be wasteful and counterproductive. Nuclear power plants, on the other hand, can provide safe, efficient, and clean power for converting large quantities of seawater into usable hydrogen fuel.¶ For the military, a small nuclear power plant could fit on a barge and be deployed to a remote theater, where it could produce both hydrogen fuel and potable water for use by U.S. and coalition forces in time of conflict. In peacetime, these same portable plants could be deployed for humanitarian or disaster relief operations to generate electricity and to produce hydrogen fuel and potable water as necessary. Such dual usage (hydrogen fuel for equipment and potable water for human consumption) could help peacekeepers maintain a fragile peace. These dual roles make nuclear-generated products equally attractive to both industry and the military, and that could foster joint programs to develop modern nuclear power sources for use in the 21st century.

## Russia

Alt energy inevitable and multiple alt causes to Russian econ

KHRUSHCHEVA ‘8(Nina L. Khrushcheva is an associate professor of international affairs at the New School, Chronicle of Higher Education, 9-5)

That scenario, however, is unlikely. The unstable conditions that are stoking Russia's current economic boom may soon bring about a crisis similar to the financial meltdown of 1998, when, as a result of the decline in world commodity prices, Russia, which is heavily dependent on the export of raw materials, lost most of its income. Widespread corruption at every level of private and state bureaucracy, coupled with the fact that the government invests little of its oil money in fostering areas like technological innovation, corporate responsibility, and social and political reform, could spin the economic balance out of control. Rampant inflation might bring the Putin-Medvedev Kremlin down. Even if Russia withstands that scenario, global forces will ultimately burst its economic bubble. The temporary release of the U.S. oil reserves, and tough economic and legal sanctions against oil speculators around the world, should end Russia's oil supremacy and hasten its economic collapse. And sooner or later, alternative solutions to the world's dependence on oil and gas will be found.

#### Russia econ is resilient – stock market

Mobius 9/25/2012

(Mark, executive chairman of the Templeton Emerging Mark ets Team.; “The next stage in Russia's economy,” The Edge Singapore – Lexis – Kurr)

Russia's stock market and investment climate In the early 1990s, Russia's stock market was primitive. Trading began around three o'clock in the afternoon, give or take, when a vehicle would pull up to the stock exchange building carrying loads of cash. Brokers would sit at long tables waiting for workers and ordinary citizens who had been given share vouchers — which could be exchanged for shares in newly privatised Russian companies — to sell them on the exchange. Around six o'clock in the evening, the vehicle would return to collect the vouchers the brokers had bought on the cheap. As investors there, we faced an extremely unstable environment and were often told "trust us!", with little basis to go on. And the vast majority of Russian stocks were so thinly traded we had to wait days, or even weeks, to execute a trade. How things have changed. The newly merged Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange (Micex) and Russian Trading System (RTS) Exchange offers trading in a full range of equities, options and commodity futures products — on an electronic platform, day and night. The Micex-RTS reported yearly trading volume of more than US$10 trillion in 2011. In 1H2012, Russia's market suffered from negative investor sentiment. Much Western capital took flight, and local investors lost confidence, too. The problem is there is a lot of uncertainty about what a new Putin presidential term means for the country. Some believe the Putin government is discouraging private-sector growth and the economy will move even more towards a state-controlled economy than it already is. On the other hand, there are those who say foreign investment is being encouraged through various government mechanisms. The jury is still out. As value investors, this has meant we could pick up shares at bargain prices. In our view, Russia appears to be one of the most attractive markets in emerging Europe from a valuation standpoint, with an average market price-to-earnings ratio of about five times in 1H. To attract more foreign capital and instil confidence, the Micex-RTS announced planned reforms that would affect new listings, including English-language reporting of quarterly reports and efforts to move towards a more traditional security and cash settlement trade transaction process. From an investment standpoint, we are looking for opportunities not only in the energy sector, but also in areas such as consumer goods and services and shipping. Rail-container shipping is an area that should see growth, aided by increasing consumer demand, a potential improvement in the global macroeconomy and development of the country's Europe-Asia transit potential. Increased privatisation efforts in this area and others in Russia should help further stimulate investment. Russia's effort to build a planned high-tech centre outside Moscow (akin to the "Silicon Valley" in the US) is also an interesting enterprise that bears watching. No matter what the future holds, Russia — and its people — have proven resilient time and again. I look forward to the next stage of Russia's economic evolution.

