# Round 1 v Northwestern BF

## 1NC

### Off 1

**Financial incentives” are direct and require the government to give money**

**Webb, 93** – lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa (Kernaghan, “Thumbs, Fingers, and Pushing on String: Legal Accountability in the Use of Federal Financial Incentives”, 31 Alta. L. Rev. 501 (1993) Hein Online)

In this paper**, "financial incentives**" are taken to **mean disbursements** 18 **of public funds** or contingent commitments **to individuals and organizations, intended to encourage**, support or induce **certain behaviours in accordance with express public policy objectives**. **They take the form of grants, contributions, repayable contributions, loans, loan guarantees and insurance, subsidies, procurement contracts and tax expenditures**.19 Needless to say, the ability of government to achieve desired behaviour may vary with the type of incentive in use: up-front disbursements of funds (such as with contributions and procurement contracts) may put government in a better position to dictate the terms upon which assistance is provided than contingent disbursements such as loan guarantees and insurance. In some cases, the incentive aspects of the funding come from the conditions attached to use of the monies.20 In others, the mere existence of a program providing financial assistance for a particular activity (eg. low interest loans for a nuclear power plant, or a pulp mill) may be taken as government approval of that activity, and in that sense, **an incentive to encourage that type of activity has been created.**21 Given the wide variety of incentive types, it will not be possible in a paper of this length to provide anything more than a cursory discussion of some of the main incentives used.22 And, needless to say, the comments made herein concerning accountability apply to differing degrees depending upon the type of incentive under consideration. **By limiting the definition of financial incentives** to initiatives where public funds are either disbursed or contingently committed**, a large number of regulatory programs with incentive effects which exist, but in which no money is forthcoming**,23 **are excluded** from direct examination in this paper. **Such programs might be referred to as indirect incentives**. Through elimination of indirect incentives from the scope of discussion, **the definition of the incentive instrument becomes both more manageable and more particular**. Nevertheless, it is possible that much of the approach taken here may be usefully applied to these types of indirect incentives as well.24 Also excluded from discussion here are **social assistance programs** such as welfare and ad hoc industry bailout initiatives because such programs **are not designed primarily to encourage behaviours in furtherance of specific public policy objectives**. In effect, **these programs are assistance, but they are not incentives**.

**Restrictions on production must mandate a decrease in the quantity produced**

**Anell 89** Chairman, WTO panel "To examine, in the light of the relevant GATT provisions, the matter referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES by the United States in document L/6445 and to make such findings as will assist the CONTRACTING PARTIES in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in Article XXIII:2." 3. On 3 April 1989, the Council was informed that agreement had been reached on the following composition of the Panel (C/164): Composition Chairman: Mr. Lars E.R. Anell Members: Mr. Hugh W. Bartlett Mrs. Carmen Luz Guarda CANADA - IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON ICE CREAM AND YOGHURT Report of the Panel adopted at the Forty-fifth Session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES on 5 December 1989 (L/6568 - 36S/68) http://www.wto.org/english/tratop\_e/dispu\_e/88icecrm.pdf

The United States argued that **Canada had failed to demonstrate that it effectively restricted domestic production** of milk. The differentiation between "fluid" and "industrial" milk was an artificial one for administrative purposes; with regard to GATT obligations, the product at issue was raw milk from the cow, regardless of what further use was made of it. The use of the word "permitted" in Article XI:2(c)(i) required that there be a limitation on the total quantity of milk that domestic producers were authorized or allowed to produce or sell. The provincial **controls** on fluid milk **did not restrict the quantities permitted to be produced; rather dairy farmers could produce and market as much milk as could be sold as beverage milk or table cream**. There were no penalties for delivering more than a farmer's fluid milk quota, it was only if deliveries exceeded actual fluid milk usage or sales that it counted against his industrial milk quota. At least one province did not participate in this voluntary system, and another province had considered leaving it. Furthermore, Canada did not even prohibit the production or sale of milk that exceeded the Market Share Quota. The method used to calculate direct support payments on within-quota deliveries assured that most dairy farmers would completely recover all of their fixed and variable costs on their within-quota deliveries. The farmer was permitted to produce and market milk in excess of the quota, and perhaps had an economic incentive to do so. 27. The United States noted that in the past six years total industrial milk production had consistently exceeded the established Market Sharing Quota, and concluded that **the Canadian system was a regulation of production but not a restriction of production. Proposals to** amend Article XI:2(c)(i) to **replace the word "restrict" with "regulate" had been defeated; what was required was the reduction of production.** The results of the econometric analyses cited by Canada provided no indication of what would happen to milk production in the absence not only of the production quotas, but also of the accompanying high price guarantees which operated as incentives to produce. According to the official publication of the Canadian Dairy Commission, a key element of Canada's national dairy policy was to promote self-sufficiency in milk production. The effectiveness of the government supply controls had to be compared to what the situation would be in the absence of all government measures.

**On is exclusive**

**Graham 16** (Arthur Butler, "Brief for Appellants – Wilson v. Dorflinger %26 Sons", Court of Appeals – State of New York, Reg. 108, Fol. 387, 1916, p. 11-12)

**The Standard Dictionary defines** the word "**on**" as follows: "In or into such **a position with reference to something,** as a vehicle, a table, or a stage, as to be in contact with and supported by it; in a position, state or condition of adherence; as, he got on before the wagon had fully stopped." In Webster's International Dictionary, we find as follows: "on--The general signification of 'on' is situation, motion or condition with respect to contact with, the surface or upper part of a thing, and supported by it; placed or lying in contact with the surface; as, the book lies on the table, which stands on the floor of a house on an island." It is submitted that an elevator is not operated on streets or on highways, as a car, truck or wagon is operated, and that **by the use of the word "on" the Legislature intended to include only those** appliances **therein enumerated,** namely, cars, trucks, and wagons. An elevator is not operated on anything, but is operated in or inside a shaft, and is controlled by guides, which deprive the operator of the power to change the course of the lift from right to left. Clearly the Legislature intended to include in Group 41, only those cars, trucks and wagons whose direction and guidance are controlled by the operator, in whatever direction he may deem advisable.

#### Violation- They aren’t direct or a reduction in incentives.

**Voting issue –**

**1. regulations is a limits disaster.**

**Doub 76** Energy Regulation: A Quagmire for Energy Policy Annual Review of Energy Vol. 1: 715-725 (Volume publication date November 1976) DOI: 10.1146/annurev.eg.01.110176.003435LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae, 1757 N Street NW, Washington, DC 20036 Mr. Doub is a principal in the law firm of Doub and Muntzing, which he formed in 1977. Previously he was a partner in the law firm of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby and MacRae. He was a member of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in 1971 - 1974. He served as a member of the Executive Advisory Committee to the Federal Power Commission in 1968 - 1971 and was appointed by the President of the United States to the President's Air Quality Advisory Board in 1970. He is a member of the American Bar Association, Maryland State Bar Association, and Federal Bar Association. He is immediate past Chairman of the U.S. National Committee of the World Energy Conference and a member of the Atomic Industrial Forum. He currently serves as a member of the nuclear export policy committees of both the Atomic Industrial Forum and the American Nuclear Energy Council. Mr. Doub graduated from Washington and Jefferson College (B.A., 1953) and the University of Maryland School of Law in 1956. He is married, has two children, and resides in Potomac, Md. He was born September 3, 1931, in Cumberland, Md. http://0-www.annualreviews.org.library.lausys.georgetown.edu/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.eg.01.110176.003435

FERS began with the recognition that federal energy policy must result from concerted efforts in all areas dealing with energy, not the least of which was the manner in which energy is regulated by the federal government. Energy selfsufficiency is improbable, if not impossible, without sensible regulatory processes, and effective regulation is necessary for public confidence. Thus, **the President directed that "a comprehensive study** be undertaken, in full consultation with Congress, to **determine the best way to organize all energy-related regulatory activities of the government."** An interagency task force was formed to study this question. **With 19 different federal** departments and **agencies contributing, the task force spent seven months deciphering the** present organizational makeup of the **federal energy regulatory system,** studying the need for organizational improvement, and evaluating alternatives. **More than 40 agencies were found to be involved** with making regulatory decisions on energy. Although only a few deal exclusively with energy, **most of the 40 could significantly affect** the availability and/or cost of **energy.** For example, **in** the field of **gas transmission,** there are **five federal agencies** that must **act on siting and land-use issues, seven on emission and effluent issues, five on public safety issues, and one on worker health and safety issues-**all before an onshore gas pipeline can be built. The complexity of energy regulation is also illustrated by the case of **Standard Oil Company** (Indiana), which reportedly **must file about 1000 reports a year with 35 different federal agencies**. Unfortunately, this example is the rule rather than the exception.

**2. Precision – A distinction between regulation and restrictions is key.**

**Sinha 6** http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/437310/ Supreme Court of India Union Of India & Ors vs M/S. Asian Food Industries on 7 November, 2006 Author: S.B. Sinha Bench: S Sinha, Mark, E Katju CASE NO.: Writ Petition (civil) 4695 of 2006 PETITIONER: Union of India & Ors. RESPONDENT: M/s. Asian Food Industries DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/11/2006 BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T [Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 17008 of 2006] WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4696 OF 2006 [Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 17558 of 2006] S.B. SINHA, J :

We may, however, notice that this Court in State of U.P. and Others v. M/s. Hindustan Aluminium Corpn. and others [AIR 1979 SC 1459] stated the law thus: "**It appears that a distinction between regulation and restriction or prohibition has always been drawn**, ever since Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virgo. **Regulation promotes the freedom or the facility which is required to be regulated in the interest of all concerned, whereas prohibition obstructs or shuts off, or denies it to those to whom it is applied**. **The Oxford English Dictionary does not define regulate to include prohibition so that if it had been the intention to prohibit the supply, distribution, consumption or use of energy, the legislature would not have contented itself with the use of the word regulating without using the word prohibiting or some such word, to bring out that effect**."

#### Topicality is a voting issue for the reasons above.

### Off 2

#### Obama will win- swing states

Blumenthal 10-25

Mark is the Director of Pollster, the Huffington Post’s Election Analysis and Model, “Presidential Polls Counter Romney Surge Myth,”

New polls released on Wednesday and Thursday continue to show President Barack Obama holding narrow leads in a handful of critical battleground states, but running within a whisker of Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney nationwide.¶ While Romney gained significantly in the wake of the first presidential debate in early October, the lack of a continuing trend over the past two weeks helps counter a theme in some campaign coverage that Romney's support continues to "surge" nationwide.¶ The most recent updates of the seven daily national tracking polls continue to split in terms of which candidate holds the nominal lead, ranging from a 4 percentage-point lead for Romney on the Rasmussen Reports automated tracking to a 3 point Obama advantage on the Investor's Business Daily/TIPP poll.¶ 2012-10-25-trackers.png¶ Separately, a new Associated Press/GfK survey released on Thursday morning showed Romney with a 2 percentage-point edge over Obama (47 to 45 percent).¶ The HuffPost Pollster tracking model, which combines data from both national and statewide polling to create a combined estimate, continues to show a near tie, with just two-tenths of one percent separating Romney (47.1 percent) and Obama (46.9 percent) as of this writing. The model currently reports just 56 percent confidence that Romney is actually leading the national popular vote; slightly better than a coin-toss, but just barely.¶ Although their methodologies and estimates of the leader vary considerably, these national tracking polls provide a useful gauge of late trends, since they collectively interview over 2,000 voters a day. Their most recent releases show no signs of Romney momentum. Three ticked in Obama's direction, three were unchanged and one moved toward Romney.¶ Wednesday also brought four new surveys in Ohio. Three of the four, from Time, SurveyUSA and Democratic pollster Lake Research, gave Obama leads ranging from 2 to 5 percentage points while the Rasmussen automated survey reported a tie.¶ 2012-10-25-ohio.png¶ The new results have little impact on the Ohio trend chart produced by the Pollster model, which continues to give Obama an advantage of just over 2 percentage points. Although that lead is narrow, the volume of polling in Ohio boosts the model's confidence that Obama is running ahead there to 96 percent.¶ Collectively, the new polls of the past 24 hours have done nothing to change the standings in the most crucial battleground states. Obama continued to hold leads of 2 to 3 percentage points in Ohio, Iowa, Nevada and Wisconsin, four states that currently combine with the states where Obama leads by larger margins to create a 277 electoral vote majority, seven more than the 270 needed to win.¶ 2012-10-25-battlegrounds.png¶ Romney continues to lead in North Carolina and retain a narrow edge in Florida, states that would net him 233 electoral votes along with other states where Romney leads by larger margins. Those totals leave 26 electoral votes up for grabs in New Hampshire, Colorado and Virginia, states where the tracking model shows Obama leading by very narrow margins of 2 percentage points or less.¶ Collectively, the trends of the past week provide a reality check to two myths that have emerged in recent campaign coverage.¶ The first is that Romney has been "surging" since the first debate. While the debate certainly boosted Romney's standing in the polls, trends over the past two weeks have been negligible, with the leader seesawing nationally within a range of roughly one percentage point. Over the same period, the standings within the key battleground states have also remained constant. Other poll tracking models have shown the same patterns.¶ The second myth is that the national and battleground states polls have produced widely divergent results. If we use the state estimates produced by the Pollster tracking model in the nine key battlegrounds (Iowa, Wisconsin, Nevada, Ohio, New Hampshire, Colorado, Virginia, Florida and North Carolina) to create a combined total vote based on the turnout in each state in 2008, we show Obama leading in across all nine states by a slim 0.6 percentage point margin (47.8 to 47.2 percent as of this writing; the estimated margin would be 47.9 to 47.2 percent if based on the 2004 turnout).¶ Romney does slightly better in the national popular vote estimate, of course, but his 0.2 percentage point advantage there is only slightly better. The net gap is less than a percentage point.¶ As the Cook Political Report's David Wasserman writes on Twitter, simply subtracting 4 percentage points from Obama's 2008 margins in each state produces a similar result: "He'd lose Popular vote by 0.7% but still win w/ 272 EC votes."¶ The differences may appear bigger because Obama's advantages are spread across a number of relatively small battleground states that, except for Ohio, all have 10 or fewer electoral votes. Romney stays close in the combined battleground state estimate mostly because his three best states -- Florida, North Carolina and Virginia -- represent just over half (51 percent) of the combined battleground vote.¶ So yes, the potential exists for a divided outcome, with Obama winning the Electoral College and Romney winning the popular vote, but such an outcome would be, as it was 12 years ago, a game of inches, not yards.

#### Plan swings all Ohio demographics

Altman 10/26/2012

(Alex, Washington correspondent for TIME, journalism degree, Northwestern; “In Ohio, China Is a Potent Campaign Weapon,” <http://swampland.time.com/2012/10/26/in-ohio-china-is-a-potent-campaign-weapon/> - Kurr)

The China baiting persists, however, because it taps into voter frustrations with China’s rocket-fueled rise at a time when the U.S. is mired in a sluggish economic recovery. Ohio lost 91,800 jobs from 2001 to 2008 because of swelling trade deficits, according to one report from the left-leaning Economic Policy Institute. Protectionism has strong appeal among some factions of the Democratic base, despite widespread belief among economists that it shackles the U.S. economy. Sherrod Brown, the Democratic Senator from Ohio locked in a tough re-election fight, has promoted a bill aimed at cracking down on Chinese currency manipulation and slammed the U.S. Treasury Department for giving China “a free pass.” Meanwhile, the free-trade policies that dominate Republican ideology — and which Romney regularly extols on the stump — wither away when it comes to must-win battlegrounds like Ohio. So it goes in the nation’s most important swing state. Twice Obama has used campaign swings to Ohio to announce new filings with the World Trade Organization complaining about Chinese trade practices. “It’s a symbolic issue. For Ohio workers especially, the outsourcing of jobs is a deep concern and has been for years,” says Paul Beck, a political scientist at Ohio State University. “So both campaigns are attacking China and blaming the other side for being too soft.” That blame is being assigned on TV spots running across the state as well. In the Youngstown market, two Democratic-allied super PACs are running ads casting Romney as an “economic traitor” for the offshoring Bain has done. American Crossroads, the Karl Rove–founded Republican outfit, is up across Ohio with a new spot called “Bow,” which raps the President for kowtowing to China. It freezes on Obama — you guessed it — bowing his head slightly while he clasps hands with Chinese President Hu Jintao, a traditional gesture of respect akin to the American habit of shaking hands. Even in Columbus, where a stable local economy propped up by government and education jobs has insulated citizens from the manufacturing losses racking other parts of Ohio, supporters at Romney’s rally said cracking down on China was an important task for the next U.S. President. “It really resonates, because we’re losing so many jobs to China,” says Jim Snyder, a businessman from Columbus. Whether Romney would follow through on his tough talk once in office is an open question, but it’s safe to bet he’ll keep relying on it to carry him there.

#### Ohio decides the election

Silver 10-23

Nate is a statistician and directs the New York Time’s fivethirtyeight blog, “Ohio has 50-50 Chance of Deciding Election,”

We are now running about 40,000 Electoral College simulations each day. In the simulations that we ran on Monday, the candidate who won Ohio won the election roughly 38,000 times, or in about 95 percent of the cases. (Mr. Romney won in about 1,400 simulations despite losing Ohio, while Mr. Obama did so roughly 550 times.)¶ Whether you call Ohio a “must-win” is a matter of semantics, but its essential role in the Electoral College should not be hard to grasp.¶ Were he to lose Ohio, Mr. Romney would have a number of undesirable, although not impossible, options.¶ The most favorable path, in the view of the model, would be for Mr. Romney to carry both Iowa and Nevada.

**Romney will destroy US-Russian relations**

**Larison 6-27**

Columnist for the American Conservative [Daniel Larison “U.S.-Russian Relations Would Get Much Worse Under Romney” <http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/u-s-russian-relations-would-get-much-worse-under-romney/>]

**Putin doesn’t** actually **want a “hard-line conservative in the White House.” Putin distrusts the U.S.** **because he believes** that the **Bush** administration **behaved in an ungrateful and untrustworthy fashion** in the previous decade, **and U.S.-Russian relations improved** as much as they did **because the current administration seemed to be more reliable**. U.S.-Russian **relations reached their lowest poin**t in the last twenty years in no small part **because of a “more active U.S. policy**” toward the Middle East, the South Caucasus, and central Europe. Putin might be willing to deal with a more hard-line American President, but only so long as it this translated into tangible gains for Russia. Provided that the hard-liner was willing to live up to his end of the bargain, there could be some room for agreement, but there isn’t any. Since **Romney’s Russia policy is essentially to never make any deals with the current Russian government, Putin doesn’t have much of an incentive to cooperate. That will guarantee that U.S.-Russian relations will deteriorate much more than they have in the last year.**

**Nuclear war**

**ALLISON 11**

Director @ Belfer Center for Science and Int’l Affairs @ Harvard’s Kennedy School, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Robert D. Blackwill, Senior Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations [Graham Allison, “10 Reasons Why Russia Still Matters”, Politico -- October 31 -- <http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=161EF282-72F9-4D48-8B9C-C5B3396CA0E6>]

That central point is that Russia matters a great deal to a U.S. government seeking to defend and advance its national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s decision to return next year as president makes it all the more critical for Washington to manage its relationship with Russia through coherent, realistic policies. No one denies that Russia is a dangerous, difficult, often disappointing state to do business with. We should not overlook its many human rights and legal failures. Nonetheless, Russia is a player whose choices affect our vital interests in nuclear security and energy. It is key to supplying 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Ten realities require U.S. policymakers to advance our nation’s interests by engaging and working with Moscow. First, Russia remains the only nation that can erase the **U**nited **S**tates from the map in 30 minutes. As every president since John F. Kennedy has recognized**, Russia’s cooperation is critical to averting nuclear war**. Second, Russia is our most consequential partner in preventing nuclear terrorism. Through a combination of more than $11 billion in U.S. aid, provided through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and impressive Russian professionalism, two decades after the collapse of the “evil empire,” not one nuclear weapon has been found loose. Third, Russia plays an essential role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile-delivery systems. As Washington seeks to stop Iran’s drive toward nuclear weapons, Russian choices to sell or withhold sensitive technologies are the difference between failure and the possibility of success. Fourth, Russian support in sharing intelligence and cooperating in operations remains essential to the U.S. war to destroy Al Qaeda and combat other transnational terrorist groups. Fifth, Russia provides a vital supply line to 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan. As U.S. relations with Pakistan have deteriorated, the Russian lifeline has grown ever more important and now accounts for half all daily deliveries. Sixth, Russia is the world’s largest oil producer and second largest gas producer. Over the past decade, Russia has added more oil and gas exports to world energy markets than any other nation. Most major energy transport routes from Eurasia start in Russia or cross its nine time zones. As citizens of a country that imports two of every three of the 20 million barrels of oil that fuel U.S. cars daily, Americans feel Russia’s impact at our gas pumps. Seventh, Moscow is an important player in today’s international system. It is no accident that Russia is one of the five veto-wielding, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, as well as a member of the G-8 and

**Romney Labels a Currency Manipulator**

**Roach 8-28**

Stephen is a lecturer at Yale University’s School of Management and Jackson Institute for International Affairs. He is also a Senior executive with Morgan Stanley, “How Romney Could go Wrong from Day 1,” <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c74802de-f0f9-11e1-89b2-00144feabdc0.html#axzz25ue916Yz>

True to his word as a candidate, **a few hours after taking office** as US president on January 20, 2013, Mitt **Romney issued his first executive order, declaring China guilty of currency manipulation.** In accordance with the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, President **Romney’s act triggered immediate negotiations between US and Chinese officials**. But **the negotiations stalled and both parties blamed the other in press releases.**¶ **In** early February, in **his first State of the Union address**, Mr **Romney said**: “Enough is enough. It **is high time for China to play by our rules.” Congress roared its approval and within a week, overwhelming bipartisan majorities of both houses passed the Defend America Trade Act** of 2013. **Modelled on the currency manipulation “remedies” of countervailing tariffs first proposed in 2005**, DATA was signed into law on President’s Day, February 18 2013. **China was quickly deemed to be in violation of the new statute.**¶ More¶ At that point negotiations took on a new urgency. But **the new leaders in both countries were in no mood for compromise and the talks failed. In accordance with the provisions of DATA, Washington slapped immediate tariffs of 20 per cent on all Chinese products entering the US.**¶ **As plants shut down across China, Beijing declared this to be an act of economic wa**r and filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization. Li Keqiang, newly installed as premier, announced after the National People’s Congress in March that **China had no patience to endure a WTO dispute process that could take anywhere from two to five years to run its course**.¶ China’s Ministry of Commerce then announced retaliatory tariffs of 20 per cent on all US exports to China. This hit growth-starved America right between the eyes. With $104bn of American-made goods sold in Chinese markets in 2011, China had become the US’s third-largest and its fastest-growing export market. To add insult to injury, China-dependent Walmart announced average price increases of 5 per cent. Other retailers followed suit. Talk of stagflation was in the air and hard-pressed American consumers hunkered down further.¶ US financial markets swooned. The stock market was hit by pressures on profit margins, growth and inflation. The bond market was also unnerved by the realisation that the Federal Reserve was seriously behind the curve. With good reason. After its meeting in June 2013, the Fed reaffirmed its ever-extending commitment to keep its benchmark policy rate near zero through 2015, and even dangled the possibility of yet another round of quantitative easing, QE4. Yields on 10-year Treasuries moved back above 4 per cent and stocks fell sharply further.¶ Feeling the heat from financial markets, Washington turned up the heat on China. **Mr Romney called Congress back from its Independence Day holiday into a special session. By unanimous consent, Congress passed an amendment to DATA – upping the tariffs on China by another 10 percentage points.**¶ **At that point an indignant China turned to its own version of the big bazooka**. The biggest foreign buyer of US debt was nowhere to be seen at the Treasury’s August 2013 auction. **Long-term interest rates spiked and within weeks yields on 10-year Treasuries hit 7 per cent. The dollar plunged and the US stock market went into free fall**.¶ Just like that, the so-called exorbitant privilege of the haven asset vanished. **When asked** at a press conference **why China would willingly engage in actions that would undermine the value of more than $2tn in Treasuries and other dollar-based holdings**, Zhou Xiaochuan, **retiring governor of the People’s Bank of China, said: “This is not about risk-adjusted portfolio returns. We are defending our people against an act of economic war.”**¶ **By the autumn of 2013 there was little doubt of the severity of renewed recession in the US.** Trade sanctions on China had backfired. Beleaguered American workers paid the highest price of all, as the unemployment rate shot back up above 10 per cent. **A horrific policy blunder had confirmed that there was no bilateral fix for the multilateral trade imbalance of a savings-starved US economy**.¶ In China, growth had slipped below the dreaded 6 per cent threshold and the new leadership was rolling out yet another investment stimulus for a still unbalanced and unstable Chinese economy. **As the global economy slipped back into recession, the Great Crisis of 2008-09 suddenly looked like child’s play. Globalisation itself hung in the balance**.¶ History warns us never to say never. We need only look at the legacy of US Senator Reed Smoot and Representative Willis Hawley, who sponsored the infamous Tariff Act of 1930 – America’s worst economic policy blunder. Bad dreams can – and have – become reality.

### Off 3

#### Fiscal Cliff Passes but Capital’s Key

Klein 10-18

Ezra is a Washington Post Columnist, Bloomberg Columnist and MSNBC Contributor, “Obama’s plan: Push Republicans off the fiscal cliff,” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/10/18/obamas-plan-push-republicans-off-the-fiscal-cliff/>

I’ve criticized the Obama campaign for failing to detail much of a vision for a second term. But that’s not to say they don’t have one. They do. It’s just a hard one to campaign on.¶ Nam Y. Huh — Associated Press¶ After promising in 2008 to bring about a new era of cooperation in Washington, they’re campaigning in 2012 knowing that, if reelected, they will start their second term with a brutal, economy-shaking showdown with Republicans over spending and taxes.¶ If the Obama administration were to really lay out their plans, they would go something like this. In November, President Obama will reiterate, clearly and firmly, that he will veto any attempts to extend the high-income tax cuts or lift the big, dumb spending cuts without finding equivalent savings elsewhere. In fact, as my colleague Lori Montgomery reports, they’re already reiterating that promise.¶ That veto threat is the center of the Obama administration’s second-term strategizing. The Obama administration believes – and, just as importantly, they believe Republicans believe — that they’ve got the leverage here. The Republican position on taxes is less popular than the Democratic position. The outcome of gridlock is much higher taxes, which is more anathema to Republicans and arguably cheering to Democrats. The big, dumb spending cuts, despite being poorly timed and inanely constructed, are very progressive in their effect, falling heavily on military spending while exempting Medicaid, Social Security, and Medicare beneficiaries.¶ Note: These figures don’t include savings from reduced interest payments.¶ I’ve called this the GOP’s dual-trigger nightmare. It’s bad for the economy, but it also effectively ends our deficits with a mix of tax increases and spending cuts more progressive than anything any Democrat has dared propose. Republicans absolutely can’t let it happen. But the only way they can stop it from happening is to make a deal. ¶ The administration hopes this deal will include more than just deficit reduction. They also see it as a vehicle for infrastructure investment and tax reform. They think there’s some chance that parts of the American Jobs Act, like the hiring tax credits, could sneak through the door, too. There’s even talk of using it to address climate change, though everyone agrees that’s unlikely. Whatever ends up in the final deal, there’s little doubt that it will be a big deal, and it’s likely to come together fairly quickly in the first year. The White House — and the expiring tax and spending provisions — won’t give Republicans any other choice.¶ In a way, the Obama administration’s plan for a second term is much like their plan for the first term: Make a deal with Republicans. Get a big bipartisan solution to our problems. But the means are almost precisely the opposite. Where in the first term, the hope was that they could reach out, talk through the issues, and come to an agreement, the plan for the second is to push the Republican Party off the fiscal cliff, and then force them to reach out in order to get pulled back up.¶ To put it plainly, in 2008, the Obama campaign hoped Republicans would work with them. In 2012, they have a plan. Their plan stands a good chance of working. But it doesn’t sound as good as hope does in a speech. That’s why you’re not hearing much about it.

#### Plan kills Obama

Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 1/9/12, Obama Plays Safe on Energy Policy, Lexis

With less than a year to go until he faces re-election, US President Barack Obama is trying to avoid controversial energy policy decisions, postponing the finalization of restrictions on oil refinery and power plant emissions and delaying the approval of a major crude pipeline project. The president’s caution will prolong the status quo on issues where the industry both opposes and supports the administration’s plans, and also illustrates what's at stake for energy policy depending on whether or not Obama is given another four years in office. Most of Obama's original campaign pledges on promoting alternatives to fossil fuels and tackling climate change have not passed muster with Congress, most notably an ambitious plan for national carbon controls, a subsequent toned-down clean energy standard floated after the carbon legislation failed, and repeated efforts to repeal $30 billion-$40 billion worth of oil industry tax deductions over 10 years ( PIW May9'11 ). The one exception has been the passage of $90 billion in clean energy funding as part of an economic stimulus bill passed early in Obama's term, but the White House has been unable to repeat this success in other energy policy areas ( PIW Feb.23'09 ).

#### Causes Middle East War

Hutchison, U.S. Senator from the great state of Texas, 9/21/2012

(Kay Bailey, “A Looming Threat to National Security,” States News Service, Lexis)

Despite warnings of the dire consequences, America is teetering at the edge of a fiscal cliff, with January 1st, 2013 as the tipping point. On that date, unless Congress and the White House can reach agreement on how to cut the federal deficit, all taxpayers will be hit with higher taxes and deep cuts - called "sequestration" - will occur in almost all government spending, disrupting our already weak economy and putting our national security at risk.¶ According to the House Armed Services Committee, if sequestration goes into effect, it would put us on course for more than $1 trillion in defense cuts over the next 10 years. What would that mean? A huge hit to our military personnel and their families; devastating cuts in funding for critical military equipment and supplies for our soldiers; and **a** potentially **catastrophic blow to our** national defense and **security capabilities** in a time of increasing violence and danger.¶ All Americans feel a debt of gratitude to our men and women who serve in uniform. But Texas in particular has a culture that not only reveres the commitment and sacrifice they make to protect our freedom, we send a disproportionate number of our sons and daughters to serve.¶ The burden is not borne solely by those who continue to answer the call of duty, but by their families as well, as they endure separation and the anxiety of a loved one going off to war. These Americans have made tremendous sacrifices. They deserve better than to face threats to their financial security and increased risks to their loved ones in uniform, purely for political gamesmanship.¶ Sequestration would also place an additional burden on our economy. In the industries that support national defense, as many as 1 million skilled workers could be laid off. With 43 straight months of unemployment above 8 percent, it is beyond comprehension to add a virtual army to the 23 million Americans who are already out of work or under-employed. **Government and private economic forecasters warn that sequestration will push the country back into recession next year**.¶ The recent murder of our Ambassador to Libya and members of his staff, attacks on US embassies and consulates and continued riots across the Middle East and North Africa are stark reminders that great portions of the world remain volatile and hostile to the US. **We have the mantle of responsibility that being the world's lone super-power brings**. **In the absence of U.S. military leadership**, **upheaval in the Middle East would be worse**. **As any student of history can attest**, **instability does not confine itself to national borders**. **Strife that starts in one country can spread like wildfire across a region**.¶ Sequestration's cuts would reduce an additional 100,000 airmen, Marines, sailors and soldiers. That would leave us with the smallest ground force since 1940, the smallest naval fleet since 1915 and the smallest tactical fighter force in the Air Force's history. With the destabilization in the Middle East and other areas tenuous, we would be left with a crippled military, **a diminished stature internationally and a loss of technological** research, development and **advantage** - just as actors across the globe are increasing their capabilities.¶ Sequestration can still be avoided. **But that will require leadership from the President** that has thus far been missing. Congress and the White House must reach a long-term agreement to reduce $1 trillion annual budget deficits, without the harsh tax increases that could stall economic growth and punish working families.

#### Middle East goes nuclear

James A. Russell, Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, ‘9 (Spring) “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” IFRI, Proliferation Papers, #26, http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26\_Russell\_2009.pdf

**Strategic stability in the region is** thus **undermined by** various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) **the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists**; (3) **incompatible assumptions about** the structure of **the deterrent relationship that makes** the **bargaining** framework strategically **unstable;** (4) **perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity** for military **action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack**; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) **the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants**. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors**, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of** **chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons**. **It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used** **in the context of an unstable strategic framework.** **Systemic asymmetries** between actors in fact s**uggest** a certain increase in **the probability of war** – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. **Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own** and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent **such an outcom**e, which **would be an unprecedented disaster for the** peoples of the **region, with substantial risk for the entire world**.

### Off 4

#### CP text: In a relevant test the case the United States Supreme Court should rule that duties on crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells from the People’s Republic of China are unconstitutional.

#### The United States federal government should lower duties on crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells from the People’s Republic of China

**Counterplan solves**

**Craig 2010**

(Robin Kundis Craig, Attorneys' Title Professor and Associate Dean for Environmental Programs at Florida State University College of Law, Summer 2010, “MULTISTATE DECISION MAKING FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY AND TRANSMISSION: SPOTLIGHT ON COLORADO, NEW MEXICO, UTAH, AND WYOMING: Constitutional Contours for the Design and Implementation of Multistate Renewable Energy Programs and Projects,” University of Colorado Law Review, Lexis)

A number of dormant Commerce Clause cases have involved **energy production**, and they systematically conclude that states cannot create legal requirements or preferences based on the source of the fuel or energy. In Wyoming v. Oklahoma, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an Oklahoma statute that required Oklahoma coal-fired electric power plants producing power for sale in Oklahoma to burn a mixture of coal containing at least ten percent Oklahoma-mined coal. 121 Moreover, the "savings clause" of the Federal Power Act did not prevent the conclusion that the Oklahoma statute was unconstitutional. 122 Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois concluded that a Clean Air Act compliance plan that favored Illinois coal violated the dormant Commerce Clause. 123¶ Nor can states "hoard" state-created energy within their borders. Thus, in 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that New Hampshire could not constitutionally restrict interstate transportation of hydroelectric power generated in New Hampshire. 124

### Trade War

**Protectionism not kill trade.**

**Guoqiang 9**—director of foreign economic relations research for China's State Council (Long, “Is Protectionism a Threat to the World Economy?,” 6 March 2009, http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/finance\_investment/2009/03/06/131493.shtml) //khirn

**I don't think we'll end up with a trade war. Countries** mostly **adopt protectionist measures within the WTO framework**. There are two reasons--the first is that all the countries have something in common in prosting protectionism, second, **countries** have **emphasized corporation** at recent top-level meetings. **If some country dared** to really **put up** protectionist **barriers, it would open up a hornets' nest** of criticism against them. Second, trade **retaliation forces parties to weigh** the **pros and cons before taking protectionist measures**. So **while protectionism is sure to rise, it would not have a big impact**. Periodic **trade disputes will be unavoidable** in the near future, **but there would be little possibility of trade conflicts. I treat frictional** trade **rhetoric as a part of** the bilateral **negotiation** process. It just becomes more intense during times of crisis.

**Trade wars don’t go hot**

**Bearce ’03** [David, Associate Prof. Pol. Sci. @ U. Pittsburgh, International Studies Quarterly, “Grasping the Commercial Institutional Peace”, 47:3, Blackwell-Synergy]

**Even as we accept that such trade dispute settlement mechanisms help resolve economic conflict, it is not clear that this finding should have any strong application to the dependent variable of inter-state military conflict.** On this point**, it is important to distinguish between different types of inter-state conflict; economic versus military** (McMillan, 1997:39); **and recognize that disputes about banana tariffs, for example, are not likely to escalate into military confrontations**. **While military conflict often has economic antecedents, there is little evidence that trade wars ever become shooting wars. In terms of inter-state disagreements with real potential for military conflict, scholars highlight territorial disputes** (Vasquez, 1993; Hensel, 2000; Huth, 2000). The trade dispute settlement mechanisms embedded in regional commercial institutions simply have no jurisdiction or power to resolve highly contentious territorial disagreements

#### Tariff’s dispute inevitable- tires

WSJ 9-17

“China Goes to WTO Over U.S. Tariff Law,” <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444450004578001864184711522.html>

China has taken its complaint over a new U.S. tariff law to the World Trade Organization for consultations, the latest in a series of trade spats between the world's two largest economies.¶ The law, passed by the U.S. Congress and signed by President Barack Obama in March, restored U.S. authority to levy certain kinds of import tariffs against Chinese goods—authority that had been struck down earlier by a federal court.¶ "This law will put Chinese companies in an uncertain legal environment," Ministry of Commerce spokesman Shen Danyang said in a statement. "It violates World Trade Organization rules on transparency and proper procedures."¶ The filing came hours after people familiar with the matter said the Obama administration plans to announce new WTO complaints against China involving autos and auto parts. With the U.S. presidential election less than two months off, trade with China has become a key campaign issue.¶ The Chinese ministry refers to the U.S. legislation as the "GPX law," as it came in response to a ruling last year in the case GPX International Tire Corp. v. United States. GPX is a Massachusetts-based tire seller that filed for bankruptcy after the U.S. imposed duties on tires imported from China.¶ The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled in favor of GPX, ordering the U.S. Department of Commerce not to impose antisubsidy duties on goods from China. The court found that in a nonmarket economy, government payments to companies cannot be characterized as "subsidies."¶ The ruling lifted the department's authority to simultaneously levy antisubsidy and antidumping duties on Chinese goods, which had been a common practice, and invalidated all antisubsidy duties levied against China since 2006.¶ In the bill following the ruling, Congress granted the Commerce Department new authority to levy the tariffs. It made the authority retroactive to 2006, which GPX says violates the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.

#### Your economic collapse evidence says currency manipulation not the plan causes trade war

Wang and Li 11 (Jianhua and Yunlu—Xinhua news agency, citing Ni Feng, Vice President of the Institute of American Studies underthe Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Zhao Jinping, vice director of the Foreign Economic Department of the Development Research Center (DRC) of the State Council “China-US trade war no good for anyone”, October 13, 2011. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90780/7616581.html

Economic and trade analysts say that if the United States passes into law a bill concerning the RMB exchange rates, long-held fears of a brewing trade war between the United States and China will become a horrible reality, hurtling the world economy into disorder and recession.¶ If the U.S. Senate passes the bill on Oct. 12 Beijing time, the bill still requires approval from the U.S. House. After the Senate and the House both pass the bill, it ultimately must be signed into law by the U.S. president.¶ According to the bill, if the exchange rates of major trade partners are considered undervalued, the United States will levy punitive tariffs on the goods imported from the trade partners. Furthermore, if the currency value of a trade partner is considered so low that it has become a means to subsidize their exports, the U.S. businesses can request the U.S. government to impose higher tariffs on overseas competitors.

**Economic decline does not cause war**

**Miller 2k**

(Morris, economist, adjunct professor in the University of Ottawa’s Faculty of Administration, consultant on international development issues, former Executive Director and Senior Economist at the World Bank, Winter, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Vol. 25, Iss. 4, “Poverty as a cause of wars?” p. Proquest)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. **After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis** in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they **concluded** that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of **economic crisis** - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - **bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or,** in democratic states, rarely) to **an outbreak of violence** ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

#### No Incentive for U.S. China war

**Bremmer, 10** – president of Eurasia Group and author (Ian Bremmer, “China vs. America: Fight of the Century,” Prospect, March 22, 2010, http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2010/03/china-vs-america-fight-of-the-century/)

China will not mount a military challenge to the US any time soon. Its economy and living standards have grown so quickly over the past two decades that it’s hard to imagine the kind of catastrophic event that could push its leadership to risk it all. Beijing knows that no US government will support Taiwanese independence, and China need not invade an island that it has largely co-opted already by offering Taiwan’s business elite privileged investment opportunities.

**Durban doesn’t solve**

**Hodgkinson 9-20**

David is a lawyer and an expert on writing treaties about Climate Change, “Climate Conversion- Is Progress on Climate Change an Illusion,” <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/blogs/climate-conversations/is-progress-on-climate-change-an-illusion/>

**The world is not organised to deal with** the **climate change** problem. Climate change is a global problem, but **there is,** of course, **no global government** with the interests of the earth as a whole at heart. Rather, **there are sovereign states, the interests and concerns of which are very different**.¶ This difference is recognised in one way by both the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol. The UNFCCC states that “developed” and “developing” states have “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” in dealing with climate change. Under the UNFCCC, it’s clear that developed countries “should take the lead in combating climate change” and its effects.¶ These are very successful treaties – at least in terms of signatories. There are 194 state parties to the UNFCCC. And there are no legally binding limits on emissions for those parties to it (which might help to explain its success).¶ There are 191 state parties to Kyoto. Parties to that treaty in general agree to reduce their overall emissions either individually or jointly by at least 5 percent below 1990 levels in a first commitment period from 2008 to 2012.¶ Under Kyoto, only developed states have mitigation targets. Those targets owe less to climate change science than they do to the quality of the negotiating teams of state parties to Kyoto.¶ Against this background, at Durban last year – at meetings of parties to the UNFCCC and Kyoto (COP 17/CMP 7) – did the planet benefit? What was actually achieved? Was it enough to limit global temperature rise to 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, the global warming limit adopted by parties to the UNFCCC? And what are the implications for Doha (COP 18/CMP 8) and beyond?¶ FROM DURBAN TO DOHA TO....?¶ **At Durban, state parties to the Kyoto Protocol** – with exceptions (Canada, Japan and Russia) – **decided on a second commitment period**, to begin on 1 January 2013 and end either in 2017 or 2020 (the end date to be determined sometime this year). ¶ **Kyoto will cover only about 14 percent or 15 percent** of the world’s emissions **– a figure widely used at Durban**.¶ Durban also launched a “Platform for Enhanced Action,” a non-binding agreement “to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force” under the UNFCCC and applicable to all parties – both developed and developing.¶ Any such protocol, legal instrument or “agreed outcome with legal force” is to be concluded by 2015 – with “pledges” from developed and developing state parties to reduce emissions – and ostensibly to come into effect and be implemented from 2020. **These parties would also, of course, need to ratify such an agreement.**¶ Including both developed and developing state parties would represent what Tod Stern, the chief US climate change negotiator, refers to as the end of the “firewall” between the obligations of developed and developing states.¶ But **this “Durban Platform” is simply an agreement to reach agreement – an agreement to agree**. Indeed, **post-Durban, India’s environment minister said that the agreement does not mean that “India has to take binding commitments** to reduce its emissions in absolute terms in 2020.”¶ If – if – parties reach agreement and targets commence in 2020, what happens between now and then, in a decade critical for achieving the 2 degrees limit (and the Durban Platform even refers to strengthening this to 1.5 degrees)? Some states will, and some states may, take voluntary action, but verification and other issues need to attend such action.¶ **In 2007 the non-binding Bali “road map” was agreed with a view to a post-2012 agreement. Now there is an agreement** – the Durban Platform – **which is procedural in nature and aims to work towards a 2015 agreement with a 2020 start date** for developed and developing states.¶ And as time elapses, and with every delay, the ambitions for agreement unsurprisingly increase.¶ It’s the illusion of progress.¶ And this in a world where, if an agreement was to be concluded between just the world’s 5 largest emitters (developed or developing) – between China (producing 29 percent of emissions), the US (16 percent), India (6 percent), Russia (5 percent) and Japan (4 percent) – none of whom have had (or will have) targets under the Kyoto process – such an agreement would cover 60 percent of global emissions (71 percent if the EU is added).¶ For China, its per capita CO2 emissions increased by 9 percent over the past year, prompting this from the journal Nature:¶ “For years, China has dismissed concerns about its rising carbon emissions by pointing out that, on a per-capita basis, Chinese citizens still emit far less that their counterparts in the industrialised world. But now that China’s per-capita emissions are on par with those of the European Union, that argument will be much harder to make.”

 **GOP Blocks**

**Harvey ’12**

Fiona is an environmental correspondent for the Guardian, “Republican Presidential Win would Lose U.S. Ground to China- UN Climate Chief,” <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/mar/09/republican-climate-change-us-president-china?newsfeed=true>

**The U**nited **N**ations climate chief has **warned that US voters risk ceding progress to China** and Europe **if they opt for a presidential candidate who denies climate change**.¶ Christiana Figueres, the executive secretary of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, told an audience in London: "The one thing [the frontrunners for the Republican candidacy] have in common is saying they do not believe in climate change, so it's very much the decision of the US electorate.¶ "My concern on this has been: is the US electorate willing to let history progress in such a way that it is China and Europe that are going to produce and benefit from the clean technologies we are going to be using? Is the US electorate willing to let the competitive edge on technology go to China or Europe or would they prefer to be leaders in technology? That is the question they have to answer."¶ The remarks by Figueres, a self-described "daughter of a revolutionary from Costa Rica", are unlikely to go down well with the Republican candidates, who tend to take a hostile view to the UN as well as climate change. Last year, **the Republican-controlled House of Representatives cut funding to the UN climate science body, the I**ntergovernmental **P**anel on **Cl**imate **C**hange.¶ Figueres also called on people everywhere to take a public stand on climate change, saying it was needed to achieve a globally co-ordinated effort to tackle greenhouse gas emissions.¶

#### No resource wars

**Salehyan ‘7**

[Idean Salehyan, assistant professor of political science at the University of North Texas. “The New Myth About Climate Change”, Foreign Policy, August 2007, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3922>]

First, aside from a few anecdotes, **there is little** systematic **empirical evidence that resource scarcity** and changing environmental conditions **lead to conflict.** In fact, several **studies have shown that** an **abundance of** natural **resources is more likely to contribute to conflict. Moreover, even as the planet has warmed, the number of civil wars and insurgencies has decreased dramatically.** Data collected by researchers at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world. Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. If global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend. Furthermore, if famine and drought led to the crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict elsewhere? For instance, the U.N. World Food Programme warns that 5 million people in Malawi have been experiencing chronic food shortages for several years. But famine-wracked Malawi has yet to experience a major civil war. Similarly, **the Asian tsunami in 2004 killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental refugees, and led to severe shortages of shelter, food, clean water, and electricity. Yet the tsunami, one of the most extreme catastrophes in recent history, did not lead to an outbreak of resource wars.** Clearly then**, there is much more to armed conflict than resource scarcity** and natural disasters.

**No impact to warming**

**Mendelsohn 9**,

(Robert O. the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of¶ Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and¶ Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/¶ gcwp060web.pdf

The heart of the **debate about climate change comes from** a number of **warnings** from scientists and others that give the impression **that** human induced **climate change is an immediate threat to society** (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006.) Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b) crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20-30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people. (Dasgupta et al. 2009) Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and wellbeing may be at risk (Stern 2006). **These statements are** largely **alarmist and misleading**. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, **society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences**. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear **that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences**. **The severe impacts** predicted **by alarmists require a century** (or two in the Case of Stern 2006) **of no mitigation**. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no **or little adaptation. the net** economic **impacts** from climate change over the next 50 years **will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold** **and** many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because **people will adapt**. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long-run balanced responses.

### Advantage 2

#### Companies already reducing PV

Recharge 10/24

(“Wacker delays start-up of $1.5bn Tennessee polysilicon plant” http://www.rechargenews.com/energy/solar/article325978.ece)

Wacker says the dire state of the PV market means the plant will not now start production of the solar raw-material until mid-2015, rather than the end of next year as planned.¶ The 15,000-tonne plant at Charleston is the largest investment in Wacker’s history, but the polysilicon market has changed drastically since it broke ground at the site in April 2011.¶ Releasing its third-quarter financial results today, the German group says its polysilicon sold at a 40% discount in the three months ending September when compared to the same period in 2011.

**Conventional deterrence outweighs nuclear primacy**

George **Perkovich**, **2009,** International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, May 2009, “Extended Deterrence On The Way To A Nuclear Free World,” International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament

For Credible Deterrence, Focus on Non-Nuclear Capabilities The most credible and perhaps least dangerous way to assure allies of U.S. commitments to defend them is to station U.S. conventional forces on allied territories, as is already the case in original NATO states and in Japan and South Korea. With U.S. conventional forces in harm’s way, an adversary attacking a U.S. ally would draw the U.S. into the conflict with greater certainty than if nuclear weapons were directly and immediately implicated. Indeed, the greater credibility that U.S. conventional forces bring to extended deterrence is one reason why Poland has been keen to have U.S. missile defense personnel based on Polish soil. Were U.S. personnel attacked, the U.S. would respond forcefully. Arguably the best way to strengthen the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence would be to stress that conventional capabilities of the U.S. and its allies alone are sufficient to defeat all foreseeable adversaries in any scenario other than nuclear war. And as long as adversaries can threaten nuclear war, the U.S. will deploy nuclear weapons to deter that threat. Of course, basing U.S. conventional forces on allied territory also invites controversy in many places, including Japan. Such controversies are much less intense than would flow from proposals to base nuclear weapons, but they point to the fundamental underlying political-psychological challenge of extended deterrence. Allies want the protection that the U.S. can provide, and worry about abandonment, but they also don’t want to be implicated in U.S. policies that could entrap them in conflicts not entirely of their making. This tension is the heart of the extended deterrence challenge. To repeat, rather than focusing on nuclear weapons, the U.S. and its allies should concentrate on building cooperation and confidence in overall political-security strategies in each region. Indeed, it is worthwhile to honestly consider whether in Northeast Asia and Central Europe and Turkey the recently expressed concerns over the future credibility of extended U.S. nuclear deterrence is a proxy for deeper concerns that are more difficult to express. For example, in Poland, Russia’s rhetoric and foreign policy, including the conflict with Georgia, elicit private worries that NATO would not actually risk confrontation with Russia to defend Poland against Russian bullying. Can NATO as a collection of 26 states with diverse interests and capabilities be relied upon stand up forcefully in behalf of Poland (and other new NATO states)? Doubts about the answer to this question at least partially explain why Poland has sought special guarantees from the U.S. It is not clear that focusing on the nuclear element of extended deterrence in this situation helps produce policies and capabilities that actually would deter or dissuade Russia from bellicosity. The types of scenarios in which Russia might bully Poland are not likely to include credible threats of Russian coercion that would make countervailing use of nuclear weapons realistic or desirable. Indeed, raising the specter of nuclear threats could undermine the credibility of extended deterrence because allied states, including the American public, would probably become alarmed in ways that would weaken resolve to push back firmly against Russian pressure. This resembles the credibility problems of extended nuclear deterrence during the Cold War. Decisions to extend NATO membership to former Warsaw Pact states were made during the 1990s when the risks of Russian coercion appeared to be a relic of history. Precisely because the threat of war against the new NATO states was low, it appeared to entail little cost and risk to extend NATO protection to them. NATO governments and societies did not carefully consider the implications. However, once commitments were made to new allies, it has become imperative to treat them seriously. Given the unfinished challenge of mobilizing collective resolve to implement NATO’s obligations, whether in Afghanistan or Eastern Europe, if risks of threats to new allies’ security rise anew, great care must be taken not to invoke prospects of nuclear crisis unless and until there are clear dangers of nuclear conflict. This is not the case today. It will seem strange and unwelcome to populations of other NATO states to call for greater salience of extended nuclear deterrence in response to a U.S.led effort to move to a nuclear-weapon free world. Many of these Western European states have always been highly ambivalent about getting caught in a nuclear conflict between the U.S. and Russia. That is, they welcome extended deterrence when it might make war less likely but they fear it when it might make war in Europe more likely, or more horrifying than it otherwise would be. Bringing this ambivalence to the foreground now could needlessly weaken alliance solidarity. It would be wiser to avoid such developments by focusing on confidence-building, threat reduction, arms control, and reduction of the salience of nuclear weapons in Russian-Western relations. If efforts to reduce threats and promote cooperation fail, then Central European allies will most need reassurance that capabilities and determination exist to counter Russian bullying by means proportionate to those Russia would use for such bullying. Careless invocations of the nuclear element of extended deterrence should be avoided.

#### Solar trades off with Polysilicon for semiconductors

Sage Concepts ‘10

Sage Concepts studies changes in international markets, “Executive Summary,” <http://www.sageconceptsonline.com/docs/report1.pdf>

The biggest problem in the silicon world had previously been the shortage of polysilicon. After ¶ seven years of silicon glut (oversupply), the polysilicon supply had become inadequate to supply, ¶ both its traditional customer (the semiconductor market) and its new customer (the photovoltaic ¶ market). ¶ However through massive new investment by new polysilicon suppliers combined with a global ¶ economic downturn, the supply of polysilicon has returned to an oversupply situation once ¶ again. While most of the new polysilicon supply is not of sufficient quality to serve the ¶ semiconductor industry, it will be sufficient to serve the solar industry and thus relieve the ¶ pressure on the traditional high quality polysilicon suppliers. ¶ The photovoltaic (solar) demand for polysilicon increased from 72,121 metric tons in the year ¶ 2009 to 120,826 metric tons in 2010. The combined demand (solar + semiconductor+ solar ¶ inventory build) was (120,826+ 28,028+11,042) = 159,896 metric tons in 2010. This demand ¶ was less than the polysilicon manufacturing capacity of the polysilicon suppliers of 172,400 ¶ metric tons by some 12,504 metric tons. New polysilicon supplies contributed 68,000 metric tons ¶ of capacity. This adequacy of supply resulted in average polysilicon prices staying constant at ¶ $55/kg.

#### 94% of Polysilicon doesn’t go to semiconductors

Sage Concepts ‘10

Sage Concepts studies changes in international markets, “Executive Summary,” <http://www.sageconceptsonline.com/docs/report1.pdf>

Semiconductor silicon is becoming a niche product, only 5.9% of the silicon wafer ¶ area produced is for semiconductor production and only 17.6% of the polysilicon ¶ produced goes to semiconductor industry.