#### Even if economic crisis causes political crisis, it won’t escalate—the 1998 crisis proves

David Kotz, teaches economics at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Nov/Dec 1998, http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Economics/CapitalistCollapse\_Russia.html

Despite the unprecedented economic depression, until recently Russian bankers kept getting richer and the stock market soared, buoyed by the lucrative trade in Russia's valuable oil, gas, and metals. Western banks helped to finance the speculative binge that drove up Russian stock prices, making it one of the world's best-performing stock markets in 1997. Then in the late spring of this year, Russia's stock market began to fall and investors started to pull their money out of the country. The Clinton administration, fearing that Yeltsin's government would not survive a looming financial crisis, pressed a reluctant IMF to approve a $22.6 billion emergency loan on July 13. This bailout proved unsuccessful. Four weeks later the financial crisis resumed as investors fled and Russia's government had to pay as much as 300% interest to attract buyers for its bonds. After Washington rejected Yeltsin's desperate plea for still more money, Russia did the unthinkable: it was forced to suspend payment on its foreign debt for 90 days, restructure its entire debt, and devalue the ruble. Panic followed, as Russia's high-flying banks teetered on the edge of collapse, depositors were unable to withdraw their money, and store shelves were rapidly emptied of goods. The financial collapse produced a political crisis, as President Yeltsin, his domestic support evaporating, had to contend with an emboldened opposition in the parliament.

### 1ar- Oil DA

#### Downward prices pressure now due to supply cushion- supply disruptions irrelevant

Davis 10/5

Philip R. Davis is a founder of Phil's Stock World (www.philstockworld.com), a stock and options trading site that teaches the art of options trading to newcomers and devises advanced strategies for expert traders. Mr. Davis is a serial entrepreneur, having founded software company Accu-Title, a real estate title insurance software solution, and is also the President of the Delphi Consulting Corp., an M&A consulting firm that helps large and small companies obtain funding and close deals. He was also the founder of Accu-Search, a property data corporation that was sold to DataTrace in 2004 and Personality Plus, a precursor to eHarmony.com.

<http://seekingalpha.com/article/907951-why-oil-prices-are-low-and-staying-that-way>

I think oil is suffering from the stuffed strip at the NYMEX, the supply glut, the lack of demand and the fact that Iran's entire production is off-line and it's having no affect whatsoever on the global markets. So now the supply cushion is known to be much more than was previously stated and it's going to be much harder, going forward, to panic prices higher when a 150Kbd Nigerian pipeline goes down for a few days.

#### Downward pressure now- their ev doesn’t assume slowing demand

Seeking Alpha 10/5

http://seekingalpha.com/article/906611-etf-opportunity-in-the-undervalued-natural-resources-sector

European Central Bank president Mario Draghi's promise in late July to do "whatever it takes" to save the euro allayed the possibility of an imminent sovereign default. The ECB plans to purchase bonds from the euro's weakest countries in order to reduce their borrowing costs. However, the bank's requirement that these purchases be offset by deposits of equal size will likely limit the stimulative impact of this program. As a result of this continued weakness in Europe and China, the IEA projects that global demand for oil will grow at a modest 1% in 2013. There is significant risk that oil demand may fall short of expectations, which would put downward pressure on oil prices and many of the fund's energy holdings.

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#### They’re own ev says russia’s economy is resilient and recovers from crisis- here’s more ev

Heilprin 11 – AP Report (John, “Putin says Russia economy recovering, still below pre-global financial crisis level” June 15, 2011 http://www.startribune.com/world/123913759.html)

GENEVA - Russia's economy is recovering, but remains well below the level it was at before the global financial crisis, says Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, addressing a U.N. labor meeting in Geneva on Wednesday. Putin said Russia has "managed to recover two-thirds of our economy, but still we have not reached pre-crisis levels." The Russian economy contracted by almost 8 percent during the recession. He added that the economy — the world's sixth-largest — would reach pre-crisis levels by 2012, eventually rising to become one of the world's top five. Putin also called for "a more fair and balanced economic model," as nations gradually recover from the world financial crisis that hit in 2008. In April, Putin said in his annual address before Russian parliament that the key lesson from the financial crisis was for the country to be self-reliant and strong enough to resist outside pressure. He said Russia's economy grew 4 percent last year. Putin, widely seen as wanting to reclaim his nation's presidency, said on Wednesday that his government is emphasizing social programs such as increasing aid for young mothers, disabled workers and people with health problems as it recovers.

#### Give Russia war zero probability – politics, military superiority, economic concerns, and nuclear security

Graham 2007

(Thomas, Russia in Global Affairs, "The dialectics of strength and weakness", <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/20/1129.html>, WEA)

An astute historian of Russia, Martin Malia, wrote several years ago that “Russia has at different times been demonized or divinized by Western opinion less because of her real role in Europe than because of the fears and frustrations, or hopes and aspirations, generated within European society by its own domestic problems.” Such is the case today. To be sure, mounting Western concerns about Russia are a consequence of Russian policies that appear to undermine Western interests, but they are also a reflection of declining confidence in our own abilities and the efficacy of our own policies. Ironically, this growing fear and distrust of Russia come at a time when **Russia is arguably less threatening to the West, and the United States in particular, than it has been at any time since the end of the Second World War. Russia does not champion a totalitarian ideology intent on our destruction, its military poses no threat to sweep across Europe, its economic growth depends on constructive commercial relations with Europe, and its strategic arsenal – while still capable of annihilating the United States – is under more reliable control than it has been in the past fifteen years and the threat of a strategic strike approaches zero probability.** Political gridlock in key Western countries, however, precludes the creativity, risk-taking, and subtlety needed to advance our interests on issues over which we are at odds with Russia while laying the basis for more constructive long-term relations with Russia.

### K

#### Prolif impacts outweigh the K and flip ethics

Ford 11

Chris Ford, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C. He previously served as U.S. Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, and General Counsel to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1/10/11, Havea and Have-Nots: "Unfairness in nuclear Weapons possession," www.newparadigmsforum.com/NPFtestsite/?p=658