#### Tariff increases polysilicon supply

Solar Industry Magazine 9-14

“Solar Polysilicon Glut Persists as Suppliers Consider Production Cuts,” <http://solarindustrymag.com/e107_plugins/content/content.php?content.11180>

With pricing for photovoltaic polysilicon declining at an accelerated rate in August, there are no signs that the glut plaguing the industry has abated, behooving tier-one suppliers to consider reducing production in order to stabilize market conditions. PV polysilicon prices last month fell at a faster rate in August than they did in July ,continuing a losing streak that started in the fourth quarter of 2011, according to a new report from information and analytics provider [IHS](http://www.ihs.com/). In August, the contract price of 9N polysilicon and above grades amounted to&#036;27.80/ kg, while pricing of the same-grade polysilicon traded in the spot marketwas much lower - at &#036;21.90/kg. The gap between the two categories wideneddue to the fast decline of spot prices. Contract pricing for 6N to 8N polysilicon was&#036;22.70/kg, while the price on the spot market was &#036;20.10/kg. "Oversupply remains the dominant trend impacting the PV polysilicon market," saysHenning Wicht, director for PV advanced products at IHS. "The glut has caused pricing to drop precipitously, impacting profitability for polysilicon suppliers. "Pricing also has been impacted by a number of related factors, including a sharpdecrease in demand for solar module shipments in August, high module-channelinventory in Europe and the United States, and the possible implications of the Chineseanti-dumping tariff against international players," Wicht continues. "In order to stabilizethe price of polysilicon, tier-one suppliers need to consider reducing production." Will demand return? Looking ahead to polysilicon demand in September and October, IHS sees a potentialrevival. However, an impending trade war with China in this market creates an air ofuncertainty that may frighten away some buyers. If these pressures continue,September and October could potentially see weak demand, putting additional pressureon polysilicon suppliers worldwide. Price is also a matter of uncertainty because of the anti-dumping situation in China. If apunitive tariff is imposed on Korean and EU/U.S. polysilicon makers in the next threemonths by the Chinese Department of Commerce, these companies will be forced toaccelerate price declines because China is the dominant buyer of polysilicon. Although tier-one polysilicon manufacturers reduced utilization slightly in August, theirproduction rates remain high. Furthermore, resold polysilicon is in plentiful supply. If Tier1 suppliers maintain high utilization levels, the polysilicon oversupply situation willcontinue for the next 12 months, the report says. "Now is the time for tier-one polysilicon suppliers to seriously think about a cut inproduction, given that profit margins for these companies are already very weak," Wichtnotes. "Based on the market developments in July and August - as well as the forecastfor September - a worse profit/loss situation in the third quarter is forecast for majorpolysilicon makers than in the second quarter." August turned out to be a very slow month for polysilicon demand; at least 10% to 15%less polysilicon was traded during the month compared to July. The lower demand ishaving a significant impact on the market for spot polysilicon because buyers still need tofulfill their long-term agreements with major suppliers, even though some buyers triedhard to keep the volume to a minimum. This is another reason tier-one suppliers should consider cutting production in the comingquarters, the company explains. August was also sluggish for crystalline silicon moduledemand in Europe due to high channel stockpiles and the holiday season. On the otherside of the Eurasian landmass, demand from China is ready to take off soon - eventhough it has yet to materialize.

####  China will just offshore

Woody ‘12

Forbes Staff, “Solar Installers Caught In Cross Fire Of Escalating China Trade War”, 5/18/12, http://www.forbes.com/sites/toddwoody/2012/05/18/solar-installers-caught-in-cross-fire-of-escalating-china-trade-war/,

Shayle Kann, vice president of research at GTM Research, says he expects other Chinese solar manufacturers to build factories overseas to avoid the tariffs.¶ “We think there will be some short-term disruption in the supply chain in the U.S. as installers figure out what they can and cannot procure, and as suppliers determine their strategies to deal with the tariffs,” Kann said an e-mail from China, where he is attending a solar trade show. “So while there may be a near-term impact on demand, we continue to anticipate substantial growth in the U.S. market this year and moving forward. We’re currently forecasting 75% installation growth in 2012, down from 109% in 2011.”

#### Won’t go to war over food

**Chang ‘11**

Gordon G Chang, Graduated Cornell Law School “Global Food Wars” <http://blogs.forbes.com/gordonchang/2011/02/21/global-food-wars/>

In any event, food-price increases have apparently been factors in the unrest now sweeping North Africa and the Middle East. The poor spend up to half their disposable income on edibles, making rapid food inflation a cause of concern for dictators, strongmen, and assorted autocrats everywhere. So even if **humankind does not go to war over bad harvests**, Paskal may be right when she contends that climate change may end up altering the global map. This is not the first time in human history that food shortages looked like they would be the motor of violent geopolitical change. Yet amazing **agronomic advances**, especially Norman Borlaug’s Green Revolution in the middle of the 20th century, **have consistently proved** the **pessimists wrong**. In these days when capitalism is being blamed for most everything, **it’s important to remember the power** **of** human **innovation** in free societies—**and the efficiency** of free **markets**.

#### No Natural Gas Spikes

**Zeits 9/7**/2012

(Richard, Zeits Energy Analytics, Seeking Alpha Investment Analysis, "US gas production to stay high for the next 12-18 months" seekingalpha.com/article/852901-southwestern-energy-u-s-gas-production-to-stay-high-for-the-next-12-18-months)

Mr. **Mueller's forecast**, while not bullish at the first glance, in fact **has positive implications for the sector**. I would argue, **with natural gas prices in the $4-$5 range, the industry stands to make ample returns, and additional demand would amplify profitable volumes**. It is difficult to disagree with Mr. Mueller's assessment that a $5/MMBtu price would not be sustainable for long, considering the industry's much evolved cost structure. **Over the past several years, shale gas operators have made great progress in perfecting extraction techniques**, reducing drilling and completion times, and optimizing production regimes. On average, natural gas wells are more productive and less expensive to drill and complete than just two or three years ago. **Processing and delivery infrastructure has largely been put in place to accommodate massive shale gas volumes**.

## 2NC

### Advantage 2

#### China will just offshore

Woody ‘12

Forbes Staff, “Solar Installers Caught In Cross Fire Of Escalating China Trade War”, 5/18/12, http://www.forbes.com/sites/toddwoody/2012/05/18/solar-installers-caught-in-cross-fire-of-escalating-china-trade-war/,

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#### Solar production is oversupplied

Wang 6-27

Ucilla is a contributor to the energy section of Forbes, “Report: Solar Panel Supply will far Exceed Demand by 2012,” <http://www.forbes.com/sites/uciliawang/2012/06/27/report-solar-panel-production-will-far-exceed-demand-beyond-2012/>

When solar equipment manufactures began posting big losses during 2011, forcing some to close factories or even file for bankruptcies, many of them wondered: when will the market recover? End of 2011? Mid-2012? Not this year. Or even next year. First Solar Struggles Amid Decline Of Thin-Film Solar Marker **Solar panel makers are on track to deliver 59 gigawatts of their products worldwide this year when demand will likely hit 30 gigawatts, according to a report released by GTM Research Wednesday. To re-establish a healthy balance of supply and demand, an estimated 21 gigawatts of existing factories will close by 2015**, said Shyam Mehta, author of the report. **The oversupply problem began to surface in early 2011 and led to a near 50% drop in wholesale solar panel prices last year**. Lower government subsidies and worries about the financial health of Europe – the largest solar market – tempered demand for solar equipment last year. Emerging markets such as the Japan, China and India should see a big jump in solar panel installations this year. Th**e U.S. also could experience a 75% growth in 2012. But all these increases aren’t going to be enough to make use of most of the solar panels that will be rolling off assembly lines, especially when some manufacturers have built new factories over the past year and a half or plan to add more production lines in the next few years**. Companies are building new factories for reasons that aren’t necessary foolish. Many startups only recently entered the market and need to gain manufacturing scale to lower their production costs, or else they will never be competitive, Mehta said. Several U.S. thin film companies, which use semiconductors that allow them to create ultra-thin solar panels, are in production expansion mode. They include Stion, SoloPower, HelioVolt and Nanosolar. GE is building a solar panel factory in Colorado that will eventually reach an annual production capacity of 400 megawatts. The company plans to use a thin film technology developed by a startup it bought in 2011 and begin shipping panels from the new factory in 2013. Some Japanese and Chinese manufacturers who are not startups, such as Hanergy and Panasonic (which bought Sanyo and its solar business), also have been beefing up their production fleets. Sometimes manufacturers expand production because they expect the oversupply problem to be short-term. They also could be executing plans they created a few years ago because building a factory requires time to raise money, gain regulatory approval and bring production equipment online. Meanwhile, other companies, such as GCL-Poly Energy, which is among the largest maker of silicon and silicon wafers (for making solar cells) in the world, are willing to expand production and lose money for a while in order to gain market share, Mehta said. Finally, some companies that are adding factories “are just plain clueless,” he added. China-based GCL-Poly is an interesting company to watch because it’s increasing silicon and wafer production while also aggressively pursuing solar energy generation projects. The company has announced or completed projects in place such as California and China, and in May it said it would team up with Spanish firm Isofoton to jointly develop 1 gigawatt of power projects worldwide. GCL-Poly recently created a joint venture with New Jersey-based NRG Energy to provide solar power plant engineering and construction services. The joint venture, called Sunora Energy Solutions, inaugurated a factory in Arizona last week to make racks for mounting solar panels. Sunora also assembles the mounting equipment with solar panels from other suppliers before shipping them to construction sites. **The big decline in solar panel prices is great news for solar project builders**, said John Plumlee, CEO of Sunora. **Pre-assembling mounting gear with solar panels at a factory rather than at the job site, as is the typical practice, also will save money, he added. “This is absolutely a great time to launch a solution business and a terrible time to be a module manufacturing business,”** Plumlee said.

**Conventional deterrence outweighs nuclear primacy**

George **Perkovich**, **2009,** International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, May 2009, “Extended Deterrence On The Way To A Nuclear Free World,” International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament

For Credible Deterrence, Focus on Non-Nuclear Capabilities The most credible and perhaps least dangerous way to assure allies of U.S. commitments to defend them is to station U.S. conventional forces on allied territories, as is already the case in original NATO states and in Japan and South Korea. With U.S. conventional forces in harm’s way, an adversary attacking a U.S. ally would draw the U.S. into the conflict with greater certainty than if nuclear weapons were directly and immediately implicated. Indeed, the greater credibility that U.S. conventional forces bring to extended deterrence is one reason why Poland has been keen to have U.S. missile defense personnel based on Polish soil. Were U.S. personnel attacked, the U.S. would respond forcefully. Arguably the best way to strengthen the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence would be to stress that conventional capabilities of the U.S. and its allies alone are sufficient to defeat all foreseeable adversaries in any scenario other than nuclear war. And as long as adversaries can threaten nuclear war, the U.S. will deploy nuclear weapons to deter that threat. Of course, basing U.S. conventional forces on allied territory also invites controversy in many places, including Japan. Such controversies are much less intense than would flow from proposals to base nuclear weapons, but they point to the fundamental underlying political-psychological challenge of extended deterrence. Allies want the protection that the U.S. can provide, and worry about abandonment, but they also don’t want to be implicated in U.S. policies that could entrap them in conflicts not entirely of their making. This tension is the heart of the extended deterrence challenge. To repeat, rather than focusing on nuclear weapons, the U.S. and its allies should concentrate on building cooperation and confidence in overall political-security strategies in each region. Indeed, it is worthwhile to honestly consider whether in Northeast Asia and Central Europe and Turkey the recently expressed concerns over the future credibility of extended U.S. nuclear deterrence is a proxy for deeper concerns that are more difficult to express. For example, in Poland, Russia’s rhetoric and foreign policy, including the conflict with Georgia, elicit private worries that NATO would not actually risk confrontation with Russia to defend Poland against Russian bullying. Can NATO as a collection of 26 states with diverse interests and capabilities be relied upon stand up forcefully in behalf of Poland (and other new NATO states)? Doubts about the answer to this question at least partially explain why Poland has sought special guarantees from the U.S. It is not clear that focusing on the nuclear element of extended deterrence in this situation helps produce policies and capabilities that actually would deter or dissuade Russia from bellicosity. The types of scenarios in which Russia might bully Poland are not likely to include credible threats of Russian coercion that would make countervailing use of nuclear weapons realistic or desirable. Indeed, raising the specter of nuclear threats could undermine the credibility of extended deterrence because allied states, including the American public, would probably become alarmed in ways that would weaken resolve to push back firmly against Russian pressure. This resembles the credibility problems of extended nuclear deterrence during the Cold War. Decisions to extend NATO membership to former Warsaw Pact states were made during the 1990s when the risks of Russian coercion appeared to be a relic of history. Precisely because the threat of war against the new NATO states was low, it appeared to entail little cost and risk to extend NATO protection to them. NATO governments and societies did not carefully consider the implications. However, once commitments were made to new allies, it has become imperative to treat them seriously. Given the unfinished challenge of mobilizing collective resolve to implement NATO’s obligations, whether in Afghanistan or Eastern Europe, if risks of threats to new allies’ security rise anew, great care must be taken not to invoke prospects of nuclear crisis unless and until there are clear dangers of nuclear conflict. This is not the case today. It will seem strange and unwelcome to populations of other NATO states to call for greater salience of extended nuclear deterrence in response to a U.S.led effort to move to a nuclear-weapon free world. Many of these Western European states have always been highly ambivalent about getting caught in a nuclear conflict between the U.S. and Russia. That is, they welcome extended deterrence when it might make war less likely but they fear it when it might make war in Europe more likely, or more horrifying than it otherwise would be. Bringing this ambivalence to the foreground now could needlessly weaken alliance solidarity. It would be wiser to avoid such developments by focusing on confidence-building, threat reduction, arms control, and reduction of the salience of nuclear weapons in Russian-Western relations. If efforts to reduce threats and promote cooperation fail, then Central European allies will most need reassurance that capabilities and determination exist to counter Russian bullying by means proportionate to those Russia would use for such bullying. Careless invocations of the nuclear element of extended deterrence should be avoided.

### Advantage 1

**Diversionary theory wrong—collapse kills resources for military aggression**

**Bennett 2k**

PolSci Prof, Penn State (Scott and Timothy Nordstrom, Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic Problems in Enduring Rivalries, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Ebsco)

Conflict settlement is also a distinct route to dealing with internal problems that leaders in rivalries may pursue when faced with internal problems. Military competition between states requires large amounts of resources, and rivals require even more attention. **Leaders** may choose to **negotiate a settlement** that ends a rivalry **to free up** important **resources** that may be reallocated **to the** domestic **economy**. In a “guns versus butter” world of economic trade-offs, when a state can no longer afford to pay the expenses associated with competition in a rivalry, it is quite rational for leaders to reduce costs by ending a rivalry. This gain (a peace dividend) could be achieved at any time by ending a rivalry. However, such a gain is likely to be most important and attractive to leaders when internal conditions are bad and the leader is seeking ways to alleviate active problems. **Support for policy change away from continued rivalry** is more likely to **develop when the economic situation sours and elites** and masses **are looking** for ways **to improve a worsening** **situation**. It is at these times that **the pressure to cut military investment will be greatest** and that state leaders will be forced to recognize the difficulty of continuing to pay for a rivalry. Among other things, this argument also encompasses the view that the cold war ended becausethe Unionof Soviet Socialist Republics could no longer compete economically with the United States.

**Their studies are flawed- bad data sets and research designs**

**Boehmer ‘7** –

political science professor at the University of Texas (Charles, Politics & Policy, 35:4, “The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict”, WEA)

This article examines the contemporaneous effect of low economic growth and domestic instability on the threat of regime change and/ or involvement in external militarized conflicts. Many **studies of diversionary conflict argue** that **lower** rates of economic **growth should heighten the risk of international conflict**. Yet we know that militarized interstate conflicts, and especially wars, are generally rare events whereas lower rates of growth are not. Additionally, a growing body of literature shows that regime changes are also associated with lower rates of economic growth. The question then becomes which event, militarized interstate conflict or regime change, is the most likely to occur with domestic discord and lower rates of economic growth? Diversionary theory claims that leaders seek to divert attention away from domestic problems such as a bad economy or political scandals, or to garner increased support prior to elections. Leaders then supposedly externalize discontented domestic sentiments onto other nations, sometimes as scapegoats based on the similar in-group/out-group dynamic found in the research of Coser (1956) and Simmel (1955), where foreign countries are blamed for domestic problems. This process is said to involve a “rally-round-the-flag” effect, where a leader can expect a short-term boost in popularity with the threat or use of force (Blechman, Kaplan, and Hall 1978; Mueller 1973). Scholarship on diversionary conflict has focused most often on the American case1 but recent studies have sought to identify this possible behavior in other countries.2 The Falklands War is often a popular example of diversionary conflict (Levy and Vakili 1992). Argentina was reeling from hyperinflation and rampant unemployment associated with the Latin American debt crisis. It is plausible that a success in the Falklands War may have helped to rally support for the governing Galtieri regime, although Argentina lost the war and the ruling regime lost power. How many other attempts to use diversionary tactics, if they indeed occur, can be seen to generate a similar outcome? The goal of this article is to provide an assessment of the extent to which diversionary strategy is a threat to peace. Is this a colorful theory kept alive by academics that has little bearing upon real events, or is this a real problem that policy makers should be concerned with? If it is a strategy readily available to leaders, then it is important to know what domestic factors trigger this gambit. Moreover, to know that requires an understanding of the context in external conflict, which occurs relative to regime changes. **Theories of diversionary conflict usually emphasize the potential benefits of diversionary tactics, although few pay equal attention to the prospective costs** associated with such behavior. It is not contentious to claim that leaders typically seek to remain in office. However, whether they can successfully manipulate public opinion regularly during periods of domestic unpopularity through their states’ participation in foreign militarized conflicts—especially outside of the American case—is a question open for debate. Furthermore, there appears to be a logical disconnect between diversionary theories and extant studies of domestic conflict and regime change. Lower rates of economic growth are purported to increase the risk of both militarized interstate conflicts (and internal conflicts) as well as regime changes (Bloomberg and Hess 2002). This implies that if leaders do, in fact, undertake diversionary conflicts, many may still be thrown from the seat of power—especially if the outcome is defeat to a foreign enemy. Diversionary conflict would thus seem to be a risky gambit (Smith 1996). Scholars such as MacFie (1938) and Blainey (1988) have nevertheless questioned the validity of **the** diversionary **thesis**. As noted by Levy (1989), this perspective **is** **rarely** formulated as a **cohesive** and comprehensive theory, and there has been little or no knowledge cumulation. Later analyses do not necessarily build on past studies and the discrepancies between inquiries are often difficult to unravel. “**Studies have used a variety of research designs**, different dependent variables (uses of force, major uses of force, militarized disputes), different estimation techniques, **and different data** **sets** covering different time periods and different states” (Bennett and Nordstrom 2000, 39). To these problems, we should add a lack of theoretical precision and incomplete model specification. By a lack of theoretical precision, I am referring to the linkages between economic conditions and domestic strife that remain unclear in some studies (Miller 1995; Russett 1990). Consequently, extant studies are to a degree incommensurate; they offer a step in the right direction but do not provide robust cross-national explanations and tests of economic growth and interstate conflict. Yet a few studies have attempted to provide deductive explanations about when and how diversionary tactics might be employed. Using a Bayesian updating game, Richards and others (1993) theorize that while the use of force would appear to offer leaders a means to boost their popularity, a poorly performing economy acts as a signal to a leader’s constituents about his or her competence. Hence, **attempts to use diversion are likely to fail either because incompetent leaders will likewise fail in foreign policy or people will recognize the gambit for what it is.** Instead, these two models conclude that diversion is likely to be undertaken particularly by risk-acceptant leaders. This stress on a heightened risk of removal from office is also apparent in the work of Bueno de Mesquita and others (1999), and Downs and Rocke (1994), where leaders may “gamble for resurrection,” although the diversionary scenario in the former study is only a partial extension of their theory on selectorates, winning coalitions, and leader survival. Again, how often do leaders fail in the process or are removed from positions of power before they can even initiate diversionary tactics? A few studies focusing on leader tenure have examined the removal of leaders following war, although almost no study in the diversionary literature has looked at the effects of domestic problems on the relative risks of regime change, interstate conflict, or both events occurring in the same year.3

**Trade disputes don’t spillover to other issues and don’t escalate**

**Feigenbaum 10**

[Evan A. Feigenbaum is head of the Asia practice group at the Eurasia Group and adjunct senior fellow for Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations. From 2001 to 2009, he worked on East, Central, and South Asia at the U.S. State Department. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/10/19/reluctant_warriors?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full>]

**A third trend is the growing tolerance for trade tensions in both Washington and Beijing.** This confidence has made both governments less restrained in pursuing trade disputes. But it also means **the U**nited **S**tates **and China have largely separated security issues,** such as North Korea and Iran, **from** the minutiae of Section 301 and 421 filings and **market-access disputes. The relationship will not collapse, even in the face of an avalanche of anti-dumping suits, as both governments work to delink the various issues on an increasingly complex bilateral men**u. Beijing, having grown more comfortable with the World Trade Organization's dispute-resolution procedures (and having learned to leverage the system to its own advantage), is now prepared to vigorously fight U.S. suits in many of these areas. It has investigated numerous anti-dumping cases brought by Chinese producers, lent its ear to a proliferation of Chinese business lobbies, and is investigating a countervailing duties case into U.S. subsidies for the Big Three automakers. Finally, U.S. demands for access to China's 1.3 billion consumers are growing in both scope and intensity, particularly as China's indigenous innovation policies threaten the proprietary technologies of U.S. companies. **And demands for market access now flow both ways**. A China already resistant to U.S. pressure will become even more so the more Chinese investments in the United States are blocked.

**Trade disputes don’t affect relations**

**Feigenbaum 10**

[Evan A. Feigenbaum is head of the Asia practice group at the Eurasia Group and adjunct senior fellow for Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations. From 2001 to 2009, he worked on East, Central, and South Asia at the U.S. State Department. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/10/19/reluctant_warriors?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full>]

But **U.S.-China relations can** probably **weather a proliferation of** such acrimonious **trade disputes,** especially if they are channeled through the WTO and other rules-based mechanisms. **The bilateral relationship is extremely diverse; both sides have strong incentives not to let trade friction undermine every other form of cooperation**. And it's worth noting that virtually **no U.S. company plans to flee China** -- not even those that stand to lose the most from China's indigenous innovation policies. Meanwhile, **Beijing has** two **good reasons to keep the overall relationship with Washington on track.** For one, **China's economy is not yet "decoupled" from America's; China continues to run large trade surpluses with the U**nited **S**tates **and**, because of its own stabilized exchange rate, **is bound to U.S. monetary policy as its dollar reserves accumulate**. For another, **Beijing has more trade and investment options with more countries than ever before; China can now weather conflict with the U**nited **S**tates **more easily -- thus Beijing need not treat trade conflict with Washington as a strategic threat.** Still, to keep frictions from escalating, both sides must make sure they stick as much as possible to WTO and rules-based mechanisms for resolving their differences, avoiding purely punitive actions not linked to specific commercial grievances. The likely course for the United States probably involves pursuing a mix of anti-dumping and countervailing duties cases -- and continuing to search for a more systemic remedy to press, persuade, and sometimes coerce China to level its playing field. That will produce very real tensions. But **rules-based spats,** though contentious, **will not** likely **result in underlying strategic conflict.** Indeed, the essential strategic reality of Asia today is this: China is fast becoming the central player in a new economic regionalism, but Asian countries are deepening defense and political coordination with the United States as a hedge against Beijing's growing strategic weight.

**No risk of a trade war – china is rational and will just focus domestically.**

**Haley, ’12** (George T. (PhD, UT at Austin) is Professor of Marketing at the U. of New Haven Director of the Center for International Industry Competitiveness (CIIC). “The Case for U.S. Tariffs on Chinese Solar Panels,” 06/19/2012,

<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/usha-haley/the-case-for-us-tariffs-o_b_1605087.html>)-mikee

With the U.S. Commerce Department's preliminary decision in May to impose 31-percent anti-dumping tariffs on Chinese photovoltaic (PV) solar panels, some commentators have warned that this is the first shot in a job-killing trade war with China. **Professed fears of a trade war are as predictable as night after day. Fortunately, the hand wringing is largely unnecessary. Prediction of a trade war is largely a dangerous myth.** Historically, U.S.-China trade disputes follow a different pattern. In fact, **China**, while complaining loudly, **tends to comply with trade-case findings rather than retaliating in response**. Why? **Because Chinese trade-policy makers are rational** political players. They make decisions based on political and economic interests, including jobs and growth. **They rarely suffer self-inflicted wounds** (or even self-inflicted paper cuts). A trade war with China would hurt the U.S. but would mortally wound China. **The U.S. market remains central to China's export-led development.** In 2011 exports to the U.S. represented 21 percent of China's total exports and 8.3 percent of China's GDP. Conversely, exports to China represented 3.7 percent of the U.S.'s total exports and less than 0.5 percent of U.S. GDP. **With European markets collapsing, China's dependence on the United States is increasing.** China's solar-manufacturing industry relies especially heavily on foreign markets, including the US. **Currently, Chinese solar-panel manufacturing capacity is 32 times greater than domestic consumption**. As a result, China exports 95 percent of its production. **U.S. anti-dumping tariffs will encourage domestic consumption in China, thereby reducing the growth in China's carbon footprint.** China's need to export has led to the recent solar-trade dispute. Over the past seven years China has gone from a non-factor to the world's biggest player in the solar sector. Thanks to Chinese overproduction, prices for solar panels have plummeted. In an industry where prices dropped an average of 10 percent a year, prices suddenly fell 50 percent as Chinese firms jockeyed to grab market share. However, Chinese solar panels may not remain cheap for long. **Our research, along with Chinese CEOs' statements, shows that Chinese solar manufacturers will raise prices after driving out U.S. manufacturers.** As China's market position grew, American manufacturers suffered. Twelve American manufacturers have had significant layoffs or have shuttered completely. These manufacturing jobs that the U.S. is losing to China pay better and have three times greater ripple effects than installation jobs. Between 2010 and 2011 the U.S. went from a $540-million trade surplus with China in solar products to a $1.6-billion deficit. Chinese solar-panel exports rose nearly 1,000 percent. Simultaneously, Chinese imports of U.S. polysilicon dropped 20 percent as China ramped up domestic production. Under threat, SolarWorld, the largest U.S. solar manufacturer, filed a trade case alleging that the Chinese manufacturers received World-Trade-Organization-illegal subsidies and have sold their cells and panels below cost. Through Commerce's investigation and the U.S. debate, three interesting facts became apparent.

### Elections

**Current WTO disputes prove the relationship is healthy**

**Beattie 9-17**

Alan is the international economics editor for the Financial Times, “A Better Kind of Trade War,” <http://blogs.ft.com/the-world/2012/09/a-better-kind-of-trade-war/#axzz26mcXr100>

Paraphrasing Churchill (who was speaking at a White House lunch, as it happens) to law-law is better than to war-war. Obviously disappointing that the Obama administration is willing to politicise a trade policy (or at least its timing) so blatantly, the US government starting a WTO case against China on auto parts the day that POTUS arrived to campaign in Ohio.¶ But that’s hardly new. George W **Bush imposed steel import tariffs in 2002** ahead of the mid-term elections, knowing that by the time that the WTO had declared the tariffs illegal, as it duly did in November 2003, they would have done their electoral work.¶ And as Dan Ikenson from Cato accurately pointed out at length earlier this year, **there is a very clear difference between a trade war where you litigate to get the other guy to remove trade distortions than one where you retaliate with distortions of your own.¶ Far better that Obama go after China’s export subsidies at the WTO** (where he is very likely to win, incidentally) than take actions like the decision he made back in 2009 to block Chinese tyre imports, or like the Bush steel tariffs. The Obama administration hasn’t exactly been a great global leader on trade, but nor has it been a protectionist disaster.¶ One more reason to take comfort. **Quite a few people down the years (including me) have worried that if the WTO’s negotiation function seizes u**p, as it clearly now has, **governments will ignore the dispute settlement procedure** -i.e. the judiciary won’t work if the legislature is broken. **Happily, there are as yet few signs of that.¶ I should add that China’s response today – to file a WTO case against the US’s use of anti-dumping and countervailing duties to block imports** – is also a relatively welcome development. **If both cases succeed, we will be closer to the ideal: China’s exports having a fair run at the US market, competing on price rather than subsidy, and the US letting them in.**

#### Obama will win Ohio- demographic edge

Cohn 10-25

Nate is an election analyst for the New Republic, “The Road to Victory in Ohio,” <http://www.tnr.com/blog/electionate/109150/the-road-victory-in-ohio>

For the second time in eight years, the Buckeye State is poised to offer the decisive electoral votes to reelect an incumbent president. The polls show Obama with a lead of around 2 or 3 points, enough to make him a favorite but not enough to assure victory, especially since he remains beneath 49 percent of the vote. At first glance, Obama’s resilience in the Buckeye State seems to defy partisan history and demographics. It’s about the only state where Obama is doing so well where his chances depend on maintaining gains among white working-class voters who voted for Bush in 2004. But Obama's success among African Americans and postgraduates has shifted the state toward Democrats, forcing Romney to compensate with white working class Kerry voters. And although there are clear opportunities for Romney to make gains in southern and southeastern Ohio, the Obama campaign's strategy is perfectly suited to deny him the gains he needs. ¶ But Obama’s road to victory in Ohio starts with a strong showing among the African American voters that provided Bush with reelection eight years ago. It’s often overlooked just how much Obama gains over Kerry’s performance just by winning an outsized share of African Americans. According to the 2004 exit polls, Bush’s concerted efforts to appeal to African American voters—mainly on cultural issues—held Kerry to just 84 percent of the black vote. African American voters predictably swung decisively toward Obama, offering him 97 percent of the vote on Election Day with an additional point of black turnout.¶ In 2004, Bush won Ohio by 118,000 votes, but Obama’s gains among African American voters are sufficient to erase Kerry’s deficit without any changes in the composition of the electorate. The exit polls show that approximately 550,000 African American voters cast ballots in Ohio and offered Kerry a margin of approximately 380,000 votes. If Kerry had won 97 percent of the black vote, as Obama did, then Kerry would have won black voters by a 530,000 vote margin. Thus, changes in black vote preference alone is sufficient to swing Ohio by 150,000 votes—enough to overcome Bush’s 118,000 vote victory. Obama makes additional gains from increased African American turnout. The 2008 exit polls showed African Americans increasing from 10 percent in 2004 to 11 percent in 2012, increasing his margin among African Americans by an additional 60,000 votes. If Obama can maintain elevated black turnout and support, he would transform Kerry’s 118,000 vote deficit into a 92,000 vote lead without persuading a single white Bush voter. These numbers aren’t exact, but they do show that Obama’s support among African Americans is enough to turn a lean-Republican state like Ohio into a true toss-up that might even tilt-Democratic without commensurate losses among white voters.¶ Obama ultimately won by 262,000 voters in Ohio and many of his additional gains came from rural northwest Ohio and the Columbus metropolitan area. Like many other white, moderate, but traditionally Republican areas in the northwestern part of the country (think Indiana, northeast Wisconsin, North Dakota), Obama’s performance in many parts of rural northwest Ohio was the best by any Democrat since 1964. Obama’s gains in the relatively affluent and well-educated Columbus metropolitan area were similar to his gains in other post-industrial metropolitan areas like Raleigh, Washington, and Denver—Bush won Ohio’s postgraduate voters by 2 points in 2004, but Obama would win them by 10 points. These gains were felt most clearly in Columbus, where Obama netted an additional 65,000 votes over Kerry's performance. Elsewhere in Ohio, Obama made relatively small gains with white voters and actually did worse than Kerry in the Mahoning and Ohio River valleys of southeastern Ohio. But these losses weren’t nearly enough to overcome Obama’s huge gains in northwest Ohio, Columbus, and among African Americans.¶ Support thought-provoking, quality journalism. Join The New Republic for $3.99/month.¶ Romney’s road to victory starts by undoing Obama’s gains in rural northwest Ohio, where Obama outperformed reasonable Democratic benchmarks by a substantial margin. But Obama seems likely to hold onto many of his gains Franklin County and African Americans, leaving Romney with a deficit in the state. Resurgent Republican enthusiasm can probably make up some ground, but Romney would still need to persuade plenty of white Kerry or Obama voters to overcome persistent Democratic strength in Franklin County and among African Americans, where Obama is all but assured to outperform Kerry’s total.¶ Where can the Romney campaign make up ground among Kerry voters? His best chance is the traditionally Democratic stretch of southern and southeastern Ohio, where Democrats long held the allegiance of working class voters tied to the coal industry. If you’ve been wondering why Romney likes talking about coal so much, this is why: there are many socially conservative but Democratic-leaning voters in southeastern Ohio who have never especially liked the president and where the so-called ‘war on coal’ is a pocket book issue. If one excludes the northern cities of Akron, Canton, Youngstown, and Warren, the coal producing stretch of Ohio holds nearly 700,000 voters or about 12 percent of the Ohio electorate. Obama only won 45 percent of the vote in this traditionally Democratic but socially conservative region, but that still leaves plenty of room for Romney to make additional gains. If Romney could reduce Obama’s share of the vote to 40 percent, he would net 75,000 additional votes. Smaller gains across the rest of Ohio, where Obama picked up support over Kerry’s performance, could plausibly put him over the top. But coal country is not populous enough for anything short of big gains to flip the state.¶ But Romney isn’t assured of the gains necessary to overcome Obama’s advantage in the big cities. In 2008, Obama performed poorly in the industrial northeastern part of Ohio, but it’s conceivable that he could match or even exceed his ’08 totals in places like Youngstown, where Obama did worse than Kerry and the auto-bailout and shale oil boom have rejuvenated a struggling manufacturing hub. The Obama campaign has attacked Romney for arguing that a Massachusetts coal plant “kills,” undermining Romney’s ability to completely exploit the so-called ‘war on coal.” And Obama’s broader strategy to depict Romney as an out of touch plutocrat bent on outsourcing middle class jobs resonates across eastern and southeastern Ohio. These populist and working class areas were once Democratic for a reason and the Obama campaign’s caricature of Romney helps remind them why.¶ Romney will still do better than McCain in southern and southeast Ohio, but “better” isn’t enough, with Obama starting well above Kerry’s performance among African Americans and postgraduate voters around Columbus. Absent a strong enough counter-veiling force, Obama's improvements among these two groups are sufficient to overcome Ohio's traditional Republican-lean. To compensate, Romney needs to run up the score among voters who have traditionally voted for Democrats in southern and southeast Ohio, but the Obama campaign has developed a messaging strategy perfectly suited to blocking his route to victory. With twelve days to go, the polls show that the Obama campaign's approach is succeeding.

¶

#### Obama will win- Silver model

Silver 10-26

“The State of the States,” <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/26/oct-25-the-state-of-the-states/>

If Mr. Obama wins Wisconsin and Nevada along with the states like Michigan where he seems to have a clearer advantage, he will have 253 electoral votes, putting him 17 votes shy of clinching an Electoral College majority.¶ Ohio, which has 18 electoral votes, is the state most likely to provide those votes to Mr. Obama. He leads in the FiveThirtyEight forecast by 2.3 percentage points in Ohio, and by a similar margin according to other Web sites that aggregate polls. The forecast gives Mr. Obama about a 75 percent chance of winning Ohio. This figure is, not coincidentally, close to Mr. Obama’s 73 percent overall chance of winning the Electoral College. (Ohio has about a 50-50 chance of providing the decisive Electoral College votes.)

#### Nate Silver is the best around

Leigh Bureau ‘10

the world’s preeminent lecture bureau, “Nate Silver,” http://www.leighbureau.com/speaker.asp?id=498

Nate Silver has been called a "spreadsheet psychic" and "number-crunching prodigy" by New York Magazine.¶ Nate comes out of the world of baseball statistics, but during the 2008 presidential election primaries, he turned his sights and his amazing predictive abilities and forecasting models to the game of politics and current events — with incredible results.¶ He began by predicting 2008 primary election results with stunning accuracy — and often in opposition to the better-known political pollsters. He then moved on to the general election, where he correctly predicted the presidential winner in 49 states and the District of Columbia.¶

#### Obama wins- field offices

The Atlantic 10-24

“Obama’s Ground Game Could Win Him the Election,” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/2012-presidential-campaign/obama-s-ground-game-could-win-him-the-election-20121024?page=1>

A giant chalkboard takes up a wall in this unassuming office suite hung with Obama signs, one of more than 60 campaign offices for the president in this battleground state. On it is drawn a calendar of the final weeks before the election. Phone banks, canvasses, and campaign events are marked in color-coded chalk. And every Saturday through Nov. 6, in capital letters, is marked "DRY RUN" — a precision-timed Election Day simulation drill, where everything from data reporting to snacks is rehearsed down to the minute.¶ Forget the polls, the debates, the last-minute ads and volleys of insults. This is how the Obama campaign plans to win the election.¶ Latest Politics Posts:¶ • When Michelle Obama Talks, Do Women Listen?¶ • Donald Trump Has Mistaken Barack Obama for Gary Busey¶ • Obama's Edge: The Ground Game That Could Put Him Over the Top¶ Four years ago, Barack Obama built the largest grassroots organization in the history of American politics. After the election, he never stopped building, and the current operation, six years in the making, makes 2008 look like "amateur ball," in the words of Obama's national field director, Jeremy Bird. Republicans insist they, too, have come a long way in the last four years. But despite the GOP's spin to the contrary, there's little reason to believe Romney commands anything comparable to Obama's ground operation.¶ And this time, Obama may actually need it.¶ Though he trounced John McCain organizationally four years ago, the irony was that Obama didn't really need his sophisticated field organization. Riding a wave of voter enthusiasm and Bush fatigue, and crushing McCain with fundraising and TV ad spending, Obama almost certainly would have won the 2008 election anyway. The political operative's rule of thumb is that organization can increase your share of the vote by 2 percentage points; Obama won the national popular vote by 7 points. One academic study looked at Obama's edge in field offices and concluded they probably put a couple of extra states in his column, but he would have won without them.¶ This year is different. The polls are so close that a lively partisan meta-fight has broken out over which side actually has the upper hand going into the final stretch, with Romney claiming momentum is on his side, while Obama clings to slim leads in enough swing states to take the Electoral College. In an election that's tied in the polls going down to the wire, Obama's ground game could be crucial.¶ In the closing days of the race, "we have two jobs," Obama campaign manager Jim Messina said on Tuesday. "One, to persuade the undecideds, and two, to turn our voters out." The former is the job of the president and his TV and other media ads. As for the latter, "That's the grassroots operation we've been building for the last 18 months."¶ The Field-Office Gap¶ While Obama's office in Sterling is one of more than 800 across the country — concentrated, of course, in the swing states — Romney commands less than half that number, about 300 locations. In the swing states, the gap is stark. Here's the numerical comparison in what are generally considered the top three swing states — Ohio, Florida and Virginia:¶ But the difference isn't just quantitative, it's qualitative. I visited Obama and Romney field offices in three swing states — Colorado, Ohio, and Virginia — dropping in unannounced at random times to see what I could see. There were some consistent, and telling, differences.¶ Obama's office suite in Sterling was in an office park next to a dentist's office. The front window was plastered with Obama-Biden signs, the door was propped open, and the stink bugs that plague Virginia in the fall crawled over stacks of literature — fliers for Senate candidate Tim Kaine, Obama bumper stickers — piled on a table near the front reception desk. In rooms in front and back, volunteers made calls on cell phones, while in the interior, field staffers hunched over computers. One wall was covered with a sheet of paper where people had scrawled responses to the prompt, "I Support the President Because ... ", while another wall held a precinct-by-precinct list of neighborhood team leaders' e-mail addresses.¶ Only about a mile down the road was the Republican office, a cavernous, unfinished space on the back side of a strip mall next to a Sleepy's mattress outlet. On one side of the room, under a Gadsden flag ("Don't tread on me") and a poster of Sarah Palin on a horse, two long tables of land-line telephones were arrayed. Most of the signs, literature, and buttons on display were for the local Republican congressman, Frank Wolf. A volunteer in a Wolf for Congress T-shirt was directing traffic, sort of — no one really seemed to be in charge and there were no paid staff present, though there were several elderly volunteers wandering in and out. The man in the T-shirt allowed me to survey the room but not walk around, and was unable to refer me to anyone from the Romney campaign or coordinated party effort.

#### Field offices key boost

Maskett ‘09

Seth is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Denver University, “Did Obama’s Ground Game Matter? The Influence of Local Field Offices During the 2008 Presidential Election,” <http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/content/73/5/1023.full>

As this table shows, most of the suggested causes of increased Democratic vote shares were positive and statistically significant (p ≤.05). Most critically, even accounting for these alternative predictors, the presence of an Obama field office was associated with a 0.8 percentage point increase in the Democratic vote share in the county. Although this is not an enormous effect, it is worth noting that the presidential contests in North Carolina and Missouri were settled by margins smaller than this, and Indiana's margin was only slightly greater.¶ Notably, neither the Kerry office coefficient nor the interaction variable was statistically significant. This suggests that the Obama campaign succeeded where it went beyond what the Kerry campaign had done. In counties where both campaigns had set up offices, there was no net boost to the Democratic vote in 2008. However, Kerry had only established 125 county-level offices in these eleven states compared to Obama's 377. Obama saw the boost to his vote share, these figures tell us, when he set up an office in places that Kerry never did.¶ Unsurprisingly, economic conditions appeared to affect vote choice. Each percentage point increase in the local unemployment rate was associated with a 0.6-point increase in the Democratic vote share over the 2004 baseline, a result that was statistically significant. While county growth and population size seemed largely irrelevant, counties with high numbers of African Americans and Latinos saw disproportionate rises in the Democratic vote share. The coefficient for Latinos was actually twice that of African Americans, suggesting considerably greater activation of Latino Democratic voting by Obama. Age had a negative and statistically significant relationship with the Democratic vote increase, consistent with other evidence that younger voters became substantially more Democratic between 2004 and 2008 (Gelman and Sides 2009). Income, interestingly, had a positive effect, suggesting that Obama was able to make gains in some wealthier counties that had eluded Kerry. Finally, the Kerry share of the 2004 vote had a negative relationship with the Democratic vote increase, suggesting that Obama saw a greater Democratic vote increase within more conservative areas than within more liberal ones, perhaps reflecting a possible ceiling effect.¶ Obama, of course, wasn't actually competing against John Kerry so much as he was against another senator, John McCain. In table 2, I have specified the regression equation somewhat differently, using Obama's share of the two-party vote as the dependent variable. I have replaced the Kerry county field office variable with a McCain county field office one, and I have interacted it with the Obama field office variable. Otherwise, the two equations are specified identically.¶ View this table:¶ In this window¶ In a new window¶ Table 2. ¶ Variables Predicting Obama's Share of the Two-Party Vote, 2008¶ The Obama county field office coefficient is again positive and statistically significant, and the coefficients on the other control variables are essentially the same as they were in table 1. One surprising finding, however, is that McCain's field office presence had a positive impact on Obama's vote share, although this coefficient is not statistically significant. Somewhat less surprising is that the interaction term is negative, suggesting that McCain was able to check Obama's gains in counties where both candidates had a field office presence. Statistically, however, this result is indistinguishable from zero. The overall lesson of this table is that Obama's field offices were helpful to their candidate while McCain's were not.8¶ These findings are consistent with the notion that local campaign organizations may be pivotal in elections. Interestingly, however, while these findings are robust in the aggregate, they lose their statistical significance in many of the battleground states, even though the coefficients remain generally positive. When the regressions are run within states, the county campaign office variable only remains statistically significant for Florida, Indiana, and North Carolina. The second column in table 3 shows the county field office coefficient (as derived from table 1) for each of the eleven battleground states.9 Standard errors appear in parentheses next to the coefficients.¶ View this table:¶ In this window¶ In a new window¶ Table 3. ¶ State-Level Field Office Coefficients and Impact on Election¶ Even if the presence of a campaign office didn't seem to matter in some states, however, this table suggests that it was determinative in others. The third column in this table shows Obama's actual share of the two-party vote in each of the states. To better understand the impact of the field offices, I conducted two simulations that estimate the election outcome in the state in the counterfactual condition in which Obama did not have a field office. In the first simulation, I estimate the statewide vote assuming those mobilized by the Obama field offices never turned out to vote. In other words, I remove a share of Obama's vote commensurate with the size of the field office coefficient from each of the counties that hosted such an office. In the second simulation, I assume that those mobilized for Obama instead voted for McCain. For example, the field office effect was an estimated 0.033 in Florida. Removing that share of the vote from Obama's vote in the counties with a field office brings Obama's two-party vote share in Florida down from 0.514 to 0.5003, a bare win. Placing that share of the vote into McCain's column brings Obama's statewide vote share down to 0.487, a loss.¶ In three of the states under analysis—Florida, Indiana, and North Carolina—Obama won the actual election but would have lost if the mobilized voters had instead voted for McCain. McCain would also have won Indiana and North Carolina had the mobilized voters simply chosen to stay home on Election Day. These three states were worth a total of fifty-three electoral votes—not enough to actually cost Obama the White House, but certainly enough to make it a much closer election.

#### Obama wins- Cell Phone polls prove

Kellner 10-23

Pete is President of Yougov, one of America’s largest and best polling firms and a contributor to the Huffington Post’s Pollster, “Obama Stays Ahead- Just,” <http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/peter-kellner/barack-obama-mitt-romney-us-election-_b_2005585.html?utm_hp_ref=@pollster>

Two further points. Apart from the issue of political weighting, telephone polls in the US divide between traditional polls conducted by human beings, and robopolls done automatically by computers dialing voters. Robopolls are cheaper; or, for the same cost, can reach more people faster. The trouble is that, under US law, robpolls can dial only landlines. They can't reach the one-in-three Americans who have only mobile phones. Another 18% of Americans have landline phones but seldom use them. These figures rise dramatically among the under 30s. They are the people who are keenest on Obama. So we should not be surprised that robopolls, both nationally and in swing states, tend to produce slightly higher figures for Romney than conventional telephone polls in which real people dial both landline and mobile phone numbers.¶ If the overall result were clear-cut, the small differences between robopolls and live-interviewer polls would be of interest only to obsessive poll-watchers. In the current very close race, they tell very different stories. It looks increasingly as if the state that will decide the outcome next month will be Ohio. According to robopolls, the state, and therefore the nation, are too close to call; according to the live-interviewer polls (and YouGov's online polls), Obama enjoys a modest but consistent lead in Ohio and is on course for a second term in the White House.

#### No risk of a link turn- Democrats are pumped in Ohio

Walters 10-26

Amy is ABC News Chief Political Correspondent, “What’s Going on in Ohio?” <http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/10/whats-going-on-in-ohio/>

¶ Or, why does Obama continue to hold a small lead in that state while national polls have the race a dead heat.¶ ¶ The three most recent Ohio polls (CNN, Time, and CBS/Quinnipiac) show President Obama with a lead of 4-5 points. Meanwhile, the latest ABC/Washington Post national tracking poll has the race a dead heat, with Romney at 49 percent and Obama at 48 percent.¶ ¶ How is that possible?¶ ¶ Three things: Democrats, white voters, and men.¶ ¶ 1) The Democratic advantage in the Ohio polls is anywhere from 3-9 points (it was 8 points in 2008). Our latest national survey showed Democrats with a 4 point advantage on party identification. And, Obama is getting almost every single one of those Democrats to vote for him (anywhere between 92 to 94 percent). In 2008, Obama carried 89 percent of the Democratic vote.¶ ¶ 2) In Ohio Obama does 7 to 11 points better among white voters and 7 to 12 points better among white men specifically than he does nationally. The three media polls from Ohio showed Romney getting between 49 to 53 percent of the white vote, while the ABC/Washington Post poll showed Romney winning white voters nationally with 60 percent of the vote. The CNN and CBS/Quinnipiac polls show Romney between winning 54 – 59 percent of white men . The ABC/Washington Poll shows Romney carrying white men by a whopping 66 percent.¶ ¶ 3) Romney does better among men nationally than he does in Ohio. The national tracking poll shows Romney leading among men by 18 points. In Ohio, however, Romney’s lead among men is a more modest 6 to 9 points. And, among women, Obama has anywhere from a 12 to 19 point lead over Romney.

#### Being tough on China is key

Stokes & Wite 9-19

Bruce Stokes is director of Global Economic Attitudes at the Pew Research Center. Richard Wike is associate director of the Pew Global Attitudes Project, “China: The Partisan Campaign Concern,” <http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2012/09/19/china_the_partisan_campaign_concern_115491.html>

In a presidential election campaign so far dominated by domestic economic concerns, debate over international matters has largely been an afterthought. With the outbreak of anti-American violence in some Muslim-majority countries, this may begin to change, but it is still too soon to tell.¶ What is clear, however, is that China will be on voters’ minds come Election Day, in part because it is a crossover issue. Sino-American relations clearly fall in the foreign policy realm, but voters’ interest in China is driven largely by domestic economic worries. This was underscored by the Obama administration’s Sept. 17 unfair trade case at the World Trade Organization against alleged Chinese subsidies of auto parts exports.¶ So voters can expect to hear more about China as an economic competitor as the campaign progresses, especially from GOP nominee Mitt Romney, in part because Republican voters are more concerned about China than are Democrats.¶ Most Americans describe relations between the U.S. and China as good and most consider China a competitor rather than an enemy or partner, according to a new survey by the Pew Research Center.¶ At the same time, when asked which country represents the greatest danger to the U.S., more Americans volunteer China (26 percent) than name any other country, including Iran and North Korea. And about half (52 percent) view China’s emergence as a world power as a major threat to the United States.¶ But, Republicans are more concerned than Democrats about the impact of China’s rise. Six-in-10 Republicans believe Beijing’s emergence as a world power poses a major threat to the U.S., compared with 48 percent of Democrats. And Republicans are more likely (74 percent) than Democrats (61 percent) to say China cannot be trusted.¶ Moreover, contrary to the popular narrative that Democrats are protectionists and Republicans are free traders, far more Republicans (71 percent) than Democrats (54 percent) see the U.S. trade deficit with China as a very serious problem for the United States. Similarly, GOP members (76 percent) are more likely than Democrats (67 percent) to worry about the loss of U.S. jobs to China. And Republicans (87 percent) are more concerned than Democrats (75 percent) about the large amount of American debt held by the Asian nation.¶ With such concerns, it is hardly surprising that Republicans are also far more likely to favor toughness with China on economic and trade issues. Democrats are more likely to say building a strong relationship with China is a top priority. About two-thirds of Republicans (68 percent) say it is very important for Washington to be tough with Beijing, compared with 53 percent of Democrats. At the same time, 59 percent of Democrats believe building a strong bilateral relationship with China should be a top priority, while only 48 percent of Republicans agree.¶ And GOP voters also think their party can do a better job than the Obama administration in dealing with China. Republicans (65 percent) are nearly twice as likely as Democrats (35 percent) to say the president should be tougher on Beijing. Meanwhile, roughly half (51 percent) of Democrats say that Obama’s dealings with China are about right.¶ This critique may, in part, simply reflect a partisan belief typical of those out of power that they can always do better than those in power. A decade ago, 40 percent of Democrats said then-President George W. Bush was not being tough enough on China, while just 34 percent believed his dealings with China were about right. In contrast, only 32 percent of Republicans criticized Bush for not being tough enough; 57 percent said his administration’s handling of China was about right.¶ Security issues involving China are less of a public concern or a partisan issue. Only about half the public is worried about cyber attacks from China (50 percent) or Beijing’s growing military power (49 percent) and just 27 percent are concerned about tensions between China and Taiwan. And there is no real difference between the party faithful on Beijing’s military ambitions or regarding its relations with Taipei.¶ Despite the recent upsurge in anti-American violence in much of the Muslim world, domestic economic issues are likely to dominate the U.S. presidential campaign over the next six weeks. The lone international economic exception may be China. Because in many voters’ minds, China is a domestic economic concern seen through a partisan lens.

**plan has Obama back down on China in the final month of the election-- Policies toward China in this final month are key to the election**

**Dirks 10-4-12**

Andrew S. Dirks – Intern with the China Center at the Carter Institute

http://chinaelectionsblog.net/?p=20820

**As the U.S. Presidential contest** between Barack Obama and Mitt Romney **enters its final month**, the dangers of this important relationship being harmed by contentious political rhetoric from Republicans and Democrats has become too great to ignore. President **Obama will be forced to walk a precarious tightrope on Sino-U.S. relations over the next month, as** his opponent Mitt **Romney and the Republican leadership attempt to present themselves as “tougher” on China.** ¶ Ex-Massachusetts governor Romney has criticized President Obama’s trade record on China numerous times throughout his campaign. Trade conflicts between China and the United States has led to one of the few specific campaign promises made by Governor Romney, who has vowed to officially accuse China of currency manipulation on his first day as president. This pugnacious attitude towards China is echoed in the official platform the Republican Party adopted in August 2012,which accused President Obama of “virtual surrender” on Sino-U.S. trade issues.[i] The Republican platform also decries China’s “destabilizing” territorial claims in the South China Sea and has promised to continue U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, which is always a contentious issue.[ii] The Republican promises of acting “tougher” on China put President Obama in a delicate position: how to counter these political attacks during the election without going so far as to harm the future of US-China relations should he win a second term. Sino-US relations are obviously important to the Obama Administration, as a senior diplomat of Obama’s foreign policy team told journalist David Sanger “If we get China wrong, in thirty years that’s the only thing anyone will remember.”[iii] ¶ Has the Obama administration been weak on China as the Republicans claim? A review of the historical record of the last three years does not completely validate Republican attacks. During the first debate of the Democratic Primary season leading up to the 2008 Presidential election, Senator Barack Obama referred to China as “…neither our enemy nor our friend…They’re competitors.”[iv] As president, Obama has largely followed this line of reasoning. Obama’s creation of the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in 2009 was an attempt to outline a new approach for strengthening Sino- ties on issues of security and trade.[v] Not dissimilar from Obama’s efforts to increase dialogue with Iran upon his election, this early effort at a new start for -China cooperation has been contrasted by Obama’s evolution into taking a stronger stance on China. Obama has doubled the amount of trade cases brought against China compared with the administration of George W. Bush.[vi] These trade cases range from complaints about excessive tariffs on American automobiles imported into China to restrictive Chinese export policies on rare earth materials to subsidies given to Chinese companies investing in alternative energy sources.[vii] ¶ Additionally, Obama expanded on his active enforcement policy on Chinese trade by proposing the creation of a Trade Enforcement Unit during the 2012 State of the Union address designed to look into “unfair trading practices in countries like China.”[viii] Nevertheless, these policies have not immunized Obama from continuing criticism on the issue of China, with Governor Romney releasing a new ad on September 13 specifically attacking Obama on trade policies with China, in which Romney continues to claim that Obama has failed “seven times” to label China a currency manipulator.[ix] This attack is at best misleading, as it was not Obama personally, but the Treasury Department that has issued reports as recently as May 2012 that cleared China of currency manipulation.[x] This line of attack by Mitt Romney makes for a good political sound bite, but runs the risk of needlessly provoking China, as under World Trade Organization rules the United States could not act unilaterally against China even if it proved China was manipulating the yuan.[xi] Should this fight over labeling China a currency manipulator continue, it would not be the first instance of American domestic politics affecting Sino-U.S. relations, as the delicate issue of selling new jet fighters to Taiwan in 2011 was used by the Republicans to score political points.¶ American arms sales to Taiwan are always a sensitive issue due to Beijing’s insistence on Taiwan’s status as an integral part of China. This issue emerged again in 2011 with a deal for new F-16 fighter sales to Taiwan. Obama initially reached a compromise on this issue in September 2011 by withdrawing a proposed sale of more advanced class C/D fighters to Taiwan. Obama opted instead to upgrade Taiwan’s existing class A/B fighters aftervociferous objections to the sale of the new fighters by the People’s Republic.[xii] The issue appeared to be settled until the House of Representatives voted in April 2012 to force Obama to reconsider selling the more advanced fighters to Taiwan. ¶ In addition to this vote by the House, Republican Senator John Cornyn of Texas had blocked the confirmation of Mark Lippert as the new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs by placing a hold on his nomination only to be removed on the condition that Obama pledged to re-open the prospect of selling the advanced fighters to Taiwan.[xiii] This maneuver gained political capital for Republican Party as approving the sale could also allow Lockheed Martin, the company which manufactures the F-16, to retain thousands of jobs in the electoral battleground states of Ohio and Florida, where Obama is particularly vulnerable on the performance of the economy.[xiv] ¶ Linking **the foreign policy issue of Sino-U.S. relations** to the domestic issue of the economy is a key reason why this particular foreign policy issue **has played a large role in an election most prognosticators believed would be solely determined by which candidate could make the best case for improving the economy. This link also allows the Republican Party to attack Obama’s strength on foreign policy**, as 52% of respondents to a major poll in May 2012 favored Obama over Romney in the foreign policy arena.

#### Solar industry key to Ohio

PR Newswire 11

(“Ohio Poised as Global Leader in Solar Industry,” July 14, <http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/ohio-poised-as-global-leader-in-solar-industry-125554998.html> - Kurr)

Ohio has built its world-class manufacturing base in glass and plastic films to support the automotive industry. This existing infrastructure is now being repurposed to create truly innovative materials and products for solar photovoltaic technologies. This is key to new solar power technology development and the rapidly growing commercial success of Ohio's advanced energy community. In support, the state's academic institutions are solving some of the industry's most challenging innovation needs and preparing the next generation of advanced energy engineers for business success. "Ohio is becoming a national and international leader in the solar industry," said Rick Stansley, co-director of the Wright Center for Photovoltaics Innovation and Commercialization, a world-class science and technology platform dedicated to research, development and commercialization of new photovoltaic solutions. "The state's long history as a manufacturing leader shows that we have the workforce and expertise to succeed in the evolving manufacturing sector and provide a world-class supply chain for the solar industry," continued Stansley. Finding the perfect location that successfully balances world-class industry resources, academic institutions and skilled labor with market access is critical for success in the solar industry. Ohio offers a complete advanced energy supply chain infrastructure for businesses in the solar energy industry. The state's manufacturing strengths, skilled workforce and central location make Ohio a preferred location for advanced energy manufacturing businesses. Northwest Ohio's historic strengths in the glass industry along with the world-class supply chain of manufacturers and systems integrators found throughout the state are a driving force supporting the state's solar industry growth. Leading solar manufacturing companies, such as First Solar Inc., WK Solar Group LLC and Xunlight Corporation, have operations in Ohio.

#### Threshold for a link is small this late in the race

Silver 10-20

“Calm Day in Forecast but Volatility Ahead,” <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/20/oct-20-calm-day-in-forecast-but-volatility-ahead/>

What makes this challenging is that although something like a half-point shift is hard to detect in the polls, it is also potentially meaningful given how late it is in the race and how close the contest is.¶ The most natural analogy might be to a baseball game. Scoring a run in the first inning is worth something, but it won’t shift the win probabilities all that much: there’s too much that can happen later on in the game.¶ We’re now in the political equivalent of the eighth inning, however. A run scored in the eight inning is potentially much more important than one in the first.¶ The reason I say “potentially” is that it makes a tremendous difference depending what the score is. In a blowout, the eighth inning won’t matter at all. A team down 9-1 is almost certainly going to lose; but so will one that gets a solo home run and trails 9-2 instead.¶ (The political equivalent: Walter Mondale, in 1984, improved to a 17-point deficit from a 20-point deficit in national polls after his first debate with Ronald Reagan. This may have helped him to carry his home state of Minnesota, and lose the Electoral College 525-13 rather than 535-3.)¶ But if the score is tied, or if it’s a one-run game, a run scored in the eighth will make a huge difference.¶ That’s where we find ourselves right now in the presidential race. This election is close and is likely to end up that way. There’s about a 50-50 chance that the election will end up within 2.5 percentage points, according to the forecast, against only a 15 percent chance that either candidate will win by five points or more.¶ For this reason, the percentage estimates in the forecast are likely to be volatile from here on out.¶ Early in the year, we’d treat as a pretty big deal if a candidate’s Electoral College win probability increased by a percentage point or more (for instance, to 63 percent from 62 percent). Now, changes like that are going to be fairly common, and there will often be larger shifts. Thursday, for example, was a good but hardly spectacular day for Mr. Obama in the polls, and that was enough to produce about a 5 percent swing toward him. Friday, however, brought a 2 percent shift back toward Mr. Romney, despite polling that seemed fairly mixed on the surface.¶ There are some other reasons the forecast is likely to become more volatile over these final two weeks. The FiveThirtyEight forecast is technically a combination of a polling-based model and a “fundamentals” model based on economic statistics and Mr. Obama’s incumbency status.¶ The forecast is also designed, however, to weight the economic component less and less as time goes on, eventually defaulting to a purely poll-based model by Election Day. (The guiding principle behind this is simply that voters’ views of the economy should be priced into the polling by late in the race.) Although the economic component of the model is dynamic — it can change as new economic statistics are released — it is generally less volatile than the polling component. (While there have been some ups and downs in the economic numbers, nothing has changed the basic story of an economy that is recovering, but slowly.) So as the polling component comes to predominate, the overall forecast will become more volatile as well.¶ Also, the model is designed to be more aggressive about buying into a potential change in the polls in the closing stages of the race.¶ Most people’s intuition will lead them to overstate the volatility in the presidential race. Furthermore, they often do so for the wrong reasons — because they pay too much attention to one or two outlier polls rather than to the consensus evidence.¶ On the other hand, because we are often now getting 20 polls on a given day — instead of two or three — there is potentially more evidence to testify to a statistically meaningful change in the race if it is reflected in the polling consensus.¶ Furthermore, it is now late enough in the race that news events that produce what would ordinarily be a temporary “bounce” in the polls could carry forward to Election Day.¶ The writer Jazz Shaw joked recently, for instance, that he didn’t think Mr. Romney’s bounce from his debate in Denver would persist for more than another four weeks — just long enough, of course, that it might be enough to win him the election on Nov. 6.¶ Perhaps in some abstract sense, this is true. If Mr. Romney and Mr. Obama debated another 10 times, and the election were held next March, the Denver debate would be discounted by voters. But it won’t be such a distant memory when voters go to the polls in 17 days.

**Romney will destroy US-Russian relations – hardline & won’t compromise**

**Larison 6-27**

Columnist for the American Conservative [Daniel Larison “U.S.-Russian Relations Would Get Much Worse Under Romney” <http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/u-s-russian-relations-would-get-much-worse-under-romney/>]

**Putin doesn’t** actually **want a “hard-line conservative in the White House.” Putin distrusts the U.S.** **because he believes** that the **Bush** administration **behaved in an ungrateful and untrustworthy fashion** in the previous decade, **and U.S.-Russian relations improved** as much as they did **because the current administration seemed to be more reliable**. U.S.-Russian **relations reached their lowest poin**t in the last twenty years in no small part **because of a “more active U.S. policy**” toward the Middle East, the South Caucasus, and central Europe. Putin might be willing to deal with a more hard-line American President, but only so long as it this translated into tangible gains for Russia. Provided that the hard-liner was willing to live up to his end of the bargain, there could be some room for agreement, but there isn’t any. Since **Romney’s Russia policy is essentially to never make any deals with the current Russian government, Putin doesn’t have much of an incentive to cooperate. That will guarantee that U.S.-Russian relations will deteriorate much more than they have in the last year.**

**Nuclear war**

**ALLISON 11**

Director @ Belfer Center for Science and Int’l Affairs @ Harvard’s Kennedy School, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Robert D. Blackwill, Senior Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations [Graham Allison, “10 Reasons Why Russia Still Matters”, Politico -- October 31 -- <http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=161EF282-72F9-4D48-8B9C-C5B3396CA0E6>]

That central point is that Russia matters a great deal to a U.S. government seeking to defend and advance its national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s decision to return next year as president makes it all the more critical for Washington to manage its relationship with Russia through coherent, realistic policies. No one denies that Russia is a dangerous, difficult, often disappointing state to do business with. We should not overlook its many human rights and legal failures. Nonetheless, Russia is a player whose choices affect our vital interests in nuclear security and energy. It is key to supplying 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Ten realities require U.S. policymakers to advance our nation’s interests by engaging and working with Moscow. First, Russia remains the only nation that can erase the **U**nited **S**tates from the map in 30 minutes. As every president since John F. Kennedy has recognized**, Russia’s cooperation is critical to averting nuclear war**. Second, Russia is our most consequential partner in preventing nuclear terrorism. Through a combination of more than $11 billion in U.S. aid, provided through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and impressive Russian professionalism, two decades after the collapse of the “evil empire,” not one nuclear weapon has been found loose. Third, Russia plays an essential role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile-delivery systems. As Washington seeks to stop Iran’s drive toward nuclear weapons, Russian choices to sell or withhold sensitive technologies are the difference between failure and the possibility of success. Fourth, Russian support in sharing intelligence and cooperating in operations remains essential to the U.S. war to destroy Al Qaeda and combat other transnational terrorist groups. Fifth, Russia provides a vital supply line to 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan. As U.S. relations with Pakistan have deteriorated, the Russian lifeline has grown ever more important and now accounts for half all daily deliveries. Sixth, Russia is the world’s largest oil producer and second largest gas producer. Over the past decade, Russia has added more oil and gas exports to world energy markets than any other nation. Most major energy transport routes from Eurasia start in Russia or cross its nine time zones. As citizens of a country that imports two of every three of the 20 million barrels of oil that fuel U.S. cars daily, Americans feel Russia’s impact at our gas pumps. Seventh, Moscow is an important player in today’s international system. It is no accident that Russia is one of the five veto-wielding, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, as well as a member of the G-8 and

**Romney definitely labels a manipulator and it escalates- platform,**

**Shobert 2-22**

[Benjamin, Managing Director of Rubicon Strategy Group, a consulting firm specialized in strategy analysis for companies looking to enter emerging economies, “Romney lays ground for China trade war”, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China\_Business/NB22Cb01.html]

Part of what **Romney** wrote aligns with his early September 2011 economic plan, where he **announced** that **his administration would** formally **label China a "currency manipulator**". On this point, his Wall Street Journal op-ed doubled down; there, he wrote, " ... on day one of my presidency I will designate it a currency manipulator and take appropriate counteraction." As a head nod to the influential parts of the GOP who represent the interests of big-business, **he** subsequently **added,** "A trade war with China is the last thing I want, but **I cannot tolerate our current trade surrender." For someone who claims not to want a trade war with China, Romney is making a pretty compelling case for how his administration would make one all but certain. It is a temptation to read Romney's op-ed a**s the sort of **positioning during** the primaries that Americans have come to expect during their **elections**. Even in the US-China policy-community, many draw comfort from past election cycles where blustery comments from potential presidential candidates were dramatically toned down - if they did not go away altogether - once their transition into elected office took place. The present administration went through a similar smoothing out of the rough edges about its stance towards China once it emerged victoriously from both the primary and the general election. Admittedly, this is the safest way to interpret Romney's most recent volley towards the Chinese: as the primary shifts back to his "home state", **China presents an issue that certainly has bi-partisan traction in a manufacturing-sensitive** midwestern **economy** like Michigan, where China's economy is perceived to have benefited at the expense of middle-class American blue-collar workers. It is a note the Romney campaign believes can be safely struck not only in the midst of a heated GOP primary, but in the general election as well. Tradition says nothing should be made of Romney's saber rattling towards China, but is tradition wrong? **Choosing to interpret Romney's attitude towards China as something not to be alarmed about overlooks a major difference** between past election cycles and today's: **now the American psyche is deeply frustrated over the difficulties the country's economy must face.** **In the past, the relative confidence** felt **about America's economic future allowed many to overlook the potential threat China might present. Today, that confidence is gone. The** average **American worker remains traumatized** and deeply insecure **since** the **2008 financial crisis**. Many also feel brutalized over the ugly state of American politics, precisely when the latter should be shedding light on how best to deal with the former. An economic crisis has quickly devolved into a political one, leaving many in middle America eager for someone to blame. **Tied to these economic insecurities are deep misgivings about America's place in the world**, **which go back to** the US response to **9/11 and** the subsequent invasions of **Afghanistan and Iraq.** Americans are torn between the GOP world view that argues for America to remain a hegemonic force for good around the world, versus a libertarian-progressive framework that believes that America can be powerful and influential, but must do so within a the realities of both a multi-polar world and the economic limitations imposed on Washington based on years of fiscal imprudence. **When Romney** disparagingly **writes of** President Barack **Obama that he "came** into office **as a** near **supplicant to Beijing", he touches on this insecurity** and appeals to the American desire to appear muscular and able to "go it alone" where others counsel caution and compromise. The popular temper American politicians tap into over China is not necessarily new, although a good argument could be made that **negative portrayals of China** during American elections **has been growing more common** in this, and recent election cycles. **Conventional thinking has it that the real decision-makers** about American policy towards China **are those who never run for elected office, the safe wise men** who, behind closed doors, know how to calm everyone down and focus on how best to maintain the status-quo. **That is precisely why Romney's ongoing diatribe against China is so distressing: he is supposed to be one of those calm, level-headed people** that could be trusted not to demagogue China in order to score cheap political points. For US-China policy-makers, **Romney's elevation of China as an issue for the general election should not be overlooked, downplayed, or rationalized. To have the supposedly most business-savvy candidate** for president the country has seen in years run within the most pro-business, historically free trade American political party with a major plank of his economic plan being to **call out China as a currency manipulator is noteworthy.**

**Romney’s serious- Republicans support and more popular lies to tell**

**Fletcher 9-4**

Ian is a Senior Economist of the Coalition for a Prosperous America, “What’s Romney Really up To?” <http://www.wnd.com/2012/09/whats-romney-really-up-to/>

On the currency manipulation side, retaliating against Chinese currency manipulation while not specifying what other supporting policies will or will not be applied, is also a fairly mild gesture. It could mean a whole lot, or not that much.¶ If, for example, America forces China to stop manipulating the dollar-yuan exchange rate, but does nothing about the backdoor protectionism and industry subsidies of China and other nations that run surpluses with the U.S, the effect on our deficit will be muted. Or if America responds to Chinese currency manipulation with countervailing duties, but these duties are too low to make a difference, again we will have pulled our punch.¶ Above all, currency manipulation is only one tool among many that mercantilist nations can use to manipulate their trade. We need to stop it, but doing so is not a panacea.¶ Furthermore, **Romney has counterbalanced his promise of a crackdown on China with a promise to negotiate more free-trade agreements**. So, as in the case of immigration, he’s playing nationalist softball, not hardball.¶ This mushiness and uncertainty in the Republican positions is maddening from the point of view of the voter. It’s a tease. The party is saying that it might give the voters two fairly big things the voters actually want, according to polls, but just how much is up for grabs.¶ Looked at one way, **the Republican party is actually playing a fairly rational game. It’s offering voters just enough to entice them away from the other side, but no more**. There are good reasons the party doesn’t want to go hard core on either immigration or trade, most of them being Republican vested interests that benefit from one or the other.¶ Before the readers asks – **I believe the Republican pledges on both immigration and trade are probably sincere.** For one thing, **if the party were simply spinning lies to win votes, they could certainly gin up much more popular lies on these issues**. Both positions have been hedged with the kind of equivocation that says “let’s not go too far on this, as we might actually have to live up to it if elected.”¶ **I suspect the Republicans’ tactical embrace of these policies stems from the fact that significant sections of the Republican establishment are actually getting comfortable with them on the policy merits. It’s a lot easier for a political party to embrace something for political reasons when it feels it can accept the actual policy results.**

#### Romney can’t moderate- GOP push

Cohn 10-8

Jonathon is a columnist for the New Republic, “A Little Late for a pivot isn’t it?” <http://www.tnr.com/blog/plank/108311/romney-moderate-mitt-pivot-debate-ryan-tax-budget-medicaid>

So what does this jumble of statements and positions tell us about Romney? One theory is that Romney's policy commitments don't mean much anyway—that he’s a technocrat who talks like a conservative ideologue only when necessary to please his party’s political base. David Brooks and Ross Douthat have made versions of this argument, perhaps because they hold relatively moderate views and want badly to believe Romney agrees with them. I'm dubious, but who knows—maybe they're right. ¶ Still, there’s a reason we ask politicians to make policy commitments during campaigns. Historically, those commitments have told us something about the plans candidates pursue in office. Those commitments have also told us something about the resistance candidates will put up in the face of political pressure. With Romney, the latter may be more important, because if he’s elected he'd almost certainly be working with a Republican Congress. The plans he endorsed are very much like the ones House Republicans have already passed. And, as Jamelle Bouie at the American Prospect notes, "When a President Romney faces political pressure, the vast majority of it will come from the right." If Romney is not willing to stand up to that pressure now, why should we expect he'd stand up to it as president? ¶ Keep in mind just how extreme these Republican plans are. According to Robert Greenstein, president of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, the most recent Ryan budget calls for “the largest redistribution of income from the bottom to the top in modern U.S. history and likely increase poverty and inequality more than any other budget in recent times (and possibly in the nation’s history).” Let's be charitable and suppose that, come 2013, President Romney and a less radically conservative Senate scaled back that plan by half. It'd still be radical. ¶ Romney had more than a year of campaigning to position himself as a moderate. He chose not to do so. That tells us a lot—more, surely, than anything he says now.¶ Update: I added a few more links and tweaks to language.

## 1NR

#### Financial incentives are distinct from subsidy removal, regulations, technical assistance and rationing, **or removing tariffs**

Anandalingam, 94 **-** Department of Systems Engineering, University of Virginia (G. “Energy Conservation in the Industrial Sector,” Energy Research in Developing Countries, ed: Stephen Graham, http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/11296/1/98309.pdf)

Policies to overcome barriers to energy conservation pertain to pricing, financial incentives, and nonfinancial incentives. Pricing policy should aim to remove price subsidies and make prices equal to economic (including environmental) costs. Tariffs may also be imposed on imported oil, and taxes can be levied on energy products. Financial incentives include income tax credits and accelerated depreciation for conservation investments. These, however, have the potential drawback known as the "free-rider" problem. In this case, incentives are provided inefficiently for all investment proposals, not just for those that require incentives to achieve financial viability. Nonfinancial incentives include standards, targets, and regulations, technical assistance and information programs, and rationing and allocation schemes to encourage energy productivity.

#### Their own 1AC ev. concedes the tariffs do NOT slow the growth of energy production

Jabusch 5/18/12

[Garvin Jabusch, cofounder and chief investment officer of Green Alpha Advisors and co-manager of the Green Alpha Next Economy Index. Jabusch was previously Director of Forward Sustainable Investments, a business unit of Forward Management, and Vice President, Strategic Services at Morgan Stanley. “Tariffs on Chinese Solar Are Bad for Us All,” http://sierraclub.typepad.com/gaa/2012/05/tariffs-on-chinese-solar-are-bad-for-us-all.html]

. Commerce’s decision will do little to slow the growth and technological progress of solar globally; it will just mean the U.S. won’t be competing in this key piece of powering the future economies.¶ There are of course American firms, such as New Hampshire based GT Advanced Technologies (GTAT), who have managed to compete very well with Chinese solar without Commerce’s protectionism. Tom Gutierrez, CEO of GT Advanced Technologies, recently had this to say on the opinion page of the Boston Globe:¶ I look at the time and energy invested in this investigation and wonder: Why, and what for?

#### Production refers to primary energy extraction for a specific list of sources

Energici 12 (provides business intelligence and decision support services to companies and investors active in the wind, solar, hydro, geothermal and bioenergy industries. Specializes in providing robust research, analysis and intelligence coverage of trends and developments) February “PRIMARY ENERGY PRODUCTION (MONTHLY)” http://www.energici.com/energy-profiles/by-country/europe-m-z/sweden/49-countries/north-america/usa/usa-geothermal/449-primary-energy-production

Definition : Primary Energy Production is the amount of energy converted from a primary energy source in its natural state, such as coal, gas, wind etc. that has not been subjected to any conversion or transformation process. The U.S. Energy Information Administration includes the following in U.S. primary energy production: coal production, waste coal supplied, and coal refuse recovery; crude oil and lease condensate production; natural gas plant liquids production; dry natural gas—excluding supplemental gaseous fuels—production; nuclear electricity net generation\*, conventional hydroelectricity\* (not hydro pumped storage), geothermal electricity\*, solar thermal and photovoltaic electricity\*, wind electricity\*, wood and wood-derived fuels consumption; biomass waste consumption and biofuels feedstock.

#### Removing tariffs—border measures are not restrictions on production

Lothar Ehring and Gian Franco Chinale 11 (Assistant to Mr. Péter Balás, Deputy Director-General at the Directorate-General for Trade of the European Commission, responsible for multilateral affairs, as well as trade defence instruments and bilateral trade relations with Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Until 2008, Lothar Ehring served in the Unit of the European Commission's Directorate-General for Trade that is responsible for Legal Aspects of Trade Policy. He was the Coordinator for legal issues of multilateral trade, handled several WTO disputes and also represented the European Community in the negotiations on the reform of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding) “Regulation of Energy in International Trade Law: Wto, Nafta and Energy Charter” p. 134-5

The perfect example to test and discuss this interpretation is the famous case of OPEC production quotas. These quotas. as implemented at the national levels of OPEC members, are horizontal restrictions on production. They limit exportation no more than domestic sales, and yet the argument is made time and again that they fall foul of Article XI:I of the GATT 1994.” The proponents of this thesis recognize that they are on thin ice. given that production limitations are as remote from being border measures as a restriction can possibly be. Equally clear is the fact that a production limitation definition does not discriminate against exports, neither de jure nor de facto. The proponents of the OPEC GATT-illegality attempt to overcome this conclusion with the argument that for some of the oil exporting countries in question, the near totality of the production goes to export. This. however, is legally irrelevant to the question of whether there is a discrimination against or higher burden on exports. The quantitative relationship between domestic consumption and exports can be very imbalanced for reasons of production and consumption capacities, in large part for reasons of a country’s size and the foreign demand for the product concerned. Also the conceptual argument that a restriction on production can be decomposed into a restriction on exportation as well a restriction on domestic sales is not plausible. The production restriction is precisely and inseparably both at the same time and this makes a qualitative difference that is impossible to set aside.

#### —that’s NOT A RESTRICTION

Priebe ’99 (Director of Agricultural Economic Law, European Commission)

Rhinehard, *Production Rights in European Agriculture* p.200

The milk quota system, to quote the prime example, is a levy imposed on production in¶ excess of reference quantities, or 'quotas' . The Community does not prohibit surplus production,¶ but it does make it subject to a very dissuasive tax. An 'overproduction tax' as high as¶ that under the milk quota system is tantamount, in economic terms at least, to a prohibition on¶ large-volume production above the limits laid down. The beet quota system, on the other¶ hand, is of a different legal nature. This is based on production limits that are governed in¶ practice by delivery contracts between growers and sugar companies.¶ In other industries, limits exist as conditions for the granting of direct aid. In such cases,¶ this is not a direct restriction on production, in a strictly legal sense. The farmer is free not to¶ comply with these conditions if he chooses not to accept the aid offered. Economically, s/he¶ often has no choice. Accordingly, in order to obtain Community aid, he has to comply with¶ the conditions that apply. For instance, under the support scheme for arable crop growers, aid¶ applications cannot be submitted in respect of land which was used for permanent pasture,¶ permanent crops, forest or non-agricultural uses4 as at 31 December 1991. Such a provision,¶ designed to avoid speculation in arable crops triggered purely by the introduction of the direct¶ aid system in 1992, divides agricultural land into two: land which is eligible for arable land¶ support and ineligible land. This is a permanent division. The set-aside obligation, signifYing¶ each producer's individual contribution to the disciplining of production under the same¶ system, is another example of this form of restriction. **This ev. gender paraphrased**

# Round 4 v Idaho State

## 1NC

### 1NC

#### 1 Interpretation: The ballot is to determine if the enactment of a topical plan is better than the status quo or a competitive option.

#### 2 Violation:

#### A “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School, ‘4

(5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, <http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm>)

**The colon introduces** the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. **A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:"¶ Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.**

#### B USFG is the national government in DC.

Encarta Online Encyclopedia, 2k

(http://encarta.msn.com)

“The federal government **of the U**nited **S**tates **is centered in** Washington **DC”**

#### C Should means there is a practical reason for action

WordNet in ‘97

Princeton University, 1.6

**Should** v 1 : be expected to: “Parties should be fun” 2 : **expresses an** emotional**, practical,** or other **reason for doing something:** “You had better put on warm clothes”; “You should call your mother-in-law”; *“The State ought to repair bridges*”[syn**:** had better, ought]

#### 3 Vote Negative:

#### Limits on what can be debated protect subversion and meaningful debate.

Shively, 2K

(Former Assistant Politics Professor – Texas A&M, Partisan Politics and Political Theory, pp. 181-4, We have the full text of the card if you want to see it)

At the very least, **we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it.** For instance, once cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one’s target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, **contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagreements.** The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator’s audience must know what is being resisted. In short, **the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it.** In other words, **contestation rests on some basic agreements or harmony.**¶Continues on page 184¶ But, again, the response to the ambiguist must be that **the practice of questioning and undermining rules**, like all other social practices, **needs a certain order. The subversive needs rules to protect subversion. And when we look more closely at the rules protective of subversion, we find that they are roughly the rules of argument** discussed above. In fact, **the rules of argument are roughly the rules of democracy or civility: the delineation of boundaries necessary to protect speech and action from violence, manipulation, and other forms of tyranny.**

#### And, fair division of ground is necessary for meaningful switch-side debate – switch-side debating cultivates a civic attitude which threatens fundamentalism and turns debate into a training ground for progressive politics

Mitchell et al. 07

(Gordon, Eric English, Stephen Llano, Catherine E. Morrison, John Rief, and Carly Woods, Pitt Comm Studies Grad Students, Gordon Mitchell is an Associate Comm Studies Professor @ Pitt, Communication & Critical/Cultural Studies 4)

The problem for Greene and Hicks is that this notion of citizenship becomes tied to a normative conception of American democracy that justifies imperialism. They write, ‘‘The production and management of this field of governance allows liberalism to trade in cultural technologies in the global cosmopolitan marketplace at the same time as it creates a field of intervention to transform and change the world one subject (regime) at a time.’’11 Here, Greene and Hicks argue that this new conception of liberal governance, which epitomizes the ethical citizen as an individual trained in the switch-side technique, serves as a normative tool for judging other polities and justifying forcible regime change. One need look only to the Bush administration’s framing of war as an instrument of democracy promotion to grasp how the switch-side technique can be appropriated as a justification for violence. It is our position, however, that **rather than acting as a cultural technology expanding American exceptionalism, switch-side debating originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes.** **Several prominent voices reshaping the national dialogue on homeland security have come from the academic debate community and draw on its animating spirit of critical inquiry**. For example, Georgetown University law professor **Neal Katyal served as lead plaintiff ’s counsel in Hamdan, which challenged post-9/11 enemy combat definitions**. 12 The foundation for Katyal’s winning argument in Hamdan was laid some four years before, when he collaborated with former intercollegiate debate champion Laurence Tribe on an influential Yale Law Journal addressing a similar topic.13 Tribe won the National Debate Tournament in 1961 while competing as an undergraduate debater for Harvard University. Thirty years later, Katyal represented Dartmouth College at the same tournament and finished third. **The imprint of this debate training is evident in Tribe and Katyal’s contemporary public interventions, which are characterized by meticulous research, sound argumentation, and a staunch commitment to democratic principles**. Katyal’s reflection on his early days of debating at Loyola High School in Chicago’s North Shore provides a vivid illustration. ‘‘I came in as a shy freshman with dreams of going to medical school. Then Loyola’s debate team opened my eyes to a different world: one of argumentation and policy.’’ As Katyal recounts, ‘‘the most important preparation for my career came from my experiences as a member of Loyola’s debate team.’’14 **The success of former debaters like Katyal, Tribe, and others in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security points to the efficacy of academic debate as a training ground for future advocates of progressive change**. Moreover**, a robust understanding of the switch-side technique and the classical liberalism which underpins it would help prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies**. **For buried within an inner-city debater’s files is a secret threat to absolutism: the refusal to be classified as ‘‘with us or against us,’’ the embracing of intellectual experimentation in an age of orthodoxy, and reflexivity in the face of fundamentalism**. But by now, the irony of our story should be apparent\***the more effectively academic debating practice can be focused toward these ends, the greater the proclivity of McCarthy’s ideological heirs to brand the activity as a ‘‘weapon of mass destruction.’’**

#### Dialogue is critical to affirming any value—shutting down deliberation devolves into totalitarianism and reinscribes oppression

Morson 4

http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331

Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel); and his favorite writers -- Chekhov, Gogol, and, above all, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is especially interested in the relation of literature to philosophy.

 Bakhtin viewed the whole process of “ideological” (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic) development as an endless dialogue. As teachers, we find it difficult to avoid **a voice of authority,** however much we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice, because our rebelliousness against society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture.We speak the language and thoughts of **academic educators**, even when we imagine we are speaking in no jargon at all, and that jargon, inaudible to us, sounds with all the overtones of authority to our students. We are so prone to think of ourselves as **fighting oppression** that it takes some work to realize that we ourselves may be felt as oppressive and **overbearing,** and that our own voice may provoke the same reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree. So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image: helpful, but often painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on “The Theme of the Rebel” and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors. There is a famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox opponents. Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isn’t that itself often the root cause? We know from Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who escaped to Poland, that Ivan saw himself as someone who had been oppressed by noblemen as a child and pictured himself as the great rebel against traditional authority when he killed masses of people or destroyed whole towns. There is something in the nature of maximal rebellion against authority that produces ever greater intolerance, unless one is very careful. For **the skills of** fighting or **refuting an oppressive power are not** those of **openness, self-skepticism, or real dialogue**. In preparing for my course, I remember my dismay at reading **Hitler’s** Mein Kampf and discovering that his self-consciousness was **precisely** that of the rebel speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that much of his amazing appeal – otherwise so inexplicable – was to the German sense that they were rebelling victims. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic exploited much the same appeal. Bakhtin surely knew that Communist totalitarianism, **the Gulag,** and the unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power. His favorite writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that the worst oppression comes from those who, with the rebellious psychology of “the insulted and humiliated,” have seized power – **unless they have somehow cultivated the value of dialogue**, as Lenin surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had. Rebels often make the worst tyrants because their word, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has borrowed something crucial from the authoritative word it opposed, and perhaps exaggerated it: the aura of righteous authority. If one’s ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth, one is likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority; and rebels of the next generation may proceed in much the same way, **in an ongoing spiral of intolerance**.

**Decisionmaking is the most portable skill—key to all facets of life and advocacy**

**Steinberg**, lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, and Freeley, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, **‘8**

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 9-10)

After several days of **intense debate**, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.

Meanwhile, and perhaps **equally difficult** for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. **Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made**. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.

Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. **Life demands decision making**. We make **countless individual decisions** every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. **Every profession** requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.

We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through **military invasion or diplomacy**? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?

Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game? **And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others**. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. **We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?**

The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.

Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.

Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.

**Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us**. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

**Personal experience at the expense of dialogue shuts down deliberation and makes debate useless**

**SUBOTNIK 98**

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Having traced a major strand in the development of CRT, we turn now to the strands' effect on the relationships of CRATs with each other and with outsiders. As the foregoing material suggests, **the central** CRT **message is not simply that minorities are being treated unfairly**, or even that individuals out there are in pain - assertions for which there are data to serve as grist for the academic mill - **but that the minority scholar himself or herself hurts and hurts badly**.

An important problem that concerns the very definition of the scholarly enterprise now comes into focus. **What can an academic** trained to [\*694] question and to doubt n72 **possibly say to Patricia Williams when effectively she announces, "I hurt bad"?** n73 **"No, you don't hurt"? "You shouldn't hurt"?** "Other people hurt too"? Or, most dangerously - and perhaps most tellingly - "What do you expect when you keep shooting yourself in the foot?" If the majority were perceived as having the well- being of minority groups in mind, these responses might be acceptable, even welcomed. And they might lead to real conversation. But, **writes Williams, the failure by those "cushioned within the invisible privileges of race and power**... to incorporate a sense of precarious connection as a part of our **lives is... ultimately obliterating**." n74

"Precarious." "Obliterating." **These words will clearly invite responses only from fools and sociopaths; they will, by effectively precluding objection, disconcert and disunite others**. **"I hurt," in academic discourse, has three broad though interrelated effects**. First, **it demands priority from the reader's conscience. It is for this reason that law review editors, waiving usual standards, have privileged a long trail of undisciplined - even silly** n75 **- destructive and, above all, self-destructive arti cles.** n76 **Second, by emphasizing the emotional bond between those who hurt in a similar way, "I hurt" discourages fellow sufferers from abstracting themselves from their pain in order to gain perspective on their condition**. n77

 [\*696] **Last, as we have seen, it precludes the possibility of open and structured conversation with others**. n78 [\*697] **It is because of this conversation-stopping effect** of what they insensitively call "first-person agony stories" **that Farber and Sherry deplore their use.** "The norms of academic civility hamper readers from challenging the accuracy of the researcher's account; it would be rather difficult, for example, to criticize a law review article by questioning the author's emotional stability or veracity." n79 Perhaps, a better practice would be to put the scholar's experience on the table, along with other relevant material, but to subject that experience to the same level of scrutiny.

If **through the foregoing rhetorical strategies CRATs succeeded in limiting academic debate**, why do they not have greater influence on public policy? **Discouraging white legal scholars from entering the national conversation about race**, n80 I suggest, **has generated a kind of cynicism in white audiences** which, in turn, has had precisely the reverse effect of that ostensibly desired by CRATs. **It drives the American public to the right and ensures that anything CRT offers is reflexively rejected.**

In the absence of scholarly work by white males in the area of race, of course, it is difficult to be sure what reasons they would give for not having rallied behind CRT. Two things, however, are certain. First, **the kinds of issues** raised by Williams **are too important** in their implications  [\*698]  for American life **to be confined to communities of color.** If the lives of minorities are heavily constrained, if not fully defined, by the thoughts and actions of the majority elements in society, **it would seem to be of great importance that white thinkers and doers participate in open discourse** to bring about change. Second, given the lack of engagement of CRT by the community of legal scholars as a whole, the discourse that should be taking place at the highest scholarly levels has, by default, been displaced to faculty offices and, more generally, the streets and the airwaves.

#### State action and coercion key to solve existential problems and turns corporate dominance

Mansbridge ’11

Jane is the Charles Adams Professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, “On the Importance of Getting Things Done,” <http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2FPSC%2FPSC45_01%2FS104909651100165Xa.pdf&code=61d04501e14285b50244640216120c97>

T¶ rend plus inaction equals¶ drift. When a¶ trend has external causes¶ and no one can act to intervene, that inaction leads to¶ drift—the unimpeded trajectory of change. Drift in the¶ United States produces the¶ domination of American¶ democracy by business interests. Drift in international¶ decisions produces global¶ warming. Speciﬁc institutional designs for government, such as the US separation of¶ powers, can cause the inaction that facilitates drift. More fundamentally, ingrained patterns of thinking can cause inaction. Here¶ I argue that the long and multifaceted resistance tradition in the¶ West contributes to inaction by focusing on stopping, rather than¶ using, coercion.¶ By contrast, a political theory of democratic action explicitly¶ recognizes that solving collective action problems requires lawgiving, and that lawgiving requires coercion—getting people to¶ do what they would not otherwise do through the threat of sanction and the use of force. The work of democracy is to make that¶ coercion somewhat more legitimate. Thus, while a theory of democratic action should incorporate resistance, it should not—and¶ cannot—be driven by resistance.¶ In the United States and on the planet, we now face problems¶ vaster than any that James Madison conceived, involving interdependence on a global scale and potential catastrophe for unborn¶ generations. Serious attempts to deal with these problems continue to be stymied, in part by a view of democracy that is in many¶ of its strands a theory of individual and collective resistance, not a¶ theory of collective action.

#### Coercion of State power necessary to prevent extinction and not inherently exclusionary

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Let me suggest another approach, based on two premises. First,¶ we need coercion to solve collective action problems. Second, there¶ can be no such thing as fully legitimate coercion. Therefore we¶ need theories that can guide public action and help improve democratic legitimacy incrementally.We can move toward the ideal of¶ democratic legitimacy without discrediting every state that falls can work through the simple capacity to act (I turn on the light¶ switch—my preferences cause the outcome). When the outcome¶ requires other human beings, the causal relation can work through¶ genuine persuasion on the merits. Neither of these is coercive¶ power.¶ By “coercion” or “coercive power” I mean the threat of sanction or the use of force. I do not view the words “coercion” or¶ “coercive” as inherently negative. It is true that both coercion and¶ the threat of sanction will always have a negative valence. Punishment would not be punishment if those being punished did¶ not want to avoid it. But a relationship, for example between two¶ people, may be better when the partners have equal capacity to¶ sanction each other than when neither has that capacity. When¶ you care for someone, you give that person the capacity to sanction you and to threaten sanctions. Deeply interdependent social¶ relations are, I believe, all built in part on mutual coercion.¶ In short, by coercive power I mean “power over,” not the nicer¶ forms of power such as “power to” (that is, capacity) or “power¶ with” (cooperative power). Although Arendt (1970) described¶ power as the human ability to act in concert, this is not what I¶ mean. Those forms of power are admirable in their place. But to¶ solve collective action problems we also need coercive power, based¶ on the threat of sanction or the actual use of force.¶ 10¶ Why is this the case? The answer has to do with the nature of¶ goods that are non-excludable. Their character is such that everyone can use them without in any way contributing to providing¶ them. Examples include law and order, common defense, roads¶ without tolls, an educated workforce, clean rivers, and breathable¶ air. Collective action problems arise whenever we want to produce such goods. All of these things, and thousands of other desirable collective outcomes, are nonexcludable, or largely so. By their¶ nature, goods like these cannot be parceled out only to those who¶ work or pay to bring them into being. It is only goods like these—¶ nonexcludable goods—that produce the collective action problem, which is, at bottom, a problem of non-contribution.¶ Coercion is not always necessary to solve collective action problems and get people to contribute to producing a nonexcludable¶ good. Sometimes we can produce such goods through voluntary acts of solidarity. Everyone can voluntarily chip in to build a road,¶ defend the country, produce schooling for the poor, or abstain¶ from overﬁshing. But in most cases we also need coercion around¶ the edges to give those who are tempted to free ride on the contributions of others an external incentive to contribute. The need¶ for coercion to solve collective action problems is, in my view, the¶ primary reason for government. Coercion also helps human beings¶ achieve justice together through government.¶ My second premise is that no actual instance of coercion can¶ fully meet the criteria of democratic legitimacy. Over the years,¶ democratic theorists have worked out democratic criteria for¶ moments of both genuine commonality and genuine conﬂict. The¶ criteria for moments of commonality specify, among other things,¶ that deliberations leading to consensus should ideally take place¶ in conditions free from coercive power (free, that is, from the threat¶ of sanction and the use of force).¶ 11¶ In reality, however, the conditions for deliberation are never fully free from coercive power. As¶ for conﬂict, the democratic criteria for moments of conﬂict specify, among other things, that ideally, decisions should be based on¶ the equal power of each participant.¶ 12¶ In reality, however, power¶ is never fully equal in democratic negotiation or even in majority rule, where the agenda always derives from an unequal process.¶ Therefore the coercion that actually existing democracies deploy¶ to implement their decisions will never be completely legitimate.¶ In short, a political theory of democratic action demands a¶ corresponding theory of imperfect legitimacy. Legitimacy is not a¶ dichotomy—a thing you either have or do not have. It is a continuum from more to less.¶ A political theory of democratic action should not neglect the¶ goals of resistance theory. Every means of approximating relatively legitimate coercion has its underside. Every exercise of coercive power puts those on the receiving end of that power at risk.¶ But simply blocking the exercise of power is often a bad solution.¶ One version of resistance theory, attractive to the framers of the¶ American constitution and to many since then, holds that if you¶ put enough institutional veto points in place, the little that gets¶ through is bound to promote the common good.¶ 13¶ This approach¶ privileges stopping the work of the government. It may have been¶ appropriate in a simpler world, where it might reasonably be said¶ that the government is best which governs least, and in a more¶ decentralized world, where the scope of government action did¶ not need to be as great. In a more heavily interdependent world, a¶ democracy needs more collective power to solve the growing number of collective action problems. It can safely allow more collective power through the grid if it reduces the worst eﬀects of that¶ power in other ways.¶ Starting with the aims of the power itself, a democracy can¶ organize itself to make the power that surges through the system¶ more likely to promote the common good—for example, by reforming campaign ﬁnance, reducing corruption, attracting more public spirited individuals to oﬃce, and bringing stakeholders into constructive negotiation with one another. Democracies can also¶ devise targeted safeguards for the vulnerable—for example, by legislation such as the Voting Rights Act of 1964. Democracies can¶ encourage both constructive and critical organization in civil¶ society—for example, by facilitating unionization, subsidizing¶ investigative journalism, and protecting internet access—so that¶ new ideas feed into state power and people can organize eﬀectively when resistance is necessary.¶ More generally, when a good has mixed positive and negative¶ features—and I consider coercion such a mixed good—one should¶ not always block or automatically resist the good, but rather look¶ for practices and institutions that reduce its undesirable eﬀects,¶ protect the vulnerable, compensate the losers, and facilitate ongoing changes for the better.¶ In the tension between resistance and action, context is critical.Tyrannical regimes demand resistance. Deeply corrupt regimes¶ cannot justly claim legitimacy. But when the threat of tyranny is¶ relatively weak and corruption relatively limited, the need for collective action is often greater than the need for resistance. I do not¶ pretend here to oﬀer guidance to political movements on their¶ choice of tactics, many of which are appropriately aimed at resist ing particular injustices or at drawing attention to unsolved problems, such as rising inequality or global warming, even when the¶ protesters do not agree on a plan of action (think “Occupy Wall¶ Street”). I am arguing instead for something deeper: a shift in¶ emphasis within democratic theory, from a long-standing promotion of resistance to the greater embrace of coercion, even while¶ recognizing that the coercion can never be more than partially¶ legitimate. Where might a democratic theory that recognizes the central role¶ of coercive action turn its analytic gaze?Two promising and underexplored areas are negotiation and uncorrupt delegation supplemented by citizen deliberation. Theorists trying to make headway¶ on these problems could beneﬁt from working closely with empirical scholars of conﬂict resolution, comparative government, and¶ perhaps other ﬁelds.¶ To explore the normative complexity of negotiations, we could¶ begin with Denmark. In 2002, two development economists coined¶ the phrase “getting to ‘Denmark’” to describe the goal of helping¶ impoverished countries deliver key public services.¶ 14¶ Francis Fukuyama adopted “getting to Denmark” to describe the historical paths¶ for acquiring an eﬀectively functioning, accountable state under¶ the rule of law (Fukuyama 2011, 14 ﬀ, 431 ﬀ.). Denmark is small,¶ homogeneous, and defended primarily by the armies of others.¶ Like many Nordic states it has a culture that may not be duplicable. Its social welfare model has the inevitable imperfection of¶ requiring signiﬁcant barriers to entry. Yet Denmark could nevertheless serve as one model in an exploration of negotiation—¶ speciﬁcally the contribution of diﬀerent forms of democratic negotiation to relatively legitimate coercion. The outcomes of¶ the Danish political process match what its citizens want relatively closely, and the process itself, although not based on the¶ majority rule of alternating parties, has strong claims to democratic legitimacy.¶ Regarding outcomes, Denmark has the most equal income distribution of any advanced industrialized country. Robert Kuttner¶ reported in 2008 that “Denmark’s ﬁnancial markets are clean and¶ transparent, its barriers to imports minimal, its labor markets the¶ most ﬂexible in Europe, its multinational corporations dynamic¶ and largely unmolested by industrial policies, and its unemployment rate of 2.8 percent the second lowest in the OECD” (Kuttner¶ 2008, 78). In its Index of Economic Freedom, the Heritage Foundation gives Denmark a score of 78.6 out of 100, or eighth place in¶ the world, better than the United States in ninth place. Denmark¶ has universal health insurance, good child-care and generous¶ unemployment compensation. It has the world’s second highest¶ tax rate and spends 50% of its GDP on public services.¶ 15¶ How did Denmark’s democracy become capable of such eﬀective action? First, after a series of reforms in the early and midnineteenth century, Denmark is now tied with New Zealand and¶ Singapore for the distinction of being the least corrupt country¶ on earth in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions¶ Index.¶ 16¶ Second, because its list system of proportional representation currently produces eight parties in parliament and no single party has had a parliamentary majority since 1909, passing¶ laws requires negotiation and compromise among parties. This¶ system generates a more cooperative form of negotiation than in¶ the US Congress. Third, Danish democracy has little separation¶ of powers on the national level (although we cannot be sure this¶ is related to its eﬀectiveness). It has a parliamentary system with¶ a unicameral legislature and extremely limited judicial review.¶ Finally, Denmark has evolved a form of eﬀective and far-reaching¶ decentralization in which local elected bodies serve as responsive¶ service-deliverers but not powerful veto points.¶ 17¶ The result of this noncorrupt and negotiated system? Denmark’s citizens have, according to the Eurobarometer, greater¶ trust in their national parliament and their national parties than¶ the citizens of any other country in Europe. They are more “satis-¶ ﬁed with the way democracy works” in their country than the citizens of any other country in Europe. Staggeringly, 94% of the¶ Danish citizens are at least “fairly satisﬁed” with the way democracy works in their country.¶ 18¶ To this sociological legitimacy, add¶ some normativelegitimacy from two features. First, Denmark’s citizens are actively engaged in their politics. Without any compulsory voting, the turnout in the general elections since 1960 has¶ averaged 85%. In The Economist’s 2010 Democracy Index, Denmark has the third highest score in the world, after Norway and¶ Iceland.¶ 19¶ Second, the very process of negotiation adds democratic¶ value by drawing out the reasons and justiﬁcations advanced by¶ the diﬀerent parties.¶ 20¶ Danes have also shown their capacity for resistance when¶ needed. In 1943, when the German army occupied Denmark, the¶ public denunciation of the German plan for deporting the Jews¶ involved the King, the universities, students, the Danish state¶ church, the Supreme Court, the trade unions, the employers’ confederation, the farmers’ organizations, the heads of ministries,¶ and all of the political parties except the small pro-Nazi National¶ SocialistWorkers’ Party of Denmark (Kirchhoﬀ 1995). Denmark’s¶ corporate entities were actually the foci for resistance. I am not saying that the United States can model itself on Denmark. That would be absurd. Nor am I saying that Denmark is a¶ perfect polity. Its protections forits own citizensarearguably related¶ toits relative homogeneity andits barriers toimmigration. Finally,¶ I do not have suﬃcient empirical data to judge the relative merits¶ of the diﬀerent systems that are less prone to deadlock, whether¶ majority-rule Westminster systems or well-structured systems of¶ negotiation, or the roles of diﬀerent kinds of veto points, which in¶ some contexts may promote, rather than hinder, common democratic action (Birchﬁeld and Crepaz 1998). I am saying that these¶ questions need entwined empirical and normative attention. In the¶ future I hope that comparativists will readmore democratic theory¶ and theorists more comparative work, to the point where each can,¶ with the help of their colleagues, contribute productively to the¶ development of bothﬁelds. In particular, Iam urginghere that political theorists can proﬁtably ally with comparativists and other¶ empirical political scientists to investigate the sources of democratic legitimacy in countries other than our own and Great Britain. In Denmark, we might concentrate on the strengths and¶ weaknesses of their forms of negotiation. These forms of negotiation, developed historically not only by Denmark but also by other¶ relatively neocorporatist states in Europe, have heavily inﬂuenced¶ the relatively successful processes of the EU bureaucracies, which¶ unlike Denmark have highly heterogeneous constituencies.¶ Just as one size does not ﬁt all in economic development, so¶ too one size does not ﬁt all in the building of legitimate democratic action.The new ﬁeld of comparative political theory is investigating, among other things, the sources for democratically¶ legitimate action in the cultures and philosophies of nonwestern¶ countries. My point is that as this work goes forward, the focus¶ should be as much on the sources of coordinated, intelligent¶ action—and relatively legitimate coercion—as on resistance.¶ If we think about problems of global scale, like climate change¶ and weapons of mass destruction, the focus on action becomes¶ even more necessary. Decisions at the global level cannot be as¶ democratically legitimate as those at a national scale. In the foreseeable future, decisions at the global level will be even less likely¶ than those at the national level to be discussed, much less resolved,¶ in an arena governed only by the “forceless force of the better¶ argument.” Nor will decisions be made in a way that even approximates the equal power of each individual or the proportionate¶ power of those aﬀected. To achieve action capable of addressing¶ collective action problems on a global level, we will have to accept¶ ongoing coercion that is far less democratically legitimate than¶ the coercion we accept at the level of the nation state.Yet we must¶ take action, as soon as is humanly possible, for the sake of unborn¶ generations.

### 1NC

#### THE WORKING CLASS MUST COALESCE IN MATERIAL ACTION AGAINST FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION ESPECIALLY IN THE CONTEXT OF ENERGY PLANNING. THE AFF’S NOTION OF AGENCY UNIQUELY UNDERMINES THE MATERIALIST ANTI-CAPITALIST REVOLUTIONARY KNOWLEDGE KEY TO SURVIVAL.

Callinicos 2k10

[Alex, Bonfire of Illusions: The Twin Crisis of the Liberal World, Polity, professor of European studies King’s College – London, DPhil – Oxford, p. 139-43]

There are other strong reasons to press for a break with the logic of competitive accumulation. The scientific evi-dence that the emission of greenhouse gases - most notably C02 - caused by human activity is generating profound and irreversible processes of climate change is now beyond dispute. It is also very widely agreed that preventing these processes reaching a disastrous scale requires the rapid adoption and implementation of drastic targets for cutting CO2 emissions. But while the targets, particularly since the eclipse of the Bush gang, have become more ambitious, the actual emissions have continued to rise. The most plausible explanation appeals to the logic of competition.