¶ First, however, let’s provide some context. As I noted above, it is fascinating that in the long history of military technological have/have not dynamics, the international politics of nuclear weaponry has acquired such a strong flavor of moral critique. To my knowledge, after all, one did not see Xiongnu politics emphasizing how darned unfair it was of those nasty Chinese Emperors to monopolize the presumed secrets of China’s bingjia strategic literature. Nor does the unfairness of Byzantine efforts to control the recipe for Greek Fire seem to have become a prevalent trope of Frankish or Persian diplomacy. “Have nots” have surely always coveted powerful tools possessed by the “haves,” or at least wished that the “haves” did not possess them. It seems pretty unusual, however, for non-possessors to articulate such understandable envy and resentment in the moral language of “unfairness,” and to assume that this presumed injustice should motivate the “haves” to change their behavior. This argument seems to be a curiously modern phenomenon.¶ One might respond that the very specialness of nuclear weapons makes such a position appropriate. After all, while a local monopoly on iron swords may have given the Vikings some advantage in skirmishes with Native Americans in what the Norsemen called Vinland, such technological asymmetry was not strategically decisive. (Indeed, the Vikings seem ultimately to have been pushed out of the New World entirely.) If iron had threatened to offer the Vikings an insuperable advantage, would the Skraelings have been justified in developing a moral language of “have/have not” resentment that demanded either the sharing of iron weaponry or Viking disarmament in the name of achieving a global “iron zero”? I’m skeptical, but for the sake of argument let’s say “maybe.”¶ The argument that nuclear weapons are “special,” however, is a two-edged sword. Perhaps they are indeed so peculiarly potent and militarily advantageous that their asymmetric possession is sufficiently “unfair” to compel sharing or disarmament. Such an argument, however, sits only awkwardly – to say the least – with the simultaneous claim by many advocates of the “have/have not” critique that nuclear weapons have no real utility in the modern world and can therefore safely be abandoned by their possessors. After all, it is hard to paint nuclear weapons as being strategically decisive and useless at the same time. (If they are indeed useless, the conclusion of “unfairness” hardly sounds very compelling. If they aren’t useless, however, it may be appropriately hard to abolish them.)¶ More importantly, any argument about the destructively “special” character of nuclear weaponry cuts against the “unfairness critique” in that it is this very specialness that seems to rob the “have/have not” issue of its moral relevance. Unlike iron swords, the bingjia literature, Greek Fire, or essentially all other past military technologies the introduction of which produced global control/acquisition dynamics, **nuclear weapons** have **introduced existential questions about the future of human civilization which utterly swamp the conventional playground morality of unfair “have/have not” competition. No prior technology held the potential to destroy humanity, making nuclear weapons** – with the possible exception of certain techniques of biological weaponry – **a sui generis case to which the conventional “unfairness” critique simply does not very persuasively apply.**¶III. Implications¶ Let me be clear about this. The moral critique of nuclear weapons possession may yet speak to the issue of whether anyone should have them. (This is not the place for a discussion of the feasibility of the remedies proposed by the disarmament community, but let us at least acknowledge the existence of a real moral issue.) But this matter has nothing to do with “unfairness” per se – and to the extent that it purports to, one should give it little credence. If indeed nuclear weapons do menace the survival of humanity, it is essentially irrelevant whether their possession is “unfairly” distributed – and it is certainly no solution to make the global balance of weaponry more “fair” by allowing more countries to have them. (Disarmament advocates hope to address the fairness problem by eliminating nuclear weapons, of course, but this is just icing. Disarmament is almost never articulated as being driven primarily by fairness; the critical part of that argument is instead consequentialist, stressing the dangers that any nuclear weapons are said to present.) As a moral critique, in other words, the fair/unfair dichotomy fails to speak intelligibly to the world’s nuclear dilemma. It isn’t really about “fairness” at all.¶ Given the entanglement of nuclear weapons issues with quasi-existential questions potentially affecting the survival of millions or perhaps even billions of people, moreover, **it stands to reason that an “unfair” outcome that nonetheless staves off such horrors is a perfectly good solution**. On this scale, one might say, **non-catastrophe entirely trumps accusations of “unfairness.” Questions of stability are far more important than issues of asymmetric distribution**.¶ This, of course, has powerful implications for nonproliferation policy, because pointing out the hollowness of the “unfairness” argument as applied to nuclear weapons suggests the moral sustainability of nonproliferation even if complete nuclear disarmament cannot be achieved and the world continues to be characterized by inequalities in weapons possession. **We forget this at our collective peril**.¶ Don’t get me wrong. “Unfairness” arguments will presumably continue to have a political impact upon the diplomacy of nuclear nonproliferation, either as a consequence of genuine resentment or as a cynical rationalization for the destabilizing pursuit of dangerous capabilities. (Indeed, one might even go so far as to suspect that the emergence of the “unfairness” critique in modern diplomatic discourse is in some sense partly the result of how morally compelling nonproliferation is, in this context, irrespective of the “fairness” of “have/have not” outcomes. Precisely because **the moral case for nonproliferation-driven inequality is** so **obvious and** so **compelling** if such imbalance serves the interests of strategic stability, perhaps it was necessary to develop a new rationale of “fairness” to help make proliferation aspirations seem more legitimate. Skraelings, one imagines, did not need an elaborate philosophy of “fairness” in order to justify trying to steal iron weapons; the desirability of such tools was simply obvious, and any effort to obtain them unsurprising and not in itself condemnable.) But even in this democratic and egalitarian age, merely to incant the mantra of “unfairness” – or to inveigh against the existence of “haves” when there also exist “have nots” – is not the same thing as having a compelling moral argument. Indeed, I would submit that **we lose our moral bearings if we allow “unfairness” arguments to distract us from what is really important here: substantive outcomes in the global security environment**.¶ “Unfairness,” in other words, is an overrated critique, and “fairness” is an overrated destination. At least where nuclear weapons are concerned, there are more important considerations in play. Let us not forget this.