The problem is, yet again, one of collective action. Evi- dently it is in everyone's interest to avoid drastic climate change. But no individual capital or state is willing to shoulder the additional costs involved in moving to a low- carbon economy. In international negotiations, the leading states play a game of pass-the-parcel - the US demanding that India and China adopt tough targets, the latter asking why they should bear the burden of two centuries of industrialization mainly in the North. The EU, despite its pre- tensions to be a master of 'soft power' that has transcended bad old nationalism, is particularly ineffectual. Germany has vocally and largely successfully defended its car firms against what they regarded as excessively tough targets. And the economic crisis has provided many governments with a perfect excuse to go slow in reducing reliance on fossil fuels. The logic of competitive accumulation here threatens the future of the human species.20 The implication is that any sustainable alternative to •capitalism has to be based, not on the market, but on democratic planning. In a democratically planned economy the allocation of resources would be the outcome of a democratic political process that would set overall priori- ties for the economy. There are some models of how this could work. One is Albert's Parecon, or participatory economics. This involves an economy of workers' and consumers' councils in which individuals and enterprises submit proposals for their share of society's resources and a process of gradual adjustments (Albert calls them 'iterations') takes place while technical experts come up with a plan that would give everyone as much as possible of what they want. The main weakness of this model is that it mimics a bit too closely the workings of a market economy, in which claims on resources are driven by individual demands. Albert is an anarchist, and his commitment to decentralization here goes too far. The allocation of society's resources isn't a neutral technical issue. It's a political question that requires some sort of collective and democratic decision-making process to choose between what would often be competing views of the priorities of the society in question. From this perspective, Pat Devine offers a superior model of what he calls negotiated coordination. Here the allocation of resources is largely the outcome of discussion between producers, consumers and other affected groups, but within the framework of overall decisions about economic priorities made democratically at the national and international level.21 Plainly there is much more to be said - and, above all, to be done - about democratic planning. All the same, the importance of the kind of work being done by Albert Devine and others is that they begin to break down the prejudice against planning and to sketch out how an economy that rejected the market could manage to be both democratic and efficient. But any break with capitalism couldn't take the form of an instantaneous leap into a fully planned economy. Marx long ago argued in the 'Critique of the Gotha Programme' that a new workers' state would inherit a society deeply marked by capitalism. Initially, it would have to make compromises with the old order, and gradually move towards a society governed by the communist principle 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!'22 Similarly today a government breaking with capitalism would need to make a decisive shift towards an economy in which priorities were decided democratically rather than left to the anarchy of competition. This would involve critically taking control of the financial markets, nationalizing under workers' control key sectors of the economy, and extending social provision on the basis of a progressive tax system that redistributed wealth and income from rich to poor. These measures, radical though they are, would still leave in place many aspects of a market economy. Large sectors would remain in private hands. Continuous pressure and the introduction of new mea- sures would be necessary to move the economy as a whole towards the principles of democratic planning. One key step would be to weaken the power of the capitalist labour market, which today rules our lives. In my view, the best way to do this would be to intro- duce universal direct income. In other words, every resi- dent of the country would receive, as of right, an income that met their basic needs at a relatively low but neverthe- less decent level. This would serve two goals. First, it would ensure a basic level of welfare for everyone much more efficiently than existing systems of social provision. (People with greater needs because they had children or were disabled or whatever would receive a higher basic income.) Secondly, having a guaranteed basic income would greatly reduce the pressure on individuals to accept whatever job was on offer on the labour market. One of the main presuppositions of capitalism - that workers have no acceptable alternative to wage labour - would be removed. The balance of power between labour and capital would shift towards the workers, irrespective of the nature of their employer.23 More broadly, the question of power is crucial. One obvious challenge to the kind of vision of change I have just sketched out is how to ensure that the direction of change would be towards a democratically planned economy rather than back to market capitalism or maybe to the kind of state capitalism that ended up dominating the Soviet Union. The only guarantee that counts is that levers of political power are in the hands of the workers and the poor themselves. As long as the state takes the form that it does today, of a bureaucratically organized, hierarchical set of apparatuses whose managers' interests are bound up with those of capital, any improvement in society can only be temporary and fragile. This is why the strategy of ignoring the state advocated by Holloway is so badly mistaken. If we are to move towards a democratically planned economy, then the existing state has to be confronted and broken. This task can only be achieved through the development of a different kind of power, one based on the self- organization of workers and other poor people that devel- ops out of their struggles against capital. The great revolutionary movements of the twentieth century offered some glimpses of this power - from the workers' and sol- diers' councils of the Russian Revolution of October 1917 to the workers' shoras during the Iranian Revolution of 1978-9. The self-organization displayed by the Bolivian popular movement during the insurrections of October 2003 and May-June 2005 showed that the contemporary movements against neoliberalism can generate this kind of power as well.24 A democratically planned economy would be the core of a self-managing society, one in which directly elected workplace and neighbourhood councils took responsibil- ity for their own affairs and linked together to make deci- sions for society at large. The key insight that Marx had during the Paris Commune of 1871 was that these forms of organization would develop before the new society was created, in the process of fighting the old society. The same methods of self-organization that would be the basis of a self-managing society are needed by the exploited and oppressed to resist and, ultimately, to overthrow capital itself. The overthrow of capital is itself a process. The dilemma that Albert imagines confronting a workers' cooperative in a market economy would face any society that was beginning to introduce the principles of democratic plan- ning in a world still ruled by capitalism. It was responsible for the corruption and eventual destruction of the Russian Revolution of October 1917. Any breakthrough in one part of the world could only survive by spreading and progressively overturning the logic of capital on a global scale. The globalization of capital has produced a global- ization of resistance. Struggles in different parts of the world contaminate each other. Chiapas and Seattle had global reverberations. The two European countries with the most advanced and combative social movements, France and Greece, have exerted a degree of mutual influ- ence on one another. The movements in Latin America have become a beacon to all those fighting neoliberalism. "We are still a very long way from overturning capitalism even in one country. Indeed, the more one seeks to elabo- rate on the shape of an alternative to capitalism the more one is overawed by the immensity of the task. The biggest immediate obstacle that confronts anyone seeking to address it is the chronic political weakness of the radical anticapitalist left on a global scale. Nevertheless, the present crisis has torn a huge hole in neoliberalism both as an ideology and as a mode of organizing capital- ism. The market no longer seems like a second nature unamenable to change or control. Those who are prepared to seize this moment boldly can help to ensure that the boundaries of the possible really are widened, allowing the billions of victims of capitalism finally to escape.

#### Text: VOTE NEGATIVE TO REJECT THE 1AC IN FAVOR OF MATERIALIST REVOLUTIONARY KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION AGAINST CAPITALISM.

#### AND, ECOLOGICAL CATASTROPHE NECESSITATES MATERIALIST REVOLUTIONARY DIALECTICS AGAINST CAPITALISM’S EXPLOITATION TO ENSURE SURVIVAL.

Foster 2k11

[john bellamy,  professor of sociology at the University of Oregon and also editor of Monthly Review, Since the Great Financial Crisis hit in 2008, Foster has been sought out by academics, activists, the media, and the general public as a result of his earlier prescient writings on the coming crisis. He has given numerous interviews, talks, and invited lectures, as well as written invited commentary, articles, and books on the subject]

In the twenty-first century it is customary to view the rise of planetary ecological problems as a surprising development scarcely conceivable prior to the last few decades. It is here, however, that we have the most to learn from the analysis of nineteenth-century thinkers who played a role in the development of ecology, including both early ecological scientists and classical historical materialists. Science has long warned of the negative, destructive side of the human transformation of the earth—a warning which the system, driven by its own imperatives, has continually sought to downplay. Indeed, what distinguishes our time from earlier centuries is not so much the conservation of catastrophe, which has long been recognized, but rather the accelerated pace at which such destruction is now manifesting itself, i.e., what I am calling the accumulation of catastrophe. The desertification arising in pre-capitalist times, partly through human action, manifested itself over centuries, even millennia. Today changes in the land, the atmosphere, the oceans, indeed the entire life-support system of the earth, are the product of mere decades. If in the past, Darwin was struck that in a mere three centuries after European colonization, the ecology of the island of St. Helena had been destroyed to the point that it was reduced to “desert”—today, in only two generations, we have altered the biogeochemical processes of the entire planet.28The absence of a historical perspective on the conservation, even accumulation, of catastrophe is a major barrier to needed change in our time. Many environmentalists, including some who perceive themselves as being on the left, persist in believing that we can address our immense and growing ecological problems without altering our fundamental social-production relationships. All that is necessary in this view is the combined magic of green technology and green markets. Short-term fixes are presumed to be adequate solutions, while society remains on the same essential course as before. Indeed, the dominant perspective on ecology can be characterized, I believe, as consisting of three successive stages of denial: (1) the denial altogether of the planetary ecological crisis (or its human cause); (2) the denial that the ecological crisis is fundamentally due to the system of production in which we live, namely capitalism; and (3) the denial that capitalism is constitutionally incapable of overcoming this global ecological threat—with capital now being presented instead as the savior of the environment.The first stage of ecological denial is easy to understand. This is the form of denial represented by Exxon-Mobil. Such outright denial of the destructive consequences of their actions is the automatic response of corporations generally when faced with the prospect of environmental regulations, which would negatively affect their bottom lines. It is also the form of absolute denial promoted by climate-change denialists themselves, who categorically reject the reality of human agency in global climate change. The second stage of denial, a retreat from the first, is to admit there is a problem,while dissociating it from the larger socioeconomic system. The famous IPAT formula, i.e. Environmental Impact = Population x Consumption x Technology (which amounts to saying that these are the three factors behind our environmental problems/solutions), has been used by some to suggest that population growth, the consumption habits of most individuals, and inappropriate technology carry the totality of blame for environmental degradation. The answer then is sustainable population, sustainable consumption, and sustainable technology. This approach, though seemingly matter-of-fact, and deceptively radical, derives its acceptability for the vested interests from the fact that it generally serves to disguise the more fundamental reality of the treadmill of capitalist production itself.29 The third stage of denial, a last-ditch defense, and exhibiting a greater level of desperation on the part of the established order, is, I would argue, the most dangerous of all. It admits that the environmental crisis is wrapped up with the existence of capitalism, but argues that what we need is an entirely new kind of capitalism: variously called “sustainable capitalism,” “green capitalism,” “natural capitalism,” and “climate capitalism” by thinkers as various as Al Gore, Paul Hawken, Amory and L. Hunter Lovins, and Jonathon Porritt.30 The argument here varies but usually begins with the old trope that capitalism is the most efficient economic system possible—a form of “spontaneous order” arising from an invisible hand—and that the answer to ecological problems is to make it more efficient still by internalizing costs on the environment previously externalized by the system. Aside from the presumed magic of the market itself, and moral claims as to “the greening of corporations,” this is supposed to be achieved by means of a black box of technological wonders. Implicit in all such views is the notion that capitalism can be made sustainable, without altering its accumulation or economic growth imperative and without breaking with the dominant social relations. The exponential growth of the system ad infinitum is possible, we are told, while simultaneously generating a sustainable relation to the planet. This of course runs up against what Herman Daly has called the Impossibility Theorem: If the whole world were to have an ecological footprint the size of the United States we would need multiple planets.31 The idea that such a development process can persist permanently on a single planet (and indeed that we are not at this point already confronting earthly limits) is of course an exercise in delusion, bordering on belief in the supernatural. “Capitalism,” as the great environmental economist K. William Kapp once wrote, is “an economy of unpaid costs.”32 It can persist and even prosper only insofar as it is able to externalize its costs on the mass of the population and the surrounding environment. Whenever the destruction is too severe the system simply seeks to engineer another spatial fix. Yet, a planetary capitalism is from this standpoint a contradiction in terms: it means that there is nowhere finally to externalize the social and environmental costs of capitalist destruction (we cannot ship our toxic waste into outer space!), and no external resources to draw upon in the face of the enormous squandering of resources inherent to the system (we can’t solve our problems by mining the moon!).Market-based solutions to climate change, such as emissions trading, have been shown to promote profits, and to facilitate economic growth and financial wealth, while increasing carbon emissions. From an environmental standpoint, therefore, they are worse than nothing—since they stand in the way of effective action. Nor are the technologies most acceptable to the system (since not requiring changes in property relations) the answer. So-called “clean coal” or carbon capture and storage technologies are economically unfeasible and ecologically dubious, and serve mainly as an ideological justification for keeping coal-fired plants going. Worse still, are geoengineering schemes like dumping sulfur particles in the atmosphere or iron filings in the ocean (the first in order to deflect the sun’s rays, the second in order to promote algal growth to increase ocean absorption of carbon). These schemes carry with them the potential for even greater ecological disasters: in the first case, this could lead to a reduction of photosynthesis, in the second the expansion of dead zones. Remember the Sorcerer’s Apprentice!33 The potential for the accumulation of catastrophe on a truly planetary level as a result of geoengineering technology is so great that it would be absolute folly to proceed in this way—simply in order to avoid changes in the mode of production, i.e., a fundamental transformation of our way of life, property relations, and metabolism with nature. Science tells us that we are crossing planetary boundaries everywhere we look, from climate change, to ocean acidification, to species destruction, to freshwater shortages, to chemical pollution of air, water, soil, and humans. The latest warning sign is the advent of what is called “extreme weather”—a direct outgrowth of climate change. As Hansen says: “Global warming increases the intensity of droughts and heat waves, and thus the area of forest fires. However, because a warmer atmosphere holds more water vapor, global warming must also increase the intensity of the other extreme of the hydrologic cycle—meaning heavier rains, more extreme floods, and more intense storms driven by latent heat.” Scientists involved in the new area of climate-attribution science, where extreme weather events are examined for their climate signatures, are now arguing that we are rapidly approaching a situation where the proverbial “‘hundred-year’ flood” no longer occurs simply once a century, but every few years. Natural catastrophes are thus likely to become more severe and more frequent occurrences in the lives of all living beings. The hope of some scientists is that this will finally wake up humanity to its true danger.34 How are we to understand the challenge of the enormous accumulation of catastrophe, and the no less massive human action required to address this? In the 1930s John Maynard Keynes wrote an essay entitled “Economic Possibilities of Our Grandchildren,” aimed at defending capitalism in response to revolutionary social challenges then arising. Keynes argued that we should rely for at least a couple more generations on the convenient lie of the Smithian invisible hand—accepting greed as the basis of a spontaneous economic order. We should therefore continue the pretense that “fair is foul and foul is fair” for the sake of the greater accumulation of wealth in society that such an approach would bring. Eventually, in the time of our “grandchildren”—maybe a “hundred years” hence (i.e., by the early 2030s)—Keynes assumed, the added wealth created by these means would be great enough that we could begin to tell the truth: that foul is foul and fair is fair. It would then be necessary for humanity to address the enormous inequalities and injustices produced by the system, engaging in a full-scale redistribution of wealth, and a radical transformation of the ends of production.35 Yet, the continued pursuit of Keynes’s convenient lie over the last eight decades has led to a world far more polarized and beset with contradictions than he could have foreseen. It is a world prey to the enormous unintended consequences of accumulation without limits: namely, global economic stagnation, financial crisis, and planetary ecological destruction. Keynes, though aware of some of the negative economic aspects of capitalist production, had no real understanding of the ecological perils—of which scientists had already long been warning. Today these perils are impossible to overlook. Faced with impending ecological catastrophe, it is more necessary than ever to abandon Keynes’s convenient lie and espouse the truth: that foul is foul and fair is fair. Capitalism, the society of “après moi le déluge!” is a system that fouls its own nest—both the human-social conditions and the wider natural environment on which it depends. The accumulation of capital is at the same time accumulation of catastrophe, not only for a majority of the world’s people, but living species generally. Hence, nothing is fairer—more just, more beautiful, and more necessary—today than the struggle to overthrow the regime of capital and to create a system of substantive equality and sustainable human development; a socialism for the twenty-first century.

## 2NC

### Predictability Good

#### Predictability maintains meaningful politics and empathy even if their DA is correct

Massaro, Prof Law – Florida, ’89

(Toni M, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2099)

Yet despite their acknowledgment that some ordering and rules are necessary, empathy proponents tend to approach the rule-of-law model as a villain. Moreover, they are hardly alone in their deep skepticism about the rule-of-law model. Most modern legal theorists question the value of procedural regularity when it denies substantive justice. 52 Some even question the whole notion of justifying a legal [\*2111] decision by appealing to a rule of law, versus justifying the decision by reference to the facts of the case and the judges' own reason and experience. 53 I do not intend to enter this important jurisprudential debate, except to the limited extent that the "empathy" writings have suggested that the rule-of-law chills judges' empathic reactions. In this regard, I have several observations.¶ My first thought is that the rule-of-law model is only a model. If the term means absolute separation of legal decision and "politics," then it surely is both unrealistic and undesirable. 54 But our actual statutory and decisional "rules" rarely mandate a particular (unempathetic) response. Most of our rules are fairly open-ended. "Relevance," "the best interests of the child," "undue hardship," "negligence," or "freedom of speech" -- to name only a few legal concepts -- hardly admit of precise definition or consistent, predictable application. Rather, they represent a weaker, but still constraining sense of the rule-of-law model. Most rules are guidelines that establish spheres of relevant conversation, not mathematical formulas.¶ Moreover, legal training in a common law system emphasizes the indeterminate nature of rules and the significance of even subtle variations in facts. Our legal tradition stresses an inductive method of discovering legal principles. We are taught to distinguish different "stories," to arrive at "law" through experience with many stories, and to revise that law as future experience requires. Much of the effort of most first-year law professors is, I believe, devoted to debunking popular lay myths about "law" as clean-cut answers, and to illuminate law as a dynamic body of policy determinations constrained by certain guiding principles. 55¶ As a practical matter, therefore, our rules often are ambiguous and fluid standards that offer substantial room for varying interpretations. The interpreter, usually a judge, may consult several sources to aid in decisionmaking. One important source necessarily will be the judge's own experiences -- including the experiences that seem to determine a person's empathic capacity. In fact, much ink has been spilled to illuminate that our stated "rules" often do not dictate or explain our legal results. Some writers even have argued that a rule of law may be, at times, nothing more than a post hoc rationalization or attempted legitimization [\*2112] of results that may be better explained by extralegal (including, but not necessarily limited to, emotional) responses to the facts, the litigants, or the litigants' lawyers, 56 all of which may go unstated. The opportunity for contextual and empathic decisionmaking therefore already is very much a part of our adjudicatory law, despite our commitment to the rule-of-law ideal.¶ Even when law is clear and relatively inflexible, however, it is not necessarily "unempathetic." The assumed antagonism of legality and empathy is belied by our experience in rape cases, to take one important example. In the past, judges construed the general, open-ended standard of "relevance" to include evidence about the alleged victim's prior sexual conduct, regardless of whether the conduct involved the defendant. 57 The solution to this "empathy gap" was legislative action to make the law more specific -- more formalized. Rape shield statutes were enacted that controlled judicial discretion and specifically defined relevance to exclude the prior sexual history of the woman, except in limited, justifiable situations. 58 In this case, one can make a persuasive argument not only that the rule-of-law model does explain these later rulings, but also that obedience to that model resulted in a triumph for the human voice of the rape survivor. Without the rule, some judges likely would have continued to respond to other inclinations, and admit this testimony about rape survivors. The example thus shows that radical rule skepticism is inconsistent with at least some evidence of actual judicial behavior. It also suggests that the principle of legality is potentially most critical for people who are least understood by the decisionmakers -- in this example, women -- and hence most vulnerable to unempathetic ad hoc rulings.¶ A final observation is that the principle of legality reflects a deeply ingrained, perhaps inescapable, cultural instinct. We value some procedural regularity -- "law for law's sake" -- because it lends stasis and structure to our often chaotic lives. Even within our most intimate relationships, we both establish "rules," and expect the other [\*2113] party to follow them. 59 Breach of these unspoken agreements can destroy the relationship and hurt us deeply, regardless of the wisdom or "substantive fairness" of a particular rule. Our agreements create expectations, and their consistent application fulfills the expectations. The modest predictability that this sort of "formalism" provides actually may encourage human relationships. 60

## 1NR

### 2nc queer link

#### Queer identity politics is reliant on a liberal individualism which bolsters capitalist exploitation.

Haggarty 2k0

[G., encyclopedia of gay histories and cultures, 1999, taylor and francis, prof. English uc-riverside, 139]

Some queer political activists have argued pragmatically that, owing to their relatively small numbers, gays, and lesbians will be treated as an expendable constituency. Queer Marxist critics have suggested that gay liberation as it is constituted around the question of identity is actually an intra-bourgeois struggle and not an attempt to alter existing relations of production. Identity politics often fails to note, for example, the link between systemic homophobia and capitalist exploitation. Finally, some critics have argues against identity politics through a more general critique of a politics based on individual rights. According to such critics, identity politics is too dependent on liberal individualism. It thus promises not a radical alteration of existing power relations but a simple reshuffling that leaves existing political structures largely intact.

### 2NC ETHICS IMPACT

#### CAPITALISM MAKES ETHICAL RELATIONS IMPOSSIBLE.

Morgareidge ’98 (Clayton Morgareidge, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Lewis & Clark College. August 22, 1998http://legacy.lclark.edu/~clayton/commentaries/evil.html)

To show why this is the case, let me turn to capital's greatest critic, Karl Marx. **Under capitalism**, Marx writes, **everything in nature and everything that human beings are and can do becomes an object: a resource for, or an obstacle, to the expansion of production, the development of technology, the growth of markets, and the circulation of money.** For those who manage and live from capital**, nothing has value of its own.** Mountain streams, clean air, **human lives -- all mean nothing in themselves, but are valuable only if they can be used to turn a profit**.[1] **If capital looks at (not into) the human face, it sees there only eyes through which brand names and advertising can enter and mouths that can demand and consume food, drink, and tobacco products**. If human faces express needs, then either products can be manufactured to meet, or seem to meet, those needs, or else, **if the needs are incompatible with the growth of capital, then the faces expressing them must be unrepresented or silenced.** **Obviously what capitalist enterprises do have consequences for the well being of human beings and the planet we live on. Capital profits from the production of food, shelter, and all the necessities of life. The production of all these things uses human lives in the shape of labor, as well as the resources of the earth. If we care about life, if we see our obligations in each others faces, then we have to want all the things capital does to be governed by that care,** to be directed by the ethical concern for life. But feeding people is not the aim of the food industry, or shelter the purpose of the housing industry. In medicine, making profits is becoming a more important goal than caring for sick people**. As capitalist enterprises these activities aim single-mindedly at the accumulation of capital**, and such purposes as caring for the sick or feeding the hungry becomes a mere means to an end, an instrument of corporate growth. Therefore **ethics, the overriding commitment to meeting human need, is left out of deliberations about what the heavyweight institutions of our society are going to do. Moral convictions are expressed in churches, in living rooms, in letters to the editor, sometimes even by politicians and widely read commentators, but almost always with an attitude of resignation to the inevitable.** People no longer say, "You can't stop progress," but only because they have learned not to call economic growth progress. They still think they can't stop it. And they are right -- as long as the production of all our needs and the organization of our labor is carried out under private ownership. Only a minority ("idealists") can take seriously a way of thinking that counts for nothing in real world decision making. **Only when the end of capitalism is on the table will ethics have a seat at the table.¶**

#### AND, THE AFFIRMATIVE’S CLAIM TO PERFORMATIVELY EFFECT CHANGE AGAINST CAPITALISM LOCATES AGENCY IN RHETORICAL PERFORMANCES LIKE THE PRECIOUS 1AC. THIS SHUTS DOWN MATERIALIST COALITIONAL ANTI-CAPITALIST MOVEMENTS.

GUNN AND CLOUD 2K10

[Joshua gunn and dana cloud, Phd Communicatoins, University of Texas Austin, Agentic Orientation as magical Voluntarism, Communication Theory]

Notably, Campbell’s statement on the status of agency does not attempt to reverse the posthumanist turn, but rather, sets out to reconcile the theoretical perspectives of Judith Butler and Michelle Balif with close textual reading practices that, until the crisis of agency, were assumed to have singular, self-transparent authors. Similarly,

John Lucaites’ call to jettison agency as a concept and locate power, instead, in historically particular rhetorical performances ‘‘in relationship to a set of perceived or constituted tensions . . . between cultural, institutional, and technological norms and structures’’ is a theoretical compromise: Agency is best understood on a caseby-case basis, leading to a multiplicity of conceptions of agency (Lucaites, 2003, paras. 1–2). Carolyn R. Miller’s (2007) recharacterization of agency as an attribution that makes certain kinds of symbolic action possible also ﬁgures a subject’s actions between the constraints of an exterior and the motives of an interior. The most widely known, explicitly dialectical positions on agency in rhetorical studies, however, are those of James Arnt Aune, Dana Cloud, and other Marxist critics. For example, critical of certain posthumanist theories of agency (namely, those of Greene 1998; 2004; 2007), Cloud, Macek, & Aune (2006) argue that social groups, especially class-based groups, harbor a capacity for political action grounded in their material circumstances: Either workers and their allies claim the real agency of that they possess and take the chance of making a world in which they are free in body as well as mind; or they resign themselves to generation after generation of grinding exploitation, settling for the meaningful but insufﬁcient consolations of sporadic, creative, ungrounded, and symbolic resistance. (2006, p. 81) Cloud, Macek, & Aune (2006) argue not only that ordinary people must mobilize collectively in order to pressure or overthrow employers and institutions, but also that it is the intersection of consciousness and experience that is generative of agency. In other words, as Cloud (2005) explains, working class agency is a product of both the experience of embodied labor and explicit political intervention and collective organizing. Agency in this view is not primarily characteristic of individuals; rather, the working class is a particular kind of collective agent that can manifest a real challenge to the capitalist system. In contrast, to believe that one can individually effect political change, or worse, to believe that one is powerless to effect political change, is to succumb to oppressive structures, economic and otherwise. Again, agency is located in the tensions between a larger structure and the (collective)

subject (also see Jameson, 1977).

#### ONLY A MATERIALLY INFORMED MARXIST CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM CAN SOLVE MYRIAD SOCIAL OPPRESSIONS RESULTING FROM CAPITAL’S EXPLOITATION.

SMITH 2K8

[Sharon, the politics of identity, January-feb., international socialist review, 57, activist, political commentator, publishes regularly in socialist worker and ISR]

FIGHTING AGAINST oppression is an urgent issue in U.S. society today. Racism, sexism, and homophobia have all reached appalling levels—that seem only to rise with each passing year. White students in Jena hang nooses, and Black students end up in prison.1 Squads of Minutemen vigilantes patrol the Mexican border with impunity, for the sole purpose of terrorizing migrant communities.2 College campuses across the U.S. commemorate “Islamo-fascism awareness week” as if it were just another legitimate student activity.3 Fred Phelps and his Kansas-based Westboro Baptist Church congregation regularly picket outside funerals of gay soldiers killed in Iraq, proclaiming that they belong in hell.4 To be sure, the problem extends way beyond the extremist fringe. Media pundits barely comment on the outrages described above, while mainstream discourse regularly heaps contempt on those attempting to fight against oppression—including young women organizing against date rape (which is assumed to be a figment of their feminism-charged imaginations) and immigrants demanding basic legal rights (as if they are out to steal jobs from native-born workers). If the “playing field is level,” as so many in the mainstream media assume, those who object must therefore be seeking an unfair advantage. It is no wonder, therefore, that so many people who experience oppression feel so embattled in the current political climate. Only a movement aimed at fighting oppression in all its forms can challenge the victim-blaming ideology that prevails today. The pressing need for such a movement is acknowledged here. Indeed, this article is intended to address the issue of how to most effectively fight back, since different political strategies lead to quite different conclusions about the kind of movement that is needed to challenge oppression. The bulk of this article is a critique of the theory behind what is known in academic and left circles as “identity politics”—the idea that only those experiencing a particular form of oppression can either define it or fight against it—counterposing to it a Marxist analysis. My central premise is that Marxism provides the theoretical tools for ending oppression, while identity politics does not.

#### AND, FOCUS ON DISCREET OPPRESSIONS UNIQUELY TRADES-OFF WITH RECOGNITION OF THE CENTRALITY OF CAPITALISM. ITS TRY OR ENDLESS CLASS SUFFERING FOR THE ALT. ONLY THIS EVIDENCE REFUTES THEIR EXPLANATION WHILE BEING EXPLICITLY CAUSAL.

SMITH 2K8

[Sharon, the politics of identity, January-feb., international socialist review, 57, activist, political commentator, publishes regularly in socialist worker and ISR]

As the experience of the 1960s shows, it is not necessary to personally experience a form of oppression to become committed to opposing it. Yet the central premise of the theory of identity politics is based on precisely the opposite conclusion: Only those who actually experience a particular form of oppression are capable of fighting against it. Everyone else is considered to be part of the problem and cannot become part of the solution by joining the fight against oppression. The underlying assumption is that all men benefit from women’s oppression, all straight people benefit from the oppression of the LGBT6 community, and all whites benefit from racism.¶ The flip side of this assumption, of course, is the idea that each group that faces a particular form of oppression—racism, sexism, or homophobia—is united in its interest in ending it. The theory of identity politics locates the root of oppression not with a capitalist power structure but with a “white male power structure.” The existence of a white male power structure seems like basic common sense since, with rare exceptions, white men hold the reigns of the biggest corporations and the highest government posts.¶ That is true, but it only tells half the story. It would be highly inaccurate to assume that all oppressed people are powerless in U.S. society today. Since the movements of the 1960s and 1970s, a significant number of women, gays, Blacks, and other racially oppressed minorities have managed to climb up the corporate and political ladder and become absorbed into various power structures. These individuals have achieved a fair amount of power in their own right. In the upcoming 2008 presidential election, the two Democratic Party frontrunners are a woman (Hillary Rodham Clinton) and an African American (Barack Obama). The speaker of the House of Representatives is a woman, Nancy Pelosi. The U.S. secretary of state is a Black woman, Condoleezza Rice. One of the most powerful politicians in Washington is openly gay Congressman Barney Frank.¶ Whose interests have these women, gays, and African Americans represented once they have achieved some power within the system? The answer is fairly plain to see—not necessarily by believing their rhetoric, but by judging their actions. Rather than fighting against the racist, sexist, and homophobic policies of the system, they become part of enforcing them. ¶ For example, when the city of San Francisco began handing out same-sex marriage licenses in 2005, did openly gay Barney Frank embrace it as a step forward for civil rights? On the contrary, Frank called a press conference to attack gay marriage as “divisive.”7¶ Has Senator Barack Obama rushed forward to defend the six Black youths victimized by racists in Jena, Louisiana? The candidate did not make an appearance at the historic civil rights protest in Jena on September 20, 2007.8 Yet Obama has devoted ample time on his recent speaking circuit to exhort Black men to become better fathers, as he did in June 2005 addressing Black worshippers at Chicago’s Christ Universal Temple: “There are a lot of folks, a lot of brothers, walking around, and they look like men...they might even have sired a child.... But it’s not clear to me that they’re full-grown men.”9 If a white politician had delivered a similar lecture, it would have immediately—and accurately—been denounced as utterly racist.¶ Nor does Condoleezza Rice hesitate to perform her duty as she wanders the globe in her role as U.S. imperialism’s key international enforcer—traveling to the Middle East, for example, to enforce Israel’s racist apartheid policies against its occupied Palestinian population. Iranian people will be no better off if and when the U.S. decides to bomb them if Clinton or Obama occupy the White House than Iraqi people were when the Bush administration decided to invade their country.¶ What all of these examples show is that there is no such thing as a common, fundamental interest shared by all people who face the same form of oppression. Oppression isn’t caused by the race, gender, or sexuality of particular individuals who run the system, but is generated by the very system itself—no matter who’s running it. It goes without saying that we must confront incidents of sexism, racism, and homophobia whenever they occur. But that alone is not going to change the racist, sexist, and homophobic character that dominates the entire system.

# Round 5 v Army

## 1NC

**Off 1**

**Interpretation- In the United States is within the geographic territority of the United States- excludes Carriers**

**U.S. Department of State 12**

[Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual, Volume 7, June 29, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86755.pdf

7 FAM 1112 **WHAT IS** BIRTH **“IN THE UNITED STATES”?**¶(CT:CON-314; 08-21-2009)¶ a. INA 101(a)(38) (8 U.S.C. 1101 (a)(38)) provides **that “the term „United States,‟ when used in a geographical sense, means the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands of the United States.”**¶ U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Volume 7 - Consular Affairs¶ 7 FAM 1110 Page 4 of 13¶ b. On November 3, 1986, Public Law 94-241, “approving the Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America”, (Section 506(c)),took effect. From that point on, the Northern Mariana Islands have been treated as part of the United States for the purposes of INA 301 (8 U.S.C. 1401) and INA 308 (8 U.S.C. 1408). (See 7 FAM 1120 Acquisition of U.S. Nationality in U.S. Territories and Possessions.)¶ c. The Nationality Act of 1940 (NA), Section 101(d) (54 Statutes at Large 1172) (effective January 13, 1941 until December 23, 1952) provided that “the term „United States‟ when used in a geographical sense means the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands of the United States.” The 1940 Act did not include Guam or the Northern Mariana Islands as coming within the definition of “United States.”¶ See the text of the 1940 Act on the CA/OCS Intranet, Acquisition of Citizenship, Legal and Regulatory Documents.¶ d. Prior to January 13, 1941, there was no statutory definition of “the United States” for citizenship purposes. **The phrase “in the United States” as used in Section 1993 of the Revised Statues of 1878 clearly includes states that have been admitted to the Union**. (See 7 FAM 1119 b.)¶ e. INA 304 (8 U.S.C. 1404) and INA 305 (8 U.S.C. 1405) provide a basis for citizenship of persons born in Alaska and Hawaii, respectively, while they were territories of the United States.¶ f. See 7 FAM 1100 Appendix B (under development) for guidance as to what constitutes evidence of birth in the United States.¶ 7 FAM 1113 **NOT INCLUDED IN THE MEANING OF "IN THE UNITED STATES"**¶ (CT:CON-314; 08-21-2009)¶ a. Birth **on U.S. Registered Vessel On High Seas or in the Exclusive Economic Zone:** A U.S.-registered or documented ship on the high seas or in the exclusive economic zone is not considered to be part of the United States. Under the law of the sea, an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is a maritime zone over which a State has special rights over the exploration and use of natural resources. The Exclusive Economic Zone extends up to 200 nautical miles from the coastal baseline. A child born on such a vessel does not acquire U.S. citizenship by reason of the place of birth (Lam Mow v. Nagle, 24 F.2d 316 (9th Cir., 1928)).¶ U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Volume 7 - Consular Affairs¶ 7 FAM 1110 Page 5 of 13¶ NOTE: This concept of allotting nations EEZs to give better control of maritime affairs outside territorial limits gained acceptance in the late 20th century and was given binding international recognition by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982.¶ Part V, Article 55 of the Convention states:¶ Specific legal regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone:¶ The Exclusive Economic Zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention.¶ b. A **U.S.-registered aircraft outside U.S. airspace is not considered to be part of U.S. territory**. A child born on such an aircraft outside U.S. airspace does not acquire U.S. citizenship by reason of the place of birth.¶ NOTE: The United States of America is not a party to the U.N. Convention on Reduction of Statelessness (1961). Article 3 of the Convention does not apply to the United States.¶ Article 3 provides “For the purpose of determining the obligations of Contracting States under this Convention, birth on a ship or in an aircraft shall be deemed to have taken place in the territory of the State whose flag the ship flies or in the territory of the State in which the aircraft is registered, as the case may be.”¶ This is a frequently asked question.¶ c. Birth on **U.S. Military Base Outside of the United States or Birth on U.S. Embassy or Consulate Premises Abroad**:¶ (1) Despite widespread popular belief, **U.S. military installations abroad and U.S. diplomatic or consular facilities abroad are not part of the United States** within the meaning of the 14th Amendment. A child born on the premises of such a facility is not born in the United States and does not acquire U.S. citizenship by reason of birth.¶ (2) The status of diplomatic and consular premises arises from the rules of law relating to immunity from the prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction of the receiving State; the premises are not part of the territory of the United States of America. (See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, Vol. 1, Sec. 466, Comment a and c (1987). See also, Persinger v. Iran, 729 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1984).¶ U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Volume 7 - Consular Affairs¶ 7 FAM 1110 Page 6 of 13¶ d. Birth on Foreign Ships In Foreign Government Non-Commercial Service:¶ (1) **A child born on a foreign merchant ship or privately owned vessel in U.S. internal waters is considered as having been born subject to the jurisdiction of the United States**. (See U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark.)¶ (2) **Foreign warships, naval auxiliaries, and other vessels or aircraft owned or operated by a State and used for governmental non-commercial service are not subject to jurisdiction of the United States**. Persons born on such vessels while in U.S. internal waters (or, of course, anywhere else) do not acquire U.S. citizenship by virtue of place of birth.¶ e. Alien Enemies During Hostile Occupation:¶ (1) **If part of the United States were occupied by foreign armed forces against the wishes of the United States, children born to enemy aliens in the occupied areas would not be subject to U.S. jurisdiction and would not acquire U.S. citizenship at birth.**¶ **(2) Children born to persons other than enemy aliens in an area temporarily occupied by hostile forces would acquire U.S. citizenship at birth because sovereignty would not have been transferred to the other country**. (See U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark.)¶ 7 FAM 1114 BIRTH IN U.S. INTERNAL WATERS AND TERRITORIAL SEA¶ (CT:CON-407; 06-29-2012)¶ a. Persons born on **ships located within U.S. internal waters (except as provided in section 1113 d above) are considered to have been** born **in the United States**. Such persons will acquire U.S. citizenship at birth if they are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Internal waters include the ports, harbors, bays, and other enclosed areas of the sea along the U.S. coast. As noted above, a child born on a foreign merchant ship or privately owned vessel in U.S. internal waters is considered as having been born subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. (See U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark.)¶ b. **Twelve Nautical Mile Limit**: The territorial sea of the United States was formerly three nautical miles. (See, e.g., Cunard S.S. Co. v Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 122, 43 S. Ct. 504, 67 L. Ed. 894 (1923).) However, the three-mile rule was changed by a Presidential Proclamation in 1988, implementing the territorial-sea provision of the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. (Presidential Proclamation 5928, signed December¶ U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual Volume 7 - Consular Affairs¶ 7 FAM 1110 Page 7 of 13¶ 27, 1988, published at 54 Federal Register 777, January 9, 1989.) As decreed by that Proclamation, the territorial sea of the United States henceforth extends to 12 nautical miles from the baselines of the United States determined in accordance with international law. (The Proclamation also stated that the jurisdiction of the United States extends to the airspace over the territorial sea.) (See Gordon, Immigration Law and Procedure, Part 8 Nationality and Citizenship, 92.03(2)(b) territorial limits.)¶ c. FAM guidance up until 1995 (7 FAM 1116.1-2 In U.S. Waters TL:CON-64; 11-30-95) advised that persons born within the 3-mile limit of the U.S. territorial sea were born “within the United States” and could be documented as U.S. citizens if they were also born subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Some commentators took this view as well, such as Gordon. Analysis of this issue undertaken in 1994-1995 revealed, however, that there is a substantial legal question whether persons born outside the internal waters of the United States but within the territorial sea are in fact born “within the United States” for purposes of the 14th Amendment and the INA.¶ Note: Cases involving persons born outside the internal waters but within the U.S. territorial sea should therefore be submitted to the Department (CA/OCS) for adjudication, upon coordination by CA/OCS/L with L/CA and L/OES and other appropriate offices within the United States Government.¶ U.S. Embassies and Consulates abroad should consult CA/OCS/L (Ask-OCS-L-Dom-Post@state.gov).¶ Domestic U.S. passport agencies and centers should contact CA/PPT/L/LA (CAPPTAdjQ@state.gov), which will confer with CA/OCS/L and L/CA.¶ On US soil is not same as "in the united states"¶ HOFSCHNEIDER '11(J.D. Candidate, Class of 2011, University at Buffalo Law School, State¶ University of New York) http://www.buffalolawreview.org/past\_issues/59\_3/Hofschneider.pdf¶ This Comment will examine two of these unintended¶ consequences: (1) gaps in the protection of refugees under¶ international human rights law, and (2) inconsistent¶ protection for battered spouses and children of United¶ States citizens under federal immigration law. Issues¶ regarding refugee protection, by implicating United States¶ treaty obligations, have received international attention and¶ have figured prominently in the debate over local versus¶ federal control of CNMI immigration.18 By contrast, the¶ potential problems caused by an inconsistent policy¶ regarding battered spouses and children of United States¶ citizens has not received much attention, if any, although it¶ is no less significant in terms of human cost and suffering.¶ Both issues raise serious concerns with regard to vulnerable¶ populations that the United States has committed to¶ protect. In both situations, immigrants find that being on¶ United States soil does not mean the same thing as being¶ “in the United States,” and that for some, the difference in¶ geography could very well mean the difference between¶ persecution and protection.¶ CNMI NOT in the United States (Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands)¶ HOFSCHNEIDER '11(J.D. Candidate, Class of 2011, University at Buffalo Law School, State¶ University of New York) http://www.buffalolawreview.org/past\_issues/59\_3/Hofschneider.pdf¶ The legal issue with abused immigrant spouses and¶ children in the CNMI was that in order to be eligible to¶ apply as selfpetitioners¶ using the I360,¶ they must have¶ been currently residing in, or at one time have resided with¶ the abuser “in the United States.”92 According to the INA¶ (preCNRA),¶ the “United States” when used in a¶ geographical sense did not expressly include the CNMI.93¶ This reasoning became the basis for the rejection of an I360¶ submitted on behalf of an applicant residing in the CNMI.¶ Compounding the disappointment surrounding this decision¶ and confounding victims’ advocates was the fact that earlier¶ I360¶ petitions from applicants in the CNMI had been¶ approved by USCIS;94 thus, to reject an application based on¶ geographical ineligibility simply did not make any sense.¶ CNMI IS now "in the United States"¶ HOFSCHNEIDER '11(J.D. Candidate, Class of 2011, University at Buffalo Law School, State¶ University of New York) http://www.buffalolawreview.org/past\_issues/59\_3/Hofschneider.pdf¶ Despite these two arguments, which were brought up in¶ the appeal against the decision rejecting the selfpetition¶ from the CNMI, USCIS maintained that the language of the¶ INA was clear that the definition of the “United States”¶ excluded the CNMI, and that the requirement of past or¶ current residence “in the United States” therefore could not¶ be met. This problematic policy inconsistency was¶ ultimately resolved informally in favor of CNMI selfpetitioners¶ during the pendency of another review.102 Like¶ many other issues arising out of the unique federalCNMI¶ relationship, the situation was resolved through political¶ instead of legal reasoning. By this time, the CNRA had¶ already passed and it would only be a matter of months¶ before the INA would include the CNMI in the definition of¶ the “United States,” thereby dissolving any ambiguity with¶ regard to eligibility.¶ CNMI is "in the United States"¶ In 2008 Congress passed the CNRA, which included the¶ gradual phasing in of federal control over immigration in¶ the CNMI and extended the INA to the CNMI such that¶ presence in the CNMI under the INA is considered presence¶ “in the United States.” The transition period began on¶ November 28, 2009, and is scheduled to end, with few¶ exceptions, on December 31, 2014.194 Regarding asylum, the¶ CNRA makes asylum applications under Section 208 of the¶ INA inapplicable until the end of the transition period.195¶ This provision adopts the recommendation of Senate Report¶ 324, which suggested making Section 208 inapplicable¶ during the transition period “given the uncertainties¶ inherent in changing the CNMI immigration regimen.”196¶ From a strategic perspective, the inapplicability of Section¶ 208 with its lower standard of proof would reduce the¶ number of people who can receive protection and the additional benefits of asylum because they would have to¶ apply under withholding of removal standards and likewise¶ receive those benefits. Because the number of foreign¶ nationals will be reduced significantly through the phasing¶ out process during the transition period, the number of¶ people who will be able to even apply for asylum in 2014¶ will likewise be significantly reduced.

**Violation- They are aircraft carriers which roam the seas outside of the United States.**

**C Vote Negative**

**1 Limits- Allows them to claim a host of aff’s outside the United States. They could put any military facility outside the United States and claim it’s floating sovereignty. Allows SPS, Ice Breakers, Drones and a host of affs.**

**2 Ground- We lose our best politics links tied to NIMBY. Perception disads tied to being in the U.S. and have unfair advantage ground tied to foreign hotspots.**

**D T is a voter for the reasons above.**

**Off 2**

**DOD is moving to a lighter and more agile force structure—2013 budget request is the first step in implementing that strategy.**

**Zee News 8/7**/12

[“Curtailing of defence budget to throw new challenges: Panetta,” Zee News, Last Updated: Tuesday, August 07, 2012, 16:48, pg. http://zeenews.india.com/news/world/curtailing-of-defence-budget-to-throw-new-challenges-panetta\_792176.html

Asked to reduce the defence budget by USD 487 billion over the next decade, the Pentagon is faced with challenge to maintain a force strong enough to meet the challenges of the future, US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta has said. "It is a period of **great challenge** for the Department, but we have also taken the mandate to reduce the defense budget by USD 487 billion over the next decade as an **opportunity** to build the force we need to confront the security threats and challenges of the future," Panetta said. In his remarks to the Association of Defense Committees, Monterey, California, Panetta referred to the new defense strategy unveiled this year. That strategy consists of five key elements, he said. "As we draw down from the wars, we will be smaller and leaner, but we must remain **agile, flexible, ready and technologically advanced**. We will rebalance our global posture and presence to emphasise the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East," he said.

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"We will build innovative partnerships and strengthen key alliances and partnerships elsewhere in the world. We must ensure we can quickly confront and defeat aggression from any adversary anytime, anywhere. "Finally, this can't simply be about cutting we have to make **key investments in technologies and capabilities**, including our industrial base," said the Defense Secretary. Panetta said the Defense Department's budget request for 2013 was the first step in implementing this strategy.

**They undermine that effort by trading off with modernization investments – turns the aff**

**Parrish 5/10**/12

[Karen Parrish, “Panetta, Dempsey: DOD Budget Request Reflects Tough Choices,” American Forces Press Service, May 10, 2012, pg. http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=116287

To meet those cuts, department senior leaders worked with President Barack Obama to craft a strategy outlining **defense priorities**, the secretary said. They then built a spending plan that both supports that strategy and meets the Budget control Act’s spending caps, he added.

“My concern is that if Congress now tries to reverse many of the tough decisions that we reached by **adding** several billion dollars to the president's budget request, then they risk not only potential **gridlock** … [but] they could force the kind of **trade-offs** that could jeopardize our national defense,” Panetta said.

The secretary described some of those trade-offs. If DOD leaders can’t retire aging ships and aircraft, he said, they will have to realize savings in areas such as **modernization investment**.

If the department can’t reduce force structure after 2014, “Congress would be forcing us to reduce readiness. We would have to cut training [and] we'd have to cut equipment,” Panetta added.

And if Congress limits the Pentagon’s ability to put military health care costs on what the secretary called a sustainable track, lawmakers would limit defense options to invest in “new technologies that we believe are critical to the force we need for the future,” he said.

Dempsey said he appreciates the difficulties lawmakers must contend with in managing military spending as U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan continues, and complex security challenges lie ahead.

The chairman said he and Panetta, along with the service chiefs and combatant commanders, faced the same issues when they prepared their budget request.

DOD’s spending plan “is a responsible investment in our nation’s security,” Dempsey said.

The challenge in finalizing defense funding is to “make sure our armed forces have what they need -- and no more than we need -- to keep America immune from coercion,” the chairman said.

DOD’s budget request reflects a **carefully devised set of choices** to sustain the joint force, Dempsey said.

Those choices, he added, reflect “the **right mix** among force structure, modernization, readiness, pay and benefits. **Different choices will produce a different balance**.”

**Resourced strategic guidance key to overall hegemony, and Asia and Middle East stability**

**Barno and Bensahel 12**

David Barno, Lieutenant General, Center for a New American Security Senior Advisor and Senior Fellow, Nora Bensahel, Ph.D., CNAS Deputy Director of Studies and Senior Fellow, 1/6/12, You Can't Have It All, www.cnas.org/node/7641

On Thursday, President Barack Obama and his top defense advisers unveiled new strategic guidance to direct the U.S. military as it transitions from a decade of grueling ground wars to an era of new challenges, including a rising China and looming budget cuts. The administration has adopted what is best characterized as a "pivot but hedge" strategy: The United States will pivot to the Asia-Pacific but hedge against unexpected threats elsewhere, particularly in the greater Middle East. This new guidance makes good sense in today's world, but it assumes that the Pentagon will absorb only $487 billion in budget cuts over the next decade. **If** far **deeper cuts occur**, as required by sequestration, **the D**epartment **o**f **D**efense **will not have the resources to execute the guidance**. "**Pivot but hedge" will die in its crib**.¶ The pivot to the Asia-Pacific is essential because the region stands poised to become the centerpiece of the 21st-century global economy. By 2015, East Asian countries are expected to surpass North America and the eurozone to become the world's largest trading bloc. Market opportunities will only increase as the region swells by an additional 175 million people by 2030. As America's economic interests in the Asia-Pacific grow, its diplomatic and military presence should grow to defend against potential threats to those interests.¶ From the perspective of the United States and its Asian allies, China and North Korea represent the most serious military threats to regional security. China's military modernization continues to progress, and its foreign policy toward its neighbors has become increasingly aggressive over the past two years. Meanwhile, the death of Kim Jong Il means that nuclear-armed North Korea has begun a leadership transition that could lead to greater military aggressiveness as his son Kim Jong Un seeks to consolidate his power and demonstrate control. In light of these potential dangers, several Asian nations have asked the United States to strengthen its diplomatic and military presence in the region so it can remain the ultimate guarantor of peace and security. A bolstered U.S. presence will reassure allies who worry about American decline by clearly conveying an unwavering commitment to Asian security.¶ But while the Asia-Pacific is becoming more important, instability across the greater Middle East -- from Tunisia to Pakistan -- still makes it the most volatile region in the world. The Arab Spring unleashed a torrent of political change that has reshaped the region in previously unfathomable ways. Iran continues to pursue nuclear weapons, and it has threatened recently to close the Strait of Hormuz. Trapped in the middle of the upheaval is Israel, a permanent ally and key pillar of America's regional security strategy. Meanwhile, U.S.-Pakistan relations continue to plunge toward a nadir, lessening American influence over a nuclear-armed and terrorist-infested state that is arguably the most dangerous country in the world.¶ Amid these dangers, U.S. interests in the greater Middle East remain largely unchanged: ensuring the free flow of petroleum from a region containing 51 percent of proven global oil reserves, halting nuclear proliferation, and guarding against the diminished but still real threat of Islamist-inspired terror attacks. Protecting these interests will unquestionably require the active involvement of the U.S. military over the next 10 years and beyond, though this certainly does not mean U.S. troops will necessarily repeat the intensive counterinsurgency campaigns of the last decade.¶ The administration's new guidance tries to balance America's rightful new focus on the Asia-Pacific with the continuing reality of deep instability in other areas of the world where U.S. interests are at stake. Yet implementing this "pivot but hedge" strategy successfully depends largely on how much Congress cuts from the Pentagon's budget, something that still remains undecided at the start of a divisive presidential election year.¶ The 2011 Budget Control Act, signed as part of last summer's negotiations over raising the U.S. debt ceiling, contains spending caps that will reduce the Department of Defense's base budget (excluding ongoing war costs in Afghanistan) by at least $487 billion over 10 years, according to Pentagon estimates. This represents a decline of about 8 percent compared to current spending levels. Administration officials have repeatedly described these cuts as painful but manageable. Indeed, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta stated Thursday that these cuts require difficult choices but ultimately involve "acceptable risk."¶ Yet deeper cuts are an entirely different story. Administration officials are extremely concerned about the Budget Control Act's automatic spending reduction process known as sequestration, which was triggered in November by the failure of the deficit reduction "super committee." According to the Congressional Budget Office, this process would roughly double the cuts to the Pentagon's base budget, resulting in nearly $900 billion in total reductions. Current law requires these cuts to take effect in January 2013 unless Congress enacts new legislation that supersedes it.¶ The new guidance says little about what cuts the Department of Defense will make when it releases its fiscal year 2013 budget request next month. But the Pentagon has made clear that its new guidance and budget request assume it will absorb only $487 billion in cuts over the next 10 years. Defense officials have acknowledged that the new guidance cannot be executed if sequestration takes place. When announcing the new strategy, for instance, Panetta warned that sequestration "would force us to shed missions, commitments, and capabilities necessary to protect core U.S. national security interests."¶ Sequestration would likely require the United States to abandon its longstanding global engagement strategy and to incur far greater risk in future military operations. If sequestration occurs, the Pentagon will likely repeat past mistakes by reducing capabilities such as ground forces that provide a hedge against unexpected threats. A pivot to the Asia-Pacific might remain an executable option under these conditions, but the U.S. ability to hedge against threats elsewhere -- particularly in the volatile Middle East -- would be diminished. This is a recipe for high risk in an uncertain and dangerous world.¶ The Pentagon's new strategic guidance presents a realistic way to maintain America's status as a global superpower in the context of shrinking defense dollars. But **further cuts**, especially at the level required by sequestration, **would make this "pivot but hedge" strategy impossible to implement** **and** would **raise serious questions about whether the U**nited **S**tates **can continue to play the central role on the global stage**.

**Extend 1AC Asia Imapct**

**Off 3**

**Obama will win- swing states**

**Blumenthal 10-25**

Mark is the Director of Pollster, the Huffington Post’s Election Analysis and Model, “Presidential Polls Counter Romney Surge Myth,”

New **polls** released on Wednesday and Thursday continue to **show** President Barack **Obama holding narrow leads in** a handful of **critical battleground states**, but running within a whisker of Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney nationwide.¶ While Romney gained significantly in the wake of the first presidential debate in early October, **the lack of a continuing trend** over the past two weeks **helps counter a theme** in some campaign coverage **that Romney's support continues to "surge**" nationwide.¶ The most recent updates of the seven daily national tracking polls continue to split in terms of which candidate holds the nominal lead, ranging from a 4 percentage-point lead for Romney on the Rasmussen Reports automated tracking to a 3 point Obama advantage on the Investor's Business Daily/TIPP poll.¶ 2012-10-25-trackers.png¶ Separately, a new Associated Press/GfK survey released on Thursday morning showed Romney with a 2 percentage-point edge over Obama (47 to 45 percent).¶ The HuffPost Pollster tracking model, which combines data from both national and statewide polling to create a combined estimate, continues to show a near tie, with just two-tenths of one percent separating Romney (47.1 percent) and Obama (46.9 percent) as of this writing. The model currently reports just 56 percent confidence that Romney is actually leading the national popular vote; slightly better than a coin-toss, but just barely.¶ Although their methodologies and estimates of the leader vary considerably, these national tracking polls provide a useful gauge of late trends, since they collectively interview over 2,000 voters a day. Their most recent releases show no signs of Romney momentum. Three ticked in Obama's direction, three were unchanged and one moved toward Romney.¶ Wednesday also brought four new surveys in Ohio. Three of the four, from Time, SurveyUSA and Democratic pollster Lake Research, gave Obama leads ranging from 2 to 5 percentage points while the Rasmussen automated survey reported a tie.¶ 2012-10-25-ohio.png¶ The new results have little impact on the Ohio trend chart produced by the Pollster model, which continues to give Obama an advantage of just over 2 percentage points. Although that lead is narrow, the volume of polling in Ohio boosts the model's confidence that Obama is running ahead there to 96 percent.¶ Collectively, the new polls of the past 24 hours have done nothing to change the standings in the most crucial battleground states. **Obama continued to hold leads of 2 to 3 percentage points in Ohio, Iowa, Nevada and Wisconsi**n, four **states that** currently **combine** with the states where Obama leads by larger margins **to create a 277 electoral vote majority**, seven more than the 270 needed to win.¶ 2012-10-25-battlegrounds.png¶ Romney continues to lead in North Carolina and retain a narrow edge in Florida, states that would net him 233 electoral votes along with other states where Romney leads by larger margins. Those totals leave 26 electoral votes up for grabs in New Hampshire, Colorado and Virginia, states where the tracking model shows Obama leading by very narrow margins of 2 percentage points or less.¶ Collectively, the trends of the past week provide a reality check to two myths that have emerged in recent campaign coverage.¶ The first is that Romney has been "surging" since the first debate. While the debate certainly boosted Romney's standing in the polls, trends over the past two weeks have been negligible, with the leader seesawing nationally within a range of roughly one percentage point. Over the same period, the standings within the key battleground states have also remained constant. Other poll tracking models have shown the same patterns.¶ The second myth is that the national and battleground states polls have produced widely divergent results. **If we use the state estimates produced by the Pollster tracking model in the nine key battlegrounds** (Iowa, Wisconsin, Nevada, Ohio, New Hampshire, Colorado, Virginia, Florida and North Carolina) to create a combined total vote based on the turnout in each state in 2008, **we show Obama leading in across all nine states by a slim 0.6 percentage point margin** (47.8 to 47.2 percent as of this writing; the estimated margin would be 47.9 to 47.2 percent if based on the 2004 turnout).¶ Romney does slightly better in the national popular vote estimate, of course, but his 0.2 percentage point advantage there is only slightly better. The net gap is less than a percentage point.¶ As the Cook Political Report's David Wasserman writes on Twitter, simply subtracting 4 percentage points from Obama's 2008 margins in each state produces a similar result: "He'd lose Popular vote by 0.7% but still win w/ 272 EC votes."¶ The differences may appear bigger because Obama's advantages are spread across a number of relatively small battleground states that, except for Ohio, all have 10 or fewer electoral votes. Romney stays close in the combined battleground state estimate mostly because his three best states -- Florida, North Carolina and Virginia -- represent just over half (51 percent) of the combined battleground vote.¶ So yes, the potential exists for a divided outcome, with Obama winning the Electoral College and Romney winning the popular vote, but such an outcome would be, as it was 12 years ago, a game of inches, not yards.

**Plan is unpopular- people hate military spending**

**Smith 12**

R. Jeffrey Smith - Smith worked for 25 years in a series of key reporting and editorial roles at The Washington Post, including national investigative editor, national security correspondent, national investigative correspondent, and a foreign staff bureau chief based in Rome. He was a senior writer for the News and Comment section of Science Magazine where he won a National Magazine Award in 1986 for writing about arms control. “To trim the deficit, Americans favor much deeper reductions at the Pentagon than their leaders do” May 10, 2012 http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/05/10/8856/public-overwhelmingly-supports-large-defense-spending-cuts¶

While politicians, insiders and experts may be divided over how much the government should spend on the nation’s defense, **there’s a** surprising **consensus among the public about what should be done:** They want to **cut spending** far more deeply than either the Obama administration or the Republicans.¶ **That’s according to the results of an** innovative, new, **nationwide survey** by three nonprofit groups, the Center for Public integrity, the Program for Public Consultation and the Stimson Center. **Not only does the public want deep cuts, it wants those cuts to encompass spending in virtually every military domain** — **air power, sea power, ground forces, nuclear weapons, and missile defenses.¶** According to the survey, in which respondents were told about the size of the budget as well as shown expert arguments for and against spending cuts, **two-thirds of Republicans and nine in 10 Democrats supported making immediate cuts** — a position at odds with the leaderships of both political parties.

**Approval Rating is key, lines up perfectly with reelection
Silver ’11**

Nate directs five thirty eight and is a statistician, “Approval Ratings and Reelection Odds,” <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/approval-ratings-and-re-election-odds/>

Earlier this month, we posted the simple version of a finding, based on the historical record, that is worth keeping in mind when you read articles about how Barack Obama’s presidency has (or has not been) been revitalized: It’s just too soon for his approval ratings to tell us very much about his re-election prospects for 2012. This is an overdue follow-up to that article — what you might think of as the slightly-more-complicated version. While **it’s true that approval ratings aren’t of much use now, it’s also the case that, by the time we get close to the election, they will have become a very reliable predictor of Mr. Obama’s chances of winning another term**. Based on Gallup polling, here is what I estimate that the incumbent president’s approval rating was on Election Day in almost every election since 1940. (There is no data for 1944 because Gallup went on wartime hiatus.) There are a few tricks I had to employ to derive these numbers; I’d ask you to take them on faith for a few moments, and then we’ll explain everything later on. **At first glance, the relationship seems nearly perfect: every incumbent with an approval rating of 49 percent or higher won re-election, while every candidate with a rating of 48 percent or lower lost.** In practice, things probably don’t work quite that crisply. For example, Harry Truman, whom we estimate had a 50 percent approval rating on Election Day 1948, won by 4.5 points, and 114 electoral votes, over Thomas E. Dewey, which suggests that he had some margin to spare. And candidate quality clearly makes a difference. Although Robert Dole is sometimes considered a weak Republican nominee, Bill Clinton beat him in 1996 by just 8.5 points, despite Mr. Clinton’s 55 percent approval rating. By contrast, in 1972, Richard Nixon, with an approval rating only a couple of points higher (57 percent), trounced a very weak Democratic nominee, George McGovern, by more than 23 points. Still, the approval rating at which an incumbent candidate goes from being an underdog to a favorite for re-election is somewhere in the high 40s. The reason the threshold is probably slightly below 50 percent rather than right at 50 percent is that in any approval survey, some people (typically 5 to 10 percent) say they are undecided about the president’s performance. For instance, at this writing, Barack Obama’s Gallup approval rating is 49 percent but his disapproval rating is just 42 percent, a net margin of +7. If those were the figures on Election Day, he would be a favorite to win unless nearly everybody who was undecided about his performance cast their ballots against him, something that is possible in theory but usually doesn’t occur in practice. Now, then, how did we come up with these numbers? As I said, it’s not quite so straightforward. Gallup has approval ratings data going back to 1937. The problem is that, until fairly recently, they had a habit of stopping their approval ratings polling several months before a presidential election. For instance, in 1956, their last poll of Dwight Eisenhower’s public approval was in early August; they did not survey him again until late November, after he had already defeated Adlai Stevenson. However, we can extrapolate what Mr. Eisenhower’s rating would have been on Election Day 1956 by drawing a smoothed regression line — known in the business as a Loess curve — using the data points before and after that date. The one hitch is that incumbent presidents, whether they win, lose, or don’t run at all, almost always receive a “bounce” in their approval rating after the election, as people either rally around a winner or feel sympathy for the lame duck. The average magnitude of this post-election bounce is 4 points. So, before I fitted the curves, I subtracted 4 points from approval rating polls conducted after Election Day. By applying this process of bounce-adjustment and curve-fitting, we are able to estimate an incumbent president’s Gallup approval rating on Election Day itself or on any day before it, as shown in this nifty-looking graphic: I haven’t labeled the curves by the candidate’s name in the chart, because that which create too much clutter. But I have distinguished those who eventually won re-election (blue lines) from those who lost (red). A couple of cases are worth attention. The red line that you see briefly extending above 80 percent is for George H.W. Bush. His approval ratings, which were already pretty good, shot up following the start of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, when American-led forces drove Iraqi troops back from their occupation of Kuwait. Politically, that made Mr. Bush look like an extremely formidable candidate for re-election: Saturday Night Live ran a sketch later that year entitled “Campaign ’92: The Race To Avoid Being The Guy Who Loses To Bush,” with Democratic candidates at a debate all trying to lose so they would not have to run against him. But Mr. Bush’s approval ratings fell precipitously throughout late 1991 and early 1992, and were below 40 percent by Election Day. If Mr. Bush is the precedent that challengers will cite when their campaign seems to be flailing, the opposite example is the original Comeback Kid, Harry Truman. He’s the blue line that you still see down around 40 percent approval with just five months to go before the election of 1948. It’s hard to know exactly where Mr. Truman’s approval numbers were on Election Day. When Gallup surveyed in late June, he had just 39 percent approval; in January, 1949, after he had beaten Thomas E. Dewey, he was up to 69 percent; and then he reverted back to 50 percent just a couple months later. Our Loess curve estimates that Mr. Truman’s approval rating was probably around 50 percent on Election Day, but this is just a guess. What’s clear is that Mr. Truman was at some point an extremely unpopular president, and he nevertheless — to the great surprise of the Chicago Daily Tribune — defeated Mr. Dewey. Another thing to take from the graphic is how the red and blue lines gradually untangle themselves as the relationship between approval ratings and re-election becomes stronger over time. We can see this a bit more clearly by taking the average approval rating for the 8 winning candidates and the 3 losing ones and tracking them over the two years leading up to the election: I would resist the idea that there is any one magical date when approval ratings go from meaningless to meaningful as predictors of re-election. In the chart, the first time the winners and the losers begin to separate themselves is about 19 months before the election — which would correspond roughly to March of the prior year — but the split would have come a bit earlier if not for Mr. Bush’s Gulf War bounce. There’s also increasing differentiation in the period roughly 10 to 5 months before the election, corresponding with primary season. Still, for the most part, the separation occurs gradually. I’ve also tried to play around with various sorts of logistic regression models that attempt to predict a president’s chances at re-election based solely on his Gallup approval rating and the number of days until the election. Don’t take this terribly seriously — it’s hard to do anything very rigorous based on so few data points (just 11 presidents in the sample), and I can imagine better model designs than the one that I’ve used. But it does yield some ballpark estimates of what this data implies. For example, a year in advance of the election, the model figures that a president with a 60 percent approval rating is about 90 percent likely to win re-election, whereas a 40 percent rating translates into a win probability of a bit below 40 percent. So by that point the differences have become fairly meaningful: What does this mean for Barack Obama? Right now, we’re still in the period where the most useful number for estimating his re-election chances is not his approval rating but rather the historical track record of incumbent presidents. As I wrote on Wednesday, since the Civil War, 73 percent of incumbent presidents who sought another term won, as have 70 percent since World War II. Plugging Mr. Obama’s current numbers into the regression model that I described above yields a 65 percent likelihood of re-election — but again, this is a really rough guess, based mostly on the high historical batting average for incumbents rather than anything to do with Mr. Obama himself. What we can say is important is the range in which Mr. Obama’s approval ratings have been varying in recent months: between about 45 and about 50 percent. **If Mr. Obama’s approval rating is at the top of that range, 50 percent, on Nov. 6, 2012 — about where it is now — the model figures that his chances of winning re-election will be greater than 80 percent. But if his approval rating is at the bottom of the range instead, at 45 percent, his chances for a second term will be only about one in three,** and he’ll have to hope that the Republican nominee is a weak one. Much will change between now and then, of course. But Mr. Obama would probably win an election held next Tuesday — and that would not have been true a couple of months ago.

**China label kills relations and the economy**

**Roach 8-28**

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True to his word as a candidate, **a few hours after taking office** as US president on January 20, 2013, Mitt **Romney issued his first executive order, declaring China guilty of currency manipulation.** In accordance with the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, President Romney’s act triggered immediate negotiations between US and Chineseofficials. But the **negotiations stalled and** both parties blamed the other in press releases.¶ In early February, in his first State of the Union address, Mr Romney said: “Enough is enough. It is high time for China to play by our rules.” Congress roared its approval and within a week, **overwhelming bipartisan majorities of both houses passed** the Defend America Trade Act of 2013. Modelled on the currency manipulation **“remedies”** of countervailing tariffs first proposed in 2005, DATA was signed into law on President’s Day, February 18 2013. **China was quickly deemed to be in violation** of the new statute.¶ More¶ At that point negotiations took on a new urgency. But the new leaders in both countries were in no mood for compromise and the talks failed. **In accordance** with the provisions of DATA**, Washington slapped immediate tariffs of 20 per cent on all Chinese products entering the US.**¶ **As plants shut down across China, Beijing declared this to be an act of economic wa**r and filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization. Li **Keqiang,** newly installed as premier**, announced** after the National People’s Congress in March that **China had no patience to endure a WTO dispute process that could take** anywhere from **two to five years** to run its course.¶ **China’s Ministry of Commerce** then **announced retaliatory tariffs of 20 per cent** on all US exports to China. This hit growth-starved America right between the eyes. With $104bn of American-made goods sold in Chinese markets in 2011, China had become the US’s third-largest and its fastest-growing export market. To add insult to injury, China-dependent **Walmart announced average price increases of 5 per cent.** Other retailers followed suit. Talk of stagflation was in the air and **hard-pressed American consumers hunkered down further**.¶ **US financial markets swooned. The stock market was hit by pressures on profit margins, growth and inflation. The bond market was also unnerved by the realisation that the Federal Reserve was seriously behind the curve**. With good reason. After its meeting in June 2013, the Fed reaffirmed its ever-extending commitment to keep its benchmark policy rate near zero through 2015, and even dangled the possibility of yet another round of quantitative easing, QE4. Yields on 10-year Treasuries moved back above 4 per cent and stocks fell sharply further.¶ Feeling the heat from financial markets, Washington turned up the heat on China. **Mr Romney called Congress back** from its Independence Day holiday into a special session. By unanimous consent, Congress passed an amendment to DATA **– upping the tariffs** on China by another **10** percentage **points.**¶At that point an indignant **China turned to its own version of the big bazooka**. The biggest foreign buyer of US debt was nowhere to be seen at the Treasury’s August 2013 auction. Long-term interest rates spiked and within weeks **yields on 10-year Treasuries hit 7 per cent. The dollar plunged and the US stock market went into free fall**.¶ Just like that, the so-called exorbitant privilege of the haven asset vanished. **When asked** at a press conference **why China would willingly engage in actions that would undermine the value of more than $2tn in Treasuries and other** dollar-based holdings, Zhou Xiaochuan, retiring **governor of the People’s Bank of China, said: “**This is not about risk-adjusted portfolio returns**. We are defending our people against an act of economic war.”**¶ **By the autumn of 2013 there was little doubt of the severity of renewed recession in** the US. Trade sanctions on China had backfired. Beleaguered American workers paid the highest price of all, as the unemployment rate shot back up above 10 per cent. A horrific policy blunder had confirmed that there was no bilateral fix for the multilateral trade imbalance of a savings-starved US economy.¶ In China, growth had slipped below the dreaded 6 per cent threshold and the new leadership was rolling out yet another investment stimulus for a still unbalanced and unstable Chinese economy. **As the global economy slipped back into recession, the Great Crisis of 2008-09 suddenly looked like child’s play. Globalisation itself hung in the balance**.¶ History warns us never to say never. We need only look at the legacy of US Senator Reed Smoot and Representative Willis Hawley, who sponsored the infamous Tariff Act of 1930 – America’s worst economic policy blunder. Bad dreams can – and have – become reality.

**Economic decline causes nuclear war**

**Harris and Burrows, 09 –**

 PhD in European History @ Cambridge and Counselor of the US National Intelligence Council AND Member of the National Intelligence Council’s Long Range Analysis Unit (Mathew J. and Jennifer, “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis,” April, Washington Quarterly, <http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_Burrows.pdf>)

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the **Great Depression** is not likely to be repeated, the **lessons** to be drawn from that period **include the harmful effects on** **fledgling** **democracies** and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) **and** on the sustainability of **multilateral institutions** (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity **conflict** and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella **could lead to an unintended escalation** and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close **proximity of** potential **nuclear rivals** combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions **may place more focus on preemption** rather than defense, potentially **leading to escalating crises**. 36 Types of **conflict** that the world continues to experience, such as **over resources, could reemerge,** particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. **Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity** will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this **could result in interstate conflicts** if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, **cooperation** to manage changing water resources **is** likely to be increasingly **difficult** both within and between states **in a** more **dog-eat-dog world.**

**Off 4**

**CP text: the United States federal government should pass the March version of the Cyber Security Act of 2012. The United States Navy should extend the Fleet Response Plan to a 42-month/two-deployment cycle. The United States Navy should homeport additional carriers in Guam.**

**Solves the aff – their author**

**Eaglen**, Senior Policy Analyst for National Security at the Heritage

Foundation, **2k8** (Mackenzie, Aug 1st, “Aircraft Carriers Are Crucial”,

The Washington Post)

The committee further directed the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report by next February reviewing potential options, including either returning the retired John F. Kennedy to service or maintaining the Kitty Hawk until the completion of Gerald Ford. Officials should also consider accelerating the delivery of the Ford to the 2013-2014 timeframe.

**THEIR CARD ENDS**

In the meantime, **the Navy should take two additional steps to help surge aircraft carrier capacity.¶ The Navy has structured its Fleet Response Plan to uphold its goal of a "6+1 fleet" -- in which at least six carriers are deployed (or able to deploy) within 30 days**, and a seventh can be deployed within 90 days. **Under the current plan, the Navy uses a 32-month operational cycle consisting of one six-month deployment**.¶ Each carrier, then, is deployed for only a limited time within a cycle. Yet with fewer ships and more needs, aircraft carrier capacity is stretched to its limit. As the RAND report suggested, **the Navy should consider extending the Fleet Response Plan to a 42-month/two-deployment cycle. This would allow the Navy to project power while also meeting the full requirements of the "6+1 fleet" plan**.¶ **The Navy also should look to homeport additional carriers in** either **Hawaii or Guam**. For the past decade **the only carrier home-ported outside the continental United States has been the Kitty Hawk in Yokosuka**, Japan. From California, it can take two weeks for a carrier strike group to travel to East Asia and three weeks to reach the Persian Gulf. **Shaving off this time by positioning a carrier in Guam, for example, would allow ships to respond more quickly to unforeseen crises**.¶ It's time to give aircraft carriers their due. They're not weapons platforms from a bygone era, but rather flexible tools of national security that can offer a vast array of capabilities. Congress was correct to stop the Navy from reducing the carrier fleet below the already-low level of 11 carriers. Now it must be prepared to back up its foresightedness by funding whichever option the Navy determines best for managing the looming Enterprise/Ford shortfall. When the question is, "where are the carriers?" we need to ensure the answer is, "plentiful, and ready to serve."

**Bill gives the DHS enforcement powers that’s key to solve**

**Weitz 11**

(Richard, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute; 4/27 “DHS Grapples with Cyber Threats” http://www.sldinfo.com/dhs-grapples-with-cyber-threats/

**The fundamental problem is that, at present, DHS has responsibility to protect all non-defense, public sector and private sector networks from cyber attack but lacks sufficient authority** to accomplish this mission. The department has broad authority within the civilian government space to set requirements for other agencies. **But DHS does not have direct enforcement authority over those departments and agencies**, which has raised issued in particular cases. For example, DHS experienced difficulty in obtaining responses regarding the scope of the Conficker worm attack from different departments and agencies. In addition, **the U.S.-CERT program which is charged with monitoring the security of civilian cyber networks does not have the enforcement authority that it needs to ensure that agencies comply with its recommendations** and mitigation guidance. U.S.-CERT also does not have the authority to compel agencies to deploy technology for determining in real time if a cyber attack is taking place. Sometimes the other agencies cannot meet DHS requirements for valid reasons, such as when they are constrained by their limited resources. But **sometimes the other agencies just ignore DHS since it is a relatively weak department that lacks a means to punish them—such as by withholding funds—for non-compliance**. According to media reports, **the White House has drafted legislation to significantly enhance DHS oversight over all civilian agency computer networks**. the 100-page document is going through interagency review. It reportedly would give DHS many, if not all, of the same authorities for the .gov networks that the Defense Department has for the .mil networks. For example, **DHS would enjoy the same broad hiring authorities as the Defense Department, including the right to make direct hires**, establish compensation rates, and pay additional benefits and incentives. Furthermore, **the draft legislation would give DHS a major role in cybersecurity-related procurements. Given the large volume of cybersecurity software purchased by the federal government, DHS could use this market power to establish and raise de facto standards in the software industry**. **The bill would also authorize the Secretary of DHS to determine what is critical infrastructure, assess audit systems for cyber resilience, and empower third-party accreditors and evaluators to assess the cybersecurity requirements of private sector owners and operators of critical information systems**. A senior accountable official would have to sign and attest that owners and operators of critical infrastructure have developed and implemented effective cybersecurity measures. Third-party

**Carriers**

**Naval forces are resilient – US will continue to outpace competitors**

**Gates 9** – US Secretary of Defense (Robert M., "A Balaced Strategy" Foreign Affairs January/February 2009, http://www.jmhinternational.com/news/news/selectednews/files/2009/01/20090201\_20090101\_ForeignAffairs\_ABalancedStrategy.pdf)

But it is also important to keep some perspective. **As much as the U.S. Navy has shrunk since the end of the Cold War, for example, in terms of tonnage, its battle fleet is still larger than the next 13 navies combined -- and 11 of those 13 navies are U.S. allies or partners.** Russian tanks and artillery may have crushed Georgia's tiny military. But before the United States begins rearming for another Cold War, it must remember that what is driving Russia is a desire to exorcise past humiliation and dominate its "near abroad" -- not an ideologically driven campaign to dominate the globe. As someone who used to prepare estimates of Soviet military strength for several presidents, I can say that **Russia's conventional military, although vastly improved since its nadir in the late 1990s, remains a shadow of its Soviet predecessor**. And adverse demographic trends in Russia will likely keep those conventional forces in check. All told, the 2008 National Defense Strategy concludes that although U**.S. predominance in conventional warfare is not unchallenged, it is sustainable for the medium term given current trends**. It is true that the United States would be hard-pressed to fight a major conventional ground war elsewhere on short notice, but as I have asked before, where on earth would we do that? **U.S.** air and **sea forces have ample untapped striking power should the need arise to deter or punish aggression -- whether on the Korean Peninsula, in the Persian Gulf, or across the Taiwan Strait.** **So although current strategy knowingly assumes some additional risk in this area, that risk is a prudent and manageable one.** **Other nations may be unwilling to challenge the United States** fighter to fighter, **ship to ship,** tank to tank. But they are developing the disruptive means to blunt the impact of U.S. power, narrow the United States' military options, and deny the U.S. military freedom of movement and action.

**US Navy is resilient, despite asymmetric threats**

**Gates 10** – US Secretary of Defense (Robert M., "Navy League Sea-Air-Space Exposition" Remarks Delivered at the National Harbor at Maryland on May 3rd, <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1460>)

**We** **know other nations are working on asymmetric ways to thwart the reach and striking power of the U.S. battle fleet. At the low end, Hezbollah, a non-state actor, used anti-ship missiles against the Israeli navy in 2006**. And Iran is combining ballistic and cruise missiles, anti-ship missiles, mines, and swarming speedboats in order to challenge our naval power in that region. At the higher end of the access-denial spectrum, the virtual monopoly the U.S. has enjoyed with precision guided weapons is eroding – especially with long-range, accurate anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles that can potentially strike from over the horizon. This is a particular concern with aircraft carriers and other large, multi-billion-dollar blue-water surface combatants, where, for example, a Ford-class carrier plus its full complement of the latest aircraft would represent potentially a $15 to $20 billion set of hardware at risk. **The U.S. will also face increasingly sophisticated underwater combat systems – including numbers of stealthy subs – all of which could end the operational sanctuary our Navy has enjoyed in the Western Pacific for the better part of six decades**. One part of the way ahead is through more innovative strategies and joint approaches. The agreement by the Navy and the Air Force to work together on an Air-Sea Battle concept is an encouraging development, which has the potential to do for America’s military deterrent power at the beginning of the 21st century what Air-Land Battle did near the end of the 20th. But we must also rethink what and how we buy – to shift investments towards systems that provide the ability to see and strike deep along the full spectrum of conflict. **This means, among other things: Extending the range at which U.S. naval forces can fight, refuel, and strike, with more resources devoted to long-range unmanned aircraft and intelligence**, surveillance, and reconnaissance c**apabilities. New sea-based missile defenses;** A submarine force with expanded roles that is prepared to conduct more missions deep inside an enemy’s battle network. **We will also have to increase submarine strike capability and look at smaller and unmanned underwater platforms. These changes are occurring even as the Navy is called upon to do more missions that fall on the low end of the conflict spectrum –** a requirement that will not go away, as the new naval operational concept reflects. Whether the mission is counterinsurgency, piracy, or security assistance, among others, new missions have required new ways of thinking about the portfolio of weapons we buy. In particular, the Navy will need numbers, speed, and the ability to operate in shallow water, especially as the nature of war in the 21st century pushes us toward smaller, more diffuse weapons and units that increasingly rely on a series of networks to wage war. As we learned last year, you don’t necessarily need a billion-dollar guided missile destroyer to chase down and deal with a bunch of teenage pirates wielding AK-47s and RPGs. **The Navy has responded with investments in more special warfare capabilities, small patrol coastal vessels, a riverine squadron, and joint high-speed vessels. Last year’s budget accelerated the buy of the Littoral Combat Ship, which, despite its development problems, is a versatile ship that can be produced in quantity and go places that are either too shallow or too risky for the Navy’s big, blue-water surface combatants**. The new approach to LCS procurement and competition should provide an affordable, scalable, and sustainable path to producing the quantity of ships we need.

**Ahmedinejad concedes war with US highly unlikely – diplomacy checks**

**Presstv 10**

 [presstv.ir, “Us Attack on Iran highly unlikely”, Presstv.ir, <http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=126519&sectionid=351020101>]

Iranian President Mahmoud **Ahmadinejad** has **described the potential of a military confrontation between the Islamic Republic and the US** **as highly unlikely**. In an exclusive interview conducted by the Al Jazeera network on Friday, Ahmadinejad stated that no country has the power to confront Iran,and added that **Tehran advocates diplomacy** as the ideal way **to deal with international issues,** the Fars news agency reported. Ahmadinejad said **Iran does not even take Israel into account and noted that Tel Aviv is not able to wage a war against the Islamic Republic.**  He went on to say that Western countries occupied Iraq and Afghanistan in an effort to protect the "Zionist regime" and asked how a regime that itself needs protection could wage a war on Iran. On the deteriorating relations between Tehran and the West, **Ahmadinejad said Western countries don't have problems only with Iran but actually have problems with every country.**  The Iranian president also asked if any government or people is at peace with them. Not only are the Islamic and Middle Eastern countries dissatisfied with Western governments but even the people of Europe are dissatisfied with them, he added. The Iranian president noted that the same is true in the US and the main reason is the West's greed. Governments and peoples around the globe no longer tolerate discrimination and hegemonistic policies, he stated. **"Relations** **must be based on mutual respect. This is not just the word of Iran but the word of all nations,"**

**Heg inevitable.**

**Goldberg 11**

(January 28 2011 “America's China Syndrome” AEIPPR American Enterprise Institute For Public Policy Research <http://www.aei.org/article/103022>)

It's true that from the early 1990s until around now, America has been essentially alone at the top of the world heap. But that hasn't meant as much as a lot of folks claim. During this pax Americana, a nasty war broke out in Europe, genocide materialized in Africa and the United States was harassed and wounded by stateless Islamic terrorism. We also fought a war in Iraq that ended in a bloody armistice, requiring constant policing for more than a decade. And now we're in another expensive war. Meanwhile, our trade deficit only gets worse and our industrial base has been outsourced to Mexico, Vietnam and, of course, China. Next, we're told, one of the consequences of the new multipolar world will be that we won't be able to do things unilaterally anymore. Anymore? What movie were they watching? When we were supposedly cock of the walk, under Democratic and Republican presidents alike, anti-Americanism flourished. The United Nations refused to authorize the use of force to stop ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. Sure, we didn't take no for an answer, but we didn't go it alone. We joined with our NATO allies to put an end to the bloodshed. During the Persian Gulf War, America had that "grand coalition" that Sen. John F. Kerry talked about. During the second Iraq war, the "coalition of the willing" was smaller, but we were hardly flying solo. U.S. leaders decried unilateralism, an odd sentiment for the undisputed global hegemon. Another **reigning cliche is that the sun is setting on us** as it did on the British Empire. But what does that mean? **China isn't remotely powerful,** influential or rich **enough to play the leading role of America, and we aren't nearly so weak,** ignorable or poor to deserve the supporting gig as 1950s Britain. Besides, although China clearly wants its moment in the sun, it doesn't seem particularly eager or able to lead. "When was the last time Beijing offered its own peace plan for the Arab-Israeli conflict, for instance?" asks Jonathan Eyal, Europe correspondent for the Straits Times in Singapore. "**Other emerging powers are no better,**" he adds. "What is India's contribution to, say, solving the crisis in Sudan? Or Russia's plan for dealing with the North Korean nuclear problem?" In other words, American leadership is still the global norm. Then there are China's very real problems. China has 700 billion very poor people. By 2050, it will have 400 million very old people. It will "get old before it gets rich," as conservative writer Mark Steyn likes to say. The country is shot through with corruption, bogus accounting practices that make subprime mortgage bundles look like gold bullion, and a political elite that remains terrified of democracy. A confident government doesn't banish its Nobel Peace Prize winners. Even with its copycat stealth fighter, China is certainly less of a military threat to the United States than the Soviet Union was. It's more of an economic challenger, but that's a good problem to have, right? Currency wars are better than nuclear ones. The most important point is that **China's rise doesn't reflect some grand failure of American foreign policy but its success.** Drawing China into the global economic and political system has been a bipartisan foreign policy goal for generations. That creates new problems but better ones. China is still governed by a fundamentally evil system. Hu has blood on his hands--he ordered the slaughter of hundreds of unarmed Tibetan protestors in 1989. But it's less evil than when it kept a billion people in poverty and killed 65 million of its own citizens. That's progress. For the last century**, America was the good-guy lead on the international stage.** In that role, we relied on a broad arsenal, literally and figuratively, to help move the world to democracy and prosperity. **Contrary to a lot of nostalgic nonsense about the** simplicity of the Cold War and the **ease of our "unipolar moment," that effort was hard**, complicated and punctuated with surprising successes and unpredicted failures. In that sense, the new normal looks a lot like the old normal

**Heg not solve war –**

**A. No threats require primacy and other factors ensure security.**

**Friedman and Preble 10** (Benjamin Friedman is a research fellow in defense and homeland security studies at the Cato Institute, Christopher Preble is director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Budgetary Savings from Military Restraint, September 22, 2010 Cato Policy Analysis No. 667 September 23, 2010 <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA667.pdf>

**The U**nited **S**tates **confuses what it wants from its military, which is** global primacy or **heg**emony**, with what its needs, which is safety**. **Our leaders tend to exaggerate the capability of the enemies** we have **and invent new enemies by defining traditional foreign troubles** —geopolitical competition among states and instability within them, for example—**as pressing threats to our security**. **Geography, wealth, and nuclear weapons provide us with safety that our ancestors would envy.** Our hyperactive military policies damage it by encouraging rivalry and resentment. Global military primacy is a game not worth the candle.56

 **( ) US will accept its new role peacefully – no backlash**

**Kupchan** **‘99**

Charles A. World Policy Journal "Life after pax Americana"

The bad news is that the global stability that unipolarity has engendered will be jeopardized **as power becomes more equally distributed in the international system**. The good news is that this structural **change** will occur through different mechanisms than in the past, and therefore **may be easier to manage peacefully**. The rising challenger is Europe, not a unitary state with hegemonic ambitions. Europe's aspirations will be moderated by the self-checking mechanisms inherent in the EU and by cultural and linguistic barriers to centralization. In addition, the United Statesis likely to react to a more independent Europe by stepping back and making room for an EU that appears ready to be more self-reliant and more muscular. **Unlike reigning hegemons in the past, the United States will not fight to the finish to maintain its primacy and prevent its eclipse by a rising challenger.** On the contrary, **the U**nited **S**tates **will cede leadership willingly as its economy slows and it grows weary of being the security guarantor of last resort. The prospect is thus not one of clashing titans, but of no titans at all**. Regions long accustomed to relying on American resourcesand leadership to preserve the peace may well be left to fend for themselves. These are the main reasons that the challenge for American grand strategy as the next century opens will be to wean Europe and East Asia of their dependence on the United States andput in place arrangements that will prevent the return of competitive balancing and regional rivalries in the wake of an American retrenchment.

**Airpower**

**A. We’ve got plenty of it now.**

**Friedman and Preble 10**

(Benjamin Friedman is a research fellow in defense and homeland security studies at the Cato Institute, Christopher Preble is director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Budgetary Savings from Military Restraint, September 22, 2010 Cato Policy Analysis No. 667 September 23, 2010 <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA667.pdf>)

We would also eliminate six fighter wing equivalents from the Air Force. There are three justifications for this cut. First, **the Navy already provides enough airpower from the sea to deal with most wars**.14 Second, **the Air Force lacks enemies** that challenge its air superiority. Third, **advancements in weapons guidance greatly increased the destructive power of each airframe. These factors mean that the fighter capability we maintain is more than what is needed to support** likely ground **conflicts** or conduct bombing raids. Because we want an offshore posture rather than a forward defense, we retain our current bomber and refueling tanker procurement plans. We also maintain the Air Force’s spending on unmanned aerial vehicles, given their flexibility and low cost relative to manned aircraft.

**B. Air power fails.**

**Kelly ‘2** (Michael, editor of the Atlantic Monthly, April, The Atlantic Monthly, “The Air-Power Revolution,” http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2002/04/kelly.htm)

But air power did not succeed in these tasks. Germany rested its (always doubtful) hopes for a successful invasion of Britain entirely on an air offensive (the [Battle of Britain](http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/bobhome.html)) that was intended to reduce a demoralized British people to surrender, or at least to destroy Britain’s defenses against invasion. The Luftwaffe’s campaign (including [the Blitz](http://www.iwm.org.uk/duxford/batt_ex5.htm)) killed about 43,000 people but unified and strengthened British will rather than crushing it, and never came close to wrecking Britain’s air defenses. In air power’s second great test failure was less absolute but more consequential in terms of future war-making. Britain’s Bomber Command believed not only that bombing could win the war but that precision bombing could win the war. The heavy bombers of the Royal Air Force would pulverize Germany’s manufacturing, transportation, and communication networks—thereby forcing Germany’s surrender without resorting to “area bombing,” the saturation bombing of civilians and their homes. Thus bombing would win the war without the mass slaughter of noncombatants—a civilized victory, even a humanitarian victory. Precision bombing proved markedly imprecise. In the first year of British bombing more than two thirds of the sorties failed to hit their targets. Even large targets, such as rail yards, could be hit only on moonlit nights. By the end of the first year the Bomber Command had admitted that precision bombing alone could not do the job (although later in the war inventions such as the British Pathfinder force and the American Norden bombsights made precision bombing much more precise), and Allied bombers turned increasingly to area bombing, which was to culminate in the horrors of Hamburg (45,400 dead), Dresden (50,000), Hiroshima (118,661), and Nagasaki (73,884). (Tallies are from The Oxford Companion to World War II.) Bombing could not produce victory except through civilian slaughter—unpalatable to people who wished to think of themselves as civilized. Indeed, it seemed, bombing could not produce victory even at that price. The mass bombing of Germany did not crush the German will or destroy (although it certainly crippled) Germany’s industrial capacity. And worse: bombing proved to be lethal not only to the bombed but to the bombers. Britain’s Bomber Command lost almost 56,000 [pilots] men in the war; American air forces, which engaged in high-risk daylight bombing, also lost almost that number.

**US primacy in Asia and the Pacific is over – even before the crash of 08, China was already catching up**

**Rachman 11**

(Gideon Rachman, Financial Times chief foreign affairs commentator, Zero-Sum Future, 2011, pp 187-188)

**Even before the crash of 2008, the military balance between China and the United States was shifting**. Aaron **Friedberg** of Princeton University **noted in 2009 that China's sustained military buildup meant that "everyone of the relative handful of bases on which the United States relies to sustain its presence in East Asia will soon be within range of** bombardment by repeated salvos of precisely targeted **Chinese** conventional ballistic and cruise **missiles**." 21 **American aircraft carriers, the key to its Pacific strategy, are** particularly **vulnerable to new Chinese precision-guided weapons**. Friedberg warned that "Washington must find ways to counter China's evolving anti-access capabilities. If it does not, America's longstanding military dominance in East Asia will quickly disappear." 22 He was not along in his concerns. In an article on the "Pentagon's wasting assets" for Foreign Affairs, also in 2009, Andrew **Krepinevich worried that "East Asian waters are slowly but surely becoming a potential no-go zone for US ships**." Krepinevich pointed out that "the US military's wasting assets are the direct consequence of the unavoidable loss of its near monopoly on guided weapons."23 **China has also been working on its ability to knock out the communications satellites on which American hightech warfare depends**. When China blasted one of its own satellites out of the sky with a missile test in January 2007, the move was widely interpreted as an implied threat to American satellites.24 This emerging power struggle is being followed closely around the world. **In the aftermath of the financial crisis** I was told by a senior British policy maker, "**Everywhere you go in Asia, you find questions about how long American military dominance can be maintained**."25

## 2NC

### DOD Tradeoff Links

Cuts likely

AP, 11 (Donna Casata and Lolita Baldor, 8/4. “Military money on chopping block.” <http://www.heraldsun.com/view/full_story/14954354/article-Military-money-on-chopping-block>)

Defense spending, which has nearly doubled in the last decade, is no longer untouchable in Washington.¶ Tea partyers and fierce fiscal conservatives in Congress are more willing to include Pentagon dollars in their mix of budget cuts despite opposition from veteran defense hawks. The death of Osama bin Laden, the diminished role of al-Qaida and the winding down of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have prompted some lawmakers to question the need for such robust military spending.¶ Among the things that could be on the block: A troubled new jet fighter, expensive plans to modernize the nation's nuclear arsenal and perhaps some of the gold-plated benefits now guaranteed to military retirees.¶ "I think programs that can't meet schedule, that can't meet cost ... requirements are very much in jeopardy and will be very much under scrutiny," Mullen said.¶

#### Sequestration means the aff forces tradeoffs – the budget is zero sum

Garamone, 12 – American Forces Press Service (Jim, 4/16. “Panetta, Dempsey Say Pentagon Feels Sequestration’s Shadow.” <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=67950>)

Panetta and Army Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, spoke about sequestration and the defense budget during a news conference at the Pentagon.¶ “Sequestration” refers to a mechanism based into the Budget Control Act that would trigger an additional $500 billion cut across the board for defense spending over the next decade if Congress doesn’t find an alternative by January.¶ “I think … the shadow of sequestration is there,” Panetta said. While the Defense Department has received no guidance from the Office of Management and Budget to begin planning for sequestration, the threat of it is having an impact on the department and on the industries the department depends on, the secretary said.¶ “In the end, it’s up to Congress,” Panetta said. “In the coming weeks, they will begin considering the defense authorization and appropriations bills. Our hope is that Congress will carefully consider the new defense strategy and the budget decisions that resulted from that strategy.”¶ Any changes the Congress contemplates will affect other sections of the budget, because it is a zero-sum game, the secretary noted. Because of the Budget Control Act, he added, any change in any one area of the budget and force structure will inevitably require offsetting changes elsewhere.¶ “That carries the real risk that … if this is not done right, the result could be a hollow, unbalanced or weaker force,” he said. “Our hope is that our strategy will not be picked apart piece by piece.”

### A2: Naval Power

**( ) Status quo naval forces and tech can keep the peace, even at reduced levels**

**Friedman and Preble 10** (Benjamin Friedman is a research fellow in defense and homeland security studies at the Cato Institute, Christopher Preble is director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Budgetary Savings from Military Restraint, September 22, 2010 Cato Policy Analysis No. 667 September 23, 2010 http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA667.pdf

**We propose** **reducing the Navy to eight carrier battle groups and six expeditionary strike groups**. We would terminate the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program after four vessels, propose an alternative low-cost frigate or corvette in its place and cut the number of destroyers and submarines that the Navy operates. **The Navy we would maintain is plenty capable given the dearth of current naval challengers and the strike power provided by modern carrier air wings**. As Secretary of Defense Gates has noted, **no enemy, or foreseeable combination of enemies, has the capability to challenge today’s Navy, on the seas or under them**.13 **This would remain the case even with the reduced Navy** that we propose. Under a strategy of restraint, **the Navy would operate as a surge force that deploys to fight, rather than attempting to stamp out trouble by maintaining a presence around the world. This force is more than sufficient for that purpose**.

**Naval power is strong now**

**Kaplan 8**, senior fellow – Center for a New American Security, 12/17/8

(Robert, “A Gentler Hegemony,” Washington Post)

**Declinism is in the air. The latest conventional wisdom is that** the combination of the disastrous **Iraq** war, the military and economic rise of Asia, **and the** steep **recession** in the West **has chastened America**, **ending** its period of **dominance** in world affairs. It is time for us to be humble. There is a lot of truth to **this**, but it **goes too far**. For decline itself -- as a concept -- is overrated. Britain's Royal Navy went into relative decline beginning in the 1890s, even as Great Britain remained powerful enough to help save the West in two world wars over the next half-century. The proper analogy may be the Indian Mutiny in 1857 and 1858, after the orientalists and other pragmatists in the British power structure, who wanted to leave traditional India as it was, lost sway to Evangelical and Utilitarian reformers who wanted to more forcefully Christianize India -- to make it in a values sense more like England. The reformers were good people: They helped abolish the slave trade and tried to do the same with the hideous practice of widow-burning. But their attempts to bring the fruits of Western civilization, virtuous as they were, to a far-off corner of the world played a role in a violent revolt against imperial authority. Yet the debacle did not signal the end of the British Empire, which expanded for nearly another century. Rather, it signaled a transition away from an ad hoc imperium fired occasionally by an ill-disciplined lust to impose its values abroad -- and to a calmer, more pragmatic and soldiering empire built on trade, education and technology. That is akin to where **we are** now, post-Iraq: **calmer, more pragmatic and with a military --** **especially a Navy** -- **that**, while in relative decline, **is still far superior to any other on Earth**. Near the end of the Cold War, **the U.S. Navy** had almost 600 ships; it is down to 280. But **in aggregate tonnage** that **is still more than the next 17 navies combined**. Our military secures the global commons to the benefit of all nations. Without the U.S. Navy, the seas would be unsafe for merchant shipping, which, in an era of globalization, accounts for 90 percent of world trade. We may not be able to control events on land in the Middle East, but our Navy and Air Force control all entry and exit points to the region. The multinational anti-piracy patrols that have taken shape in the Strait of Malacca and the Gulf of Aden have done so under the aegis of the U.S. Navy. **Sure the economic crisis will affect shipbuilding**, meaning the decline in the number of our ships will continue, and there will come a point where quantity affects quality. **But this will be an exceedingly gradual transition**, **which we will assuage by leveraging naval allies such as India and Japan**. Then there are the dozens of training deployments around the world that the U.S. military, particularly Army Special Forces, conducts in any given week. We are all over Africa, Asia and Latin America with these small missions that increase America's diplomatic throw-weight without running the risk of getting us bogged down. Aside from Iraq and Afghanistan, our military posture around the world is generally light, lethal and highly mobile. We have been quietly reducing land forces in South Korea while compensating with a more effective air and naval presence. In Colombia, platoon-size numbers of Green Berets have been instrumental in fighting narco-terrorists; in Algeria, such training teams have helped improve our relationship with that formerly radical Arab country. Such stripped-down American military deployments garner no headlines, but they are a formula that works. The Marines, after becoming virtually desert forces since 2001, will return to their expeditionary roots aboard amphibious ships in the Greater Indian Ocean and Western Pacific. American military power is not going away. But instead of being in-your-face, it will lurk just over the horizon. And that will make all the difference. In sum, we may no longer be at Charles Krauthammer's "Unipolar Moment," but neither have we become Sweden. Declinism of the sort being preached will go immediately out of fashion at the world's next humanitarian catastrophe, when the very people enraged at the U.S. military because of Iraq will demand that it lead a coalition to save lives. We might have intervened in Darfur had we not been bogged down in Iraq; after Cyclone Nargis, our ships would have provided large-scale relief, had Burma's military government allowed them to proceed. As world population rises, and with vast urban areas with tottering infrastructures in the most environmentally and seismically fragile zones, the opportunities for U.S. military-led disaster relief will be legion. The American military remains a force for good, a fact that will become self-evident in the crises to come. Of course we are entering a more multipolar world. The only economic growth over the next year or two will come from developing nations, notably India and China. But there are other realities, too. We should not underestimate the diplomatic and moral leverage created by the combination of the world's most expeditionary military and a new president who will boast high approval ratings at home and around the world. No power but the United States has the wherewithal to orchestrate an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal, and our intervention in Iraq has not changed that fact. Everyone hates the word, but **the U**nited **S**tates **is still a hegemon** of sorts, able to pivotally influence the world from a position of moral strength.

**Heg fails in the Middle East**

**Miller ‘11**

(Aaron David, public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center, served for two decades as an adviser to the U.S. secretary of state on Arab-Israeli negotiations, “For America, An Arab Winter”, Summer, http://www.wilsonquarterly.com/article.cfm?aid=1967)

We can, however, say with greater confidence how America will fare. It will be wise as we deal with the region’s changes to keep both our hopes and our fears under control. When it comes to this part of the world, Americans (me included) indulge too much in each. **Several trend lines seem clear**. First, **the gap between America’s values and its policies in the region** may narrow but **will remain**. In Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria, **the U**nited **S**tates **will be constrained by its interests from pushing too hard for reform** and is likely to be cautious in its support for the opposition. In Egypt, as it becomes clear that a powerful military functioning independently of civilian authority isn’t really compatible with democratic values, **the U**nited **S**tates (because of its close ties to the military) will find itself in a dilemma. Similarly, it **will be reluctant to embrace groups** such as the Muslim Brotherhood **whose views** on democracy, gender equality, and Israel **are fundamentally different from our own.** Second, as public opinion becomes more influential in shaping domestic and foreign policies in the Arab countries, the space available for U.S. policies and influence **may contract.** The acquiescent autocrats have acquiesced, albeit often grudgingly, in our approach to Iran, Gaza, Israel, and counterterrorism. The new regimes won’t, or at least not as easily. **Since most of our policies won’t change quickly, or at all, the U**nited **S**tates **will** likely **be in for a rough** **ride**, with both emerging governments and old ones. Indeed, **our traditional friends and adversaries are already worried about our reliability**. The Saudis were stunned at how quickly we acquiesced in and aided Mubarak’s fall, and they were also angered by our support for reforms in Bahrain. The Israelis probably are concerned as well that we plan to squeeze them on the peace process to accommodate the new Arab democrats and carve out greater space for our interests. And in traditionally pro-American monarchies such as Jordan and Morocco that have been spared disruptive change, the **kings** may **wonder how America will react if they too are pressed hard by their publics.**

### Swing States

#### Obama will win- swing states

Blumenthal 10-25

Mark is the Director of Pollster, the Huffington Post’s Election Analysis and Model, “Presidential Polls Counter Romney Surge Myth,”

New polls released on Wednesday and Thursday continue to show President Barack Obama holding narrow leads in a handful of critical battleground states, but running within a whisker of Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney nationwide.¶ While Romney gained significantly in the wake of the first presidential debate in early October, the lack of a continuing trend over the past two weeks helps counter a theme in some campaign coverage that Romney's support continues to "surge" nationwide.¶ The most recent updates of the seven daily national tracking polls continue to split in terms of which candidate holds the nominal lead, ranging from a 4 percentage-point lead for Romney on the Rasmussen Reports automated tracking to a 3 point Obama advantage on the Investor's Business Daily/TIPP poll.¶ 2012-10-25-trackers.png¶ Separately, a new Associated Press/GfK survey released on Thursday morning showed Romney with a 2 percentage-point edge over Obama (47 to 45 percent).¶ The HuffPost Pollster tracking model, which combines data from both national and statewide polling to create a combined estimate, continues to show a near tie, with just two-tenths of one percent separating Romney (47.1 percent) and Obama (46.9 percent) as of this writing. The model currently reports just 56 percent confidence that Romney is actually leading the national popular vote; slightly better than a coin-toss, but just barely.¶ Although their methodologies and estimates of the leader vary considerably, these national tracking polls provide a useful gauge of late trends, since they collectively interview over 2,000 voters a day. Their most recent releases show no signs of Romney momentum. Three ticked in Obama's direction, three were unchanged and one moved toward Romney.¶ Wednesday also brought four new surveys in Ohio. Three of the four, from Time, SurveyUSA and Democratic pollster Lake Research, gave Obama leads ranging from 2 to 5 percentage points while the Rasmussen automated survey reported a tie.¶ 2012-10-25-ohio.png¶ The new results have little impact on the Ohio trend chart produced by the Pollster model, which continues to give Obama an advantage of just over 2 percentage points. Although that lead is narrow, the volume of polling in Ohio boosts the model's confidence that Obama is running ahead there to 96 percent.¶ Collectively, the new polls of the past 24 hours have done nothing to change the standings in the most crucial battleground states. Obama continued to hold leads of 2 to 3 percentage points in Ohio, Iowa, Nevada and Wisconsin, four states that currently combine with the states where Obama leads by larger margins to create a 277 electoral vote majority, seven more than the 270 needed to win.¶ 2012-10-25-battlegrounds.png¶ Romney continues to lead in North Carolina and retain a narrow edge in Florida, states that would net him 233 electoral votes along with other states where Romney leads by larger margins. Those totals leave 26 electoral votes up for grabs in New Hampshire, Colorado and Virginia, states where the tracking model shows Obama leading by very narrow margins of 2 percentage points or less.¶ Collectively, the trends of the past week provide a reality check to two myths that have emerged in recent campaign coverage.¶ The first is that Romney has been "surging" since the first debate. While the debate certainly boosted Romney's standing in the polls, trends over the past two weeks have been negligible, with the leader seesawing nationally within a range of roughly one percentage point. Over the same period, the standings within the key battleground states have also remained constant. Other poll tracking models have shown the same patterns.¶ The second myth is that the national and battleground states polls have produced widely divergent results. If we use the state estimates produced by the Pollster tracking model in the nine key battlegrounds (Iowa, Wisconsin, Nevada, Ohio, New Hampshire, Colorado, Virginia, Florida and North Carolina) to create a combined total vote based on the turnout in each state in 2008, we show Obama leading in across all nine states by a slim 0.6 percentage point margin (47.8 to 47.2 percent as of this writing; the estimated margin would be 47.9 to 47.2 percent if based on the 2004 turnout).¶ Romney does slightly better in the national popular vote estimate, of course, but his 0.2 percentage point advantage there is only slightly better. The net gap is less than a percentage point.¶ As the Cook Political Report's David Wasserman writes on Twitter, simply subtracting 4 percentage points from Obama's 2008 margins in each state produces a similar result: "He'd lose Popular vote by 0.7% but still win w/ 272 EC votes."¶ The differences may appear bigger because Obama's advantages are spread across a number of relatively small battleground states that, except for Ohio, all have 10 or fewer electoral votes. Romney stays close in the combined battleground state estimate mostly because his three best states -- Florida, North Carolina and Virginia -- represent just over half (51 percent) of the combined battleground vote.¶ So yes, the potential exists for a divided outcome, with Obama winning the Electoral College and Romney winning the popular vote, but such an outcome would be, as it was 12 years ago, a game of inches, not yards.

### Key States

#### Obama wins- Consensus on Key States

Sargent 10-24

Greg writes the Washington Post’s Plum Line, “For Now, the Math Still Favor Obama,”

That said, the polling averages tell a very clear story right now: Obama is slightly ahead in the electoral college. All of the four major national averages — Real Clear Politics, Pollster.com, TPM, and Nate Silver’s FiveThirtyEight — show Obama with small leads in Ohio, Wisconsin, Nevada, New Hampshire, and Iowa (which is tighter). That would put Obama well past 270. He has more room for error right now than Romney does.¶ No one is denying that Romney enjoyed a big tightening that has put him at least within striking distance of victory. But right now, Obama is still leading — where it counts. Could this change? Of course. Again, Romney could still win. But Obama’s small edge in the electoral college defines the state of play with less than two weeks left.¶ The case that Romney is on track to victory rests heavily on the argument that he retains momentum and that undecided voters are breaking his way. It’s unclear what the evidence is for this — if anything, the race in those states has now become remarkably stable, despite that earlier tightening — but let’s accept it for the sake of argument. Even if Romney does retain some momentum, my metric for judging the race remains simple: That momentum will only become genuinely significant if Romney starts showing a tie or leads in the consensus of the polling averages of the key states where Obama now leads.¶ I would also add one thing to what Allen said above about North Carolina: Virginia also bears watching. The polling averages show a tighter race in Virginia than in Ohio. Yet there’s virtually no discussion of the fact that Romney has not taken Virginia off the board. Why?

### Women

#### Obama wins- women

Heileman 10-19

John is a Political Columnist for New York Magazine and Author of 2008’s Game Change, “The Waitress Mom-War,” <http://nymag.com/news/politics/powergrid/romney-obama-women-voters-2012-10/>

To the extent Obama is still a narrow favorite, the reason is that he is polling marginally better in the swing states than he is nationally—and the reason for that, in turn, is his strength with women. Obama has always done well with minority and college-educated white female voters. Where he has overperformed in 2012 is with blue-collar white women and in particular those in the states where the campaign is actually being waged. Whereas the national polls at the end of September found the president claiming 35–44 percent support among this group, “in the battleground states, especially in the Midwest, Obama’s performance [was] stronger,” wrote Ron Brownstein of National Journal at the time. “Among these women, the state-level polls show[ed] Obama drawing … 48 percent in Florida, 49 percent in Nevada, 50 percent in New Hampshire and Wisconsin … and 52 percent in Ohio and Iowa.”¶ What accounted for this divergence? Almost certainly it was the sheer weight of the negative advertising run against Romney during the spring and summer by the Obama campaign and the main Democratic super-pac, Priorities USA Action. Much of it was aimed directly at so-called waitress moms, blanketing the airwaves during the daytime on such programs as Judge Judy and Dr. Phil and painting Romney as a heartless, soulless, out-of-touch plutocrat. Indeed, one of the most-aired ads of September was a spot that featured the audio of Romney’s 47 percent comments and multiple images of working-class women.¶ But the first debate set Obama back with the waitress moms, which the Democratic pollster Geoff Garin sees as “disproportionately the moving part left in the electorate.” Beyond Obama’s massive meta-level #FAIL in Denver, he specifically fell short when it came to shoring up his position with these voters. “If you think about all of the should-have-dones that night,” says Garin, “at the top of the list was confronting Romney on these issues that speak to ­women and affect women.”¶ Thus did the Republican nominee begin his upward creep in the polls—and thus was appealing to blue-collar women of paramount importance to both him and Obama last week at Hofstra. The president’s efforts in this regard were plain to see: the repeated attacks on his opponent for pledging to eliminate funding for Planned Parenthood; his proud invocation of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. And Romney’s were no more subtle: his declaration that “every woman in America should have access to contraceptives”; his criticism of the president’s economic policies as having been especially deleterious for women; and, of course, his description of how he had pushed to include ample femalehood in his administration when he was governor of the Bay State, which led him down the path to BindersFullofWomenGate.