#### Alt will be co-opted to support nationalist and exclusionary politics—India proves

Biswas 1

Shampa Biswas, Whitman College Politics Professor, December 2001, “Nuclear apartheid" as political position: race as a postcolonial resource?, Alternatives 26.4

The enunciation of the nuclear-apartheid argument by Indian political leaders in the name of a discriminated India raises another set of issues. Herein is a question about identity and interests. As argued earlier with respect to the performative aspects of foreign/security policy, to speak in the name of India is also simultaneously to produce India as a coherent and bounded entity. But scripting India in this fashion means erasing the hierarchies, the exclusions, the differences that mark the space called India. Indeed, to imagine this entity called India as a "community" requires not just an act of collective will, but also and always a "will to power." In other words, the question of "whose imagined community?" is rendered coherent and bounded, and what interests are served by that will-to-power cannot be neglected. (61) When Indian leaders use the nuclear-apartheid argument and make the claims to certain democratic entitlements in using that argument, they will into being an India that is in itself neither coherent nor bounded, and hence render invisible the incoherences and contradictions that threaten that body politic. It is here that the question of Hindu nationalism becomes particularly salient because implicit in this production of India is the establishment of a certain hegemonic vision of India (Hindu, male, upper-caste/upper-class) that serves various specific interests. In other words, the success of Hindu nationalism depends on the ability to interpellate Indians as "Hindus," a boundary-making exercise with its own racialized, exclusionary implications. That a significant amount of political labor is expended by the BJP in claiming Hindus as the "natural inhabitants" of India and on drawing the boundaries around the "Hindu self" reveals how unstable and problematic this boundary-making exercise is. I will investigate this process a little more closely. There is an implicit claim in the Hindu nationalist discourse about who "belongs" to India and who is an "outsider." First, this requires establishing Hindus as the "natural" or "original" inhabitants of India through erasing the history of Aryan conquest and settlement in India. There has been a proliferation of literature that attempts to rewrite this history by demonstrating the indigenous roots of Hinduism. Hindu militant organizations, like the RSS, have been working among the tribal and hills people in India and attempting to bring them into the fold of Hinduism. The labeling of such groups as vanvasis (forest dwellers) rather than adivasis (original dwellers) suggests a conscious attempt to erase the association of Hinduism with "alien" Aryan roots. (62) This is always accompanied by the attempt to project Muslims as "foreigners" (Babar ki aulad, or progeny of Babar), (63) as invaders and conquerors, much like the British (only worse). (64) The second assumption about who belongs to the Hindu community is even more problematic and has had a much longer history of contestation. There have been at least two sources of resistance to the Hindu nationalist definition of the Hindu community. Romila Thapar's work has done much to problematize the very conceptualization of a Hindu religion or a Hindu community. She claims that it was orientalist scholarship that attempted to reconstruct the various parallel systems, practices, and religious beliefs that existed in India (better called Hindu religions, in the plural) into a coherent and rational faith called Hinduism, and this was done from the familiar perspective of Semitic religions. (65) Even more importantly, the construct of the "Hindu community" that Hindu nationalists draw on is a particularistic Brahmanical Hinduism that has been maintained through caste hierarchy. Groups now designated as "untouchables" have sometimes been considered as "outcastes" by upper-caste Hindus, and hence not really Hindus. Many such groups have themselves often resisted being included within a generalized, monolithic Hindu political community. (66) Much of the current BJP support comes from upper-caste, middle-class, urban, northern India, even though the party has attempted with some limited success to broaden considerably its support structure. (67) This upper-caste orientation of the party was to some extent revealed in the reaction to the Mandal Commission's recommendation, when it was charged that this would result in "apartheid, Indian style," dividing the Hindus as a community. (68) Similarly, the politics of the political parties representing lower-caste interests is attributed a "sinister design in undermining the very fabric of Indian society." (69) Hence, the grassroots work conducted by the BJP, RSS, and other affiliated organizations who feel it necessary repeatedly to assert that Dalit groups are "part and parcel of Hindu society." (70) There are also other religious groups who, although they are claimed by Hindu nationalists to be part of the Hindu ambit, have rejected and continue to reject such an incorporation. This includes Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs, and various Bhakti sects such as Kabirpanthis and Vallabhacharya, all of whom