### Cell Phone Polls

#### Obama wins- Cell Phone polls prove

Kellner 10-23

Pete is President of Yougov, one of America’s largest and best polling firms and a contributor to the Huffington Post’s Pollster, “Obama Stays Ahead- Just,” <http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/peter-kellner/barack-obama-mitt-romney-us-election-_b_2005585.html?utm_hp_ref=@pollster>

Two further points. Apart from the issue of political weighting, telephone polls in the US divide between traditional polls conducted by human beings, and robopolls done automatically by computers dialing voters. Robopolls are cheaper; or, for the same cost, can reach more people faster. The trouble is that, under US law, robpolls can dial only landlines. They can't reach the one-in-three Americans who have only mobile phones. Another 18% of Americans have landline phones but seldom use them. These figures rise dramatically among the under 30s. They are the people who are keenest on Obama. So we should not be surprised that robopolls, both nationally and in swing states, tend to produce slightly higher figures for Romney than conventional telephone polls in which real people dial both landline and mobile phone numbers.¶ If the overall result were clear-cut, the small differences between robopolls and live-interviewer polls would be of interest only to obsessive poll-watchers. In the current very close race, they tell very different stories. It looks increasingly as if the state that will decide the outcome next month will be Ohio. According to robopolls, the state, and therefore the nation, are too close to call; according to the live-interviewer polls (and YouGov's online polls), Obama enjoys a modest but consistent lead in Ohio and is on course for a second term in the White House.

### A2: Link Turns

#### No risk of a link turn - Obama has lost Conservatives - Gay Marriage, Immigration, contraception and healthcare ensure

Brownstein 6-28

Ronald is a columnist for National Journal, “Obama’s Gamble,” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/political-connections/obama-s-big-gamble-20120628>

His choice continued a striking pattern of recent months. By **endorsing gay marriage, championing free contraception in health insurance plans** (over resistance from the Catholic Church**), and administratively legalizing young people brought to the U.S. illegally by their parents, Obama has repeatedly subordinated the concerns of older and blue-collar whites to the preferences of the Democrats’ emerging coalition: minorities, young people, and culturally liberal college-educated whites**, especially women. “**He’s taking positions that are strongly opposed by culturally conservative whites, basically conceding that he is going to do poorly among them**, in a conscious effort to increase enthusiasm among the coalition that put him in office,” says GOP pollster Whit Ayres. Each strand of that Democratic “coalition of the ascendant,” as I’ve called it, is growing as a share of the electorate. But Obama’s tightening embrace of its priorities nonetheless represents a historic gamble. Romney could still beat him by amassing large enough margins among the economically strained, culturally conservative older, and blue-collar whites whom Obama’s recent decisions may further provoke. The president isn’t conceding those voters, who once anchored his party’s base: His attacks on Romney’s Bain Capital experience largely target them. But. **far more than previous Democratic nominees, Obama seems willing to risk alienating them** As longtime Democratic strategist William Galston observes, “**Obama is betting his presidency on mobilizing … this new [coalition].” Win or lose, Obama seems destined to speed the Democrats’ evolution away from the New Deal coalition centered on working-class whites toward one that revolves around the two titanic social forces he embodies: rising education levels and growing diversity.**

### A2: People Won’t Vote for Romney/Romney Supports it

#### Unpopularity of the plan means people will break for Romney that’s the 1NC.

**Environmentalists won’t turn out if angry**

**Schow 12**. [Ashe, Heritage Action’s Deputy Communications Director, “Pres. Obama continues to pander to environmentalists” Heritage Action for America -- January 9 -- http://heritageaction.com/2012/01/pres-obama-continues-to-pander-to-environmentalists/]

It seems that President Obama is worried about whether or not environmentalists will come out in full force to support his re-election effort. Evidenced by the decision to delay the Keystone XL pipeline – which would lower energy prices and put thousands of Americans to work – and now a mining ban in Arizona; it’s clear that President Obama will do whatever it takes to shore up environmentalist’s support, even if it means destroying job creation and smacking down labor unions.¶ Are his re-election priorities skewed? Probably. But it could just be strategy. President Obama is betting that labor unions will come out in support this election no matter what, so the President probably assumes that no matter what he does that ends up hurting union workers, the larger organization will still support him.¶ **The same cannot be said for environmentalists**. They tend to stay home if they are not appeased. But President Obama is playing with fire. In each of these decisions – along with the 2010 moratorium on offshore drilling – environmentalists cheer victory while thousands of workers (many of them unionized) are left without a job. If the President is so concerned about jobs, why is he denying them to anyone, especially his friends in the labor unions?

#### Base won’t turn out if policies aren’t in line with them and the base outweighs moderate losses

Adams et al ‘6

James is in the Department of Political Science at the University of California Davis and wrote this article with 3 other Professors of Political Science, “Move to the Center or Mobilize the Base,” Conference Paper at the American Political Science Association- via EBSCO

Our theoretical and empirical results, which suggest that candidates maximize their¶ vote margins in general elections by presenting policies designed to appeal to their partisan¶ constituencies, is relevant to the extensive literature on elections and representation. Dat­¶ ing back to Miller and Stokes’s (1963) seminal work, scholars have conceptualized con­¶ gressional representation in terms of the Miller­Stokes “diamond model” which empha­¶ sizes the linkages between legislators’ roll­call votes and the policy preferences of their ge­¶ ographic constituencies, defined as the set of all voters from the legislator’s district. How­¶ ever subsequent work has cast doubt on how well this diamond model captures the repre­¶ sentational process; in particular, scholars have increasingly emphasized the crucial influ­¶ ence of the legislator’s “reelection constituency” (Fenno, 1978), defined as “the people¶ who are reliable supporters at the ballot box” (Uslaner, 1999, page 10, emphasis in origi­¶ nal).¶ 22¶ ¶ Uslaner summarizes the current state of the research as follows:¶ The [Miller­Stokes] model has served us well for a long time, but diamonds aren’t¶ forever… A more profound challenge to the diamond model comes from the recog­¶ nition that legislators tend to represent their core supporters, mostly composed of their fellow partisans, better than they do the full electorate. (Uslaner, 1999, page¶ 12).¶ The value of our theoretical results is that they provide a plausible rationale for the¶ empirical finding that legislators tend to represent their core supporters at the expense of¶ their geographic constituency: namely, that this is an electorally optimal strategy! ¶ In addition, as we observed in the introduction to this essay, our emphasis on the¶ centrifugal effects on candidate strategies associated with voter turnout in a partisan elec­¶ torate is one that is increasingly shared, both by the popular media and by campaign man­¶ agers (see Miniter, 2005; Nagourney, 2003; Millbank and Allen, 2004). Thus Mathew¶ Dowd, a senior advisor to George W. Bush’s re­election campaign, stated in the summer of¶ 2003 that “there’s a realization, having looked at the past few elections, that the party that¶ motivates their base – that makes their base emotional and turn out – has a much higher¶ likelihood of success on election day” (quoted in Nagourney, 2003).¶ 23¶ And Stanley Green­¶ berg, a Democratic pollster who advised the Democratic presidential candidates Bill Clin­¶ ton, Al Gore, and John Kerry, argues that in order to win elections¶ The starting point for both Democrats and Republicans is to make sure that they¶ take into battle the core of loyalists that this era has bequeathed them. But since¶ neither party’s core support or base is big enough to assure victory, each struggles¶ valiantly to make more of it – in the first instance, by growing the groups that are¶ the most loyal, by fanning the passions on each party’s lead issues to achieve even¶ greater unity in their voting and more energy and greater turnout at the polls (2005,¶ pages 91­92).¶ The theoretical results we have presented are exactly in tune with the arguments ad­¶ vanced by the political professionals quoted above. By shifting their policies away from¶ the median voter’s position in the direction of their partisan constituency’s policy prefer­¶ ences, candidates increase the unity in their partisan ranks, as Greenberg emphasizes, and¶ candidates simultaneously energize their base to turn out to vote, as both Dowd and Green­¶ berg emphasize. The importance of our theoretical arguments is that they illuminate why¶ the turnout gains that candidates obtain from targeting their base are likely to outweigh the¶ vote losses among moderate voters that noncentrist positioning would seem to entail. In¶ particular, in a partisan electorate, voters’ candidate preferences are rarely in doubt – so¶ that moderate Democratic and Republican partisans will support their party’s candidate at high rates even when these candidates propose radical positions – which give candidates¶ the leeway to shift away from the center, in order to boost turnout among their habitual¶ supporters. Thus we have shown that the strategic logic of candidate positioning in a parti­¶ san electorate with variable turnout is dramatically different from the strategic logic that¶ obtains when we disregard voters’ partisan loyalties (cf. Hinich and Ordeshook, 1970).

#### Romney will just “etch a sketch”

**Heilemann et al 10-3**. [John, journalist for New York magazine, Mike Murphy, Republican political consultant, Charlie Rose, journalist, “Analysis of Presidential Debate” The Charlie Rose Show -- lexis]

I thought that you saw, you know, to go back to the old trope, you know people mocked around the campaign when the etch-a-sketch comment was made by Eric Fehrnstrom back at the end of the primaries. But the truth is --¶ CHARLIE ROSE: **He`s going to write a new script** is what he said.¶ JOHN HEILEMANN: Yes and the Obama campaign thought well, that`s what they expected to happen. And that`s actually why they thought Romney was a dangerous candidate was that he would etch-a-sketch

and that you know he wouldn`t be -- he would go back to being what the previous incarnation of him was which is not a hard-right, base-loving, base-enthusiasm driving candidate.¶ He would be a pragmatic moderate Massachusetts Governor. And that would be a dangerous candidate for them to have to run against. We haven`t seen that in Mitt Romney. And on a succession of issues all night tonight, that was the Mitt Romney that he was trying to portray. It`s come very late in this campaign but, it is -- and I think the Obama campaign thought well if we haven`t seen it so far there is -- we`re not going to get to see it. He`s not going to try to revive that image tonight. But that`s what he tried to do and I think it was one of the reasons President Obama was off his game.¶ The other reason and you`ll hear this a lot I think over the next 12 or 24 hours but he goes back to the Kerry-Bush example. You know incumbent presidents, they come out for this first debate -- it`s been a long time since Barack Obama has had a debate, it`s been four years. And in the last four years since he last left the stage with John McCain at that third debate in October of 2008, there is almost no one who`s argued with him.¶ NORAH O`DONNELL: Yes.¶ JOHN HEILEMANN: Under any circumstance. He has been -- he has been, he has had four years of yes men, nodding their head and agreeing with everything he says. And you get up on that stage and you`re rusty to begin with and then you have someone who is up there who is right in your face.¶ (CROSSTALK)¶ CHARLIE ROSE: You mean, nobody goes -- nobody goes into the Oval Office and says Mr. President you got it wrong.¶ JOHN HEILEMANN: You got it wrong, you are wrong about everything --¶ (CROSSTALK)¶ JOSH TYRANGIEL: Well, well if they do that --¶ (CROSSTALK)¶ MIKE MURPHY: You could -- you could feel it. You know it`s a lot easier in debate perhaps to say Mitt that`s the stupidest answer I`ve ever heard you sound like a rich idiot. It`s hard to say Mr. President you just put me to sleep with that boring lecturing answer.¶ JOHN HEILEMANN: Right.¶ MIKE MURPHY: And as an old campaign hack it read to me a very weak debate threat. So it`s interesting now to think about what their internal spasm is going to be.¶ CHARLIE ROSE: Ok.¶ MIKE MURPHY: First of all they`re going to give Biden a bayonet next week and tell him to carve, you know, Ryan up. And I`m not sure Biden will be that good at.¶ CHARLIE ROSE: Yes.¶ MIKE MURPHY: It is not his natural demeanor.¶ CHARLIE ROSE: Yes.¶ MIKE MURPHY: So we could have an overreaction Biden show.¶ CHARLIE ROSE: Yes.¶ MIKE MURPHY: And second I think, there`s one point about -- and I agree totally with what John said about, you saw what the country did, the guy who won Massachusetts tonight. They`ve been afraid in the Romney campaign to do that because they`re very sensitive, in my view --¶ (CROSSTALK)¶ CHARLIE ROSE: Yes.¶ MIKE MURPHY: -- oversensitive to the criticism from the base. I think the base is going to be silent tomorrow because they tasted losing for a week. Tonight they`re tasting winning and I think you`re going to see Republican Party get very much on board a winner now. And if that continues, Romney will be Romney, the one we saw tonight which I think is actually the most authentic Romney.¶ The Obama guys may litigate flip-flopping. But as an old rule of politics when you`re flipping toward the voters you`re doing OK. So I think they got a real opportunity now and we`ll see what the next week looks like it`s going to tell us a lot.

####  Romney can’t lose by flip-flopping- Obama strategic decision

Bai 10-24

Matt is the New York Time’s Magazine’s Chief Political Correspondent, “How Bill Clinton May have Hurt the Obama Campaign,” <http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/how-bill-clinton-may-have-hurt-the-obama-campaign/>

When the histories of the 2012 campaign are written, much will be made of Bill Clinton’s re-emergence. His convention speech may well have marked the finest moment of President Obama’s re-election campaign, and his ads on the president’s behalf were memorable.¶ Political Times¶ Political Times¶ Matt Bai’s analysis and commentary.¶ But there is one crucial way in which the 42nd president may not have served the 44th quite as well. In these final weeks before the election, Mr. Clinton’s expert advice about how to beat Mitt Romney is starting to look suspect.¶ You may recall that last spring, just after Mr. Romney locked up the Republican nomination, Mr. Obama’s team abruptly switched its strategy for how to define him. Up to then, the White House had been portraying Mr. Romney much as George W. Bush had gone after John Kerry in 2004 – as inauthentic and inconstant, a soulless climber who would say anything to get the job.¶ But it was Mr. Clinton who forcefully argued to Mr. Obama’s aides that the campaign had it wrong. The best way to go after Mr. Romney, the former president said, was to publicly grant that he was the “severe conservative” he claimed to be, and then hang that unpopular ideology around his neck.¶ In other words, Mr. Clinton counseled that independent voters might forgive Mr. Romney for having said whatever he had to say to win his party’s nomination, but they would be far more reluctant to vote for him if they thought they were getting the third term of George W. Bush. Ever since, the Obama campaign has been hammering Mr. Romney as too conservative, while essentially giving him a pass for having traveled a tortured path on issues like health care reform, abortion and gay rights.¶ It’s not hard to understand why Mr. Obama and his advisers took Mr. Clinton’s advice to heart; to disregard it would be like telling Derek Jeter, “Hey man, appreciate the input, but I think I know how to make that flip play from the hole just fine on my own.” Nor is it hard to see how Mr. Clinton, given his own personal experience, may have reached his conclusion.¶ After all, if you’re Bill Clinton, you have to look at it this way: for your entire career as a candidate, other politicians tried to paint you as waffling and slippery, and not once did it actually work. (Well, there was that gubernatorial defeat in 1980, but that had more to do with Jimmy Carter and a bunch of Cuban refugees than anything else.)¶ Meanwhile, you won a couple of national elections by positioning yourself as the pragmatic bulwark against conservative extremism on one side and liberal excess on the other. So it would be natural to have learned that it makes more sense to exploit your opponent’s rigid ideology than his general squishiness.¶ But Mr. Clinton’s situation was different from either Mr. Romney’s or Mr. Obama’s. For one thing, Mr. Clinton’s brand of centrism — which Republicans, and a lot of Democrats, tried to portray as expedient — actually sprang from a coherent worldview. The charges of inauthenticity never seriously wounded Mr. Clinton because, unlike Mr. Romney, he had been remarkably consistent throughout his political life, and where there was inconsistency, Mr. Clinton had a singular ability to argue his way out of it.¶ Also, Mr. Clinton was able to set himself up against ideological extremism so successfully because he really was a centrist deal-maker, and everyone knew it. However much Mr. Obama may see himself in the same pragmatic vein, the voters, by and large, do not.¶ For a while this summer and into the fall, the Obama-Clinton strategy seemed to be working flawlessly. That’s because, almost inexplicably, Mr. Romney continued to run as if he were still contesting the Republican primaries. But in recent weeks, starting with the first debate, the challenger has made a brazen and frantic dash to the center, and Mr. Obama has often seemed off-balance, as if stunned that Mr. Romney thinks he can get away with such an obvious change of course so late in the race. Which, apparently, he can.¶ The bottom line here is that one can over-think this whole notion of framing your opponent. Ninety-nine times out of 100, the line of attack that works best is the one that really rings true. In the case of Mr. Romney, whatever his stated positions may be, the idea that he’s a far-right ideologue, a kind of Rush Limbaugh with better suits and frosty hair, just doesn’t feel especially persuasive.¶ On the other hand, the notion that Mr. Romney isn’t centered in any philosophical impulse — that he will say or do whatever it takes to win — seems more plausible, given his contortions on a range of policies, and given his excessive caution as a candidate.¶ If there’s one thing voters have shown time and time again in recent elections, it’s that they value authenticity above almost anything else. And Mr. Obama might have argued that this lack of a true north actually makes Mr. Romney more threatening to moderate voters than he would be if he were an actual ideologue, simply because he hasn’t shown any inclination to stand up to the more extreme forces in his own party.¶ As it is, though, Mr. Obama has chosen his path, and he now has only days to convince a lot of independents in states like Ohio and Virginia that Mr. Romney really is some raging conservative, rather than the more malleable, somewhat awkward fellow he is impersonating on TV. It’s an approach that has both pluses and minuses for Mr. Obama, much like the former president whose influence pervades his campaign.

#### Would be used behind the scenes

Wilson 10-25

Reid is a Columnist for National Journal, “The Dirty Side of Voter Turnout,” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/on-the-trail/the-dirty-side-of-voter-turnout-20121025>

In Maricopa County, home of more than half of Arizona’s voters, material reminding Spanish-language speakers to vote lists Election Day as Nov. 8, two days after the polls close. In Florida, the Division of Elections is investigating letters sent to voters in 24 counties that say recipients have been flagged as possible noncitizens and are therefore ineligible to vote. In Wisconsin, billboards warn of jail time for voter fraud. And voters in several swing states have reported receiving calls telling them they can vote by phone instead of at the ballot box.¶ Welcome to the unseemly underside of politics. While President Obama and Republican challenger Mitt Romney work to mobilize as much of their base as possible, some operatives are working behind the scenes to dissuade the other side’s voters from casting ballots.¶ In other cases, simple mistakes in local elections offices threaten to disenfranchise at least a handful of voters. In a close-fought election likely to come down to just a few states, any problem at the polls will cause the losing side to scream bloody murder.¶ Both the Obama and Romney camps claim they are confident they’ll win by sufficient margins. But privately, each side is preparing armies of lawyers and warning staff to be ready to fly to a political hot spot at a moment’s notice on Election Night.¶ “What we’re preparing for now is the efforts on the ground, and we will, as we’ve had in the past, have thousands of lawyers working at polling places throughout the country,” said Will Crossley, a Democratic National Committee spokesman. “This program that we have is bigger than we’ve had in a long time.”¶ “We have all the resources and infrastructure we need for any potential dispute or recount,” said one Romney aide. Because of a three-decade old court agreement, the Republican National Committee is not allowed to send lawyers into the field. Instead, the Republican National Lawyers Association, headed by longtime GOP activists David Norcross and Cleta Mitchell, organize the party’s volunteer legal efforts.¶ While there’s no evidence that either the official party organizations or the two presidential campaigns are involved in the shadiest efforts, operatives on both sides are engaged in underhanded, sometimes even illegal, tactics. The letters in Florida targeted Republican voters. The billboards in Wisconsin are in prominent African-American neighborhoods, where huge numbers of Democratic voters live.¶ In some states, both sides are working the referees by warning of dirty tricks that might happen before they actually do. Democrats have pointed out that a private equity firm run by Romney’s son, Tagg, is an investor in the parent company of a firm that makes Ohio voting machines. And Republican secretaries of state in Iowa, Colorado, and Florida have undertaken investigations into supposed Democratic voter fraud, although they’ve turned up only a small handful of ineligible voters who cast ballots.¶ In a more aboveboard realm, Democrats and Republicans have engaged in decades-long battles over voting rights. Democratic legislatures expanded early voting hours and access to absentee ballots, while Republicans have fought to ensure military voters get their ballots in enough time to vote. Over the last two years, Republicans have renewed a push to require voters to show identification when they get their ballots, while legislatures in states like Ohio and Florida have sought to curtail some early-voting hours.¶ Simple errors at local elections offices, whether poorly designed ballots in Palm Beach County in 2000 or mislabeled elections materials like those in Maricopa County today, can give both parties a chance to claim voting irregularities. Long lines at early voting locations in Iowa and elsewhere have already caused some grumbling, but it’s just a preview of the strain that will be put on election workers when they deal with the tens of millions of voters who turn up on Nov. 6.¶ Software bugs never fail to spur calls of election-fixing. On Wednesday, reports that a voting machine in Greensboro, N.C. was registering Romney votes as Obama votes landed on the Drudge Report website.¶ Both sides are ready for human errors, too. “Our belief is that local registrars, local supervisors of elections, the last thing they want is a catastrophe on Election Day with cameras outside their offices. So they have an interest in making the elections run smoothly,” the DNC's Crossley said. “That way more people get to vote.”

### A2: Energy Irrelevant/Aff to small

#### Late in the game means small events change the race and can become key issue

Silver 10-20

“Calm Day in Forecast but Volatility Ahead,” <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/20/oct-20-calm-day-in-forecast-but-volatility-ahead/>

What makes this challenging is that although something like a half-point shift is hard to detect in the polls, it is also potentially meaningful given how late it is in the race and how close the contest is.¶ The most natural analogy might be to a baseball game. Scoring a run in the first inning is worth something, but it won’t shift the win probabilities all that much: there’s too much that can happen later on in the game.¶ We’re now in the political equivalent of the eighth inning, however. A run scored in the eight inning is potentially much more important than one in the first.¶ The reason I say “potentially” is that it makes a tremendous difference depending what the score is. In a blowout, the eighth inning won’t matter at all. A team down 9-1 is almost certainly going to lose; but so will one that gets a solo home run and trails 9-2 instead.¶ (The political equivalent: Walter Mondale, in 1984, improved to a 17-point deficit from a 20-point deficit in national polls after his first debate with Ronald Reagan. This may have helped him to carry his home state of Minnesota, and lose the Electoral College 525-13 rather than 535-3.)¶ But if the score is tied, or if it’s a one-run game, a run scored in the eighth will make a huge difference.¶ That’s where we find ourselves right now in the presidential race. This election is close and is likely to end up that way. There’s about a 50-50 chance that the election will end up within 2.5 percentage points, according to the forecast, against only a 15 percent chance that either candidate will win by five points or more.¶ For this reason, the percentage estimates in the forecast are likely to be volatile from here on out.¶ Early in the year, we’d treat as a pretty big deal if a candidate’s Electoral College win probability increased by a percentage point or more (for instance, to 63 percent from 62 percent). Now, changes like that are going to be fairly common, and there will often be larger shifts. Thursday, for example, was a good but hardly spectacular day for Mr. Obama in the polls, and that was enough to produce about a 5 percent swing toward him. Friday, however, brought a 2 percent shift back toward Mr. Romney, despite polling that seemed fairly mixed on the surface.¶ There are some other reasons the forecast is likely to become more volatile over these final two weeks. The FiveThirtyEight forecast is technically a combination of a polling-based model and a “fundamentals” model based on economic statistics and Mr. Obama’s incumbency status.¶ The forecast is also designed, however, to weight the economic component less and less as time goes on, eventually defaulting to a purely poll-based model by Election Day. (The guiding principle behind this is simply that voters’ views of the economy should be priced into the polling by late in the race.) Although the economic component of the model is dynamic — it can change as new economic statistics are released — it is generally less volatile than the polling component. (While there have been some ups and downs in the economic numbers, nothing has changed the basic story of an economy that is recovering, but slowly.) So as the polling component comes to predominate, the overall forecast will become more volatile as well.¶ Also, the model is designed to be more aggressive about buying into a potential change in the polls in the closing stages of the race.¶ Most people’s intuition will lead them to overstate the volatility in the presidential race. Furthermore, they often do so for the wrong reasons — because they pay too much attention to one or two outlier polls rather than to the consensus evidence.¶ On the other hand, because we are often now getting 20 polls on a given day — instead of two or three — there is potentially more evidence to testify to a statistically meaningful change in the race if it is reflected in the polling consensus.¶ Furthermore, it is now late enough in the race that news events that produce what would ordinarily be a temporary “bounce” in the polls could carry forward to Election Day.¶ The writer Jazz Shaw joked recently, for instance, that he didn’t think Mr. Romney’s bounce from his debate in Denver would persist for more than another four weeks — just long enough, of course, that it might be enough to win him the election on Nov. 6.¶ Perhaps in some abstract sense, this is true. If Mr. Romney and Mr. Obama debated another 10 times, and the election were held next March, the Denver debate would be discounted by voters. But it won’t be such a distant memory when voters go to the polls in 17 days.

####

#### Nate Silver is the best around

Leigh Bureau ‘10

the world’s preeminent lecture bureau, “Nate Silver,” http://www.leighbureau.com/speaker.asp?id=498

Nate Silver has been called a "spreadsheet psychic" and "number-crunching prodigy" by New York Magazine.¶ Nate comes out of the world of baseball statistics, but during the 2008 presidential election primaries, he turned his sights and his amazing predictive abilities and forecasting models to the game of politics and current events — with incredible results.¶ He began by predicting 2008 primary election results with stunning accuracy — and often in opposition to the better-known political pollsters. He then moved on to the general election, where he correctly predicted the presidential winner in 49 states and the District of Columbia.¶

#### Energy would become key- the plans decision to focus voter priorities to energy would

Aldrich, Griffin & Rickershausser ‘05

John is an Endowed Professor of Political Science at Duke University and wrote the article with his 2 students, “The Presidency and the Election Campaign: Altering Voters’ Priorities in the 2004 Election,” The Presidency and the Political System, Congrsesional Quaterly Press

We first compare by month the percentage of the electorate that identified an issue as the nation's most important problem and the percentage of each of the candidate's speeches in that month that addressed that issue.¶ Looking first at the war in Iraq, voters of all partisan stripes appear to have responded to variations in the candidates' emphasis on this issue (see Figure 4). For example, President Bush focused much less on Iraq in July than in June; Kerry also emphasized Iraq less. As a result, there was a sharp drop in voters’ identification of Iraq as the nation's most important problem from July to August. Then, in September, both candidates focused more on Iraq than they had in August, and the voters also became more concerned about Iraq. ¶ As for the war on terrorism, Bush generally increased his attention to this concern as the year unfolded. Except in September, Kerry spoke about it less. Among the public, there was fairly low but slowly increasing concern about this issue until the end of the campaign. ¶ Turning to health care, John Kerry emphasized health care issues much more in August than he had in July, and President Bush emphasized health care issues more in September than he had in August (See Figure 5). Among voters, a sharp increase in their identification of health care as the nation's most important problem occurred in September, following the candidates’ increased emphasis on the issue. In October and November, the candidates emphasized health care less than they has in September, and voters, too, cared less about this issue.¶ The economy is a special case. If the incumbent campaigns on the economy, it is to claim that all is well – and therefore it should not be considered an “important problem.” When the challenger addresses the economy, it is to claim that it’s in trouble. The challenger’s speeches therefore should increase expressions of public concern, the incumbent’s should decrease it. This pattern is evident in Figure 6, in which Bush's increased emphasis on the economy in the late fall reduced Republicans’ concern. In contrast, Kerry's somewhat erratic effort to persuade voters that the economy was poor was only modestly effective among Democrats. ¶ An alternative interpretation of these results is that candidates' desire to emphasize issues in response to voters' rising concerns, rather than the other way around. But as we have seen, changes in the candidates' issue emphases in 2004 generally preceded, rather than followed changes in voters' concerns. The voters were responding to the candidates. ¶ A final possibility is that both the voters' concerns and the candidates’ emphases may have been caused by events such as casualty counts in Iraq or changes in the unemployment rate. To be sure, events give the candidates the raw material with which to make credible claims. But the events themselves rarely affect the voters’ choices directly. Events affect elections only when the candidates incorporate them into their appeals.¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ ¶ The more time Bush and Kerry spent discussing an issue, the greater the percentage increase in the public’s identification of that issue as important. Issues that were largely ignored by the candidates – education, for example – actually declined in voters’ identification of them as the most important problem. The time the candidates invested discussing Iraq and health care, conversely, significantly increased the public’s concern about them. Note that, in the case of Iraq, external events and media coverage reinforced the attention the candidates gave the issue, while in the case of health care, the increase in public concern can be attributed almost exclusively to the actions of the candidates, because there were few prominent health care related external events.

## 1NR

### Foreign Military Bases

**Foreign Military bases are not in the United States- 14th amendment proves**

**US Department of State Manual ’12**

“7 Fam 1113 Not Included in the Meaning of “in the United States” http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86755.pdf

Despite widespread popular belief, U.S. military installations abroad ¶ and U.S. diplomatic or consular facilities abroad are not part of ¶ the United States within the meaning of the 14th Amendment. A ¶ child born on the premises of such a facility is not born in the ¶ United States and does not acquire U.S. citizenship by reason of ¶ birth.

#### Forward military bases are “of” the United States but not “IN” the United States

Erbsen (Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School) ‘11

Allan 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1168

The place "United States" is difficult to define for two reasons: the different meanings of United States may not be coextensive, and there are several plausible permutations of what the United States may encompass. First, the scope of the United States as an entity need not be coextensive with its scope as a place because an entity can own or exercise control over places that are not physically within itself. The Constitution seems to recognize this fact in at least two provisions. The Thirteenth Amendment refers to conduct "within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction," n87 and the Eighteenth Amendment (now repealed) referred to imports and exports "into" and "from" the "United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof." n88 A place can thus be affiliated with the United States in a constitutionally meaningful way without being "in" it, n89 and so the term "United States" may have distinct **[\*1192]** context-sensitive definitions depending on whether it refers to an entity or a place. n90 Moreover, asking whether a given place is a physical component of the United States rather than merely subject to its control (i.e., is it "in" the United States or "of" the United States) may often be pointless because there is no reason to think that the distinction matters beyond a few exceptional issues noted below. n91 Thus, for example, there might be no reason to develop legal fictions about whether the land under a particular federal installation is on U.S. soil, n92 or whether a ship flying a U.S. flag is an "island" of the United States. n93 What matters is how a particular place relates to the **[\*1193]** United States, which may not exclusively be a function of the place's location.

### EEZ and Seas Not in the United States

#### EEZ is not in the United States

**US Department of State Manual ’12**

“7 Fam 1113 Not Included in the Meaning of “in the United States” http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86755.pdf

7 FAM 1113 NOT INCLUDED IN THE ¶ MEANING OF "IN THE UNITED STATES"¶ (CT:CON-314; 08-21-2009)¶ a. Birth on U.S. Registered Vessel On High Seas or in the Exclusive ¶ Economic Zone: A U.S.-registered or documented ship on the high seas ¶ or in the exclusive economic zone is not considered to be part of the ¶ United States. Under the law of the sea, an Exclusive Economic Zone ¶ (EEZ) is a maritime zone over which a State has special rights over the ¶ exploration and use of natural resources. The Exclusive Economic Zone ¶ extends up to 200 nautical miles from the coastal baseline. A child born ¶ on such a vessel does not acquire U.S. citizenship by reason of the ¶ place of birth (Lam Mow v. Nagle, 24 F.2d 316 (9th Cir., 1928)).

# Round 7 v Liberty LS

## 1NC

### Off 1

**Obama will win- swing states**

**Blumenthal 10-25**

Mark is the Director of Pollster, the Huffington Post’s Election Analysis and Model, “Presidential Polls Counter Romney Surge Myth,”

New **polls** released on Wednesday and Thursday continue to **show** President Barack **Obama holding narrow leads in** a handful of **critical battleground states**, but running within a whisker of Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney nationwide.¶ While Romney gained significantly in the wake of the first presidential debate in early October, **the lack of a continuing trend** over the past two weeks **helps counter a theme** in some campaign coverage **that Romney's support continues to "surge**" nationwide.¶ The most recent updates of the seven daily national tracking polls continue to split in terms of which candidate holds the nominal lead, ranging from a 4 percentage-point lead for Romney on the Rasmussen Reports automated tracking to a 3 point Obama advantage on the Investor's Business Daily/TIPP poll.¶ 2012-10-25-trackers.png¶ Separately, a new Associated Press/GfK survey released on Thursday morning showed Romney with a 2 percentage-point edge over Obama (47 to 45 percent).¶ The HuffPost Pollster tracking model, which combines data from both national and statewide polling to create a combined estimate, continues to show a near tie, with just two-tenths of one percent separating Romney (47.1 percent) and Obama (46.9 percent) as of this writing. The model currently reports just 56 percent confidence that Romney is actually leading the national popular vote; slightly better than a coin-toss, but just barely.¶ Although their methodologies and estimates of the leader vary considerably, these national tracking polls provide a useful gauge of late trends, since they collectively interview over 2,000 voters a day. Their most recent releases show no signs of Romney momentum. Three ticked in Obama's direction, three were unchanged and one moved toward Romney.¶ Wednesday also brought four new surveys in Ohio. Three of the four, from Time, SurveyUSA and Democratic pollster Lake Research, gave Obama leads ranging from 2 to 5 percentage points while the Rasmussen automated survey reported a tie.¶ 2012-10-25-ohio.png¶ The new results have little impact on the Ohio trend chart produced by the Pollster model, which continues to give Obama an advantage of just over 2 percentage points. Although that lead is narrow, the volume of polling in Ohio boosts the model's confidence that Obama is running ahead there to 96 percent.¶ Collectively, the new polls of the past 24 hours have done nothing to change the standings in the most crucial battleground states. **Obama continued to hold leads of 2 to 3 percentage points in Ohio, Iowa, Nevada and Wisconsi**n, four **states that** currently **combine** with the states where Obama leads by larger margins **to create a 277 electoral vote majority**, seven more than the 270 needed to win.¶ 2012-10-25-battlegrounds.png¶ Romney continues to lead in North Carolina and retain a narrow edge in Florida, states that would net him 233 electoral votes along with other states where Romney leads by larger margins. Those totals leave 26 electoral votes up for grabs in New Hampshire, Colorado and Virginia, states where the tracking model shows Obama leading by very narrow margins of 2 percentage points or less.¶ Collectively, the trends of the past week provide a reality check to two myths that have emerged in recent campaign coverage.¶ The first is that Romney has been "surging" since the first debate. While the debate certainly boosted Romney's standing in the polls, trends over the past two weeks have been negligible, with the leader seesawing nationally within a range of roughly one percentage point. Over the same period, the standings within the key battleground states have also remained constant. Other poll tracking models have shown the same patterns.¶ The second myth is that the national and battleground states polls have produced widely divergent results. **If we use the state estimates produced by the Pollster tracking model in the nine key battlegrounds** (Iowa, Wisconsin, Nevada, Ohio, New Hampshire, Colorado, Virginia, Florida and North Carolina) to create a combined total vote based on the turnout in each state in 2008, **we show Obama leading in across all nine states by a slim 0.6 percentage point margin** (47.8 to 47.2 percent as of this writing; the estimated margin would be 47.9 to 47.2 percent if based on the 2004 turnout).¶ Romney does slightly better in the national popular vote estimate, of course, but his 0.2 percentage point advantage there is only slightly better. The net gap is less than a percentage point.¶ As the Cook Political Report's David Wasserman writes on Twitter, simply subtracting 4 percentage points from Obama's 2008 margins in each state produces a similar result: "He'd lose Popular vote by 0.7% but still win w/ 272 EC votes."¶ The differences may appear bigger because Obama's advantages are spread across a number of relatively small battleground states that, except for Ohio, all have 10 or fewer electoral votes. Romney stays close in the combined battleground state estimate mostly because his three best states -- Florida, North Carolina and Virginia -- represent just over half (51 percent) of the combined battleground vote.¶ So yes, the potential exists for a divided outcome, with Obama winning the Electoral College and Romney winning the popular vote, but such an outcome would be, as it was 12 years ago, a game of inches, not yards.

**SMR’s incredibly unpopular- Batman**

**Deal-Blackwell 7/23**

(Deborah, works with Los Alamos, founder of Hyperion Power Generation, ““Dark Knight Rises” Batman movie does infant SMR industry no favors” <http://ixpower.com/tag/small-modular-reactors/>, SEH)

But, I couldn’t believe it …Holy Plot Twist Batman! I cringed when we got to the part where they introduced the little nuclear reactor. ACK! **The Nolan Brothers had written in Wayne Enterprises** Applied Science Division **developing an SMR** (Small Modular nuclear power Reactor) that was used by the bad guys to threaten Gotham. In the movie, **the bad guys gain access to the SMR and** had a scientist magically presto changeo **TURN IT INTO A FUSION NUCLEAR BOMB** in what seemed like a turn of a screw, and in the space of a few minutes. As the movie progressed, and I became sore from my date nudging me with his elbow, darn it if the characters didn’t flip the sucker onto the back of the truck and drive around Gotham with it …!¶ GROAN! CRINGE! I know it’s just a movie and YOU know it’s just a movie, but golly, gosh darn, The Dark Knight Rises sure doesn’t help the rise of the fledging SMR industry! ¶ Fusion?! Ack! Fusion bomb?! Ack! Quickly retrofitting a power reactor to be a bomb?! Ack! Throwing it in a truck and driving it around the city?! ¶ Double Ack! The fairy tale spun further and further out of control. I wanted to bang my head on the seat in front of me. I don’t recall any other recent movies featuring a small nuclear power being turned into a bomb, and I sure wish this one had not.¶ **Misconceptions about nuclear power abound today. Misconceptions and fear about SMRs**, I’m afraid, **will no doubt skyrocket after everyone gets around to seeing this movie**. If you ask me, **the release of this Batman flick hands the Union of Concerned Scientists a loaded Batpistol to scare the uninformed majority into opposing the development of SMRs**. ¶ This movie could be a pain in the collective butts of those of us who believe SMRs have a place in the future of clean energy for our planet and may come back to haunt the nuclear industry – for both big and small power reactors. I’m pretty sure it will – just as sure as at the end of every Batman movie, the dark knight rises.¶

**Approval Rating is key, lines up perfectly with reelection
Silver ’11**

Nate directs five thirty eight and is a statistician, “Approval Ratings and Reelection Odds,” <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/approval-ratings-and-re-election-odds/>

Earlier this month, we posted the simple version of a finding, based on the historical record, that is worth keeping in mind when you read articles about how Barack Obama’s presidency has (or has not been) been revitalized: It’s just too soon for his approval ratings to tell us very much about his re-election prospects for 2012. This is an overdue follow-up to that article — what you might think of as the slightly-more-complicated version. While **it’s true that approval ratings aren’t of much use now, it’s also the case that, by the time we get close to the election, they will have become a very reliable predictor of Mr. Obama’s chances of winning another term**. Based on Gallup polling, here is what I estimate that the incumbent president’s approval rating was on Election Day in almost every election since 1940. (There is no data for 1944 because Gallup went on wartime hiatus.) There are a few tricks I had to employ to derive these numbers; I’d ask you to take them on faith for a few moments, and then we’ll explain everything later on. **At first glance, the relationship seems nearly perfect: every incumbent with an approval rating of 49 percent or higher won re-election, while every candidate with a rating of 48 percent or lower lost.** In practice, things probably don’t work quite that crisply. For example, Harry Truman, whom we estimate had a 50 percent approval rating on Election Day 1948, won by 4.5 points, and 114 electoral votes, over Thomas E. Dewey, which suggests that he had some margin to spare. And candidate quality clearly makes a difference. Although Robert Dole is sometimes considered a weak Republican nominee, Bill Clinton beat him in 1996 by just 8.5 points, despite Mr. Clinton’s 55 percent approval rating. By contrast, in 1972, Richard Nixon, with an approval rating only a couple of points higher (57 percent), trounced a very weak Democratic nominee, George McGovern, by more than 23 points. Still, the approval rating at which an incumbent candidate goes from being an underdog to a favorite for re-election is somewhere in the high 40s. **The reason the threshold is probably slightly below 50 percent rather than right at 50 percent is that in any approval survey, some people (typically 5 to 10 percent) say they are undecided about the president’s performance**. For instance, at this writing, Barack Obama’s Gallup approval rating is 49 percent but his disapproval rating is just 42 percent, a net margin of +7. If those were the figures on Election Day, he would be a favorite to win unless nearly everybody who was undecided about his performance cast their ballots against him, something that is possible in theory but usually doesn’t occur in practice. Now, then, how did we come up with these numbers? As I said, it’s not quite so straightforward. Gallup has approval ratings data going back to 1937. The problem is that, until fairly recently, they had a habit of stopping their approval ratings polling several months before a presidential election. For instance, in 1956, their last poll of Dwight Eisenhower’s public approval was in early August; they did not survey him again until late November, after he had already defeated Adlai Stevenson. However, we can extrapolate what Mr. Eisenhower’s rating would have been on Election Day 1956 by drawing a smoothed regression line — known in the business as a Loess curve — using the data points before and after that date. The one hitch is that incumbent presidents, whether they win, lose, or don’t run at all, almost always receive a “bounce” in their approval rating after the election, as people either rally around a winner or feel sympathy for the lame duck. The average magnitude of this post-election bounce is 4 points. So, before I fitted the curves, I subtracted 4 points from approval rating polls conducted after Election Day. By applying this process of bounce-adjustment and curve-fitting, we are able to estimate an incumbent president’s Gallup approval rating on Election Day itself or on any day before it, as shown in this nifty-looking graphic: I haven’t labeled the curves by the candidate’s name in the chart, because that which create too much clutter. But I have distinguished those who eventually won re-election (blue lines) from those who lost (red). A couple of cases are worth attention. The red line that you see briefly extending above 80 percent is for George H.W. Bush. His approval ratings, which were already pretty good, shot up following the start of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, when American-led forces drove Iraqi troops back from their occupation of Kuwait. Politically, that made Mr. Bush look like an extremely formidable candidate for re-election: Saturday Night Live ran a sketch later that year entitled “Campaign ’92: The Race To Avoid Being The Guy Who Loses To Bush,” with Democratic candidates at a debate all trying to lose so they would not have to run against him. But Mr. Bush’s approval ratings fell precipitously throughout late 1991 and early 1992, and were below 40 percent by Election Day. If Mr. Bush is the precedent that challengers will cite when their campaign seems to be flailing, the opposite example is the original Comeback Kid, Harry Truman. He’s the blue line that you still see down around 40 percent approval with just five months to go before the election of 1948. It’s hard to know exactly where Mr. Truman’s approval numbers were on Election Day. When Gallup surveyed in late June, he had just 39 percent approval; in January, 1949, after he had beaten Thomas E. Dewey, he was up to 69 percent; and then he reverted back to 50 percent just a couple months later. Our Loess curve estimates that Mr. Truman’s approval rating was probably around 50 percent on Election Day, but this is just a guess. What’s clear is that Mr. Truman was at some point an extremely unpopular president, and he nevertheless — to the great surprise of the Chicago Daily Tribune — defeated Mr. Dewey. Another thing to take from the graphic is how the red and blue lines gradually untangle themselves as the relationship between approval ratings and re-election becomes stronger over time. We can see this a bit more clearly by taking the average approval rating for the 8 winning candidates and the 3 losing ones and tracking them over the two years leading up to the election: I would resist the idea that there is any one magical date when approval ratings go from meaningless to meaningful as predictors of re-election. In the chart, the first time the winners and the losers begin to separate themselves is about 19 months before the election — which would correspond roughly to March of the prior year — but the split would have come a bit earlier if not for Mr. Bush’s Gulf War bounce. There’s also increasing differentiation in the period roughly 10 to 5 months before the election, corresponding with primary season. Still, for the most part, the separation occurs gradually. I’ve also tried to play around with various sorts of logistic regression models that attempt to predict a president’s chances at re-election based solely on his Gallup approval rating and the number of days until the election. Don’t take this terribly seriously — it’s hard to do anything very rigorous based on so few data points (just 11 presidents in the sample), and I can imagine better model designs than the one that I’ve used. But it does yield some ballpark estimates of what this data implies. **For example, a year in advance of the election, the model figures that a president with a 60 percent approval rating is about 90 percent likely to win re-election, whereas a 40 percent rating translates into a win probability of a bit below 40 percent**. So by that point the differences have become fairly meaningful: What does this mean for Barack Obama? Right now, we’re still in the period where the most useful number for estimating his re-election chances is not his approval rating but rather the historical track record of incumbent presidents. As I wrote on Wednesday, since the Civil War, 73 percent of incumbent presidents who sought another term won, as have 70 percent since World War II. Plugging Mr. Obama’s current numbers into the regression model that I described above yields a 65 percent likelihood of re-election — but again, this is a really rough guess, based mostly on the high historical batting average for incumbents rather than anything to do with Mr. Obama himself. What we can say is important is the range in which Mr. Obama’s approval ratings have been varying in recent months: between about 45 and about 50 percent. **If Mr. Obama’s approval rating is at the top of that range, 50 percent, on Nov. 6, 2012 — about where it is now — the model figures that his chances of winning re-election will be greater than 80 percent. But if his approval rating is at the bottom of the range instead, at 45 percent, his chances for a second term will be only about one in three,** and he’ll have to hope that the Republican nominee is a weak one. Much will change between now and then, of course. But Mr. Obama would probably win an election held next Tuesday — and that would not have been true a couple of months ago.

**China label kills relations and the economy**

**Roach 8-28**

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True to his word as a candidate, **a few hours after taking office** as US president on January 20, 2013, Mitt **Romney issued his first executive order, declaring China guilty of currency manipulation.** In accordance with the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, President Romney’s act triggered immediate negotiations between US and Chineseofficials. But the **negotiations stalled and** both parties blamed the other in press releases.¶ In early February, in his first State of the Union address, Mr Romney said: “Enough is enough. It is high time for China to play by our rules.” Congress roared its approval and within a week, **overwhelming bipartisan majorities of both houses passed** the Defend America Trade Act of 2013. Modelled on the currency manipulation **“remedies”** of countervailing tariffs first proposed in 2005, DATA was signed into law on President’s Day, February 18 2013. **China was quickly deemed to be in violation** of the new statute.¶ More¶ At that point negotiations took on a new urgency. But the new leaders in both countries were in no mood for compromise and the talks failed. **In accordance** with the provisions of DATA**, Washington slapped immediate tariffs of 20 per cent on all Chinese products entering the US.**¶ **As plants shut down across China, Beijing declared this to be an act of economic wa**r and filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization. Li **Keqiang,** newly installed as premier**, announced** after the National People’s Congress in March that **China had no patience to endure a WTO dispute process that could take** anywhere from **two to five years** to run its course.¶ **China’s Ministry of Commerce** then **announced retaliatory tariffs of 20 per cent** on all US exports to China. This hit growth-starved America right between the eyes. With $104bn of American-made goods sold in Chinese markets in 2011, China had become the US’s third-largest and its fastest-growing export market. To add insult to injury, China-dependent **Walmart announced average price increases of 5 per cent.** Other retailers followed suit. Talk of stagflation was in the air and **hard-pressed American consumers hunkered down further**.¶ **US financial markets swooned. The stock market was hit by pressures on profit margins, growth and inflation. The bond market was also unnerved by the realisation that the Federal Reserve was seriously behind the curve**. With good reason. After its meeting in June 2013, the Fed reaffirmed its ever-extending commitment to keep its benchmark policy rate near zero through 2015, and even dangled the possibility of yet another round of quantitative easing, QE4. Yields on 10-year Treasuries moved back above 4 per cent and stocks fell sharply further.¶ Feeling the heat from financial markets, Washington turned up the heat on China. **Mr Romney called Congress back** from its Independence Day holiday into a special session. By unanimous consent, Congress passed an amendment to DATA **– upping the tariffs** on China by another **10** percentage **points.**¶At that point an indignant **China turned to its own version of the big bazooka**. The biggest foreign buyer of US debt was nowhere to be seen at the Treasury’s August 2013 auction. Long-term interest rates spiked and within weeks **yields on 10-year Treasuries hit 7 per cent. The dollar plunged and the US stock market went into free fall**.¶ Just like that, the so-called exorbitant privilege of the haven asset vanished. **When asked** at a press conference **why China would willingly engage in actions that would undermine the value of more than $2tn in Treasuries and other** dollar-based holdings, Zhou Xiaochuan, retiring **governor of the People’s Bank of China, said: “**This is not about risk-adjusted portfolio returns**. We are defending our people against an act of economic war.”**¶ **By the autumn of 2013 there was little doubt of the severity of renewed recession in** the US. Trade sanctions on China had backfired. Beleaguered American workers paid the highest price of all, as the unemployment rate shot back up above 10 per cent. A horrific policy blunder had confirmed that there was no bilateral fix for the multilateral trade imbalance of a savings-starved US economy.¶ In China, growth had slipped below the dreaded 6 per cent threshold and the new leadership was rolling out yet another investment stimulus for a still unbalanced and unstable Chinese economy. **As the global economy slipped back into recession, the Great Crisis of 2008-09 suddenly looked like child’s play. Globalisation itself hung in the balance**.¶ History warns us never to say never. We need only look at the legacy of US Senator Reed Smoot and Representative Willis Hawley, who sponsored the infamous Tariff Act of 1930 – America’s worst economic policy blunder. Bad dreams can – and have – become reality.

 **Economic decline causes nuclear war**

**Harris and Burrows, 09 –**

 PhD in European History @ Cambridge and Counselor of the US National Intelligence Council AND Member of the National Intelligence Council’s Long Range Analysis Unit (Mathew J. and Jennifer, “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis,” April, Washington Quarterly, <http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_Burrows.pdf>)

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the **Great Depression** is not likely to be repeated, the **lessons** to be drawn from that period **include the harmful effects on** **fledgling** **democracies** and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) **and** on the sustainability of **multilateral institutions** (think League of Nations in the same period). **There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first** as much as in the twentieth **century.** For that reason, the ways in which **the potential for greater conflict could grow** would seem to be even more apt **in a** constantly **volatile economic environment** as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. **Terrorism**’s appeal **will decline if** economic **growth continues** in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the **diffusion of technologies** and scientific knowledge **will place** some of **the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach**. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity **conflict** and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella **could lead to an unintended escalation** and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close **proximity of** potential **nuclear rivals** combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions **may place more focus on preemption** rather than defense, potentially **leading to escalating crises**. 36 Types of **conflict** that the world continues to experience, such as **over resources, could reemerge,** particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. **Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity** will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this **could result in interstate conflicts** if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, **cooperation** to manage changing water resources **is** likely to be increasingly **difficult** both within and between states **in a** more **dog-eat-dog world.**

### Off 2

**Fiscal Cliff Passes but Capital’s Key**

**Klein 10-18**

Ezra is a Washington Post Columnist, Bloomberg Columnist and MSNBC Contributor, “Obama’s plan: Push Republicans off the fiscal cliff,” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/10/18/obamas-plan-push-republicans-off-the-fiscal-cliff/>

I’ve criticized the Obama campaign for failing to detail much of a vision for a second term. But that’s not to say they don’t have one. They do. It’s just a hard one to campaign on.¶ Nam Y. Huh — Associated Press¶ After promising in 2008 to bring about a new era of cooperation in Washington, they’re campaigning in 2012 knowing that, if reelected, they will start their second term with a brutal, economy-shaking showdown with Republicans over spending and taxes.¶ If the Obama administration were to really lay out their plans, they would go something like this. In November, President **Obama will reiterate**, clearly and firmly, that **he will veto any attempts to extend** the **high-income tax cuts** or lift the big, dumb spending cuts without finding equivalent savings elsewhere. In fact, as my colleague Lori Montgomery reports, they’re already reiterating that promise.¶ That veto threat is the center of the Obama administration’s second-term strategizing. The **Obama** administration believes – **and**, just as importantly, **they believe** **Republicans believe — that they’ve got the leverage here**. The Republican position on taxes is less popular than the Democratic position. The outcome of gridlock is much higher taxes, which is more anathema to Republicans and arguably cheering to Democrats. The big, dumb spending cuts, despite being poorly timed and inanely constructed, are very progressive in their effect, falling heavily on military spending while exempting Medicaid, Social Security, and Medicare beneficiaries.¶ Note: These figures don’t include savings from reduced interest payments.¶ I’ve called this the GOP’s dual-trigger nightmare. It’s bad for the economy, but it also effectively ends our deficits with a mix of tax increases and spending cuts more progressive than anything any Democrat has dared propose. Republicans absolutely can’t let it happen. But the only way they can stop it from happening is to make a deal. ¶ The administration hopes this deal will include more than just deficit reduction. They also see it as a vehicle for infrastructure investment and tax reform. They think there’s some chance that parts of the American Jobs Act, like the hiring tax credits, could sneak through the door, too. There’s even talk of using it to address climate change, though everyone agrees that’s unlikely. Whatever ends up in the final deal, there’s little doubt that it will be a big deal, and it’s likely to come together fairly quickly in the first year. The White House — and the expiring tax and spending provisions — won’t give Republicans any other choice.¶ In a way, the Obama administration’s plan for a second term is much like their plan for the first term: Make a deal with Republicans. Get a big bipartisan solution to our problems. But the means are almost precisely the opposite. Where in the first term, the hope was that they could reach out, talk through the issues, and come to an agreement**, the plan for the second is to push the Republican Party off the fiscal cliff, and then force them to reach out in order to get pulled back up**.¶ To put it plainly, in 2008, the Obama campaign hoped Republicans would work with them. In 2012, they have a plan. **Their plan stands a good chance of working**. But it doesn’t sound as good as hope does in a speech. That’s why you’re not hearing much about it.

**Plan kills Obama**

**Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 1/9**/12, Obama Plays Safe on Energy Policy, Lexis

With less than a year to go **until he faces re-election, US President Barack Obama is trying to avoid controversial energy policy decisions**, postponing the finalization of restrictions on oil refinery and power plant emissions and delaying the approval of a major crude pipeline project. The president’s **caution will prolong the status quo on issues where the industry both opposes and supports the administration’s plans**, and also illustrates what's at stake for energy policy depending on whether or not Obama is given another four years in office. Most of Obama's original campaign **pledges on promoting alternatives to fossil fuels and tackling climate change have not passed muster** with Congress, most notably an ambitious plan for national carbon controls, a subsequent toned-down clean energy standard floated after the carbon legislation failed, and repeated efforts to repeal $30 billion-$40 billion worth of oil industry tax deductions over 10 years ( PIW May9'11 ). The one exception has been the passage of $90 billion in clean energy funding as part of an economic stimulus bill passed early in Obama's term, but the White House has been unable to repeat this success in other energy policy areas ( PIW Feb.23'09 ).