the BJP considers as offshoots of Hinduism but who have always resisted such inclusion. For instance, the construction and consolidation of a singular, well-defined Sikh identity had itself come from the earlier resistance of the Singh Sabha movement to the assimilationist attempts of the Hindu revivalist Arya Samaj at "purification" and "reconversion" in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. (71) The Sikh demands that led to the Punjab crisis are seen by the BJP as a creation of a pseudosecularist politics in which groups claim a minority status to use the state for its own interests. This attempt to appropriate Sikh identity erases the legitimacy of many of the genuine political demands of Sikhs t hat continue to be ignored. The point is that since the days of Hindu ideologue Savarkar's Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu? there has been an explicit attempt to fix the meaning of Hinduism by appropriating and assimilating within its fold various groups, many of whose self-identities have been staked in opposition to Hinduism. (72) In Savarkar's work there is also an explicit attempt to construct this Hindu nation as a "race." It is quite common to see the category of "race" invoked in the writings of many of the early Hindu nationalists. Many such writers borrowed from Western racial theory to conceptualize religious communities as distinct "races." (73) It is interesting to see that even though important ideologues like Savarkar and Golwalkar attempt to define race at least partially in biological terms, (74) the thrust of the argument is on cultural variables. Hence a Hindu in Savarkar's discourse is one "who has inherited and claims as his own the culture of that race as expressed chiefly in their common classical language Sanskrit and re presented by a common history, a common literature, art and architecture, law and jurisprudence, rites and rituals, ceremonies and sacraments, fairs and festivals." (75) Race, in Golwalkar's writing, is defined as "a hereditary society having common customs, common language, common memories of glory or disaster; in short, it is a population with a common origin under one culture," (76) and it is on this basis that the "Hindu race" is defined. In such an analysis, race and culture are both constituted through the category of religion. (77) It is typical also of the Hindu communal discourse, as Purushottam Agarwal points out, that various ethnic groups owing allegiance to Islam are transformed into one single race, the Muslim. (78) But unlike the category of "the nation," it is very rare to find the category of "race" explicitly invoked in the contemporary Hindu nationalist discourse. Yet even though the BJP does not explicitly invoke the category of race very much (affiliated organizations like the VHP and the RSS still refer to race occasionally), these early formulations inform the BJP construction of Hindu identity and non-Hindu others. Hence, not only are Muslims homogenized into one monolithic community, but also associated with a range of essentialized negative characteristics such as "dirt," "excessive libidinal energies" or "animal sexuality," "backward cultural norms," and so on. Prominent here is the phenomenal procreative power attributed to the racialized community that is a trademark of racial discourse almost everywhere. VHP propaganda stresses both the practice of polygamy and the virility of the Muslim male as contributing to fertility rates that would lead to the Muslim population eventually outnumbering the Hindus. To quote a VHP leader, "Muslims follow a more insidious path to conversion--seduction and then marriage with innocent Hindu girls." (79) A VHP pamphlet states that the Muslim family-planning motto is, "Hum paanch, hamare pacchis" ("We are five"; i.e., one Muslim man and his four wives, and we have twenty-five children). (80) Similarly, Muslim migrants from Bangladesh are attributed with animal sexuality, dirt, and undesirable social behavior, which includes in particular the rape of Hindu women. n other words, to hail Indians as Hindus is also an attempt to appropriate many non-Hindus as Hindus, while simultaneously rejecting Muslims from the Indian nation. This is what makes the definition of the Hindu nation within BJP discourse both problematically broad and dangerously narrow. Hence, if the invocation of "race" through the nuclear-apartheid position by the BJP **produces** India as a particular kind of nation, one must ask who is racially excluded through this boundary-making exercise, and with what implications. The claim of Hindu nationalists to represent a homogenous Hindu community with pregiven interests in the construction of a Hindu India is a hegemonic project that serves particular caste and class interests. Here the question of India's poverty also becomes more relevant when it is understood that this particular hegemonic vision of (nuclear) India makes possible the redistribution of state resources to a nuclear program that does not have uniform effects across the Indian spectrum. (81) If the threat of economic sanctions was unable to deter Indian and Pakistani nuclearization, one wonders how much of that was a result of the unequal distribution of the burdens of sanctions within a political body and apathy toward the plight of those most adversely affected by such sanctions (i.e., the marginalized groups in society).