**Causes Middle East War**

**Hutchison**, U.S. Senator from the great state of Texas, 9/21/**2012**

(Kay Bailey, “A Looming Threat to National Security,” States News Service, Lexis)

Despite warnings of the dire consequences, America is teetering at the edge of a fiscal cliff, with January 1st, 2013 as the tipping point. On that date, unless Congress and the White House can reach agreement on how to cut the federal deficit, all taxpayers will be hit with higher taxes and deep cuts - called "sequestration" - will occur in almost all government spending, disrupting our already weak economy and putting our national security at risk.¶ According to the House Armed Services Committee, if sequestration goes into effect, it would put us on course for more than $1 trillion in defense cuts over the next 10 years. What would that mean? A huge hit to our military personnel and their families; devastating cuts in funding for critical military equipment and supplies for our soldiers; and **a** potentially **catastrophic blow to our** national defense and **security capabilities** in a time of increasing violence and danger.¶ All Americans feel a debt of gratitude to our men and women who serve in uniform. But Texas in particular has a culture that not only reveres the commitment and sacrifice they make to protect our freedom, we send a disproportionate number of our sons and daughters to serve.¶ The burden is not borne solely by those who continue to answer the call of duty, but by their families as well, as they endure separation and the anxiety of a loved one going off to war. These Americans have made tremendous sacrifices. They deserve better than to face threats to their financial security and increased risks to their loved ones in uniform, purely for political gamesmanship.¶ Sequestration would also place an additional burden on our economy. In the industries that support national defense, as many as 1 million skilled workers could be laid off. With 43 straight months of unemployment above 8 percent, it is beyond comprehension to add a virtual army to the 23 million Americans who are already out of work or under-employed. **Government and private economic forecasters warn that sequestration will push the country back into recession next year**.¶ The recent murder of our Ambassador to Libya and members of his staff, attacks on US embassies and consulates and continued riots across the Middle East and North Africa are stark reminders that great portions of the world remain volatile and hostile to the US. **We have the mantle of responsibility that being the world's lone super-power brings**. **In the absence of U.S. military leadership**, **upheaval in the Middle East would be worse**. **As any student of history can attest**, **instability does not confine itself to national borders**. **Strife that starts in one country can spread like wildfire across a region**.¶ Sequestration's cuts would reduce an additional 100,000 airmen, Marines, sailors and soldiers. That would leave us with the smallest ground force since 1940, the smallest naval fleet since 1915 and the smallest tactical fighter force in the Air Force's history. With the destabilization in the Middle East and other areas tenuous, we would be left with a crippled military, **a diminished stature internationally and a loss of technological** research, development and **advantage** - just as actors across the globe are increasing their capabilities.¶ Sequestration can still be avoided. **But that will require leadership from the President** that has thus far been missing. Congress and the White House must reach a long-term agreement to reduce $1 trillion annual budget deficits, without the harsh tax increases that could stall economic growth and punish working families.

**Middle East goes nuclear**

James A. **Russell**, Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, **‘9** (Spring) “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” IFRI, Proliferation Papers, #26, http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26\_Russell\_2009.pdf

**Strategic stability in the region is** thus **undermined by** various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) **the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists**; (3) **incompatible assumptions about** the structure of **the deterrent relationship that makes** the **bargaining** framework strategically **unstable;** (4) **perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity** for military **action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack**; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) **the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants**. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors**, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of** **chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons**. **It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used** **in the context of an unstable strategic framework.** **Systemic asymmetries** between actors in fact s**uggest** a certain increase in **the probability of war** – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. **Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own** and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent **such an outcom**e, which **would be an unprecedented disaster for the** peoples of the **region, with substantial risk for the entire world**.

###  Off 3

**CP text: the 50 States and all relevant Territories should enter into a compact on:**

**providing a substantial amount of loan guarantees for small modular thermal reactors in the United States. The Compact should collect revenue via a Clean Energy Community Finance Initiative.**

**Compacts solve faster than the federal government**

**Mountjoy ‘01**

John is a policy analyst with the council of State Governments, “Interstate Compacts Make a Comeback,” Spring <http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/ncic/Comeback.pdf>

**Some may question the need for interstate compacts to address multi-state policy issues. Why** ¶ **not leave such regulation to the feds?** ¶ **“Interstate compacts help us maintain state control,”** said Gary McConnell, director of the ¶ Georgia Emergency Management Agency. ¶ During his 10 years as GEMA director, McConnell has played an instrumental role in developing ¶ and promoting a successful interstate compact —the Emergency Management Assistance ¶ Compact, or EMAC. EMAC allows state emergency management agencies to cooperate and ¶ share resources in the event of natural and man-made disasters. ¶ “**We can go to the federal government for all kinds of help when natural disasters strike, but the** ¶ **states** [cooperating under an interstate compact] **can provide specific resources quicker, which** ¶ **are likely to be problem specific,” McConnell said. “It’s less bureaucratic, and it’s far cheaper**. ¶ It’s easier for us under EMAC to obtain resources from surrounding states than it is to use ¶ federal assistance, which we’d end up having to pay more for anyway. **I suspect this is the case** ¶ **with many other interstate compacts as well.”** ¶ **“States are rediscovering that they have the power to address their own problems better than the** ¶ **federal government**,” said Rick Masters, The Council of State Governments’ legal counsel and ¶ special counsel for interstate compacts. ¶ CSG, which has tracked interstate compacts for more than 40 years, maintains a clearinghouse of ¶ compact information. More recently, CSG helps administer EMAC and is facilitating the update ¶ of the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision and the Interstate Compact on ¶ Juveniles. Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution laid the legal foundation for interstate ¶ compacts: “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep ¶ Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another ¶ State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent ¶ Danger as will not admit of delay.” Compacts actually preceded the Constitution, having been ¶ used in colonial times to resolve boundary disputes between colonies. ¶ Prior to the 1920s, interstate compacts were typically bi-state agreements, addressing boundary ¶ disputes and territorial claims. In fact, only 36 interstate compacts were formed between 1783 ¶ and 1920. It is only in this century that states have turned to interstate compacts to facilitate ¶ cooperative solutions to multi-state problems. ¶ After a lull in the late 1970s and early 1980s, interstate compacts are beginning to enjoy a ¶ resurgence. Since the early 1990s, states have initiated or updated several high-profile compacts. ¶ Examples include EMAC, the Interstate Compact on Industrialized/Modular Buildings and the ¶ Interstate Insurance Receivership Compact. Interstate compacts can set the framework for cooperative solutions to today’s cross-state ¶ challenges, from policing drugs to supplying energy or controlling sprawl. ¶ “Issues within the states are becoming more complex and aren’t confined by state boundaries. As ¶ a result, solutions are becoming multi-state as well. Compacts are the only tool that is truly ¶ adequate for addressing these multi-state issues,” said Bill Voit, senior project director at The ¶ Council of State Governments. ¶ An example is an interstate compact being considered to facilitate taxation of e-commerce. ¶ Opponents of Internet taxation claim that it would be virtually impossible for online vendors to ¶ comply with the complex, often confusing system of state and local sales and use taxes. Since ¶ Internet sales are expected to reach $184 billion annually by 2004, states have a vested interest in ¶ breaking down this and other barriers to taxing online transactions. ¶ Congress currently is considering the Internet Tax Moratorium Equity Act (S. 512) to help states ¶ simplify their sales and use taxes, in part by authorizing states to enter into an Interstate Sales ¶ and Use Tax Compact. The compact would create a “uniform, streamlined sales and use tax ¶ system,” convenient to remote sales. ¶ At least 18 states are considering the model streamlined sales tax legislation in 2001. Kentucky, ¶ South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming already have signed bills into law. ¶ Existing interstate compacts, many drafted in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, are ripe for ¶ amendment and revision. Technology and the Internet now make the sharing of information ¶ seamless and immediate, yet several interstate compacts are plagued by inadequate ¶ administration. ¶ “Not only do we see the development of new compacts, but we are seeing the re-examination of ¶ existing compacts…revising them to keep pace with our changing world,” Masters said. ¶ Developed in 1937, the Interstate Compact for the Supervision of Parolees and Probationers is ¶ one example of a compact in need of update. Adopted by all 50 states, the compact regulates the ¶ movement of parolees and probationers across state lines. The burgeoning offender population ¶ and the ease with which offenders now can travel have created several problems for the compact, ¶ including: frequent violations of compact rules, inability to enforce compliance, difficulty in ¶ creating new rules and slow, unreliable exchange of case information. ¶ The antiquated compact needed a replacement that would provide states the authority, ¶ enforcement tools and resources to adequately track and ensure supervision of parolees and ¶ probationers. ¶ The new interstate compact, the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision, provides ¶ these solutions. The new compact includes mechanisms for enforcement, accountability, resource provision, information sharing and state-to-state cooperation. Currently, the compact ¶ has been introduced in 39 states and enacted in 18. ¶ Just as technology can smooth the operation of interstate compacts, alternative dispute resolution ¶ techniques can increase their self-sufficiency. Enforcement tools within interstate compacts need ¶ to utilize more of the mediation and arbitration services that have proven successful throughout ¶ state government. By developing additional self-contained enforcement mechanisms, compact ¶ members would not need to rely solely on the crowded docket of the U.S. Supreme Court. ¶ **States should further utilize interstate compacts to address new problems and create new** ¶ **methods of interstate cooperation. If not, federal preemption in certain policy areas is a distinct** ¶ **possibility.**

### Off 4

**The affirmative’s move to prevent the spread of weapons to new nuclear states is a specific brand of Orientalist logic that should be rejected**

**Gusterson 1999** (Hugh, Professor of Anthropology, George Mason University , “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in Western Imagination,” Cultural Anthropology, pg. 114)

http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Stan-PS-314-2009-Q1\_PNP/Syllabus/EReadings/Gusterson1999Nuclear.pdf

Thus in Western discourse nuclear weapons are represented so that "theirs" are a problem whereas "ours" are not. During the Cold War the **Western discourse on the dangers of "nuclear proliferation" defined the term in such a way as to sever** the two senses of the word proliferation. This usage split off **the "vertical" proliferation of the superpower arsenals** (the development of new and improved weapons designs and the numerical expansion of the stockpiles) **from the "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, presenting only the latter as the "proliferation problem.**" Following the end of the Cold War, the American and Russian arsenals are being cut to a few thousand weapons on each side.5 However, the United States and Russia have turned back appeals from various nonaligned nations, especially India, for the nuclear powers to open discussions on a global convention abolishing nuclear weapons. Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty notwithstanding, the Clinton administration has declared that nuclear weapons will play a role in the defense of the United States for the indefinite future. Meanwhile, in a controversial move**, the Clinton administration has broken with the policy of previous administrations in basically formalizing a policy of using nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states to deter chemical and biological weapons** (Panofsky 1998; Sloyan 1998).  **discourse that stabilizes this system of nuclear apartheid in Western ideology is a specialized variant within a broader system of colonial and postcolonial discourse that takes as its essentialist premise a profound Otherness separating Third World from Western countries. This inscription of Third World (especially Asian and Middle Eastern) nations as ineradicably different from our own has, in a different context, been labeled "Orientalism" by Edward Said** (1978). Said argues that **orientalist discourse constructs the world in terms of a series of binary oppositions that produce the Orient as the mirror image of the West: where "we" are rational and disciplined, "they" are impulsive and emotional; where "we" are modern and flexible, "they" are slaves to ancient passions and routines; where "we" are honest and compassionate, "they" are treacherous and uncultivated. While the blatantly racist orientalism of the high colonial period has softened, more subtle orientalist ideologies endure in contemporary politics.** They can be found, as Akhil Gupta (1998) has argued, in discourses of economic development that represent Third World nations as child nations lagging behind Western nations in a uniform cycle of development or, as Lutz and Collins (1993) suggest, in the imagery of popular magazines, such as National Geographic. I want to suggest here that another variant of contemporary orientalist ideology is also to be found in U.S. national security discourse.

**Alternative: Vote Negative to do the Affirmative without the justification of stopping proliferation.**

**Gourgouris 2006** Stathis Gourgouris Social Text 87, Vol. 24, No. 2, Summer 2006. © 2006 by Duke University Press

It is important to understand that **both these registers are**, in the first instance, **constitutively intertwined**. Namely, **the broader epistemological and allegorical register is as real and historical as the one that pertains to actual social times and spaces.** Conversely, **a profound** allegorical and **epistemological force animates and surely exceeds the explicit boundaries of the social dimensions that are easily recognizable in the specific histories and geographies of orientalist practices. One need only consider how complex and ubiquitous — indeed, practically limitless — is the racist prejudice that configures the Arab as terrorist, which permeates the social and political imagination in America, with very real and brutal consequences**. In the second instance, both these registers, intertwined as they are, are fundamentally political in nature. By this I mean: **they are both determined by, but also determining of, a whole complex of relations of power and violent contention, a social dynamics of domination, antagonism, and resistance, which has been linked from the outset (that is, from when orientalism emerged as a bona fide discipline in the nineteenth century) to a vast network of colonialist and, later, imperialist practices.** The tremendous anxiety and animosity that Said’s book continues to provoke in certain quarters are certainly due to the immanent political stakes of its object of inquiry, despite the fact that most critiques from such quarters compulsively displace their

### Prolif

**There’s a greater likelihood it backfires — resentment causes countries to pursue nuclear capabilities.**

**Farmer ’10**

[J. Doyne Farmer of the Santa Fe Institute and Arjun Makhijani of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research. “As US Nuclear Future? Not wanted, not needed.” Nature 467, 391–393 (23 September 2010) ETB]

There are also undesirable side effects of using nuclear power**. To make a** large **dent in CO2 emissions, 2,000–**3,000 **reactors would be needed worldwide by 2050** to replace an equivalent coal capacity and to increase the share of nuclear electricity to about 30%. **This poses a huge proliferation hazard.** **Two** medium-sized uranium–**enrichment plants would need to be built every year** to fuel so many nuclear reactors, **increasing the risk that** some **fuel would be diverted and enriched to weapons-grade material.** **A major US push for nuclear power will make developing countries more likely to demand the capacity to enrich their own fuel, vastly hampering efforts to clamp down on nuclear proliferation.**

**Obama won’t push for gold standard**

**Soloski ’11**

Henry is director of Nonproliferation policy education Center, “The Post-Fukushima Arms Race,” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/07/29/the_post_fukushima_arms_race?page=0,2>

Second, the United States needs to back these standards itself. **When the** **Obama administration promoted the UAE standard, it claimed the deal would serve as a model** agreement, **but things are less** **clear now.** The administration is trying to strike nuclear cooperation deals with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam, which, Foggy Bottom has warned, may not uphold the Gold Standard conditions.¶ Third, the United States and Japan should encourage others to tighten their rules on nuclear exports. Certainly, if the United States and Japan formally pushed the Gold Standard, it would have a powerful effect on France, Germany, and South Korea.¶ ¶ Paris has so far resisted adopting the Gold Standard, but has financial reasons to be receptive to U.S. suggestions that it reconsider. France does billions of dollars of federally guaranteed nuclear construction business in the United States, including a $2.7 billion contract with the U.S. Energy Department. Germany, meanwhile, has shifted into the non-nuclear camp domestically and is debating whether it should promote any nuclear exports. South Korea, which wants to be a responsible nuclear exporter, would likely also fall into line.¶ That leaves Russia, which might resist tighter export standards. But Moscow needs Western nuclear safety technology to bring its own nuclear reactors up to world standards, which provides some leverage. China, which is not likely to become a major nuclear exporter for a decade, is the wild card -- but it might go along with tighter standards in time, as it has reluctantly in the past.¶ There is no question that efforts to tighten export controls are an uphill climb. **This spring, the House** Foreign Affairs Committee under Chairwoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Fla.) **unanimously approved bipartisan** draft **legislation that would encourage** the State Department to apply **the Gold Standard** to all future U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements and make the recycling of spent fuel from U.S.-exported reactors more difficult.¶ **However, it's not only American and U.S.-based French nuclear firms that are lobbying hard against this legislation -- so is** the **Obama** administration. **Despite all the high-minded rhetoric** about the importance of nonproliferation, **it appears the White House attaches higher priority to nuclear sales in developing countries**. Just last week, **word leaked** out that **the administration is renewing talks to conclude a nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia -- even though Riyadh's royals recently declared that Saudi Arabia was committed to acquiring nuclear weapons if Iran did.**¶ As usual, critics of stricter export rules argue that if restrictions are tightened, countries will turn to suppliers that apply even laxer security rules. This is the same tired argument that was made 30 years ago when Congress proposed tightening conditions on U.S. civilian nuclear exports in reaction to India's diversion of U.S. and Canadian nuclear power assistance to make its first bomb. Those efforts resulted in the tighter nuclear export rules contained in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 -- the very same rules that the Nuclear Suppliers Group later imposed internationally on all nuclear supplier states.

**Proliferation will be with small arsenals – solves any offense.**

**Seng,** phd candidate in Political Science @ Chicago **97** [Security Studies] Summer pg. 63

<Minor proliferators are likely to enjoy two main sorts of command and control advantages that, by and large, the superpowers did not have. One, minor proliferators will enjoy greater organizational simplicity that stems from the *small size* and *simple composition* of their nuclear arsenals. This will help alleviate fears concerning rigid standard operating procedures, launch delegation, and the lack of use-control technologies. Two, they will be able to protect their arsenals from counterforce strikes using the most rudimentary weapons survival strategy: *concealment*. Reliance on concealment strategies will eliminate the need for launch-on-warning procedures and the dangerous time pressures they generate. The two advantages will work together to help alleviate dangers of minor proliferators losing possession of their nuclear weapons.>

**Export restrictions means still lose to China**

**Blomberg 10/1**

(Brian Wingfield, “Nuclear Firms Seek Eased Export Rules as U.S. Demand Wanes” <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-01/nuclear-companies-seek-relaxed-export-rules-as-u-s-demand-wanes.html>, SEH)

“For U.S. exporters and their customers, navigating the bureaucratic maze for a U.S. export license presents a challenge in itself that has no parallel in the other countries surveyed in this study,” its said.¶ The Energy Department, which has jurisdiction over nuclear- related assistance for foreign countries, has proposed rule revisions that “would significantly expand the scope of technologies covered by the regulation,” according to today’s report, prepared by for the NEI by the law firm Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP.¶ Compared with the regulatory systems Russia, France, Japan and Korea, “the U.S. regime imposes few deadlines for decision- making on export license applications,” according to the report. Processing export licenses in the U.S. can take a year or more, it said.¶ Exelon of Chicago wants to export its operations methods, which would involve sending top managers abroad to provide guidance on reactor technology and safety, according to Bradley Fewell, vice president and deputy general counsel for Exelon Generation Co. LLC.¶ “These regulations are hampering our ability to expand the sale of and the implementation of” the product, he said at a press conference today in Washington. Exelon is the largest U.S. owner and operator of commercial nuclear reactors.

**Have to have 123 agreement**

**Export.gov 10**

(List of government rules on exports, “123 Agreements”, <http://export.gov/civilnuclear/eg_main_022093.asp>, SEH)

For significant nuclear exports, the country must have a 123 Agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation pursuant to Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. In order for a country to enter into such an Agreement with the United States, that country must commit itself to adhering to U.S.- mandated nuclear nonproliferation norms.¶ Significant nuclear exports include power reactors, research reactors, source and special nuclear materials (for use as reactor fuel), and four major components of reactors (pressure vessels, fuel charging and discharging machines, complete control rod drive units, and primary coolant pumps).

**U.S. won’t use prolif influence**

**Cleary ’12**

Richard is a former research assistant with the American Enterprise Institute and worked for the United States Committee on Foreign Relations, “Richard Cleary: Persuading Countries to forgo nuclear fuel making,” <http://npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1192&tid=30>, August

The cases above offer a common lesson: The U.S., though constrained or empowered by circumstance, can exert considerable sway in nonproliferation matters, but often elects not to apply the most powerful tools at its disposal for fear of jeopardizing other objectives. The persistent dilemma of how much to emphasize nonproliferation goals, and at what cost, has contributed to cases of nonproliferation failure. The inconsistent or incomplete application of U.S. power in nonproliferation cases is most harmful when it gives the impression to a nation that either sharing sensitive technology or developing it is, or will become, acceptable to Washington. U.S. reticence historically, with some exceptions, to prioritize nonproliferation—and in so doing reduce the chance of success in these cases—does not leave room for great optimism about future U.S. efforts at persuading countries to forgo nuclear fuel-making.¶ The most successful case above, South Korea, saw the U.S. put in question the basis of its relationship with Seoul, its security assurance, for nonproliferation aims. The potential near-term consequences of a South Korean nuclear weapon made this bold diplomatic maneuver worth the risk. But in other cases competing U.S. aims, often worthy, have impinged on nonproliferation goals, diluting efforts and sending mixed signals. In the case of Pakistan, for example, even well before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States failed to use sufficiently forceful sticks or attractive carrots. U.S. efforts were bound by increasing distrust between Islamabad and Washington, a delicate geopolitical situation in the subcontinent given India’s close relationship with the Soviet Union, and facing a great challenge in a Pakistani leadership that was humiliated in 1971 and keen to reestablish some power equity with India. In negotiations with Iran regarding the nuclear cooperation agreement, U.S. policy makers–hoping to reinforce the NPT after the Indian test, avoid offending the Shah, and secure civilian nuclear contracts–were initially willing to make concessions on the issue of national reprocessing. In the case of the West Germany-Brazil contract, Kissinger went so far as to tell his counterpart in Bonn that, with expanded safeguards, the deal would be acceptable to Washington despite the clear proliferation risk from Brasilia.¶ The examples above show the limitations of both demand and supply side efforts. Supply side diplomatic interventions, made before the transfer of technology, have been at times effective, particularly in precluding nuclear fuel-making in the short term and buying time for more lasting solutions. However, as the Pakistan and Brazil cases illustrated, supply side interventions are no substitute for demand side solutions: Countries face political choices regarding nuclear fuel-making. A nation set upon an independent fuel-making capacity, such as Pakistan or Brazil, is unlikely to give up efforts because of supply side controls. Multilateral fuel-making arrangements, as proposed repeatedly by the United States, have not materialized and therefore seem to have had little tangible influence.¶ In recent years, a new nonproliferation instrument has appeared: a restructured 123 nuclear cooperation agreement, developed in the course of negotiations with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and signed in 2009. This agreement, unlike previous bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, offers a model for demand side nonproliferation, with the UAE vowing to forgo all enrichment and reprocessing technology on its own soil. It goes far beyond, for example, the “veto” on reprocessing of U.S.-origin spent fuel broached in the negotiations with the Shah. This “Gold Standard” agreement, much hailed at first, particularly in contrast to Iran’s enrichment activities, has begun to lose its luster as, once again, competing priorities marginalize nonproliferation. In January 2012, the Obama Administration announced that a “case by case” approach would be taken to the application of the Gold Standard. Countries such as Vietnam, where the U.S. holds out hope for a grander partnership aimed at countering China, may not be held to the UAE’s standard.100 Today, as in the 1970s with the Symington and Glenn Amendments, Congress seems most concerned about the prospect of proliferation of ENR technology.¶ The UAE case is a striking reminder of the lasting challenge facing American nonproliferation efforts. As a global power with ranging interests, governed by a political system where dissenting factions in Congress, the White House, and bureaucratic organs can influence policy in a number of ways, and operating in an international system with its own constraints on U.S. power, the United States has struggled to marshal its strength toward persuading countries to forgo nuclear fuel-making. While there is no guarantee that the decisive and steadfast application of sticks and carrots in the cases above would have changed the outcomes—it may have brought unintended consequences of its own—a commitment to doing so would have improved the chance of persuading countries to eschew fuel-making.

### Warming

**No impact to warming**

**Nazworth ‘12**

(Napp Nazworth , Christian Post Reporter, April 26, 2012, “Environmentalist Scientist Admits He Was 'Alarmist' on Global Warming”, Christian Post Politics, http://www.christianpost.com/news/environmentalist-scientist-admits-he-was-alarmist-on-global-warming-73948/)

James **Lovelock, the scientist who developed the "Gaia theory" of Earth**, **said in a** MSNBC **interview that he was too "alarmist" in an earlier book on global warming**.¶ **The science supporting global warming**, Lovelock said, **does not understand** as much about how **the Earth's climate changes as scientists had previously claimed**.¶ "**The problem is we don't know what the climate is doing**. **We thought we knew 20 years ago**. **That led** to some **alarmist** **books** – mine included – **because it looked clear-cut, but it hasn't happened**," Lovelock said. **"The climate is doing its usual tricks**. **There's nothing** much really **happening yet.** **We were supposed to be halfway toward a frying world now**."¶ Lovelock has written several books considered important works within the environmentalist movement, including, Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth (1979), The Revenge of Gaia (2006), and The Vanishing Face of Gaia: A Final Warning (2009).

**Desalination is inevitable**

**PR 10**

Pike Research is a market research and consulting firm that provides in-depth analysis of global clean technology markets. The company’s research methodology combines supply-side industry analysis, end-user primary research and demand assessment, and deep examination of technology trends to provide a comprehensive view of the Smart Energy, Clean Transportation, Clean Industry, Corporate Sustainability, and Building Efficiency sectors. June 28, 2010 “Worldwide Desalination Plant Investment to Double by 2016”

http://www.pikeresearch.com/newsroom/worldwide-desalination-plant-investment-to-double-by-2016

**Water scarcity, population and economic growth, pollution, and urbanization are** all **placing increased pressure on freshwater resources around the world.** The gap between the supply of freshwater and demand for water for industrial, agricultural, and domestic use is growing at a rapid pace. At the same time, **the cost of desalination has come down steadily, and it is becoming** a **more affordable** means of meeting the world’s growing freshwater needs. **According to a new report from Pike Research, all of these factors will contribute to strong growth in the desalination technology market** over the next several years, and the cleantech market intelligence firm forecasts that **global desalination investment will double** from $8.3 billion in 2010 to $16.6 billion per year **by 2016**, representing cumulative spending of $87.8 billion during that period.¶ “The desalination plant supplier market is highly fragmented, despite a great deal of mergers and acquisitions activity during the last decade,” says managing director Clint Wheelock. “The top five suppliers captured only 25% of the market from 2007 to 2009. And as reverse osmosis (RO) is increasingly adopted as the major desalination technology, **the barriers to entry are being lowered.”**

**Can’t solve emissions- lack of plants globally and not fast enough**

**Netzer ‘11**

[Nina Netzer and Jochen Steinhilber. The authors work for the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Berlin, Germany. Jochen Steinhilber is Head of the Department for Global Policy and Develop­ment, Nina Netzer is in charge of International Energy and Climate Policy. “The end of nuclear energy? International perspectives after Fukushima.” July 2011 ETB]

In weighing out different aims and scenarios, it is considering that **neither fossil fuels nor nuclear energy have ever been a low-emission** or ecologically sustainable **choice**. While it is indeed true that a nuclear power plant does not produce any CO2 in operation, **if one takes into account the entire cycle of construction and operation** all the way to decommissioning **and** in particular **include**s **the mining of uranium and manufacture of fuel rods** **in the equation**, **greenhouse gases** certainly **are produced**, **as** **fossil** energy **fuels** **are** **used** **for** many of **these processes**. On top of this, the **potential** **for reduc­tion of** CO2 **emissions** in this sector **is not** particularly **high because of the low percentage of nuclear energy in global** primary **energy production**. **It will** moreover **scarcely be possible to build enough reactors** in the near future in order **to reduce the global emissions balance**. **To reach the target** accepted by the international com­munity of states at the World Climate Summit in Cancun of keeping global warming to below 2°, global green­house **emissions would have to decline by** at least **50 per cent by 2050.** **Because the** average **time required to put a reactor into operation** from the planning to commis­sioning **is** approximately **10 years, nuclear energy can­not provide any speedier contribution to a reduction of emissions.**

**SMR’s for desalination already exist**

**W**orld **N**uclear **A**ssociation, July **2012**, “Nuclear Desalination,” http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf71.html

SMART: **South Korea has developed a small nuclear reactor** design **for** cogeneration of electricity and potable **water**. The 330 MWt SMART reactor (an integral PWR) has a long design life and needs refuelling only every 3 years. The main concept has the SMART reactor coupled to four MED units, each with thermal-vapour compressor (MED-TVC) and producing total 40,000 m3/day, with 90 MWe.

 CAREM: **Argentina has designed an integral** 100 MWt **PWR suitable for** cogeneration or **desal**ination alone, and a prototype in being built next to Atucha. A larger version is envisaged, which may be built in Saudi Arabia. NHR-200: **China's INET has developed** this, based on a 5 MW pilot plant. **Floating nuclear power plant** (FNPP) **from Russia**, with two KLT-40S reactors derived from Russian icebreakers, or other designs for desalination. (If primarily for desalination the twin KLT-40 set-up is known as APVS-80.) ATETs-80 is a twin-reactor cogeneration unit using KLT-40 and may be floating or land-based, producing 85 MWe plus 120,000 m3/day of potable water. The small ABV-6 reactor is 38 MW thermal, and a pair mounted on a 97-metre barge is known as Volnolom floating NPP, producing 12 MWe plus 40,000 m3/day of potable water by reverse osmosis. A larger concept has two VBER-300 reactors in the central pontoon of a 170 m long barge, with ancillary equipment on two side pontoons, the whole vessel being 49,000 dwt. The plant is designed to be overhauled every 20 years and have a service life of 60 years. Another design, PAES-150, has a single VBER-300 unit on a 25,000 dwt catamaran barge.

**Water conflict doesn’t escalate- too many limiting factors**

**Leslie 2k**

[Jacques Leslie, “Running Dry.” Harper's Magazine, July 1, 2000]

Yet such wars haven't quite happened. Aaron **Wolf, an Oregon State University specialist in water conflicts, maintains that the last war over water was fought** between the Mesopotamian city states of Lagash and Umma **4,500 years ago.** Wolf has found that **during the twentieth century only 7 minor skirmishes were fought over water while 145 water-related treaties were signed**. He argues that **one reason is strategic: in a conflict involving river water, the aggressor would have to be both downstream** (since the upstream nation enjoys unhampered access to the river) **and militarily superior.** As Wolf puts it, "An upstream riparian would have no cause to launch an attack, and a weaker state would be foolhardy to do so." And **if a** powerful **downstream nation retaliates** against a water diversion by, say, destroying its weak upstream neighbor's dam, **it** still **risks** the consequences, in the form of **flood or pollution or poison from upstream.**  So, until now, water conflicts have simmered but rarely boiled, perhaps because of the universality of the need for water. Almost two fifths of the world's people live in the 214 river basins shared by two or more countries; **the Nile links ten countries, whose leaders are profoundly aware of one another's hydrologic behavior. Countries usually manage to cooperate** about Water, **even in unlikely circumstances.** In 1957, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam formed the Mekong Committee, which exchanged information throughout the Vietnam War. Through the 1980s and into the 1990s, Israeli and Jordanian officials secretly met once or twice a year at a picnic table on the banks of the Yarmuk River to allocate the river's water supply; these so-called picnic-table summits occurred while the two nations disavowed formal diplomatic contact. Jerome Delli Priscoli, editor of a thoughtful trade journal called Water Policy and a social scientist at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, believes the whole notion of water conflict is overemphasized: "Water irrigation helped build early communities and bring those communities together in larger functional arrangements. Such community networking was a primary impetus to the growth of civilization. Indeed, **water may** actually **be one of humanity's great learning grounds for building community.... The thirst for water may be more persuasive than** the impulse toward **conflict."**

### Solvency

**Decade before solvency**

**St. Louis Post-Dispatch ‘12**

[Jeffrey Tomich, <http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/business/2012/05/10/small-problem.html> ETB]

For all the hype, **small reactors are still** at least **a decade away. And that’s if design, licensing and commercial development go at the pace hoped for** by the nuclear industry.¶ And even then, the potential for small reactors hinges on how they compete in the energy marketplace. More than concerns about nuclear safety in the wake of the Fukushima disaster in Japan or the problem of where to dispose of highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel, the technology’s future will be dictated by economics.¶ Jackson said Westinghouse aspires to make small reactors whose costs are equal to or less than full-size reactors.¶ For now, **there’s no cost data for small reactors and no firm evidence they will produce electricity at a lower price than larger plants.**¶ “It’s too early to determine that,” Klein said. “**We’re going to have to see some built.”**

**No Solvency- NRC licensing suspension**

**Reuters 8/7**/12

[http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/08/nuclear-power-plant-license\_n\_1753931.html ETB]

**U.S. regulators** on Tuesday **suspended** **issuing final decisions on new licenses and** on license **renewals for nuclear** power **plants** until the agency decides how to deal with the thorny issue of spent nuclear fuel. The order from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission - headed by Allison Macfarlane, a nuclear waste expert - will not stop hearings or other work on licensing activity and **no license decisions are imminent,** an NRC spokesman said.

**Loan guarantees fail**

**NYT ‘11**

[“U.S. Pushes, But Reactors Are Lagging” 2/1/11, ETB]

But some **obstacles** are specific to **the nuclear industry**, **like** the **ballooning cost estimates** for construction of reactors, which **are massive in scale**. **Even when projects are identified** as prime candidates **for federal loan guarantees**, some **investment partners turn wary**. **''All that uncertainty creates an incentive for you to wait,'**' said Joseph E. Aldy, who was a special assistant to President Obama until December.

**Natural gas prevents**

**Scientific America 3/27**

(David Biello, “Small Reactors Make a Bid to Revive Nuclear Power¶ Can small, LEGO-like reactors help create better prospects for the nuclear industry?” <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=small-reactors-bid-to-revive-nuclear-power&print=true>, SEH)

**Regardless of how cheap such small modular reactors may allow nuclear to be in future, it is unlikely to be as cheap as natural-gas-fired turbines in the present**. In fact, **low natural gas prices stalled the U.S. nuclear renaissance outside Georgia and South Carolina, long before the reactor meltdowns at Fukushima Daiichi in Japan. "Because of an unanticipated abundance of natural gas in the United States, nuclear energy, in general, is facing tough competition,"** noted an analysis of the prospects for small modular reactors from the University of Chicago published last November. **The analysis also suggested that small reactors would be more expensive than large reactors on a per-megawatt basis until manufacturing in significant quantities has happened**. "It [is] unlikely that SMRs will be commercialized without some form of government incentive."

## 2NC

### A2: Do Both

#### Perm links more- Energy lobbies will lobby Congress to not preempt compacts

Every Vote Equal ’11

Every Vote Equal is a policy book advocating for a compact to create a national popular vote for President with chapters on the history of interstate compacts and written by 15 judges and U.S. Representatives, “Background on Interstate Compacts,” <http://www.every-vote-equal.com/pdf/EVECh5new_web.pdf>

Economic interest groups often encourage the establishment of regulatory compacts. Such groups typically lobby Congress not to exercise¶ its preemption powers in a particular area by arguing that coordinated¶ action by the states, by means of an interstate compact, is sufficient to¶ solve a problem.¶

### A2: Theory

#### 50 states act together all the time

Mountjoy ‘01

John is a policy analyst with the council of State Governments, “Interstate Compacts Make a Comeback,” Spring <http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/ncic/Comeback.pdf>

Interstate compacts are contracts between states that carry the force and effect of statutory law. ¶ They are a tool for state governments to address regional or national policy concerns. Compacts ¶ are not a solution per se, but rather they allow a state to enter into a contract with other states to ¶ perform a certain action, observe a certain standard or to cooperate in a critical policy area. ¶ The law and use of interstate compacts is not particularly complex. Like any contract, the ¶ language of a compact needs to be identical in intent and context, if not identical in exact ¶ verbiage between the states. ¶ Although typically overlooked as a state policy option, more than 200 interstate compacts exist ¶ today. Whether large or small, compacts play a role in everyday state relations and activities. ¶ Most interstate compacts cover rudimentary functions, such as regulating boundaries and water ¶ rights, and have less then 15 signatories. For example, the Waterfront Commission Compact ¶ between New Jersey and New York regulates the practices in handling waterfront cargo in the ¶ Port of New York. ¶ Several interstate compacts have 50-state membership, or close to it, and are managed by ¶ administrative or regulatory agencies. The American Association of Motor Vehicle ¶ Administrators oversees the Drivers’ License Compact, which facilitates recognition of drivers’ ¶ licenses issued in other states. The Interstate Compact for Education, administered by the ¶ Education Commission of the States, maintains close cooperation among executive, legislative, ¶ professional and educational leadership on a nationwide basis at the state and local levels.¶

#### Literature bias towards the federal government, not the states.

Barry G. Rabe, University of Michigan, 2 (http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/states\_greenhouse.pdf)

Most analysis of policy options to address global climate change has focused on national and international levels of governance. Even within the United States, most scholars and journalists have concentrated on federal government capacity to engage in international negotiations and formulate nation-wide policies. This emphasis has tended to overshadow a remarkably — and increasingly — active process of policy formulation evident in the American states. This report is intended to provide an overview of this aspect of American climate change policy, considering recent trends and highlighting a range of case studies that cut across traditional policy sectors.

### A2: Funding

#### Clean energy revenue systems solve

Saha et al ’12

Devasharee is a senior policy analyst at Brooking’s Metropolitan Policy Center and writing with 3 other analysts on state and environmental policy for a Brookings study, “Leveraging State Clean Energy Funds for Economic Development,” <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/1/11%20states%20energy%20funds/0111_states_energy_funds>

To act on this promise, states without clean energy funds should consider establishing dedicated clean energy revenue streams to engage in project finance and smart industry support. ¶ These states typically do not have dedicated support for either clean energy projects or clean energyrelated economic development activities.¶ 16¶ A range of sources for these funds exists and includes ¶ general revenue bonds, tax or lottery revenues, pollution charges, and renewable portfolio standard ¶ (RPS) compliance fees. However, experience has shown that electricity surcharges set on electricity ¶ consumption or “wires charges” tend to be the most stable and reliable revenue source, as well as the ¶ most fair as they internalize the environmental consequences of electricity purchases.¶ 17¶ States should ¶ examine these sources as potential bases for the establishment of new clean energy funds.

#### CDI funding solves

Saha et al ’12

Devasharee is a senior policy analyst at Brooking’s Metropolitan Policy Center and writing with 3 other analysts on state and environmental policy for a Brookings study, “Leveraging State Clean Energy Funds for Economic Development,” <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/1/11%20states%20energy%20funds/0111_states_energy_funds>

Link clean energy funds with economic development entities, community development finance ¶ institutions (CDFIs), development finance organizations,and other stakeholders. ¶ Clean energy is a relatively new industrial sector. For this reason many state economic development ¶ agencies, development finance agencies, and CDFIs have yet to fully enter the space or develop ¶ programs to promote and finance clean energy in their states. But they are the ideal partners to work ¶ with clean energy funds to develop effective economic development programs. ¶ Economic development agencies are tasked with generating jobs, retaining existing jobs, and ¶ stimulating industrial and commercial growth and innovation in their state. To date, very few state ¶ economic development agencies have partnered with their states’ clean energy funds with a few ¶ notable exceptions. ¶ CDFIs are financial institutions that provide credit and financial services to underserved communities and in many areas they are the leading infrastructure finance experts.¶ 24¶ As mission-driven institutions, many CDFIs have lent to clean energy and sustainable development projects and businesses. But ¶ few CDFIs have successfully developed to scale a financing operation that incorporates clean energy ¶ measures within their traditional community development lending operations. CDFIs often do not have ¶ dedicated clean energy funds, and existing funding is typically limited to projects, whether energy ¶ efficiency or weatherization. At the local level, there is not yet in place a broader strategy for job and ¶ wealth creation, and virtually no focus on power generation (such as renewable energy or manufacturing support or workforce training).¶ Development finance agencies are state, county and municipal agencies and authorities that provide or support economic development financing programs, including tax-exempt and taxable bonds, ¶ credit enhancement programs, and direct debt and equity investments. Throughout the U.S. over ¶ 50,000 state and local agencies exist to help finance development.¶ 25¶ Tax-exempt bonds have been ¶ used to invest in three quarters of the U.S. infrastructure representing a $3 trillion industry. To date, ¶ these agencies have not been that active in the clean energy space, although a few municipalities ¶ have financed solar projects through bond offerings.¶ 26¶ But there is a growing interest from this sector ¶ to become more involved in clean energy financing. Their entry into clean energy could bring much ¶ needed public and private capital.¶ 27¶ In addition, other stakeholders such as state housing finance authorities and workforce development agencies have not effectively integrated clean energy strategies within their program deployment. And finally state academics could bring important analysis, research, and evaluation to bear on ¶ program and policy creation. ¶ These finance and economic development agencies should be working together with state clean ¶ energy funds, which bring dedicated revenue streams and years of experience in clean energy technologies and local markets, to develop and adapt the best clean energy economic development programs ¶ for their state.

### A2: Investor Signal

#### State policies are a better signal for investors

Sinclair, 10

(JD-Cornell & Executive Director of Clean Energy States Alliance, “Federal Climate and Energy Legislation and the States: Legislative Principles

and Recommendations for a New Clean Energy Federalism,” April http://www.cleanegroup.org/assets/Uploads/2011-Files/Reports/CEGCleanEnergyFederalismv3April2010.pdf)

1. States should and will remain the laboratories of experimentation and innovation on technology and economic development because **most energy investment decisions are made at the state and/or local utility and customer level**. 2. State and local clean energy development decisions are **made closer to the markets, are often more politically durable and stable over time, and should be encouraged**. 3. There is no simple, standard or optimal clean energy program design and practice that will achieve carbon stabilization; instead, all states and local jurisdictions should be given adequate federal resources and assistance to create and implement a diverse portfolio of finance, technology, and policy tools to create the necessary fifty state programs to advance a clean energy future. 4. There are many existing, experienced and “best practice” state-based, clean energy institutions that deserve continued and expanded support for their decade-long successes in these areas. 5. States can develop **more nuanced and effective finance mechanisms that can leverage private sector development because they know their markets, their market players and their barriers to success**.¶ 6. Bottom-up, distributed solutions that the states can provide have always proved the most responsive and nimble solutions that best respect the ever changing demands of locally regulated state energy investment decisions, which are the hallmark of the US energy sector. 7. States should be given express authority to enact climate and clean energy policy and laws that are more stringent and aggressive than the federal programs. Specific legislative principles and concepts should inform all recommendations regarding the role of states in future national climate and energy legislation. These overarching principles and concepts frame how the specific proposals made here should be envisioned and realized, and they address the core elements of this report: allowance funding for states, new state-based financing programs, and encouraging disruptive climate technology innovation. State Allowance Funding¶ For allowance funding to the states, Congress should: 1. Rely on the expertise of the existing state programs and agencies that have deployed clean energy over the last decade with tremendous success. 2. Defer to state expertise in the allocation or investment of allowance funding at the state level. 3. Provide states with significant flexibility and specific incentives to employ a broad portfolio of financing tools and strategies to accelerate clean energy deployment to reflect each state’s political and resource context. 4. Call on every state to seek out and develop, wherever possible, opportunities to leverage their emissions allocation-derived funding with associated private capital to the greatest extent possible. 5. Encourage coordination among states to follow best practices and develop effective, program investments based on the storehouse of experience that state clean energy programs offer. 6. Encourage states to use allowance funding to partner and pursue joint multistate clean energy projects and programs to reduce administrative costs and ensure coordinated technology commercialization activities across states and regions.

#### Viewed as more certain and predictable than the fed

Milford, 12

(President-Clean Energy Group, “Clean-Energy Finance to Beat Beltway Blues,” http://www.cleanegroup.org/blog/clean-energy-finance-to-beat-beltway-blues/)

As the country looks for new sources of clean energy finance while Congress remains paralyzed, we might have missed the most obvious funders that have been right under our noses for years. They are the public infrastructure finance agencies all over America that know how to raise capital at the scale needed in this sector. In turn, Congress and the Administration should look to new policies to support this emerging, state-based infrastructure financing trend.

Hundreds of billions of dollars are needed scale up renewable energy, energy efficiency and clean energy manufacturing support. To fill this gap, some are looking to the states, regions and localities, a return to federalism as an investment strategy. Federal gridlock reminds us again that **states have been the clean energy innovators**. State funds have raised and leveraged over $12 billion in clean energy investment in the last decade. And clean energy policy at the state level has been done on a relatively bipartisan basis, unlike in Washington. In this search for new forms of clean energy finance, a large group of state and local finance partners has been overlooked – the public authorities and other entities that do tax-exempt and taxable bond financing – a $3 trillion industry that has financed our nation’s infrastructure and public improvements, from bridges to hospitals to university expansion. In the U.S. over 50,000 state and local agencies help finance economic and community development. To date, these agencies have not been that active in clean energy, with the exception of a few projects; but they now want to aggressively move into clean energy financing. As to the capital they can raise, municipal bond issuers in March 2012 alone brought 1,196 deals to market worth $34.50 billion. That makes $78.3 billion in 2,927 deals in only the first three months of 2012. Let’s compare this scale to the possible declining federal support. Tax equity revenue generated for wind through the uncertain production tax credit was about $3.5 billion in 2011, while federal support for solar through various subsidies was about $2.5 billion. These amounts are what municipal bond authorities finance every few days, every week of the year, all across the country.¶ Now, these bonding instruments are not exact replacements for tax equity investment, but they could usher in new forms of finance strategies. These tools have the **potential to enlist major capital players such as institutional investors** and pension funds that look for **longer term, more predictable returns** from infrastructure bonds—creating a new investment profile for clean energy with **investors that finance at scale.** So far, there are some interesting emerging examples of bond financing in this space. In New Jersey, bond financing is being used to scale up solar installations though traditional public authority activity, now almost $200 million in investment. There are other models in energy efficiency finance and in other sectors that can be scaled up and replicated across the country.Oddly enough, until now no one has ever approached these public infrastructure finance agencies to work on clean energy in any systematic way across clean energy markets. Some good news is that the membership organization of these authorities, the Council of Development Finance Agencies or CDFA, has entered into a partnership with Clean Energy Group and state clean energy funds to begin to explore use of bonding tools to finance clean energy.¶So we have a **unique financing situation for clean energy**. To grow a robust clean energy economy, we have a new group of financial players who know how to raise hundreds of billions of dollars for infrastructure investment. They are motivated to make significant new investments in clean energy using existing bond instruments. They have begun to make small moves into the clean energy space, with a handful of investments. They are interested in becoming major players. While the deadlock in Washington and the **uncertainty over federal support is** unwelcome, it need **not mean a death knell for** the clean **energy** industry. Instead, we have an opportunity to return to our federalist roots and look for our states, regions and local bonding agencies to begin to finance clean energy in the same way we scaled up the infrastructure that made America what it is today. At the same time, there are many ways for the Administration to help, from clarifying various tax exempt rules to favor clean energy bonds to considering other support mechanisms that put the states in the financing lead. Congress too has a role to play to create a more bottom up, federalist financing strategy for clean energy. At the very least, this new state-based policy conversation around infrastructure finance should begin now, to begin to shape a new clean energy investment strategy that does not rely so much on the whims of Washington.

### Solve Nuclear

#### States incentives solve nuclear development

Dow Jones Newswires, 7

(5-21-07, “States Maneuver to Lure New Nuclear Power Plants” <http://investorshub.advfn.com/boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=19778941>

In a positive shift for U.S. power companies planning a new fleet of nuclear facilities, nuclear power has gained popularity in several states as a solution to high power prices and growing demand. ¶ Louisiana, Florida, South Carolina and Georgia are offering incentives to develop new nuclear generation, hoping that nuclear power prices will be lower and less volatile than power generated by natural gas. State regulators also hope new nuclear power plants will create jobs and bolster local industry. Nuclear operators say state rules ensuring cost recovery of new plants - particularly pre-construction costs - will likely affect their decisions about where to build new plants. ¶ Louisiana and Florida have approved measures that would allow New Orleans-based Entergy Corp. (ETR) and Juno Beach, Fla.-based FPL Group (FPL) to pass on some pre-construction nuclear plant development costs to their customers, while Georgia regulators are considering a similar move.

**And – the signal is the same**

**Bickers 8** (Richard, Editor – NPO, quarterly journal published by the Nuclear Energy Institute, “The Trickle-Up Effect,” Nuclear Policy Outlook, Second Quarter, www.nei.org/filefolder/Outlook\_June.pdf)

**States Put Singular Stamp on Energy Policy**—**With National Implications** Spurred by federal legislation and public concern about energy costs, electricity supply and environmental issues, the pace of state and local government activity on energy policy in general— and nuclear power in particular—has skyrocketed in the past few years. Energy, environmental and economic concerns are coalescing, and states are taking action. “For most people, the federal government seems too removed from their daily lives,” said Del. Sally Jameson (D), a member of the Maryland House of Delegates since 2003. Her district straddles the nation’s capital and Calvert County, Md., home to Constellation Energy’s Calvert Cliffs nuclear plant. “**Most people look to the state for policy**. They know us one-on-one and state policy directly affects their lives. “The federal government is so huge that they believe they will get lost in it. At the state level,” she noted, “their voices are heard.” Looking to the future, the United States must maintain at least the current 30 percent share of non-emitting electric generating capacity if it is to meet its clean-air goals. Even with conservative assumptions about increases in electricity demand and a doubling of renewable energy production, the United States faces a challenge to maintain its current proportion of carbon-free electricity production. A substantial increase in nuclear energy is essential. The Energy Policy Act of 2005, which incorporated a wide range of measures to support current nuclear plants and provided important incentives for building new nuclear plants, reflects a national commitment to carbon-free energy sources. The legislation includes investment incentives to encourage construction of new nuclear plants, including production tax credits, loan guarantees and business risk protection for companies pursuing the first new reactors. Now, states are linking environment and energy in the policy calculus. “The view is that when the federal government isn’t taking the lead, the legislatures need to step up to the plate,” said Melissa Savage, program director for the Agriculture, Energy and Environmental Committee of the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL). States are “repealing moratoriums, holding committee session study hearings, looking at changing regulations, and just getting the conversation started in some cases,” she noted. “We’re facing a pretty critical energy crunch in the country. The issue is starting to bubble back up,” Savage said. “In some states, it never went away.” Ten states have passed policies instituting some form of cost recovery assurance for nuclear plant construction. Three states have introduced and one has passed legislation requiring that nuclear energy be included in some form of clean or alternative energy portfolio. Six of the 13 states with moratoriums preventing new nuclear plants are considering removing those bans. Two states have passed local tax incentives for nuclear plants. For Maryland’s Jameson, the link between environmental and energy policy is a driving factor in policy formulation. “We are nearly surrounded by water in Maryland,” she said, pointing to the Chesapeake Bay, Atlantic Ocean and a network of rivers. “We are doing everything we can to limit harm to our waterways and environment because of climate change and global warming.” The state has taken a “fairly proactive approach” to addressing both environmental and energy issues in the face of a Maryland Public Service Commission warning that electricity customers could face power restrictions or rolling blackouts as early as 2011, she said. **STATES AS POLICY LABORATORIES** “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country,” Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis wrote in 1932. Historically, state and local governments have led the way on issues as varied as child labor, the environment and social reform. And state governments indeed are serving as laboratories in the development of policy supporting nuclear energy. One such policy is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, or RGGI, a cooperative effort by 10 Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Participating states have agreed to implement RGGI through a regional cap-andtrade program whereby participating states anticipate auctioning nearly the entire annual regional emissions budget, approximately 188 million tons of carbon dioxide. Each ton of carbon dioxide will constitute an “allowance.” The multi-state agreement treats all carbon-free sources of electricity, such as nuclear energy and renewables, equally in the framework for awarding monetary credits for greenhouse gas reduction. The RGGI states have agreed to participate in regional auctions for the allowances, beginning this September. Officials have scheduled a second auction in December.

#### State governments can use financial incentives to spur nuclear power

NEI 9

 (Nuclear Energy Institute, “Policies That Support New Nuclear Power Plant Development”, <http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/newplants/factsheet/policiessupportnewplantdevelopment/?print=true>)

Several states have passed legislation or implemented regulations, or both, to support construction of new nuclear power plants. ¶ These policies range from property tax incentives to pre-determination of rate-making principles for a project before construction begins.¶ The policies that help most with financing new plants in regulated states are those that:¶ Require the state public utility commission to determine if a proposed plant is prudent before construction begins and approve costs periodically during construction, thereby guaranteeing these capital costs will be added to the rate base when the plant comes online.¶ Allow the carrying cost of construction work in progress (CWIP)—or the financing cost associated with construction—to be passed on to ratepayers during construction. Allowing CWIP reduces the cost ratepayers will pay for power from the plant when it goes into commercial operation.¶ Some unregulated states assist with financing for unregulated plants by allowing pre-negotiated, long-term power purchase agreements (PPA). PPAs guarantee the project will have a source of cash flow (and cost recovery) once it is operational.¶ State-level policies send positive signals to the financial community, helping companies finance projects reasonably, and, thereby, keeping the cost of electricity for consumers lower.

### Swing States

#### Obama will win- swing states

Blumenthal 10-25

Mark is the Director of Pollster, the Huffington Post’s Election Analysis and Model, “Presidential Polls Counter Romney Surge Myth,”

New polls released on Wednesday and Thursday continue to show President Barack Obama holding narrow leads in a handful of critical battleground states, but running within a whisker of Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney nationwide.¶ While Romney gained significantly in the wake of the first presidential debate in early October, the lack of a continuing trend over the past two weeks helps counter a theme in some campaign coverage that Romney's support continues to "surge" nationwide.¶ The most recent updates of the seven daily national tracking polls continue to split in terms of which candidate holds the nominal lead, ranging from a 4 percentage-point lead for Romney on the Rasmussen Reports automated tracking to a 3 point Obama advantage on the Investor's Business Daily/TIPP poll.¶ 2012-10-25-trackers.png¶ Separately, a new Associated Press/GfK survey released on Thursday morning showed Romney with a 2 percentage-point edge over Obama (47 to 45 percent).¶ The HuffPost Pollster tracking model, which combines data from both national and statewide polling to create a combined estimate, continues to show a near tie, with just two-tenths of one percent separating Romney (47.1 percent) and Obama (46.9 percent) as of this writing. The model currently reports just 56 percent confidence that Romney is actually leading the national popular vote; slightly better than a coin-toss, but just barely.¶ Although their methodologies and estimates of the leader vary considerably, these national tracking polls provide a useful gauge of late trends, since they collectively interview over 2,000 voters a day. Their most recent releases show no signs of Romney momentum. Three ticked in Obama's direction, three were unchanged and one moved toward Romney.¶ Wednesday also brought four new surveys in Ohio. Three of the four, from Time, SurveyUSA and Democratic pollster Lake Research, gave Obama leads ranging from 2 to 5 percentage points while the Rasmussen automated survey reported a tie.¶ 2012-10-25-ohio.png¶ The new results have little impact on the Ohio trend chart produced by the Pollster model, which continues to give Obama an advantage of just over 2 percentage points. Although that lead is narrow, the volume of polling in Ohio boosts the model's confidence that Obama is running ahead there to 96 percent.¶ Collectively, the new polls of the past 24 hours have done nothing to change the standings in the most crucial battleground states. Obama continued to hold leads of 2 to 3 percentage points in Ohio, Iowa, Nevada and Wisconsin, four states that currently combine with the states where Obama leads by larger margins to create a 277 electoral vote majority, seven more than the 270 needed to win.¶ 2012-10-25-battlegrounds.png¶ Romney continues to lead in North Carolina and retain a narrow edge in Florida, states that would net him 233 electoral votes along with other states where Romney leads by larger margins. Those totals leave 26 electoral votes up for grabs in New Hampshire, Colorado and Virginia, states where the tracking model shows Obama leading by very narrow margins of 2 percentage points or less.¶ Collectively, the trends of the past week provide a reality check to two myths that have emerged in recent campaign coverage.¶ The first is that Romney has been "surging" since the first debate. While the debate certainly boosted Romney's standing in the polls, trends over the past two weeks have been negligible, with the leader seesawing nationally within a range of roughly one percentage point. Over the same period, the standings within the key battleground states have also remained constant. Other poll tracking models have shown the same patterns.¶ The second myth is that the national and battleground states polls have produced widely divergent results. If we use the state estimates produced by the Pollster tracking model in the nine key battlegrounds (Iowa, Wisconsin, Nevada, Ohio, New Hampshire, Colorado, Virginia, Florida and North Carolina) to create a combined total vote based on the turnout in each state in 2008, we show Obama leading in across all nine states by a slim 0.6 percentage point margin (47.8 to 47.2 percent as of this writing; the estimated margin would be 47.9 to 47.2 percent if based on the 2004 turnout).¶ Romney does slightly better in the national popular vote estimate, of course, but his 0.2 percentage point advantage there is only slightly better. The net gap is less than a percentage point.¶ As the Cook Political Report's David Wasserman writes on Twitter, simply subtracting 4 percentage points from Obama's 2008 margins in each state produces a similar result: "He'd lose Popular vote by 0.7% but still win w/ 272 EC votes."¶ The differences may appear bigger because Obama's advantages are spread across a number of relatively small battleground states that, except for Ohio, all have 10 or fewer electoral votes. Romney stays close in the combined battleground state estimate mostly because his three best states -- Florida, North Carolina and Virginia -- represent just over half (51 percent) of the combined battleground vote.¶ So yes, the potential exists for a divided outcome, with Obama winning the Electoral College and Romney winning the popular vote, but such an outcome would be, as it was 12 years ago, a game of inches, not yards.

### Key States

#### Obama wins- Consensus on Key States

Sargent 10-24

Greg writes the Washington Post’s Plum Line, “For Now, the Math Still Favor Obama,”

That said, the polling averages tell a very clear story right now: Obama is slightly ahead in the electoral college. All of the four major national averages — Real Clear Politics, Pollster.com, TPM, and Nate Silver’s FiveThirtyEight — show Obama with small leads in Ohio, Wisconsin, Nevada, New Hampshire, and Iowa (which is tighter). That would put Obama well past 270. He has more room for error right now than Romney does.¶ No one is denying that Romney enjoyed a big tightening that has put him at least within striking distance of victory. But right now, Obama is still leading — where it counts. Could this change? Of course. Again, Romney could still win. But Obama’s small edge in the electoral college defines the state of play with less than two weeks left.¶ The case that Romney is on track to victory rests heavily on the argument that he retains momentum and that undecided voters are breaking his way. It’s unclear what the evidence is for this — if anything, the race in those states has now become remarkably stable, despite that earlier tightening — but let’s accept it for the sake of argument. Even if Romney does retain some momentum, my metric for judging the race remains simple: That momentum will only become genuinely significant if Romney starts showing a tie or leads in the consensus of the polling averages of the key states where Obama now leads.¶ I would also add one thing to what Allen said above about North Carolina: Virginia also bears watching. The polling averages show a tighter race in Virginia than in Ohio. Yet there’s virtually no discussion of the fact that Romney has not taken Virginia off the board. Why?

### Women

#### Obama wins- women

Heileman 10-19

John is a Political Columnist for New York Magazine and Author of 2008’s Game Change, “The Waitress Mom-War,” <http://nymag.com/news/politics/powergrid/romney-obama-women-voters-2012-10/>

To the extent Obama is still a narrow favorite, the reason is that he is polling marginally better in the swing states than he is nationally—and the reason for that, in turn, is his strength with women. Obama has always done well with minority and college-educated white female voters. Where he has overperformed in 2012 is with blue-collar white women and in particular those in the states where the campaign is actually being waged. Whereas the national polls at the end of September found the president claiming 35–44 percent support among this group, “in the battleground states, especially in the Midwest, Obama’s performance [was] stronger,” wrote Ron Brownstein of National Journal at the time. “Among these women, the state-level polls show[ed] Obama drawing … 48 percent in Florida, 49 percent in Nevada, 50 percent in New Hampshire and Wisconsin … and 52 percent in Ohio and Iowa.”¶ What accounted for this divergence? Almost certainly it was the sheer weight of the negative advertising run against Romney during the spring and summer by the Obama campaign and the main Democratic super-pac, Priorities USA Action. Much of it was aimed directly at so-called waitress moms, blanketing the airwaves during the daytime on such programs as Judge Judy and Dr. Phil and painting Romney as a heartless, soulless, out-of-touch plutocrat. Indeed, one of the most-aired ads of September was a spot that featured the audio of Romney’s 47 percent comments and multiple images of working-class women.¶ But the first debate set Obama back with the waitress moms, which the Democratic pollster Geoff Garin sees as “disproportionately the moving part left in the electorate.” Beyond Obama’s massive meta-level #FAIL in Denver, he specifically fell short when it came to shoring up his position with these voters. “If you think about all of the should-have-dones that night,” says Garin, “at the top of the list was confronting Romney on these issues that speak to ­women and affect women.”¶ Thus did the Republican nominee begin his upward creep in the polls—and thus was appealing to blue-collar women of paramount importance to both him and Obama last week at Hofstra. The president’s efforts in this regard were plain to see: the repeated attacks on his opponent for pledging to eliminate funding for Planned Parenthood; his proud invocation of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. And Romney’s were no more subtle: his declaration that “every woman in America should have access to contraceptives”; his criticism of the president’s economic policies as having been especially deleterious for women; and, of course, his description of how he had pushed to include ample femalehood in his administration when he was governor of the Bay State, which led him down the path to BindersFullofWomenGate.

### Cell Phone Polls

#### Obama wins- Cell Phone polls prove

Kellner 10-23

Pete is President of Yougov, one of America’s largest and best polling firms and a contributor to the Huffington Post’s Pollster, “Obama Stays Ahead- Just,” <http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/peter-kellner/barack-obama-mitt-romney-us-election-_b_2005585.html?utm_hp_ref=@pollster>

Two further points. Apart from the issue of political weighting, telephone polls in the US divide between traditional polls conducted by human beings, and robopolls done automatically by computers dialing voters. Robopolls are cheaper; or, for the same cost, can reach more people faster. The trouble is that, under US law, robpolls can dial only landlines. They can't reach the one-in-three Americans who have only mobile phones. Another 18% of Americans have landline phones but seldom use them. These figures rise dramatically among the under 30s. They are the people who are keenest on Obama. So we should not be surprised that robopolls, both nationally and in swing states, tend to produce slightly higher figures for Romney than conventional telephone polls in which real people dial both landline and mobile phone numbers.¶ If the overall result were clear-cut, the small differences between robopolls and live-interviewer polls would be of interest only to obsessive poll-watchers. In the current very close race, they tell very different stories. It looks increasingly as if the state that will decide the outcome next month will be Ohio. According to robopolls, the state, and therefore the nation, are too close to call; according to the live-interviewer polls (and YouGov's online polls), Obama enjoys a modest but consistent lead in Ohio and is on course for a second term in the White House.

### Field Offices

#### Obama wins- field offices

The Atlantic 10-24

“Obama’s Ground Game Could Win Him the Election,” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/2012-presidential-campaign/obama-s-ground-game-could-win-him-the-election-20121024?page=1>

A giant chalkboard takes up a wall in this unassuming office suite hung with Obama signs, one of more than 60 campaign offices for the president in this battleground state. On it is drawn a calendar of the final weeks before the election. Phone banks, canvasses, and campaign events are marked in color-coded chalk. And every Saturday through Nov. 6, in capital letters, is marked "DRY RUN" — a precision-timed Election Day simulation drill, where everything from data reporting to snacks is rehearsed down to the minute.¶ Forget the polls, the debates, the last-minute ads and volleys of insults. This is how the Obama campaign plans to win the election.¶ Latest Politics Posts:¶ • When Michelle Obama Talks, Do Women Listen?¶ • Donald Trump Has Mistaken Barack Obama for Gary Busey¶ • Obama's Edge: The Ground Game That Could Put Him Over the Top¶ Four years ago, Barack Obama built the largest grassroots organization in the history of American politics. After the election, he never stopped building, and the current operation, six years in the making, makes 2008 look like "amateur ball," in the words of Obama's national field director, Jeremy Bird. Republicans insist they, too, have come a long way in the last four years. But despite the GOP's spin to the contrary, there's little reason to believe Romney commands anything comparable to Obama's ground operation.¶ And this time, Obama may actually need it.¶ Though he trounced John McCain organizationally four years ago, the irony was that Obama didn't really need his sophisticated field organization. Riding a wave of voter enthusiasm and Bush fatigue, and crushing McCain with fundraising and TV ad spending, Obama almost certainly would have won the 2008 election anyway. The political operative's rule of thumb is that organization can increase your share of the vote by 2 percentage points; Obama won the national popular vote by 7 points. One academic study looked at Obama's edge in field offices and concluded they probably put a couple of extra states in his column, but he would have won without them.¶ This year is different. The polls are so close that a lively partisan meta-fight has broken out over which side actually has the upper hand going into the final stretch, with Romney claiming momentum is on his side, while Obama clings to slim leads in enough swing states to take the Electoral College. In an election that's tied in the polls going down to the wire, Obama's ground game could be crucial.¶ In the closing days of the race, "we have two jobs," Obama campaign manager Jim Messina said on Tuesday. "One, to persuade the undecideds, and two, to turn our voters out." The former is the job of the president and his TV and other media ads. As for the latter, "That's the grassroots operation we've been building for the last 18 months."¶ The Field-Office Gap¶ While Obama's office in Sterling is one of more than 800 across the country — concentrated, of course, in the swing states — Romney commands less than half that number, about 300 locations. In the swing states, the gap is stark. Here's the numerical comparison in what are generally considered the top three swing states — Ohio, Florida and Virginia:¶ But the difference isn't just quantitative, it's qualitative. I visited Obama and Romney field offices in three swing states — Colorado, Ohio, and Virginia — dropping in unannounced at random times to see what I could see. There were some consistent, and telling, differences.¶ Obama's office suite in Sterling was in an office park next to a dentist's office. The front window was plastered with Obama-Biden signs, the door was propped open, and the stink bugs that plague Virginia in the fall crawled over stacks of literature — fliers for Senate candidate Tim Kaine, Obama bumper stickers — piled on a table near the front reception desk. In rooms in front and back, volunteers made calls on cell phones, while in the interior, field staffers hunched over computers. One wall was covered with a sheet of paper where people had scrawled responses to the prompt, "I Support the President Because ... ", while another wall held a precinct-by-precinct list of neighborhood team leaders' e-mail addresses.¶ Only about a mile down the road was the Republican office, a cavernous, unfinished space on the back side of a strip mall next to a Sleepy's mattress outlet. On one side of the room, under a Gadsden flag ("Don't tread on me") and a poster of Sarah Palin on a horse, two long tables of land-line telephones were arrayed. Most of the signs, literature, and buttons on display were for the local Republican congressman, Frank Wolf. A volunteer in a Wolf for Congress T-shirt was directing traffic, sort of — no one really seemed to be in charge and there were no paid staff present, though there were several elderly volunteers wandering in and out. The man in the T-shirt allowed me to survey the room but not walk around, and was unable to refer me to anyone from the Romney campaign or coordinated party effort.

#### Field offices key boost

Maskett ‘09

Seth is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Denver University, “Did Obama’s Ground Game Matter? The Influence of Local Field Offices During the 2008 Presidential Election,” <http://poq.oxfordjournals.org/content/73/5/1023.full>

As this table shows, most of the suggested causes of increased Democratic vote shares were positive and statistically significant (p ≤.05). Most critically, even accounting for these alternative predictors, the presence of an Obama field office was associated with a 0.8 percentage point increase in the Democratic vote share in the county. Although this is not an enormous effect, it is worth noting that the presidential contests in North Carolina and Missouri were settled by margins smaller than this, and Indiana's margin was only slightly greater.¶ Notably, neither the Kerry office coefficient nor the interaction variable was statistically significant. This suggests that the Obama campaign succeeded where it went beyond what the Kerry campaign had done. In counties where both campaigns had set up offices, there was no net boost to the Democratic vote in 2008. However, Kerry had only established 125 county-level offices in these eleven states compared to Obama's 377. Obama saw the boost to his vote share, these figures tell us, when he set up an office in places that Kerry never did.¶ Unsurprisingly, economic conditions appeared to affect vote choice. Each percentage point increase in the local unemployment rate was associated with a 0.6-point increase in the Democratic vote share over the 2004 baseline, a result that was statistically significant. While county growth and population size seemed largely irrelevant, counties with high numbers of African Americans and Latinos saw disproportionate rises in the Democratic vote share. The coefficient for Latinos was actually twice that of African Americans, suggesting considerably greater activation of Latino Democratic voting by Obama. Age had a negative and statistically significant relationship with the Democratic vote increase, consistent with other evidence that younger voters became substantially more Democratic between 2004 and 2008 (Gelman and Sides 2009). Income, interestingly, had a positive effect, suggesting that Obama was able to make gains in some wealthier counties that had eluded Kerry. Finally, the Kerry share of the 2004 vote had a negative relationship with the Democratic vote increase, suggesting that Obama saw a greater Democratic vote increase within more conservative areas than within more liberal ones, perhaps reflecting a possible ceiling effect.¶ Obama, of course, wasn't actually competing against John Kerry so much as he was against another senator, John McCain. In table 2, I have specified the regression equation somewhat differently, using Obama's share of the two-party vote as the dependent variable. I have replaced the Kerry county field office variable with a McCain county field office one, and I have interacted it with the Obama field office variable. Otherwise, the two equations are specified identically.¶ View this table:¶ In this window¶ In a new window¶ Table 2. ¶ Variables Predicting Obama's Share of the Two-Party Vote, 2008¶ The Obama county field office coefficient is again positive and statistically significant, and the coefficients on the other control variables are essentially the same as they were in table 1. One surprising finding, however, is that McCain's field office presence had a positive impact on Obama's vote share, although this coefficient is not statistically significant. Somewhat less surprising is that the interaction term is negative, suggesting that McCain was able to check Obama's gains in counties where both candidates had a field office presence. Statistically, however, this result is indistinguishable from zero. The overall lesson of this table is that Obama's field offices were helpful to their candidate while McCain's were not.8¶ These findings are consistent with the notion that local campaign organizations may be pivotal in elections. Interestingly, however, while these findings are robust in the aggregate, they lose their statistical significance in many of the battleground states, even though the coefficients remain generally positive. When the regressions are run within states, the county campaign office variable only remains statistically significant for Florida, Indiana, and North Carolina. The second column in table 3 shows the county field office coefficient (as derived from table 1) for each of the eleven battleground states.9 Standard errors appear in parentheses next to the coefficients.¶ View this table:¶ In this window¶ In a new window¶ Table 3. ¶ State-Level Field Office Coefficients and Impact on Election¶ Even if the presence of a campaign office didn't seem to matter in some states, however, this table suggests that it was determinative in others. The third column in this table shows Obama's actual share of the two-party vote in each of the states. To better understand the impact of the field offices, I conducted two simulations that estimate the election outcome in the state in the counterfactual condition in which Obama did not have a field office. In the first simulation, I estimate the statewide vote assuming those mobilized by the Obama field offices never turned out to vote. In other words, I remove a share of Obama's vote commensurate with the size of the field office coefficient from each of the counties that hosted such an office. In the second simulation, I assume that those mobilized for Obama instead voted for McCain. For example, the field office effect was an estimated 0.033 in Florida. Removing that share of the vote from Obama's vote in the counties with a field office brings Obama's two-party vote share in Florida down from 0.514 to 0.5003, a bare win. Placing that share of the vote into McCain's column brings Obama's statewide vote share down to 0.487, a loss.¶ In three of the states under analysis—Florida, Indiana, and North Carolina—Obama won the actual election but would have lost if the mobilized voters had instead voted for McCain. McCain would also have won Indiana and North Carolina had the mobilized voters simply chosen to stay home on Election Day. These three states were worth a total of fifty-three electoral votes—not enough to actually cost Obama the White House, but certainly enough to make it a much closer election.

### 2NC SMR Links

**SMRs are unpopular and not viewed differently than other nuclear technology**

**Szondy 2/16**

(David, writer for Gizmag, “Feature: Small modular nuclear reactors - the future of energy?” <http://www.gizmag.com/small-modular-nuclear-reactors/20860/>, SEH)

Indeed, **it is in government regulations that the modular reactors face their greatest challenges. Whatever the facts about nuclear accidents from Windscale to Fukushima, a large fraction of the public,** especially in the West, **is very nervous about nuclear energy in any form.** **There are powerful lobbies opposed to any nuclear reactors operating and the regulations written up by governments reflect these circumstances.** Much of the cost of building nuclear plants is due to meeting all regulations, providing safety and security systems, and just dealing with all the legal barriers and paperwork that can take years and millions of dollars to overcome. Modular reactors have the advantage of being built quickly and cheaply, which makes them less of a financial risk, and factory manufacturing means that a reactor intended for a plant that missed approval can be sold to another customer elsewhere. And some **SMRs are similar enough to conventional reactors that they don't face the burden of being a "new" technology under skeptical scrutiny. However, red tape is still a very real thing.**

**New Nuclear Reactors are unpopular- Correctly Worded Questions prove**

**Mariotte ’12**

Michael is Executive Director of Nuclear Information and Resource Service, “Nuclear Power and Public Opinion: What the Polls Say,” <http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/06/05/1097574/-Nuclear-Power-and-Public-Opinion-What-the-polls-say>

**Public opinion on nuclear power matters. Should we build new reactors** or not? **If so, who should pay** for them? Should we close existing reactors? Where should nuclear power rank among all the other possible sources of electricity generation? Where should we put our limited resources to attain the best possible energy future?¶ These are all fundamental questions, the answers to which could affect our future far more than, say, who will be the next Senator from Indiana. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, until recently—really the past two or three years—other than regularly-conducted, loudly-trumpeted and rarely relevant industry-sponsored polls, polling of public opinion on nuclear power (and a lot of other energy issues) was haphazard at best.¶ Gallup, for example, over the past 18 years as best as we can find out, has conducted only 10 polls (and most of these only asked a half-sample, putting their numbers into question) asking people their opinion on nuclear power. But beginning in 2009, Gallup has begun polling annually. Unfortunately, Gallup asks the exact same question, with the same wording, that the Nuclear Energy Institute’s (NEI) own well-tested polling does. And **the NEI doesn’t ask questions that it doesn’t want the answers to**. Even so, Gallup’s answers don’t quite match those NEI gets, and which are usually heavily promoted in the media by NEI.¶ To try to get a better sense of what the public really thinks about nuclear power (and since we can’t afford to conduct our own polling), **we took a look at every poll we could find on the issue, and related energy issues, over the past two years**, and in some cases further back. Yes, that includes GOP/Fox News favorite Rasmussen.¶ As DailyKos readers know, if not the general public, **examining all** the **possible polls leads to a much greater confidence in conclusions** than relying on a single poll. Thus, we have a fairly strong confidence that our conclusions are a good statement of where the American public is at on nuclear power and our energy future in the Spring of 2012.¶ **Conclusion 1: The public does NOT want to pay for new nuclear power**. It IS willing to pay for renewable energy.¶ This one is a slam dunk.¶ **New nuclear reactors are simply too expensive** for utilities to build with their own assets. Nor are banks willing to lend money for most nuclear projects; they’re considered too risky given the long history of cost overruns, defaults, cancellations and other problems. Thus, **the only two means of financing a new reactor are to either get money from taxpayers, through direct federal loans or taxpayer-backed loan guarantees, or from ratepayer**s in a few, mostly Southern states, which allow utilities to collect money from ratepayers before reactors are built—a concept known either as “early cost recovery” or Construction Work in Progress (CWIP).¶ ORC International (which polls for CNN, among others) has asked a straightforward question for the past two years (March 2011 and February 2012) **in polls commissioned by the Civil Society Institute: “Should U.S. Taxpayers Take on the Risk of Backing New Nuclear Reactors?” The answer?** Basically identical both years: **73% opposed in 2011, 72% opposed in 2012**.¶ Maybe using the work “risk” skews the poll, you think? So ORC also asked, “Do you favor or oppose shifting federal loan guarantees from nuclear energy to clean renewables?” The answer was basically the same: 74% said yes in 2011, 77% in 2012 with 47% “strongly” holding that opinion both years.¶ A third poll conducted by ORC for Civil Society Institute in March 2012 asked this question: ¶ “Utilities in some states are allowed to charge electricity ratepayers for “Construction Work in Progress” for new power plants. This means that ratepayers – instead of the companies – pay for construction of new nuclear reactors and other major power plants before any electricity ever reaches customers, thereby lowering the financial risks to shareholders. Knowing this, which of the following statements about “Construction Work in Progress” most closely reflects your view?”¶ The answer: fully 80% opposed CWIP.¶ Most pollsters have not asked similar questions; interestingly though, Rasmussen did in May 2012 for an undisclosed client. Their question: “The government is providing billions in loan guarantees to help the development of new nuclear plants. Would that money be better spent on the development of alternative new energy sources?” Unfortunately, Rasmussen did not publicize the results and hid them behind a paywall, which we were not inclined to pursue. But if anyone has access to that, we’d love to know what Rasmussen found.¶ Conclusion 2: Americans do not think nuclear power is “clean” energy, and still don’t want to pay for it.¶ Jumping back to ORC International, their March 2012 poll found this:¶ About two out of three Americans (66 percent) – including 58 percent of Republicans, 65 percent of Independents, and 75 percent of Democrats -- agree that the term “‘clean energy standard’ should not be used to describe any energy plan that involves nuclear energy, coal-fired power, and natural gas that comes from hydraulic fracturing, also known as ‘fracking.’”¶ and this:¶ About three out of four Americans (73 percent) agree that “federal spending on energy should focus on developing the energy sources of tomorrow, such as wind and solar, and not the energy sources of yesterday, such as nuclear power.” Fewer than one in four (22 percent) say that “federal spending on energy should focus on existing energy sources, such as nuclear, and not emerging energy sources, such as wind and solar.”¶ Meanwhile, the New York Times in May reported on a Harvard/Yale poll (also behind a paywall), conducted in 2011 but released in May 2012, that found that Americans are willing to pay an average of $162/year more for clean energy than they are paying now—an average 13% increase in electric bills. But when clean energy was defined as including nuclear power or natural gas, that support plummeted.¶ This is consistent with findings over the past decade, which have shown that nuclear power has typically ranked well below renewable energy sources, especially solar and wind, in public opinion, at times battling with coal for least-favorite U.S. energy source.¶ A March 2012 Gallup poll found that 69% of Americans support spending more government money on solar and wind power—with majorities among Democrats (84%) and Republicans (51%) alike. But support for “expanding the use of nuclear power” barely received a majority (52%) and then only due to Republican support: 64% of Republicans supported that idea, only 41% of Democrats.¶ **Conclusion 3: On new reactors, how one asks the question matters.**¶ Gallup and the **Nuclear Energy Institute ask the same question**: “Overall, do you strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose the use of nuclear energy as one of the ways to provide electricity in the U.S.?”¶ **This** question **doesn’t really get to the issue of support for new nuclear reacto**rs, although NEI typically tries to spin it that way. Although a question of support for current reactors wasn’t asked in any recent poll we saw, **the public traditionally has been more supportive of existing reactors than new ones**, and the question above could easily be interpreted as support for existing reactors, or even simple recognition that they exist. The results may also be skewed by the pollsters throwing nuclear in as “one of the ways,” without a context of how large a way.¶ Nonetheless, despite asking the same question, Gallup and NEI can’t agree on the answer. NEI, for example, in November 2011 asserted that 28% of the public strongly favors nuclear power with an additional 35% somewhat in favor. NEI found only 13% strongly opposed and another 21% somewhat opposed. A May 2012 NEI poll did not publicly break down the numbers into strongly vs somewhat, but claimed a similar 64-33% split between support for nuclear power and opposition.¶ Gallup, asking the same question in March 2012, found a narrower split. A smaller number was strongly in favor (23%, a drop of 5%) and a larger number strongly opposed (24%, increase of 3%)—overall an 8-point anti-nuclear swing among those with strong opinions. Those in the middle were 34% somewhat favor vs 16% somewhat opposed. The 2012 numbers were slightly worse for nuclear power than the identical question asked in March 2011, just before Fukushima.¶ But other **polls suggest that Gallup and NEI may be asking the wrong question**. For example, **the LA Times reported on a Yale-George Mason University poll in April 2012 that found** that **support for new nuclear power had dropped significantly, from 61% in 2008 to 42% today**.¶ **Even Rasmussen in** its May 2012 poll **found that only 44% support building new reactors**. That was good news for Rasmussen since it found that only 38% oppose them, with a surprising 18% undecided (surprising because no other poll we saw had such a high undecided contingent for any nuclear-related question).¶ Meanwhile the March 2012 ORC International poll found that:¶ “Nearly six in 10 Americans (57 percent) are less supportive of expanding nuclear power in the United States than they were before the Japanese reactor crisis, a nearly identical finding to the 58 percent who responded the same way when asked the same question one year ago. Those who say they are more supportive of nuclear power a year after Fukushima account for well under a third (28 percent) of all Americans, little changed from the 24 percent who shared that view in 2011.”¶ But **perhaps the most telling**, and easily the most interesting, poll **comes from a March 2012 poll from the Yale Project** on Climate Change Communications. Participants were asked, “**When you think of nuclear power, what is the first word or phrase that comes to your mind?”**¶ **29% of those polled said “disaster.” Another 24% said “bad.” Only about 15% said “good”** and that was the only measurable group that had anything positive to say. That poll also found that, “…only 47 percent of Americans in May 2011 supported building more nuclear power plants, down 6 points from the prior year (June 2010), while only 33 percent supported building a nuclear power plant in their own local area.”¶ Conclusions¶ Americans are not exactly wild about the idea of building new nuclear reactors. Polls asking the question different ways arrive at different results; at the lowest common denominator it is safe to say the country is divided on the issue. But **Americans clearly don’t want to pay for construction of new reactors**. And the reality is that no utility wants to or even can spend its own money building new reactors—they’re just too expensive. Congress, State legislatures and Public Service Commissions would do well to heed that warning, especially since **it crosses all party and political lines**.¶ It is also clear that the American public does not see nuclear power as a “clean energy” source (nor, for that matter, “clean” coal or natural gas fracking). Congressional or state efforts to include these technologies in a “clean energy standard” or a clean energy bank concept are bound to fail.¶ Finally, for those of us who want to build a genuinely clean, nuclear-free and carbon-free energy future, there is this scintillating nugget: According to the April 2012 ORC International poll:¶ “More than eight out of 10 Americans (83 percent) – including 69 percent of Republicans, 84 percent of Independents, and 95 percent of Democrats -- agree with the following statement: ‘The time is now for a new, grassroots-driven politics to realize a renewable energy future. Congress is debating large public investments in energy and we need to take action to ensure that our taxpayer dollars support renewable energy-- one that protects public health, promotes energy independence and the economic well being of all Americans.”¶ The American people are ready for significant change in energy policy; it’s time we all stepped up our efforts to harness and help direct that sentiment to build the energy future we need and deserve.

**SMRs unpopular**

**Taso ‘11**

(Firas Eugen Taso, “21st Century Civilian Nuclear Power and the Role of Small Modular Reactors”, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; Tufts University, May 2011 <http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/docview/877618836>, 8-2-12)

Paolo Ferroni also mentions that SMRs would not solve the public concern over nuclear power. To the general public, they would still be nuclear facilities, something that they do not understand and fear. Unless they were proven and demonstrated, opposition would exist **even for the smaller demonstration projects**. The NIMBY attitude would likely preclude SMRs from being a game changer for nuclear power, unless something changes **dramatically**, not only incrementally, in public perception.

**SMRs are politically “nuclear”**

**Fairley 10**

(IEEE Spectrum, May, "Downsizing Nuclear Power Plants,” spectrum.ieee.org/energy/nuclear/downsizing-nuclear-power-plants/0)

However, there are political objections to SMRs. Precisely because they are more affordable, they may well increase the risk of proliferation by bringing the cost and power output of nuclear reactors within the reach of poorer countries.¶ Russia’s first SMR, which the nuclear engineering group Rosatom expects to complete next year, is of particular concern. The Akademik Lomonosov is a floating nuclear power plant sporting two 35-MW reactors, which Rosatom expects to have tethered to an Arctic oil and gas operation by 2012. The reactor’s portability prompted Greenpeace Russia to call this floating plant **the world’s most dangerous nuclear project in a decade.**¶**SMRs may be smaller than today’s reactors. But, politically** at least, **they’re just as nuclear.**

### A2: People Won’t Vote for Romney/Romney Supports it

#### Unpopularity of the plan means people will break for Romney that’s the 1NC.

**Environmentalists won’t turn out if angry**

**Schow 12**. [Ashe, Heritage Action’s Deputy Communications Director, “Pres. Obama continues to pander to environmentalists” Heritage Action for America -- January 9 -- http://heritageaction.com/2012/01/pres-obama-continues-to-pander-to-environmentalists/]

It seems that President Obama is worried about whether or not environmentalists will come out in full force to support his re-election effort. Evidenced by the decision to delay the Keystone XL pipeline – which would lower energy prices and put thousands of Americans to work – and now a mining ban in Arizona; it’s clear that President Obama will do whatever it takes to shore up environmentalist’s support, even if it means destroying job creation and smacking down labor unions.¶ Are his re-election priorities skewed? Probably. But it could just be strategy. President Obama is betting that labor unions will come out in support this election no matter what, so the President probably assumes that no matter what he does that ends up hurting union workers, the larger organization will still support him.¶ **The same cannot be said for environmentalists**. They tend to stay home if they are not appeased. But President Obama is playing with fire. In each of these decisions – along with the 2010 moratorium on offshore drilling – environmentalists cheer victory while thousands of workers (many of them unionized) are left without a job. If the President is so concerned about jobs, why is he denying them to anyone, especially his friends in the labor unions?

#### Base won’t turn out if policies aren’t in line with them and the base outweighs moderate losses

Adams et al ‘6

James is in the Department of Political Science at the University of California Davis and wrote this article with 3 other Professors of Political Science, “Move to the Center or Mobilize the Base,” Conference Paper at the American Political Science Association- via EBSCO

Our theoretical and empirical results, which suggest that candidates maximize their¶ vote margins in general elections by presenting policies designed to appeal to their partisan¶ constituencies, is relevant to the extensive literature on elections and representation. Dat­¶ ing back to Miller and Stokes’s (1963) seminal work, scholars have conceptualized con­¶ gressional representation in terms of the Miller­Stokes “diamond model” which empha­¶ sizes the linkages between legislators’ roll­call votes and the policy preferences of their ge­¶ ographic constituencies, defined as the set of all voters from the legislator’s district. How­¶ ever subsequent work has cast doubt on how well this diamond model captures the repre­¶ sentational process; in particular, scholars have increasingly emphasized the crucial influ­¶ ence of the legislator’s “reelection constituency” (Fenno, 1978), defined as “the people¶ who are reliable supporters at the ballot box” (Uslaner, 1999, page 10, emphasis in origi­¶ nal).¶ 22¶ ¶ Uslaner summarizes the current state of the research as follows:¶ The [Miller­Stokes] model has served us well for a long time, but diamonds aren’t¶ forever… A more profound challenge to the diamond model comes from the recog­¶ nition that legislators tend to represent their core supporters, mostly composed of their fellow partisans, better than they do the full electorate. (Uslaner, 1999, page¶ 12).¶ The value of our theoretical results is that they provide a plausible rationale for the¶ empirical finding that legislators tend to represent their core supporters at the expense of¶ their geographic constituency: namely, that this is an electorally optimal strategy! ¶ In addition, as we observed in the introduction to this essay, our emphasis on the¶ centrifugal effects on candidate strategies associated with voter turnout in a partisan elec­¶ torate is one that is increasingly shared, both by the popular media and by campaign man­¶ agers (see Miniter, 2005; Nagourney, 2003; Millbank and Allen, 2004). Thus Mathew¶ Dowd, a senior advisor to George W. Bush’s re­election campaign, stated in the summer of¶ 2003 that “there’s a realization, having looked at the past few elections, that the party that¶ motivates their base – that makes their base emotional and turn out – has a much higher¶ likelihood of success on election day” (quoted in Nagourney, 2003).¶ 23¶ And Stanley Green­¶ berg, a Democratic pollster who advised the Democratic presidential candidates Bill Clin­¶ ton, Al Gore, and John Kerry, argues that in order to win elections¶ The starting point for both Democrats and Republicans is to make sure that they¶ take into battle the core of loyalists that this era has bequeathed them. But since¶ neither party’s core support or base is big enough to assure victory, each struggles¶ valiantly to make more of it – in the first instance, by growing the groups that are¶ the most loyal, by fanning the passions on each party’s lead issues to achieve even¶ greater unity in their voting and more energy and greater turnout at the polls (2005,¶ pages 91­92).¶ The theoretical results we have presented are exactly in tune with the arguments ad­¶ vanced by the political professionals quoted above. By shifting their policies away from¶ the median voter’s position in the direction of their partisan constituency’s policy prefer­¶ ences, candidates increase the unity in their partisan ranks, as Greenberg emphasizes, and¶ candidates simultaneously energize their base to turn out to vote, as both Dowd and Green­¶ berg emphasize. The importance of our theoretical arguments is that they illuminate why¶ the turnout gains that candidates obtain from targeting their base are likely to outweigh the¶ vote losses among moderate voters that noncentrist positioning would seem to entail. In¶ particular, in a partisan electorate, voters’ candidate preferences are rarely in doubt – so¶ that moderate Democratic and Republican partisans will support their party’s candidate at high rates even when these candidates propose radical positions – which give candidates¶ the leeway to shift away from the center, in order to boost turnout among their habitual¶ supporters. Thus we have shown that the strategic logic of candidate positioning in a parti­¶ san electorate with variable turnout is dramatically different from the strategic logic that¶ obtains when we disregard voters’ partisan loyalties (cf. Hinich and Ordeshook, 1970).

#### Romney will just “etch a sketch”

**Heilemann et al 10-3**. [John, journalist for New York magazine, Mike Murphy, Republican political consultant, Charlie Rose, journalist, “Analysis of Presidential Debate” The Charlie Rose Show -- lexis]

I thought that you saw, you know, to go back to the old trope, you know people mocked around the campaign when the etch-a-sketch comment was made by Eric Fehrnstrom back at the end of the primaries. But the truth is --¶ CHARLIE ROSE: **He`s going to write a new script** is what he said.¶ JOHN HEILEMANN: Yes and the Obama campaign thought well, that`s what they expected to happen. And that`s actually why they thought Romney was a dangerous candidate was that he would etch-a-sketch

and that you know he wouldn`t be -- he would go back to being what the previous incarnation of him was which is not a hard-right, base-loving, base-enthusiasm driving candidate.¶ He would be a pragmatic moderate Massachusetts Governor. And that would be a dangerous candidate for them to have to run against. We haven`t seen that in Mitt Romney. And on a succession of issues all night tonight, that was the Mitt Romney that he was trying to portray. It`s come very late in this campaign but, it is -- and I think the Obama campaign thought well if we haven`t seen it so far there is -- we`re not going to get to see it. He`s not going to try to revive that image tonight. But that`s what he tried to do and I think it was one of the reasons President Obama was off his game.¶ The other reason and you`ll hear this a lot I think over the next 12 or 24 hours but he goes back to the Kerry-Bush example. You know incumbent presidents, they come out for this first debate -- it`s been a long time since Barack Obama has had a debate, it`s been four years. And in the last four years since he last left the stage with John McCain at that third debate in October of 2008, there is almost no one who`s argued with him.¶ NORAH O`DONNELL: Yes.¶ JOHN HEILEMANN: Under any circumstance. He has been -- he has been, he has had four years of yes men, nodding their head and agreeing with everything he says. And you get up on that stage and you`re rusty to begin with and then you have someone who is up there who is right in your face.¶ (CROSSTALK)¶ CHARLIE ROSE: You mean, nobody goes -- nobody goes into the Oval Office and says Mr. President you got it wrong.¶ JOHN HEILEMANN: You got it wrong, you are wrong about everything --¶ (CROSSTALK)¶ JOSH TYRANGIEL: Well, well if they do that --¶ (CROSSTALK)¶ MIKE MURPHY: You could -- you could feel it. You know it`s a lot easier in debate perhaps to say Mitt that`s the stupidest answer I`ve ever heard you sound like a rich idiot. It`s hard to say Mr. President you just put me to sleep with that boring lecturing answer.¶ JOHN HEILEMANN: Right.¶ MIKE MURPHY: And as an old campaign hack it read to me a very weak debate threat. So it`s interesting now to think about what their internal spasm is going to be.¶ CHARLIE ROSE: Ok.¶ MIKE MURPHY: First of all they`re going to give Biden a bayonet next week and tell him to carve, you know, Ryan up. And I`m not sure Biden will be that good at.¶ CHARLIE ROSE: Yes.¶ MIKE MURPHY: It is not his natural demeanor.¶ CHARLIE ROSE: Yes.¶ MIKE MURPHY: So we could have an overreaction Biden show.¶ CHARLIE ROSE: Yes.¶ MIKE MURPHY: And second I think, there`s one point about -- and I agree totally with what John said about, you saw what the country did, the guy who won Massachusetts tonight. They`ve been afraid in the Romney campaign to do that because they`re very sensitive, in my view --¶ (CROSSTALK)¶ CHARLIE ROSE: Yes.¶ MIKE MURPHY: -- oversensitive to the criticism from the base. I think the base is going to be silent tomorrow because they tasted losing for a week. Tonight they`re tasting winning and I think you`re going to see Republican Party get very much on board a winner now. And if that continues, Romney will be Romney, the one we saw tonight which I think is actually the most authentic Romney.¶ The Obama guys may litigate flip-flopping. But as an old rule of politics when you`re flipping toward the voters you`re doing OK. So I think they got a real opportunity now and we`ll see what the next week looks like it`s going to tell us a lot.

#### Would be used behind the scenes

Wilson 10-25

Reid is a Columnist for National Journal, “The Dirty Side of Voter Turnout,” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/on-the-trail/the-dirty-side-of-voter-turnout-20121025>

In Maricopa County, home of more than half of Arizona’s voters, material reminding Spanish-language speakers to vote lists Election Day as Nov. 8, two days after the polls close. In Florida, the Division of Elections is investigating letters sent to voters in 24 counties that say recipients have been flagged as possible noncitizens and are therefore ineligible to vote. In Wisconsin, billboards warn of jail time for voter fraud. And voters in several swing states have reported receiving calls telling them they can vote by phone instead of at the ballot box.¶ Welcome to the unseemly underside of politics. While President Obama and Republican challenger Mitt Romney work to mobilize as much of their base as possible, some operatives are working behind the scenes to dissuade the other side’s voters from casting ballots.¶ In other cases, simple mistakes in local elections offices threaten to disenfranchise at least a handful of voters. In a close-fought election likely to come down to just a few states, any problem at the polls will cause the losing side to scream bloody murder.¶ Both the Obama and Romney camps claim they are confident they’ll win by sufficient margins. But privately, each side is preparing armies of lawyers and warning staff to be ready to fly to a political hot spot at a moment’s notice on Election Night.¶ “What we’re preparing for now is the efforts on the ground, and we will, as we’ve had in the past, have thousands of lawyers working at polling places throughout the country,” said Will Crossley, a Democratic National Committee spokesman. “This program that we have is bigger than we’ve had in a long time.”¶ “We have all the resources and infrastructure we need for any potential dispute or recount,” said one Romney aide. Because of a three-decade old court agreement, the Republican National Committee is not allowed to send lawyers into the field. Instead, the Republican National Lawyers Association, headed by longtime GOP activists David Norcross and Cleta Mitchell, organize the party’s volunteer legal efforts.¶ While there’s no evidence that either the official party organizations or the two presidential campaigns are involved in the shadiest efforts, operatives on both sides are engaged in underhanded, sometimes even illegal, tactics. The letters in Florida targeted Republican voters. The billboards in Wisconsin are in prominent African-American neighborhoods, where huge numbers of Democratic voters live.¶ In some states, both sides are working the referees by warning of dirty tricks that might happen before they actually do. Democrats have pointed out that a private equity firm run by Romney’s son, Tagg, is an investor in the parent company of a firm that makes Ohio voting machines. And Republican secretaries of state in Iowa, Colorado, and Florida have undertaken investigations into supposed Democratic voter fraud, although they’ve turned up only a small handful of ineligible voters who cast ballots.¶ In a more aboveboard realm, Democrats and Republicans have engaged in decades-long battles over voting rights. Democratic legislatures expanded early voting hours and access to absentee ballots, while Republicans have fought to ensure military voters get their ballots in enough time to vote. Over the last two years, Republicans have renewed a push to require voters to show identification when they get their ballots, while legislatures in states like Ohio and Florida have sought to curtail some early-voting hours.¶ Simple errors at local elections offices, whether poorly designed ballots in Palm Beach County in 2000 or mislabeled elections materials like those in Maricopa County today, can give both parties a chance to claim voting irregularities. Long lines at early voting locations in Iowa and elsewhere have already caused some grumbling, but it’s just a preview of the strain that will be put on election workers when they deal with the tens of millions of voters who turn up on Nov. 6.¶ Software bugs never fail to spur calls of election-fixing. On Wednesday, reports that a voting machine in Greensboro, N.C. was registering Romney votes as Obama votes landed on the Drudge Report website.¶ Both sides are ready for human errors, too. “Our belief is that local registrars, local supervisors of elections, the last thing they want is a catastrophe on Election Day with cameras outside their offices. So they have an interest in making the elections run smoothly,” the DNC's Crossley said. “That way more people get to vote.”

## 1NR

**Romney Labels**

**Romney definitely labels a manipulator and it escalates- platform,**

**Shobert 2-22**

[Benjamin, Managing Director of Rubicon Strategy Group, a consulting firm specialized in strategy analysis for companies looking to enter emerging economies, “Romney lays ground for China trade war”, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China\_Business/NB22Cb01.html]

Part of what **Romney** wrote aligns with his early September 2011 economic plan, where he **announced** that **his administration would** formally **label China a "currency manipulator**". On this point, his Wall Street Journal op-ed doubled down; there, he wrote, " ... on day one of my presidency I will designate it a currency manipulator and take appropriate counteraction." As a head nod to the influential parts of the GOP who represent the interests of big-business, **he** subsequently **added,** "A trade war with China is the last thing I want, but **I cannot tolerate our current trade surrender." For someone who claims not to want a trade war with China, Romney is making a pretty compelling case for how his administration would make one all but certain. It is a temptation to read Romney's op-ed a**s the sort of **positioning during** the primaries that Americans have come to expect during their **elections**. Even in the US-China policy-community, many draw comfort from past election cycles where blustery comments from potential presidential candidates were dramatically toned down - if they did not go away altogether - once their transition into elected office took place. The present administration went through a similar smoothing out of the rough edges about its stance towards China once it emerged victoriously from both the primary and the general election. Admittedly, this is the safest way to interpret Romney's most recent volley towards the Chinese: as the primary shifts back to his "home state", **China presents an issue that certainly has bi-partisan traction in a manufacturing-sensitive** midwestern **economy** like Michigan, where China's economy is perceived to have benefited at the expense of middle-class American blue-collar workers. It is a note the Romney campaign believes can be safely struck not only in the midst of a heated GOP primary, but in the general election as well. Tradition says nothing should be made of Romney's saber rattling towards China, but is tradition wrong? **Choosing to interpret Romney's attitude towards China as something not to be alarmed about overlooks a major difference** between past election cycles and today's: **now the American psyche is deeply frustrated over the difficulties the country's economy must face.** **In the past, the relative confidence** felt **about America's economic future allowed many to overlook the potential threat China might present. Today, that confidence is gone. The** average **American worker remains traumatized** and deeply insecure **since** the **2008 financial crisis**. Many also feel brutalized over the ugly state of American politics, precisely when the latter should be shedding light on how best to deal with the former. An economic crisis has quickly devolved into a political one, leaving many in middle America eager for someone to blame. **Tied to these economic insecurities are deep misgivings about America's place in the world**, **which go back to** the US response to **9/11 and** the subsequent invasions of **Afghanistan and Iraq.** Americans are torn between the GOP world view that argues for America to remain a hegemonic force for good around the world, versus a libertarian-progressive framework that believes that America can be powerful and influential, but must do so within a the realities of both a multi-polar world and the economic limitations imposed on Washington based on years of fiscal imprudence. **When Romney** disparagingly **writes of** President Barack **Obama that he "came** into office **as a** near **supplicant to Beijing", he touches on this insecurity** and appeals to the American desire to appear muscular and able to "go it alone" where others counsel caution and compromise. The popular temper American politicians tap into over China is not necessarily new, although a good argument could be made that **negative portrayals of China** during American elections **has been growing more common** in this, and recent election cycles. **Conventional thinking has it that the real decision-makers** about American policy towards China **are those who never run for elected office, the safe wise men** who, behind closed doors, know how to calm everyone down and focus on how best to maintain the status-quo. **That is precisely why Romney's ongoing diatribe against China is so distressing: he is supposed to be one of those calm, level-headed people** that could be trusted not to demagogue China in order to score cheap political points. For US-China policy-makers, **Romney's elevation of China as an issue for the general election should not be overlooked, downplayed, or rationalized. To have the supposedly most business-savvy candidate** for president the country has seen in years run within the most pro-business, historically free trade American political party with a major plank of his economic plan being to **call out China as a currency manipulator is noteworthy.**

**Romney’s serious- Republicans support and more popular lies to tell**

**Fletcher 9-4**

Ian is a Senior Economist of the Coalition for a Prosperous America, “What’s Romney Really up To?” <http://www.wnd.com/2012/09/whats-romney-really-up-to/>

On the currency manipulation side, retaliating against Chinese currency manipulation while not specifying what other supporting policies will or will not be applied, is also a fairly mild gesture. It could mean a whole lot, or not that much.¶ If, for example, America forces China to stop manipulating the dollar-yuan exchange rate, but does nothing about the backdoor protectionism and industry subsidies of China and other nations that run surpluses with the U.S, the effect on our deficit will be muted. Or if America responds to Chinese currency manipulation with countervailing duties, but these duties are too low to make a difference, again we will have pulled our punch.¶ Above all, currency manipulation is only one tool among many that mercantilist nations can use to manipulate their trade. We need to stop it, but doing so is not a panacea.¶ Furthermore, **Romney has counterbalanced his promise of a crackdown on China with a promise to negotiate more free-trade agreements**. So, as in the case of immigration, he’s playing nationalist softball, not hardball.¶ This mushiness and uncertainty in the Republican positions is maddening from the point of view of the voter. It’s a tease. The party is saying that it might give the voters two fairly big things the voters actually want, according to polls, but just how much is up for grabs.¶ Looked at one way, **the Republican party is actually playing a fairly rational game. It’s offering voters just enough to entice them away from the other side, but no more**. There are good reasons the party doesn’t want to go hard core on either immigration or trade, most of them being Republican vested interests that benefit from one or the other.¶ Before the readers asks – **I believe the Republican pledges on both immigration and trade are probably sincere.** For one thing, **if the party were simply spinning lies to win votes, they could certainly gin up much more popular lies on these issues**. Both positions have been hedged with the kind of equivocation that says “let’s not go too far on this, as we might actually have to live up to it if elected.”¶ **I suspect the Republicans’ tactical embrace of these policies stems from the fact that significant sections of the Republican establishment are actually getting comfortable with them on the policy merits. It’s a lot easier for a political party to embrace something for political reasons when it feels it can accept the actual policy results.**

**Romney Kills Relations**

**Romney will destroy US-Russian relations – hardline & won’t compromise**

**Larison 6-27**

Columnist for the American Conservative [Daniel Larison “U.S.-Russian Relations Would Get Much Worse Under Romney” <http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/u-s-russian-relations-would-get-much-worse-under-romney/>]

**Putin doesn’t** actually **want a “hard-line conservative in the White House.” Putin distrusts the U.S.** **because he believes** that the **Bush** administration **behaved in an ungrateful and untrustworthy fashion** in the previous decade, **and U.S.-Russian relations improved** as much as they did **because the current administration seemed to be more reliable**. U.S.-Russian **relations reached their lowest poin**t in the last twenty years in no small part **because of a “more active U.S. policy**” toward the Middle East, the South Caucasus, and central Europe. Putin might be willing to deal with a more hard-line American President, but only so long as it this translated into tangible gains for Russia. Provided that the hard-liner was willing to live up to his end of the bargain, there could be some room for agreement, but there isn’t any. Since **Romney’s Russia policy is essentially to never make any deals with the current Russian government, Putin doesn’t have much of an incentive to cooperate. That will guarantee that U.S.-Russian relations will deteriorate much more than they have in the last year.**

**Nuclear war**

**ALLISON 11**

Director @ Belfer Center for Science and Int’l Affairs @ Harvard’s Kennedy School, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Robert D. Blackwill, Senior Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations [Graham Allison, “10 Reasons Why Russia Still Matters”, Politico -- October 31 -- <http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=161EF282-72F9-4D48-8B9C-C5B3396CA0E6>]

That central point is that Russia matters a great deal to a U.S. government seeking to defend and advance its national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s decision to return next year as president makes it all the more critical for Washington to manage its relationship with Russia through coherent, realistic policies. No one denies that Russia is a dangerous, difficult, often disappointing state to do business with. We should not overlook its many human rights and legal failures. Nonetheless, Russia is a player whose choices affect our vital interests in nuclear security and energy. It is key to supplying 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Ten realities require U.S. policymakers to advance our nation’s interests by engaging and working with Moscow. First, Russia remains the only nation that can erase the **U**nited **S**tates from the map in 30 minutes. As every president since John F. Kennedy has recognized**, Russia’s cooperation is critical to averting nuclear war**. Second, Russia is our most consequential partner in preventing nuclear terrorism. Through a combination of more than $11 billion in U.S. aid, provided through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and impressive Russian professionalism, two decades after the collapse of the “evil empire,” not one nuclear weapon has been found loose. Third, Russia plays an essential role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile-delivery systems. As Washington seeks to stop Iran’s drive toward nuclear weapons, Russian choices to sell or withhold sensitive technologies are the difference between failure and the possibility of success. Fourth, Russian support in sharing intelligence and cooperating in operations remains essential to the U.S. war to destroy Al Qaeda and combat other transnational terrorist groups. Fifth, Russia provides a vital supply line to 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan. As U.S. relations with Pakistan have deteriorated, the Russian lifeline has grown ever more important and now accounts for half all daily deliveries. Sixth, Russia is the world’s largest oil producer and second largest gas producer. Over the past decade, Russia has added more oil and gas exports to world energy markets than any other nation. Most major energy transport routes from Eurasia start in Russia or cross its nine time zones. As citizens of a country that imports two of every three of the 20 million barrels of oil that fuel U.S. cars daily, Americans feel Russia’s impact at our gas pumps. Seventh, Moscow is an important player in today’s international system. It is no accident that Russia is one of the five veto-wielding, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, as well as a member of the G-8 and

#### KEY TO POLICYMAKING RELEVENCE – POLICYMAKERS AND POLITICS OPERATE COMPARATIVELY MORE THROUGH NARRATIVE-EVALUATION RATHER THAN LOGICAL ARGUMENT OR DATA EVALUATION.

Dryzek 2006

**John S. Dryzek, Policy analysis as critique,** John Dryzek is Professor of Political Science and Australian Research Council Federation Fellow, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. He is a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia, former Head of the Departments of Political Science at the Universities of Oregon and Melbourne and the Social and Political Theory program at ANU, and former editor of the Australian Journal of Political Science, Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, pg 194-5

Narrative analysis (Roe 1994) focuses mainly on stories that are told by participants in policy processes. The language of policy, in common with the language of many social settings, features the telling of stories much more than it features argument, deductive logic, or still less quantitative optimization. The effect of a good story is to convince its audience that an issue ought to be framed in a particular way. The facts never ‘‘speak for themselves.’’ For example, a story about rape and murder amid ethnic conflict could be told by a nationalist demagogue in terms of violated ethnic innocence and collective ethnic guilt of its perpetrators. The same facts could also support a story of violation of basic human rights and universal principles of humanity. The action consequences of each story would be vastly different.